[STATEMENT OF FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ, USN BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000100050010-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 26, 1947
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMIT7, US V
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Mr- Chairman and Gentlemen:
The bill which you now have under consideration represents the efforts
of the services to resolve their differences in' pursuit of the common goal or
increased national security. I believe it will work. It cannot be considered
perfect from the Navy point of view, but representatives of other services can,
no doubt, make the same statement on behalf of their organizations. It 1s a
compromise, a workable over-all compromise, drawn up in a spirit of coop- -
ation and understanding to provide this nation with a defense or ganizatic n
adaptable to warfare of today.
The Wartime Theater Commanders understood and practised unity of
command by methods which varied with local needs and concepts in the theaters
of operations.
Operational control of combatant units under the principle of un__.ty
is relatively simple. That was amply demonstrated in the Pacific where
integrated planning was conducted thru the medium of a Joint Staff such its I
ha-: at Pearl Harbor. Operational Planning was largely a Theater affair, but
the Logistical Planning had roots in the lashington military and civilian
structure. Consequently, the whole national logistical system; including;
procurement, became of vital. interest to the Theater Commander. For exaziple:
the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct in general terms an operation; the Theater
Commander estimates his requirements in forces, men, material, and shipping
to do the job; he takes inventory of his resources and requisitions the things
he lacks. Each service component under his command submits its needs to Its
oYrn cognizant Washington Department -- and this' is a vital point - because
highly technical material, can be designed only by technicians experienced in
the needs of the naval or military service concerned. Furthermore, from design
to delivery, careful follow-through has been necessary in the interest of
both efficiency and speed. I;o fighting man would trust the procurement of his
weapons and equipment to any general supply agency, He wants the technicians
of his own Department to design, build, and test the specialized equipment on
which depends not only his success, but the lives of his men,
Nor would the Theater Commander willingly submit to any screening
of his requirements by a general supply agency which was erOwered to scr.,en,
but which was not responsible for the results of the combat.
I emphasize this point even though this bill will permit the degr~,e-
of procure: lent autonorZr deemed vital by the opera tin_- forces, because I art
aware of the contrary concept of an over-all centralized procurement plan.
This central procurement agency may look attractive and sound plausible but it
would not produce the results desired by the Theater Commander.
Logistics, utilizing as it does more manpower than actual cormmbat,
is so vital from the standpoint of military efficiency and. economy that I
recd: wend that this Committee call on ;.ssistant Secretary of the Navy Kenney
and. r*y Logistics Deputy, Vice Admiral Carney, in order that both the comrmErcia;l_
and military logistical implications of this bill may be explored and developed,
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The past war taught us many lessons, and all too often they were IN t."~.ed
the hard way, through trial and error. We must incorporate the lessons Of ha
past in any consideration of our future requirements, certainly, but w,! must
also do more than that. To look only to the past in preparation for tht-., future is
to write a charge that we are preparing to fight a future war with the outmoded
concepts of a past war. If we have been guilty of that charge before wee she=111k_
not repeat the error.
The bill does incorporate the lessons of the past war. It gives lega
status to those coordinating and command agencies which were found . zios t
effective to the conduct of global war. This is a forward -looking bill. It .a ia
keeping with the increased tempo which modern weapons impose on warfare-.
and is sufficiently flexible to meet future needs.
The War and Navy Departments have always accepted the principle of
unity of command in a theatre of operation. This principle was written into tl- e
publication called "Joint Action" which served as doctrine before the aar. A
expressed in that publication, unity of command would devolve upon the senior
commander of the engaged service having the paramount interest in the op, 'rte?..
Lion. This provision was not as clear cut as it should have been, as b: car^~:_:
apparent with the attack on Pearl Harbor.
We were not long in correcting this deficiency, however, and orders :;-+:rb:
issued by President Roosevelt early in 1942 which eliminated all misuader t--;o id.
ing on the subject of theatre command. The global areas of possible rnilit--ry
operations were divided into logical theatres of operation. An officer was :ie x
signated to command all of our armed forces assigned to each theatre, b try y
Army, Navy or allied. The theatre commander received his orders from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and implemented them by directing the efforts of the cO i
posite forces available to him.
In. practice the principle of unity of command within a war theatre press ad
so successful that it has been permanently adopted. The principle has been
dir ~ctiT
carried over from war to peace by means of a joint Chiefs of Staff
which, with the approval of the President, established regional, unified cozm.rn." yid
assigned their tasks and designated the individual commanders thereof.
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The necessity for unified command is so great that I consider it wise to
incorporate this. accepted principle into legislation. This would be accomplishe-
ed by one of the provisions of the bill now under consideration. I refer express-
`y to the provision that the joint Chiefs of Staff will, in the language of the bill,
establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands
in the interests of national security p.)
Another expedient of war, which, having proved its worth, is now giver'
legal status in the bill under consideration, is the organization known as the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Without going into any of the details, the JCS, in bri :'f, will
serve as the senior military advisors to both the President and the Secretary c'.1
National Defense. Their responsibilities will include all of.those broad
which have a bearing on the strategic 'direction of our forces, including
stratogic plans,, logistic plans and joint training of the component forces.
An innovation which this bill provides, and I think a very excellent .:)ne, is
the establishment of a joint Staff, subordinate to and in support of th.e Joint Chief;
of Staff. Heretofore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: were supported by various ;'pint
Boards and Committees which were assigned the responsibility for preparing
studies or for drawing up plans. Since the membership of the joint Committees
was in each case composed of an equal number of representatives from both
services, there occurred an occasion a failure to agree on the subject in questic
In such case a so-called "split paper;' was forwarded to the next higher c arnn:. -
ittees, and, if the members there failed to agree, it moved to the next higher
joint committees, occasionally arriving at the joint Chiefs level without any p.c c- --
vious recommendation having been reached.
I do not mean to give the impression that this was a frequent occw~renc
for, as a matter of fact, split papers were rare throughout the course of the war.
I mention them merely to indicate that. under this bill, the responsibility of the,
staff is to the joint Chiefs rather than to their respective Departments. The
work previously accomplished through joint boards and committees will, under
the provision of the bill, be carried out by the joint Staff, and the provision for a
Director of Joint Staff will insure better organization and faster action.
Undoubtedly the biggest problems we faced in the past wax were in the
field of logistics. We entered the last war unfamiliar with the logistic problems
involved in fighting on global scale. We all remember the confusion which
resulted; the setting of seemingly impossible production schedules, the critical
shortages of certain basic materials, and the frantic efforts to gear cursclves I.
the task ahead.
To coordinate the various aspects of our armament program, there wcr
created certain wartime agencies which, beyond any.doubt, saved the -1 . or us.
Born of necessity and nurtured on the bitter reality that their efforts would mca:
for us victory or defeat, these wartime agencies transformed the nation from
state of unproductive confusion, to the "arsenal of democracy
We have consolidated this lesson in the organization proposed in this bill.
The provisions which establish the Munitions Board and the National Security
Resources Board should ensure for us the support of the industrial capacity of
the nation. Approved strategic and logistic plans initially prepared by the Johl
Chiefs of Staff will be supported, through agencies such as the National S.-cur .t;,.,
Resources Board and the Munitions Board, and will be forimlated in the light ci
all of the industrial, economic and material considerations necessary to suooor=
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 This ~xit~~~n4+~'124r1~4?@,44Fi~~a1
capacity to support these requirements is an important feature of the bill. We
seek to eliminate harmful duplication between the services.
Our att-ntion is definitely focused on the future in the provision for a
Research and Development Board. We must assure that our weapons will be at
least as goo. as those likely to be used by our enemies. This bill, by setting up
an organiz tion to control scientific research as it relates to our national secur--
itT, will give us that assurance.
The Research and Development Board will do more than its name implies.
Scientific research for the fighting services will be conducted under its Cogni=zance, and the results therefrom will he translated into now weapons and new
tactics. The research programs of the three service departments will b,v coor-
dinated and allocation of responsibility for specific programs shall be made
among them.
The provision for an adequate agency for intelligence is further indication
that this bill looks to the future. It would establish an organization known s the
C -rtral Intelligence Agency, charged with responsibility for collection of in-
fcrmation from all available sources, including government agencies, such?as
the State Department and the FBI, evaluation of that information, and dissemin-
ation thereof to all interested organizations. This plan is intended to secure
complete coverage of the wide field of intelligence and should minimize duplica-
tion of effort.
The bill provides that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
who shall be appointed by the President, may be either a civilian or a coinmissior
ed officer of the armed forces. In this prcvisionn the bill acknowledges that
military intelligence is a composite of authenticated and evaluated information
covering not only the armed forces establishment of a possible enemy buar al;(
his industrial capacity, racial traits, religious beliefs, and other related asps
-_ /,
I have touched only briefly on the features of the bill : Vice Admiral
Sherman, who: participated in its drafting, will present to you a detailed analysis
of its provisions.
In my opinion this bill, when taken in its entirety, will provide us with a
more ef-ective organizational structure for our national security. I recommend
it to yo yr favorable consideration.
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