THE STRATEGIC/TACTICAL PROBLEM OR THE NATIONAL/MIITARY FIELD COMMANDER PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A001900020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1975
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved F Release 2004/12/21 CIA-RDP79R01 4 A0019T0062001O .I KS
25 Jul
775-
THE STRATEGIC/TACTICAL PROBLEM
OR
THE NATIONAL/MILITARY FIELD COMMANDER PROBLEM
Military field commanders have a large range of critical
intelligence requirements. These needs range across an entire
spectrum beginning with what is normally thought of as strategic
intelligence on through to hot war, battlefield tactical
intelligence. The field commander needs to know the weapons
and weapons systems characteristics which determine the fighting
effectiveness of opposing forces. He does not care about the
cost of these weapons systems, location of production facilities,
production capacity for manufacturing these weapon systems,
long range opposition military budgets, etc. He does need to
understand detailed performance characteristics and effectiveness
of weapons and weapons systems. He needs to know sufficient
detail about these systems so that effective countermeasures
can be employed (e.g., ECM equipment against opposing anti-
aircraft capability), the limitations of weapons, the range of
weapons, fire power of weapons, the reliability of equipment, etc.
Much of this information cannot be derived by the military field
commander in his immediate theater of operations. Therefore
he has a requirement for what is sometimes thought of as
strategic intelligence support.
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A field commander also needs to know about the deployment
of opposing forces and weapons. He needs to know about the
status of these forces in terms of numbers, command structure,
training level, fighting effectiveness, status of stores, logistic
support capability, and any other information relevant to
opposing force effectiveness.
The commander also needs to.know about the operational
doctrine of opposing forces. The policy on things such as
ECM and the employment of tactical air support versus artillery.
The field commander has a high interest in.warning of impending
hostilitites. He needs to be able to follow shifts in deployment
of opposing forces and understand the significance of such
shifts. He needs to identify and track indicators which might
tip off initiation of hostilities. Finally, when hostilities
have begun'and a hot war is underway, the field commander needs
tactical intelligence (combat support) to support his direction
of forces Tinder his control. He needs to track accurately and
rapidly the dynamic battle scene as it unfolds. He needs to
measure the effectiveness of his forces and the fighting
effectiveness of opposing forces as it is impacted by delivery
of the field commander's weapons systems. In particular, the
field commander needs intelligence to support delivery of
weapons systems against opposition targets and intelligence to
support the circumvention of opposing weapons when they have
not been neutralized.
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In the past theater, intelligence has been largely in the
hands of the field commander. He has acquired his information
through aircraft, foot patrols, forward radar installations and
in more recent times, COMINT collection operated under his direct
command authority. Intelligence derived in this manner was
(and is) called "tactical intelligence." Even when active
hostilities were not underway, the field commanders need for
strategic intelligence support was minimal because of the
relatively unsophisticated character of the opposing weapons.
The term "tactical intelligence" is still in common use, but
the sitatuion facing the field commander in the last ten years
has undergone a dramatic transformation. Tactical aircraft
supporting military ground operations now operate with sophisticated
guided weapon systems and have an operating radius typically
in excess of SOO n.m. Tactical ballistic missiles are a key
element in the opposition force structure. These "tactical"
ballistic missiles have ranges all the way from a few tens of
miles to hundreds of miles. Helicopters have dramatically
enhanced mobility and revoluntionized fighting tactics. Guided
weapons have virtually eliminated armored vehicles, particularly
tanks, as relevant and effective elements in the fighting force.
This vast array of sophisticated and flexible weaponry has in
turn impacted the military doctrine and fighting strategies
of opposing forces.
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Most of the important weapon systems characteristics are
not derivable by the field commander with resources and assets
under his control. Furthermore, the reaction time to new weapon
systems intelligence by way of changed doctrine or more effective
tactics is measured in years, not weeks or months. Therefore
the strategic intelligence (particularly technical intelligence)
required by the field commander to insure an effective fighting
force has increased. However, strategic intelligence remains a
meaningful concept. Strategic intelligence is that intelligence
required by weapons systems planners to support weapons RFD
and procurement policies as well as force structure and field
doctrine strategies. Strategic intelligence is derived from
national strategic collection tools such as photographic
satellites, SIGINT satellites, and COMINT supported by a
powerful array of intelligence analysis and production resources.
With the evolving weapon systems effectiveness'and sophistication,
needs for strategic intelligence have been well understood and
effectively dealt with by the. intelligence community. However,
very recently it has become clear that the field commander is
in real trouble when it comes to his-capability to deal with a.
hot war in which modern weapons systems are used. The intelligence
resources under his direct control remain essentially as they
have been for tens of years. The intelligence support derived
from the national community has been useful but limited-in that
national intelligence frequently has not focused on the weapons
systems characteristics and vulnerabilities of most interest
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to a field commander. At the same time the field commander's
intelligence collection and analytical resources are sufficient
to provide him with good measures of opposing force deployment,
opposing force status or warn him of impending hostilitites.
There are serious questions after the outbreak of hostilities
about the field commander's ability to track evolving events
and coupling intelligence on the dynamic scene into his own
tactical decisions.
In response to thisintelligence gap, two things have
happened. First there has been increasing and priority placed
on real time collection resources. These requirements have
been supported by
that,
a
now po
integr
ation of
a rapidly evolving and capable technology
5X1
As consequence of the "new" intelligence needs of the field
commanders and the evolving capability of what have been
thought in the past as strategic intelligence collection resources,
the concepts of strategic versus tactical or national versus
military operational intelligence have virtually vanished.
Within the next five years, all critical collection resources
which are essential to support national intelligence will have
capabilities identical to those required to support field
operations.
The implications of this suddenly changed situation are
profound. Resource decisions and collection management in the
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future will be more complex because it is essential that the
entire range of needs be properly accounted for. New factors
must be considered such as the vulnerability of collection
systems and the efficient and rapid forwarding of intelligence
information to those who need it. The field commander can no
longer be regarded as an independent entity which must and can
have his own integrated self-contained intelligence apparatus.
Sophisticated weapon systems and associated doctrine and tactics
require equally sophisticated intelligence apparatus if the
nation is to maintain a viable military capability. Increasingly,
intelligence cannot be left in the hands of.military officers
primarily trained for conduct of military field operations.
Intelligence will become increasingly specialized and must
evolve to enjoy a first class as opposed to third class status
in the military establishment.
All of this implies that the DCI in several of his many
hats, must concern himself with a broader range of intelligence
problems and requirements than have been concerned to him in
the past.
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C., , I v % v.I
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