ELECTIONS ON 15 OCTOBER 1961 TO THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (REPUBLICAN SENATE AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (REPUBLICAN SENATE AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020015-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 3, 1961
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2004/12/13 : CIA-RDP79S00427A900500020015-7
1%0 SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
3 October 1961.
3621/61
Copy No, " -E
SUBJECT: Elections on 15 October 1961 to the Turkish Grand
National Assembly (Republican Senate and National
Assembly)
10 Offices to be filled: All 450 National Assembly
seats and epu scan Senate seats..
2. Parties participating: Republican People's Party
(RPP). In power from to 1950, the RPP stands'for
secularization and Westernization of the country and a
predominant role for the state in the economy.
Justice Party (JP) and New Turkey Party (NTP).
New parties without a well-established program. The JP
and NTP are trying to win over the remnants of the out-
lawed Democratic Party (DP) of former Premier Menderes.
Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP)o Favors
permitting the peasants to revert to their traditional,
religious-centered ways.
25X1
vim
Approved For Release 2004/12PIg'Q7A{RBP79S00427A000500020015-7
 Approved For Releasg004/12/1Nrt9S00427A020015-7
DO
Since the coup in May 1960, legislative functions
have been vested in a Constituent Assembly dominated by the
22-man Committee of National Union. Election of a Grand
National Assembly is essential to a return to civilian rule.
Whoever emerges victorious from the elections will probably
be in a strong position, since in Turkey the persons in
control of the machinery of government have always been able
to use it to their advantage and to the detriment of the
opposition.
-2-.
Approved For Release 2004/1 L M y-.1 ' 79SO0427A000500020015-7
 Approved For Release 2004/12/13 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020015-7
SECRET
5. Indications of party strengths:
The present military junta outlawed the DP
following the coup, and previous political alignments
have been completely'disrupted.
The RPP won 28 percent of the seats in the October
1957 elections and polled a popular vote of approximately
40 percent. It is Turkey's most strongly established party
and the only one organized throughout the country.
The JP and the NTP are new, untested parties. While
not organized throughout the country, both are attempting
to appeal to all voters and to win the votes of the supporters
of the outlawed DP.
The RPNP's appeal is limited to peasants and other
religiously minded elements. Despite the handicap of the
imprisonment of its leader Osman Bolukbasi during the 1957
election, the RPNP polled over 6 percent of the'popular vote.
However, it won less than 1 percent of the seats in the
legislature.
6> Principal issues:
a. The moral justification of the junta's overthrow--~.
.ing the-jAenderes government, executing?Menderes.?and two others,
and impris.ining virtually all the party's leadership.
b. T4ie role of -the, state in imposing social reforms-
by force if necessary--in order to advance the secularization
and Westernization of Turkey,
c. The extent and pace of the state's economic
development measures.
7. Principal factors influencing the outcome:
The National Assembly--the more important of the
two houses--will be elected on the basis of a new electoral
Approved For Release 2004/129P. X79S00427A000500020015-7
 Approved For Relea 2004/12/18 179SO0427AO - 50 20015-7
law which provides that the seats in each province be
divided roughly in proportion to the popular vote of all
parties. In past elections the party winning a. plurality
in each province won all the seats; this worked to the
advantage of the larger parties.
Former supporters of Menderes may express their
disapproval of the military regime by voting against the
RPP, which in the public mind shares responsibility with
the military junta for events since May 1960.
The junta is pledged to hold elections and return
the country to civilian rule. Civilian politicians probably
realize, however, that the military may renege on its pledge
if campaign arguments center on the legitimacy of the military
coup and if it seems likely that the vote will go against
the RPP, which is closely aligned with the junta. Along 'wt
with the great majority of Turks,, civilian political leaders
want an end to military rule. It seems possible that these
politicianspin the interests of making sure that the country
returns to civilian rule, will accede to the orders of the
junta and. refrain from full discussion of the Menderes
regime and the coup. Such circumspect behavior by political
leaders will probably work to the advantage of the RPP.
Informed opinion on the outcome:
If the military regime permits a free vote, the
RPP will probably win a plurality but not a majority, thus
forcing it to seek the support of one of the other parties
to form a coalition.
9. Significance for US security interests:
Tilt
There appears to be no prospect that any govern-
ment tc which the present military,junta will yield power
would sharply and immediately reverse Turkey-Is generallyipxo-
American and pro-NATO alignment. Some Turks consider that
the Menderes government was subservient to the United States,
however, and the new government can be expected to demonstrate
its ""independent" position vis-a-vis the US. The significance
of the election to US strategic interests is long range.
Approved For Release 20041tifil - RpP79S00427A000500020015-7
 Approved For Rel? 2004/12/1S'E&p779500427AOf020015-7
Should the vote be evenly divided among several parties and
a period of instability result, persons in the military and
among civilian politicians who;are xenophobic and authoritarian
might seize power, and in such, hands the effective cooperation
of Turkey with the United States and the NATO countries might
be seriously affected,
25X1
HUNTINGTON D, SHELDON
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
Approved For Release 2004/12/1f9S00427A000500020015-7