CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01060A000100230001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 28, 1951
• Content Type: CIAPER

T
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VOL. I No. 16
28 November 1951
/1~~~~~9S~1060A~p0100230001-9
CLT~RENT' IN1'ELLIf~'rENCE F3E:VIEW
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NO CHANGE iN CLASS.
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CLASS. CfiR.tiu~:~U TQ: T'=+ ~~
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[JATC:.~~~~~ fsLVicljJEfi:
Office of Current Intelpi:gence
CENTRAL INTET,LIGENCE 1~GEN~Y'
State Dept review(s) completed.
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THE..SOVIET WORLD. . . . . . . . ~ Page :3
THE PROBLEM OF WEST NEW GUINEA . . . . ? . . . Page 5
.The intransigent attitudes of Indonesia anal the Netherlands
toward a final disposition of West New Guinea are seriously
threatening relations between the two countries. Both governments
claim the area9 ands although both realize that New ,Guinea is exi
economic liability, the issue has assumed such political propor-
tions that neither country feels able. to compromise.. -(SEE MAP}
FRANCE REASSESSES ITS STAKE IN INDOCHINA . . ? Fage 7
The increa~aing demands Qf the European Defense Program day
eventually force the French Government to retrench in Indochina
or even to withdraw completely frcim the area. Parliamentary op-
position to the Indochina burden is spreading as the conviction
grows that the longterm outlook for French interests. in the area-
is hopeless. Nevertheless, continued CTS aid and French concern
over the effect any lass of prestige would have on their position
in North Africa will militate against any drastic policy 'change in
the immediate future.
REGENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE TRIESTE ISSUE . . . . . . . Fage-9
The question on the disposition of the Free Terx?itory of
Trieste remains a cause of sharp #ric.tions mot only between
Italy `and Yugoslavia, but also'~etween the Western powers and the
USSR.. The Western powers have in x~ecen~~ u~onths ux?ged that both
Italy anal Yugoslevia seek a compromise through direct negotiations.
Each principal, however, has ix~dicatee3. some doubt that,the other
is seriously interested in a solution, (SEE MAP}
OUTLOOK FOR ISRAEL'S ECONOMY IS GLOOMY . . . . . . . . . . .Page ].2
Israel's serious economic problems have become more acute
in recent weeks. Notwithstanding governmental efforts to contro].
the situation, a serious food crisis has developed along with a
shortage of many essential goods-and a grawixig black market.
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SP~~Eq~CI~A+L~~r17ARTICLEr WT~O~RtpLDI}1C0NfNl~.fN,{TTSTMI:~~ry~CH~INESE C0NIMt7NIST AID TO
~Utry1;1[~1.1~71 .~WIJ14Y "LJ.k7.C+LtiA1I~Nt' 11~ V~LiG1Y 1-J o s o o r e a a e e'? e e
International Communist strategy for the conquest of Asia
calls for the capture of revolutionary movements by Stalinist
Cammun~.st pax?tiese These "liberation" movements are to be as-
sisted by neighboring Communist states. In East Asia,~the prin-
cipal supporting tale 3:s played by Communist Chinese The most
immediate threat is to Indochina and.Burma, then to Thailand
and Malayay and finally to Indonesia and the PYiilippir,.esr
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The USSR rounded out its diplomatic attacks against the continuing
Western efforts to develop a system of defensive alliances by protesting
plans for the organization of a Middle East Command on the Soviet Unions
southern approaches, The Kremlin warned certain Arab nations and Israel
that participation in the Command, which would be linked to the:-North
Atlantic bloc, would "inflict serioue harm drt relations existing between
the USER and these countries and also ~~; the cause of upholding peace
and security in the Near and Middle East.~t
The USSR also sent notes to the four sponsors of the Command, the
United States, Great Britain, France and Turkey, A report that the top
Soviet diplomats to the Arab countries would hold a meeting within the
next few weeks is possibly an indication that the USSR is planning
further moves to exploit existing tensions in the Diddle East and b -+?-
discourage membership in the Command.
r
Possibly as a result of the small success which the Kremlin achieved:
with its protests over the last few months regarding Norwegian implementa-
tion of NATO, a Soviet diplomat reportedly suggested to the "Swedish
Foreign Office that the USSR might favor a Scandinavians "t~nder,~tandii?ig,"
including F'inlandd Similar unconfirmed reports of the USSR~s agreeable
attitude on a Scandinavian alliance have emanated from Denmark and Finland.
While it is unlikely that Moscow desires an independent alliance in such
a strategic area, this maneuver might well be designed to create con-
fusion and dissension among the Scandinavian countries.
As further support for the Soviet claim regarding aggressive in-
ten?Ions of the United States, the USSR in a note to the US pointed to
that section of the Mutual Assistance Act which provided funds for utiliz-
ing Soviet and Satellite refugees in "sub-units of armed supporting
organizations of NATO or for other purposes,< In this instance, unable
to cite a non-aggression pact as in the case of various protests to
Britain and Fronee, the USSR referred to the Roosevelt-Eitvinov exchange
of 1933 in order to establish that Washington was violating an agreement.
In Eastern Europe, long standing economic difficulties are being
aggravated by increased Soviet demands, Although output in the key
mining, chemical, heavy engineering, vehicle and power industries has in-
creased over last year, current production goals are not being fulfilled
in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Increased emphasis on heavy industry has intensified industrial
weaknesses and caused a drop in consumer goods production, This has led
to a marked decline in worker morale, Absenteeism, worker migration,
corrupt wage and norm practices, declining interest in Stakhanovism,
falsification of work book figures, waste of materials and inefficient
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use of machines also tend to reduce produc-ion.
Other factors which .have prevented fulfi~.ltnent of current plans are
stricter enforcement by the Wset of export controls,-deterioration of
obsolescent machinery, a shortage of availably industrial manpower,
especially skilled laborers and technicians, and the inferiority of raw
materials and equipmento
Although an increase in food supplies would probably contribute most
to raise production. by improving worker moray, government spokesmen,
who .have admitted this basic difficulty,, are unable to do more than offer
promises of future improvement. The Satellite gavernznents have intro-
doted certain administrative changes, such as the recent decentralization
of economic ministries in Czechos~.ovakia, to a.mprove efficiency of opera-
tion. Efforts to procure through clandestine channels raw materials
embargoed by the West also have met with some success.
Despite these endeavors, however, there ~.s no evidence that the
ambitious industrialization goals of the Sated-lites will be reached in
the foreseeable future yr that Soviet requirements for industrial and
military goods will be fully satisfied.
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THE PROBLEM OF 'VEST NEW t~TINEA
The intransigence of Indonesia and the Netherlands in ,the dispute
over Test New Guinea is seriously threatening relations between the two.
c auntries, Negotiations are at an impasse as a result of the Dutch re-
fuse]. to consider the Indonesian proposal for an early transfer of the
areaq now under interim Dutch administrations to Indonesia, Although
both governments realize that New Guinea is an economic liability,, the
question has assumed such political proportions that neither country
feels able. to c c~npromise.
Indonesia has consistently indicated that;:.. although it u~muld not
resort to force neither would it abandon its c aim9 which is based large-
ly on the fact that West Nevin Guinea was formerly administered as part of
the Netherlands East Indies, f~ the other hands the Netherlands is pro-
ceeding to bu~.Id up New Guinea with the expressed purpose of eventually
granting it autonomy,
The Dutch gc5vernment recently sharpened the issue with a proposed
redefinition of the Netherlands Kingdom which specified West New C~,z.inea
as an integral part of it, Indonesia reacted by proposing an earlty~dis-
cusaion of the de ,jute transfer of sovereignty over West New Guinea9 with
a guarantee that Netherlands interests would. be protected for 25 years:
The Netherlands implied that such a discussion would be fruitless,
The Dutch Cabinet fell-last January as a result of domestic cc~troversy
over policy on New Guinea and its successor has consistently suggested a
postponement of action on Dutch-Indonesian problems until after the June
192 parliamentary elections.
There is danger in Indonesia that leftist political pressure will force
the government to tape definitive actiann C ommunists and leftists are agi-
tating for retaliatory unilateral abrogation of the NetherlandsWIndonesian
[Jni.on and of the rather agreements signed in 191+9, The Indonesian tabinet9
although it has indicated-that it may be forced into such actinn8 probably
prefers a less drastic procedure. An abrupt abrogation of the agreements
would be disruptive to Netherlands investments in IndonesianQ and would add
to economic dislocation and unrest in Java and Sumatra,
Australia which controls East New t~.iinea strongly supports the Dutch
on the grounds that TNest New Guinea is strategically important to Pacific
defense and must t herefore be administered by a ~Pestern nation Australia
has threatened to seize the area should the Dutch deeide t o relinquish
control to Indonesian
Bvth the Netherlands. and Indonesia have sought American support for
their respective positions, The T7S Embassy in The Hague believes th at
United-States support of Indonesia would have most unf ortunate-repercussions
on the Netherlands rearmament program anal would alsi~ revive Dutch resentment
at the role played by the United States 3n Ir}donesia9s achievement of inde-
pendence. tan. the other hand, American suppo of the Dutch would force
Indonesia more firmly into a "neu.tralist~~ position as regards East?West
relations,
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V~ithin recent months the French Assembly has become increas~.ngl.~
critical of the government's policy in Indochina, R.esponsible~
lraders are now acutely aware that France cannot finance an adequate
defense in Europa and still continue the present scale of opers,tions
in Southeast ~,sia, The general public has long been indifferent to
this issue, and only the leftist parties in Parliament have hefetofax?e
criticized the current policym Naw, however, the precarious f~.nanci,~;l
position is developing rightist opposition, and there is a growing
demand for complete withdrawal from Indochina, The, Government,
concerned for the effect on `North r~frica of such a withdrawal end
hopeful for mgrs US aid to France, will nevertheless attempt tc pursue
its current Ir;dachina policy without drastic change,
The economic situation in Indochina is far from favorable,
Praducti?n is-still considerably below prewar figures, the country i
handicapped by a heavy foreign trade deficit, and the government is
increasingly resorting to deficit financing, French civil and-
military costs in Indochina are constantly expanding; this yea~+-they
are approaching a billion dollars and a substantial increase i~ 152
seems unavoidable.
Military ne?~ds in Europe are forcing the French to weigh the
.full burden of the war in Indochina, French military strength is
being seriously sapped in ~iPtnam, not only because of the drain in
men and materiel, but also because adequate cadres cannot be spared tea
train the conscripts necessary to defend France,
Premier Pleven recently fold-the National ~sacmbly that France
cannot give up the Indochina effort, Nevertheless, he stressed iri
private that Indochina is the basic cause of French financial
difficulties, Pleven has also conceded privately that the demand to
pull out of Indochina is obtaining more and more parliamentar,T`
adherents,
The Communists have long opposed the Indochina atruggleo Although
the Socialist Party adopted a pre-election resolution in. support of
the Indochina war, many French Socialists still favor a withdrawalo
The rer~ent Radical-Socialist Congress applauded a strong plea .for
France e withdrawalo This party speaks for the rural middle class ar~d
for small business, which have traditionally been nationalistic, The,
Radical-Socialists' ideology favors self determination of subject
peoples, however, arrd a realistic assessment of the French economic
situation may encourage them to favor withdrawals
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Even General de Lattre now seems less sure of France's ppsitior~
in Indochina. He exemplifies the French military tradition identified
most closely with maints.ining F'renoh prestige,at all costs. Shnu~.d.
he carry out previous threats to resign, the effect on French ppin~:or}
might well be decisive.
There is a widespread fear that the French Union would crumble
if France gave up Indochina now, particularly when the French.~ositie~n
in North Africa is under fire,- French leaders argu? that them
country. is fending off Communism in a vital area, and many of them
are still imbued~vaith the idea of a "mission" toward what they
consider a backward area and culture. These reasons bolster the
governmesnt's intention to continue the struggle. The present prospect
of additional US aid .for Eurap~an defense, however, makes US a~ssist~~ce
the decisive factor,
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RECENT DEVELf3~FNTS REGARDING THE TRIESTE ISSUE
~'he question of the disposition of the Free Territory of Trieste remains
a cause of sharp frictions not only between Ttaly and Yugoslavian but also
between the Western po~~rers and the T3SSRs The Western proposal for revision
of the 197 Italian peace treat~9 of which an important part is devoted to
Triestes is opposed by bath Yugoslavia and the Soviet Unions the former will
not consider revision until the Trieste question is settleds and the latter
wishes to keep the question alive as a source of international dispute?
During the past two years the USSR has called for implementation of the
Italian peace treaty clauses providing for the establishment of the entire
Tree Territory as an international area under the administration of a governors
In a series of notes, the latest dated 17 Novembers it has accused the tdestern
pe~uters of violating the peace treaty by failing to appoint a governors by
suppressing human rights in Triestes and by building military bases in the area,
The Western powers who in March 191~~ issued a declaration advocating the return
of the entire territory to Italys have often reiterated this stand at Italian
insistences but have meanwhile urged that Italy and Yugoslavia seek a compromise
through direct negotiations
Ixs recent months both countries have indicated willingness to negotiates
but cache fearful that it might ~creaken its bargaining positions has left the
initiative to the other? The Italian Governments under strong pressure frem.
nationalist groups to be firm in demanding the return of the entire territorys
insists that any negotiations must take the March 194$ declaration as a starting
point? It bass howevers admitted privately that it is ready to ma1~e minor eons-
cessi?ns-based on ethnic considerations The Yugeslavs9 strongly mpposed to the
Westfs declarations have indicated they intend to retain the mayor part of Zone
B Qf the territoryq which their military government has been adrninisterings and
will insist upon certain concessions involving the Slovene hinterland in Zone A~
Western: aid to Tito and the increasing importance of Yugoslavia to the
Western defense system had aroused Italian fears that the Western powers might
factor Yugoslav claims to the entire territox?y dyer those of the Italiansp a
Pz'emier de Gasperis during his visit to Washingtons again reminded the United
States of the Big Threes pledgeQ He wanted Washington to take a more active
role in seeking a solution in accord with Italian aspirations,,.
At about the same tjsne Italys under Western proddings called on Yugoslavia
to negotiate a71 issues outstanding between the two countries, Tits, had previously
declared there was na issue between the two that could not be solved by negotia--
tions To facilitate an Itale~Yugoslav rap~xrochment by keeping. the situatit~:
in Trieste quiets the Allied Military Gav~rnment of the Free Territory announced
in October that the local elections scheduled for this fa11 in Zone A would be
postponed,
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As a result of pressure exerted on the Italian and Yugoslav Governments
during S~ptembex? and pctober?~ both have expressed a willingness to initiate
talks tin Trieste with each otherts delegates and with the Glestern Fc,reign
Ministers during the current tTN General Assembly meeting in Faris. Bach
ca~tantry has indicated same doubt, however that the other is seriaEa..s1y in-
terested in a sc~lvtione
~Tnder the terms cif the settlement reportedly envisaged by th? Yugoslavi9
the Free Territory of Trieste would be divided approximately along the present
boundary betwesM Zane A and Zone Bo Italy wotild receive Zone Ae including
Triestey but would give Yugoslavia trad~.ng privileges in the.city itself in
return for Yugoslav concessions in Zane B. lr,~.at these lattex concessions
would be is not known; Italy has hitherto insisted upon the return of cer-
tain predominantly-Italian coastal cities in that ~one~
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4UTIA~FC FQR TS'RAEI,' ~ EC(3N(~MY IS GIA(JBd~C
Israel's economic problems, which have always been serious, have become
more acute in recent weeks, dominating all other issues. In spite of stren-
uous government efforts to control the situation, a dangerous food crisis
has developed, along with a shortage of many essential goods and a growing
black market. 'While timely United Mates financial assistance, aided by
the usual large contributions from private American sources, may alleviate
the current difficulties, Israel's economic outlook will be dark for a long
time to comae
Israel's economic plight is essentially a long-term, rather than a
short-term problem.. No bigger than Massachusetts and possessing very limited
resouses, Israel is unable to support its population of same one ~,nd a half
million people, almost double the number of inhabitants of just three years
ago, Immigration is a political issue and therefore difficult to restrict..
v
Inadequate housing, a limited food supply, and ,insufficient industrial
resources are. closely allied to the population problem and explain why
Israel has an unbalanced economy, where exports-total only about 20 percent
of the country's importso Defense requirements, rising from-the Iack of
final peace agreements between Isra?1 and its Arab neighbors, present an
added drain on th? country's economy,
The moderate socialist government of Prime ~Ilinister Ben-Gurian has
maintained rigid economic controls since the nation was established in
19~.Sa A strict austerity program has been imposed; food supplies, clothing
and other essential goods are rationed. The government has sought to in-
crease its f oreign exchange by encouraging contributions to the state and
investments in the country by foreign governments and individuals, partic-
ularly l~mericane Trade pacts with a large number of countries, including
several Soviet Satellite nations, have been concluded. Remarkab;Ie progress
has been achieved within Israel in increasing arable land by irrigation, in
reorganization of the important citrus industry, in expansion of the manu-
facture of pharmaceuticals, and in the development of the diamond industry.
The strict government controls have resulted in a steady, if gradual, in-
crease of exports and a reduction of overbalancing imported
In spite of Israel's noteworthy achievements; serious cracks have ap-
peared in the Israeli economy during the past year. Rising costs ref imported.
raw materials and of new machinery have increased the difficulty of compering
in world marketso Last winter's draught cut down the already limited food
supply and the shortage of steel has slowed irrigation development. Infla-
tion, government inefficiency, and a decrease in goods oval Table to the
expanding population have resulted in a breakdown. of the economic controls
and an expansion of the bleak market.
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1~hi1e the last two government crises, which brought on last s~snrner4 s
?general elections, w?re theoretically cans?d by religious differences,
economic prcblems were-the main issued Though Ben-Gurion':s party maintained
its political control, the conservative General Zionists profited by subm
stantial popular dissatisfacticn with the governmentrs economic policies
and became the second largest party in tM.e Are.?sset (Fa.rliament~,
The General Zionists maintained that the economic difficulties could
be checked by a combination of less Socie.lism and more government effiaioncy.
Th? labor party of Ben-Guxion turned. down the General Monist demands and
formed a coalition with rdnor Israeli parties, but economic issues continue
to threaten the governor?n-~'s stability mare than the foreign policy or re-
ligious issues?
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OMiMUNISMa CHINESE COMMUNIST SID TO SOUTHE~IST ~ASI~N
"LIBERrATION" MOVEMENTS
International Communist strategy fQr the conquest of Asia calls for
the capture and perversion of revolutionary movements by. Stalinist Commuw
nisi parties subservient to the Soviet Union, Cammunistmled "liberation"
moveinents~ relying primarily upon their oven armed forces operating-from'a
territorial base within the ce~untry, are to b? assisted as practicable by
neighboring "liberation" movements which have achieved national power,
The principal supporting role in East Asia devolves upon Communist Chix~a4
In Indcchinaq the Peiping regime has contributed substantially to the
capabilit3.e~ of the Viet Minha the rearganiaation of the Vi?t Minh from a
guex?rilla farce to ari army of seven divisions wasfacilitated by Chinese ad-
visers and inatructax~sd At least 30fl00O and possibly as many as 75gO4O Viet
Minh troops have rec+~ived training and equipment in Chinas ~Phile supplies
from China have been far below the level n?cessary to match the French build-
ups the Chinese Communists area capable of considerably augmenting the weapons
and other material now possessed by the Viet Minhp This capability has re-
gently been enhanced by completion of the rail line f5r?o~n ~~+'ax~ning to the Indo-
-china border,
:All repb~:ts locating Chinese Communist combat units in Indochina remain
unsubstantiated; no CY}inese tz?oops have been identified9 dead or alive9 with
the Viet Minh? :Neither is there reliable evidence of the reported formation
of 5ino-Vi?t ~voluntesrBD united The Chinese Communist capability of launch-
ing a suecseasful invasian9 ho~reverg has long- been recogn3.zeda Throughout
19519 there .have been more than 15Oy00O Chi.~~se.Commuxai~st troapa within a
few hundred miles of the borders
This threat t4 Indochina will probably continue indel?initely~ with a
lack of reliable indications of the timing of Chinese interventiono Never-
thaless$ the French have recently felt themselves sufficiently well inform?d
to estimate-that an invasion is unlikely for at least the next s?~?eral months,
In Burma9 Peipiazg is actively assisting the insurgent Brax?mese Gom~nxuzistsg
encouragingabove?ground pro-Communist organizationsq attempting-to gain core-
trs~l af.Chinese residents of Burma9 and in addition is maintaining at-least
30, 004 troflps alar~g the ChinamHurruta bardez? e
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Tae Burma ~omm~rnist Party is on?nted toward Peiping9 and its forges
hays beers stsadf.l~ mevi~ng nor~t~hward into northmoerntral Burma and toward
the China frontier, presumably to improve th?ir ~sapabilities by r?~?iving
Chinese aid. arnd ga,idance, There is evidenoa~ that som? assistance has al~
ready been provid.edm~in tkne fo$?m of ad,vissa?s arld teoYnnii~iansg training and
possibly supplies~~arad twat the sc~opcs of this aid will in~a??ass,,
In addition9 the Chinese Comm~aanists have mad? forays into Burmese terri-
toryg have infiltrated agents into Burma9 have develop?d a B~aa?me~? rebel
fo3rare rnnw maa?~ing time ire Chinaa~, hav? bean subsidising pro~Cor~murni~t Bua?mese
politiciarne9 and leave Mended Comm~arnist inf~L~.en~e among the ~~CpCQO Chixneee
in Burmao I~aa?thea?9 th?a?e is a continuing possibility that the mode~?atg l~ad-
ership of th? Burmese Csove~?nment will bo d,isplaoes~ by e~ctreme leftists who
would seek ~loeer relations with Commist Clnisaa~ The Communists have the
capability to resort to military forge sho~.ld, this ~cambirnatiorn of oiroa~m-
stan~es fail t? ba?ing Bu~aa anrnder Commua~ist doani.nationo
In Thai~and~ tla? Peiping regime ~oxatrals the 1o~al Commurflist movemerntg
which' is predominar$t~,~r C.hinese9 and is ~~tending its influence over the three
million Thailand residents of Ohinese ?thni~ origin who control a large segm
went of the Thai ec~on?agyo Ther? is nee ?8lilbea?ation?D mov?ment in Thailand.Q how-
evex?g which eotnld acquire a territorial base and ~i`~alify fair Chinese Commum
niet supports seed the absence of a common boa?dea? woeald ga?eatl~r .handicap Chi-
nese efforts to extend ~~nch s~,pport,
chile Chinese Commurnist prr~paganda charges against Thai~Larad in th? past
year could conr~eivably presage a Chiansse in~asion~, there is no evidence that
Peiping plans such ~ asperatiox~ in tla~a near futures Fear the tim? beingp
Peiping appears contsant to co:~so:~idat? its oonta??1 ovea? tla? Ccammunist move-
ment in Thailand arnd the Thailaa~d ~hinese9 with a view to employing both at
some later date in connection with eithea? a co~.p or ann invasionQ
Ian Malayan, as in Thailandp the Coist movement is predo~ainarntly Chien
nesee The- appro~cimately 4aCC? Commu~nistmled guera?il~.as of the sowcalled
Malayan Races ~iberati?n Ar~yp based in th? I~a~.ayan j~znglen constittate a
"liberation?P movement which cl,~.alifies for Chinese Commaar~ist assistanced
There does not appearq h~aweverp to have been stay appreciabl? movement of
Communist personnel and materie~_ into Ma`iayap Peiping?s principal ?ffc~rt in
Malaya to date has been t?waa?d converting: organising th? ~,5 million resi-
dent Chineseg nearly half the total pop~a.~ationo Tyne ac~tiv3.ties of both the
terrorists and the resident Chinese can`t coordinated effectively with Chi?
Hasa Comtnt~xnist military operations at a let?a? stage in Bast Asia?s ~libez"ationa"
Ixa Indonesia9 Peiping is se?king to ?ncoLarag? Indonesian neaatralist
tendencies in world p~slitics~ to organise Chine~? resid?nts of Ind.orn?siaq and
to strengthen irnternatioanal Communism?s o~aatacts with thg relativ
factual Indonesian Communist movemento m
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Peiping is suppprting with both advise and
money n ones ear an nese Communist activity9 processing Communist
agent~i into Indvneaia~, extending its influence over the Chinese co~arnunity,
di:ssem3.nating prapa~anda9 arranging visits to China far influential Indv-
nesiansq and recruiting Indonesian students for study in China. Hawe~rer9
Indanesiaes attitude has became one of increased vigilance9 a~ad the cmuntryas
geographical insularity limits outside support of local dissident groups.
Indonesia is net nrw seriously vulnerable to Chinese Communist pressure, and
will not be unless ~dalaya falls under Communist domination.
In the Philippines9 the native Huk movement9 although its fortunes have
declined during 19519 is still an orthodox ~liberati~n" movement el~,gible
fpr Chinese aid, There is fragmentary evidence that Chinese Communist agents
have been smuggled into the Philippines for service Frith the Huks9 that a
small amount of material aid has been provided by Peiping9 and that Chinese
Communist representatives attached to the Huka at the top le~rel have provided
guidance in ideology anc~ ta?~tics. Geographical factors and the American cam-
mitment to the defense of the philippines9 however9 leave the aepublic rela-
tively securq~ against Chinese Communist pressure,
25X1
25X1
Approved For elease 2004/12/13: CIA-RDP79S01060A0001002 0001-9