REFLECTIONS ON THE 'PSYCHOLOGICAL PEARL HARBOR'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01057A000200070018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

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REFLECTIONS ON THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL PEARL HARBOR"
At a moment when the eyes of the world are focused on a
point of the fourth magnitude in the firmament, it would seem
advisable to survey more searchingly the earthly horizon. Such a
scrutiny would almost certainly indicate that the dynamics of the
Soviet power potential as the base of world Communism have
generally been underestimated. A number of reflections are sug-
gested by this sobering conclusion which are here presented under
two rubrics: (A) the world outlook of the Kremlin, and (B) sug-
gested world outlook of the United States.
A. The world outlook of the Kremlin.
1. Virtually dictatorial power is now firmly in the hands of
Nikita Khrushchev. That Khrushchev has successfully concluded a
drive to power comparable to that of Stalin prior to 1930 now a ears
to be an established fact.
Khrushchev has no visible persona challenger an the principa
elements of the Soviet state and society - the Party, technological,
military and intellectual elites - appear to be either firmly behind
him or unable to constitute an effective threat to his power. It may
be added that the secret police which was a principal element of
Stalin's dictatorship remains fully in readiness and would be subject
to exploitation by Khrushchev should circumstances require.
2. The basic instrument of Khrushchev's dictatorship is the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, specifically its hierarchy of
functionaries generally known as the apparat. Khrushchev has taken
a number of powerful steps hen the apparat and its hold on
every aspect of Soviet life.
3. Although firmly in the saddle, Khrushchev faces many
difficult problems. Considerable attention has been devoted in the
press and in intelligence research to such factors as economic diffi-
culties, unrest among students and intellectuals, desire of the Soviet
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people for more consumer goods and greater contact with the
outside world, and others. We know from past statements and
actions of Khrushchev that he is aware of these problems.
4. What we have seen of Khrushchev, especially in recent
months, suggests that he will make every effort to remove or bring
under control the elements of discontent in the Soviet Union. It is
apparent that Khrushchev is a combination of a brilliant politician,
a natural demagogue, a resourceful and tough negotiator, a prag-
matist and a convinced Communist. His grasp and understanding
of internal and external political forces are increasingly revealed
as of a higher order than those exhibited in London and India. He
is particularly strong in sensing the vulnerability of an adversary
and attacking it by a variety of means, including intimidation, blan-
dishment, provocation and envelopment.
5. In the military field we must assume that the USSR has
established a permanent basis of nuclear deterrence. This proposi-
tion scarcely needs discussion and it may be assumed to underly all
Soviet strategic thinking. This doctrine presumably posits not only
that the Soviet Union now has the capability to destroy any area of
resistance, including the continental United States, but also that the
United States possesses the same capability vis-a-vis the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. In other words, no "breakthrough" of military technology can
be envisaged which would prevent either side from being able to wipe
out the entire base of the other, even in the event of an overwhelming
surprise attack.
6. Under these circumstances, "peaceful coexistence" is the
only thinkable status for the contending power blocs. Thus what was
once a slogan and a "cold-war device" has become, at least for the
predictable future, an iron reality. This does not exclude the possi-
bility of limited conventional warfare in the future. Moreover, it is
probable that the emergence of other major power groupings, such as
a United Western Europe, will alter the present polarization of world
power with unforeseeable consequences.
7. The Soviet Union, under "peaceful coexistence, " will wage
an implacable struggle to achieve world hegemony. There is no reason
to believe that any diminution of ideological fervor will weaken this
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unprecedented imperialistic drive. In the eyes of Khrushchev,
victory may well be something which can be assured, if not
actually achieved, in his own lifetime, and in the event that he
dies or is removed, he may well believe that the regime which
he now controls will be able to continue the battle with undimin-
ished vigor. This is indeed a debatable point for, in the event
of his removal from power a struggle for succession would probably
ensue which could paralyze the Soviet system and bring about a
"time of trouble" for the Soviet Union in which its drive toward the
Communist millennium would be halted. Nevertheless, it would
not be prudent to base our own strategic calculations upon such an
eventuality.
8. Having established nuclear stalemate and "peaceful
coexistence", the primary strategy of the Kremlin for world co n-
guest will necessarily be political and economic. The double-track
Soviet approach through diplomacy and Communist Party subversion
is now well established and is recognized as such by the Free World.
The battle is thus joined on a shifting front in which basic engagements
will henceforth be tactical and will be characterized by maximum
flexibility on the part of Khrushchev. There is ample evidence that
he now has at his disposition adequate material resources to heighten
the intensity of the engagement and a powerful, highly disciplined
personnel to execute it.
9. The domestic base from which Khrushchev will conduct
his campaign is inherently strong. On the political side, the supremacy
of the Party is sufficiently well established to cope with any potential
or actual dissidence or threats to the regime. On the economic side,
there appears to be in process a major shift of gear which is accom-
panied by a certain loss of momentum but which has the promise of
accelerated speed in the future. It is unnecessary here to elaborate
the steps which are being taken to increase labor productivity, worker
discipline and morale, and to achieve a smoother and more efficient
adjustment of production and distribution. We believe that Khrushchev's
agricultural program, though undoubtedly a gamble, holds the possi-
bility of quickly realizing a substantial part of the claims he has made
for it. In the industrial field the USSR may not be able to maintain the
rate of expansion which his plans call for, but it may register within
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five years sufficient progress toward its goal of catching up with
the West, specifically the United States economy, to satisfy the
aspirations of the Russian people and to convince key under-
developed and neutralist countries that the Communist model is
the one to follow. At this point, a chain reaction of "capitalist"
decline and "socialist" advance might well ensue.
10. Takin into consideration the above propositions, it
would appear that the threat presented by Soviet-dominated world
Communism has increased rather than diminished.
B. Suggested world outlook of the United States.
1. The U. S. Government and the American people should
accept and fully understand the implications of the era of permanent
nuclear stalemate. It would appear that to a large extent the reali-
zation of this situation exists not only in the United States but through-
out the politically conscious world.
2. U S policy and opinion must face the challenge presented
by Khrushchev with dignity and courage. Khrushchev has offered to
accept world control of satellites and guided missiles. While it is
obvious that current Soviet exploitation of their ICBM and satellite
triumphs is conducted primarily on the propaganda level, the hard
reality of inevitable decision lies before us. It is clear that Khrush-
chev will not present us with an easy field of negotiation, since he -
at least in his own view - is bargaining from that "position of strength"
which he has bitterly accused us of defending. The eyes of the world
will watch us with increasing concern and critical detachment. We
have neither forfeited nor fully shown our capacity for the position
of leadership which the Free World would be disposed to accord us.
3. Since further military pro ress - even if it produced major
"breakthrou hs" - can no longer eliminate the prospect of total mutual
destruction, it would appear that we should concentrate on disarma-
ment negotiations and on the requirements which peaceful coexistence
imposes upon S. It is suggested that we might cease to resist the
use of that term, and take a leaf from the Communist book, turning
the adversary's own slogans and catchwords to our ends. For the
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present, we must, of course, maintain our defense effort,
including conventional armament, at the present or higher levels
and be prepared to face the necessary economic consequences.
But our prime interest lies in the cultivation of peace, in which
we probably still have the advantage over our adversary.
4. Victory for the Free World can be achieved only in
terms of our contribution to its welfare. This is not to suggest
that our ideals of freedom and justice are not powerful weapons,
but they are standards and banners rather than instruments of
actual conflict. What is required of us is not morality of which
we have no monopoly, but practical deeds. Specifically, we must
be prepared to act on the scale of generosity and enlightened self-
interest implied in the Millikan-Rostow proposal for an interna-
tional development fund or, in the vision of an again Fertile
Crescent. We must increase our commitment to international
programs. The test of our disposition in this field is most sharply
presented by India's request for a loan. Renewal of the Aswan Dam
project might follow.
5. It is apparent that this program can only be achieved
by a sharp change in the attitude of the American people. We must
be prepared to accept the notion of sacrifice and at least limited
austerity, and to defer the unrestrained pursuit of material goods
and services which has dominated our national life during the past
decade. The American people would probably accept such a regimen
of self-denial, but they certainly would not do so without enlightened
leadership.
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Chief, SRS DDI
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