PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A000600100002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: STUDY

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000600100002-0
The Current Situation
Fighting between the militia of the right-wing
Phalanges Party and radical fedayeen has diminished
significantly since the announcement of a cease--fire and
the appointment of the military cabinet on May 23. For
the moment, both sides are restrained; the Phalangists
because.they support the new government, the fedayeen
and Lebanese leftists because they were caught off guard
by its appointment and are considering their next move.
The new.government has drawn initial strength from
the surprise that surrounded its installation, from its
law and order image, and from widespread popular uncertainty
leave Lebanon much. as before. At worst, it will move with
force against the fedayeen and the leftists, precipitating
civil war, destroying the system of political and religious
compromises on which the government rests, and inviting,
intervention by-Syria or Israel or both.. Such developments,
at a minimum, would seriously complicate general Middle
East peace negotiations. In the extreme, they could
prompt general hostilities that would involve Syria,
Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.
about what it will be like to be governed by a military
cabinet. At the same time, however, it, faces extremely
difficult problems: religious and political tensions are
at the highest level in the country's history; and
opposition forces are united as seldom before.
The policies and tactics adopted by the new govern-
ment could and probably will be the deciding factor in
whether Lebanon's traditional governing system survives
the present crisis. The best hope is that it will take
a non-partisan, conciliatory approach that through
negotiations could restore a modicum of public order and
Strateav of the New Government
For the moment, at least, the new government has
opted for a conciliatory approach. Deputy Prime Minister
Moussa.Kanaan has stressed that the government is
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000600100002-0
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005/01/31 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000600100002-0
"provisional rather than military in the strict sense,"
that its sole objective is'to restore "natural conditions"
in the country, and that it will respect between the government and the fedayeen. past
cabinetnts
has so far avoided instituting censorship, curfews, or
any of the other trappings of military rule.
Prime Minister Nur ad-Din Rifai will attempt to take
advantage of the currently difficult
of Palestine Liberation Organization ChairmanlYasirtion
Arafat, the Phalangists' sense of victory, and the
Political independence of the leader of Lebanon's
Shia Muslim community, Imam Musa Sadr, to divide the
opposition and gain grudging acceptance of his government
and extended observance of the ceasefire. If this
strategy succeeds, it will win a short-term improvement
in the security situation and---again in the short term--
justify President Franjiyah's considerable political
gamble in appointing a predominantly military government.
Even if Rifai is able to implement the cease-mfire,
however, he is certain to face what will probably turn
out to be overwhelming political challenges. In a
display of unity, important Muslim
leftist leaders, fedayeen spokesmen, the p Lebanese
and one dissident Christian political leader have joined
in condemning the new government. They have charged that
it threatens the country's majority Muslim population,
the Palestinians, Lebanon's National Covenant, and
Syria itself. If these opposition forces remain united,
they have a good chance of succeeding in their announced
goal: to force Rifai to resign.
Radical Arab governments, notably Iraq and Libya, are
sure to increaser their financial and military support to
Lebanese leftists and fedayeen radicals willing to
challenge Rifai. These governments already expend large
sums for subversive activities in Lebanon, and their agents
have played a major role in escalating urban violence over
the past few months. The principal Arab states join
with the Lebanese government in decrying this meddling
in Lebanon's domestic affairs, but are powerless to
stop it.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Implications of Further Fight:.
If the new government--p,:, tied by its own convictions
or by provocations from fore-;apported radicals or
the fedayeen---determines that ? .ust use force to put
down the civil unrest, it will : ".:,ik an all-out confrontation
with the fedayeen. In the rec.... past, when there has
been a civilian cabinet, leade of the major fedayeen
groups have resisted pressure .. :~1:n their followers ` to
become directly involved in tl.,..olence. Now, when
the government is itself wide ?..srceived to have
changed the rules of the game, the relatively
moderate fedayeen leaders wou:l.? ' probably find it impossible,
to stay out of renewed fighti r,._, .
If heavy fighting broke r: :':. between the fedayeen
and the Lebanese army, it cou:. uickly escalate to
engulf and destroy much of Bei . :'... In the past,
successive civilian governmen_:. .?.1ve. considered this an.
unacceptable risk, and have e1. ? :--d to avoid a showdown.
This has led to gradually inc:r.?.- ::;~-~d freedom of movement
for the fedayeen -in Lebanon. , - when the new military
government may be prepared to greater risks, the
fedayeen are more heavily arme