SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A000600060009-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 12, 1975
• Content Type: REGULATION

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SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976
CRS/AB/WH-WE
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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin
WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF. New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
CHARLES WILSON, Texas
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER. New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI. Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama
J. HERBERT BURK {l, Florida
PIERRE S. DU PONT, Delaware
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
EDWARD G. BIESTER, JR., Pennsylvania
LARRY WINN, JR., Hansas
BENJAMIN A. GILM AN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER. Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMnRSINO, California
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York LARRY WINN, JR., E:ansas
ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama
CHARLES WILSON, Texas
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan
V. MICHAsmL FINLEY, Subcommittee Staff Consu.'tant
JON D. HOLSYINE, Minority Subcommittee Staff Corsultant
JOAN C. SULLIVAN, Staff Assistant
CAROL A. BARRY, Staff Assistant
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CONTENTS
Thursday, July 31, 1975: WITNESSES
Page
Ingersoll, Hon. Robert S., Acting Secretary of State_ .- _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _
256
Miller, Robert II., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
and Pacific Affairs------------------------------------------
266
-
Friday, September 12, 1975:
Abramowitz, Morton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, East
Asia, and Pacific Affairs______________________________________
295
Atkinson, Brig. Gen. A. W., U.S. Air Force, Assistant Director of
Operations for Command and Control, Joint Chiefs of Staff------
303
Clements, Hon. William P., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense ------
289
Dambrauskas, Col. Vincent, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Communications-
Electronics Directorate -------------------------- .-------------
308
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR TIIE RECORD
List of Members of Congress who were notified by the executive branch
at the beginning of the Mayaguez seizure---------------------------
263
Response received by the Department of State from the United Nations
Secretary General------------------------------------------------
D
274
epartment of State answer on Geneva Protocol of 1925----------------
287
Sighting of fishing vessel with possible Caucasians aboard --------------
299
Detailed sequence of United States early reconnaissance efforts in attempt-
ing diversion of Cambodian gun boats reaching the mainland with the
crew members of the Mayaguez ------------------------------------
301
Department of Defense estimates depicting Cambodian strategy with crew
of Mayaguez after captivity and arriving on the mainland (REAM)--_-
301
Clarifying statement on executive determination of exact whereabouts of
crew members of the Mayaguez upon arriving on mainland-----------
302
Clarifying statement submitted by Defense Department on cable com-
munication received, and by whom, during seizure of the Mayaguez---
303
Clarifying statement submitted by Defense Department on precise times
PACOM, CINCPAC, and the Pentagon were notified on the seizure of
the Mayaguez---------
D
304
epartment of Defense procedures in processing of reconnaissance photog-
raphy------------
306
Statement clarifying exact location of Mayaguez at the time of the seizure
by the Cambodians____________ _
312
Clarifying statement by Defense Department of sequence of U.S. heli-
copters strikes on the Cambodian crew during seizure of the Mayaguez-_
312
APPENDIX
Letter from Assistant Secretary of State McCloskey to Hon. Thomas E.
Morgan, chairman of the Committee on International Relations respond-
ing to resolutions introduced in the House opposing the seizure of the
Mayaguez--------------------------------------
Me
321
ssage from the Department of State to the United Nations Secretary
General regarding release of the Mayaguez and its crew--. __ _ --- ---
M
a
324
ess
ge from the President to the Cambodian officials elated May 12
demanding release of the members of the crew of the Mayaguez--------
325
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.plunq Mai;
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No gNha
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approlximate location 0 -5
t k .: s? Mayaguez seizure.
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SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ
THURSDAY, JULY 31, 1975
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE: ON INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.
I lie subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House
Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommit
tee) presiding.
Mr. FASCELL. The subcomittee will come to order.
This morning the Subcommittee on International Political and
Military Affairs continues its inquiry into events surrounding the
seizure of the Mayaguez and subsequent U.S. Government efforts to
secure release of the vessel and its crew.
The purpose of our hearings is to establish the facts and to evaluate
the effectiveness of the crisis management operations of our Govern-
ment in order to assure that future crises are handled in a way that
minimizes risks to peace and to the lives of our citizens.
Since the seizure of the Mayaguez, the subcommittee and the full
committee have held five hearings on various aspects of the crisis.
Testimony has been received from representatives of the Defense and
State Departments, Members of Congress and Charles Miller, Captain
of the Mayaguez. After today's hearing the subcommittee will resume
our inquiry in September with testimony from the Deputy Secretary
of Defense.
Now, I would like to ask our ranking minority member, Mr. lVinn,
for such comments as he cares to make.
Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, would just like to add my welcome and thanks to you,
Mr. Secretary, for appearing before us this morning. We know that
you understand and share our interest in completing our investigation
of the Mayaguez action, and in creating a solid public record which
leaves no doubts as to the handling of that situation.
We are also appreciative of the many people from the administra-
tion who have already testified before us and other subcommittees,
and we know that you will be every bit as helpful. as they have been,
as you always are. There are a few areas about which we have some
questions and which we hope you can help us clarify.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Winn.
Mr. Secretary, we are pleased to have you here this morning. I
appreciate the efforts that have been made by the Executive to make
you available to make this public record. As Mr. Winn says, and as
(255)
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256
.you know, we are operating under a resolution of inquiry and that
makes it doubly necessary for us to get at the facts.
Our witness this morning is the Acting Secretary of State, Robert
S. Ingersoll, who is accompanied by Robert H. Millar. Deputy Assist-
and Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs; Mr. Robert Demling,
Executive Assistant to Mr. Ingersoll ; Mr. Monroe Leigh, Legal Ad-
viser to the Department of State, and Ambassador Robert McCloskey,
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. INGERSOLL, ACTING SECRETARY
OF STATE
Robert Stephen Ingersoll, of Winnetka, Illinois, was sworn in July 10, 1974 as
Deputy Secretary of State. Mr. Ingersoll had served since January 8, 1974, as As-
sistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and from April 3,
1972 until last January as U.S. Ambassador to Japan.
Born in Galesburg, Illinois, on January 28, 1914, Mr. Ingersoll graduated from
Phillips Academy and from the Sheffield Science School of Yale University, where
he received a BS degree in 1937.
Before his service in Japan, Mr. Ingersoll had spent some thirty-five years in
industry, the last thirty-three with the Borg-Warner Corporation in Chicago.
He was Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive officer of Borg-Warner at
the time of his appointment to Japan. Prior to joining Borg-Warner, Mr. Ingersoll
served with Armco Steel Corporation from 1937 to 1939.
He has been active in a number of civic and professional organizations.
Formerly a director of the I irst National Bank of Chicago, Atlantic Richfield.
Burlington Northern, Marcor Corp. and a member of the Board of Directors of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, he has also been a Dire2tor of the Chicago
Association of Commerce and Industry and a member of the Business Council.
In addition, he has been an active member of several international business com-
mittees and councils, including the Advisory Council on Japan-U.S. Economic
Relations, and the Emergency Committee for American Trade.
With a deep interest in education, Mr. Ingersoll holds trusteeships with the
University of Chicago, the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, and the
California Institute of Technology. He was formerly President of the Board of
Education of Winnetka, Ill.
Other associations involved him in civic activities such as board memberships
with Evanston, (Ill.) Hospital, Chicago Symphony Orchestra, Leadership Council
for Metropolitan Open Communities, and the Mayor's Committee for Arts and
Culture (Chicago).
With a long interest in the Western part of the U.S., Mr. Ingersoll vacations
in the Colorado Rockies where he participates in hiking, horseback riding, back
packing, fishing. and skiing with his family.
Mr. Ingersoll is married to the former Coralyn Eleanor Reid, and they have
four daughters.
Mr. INGERs0LL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate
your inviting me to appear before you as a Department of State witness
to testify concerning the Mayaguez crisis.
Allow me to review briefly what has already been provided. This
subcommittee has received Department of State testimony on the
Mayaquez from Deputy Assistant Secretary Miller. A. detailed chronol-
ogy concerning the Mayaquez crisis was submitted in connection with
that testimony. In addition, Assistant Secretary McCloskey sent
letters to Chairman Morgan, providing answers to questions stated in
the proposed resolution of inquiry that had been introduced in the
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House, and to you, Mr. Chairman, providing further information
subsequent to Mr. Miller's testimony.'
With respect to the legal aspects of the Mayaguez affair, the Depart-
ment's Legal Adviser, Mr. Leigh, appeared before Chairman Zablocki's
Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs.
It is my understanding that you have now asked me to appear before
you because of my participation in the National Security Council
deliberations concerning diplomatic and ultimately military action
which resulted in the release of the ship and its crew.
I attended most meetings of the National Security Council during
the Mayaguez crisis as the Representative of the Department of State.
I can , outline for you some of the primary factors influencing the policy
decisions which arose from those meetings but I do not believe it
would be appropriate to provide a detailed account of internal
executive branch discussions.
First; the President was primarily concerned with obtaining the safe
release of the ship and its crew. As soon as it was clear that the ship
had been taken to Koh Tang Island and not to the mainland, the
National Security Council was faced with developing a course of
action to prevent the crew from being moved to the mainland, where
their rescue would have been more difficult and where the risk of
long-term internment and the jeopardy to their lives would have
increased.
In view of the Khmer authorities' hostility toward the United
States, the probable conduct of the Cambodians toward the captured
Americans was unpredictable.
In the President's letter to the Speaker of the House and to the
President pro tempore of the Senate, and in Mr. Miller's testimony,
you received an account of the actions by aircraft to prevent the
movement of the crew and to keep track of such movement as could
be detected from the air. All of these actions were directed toward
minimizing the risks to the crew and toward securing their early safe
return.
A second factor influencing National Security Council deliberations
was the lack of response to our diplomatic efforts.
The President did not make the decision to proceed with military
measures to recover the ship and crew until he had come to the reluctant
conclusion that diplomatic efforts had not been successful in securing
the crew's and the ship's early release.
Mr. Miller's statement and our answer to the first question in Assist-
ant Secretary McCloskey's letter to Chairman Morgan provide a
detailed account of the essential elements of our diplomatic initiatives.
Third, the President was concerned for the principles undermined
by the Cambodian action. He believed it was necessary to make clear
that the safety of U.S. citizens and the freedom of the seas for U.S.
vessels were matters of great concern to the American Government
and people.
Regardless of the motives the Cambodian Government may have
had in seizing the ship, the seizure occurred without any prior warning
and without any conceivable basis in international law. The Cambodian
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authorities, to our knowledge, made no prompt effort to notify us that
the ship had been seized or whether and how it might be released.
It was important to make clear that this illegal act cf force and inter-
ference with freedom of navigation by the Cambodian authorities
could not be considered an acceptable precedent.
Military action to recover the ship and its crew was finally taken
on Wednesday evening, May 14, because we believed that further
delay, in the absence of any constructive response to our diplomatic
initiatives from any source, would risk removal of the entire crew to
the mainland where their rescue would be more difficult and their
safety placed in further jeopardy.
It was not until our military actions to recover the ship and crew
were already underway, that we received in Washington. a report of a
domestic broadcast in the Cambodian language which did not state
that the vessel and crew would be released but only that the vessel
would be released. The broadcast did not say when the vessel would
be released. Moreover, the broadcast was not directed to the United
States. After learning of this message, we announced that as soon as
the Cambodian authorities would issue a statement that they were
prepared to release the crew members uncondition,01y and immedi-
ately, we would promptly cease military operations.
The Cambodian authorities did not issue any su-.h statement. We
were not certain that the Cambodians had, in fact, released the entire
crew until some 3 hours after receiving the domestic broadcast.
It is reasonable to assume that the Cambodian authorities were
concerned that our initial efforts to prevent movement of the crew
presaged a determined effort to rescue them; we further assume that
such concern influenced their decision to release the crew and that our
military actions to recover the crew removed any Cambodian doubts
about that decision.
We deeply regret the lives lost during this operation. However, ever
in retrospect, there is no clear reason to believe that a course of action
other than that taken would have secured the safe release of the ship
and its crew.
I shall be glad to answer any questions, sir.
Mr. F,\SCnLL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. For whatever reasons, the
Executive's conclusions are as good as any, the fact is that the ship
and crew were released.
We have a quorum call over there and I guess we might as well take
an informal recess and we will get right back.
[A short recess was taken.]
Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order.
Mr. Secretary, would you please discuss the State Department's
contribution to the NSC meetings during the Mayaguez crisis in terms
of personnel involved, the information that was provided and options,
if any, that were identifiable, that were presented.
Mr. INGERSOLL. As far as the attendance of State Department rep-
resentatives, I attended the first day on the 12th. I attended the NSC
meeting on the 12th which was held at noon. Mr. Sisco attended a meet-
ing on Tuesday morning at about 10:30 and I at ended a meeting
that evening at 10 :40. I attended again at a meeting on the 14th about
4 o'clock and then a followup meeting was held on Thursday at about
4 o'clock.
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As far as documents or advice to the NSC is concerned, Mr. Chair-
man, I believe my statement has already indicated that I think these
are privileged and it would not be proper to disclose them in open
session, sir.
Mr. FASCELL. I was not asking for any documents, just trying to get
clear in my mind what was State's input, if any. I mean, were you
just an observer at the meetings you attended?
Mr. INGERSOLL. As far as I was concerned, I was an observer,' the
Department, itself, provided whatever information we had, first, from
the commercial channels that announced the seizure of the ship which
came to us somewhere after 5 o'clock on Monday morning. I do not
believe there was any other communication with the ship after that.
It, continued for a short time but then was shut off when the Cam-
bodians shut down the radio transmission from the ship.
I think that the bulk of the communications probably came from
the military after that in their effort to locate the ship and determine
what was happening to it.
We had access to those communications but they came to the NSC
'from the military.
Mr. FASCELL. Well, if I understood this
Mr. INGERSOLL. Excuse me, Mr. Miller reminds me we did make
diplomatic representations, first, in the Department to the Chief of
the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China on Monday after-
noon. When he refused to accept the message, we transmitted the mes-
sage to our liaison office in Peking which, in turn, delivered the mes-
sage to the Foreign Office of the People's Republic and to the
Cambodian Government in Peking.
Mr. FASCELL. Well, as I had understood from prior testimony, Mr.
Secretary, when an event like this occurs, there are two management
centers that go into operation. One is in State and I do not know what
its name is-I guess it is crisis room. What is the name?
Mr. INGERSOLL. We had a task force in the operations center where
all messages come into the Department.
Mr. FASCELL. Are you talking about the State Department now?
Mr. INGERSOLL. The State Department.
Mr. FASCELL. It had a task force?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Whenever there is a. crisis of this nature a task force
is set up specifically for this particular event and one was established
so that we could monitor on a 24-hour basis any messages that might
be received.
Mr. FASCELL. Now that is called operations center in the State
Department?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.
Mr. FASCELL. The Defense Department operates one, too, as I under-
stand it from the testimony.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.
Mr. FASCELL. And at the two operations centers, if that is what they
called it in Defense. Do you know?
1 The following amplifying statement subsequently submitted by Mr. Ingersoll :
"While the transcript is correct In recording what I said, I wish to provide this ampli-
fying statement because I misunderstood the meaning of the chairman's question.
"I attended the NSC meetings as the representative of the Department of State, and
therefore was of course a participant rather than an observer in the proceedings. How-
ever, other participants took a more active part in the discussions than I did."
63-971-76-2
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Mr. INGERSOLL. National Military Command Center in the Pen-
tagon. That, like our operations center, is always in existence 24 hours
a day 7 days a week.
Mr. F'ASOELL. There is some kind of communication that takes place
between the two centers and I was never quite clear how they did it.
Mr. INGERSOLL. We received the message of the seizure from the Na-
tional Command Center in the Pentagon, that is, the State Depart-
ment did, to our operations center.
Mr. FASOELL. Well, State sets up it task force. Is that automatic or
does some special action have to take place once the crisis is identified?
Mr. INGERSOLL. That is true. We only set it up wren the crisis is
identified and a determination is made that it warrarts a special task
force.
Mr. FASCELL. Who makes that determination?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Usually the regional desk recommends it to the
Deputy Secretary.
Mr. FASCELL. Was that done in this ease?
Mr. I NGERSOLL. Yes, sir.
Mr. FASCELL. What did the task force consist of, in terms of State
personnel for the Jlaynquez?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, the operations center is as I pointed out, in
existence all the time, but to augment the operations center and to have
something concentrating on this, one or two officers were assigned from
East Asian Bureau, which is responsible for Cambodia, to the opera-
tions center to form the task force.
There was not a zrea.t deal of volume for them to handle but at least
they were monitoring it on a 24-hour basis.
Mr. FASCELL. I do not quite understand. What were they monitoring
in this case? They have no traffic from anybody.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, we had some traffic, diplomatic traffic and we
had considerable traffic with the military.
Mr. FASCELL. That is different. The only traffic ou had was your
diplomatic effort going to the Government of China.'
Mr. INGERSOLL. And the Cambodian Government.
Mr. FASCELL. And the Cambodian Government.
Mr. INGERSOLL. And to Thai Government, to our E: nbassy in Thai-
land and later to the United Nations.
Mr. FASCELL. Basically, having done that gas far a;, the minute-to-
minute operations were concerned, that came out of the National Mili-
tary Command Center made available both to the operations center
in State and to the National Security Council?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Right.
Mr. FASCELL. That is direct communications in some fashion. I do
not know how that works yet, but I guess we will find out.
Mr. INGERSOLL. It is electronic communication directly with each
center and. that exists all of the time. I mean that i~ not something
that just started up.
Mr. FASCELL. You mean the two centers are hooked,.ip by computers
or telephone or whatever. I am not sure I understand.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, it is a message communication.
Mr. FASCELL. Teletype, radio, I mean that is all I am trying to find
out-what is it?
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Mr. INGERSOLL. They repeat the cable traffic and messages by tele-
type, yes. I do not know whether that is the term-they are in tele-
phone communication all of the time, but there is transmittal of mes-
sages automatically to each of those centers.
Mr. FASCELL. I want to be sure I am clear on this and the record has
no inference otherwise with respect to at least Secretary Inger-
soll's participation in the three meetings on the 12th, 14th, and 15th of
May 1975, on the Mayaguez incident. I am left with a distinct impres-
sion that you did not say anything, do anything, or offer anything and
that you were merely an observer representing the Department of
State.
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think you left out the meeting I was attending on
the 13th. I attended one on the evening of the 13th.
Mr. FASCELL. Right. I did leave that out. I am sorry. That is on the
list.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Of course, Dr. Kissinger attended all of these meet-
ings but as the adviser to the President for National Security Affairs.
Mr. FASCELL. The only trouble is we do not know which hat he was
wearing when he was talking.
Mr. INGERSOLL. I believe he was talking this way?
Mr. FASCELL. As both?
Mr. INGERSOLL. No. I believe as the adviser to the President, be-
cause I was representing State Department. I did make some com-
ments during the deliberations, but I say I think it is not proper for
me to disclose the discussions that went on during the NSC meeting.
Mr. FASCELL. Are you saying that on advice of Mr. Leigh or are you
just saying it?
Mr. INGERsoLL. Well, on his advice and my own understanding of
the privileged nature of NSC meetings.
Mr. FASCELL. Well, you are really not in a position to claim execu-
tive privilege, Mr. Secretary, but I think we need to clear up on the
record why you make the statement, if at all, because I cannot think
of anything I have asked yet that could not be answered. But, let us get
it straight on the record. I mean, you are claiming executive privilege
or attempting to ; is that correct?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I believe the President is the only one that can
claim executive privilege.
Mr. FASCELL. I think he is, too.
Then the question arises, whether or not even the President can
delegate that right or claim to anybody else and, if he does, how does
he do it, and since he has not given you any letter in writing or any
instructions to claim it, I do not see how you could claim it except
gratuitously. I do not even know why you claim it, frankly, but that is
your business, not mine.
Mr. INGERSOLL. You were asking me what I said during the meetings.
Mr. FASCELL. You said you did not say anything; so why would you
,claim executive privilege if you did not say anything.?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I had said I made a few comments, but they were
minor to the major discussions.
Mr. FASCELL. Yes. Well, I must confess I certainly would not be
interested in any minor comments in a major discussion.
Could we have some idea, if you do not violate whatever it is you
are hanging onto in terms of privilege, what the range of options was
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that might be considered? I mean I could draw my own scenario but
I do not know why I would want to do that.
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think the first effort was diplomatic contact with
the Cambodian Government and with the People's Republic of China,
the only outside government that had any contact with the Cambodian
Government at that time.
Mr. FASCELL. That was the United States first effort to try diplo-
matical ly to get the release of the vessel and the crew.
11 Tr. INGERSOrr. Yes, sir.
That was the first effort we made on Monday afternoon.
Mr. FASIELL. Then the decision was made on that date, May 14, as I
understood you to say, on the night of May 14, that d olomatic efforts
having failed, the decision was made to go ahead wi3h some kind of
military action.
1Ir. INC.ERs0LL. Yes, sir.
Mr. FASCELL. Is that correct? I am not trying to trap you or put
words in your mouth, but trying to get it straight.
Mr. 1NGERSOLL.:N No, that is true and I think this wars disclosed to a
group of congressional leaders about. 6:30 that evening, the evening
of the 14th. There was about an hour's meeting in the White House
at which the subject was discussed.
Afr. 1~AScEr,L. Now, we get into the time differential problem and I
am not. sure exactly what the time differential is with respect to that,
but the allegation has been made that, at the time the meeting took
place to which yon refer, when congressional leaders for the first time
were railed to the White House, the military action was already
underway.
Mr. INGERsoLL. It had not taken place at Koh Tang Island.
The helicopters were underway but could have been recalled. I might
mention, if you thought this was the first contact with Congress, there
was a previous contact by telephone on Monday afternoon. the 12th.
Mr. FASCELS.. I think we have that in the record, Mr. Secretary, that
somebody in the White House-I did not get the genileman's name-
ealled the Sneaker on the telephone. The Speaker could not remember
his name, either. by the wav.
Mr. INGERSOLL. They called about 21 Members at th=at time, not just
the Speaker.
Mr. FAsr.Er,r. Well, I am glad to have that information for the rec-
ord. Do you happen to know who the 21 Members were
11711c ".e were they called from?
Mr. TNGERSOLL. From the White House, but they can give you the
names for the record.
Mr. F.1ac,Er,L. I think that would be useful to do that.
Mr. TNGERsoLL. I emphasize that even on Wednesday, when the
congressional leaders were brought into discussion on this subject at
the White House, that the operation could have been recalled if there
had, been reason to do so.
VT'. FASCELL. But the fact is that it really was underway.
Mr. TNGERSOTJ. The order had been given to move, because it was
a several-hoar flight by helicopter from the Thai base to the island.
T ?r. RTEGr.E. Will the chairman yield for an inquiry?
Mr. FASCELL. Sure.
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Mr. RIEGLE. You have several people here with you from the State
Department and I would like to know who the 21 people are now.
Can somebody go to the phone and find out so we do not have to wait.
Mr. FASCELL. Why don't we make the record complete while doing it
because there were several phone calls made later on, as I recall, before
the first meeting at the White house on May 14 with the leadership
group and this has already been spread on some other record so you
mlorht as well do it here. But there were phone contacts at least twice
as I recall. I agree with the gentleman that we might as well get it in
the record now.
[The following information was submitted for the record:]
Senators.-Mike Mansfield ; John Stennis; Clifford Case ; John Sparkman ;
Strom Thurmond ; John McClellan ; James Eastland ; Hugh Scott ; Robert P.
Griffin ; Robert C. Byrd ; and Milton R. Young.
Representatives.-Carl Albert ; Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.; John McFall ; John
Rhodes ; Robert H. Michel ; George Mahon ; Thomas E. Morgan ; William Broom-
field ; Melvin Price ; Elf ord A. Cederberg ; and Bob Wilson.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Winn.
Mr. WINN. Thank you.
There has been question, Mr. Ambassador; that possibly because of
the lack of communications perhaps the Cambodian Government did
not get our message. As I understand the information that was sent
back to the committee by Mr. McCloskey-and I want to be sure that
is who signed this-yes. That the Chinese Government was one of the
first notified and that at the time there were two stories, that they
refused to pass that message on.
Mr. INGERSOLL . That was the message we attempted to pass to them
here in Washington; yes, sir.
Mr. WINN. Not the one in Peking.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, in Peking they returned. the message.
Mr. WI N N. By regular mail?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, later
Mr. WINN. And the other attempt to communicate our feelings to
the Cambodian Government was through
Mr. INGErsoLL [continuing]. The Cambodian Government in.
Peking.
Mr. WINN. Throegh the Cambodian Government where?
Mr. INGE, RSOLL. In Peking.
Mr. WINK. In Peking, do you know the time difference on that or
was there a time difference?
Mr. INGERSOLL. They were delivered at about the same time to the
Cambodian Government and to the Peking Government. I think, in
addition to the diplomatic communications, there were public state-
ments by the President that we demanded that the ship and crew be
released.
Mr. WINN. I am sure of that but maybe the Cambodians do not read
the New York Times.
Mr. INCERSOLL. I do not think it was just the New York Times but
was over worldwide communications.
Mr. WINN. That is what I want to find out, what methods do we
use to communicate our feelings or our demands or our time schedules
to a government like the Cambodian Government; who obviously has
been displaying an animosity toward the United States.
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264
Mr. INGERSOLL. As far as the direct communications, I have de-
how we did that. As far as general communication that was
done by the public press medi a
Mr. WTNN. But we have no idea of whether the Cambodian Govern-
ment in Phnom Penh ever got access to that through whatever method
they used to pick up news.
Mr. INGERSOLL. We never had any response from them, but the one
communication we had from them was a public broadcast in Cam-
bod is that they intended to release the ship.
Mr. WINK. That was several days later.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes.
Mr. WINN. According to the records we have, that is the only re-
sponse they made to our Government at all and it was not really to our
Government but to their people.
Mr. INGERsoLL. No. It was just a public broadcast.
Mr. IVINN. Public? Why did we wait so long to notify the U.N.?
Why didn't we notify them at the same time?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, I believe the U.N. was aware of it through the
public pronouncements that had been made.
Mr. WINN. 117c] 1, I am sure they were.
Mr. INGERSOLL. But the intention was to get a response directly from
the parties involved, particularly the party involved, the Cambodian
Government. If we received a response from them, saving they were
releasing the ship and the crew, there would be no need for the U.N.
to take action.
When it was apparent they had returned our message, that is
when we contacted the U.N.
Mr. WINN. Well, I suppose I could be a Monday-morning quarter-
back but according to the letter here that we have from Ambassador
McCloskey, it says: Mr. Waldheim, at our request, 2 days later, got
directly in touch with the Cambodian Government. We had not been
able to get in touch with them. If we had, they were completely ignor-
inn us which, of course, is obviously a possibility.
Mr. INGERSOLL. They got no response at the U.N. immediately. It
was several days later they got a response.
Mr. WINN. That is right.
The Cambodian Government did not answer Waldheim's request
for a peaceful settlement between the two parties involved.
Mr. IN-GERSOLL. Right.
Mr. WINN. In the earlier hearings we had on this, some of us were
of the opinion that the Cambodians purposely seized this ship, because
it was an American ship and I think that philosophy sort of prevailed
for the first 2 or 3 days when Mr. Miller came up and appeared up here.
Although nobody actually made the statement, I think many of us
Tel t that was the issue. That was part of the problem.
Captain Miller said that they were not flying an American flag and
other than the printing of the name in 18 inch letters on both sides of
the ship, there would be no way for them to know that that was an
American ship. So it looks like-I am strictly speculating-the Cam-
bodian gunboat, in an effort to either protect that island, and I do not
have the name of the island, the first one where it was seized before it
was taken around behind
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Mr. INGERSOLL. Poulo Wai.
Mr. WINN. Right.
And the fact they seized a Korean ship and a Panamanian ship, and
they took one of the two ships earlier, either in the same week or within
2 weeks prior to that, into the mainland, to investigate its cargo and
still there are, according to Captain Miller, 10, 11, or 12 ships a day
that use that same sealane which is approximately 51/2 miles off the
island, I asked Captain Miller if it did not turn out that he was just
sort of at the wrong place at the wrong time, and I forget his exact
response, but that is about what it boiled down to. They just happened
to get one time a Korean ship, one time a Panamanian ship and the
third time was the charm, they got us. They got one of our ships. So, it
did not look like it was intentional, I mean intentionally challenging
.an American ship.
Mr. INGERSOLL. But I do not believe anybody knew that at the time.
Mr. WINN. No, obviously. I think most of us thought it probably was
.done intentionally at the time.
Mr. INGE, RSOL L. Yes.
Mr. WINN. As a matter of fact, I carried that in my mind until
Captain Miller explained how many ships go up and down those
navigational lanes.
Congressman Riegle has asked for the list of the 21 members and
that brings a question to my mind. Do you believe that Congress can
play any role during a crisis such as the Mayaguez seizure? As I under-
stand it, and I may be wrong, but as I understand it, mainly, the first
couple of days, the 12th; the 13th, and the 14th, even though we were
having hearings up here which Ambassador McCloskey refers to all
the way through his letter in answering our questions, Members of
Congress were informed all the time, informed, and my question is,
maybe Members of Congress, the 21 leaders or 10 leaders-whatever is
feasible in a crisis matter like that-should be included in and sitting
down with the State Department and the executive branch and the
Department of Defense, even if they sit there as observers or add small
talk, as you said you did in some cases. What its your feeling on that,
Mr. Secretary?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think it is difficult to generalize in this sort of an
issue. I believe that Congress should be involved in discussions of this
type and the opinions of Congress certainly should be taken into
account in an ongoing event and decisions that are made with respect
to that. I think eventually the President has. to make the decision after
he has consulted with both his own staff and the Congress. I think
that the Chief Executive officer has to take that responsibility.
Mr. WINN. Well, I think most of us would agree with that, that some-
one has to take the main responsibility and obviously that the top man
is the President of the United States. But he calls the National Secu-
rity Council in for advice, to give him advice and he calls the Depart-
nient of State in and I just am wondering if, in your opinion, you
think he should not have staff, because I would like to have clarifica-
tion of this-I can nowhere through here find out if the President
or the Secretary of State personally talked to anyone of our leadership
-in Congress, either the Speaker or Mr. O'Neill or Mr. Rhodes or any-
one personally, or if it was all done via the staff which is what your
'letter says.
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266
Mr. INGrRSOLL. Well, on the meeting on the 14th ant 16th. the meet-
ing on the 14th, the President personally discussed this subject with
the leaders that were present.
Mr. WINN. That was when the leaders of Congress went down to
the White House?
Mr. INGERSOLI,. Yes, sir.
Mr. WINN. Of both parties?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I have forgotten the composition but I believe both
parties were represented.
Mr. WINN. Well, if it is what was considered the normal leader-
ship of Congress, it involved both parties.
Mr. INGERsoLL. I remember members of both parties being there but
I do not know the entire complement.
Mr. WINN. You were at the meeting?
Mr. INGERSOLL. No, sir.
Mr. WINN. You were not there?
Mr. INGERSOLL. No, sir.
Mr. WINN. Was the Secretary there?
Mr. INGERSoLL. I believe he was.
Mr. WTNN. Do you want to change that?
Mr. INGERsoLL. He was there.
Mr. WINN. lie was there and the President was there?
Mr. I NGERSOLL. Yes.
Mr. WINN. There is a timelag involved in some of the notification
and we have hit Mr. Miller pretty hard on this, I think, when he first
came on the IIill, what was it, the 12th or 13th-I do not remember the
day, it was pretty early.
Mr. INGERSOLL. The, 13th.
Mr. WINN. The 13th. We had another gentleman the day before
that, didn't we,Mr. Chairman?
Mr. FASCELL. Well, we had a desk officer.
Mr. WIN-x. We had the man that first got the notice in the early
morning hours.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. MILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY OF STATE, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
Mr. Mn.LER. Mr. Rives, Lloyd Rives.
Mr. FASCELL. All he said was he got the message from then on.
Mr. WINN. To Mr. Miller, lie got in touch with you
Mr. MILLER. Yes.
Mr. WINN. I think the committee is trying to work out, and Mr.
Riegle is honestly trying to find out why and what the circumstances
were that involved the loss of 41 men to, directly and indirectly, save
39 men which is obviously subject to criticism.
At the same time I think we are all wondering if the communications
system which we feel involves Congress, is as good a system as we can
develop.
We have already found some big-- discrepancies which probably do
not come under your jurisdiction, and that is in the advance warning
system by the ships. In other words, the Korean and Panamanian
ships were seized and Captain Miller, who was going right through
the same lanes, was not aware of this under any circumstances. Even
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the truckers on our highways know where the speed traps are better
than that and that is only going to cost them a ticket probably.
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that is true.
Mr. WINN. That concerns us. He had a tendency to blame the
Korean Government and Panamanian Government for not making
reports, but I blame our Coast Guard. Somewhere a captain that is
sailing toward an island where trouble has been brewing and where
gunboats have been seizing ships from other countries and we have an
American ship going into those waters, that captain should know what
is facing him.
I suppose that he can change his course, or at least he is well aware
of the possibilities. This is one of the biggest weaknesses that came
out, I think.
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think you are right, and that procedure has been
changed to be sure that ships are alerted in the future for any similar
event.
Mr. WINN. Yes; but 41 guys lost their lives as a part of the overall
deal because of a lousy communications system.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Unfortunately, we find these things out after the
event many times.
Mr. WINN. It seems so simple to me, I mean they tell them the
weather, they know what other craft are coming toward them, and I
have not seen the reports, but they get out a full manual of that. So,
somewhere there ought to be some type of emergency crisis com-
munications that trouble is brewing up around a certain island and
that other ships have been seized and searched.
We were still at the tail end of a war there, and you do not have
to use your imagination, with gunboats running; around and the
Cambodians trying to figure out where their men are and which is-
lands they can seize and which ones are valuable.
I do not think anybody has to be too smart to figure that is going to
happen certainly for a while at the tail end of the war.
Some of those islands we find out now were controlled partly by
Cambodians, the Khmer Rouge and so on. You are going to try to
flush those Cambodians out, and some of those islands are coshared
with the Thai Government.
Mr. INGERSOLL. The Vietnamese, sir.
Mr. WINN. What?
Mr. INGERSOLL. With the Vietnamese Government.
Mr. WINN. With the Vietnamese, but some of the northern islands
are shared with the Thai Government.
Mr. INGERSOLL. This particular island was in dispute between Viet-
nam and Cambodia. I think the fact there were so many ships going
by there daily, it did not appear to be likely they were going to take
all of the ships. 'I certainly agree with you that there should have
been some warning going out, and we have a procedure now which
will make sure the warnings do go out. The Korean ship was not seized
but fired upon, but it got away. I understand that the Korean Govern-
ment did issue a warning to its ships, but no other nation picked up
that warning.
Mr. WINN. That is kind of hard to understand.
Mr.INGERSOLL. Yes.
63-971-76-3
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Mi'. FASCELL. Will you yield at that point ?
Mr. WINN. I will be glad to.
Mr. FASCELL. As a matter of fact, it is a well-known secret, is it not,
Mr. Secretary, that the incident involving the Korean ship was picked
up in the foreign broadcast information service, which is published
and made available and public to everybody. The President did not
find out about it until after the Mayaguez incident was all over, and
he was, to say the least, slightly disturbed about it.
Mr. WINN. I have no more questions.
Mr. FASCELL. Sure; I am sorry.
Mr. WINN. No; I would like to yield.
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Mr. Winn for
the gracious comment he made earlier.
I understand, Mr. Ingersoll, that you were really not a direct par-
ticipant in the decision process in the Security Council?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes.
Mr. RIEGLE. Who were the direct participants?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Mr. Leigh tells ine only the President is involved
in the decisionmaking process. He is the one who makes the decisions.
Mr. RIEGLE. Well, as I look at the meetings here, and there were
five of them, I believe, I think there was one that the President was
not able to attend.
Mr. INGERSOLL. If that were true, it was the one I did not attend.
I do not know whether he was not at that meeting, but he attended
every meeting I attended.
1f t?. RIEGLE. I. think there is one that you missed. and that he missed,
but I assume that is the reason he has other people--I mean he does
not go to the meeting by himself but has other people with him, and
from what you told us, they talked a lot and you did not talk very
much, and presumably the President solicited advice, and he was dis-
cussing it and options were presented and people were advocating
points of view, and out of it came a collective judgment.
Mr. INGERSOLL. No; I do not think it is a collective judgment, but
I think it is the President who makes the decision. This has been my
experience in other meetings. In fact, in some meetings no decision
is made.
Mr. RIEGLE. Were recommendations presented?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes.
Nf1'. RIEGLE. By whom?
Mr. INGERSOLL. By attendees at the meeting.
Mr. Bn or E. Who are you referring to?
All'. INGERSOLL. At the various meetings there were representatives
from the Defense Department. Secretary Schlesinger, I believe, was
at most of the meetings I attended. Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Dr. Kissinger was there. CIA Director
Colby was there, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It varied; it
was (Gorge Brown at times, and then I think Dave Jones was thre
another time-I have forgotten at which meeting.
Mr. RIEGLE. Who presented the recommendations
Ml'. INGERSOLL. The operation of the NSC, the meeting structure, is
that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs usu-
ally summarizes the options and recommendations.
Mc. RTEGLE. Dr. Kissinger?
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Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes; and the other members discuss what has been
presented.
Mr. RiEGLE. Now, when he makes those summary presentations, is
it based on an earlier meeting that has taken place with him and other
members in the absence of the President?
In other words, how does the summary get pulled together that he
then prepares, or does he just do that himself ?
Mr. INGERSOLL. In normal circumstances, where there is time for
preparation in advance, there is another meeting held at which the
President is not present, and Dr. Kissinger usually presides. It depends
upon the issue, but after the Washington Special Group or the Senior
Review Group meet, though the NSC staff provides the briefing for
Dr. Kissinger.
Mr. RiEGLE. In this instance, then, Dr. Kissinger made the recom-
mendations?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Ile presents options. Seldom does he make recom-
mendations.
Mr. RIEGLE. So, are you saying that several options were presented
fora Presidential decision?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, the matter of diplomatic initiative, a matter
of various military actions that might take place and
Mr. RIEGLE. Let us take the military actions because that is the sort
of thing where we should know if more than one option was presented.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, there were, a considerable number discussed,
yes.
Mr. RIEGLE. Was one recommended over the rest?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, there were several, for instance, the marines
were moved from Okinawa to back up those that had come from other
areas.
The various ways of reaching the island were, discussed because
we did not have 'any assets around the island at the time, naval vessels,
aircraft, the Marine helicopters, these were all discussed.
'Jr. RIEGLE. Those are sort of tactical questions that would pre-
sumably fall under a general heading of "military action," if you
decide to take military :action, then how do you do it?
Mr. INGERSOLL. How you carry it out, that is right.
Mr. RIEGLE. So there was some tactical discussion that went on?
Mr. INGE, RSOLL. Yes, Sir.
Mr. RIEGLE. I see, and within the area, were there options other than
military ones considered, as you got to the end of the decision process?
Mr. INGERSOLL. At various times during the meeting, yes; diplomatic
efforts were discussed.
Mr. RiEGLE. After you tried the diplomatic effort and that did not
work, what happened?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Again there was another diplomatic approach.on
Wednesday through the United Nations which was before the orders
were in fact given to move militarily.
Mr. RIEGLE. And have we established why we waited so long to go
to the United Nations? It makes it sound like it was an afterthought.
If we are going to move in with the military we should at least make
an initiative through the United Nations. I think that kind of suspicion
arises when you get the timelag.
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Mr. INGERSOLL. Mr. Winn asked me, that and I said I think the
desire was to get a response directly from the parties concerned that
had been contacted through private diplomatic channels before we
went to a general request to the United Nations.
Mr. R1~.GLr. I)r. Kissinger basically made a recommendation for
some kind of military action and than it was discussed.
Mr. INGERSOLL. No ; I did not say that. I said he p ?esented options.
Air. IIIEGLE. How many options were there?
Mr. IN('.EPSOLL. Well, diplomatic and military I would say is about
all there is.
Mr. RLEGLE. And after the diplomatic initiatives that you made did
not produce anything, then that option fell on the side and you were
then talking about military possibilities.
Within. the military side of it was there more :han one option
presented or just one option presented?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, there were several, you might say, means of
rescuing the ship and the crew that were suggested, yes.
Mr. RIEGLE. Can you describe those for us?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think it is not for me to talk about what other
people said.
Mr. RI LE. You see, I agree with you that we have a problem there
and the, problem is we cannot get the people here who were the heavy
hitters at the meeting. I mean, no disrespect to you but the problem
is that when we ask for witnesses that were directly involved in this
decision process we are not able to get them to testify and they ask
you to come instead. You come because we cannot get them and it is
like a "Catch 22" situation where all we want is an opportunity for
direct conversation but never seem to be able to establish it. So as long
as you have been selected as the intermediary, it seems to be. your
responsibility as someone who was there to tell us what happened.
l\Ir. I.NGEItsoLL. I am reluctant to do so.
Mr. RLEGLE. No, I understand; I realize that is the problem, but
our job is to find out what took place and I do not think anybody here
wants to subpena you or put witnesses under oath or anything of that
kind.
Nov, if you cannot tell us because you are reluctant to say what
someone else said, then we are going to have to get somebody else in
here.
Mr. I NGEasoLL. I think so.
Mr. IhEGLE. ThaItic you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. I1'ASCELL. Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. BITCIIANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, [ am in sympathy with the purpose of these hear-
ings as described by the chairman and I quote, "To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the crisis management operations of our Government in
order to assure that future crises are handled in a way that minimizes
risks to peace and the lives of our citizens," I think that is a very
meritorious purpose.
I am glad to hear you say that we have done something about this
warning system because it does seem to me this is one thing that we
need to do.
Mr. INGERsoLL. I agree.
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Mr. BUCHANAN. A second area I wanted to discuss with the Defense
Department when the Deputy Secretary of Defense is here is the
time lag between our notification that the ship had, been taken captive
and the sending out of a reconnaissance aircraft simply to find out
what the status was. It seems like there was too long a timelag and I
would like to explore it with them.
With respect to the lives lost in this operation, I am constrained
to say that playing numbers games with the lives and rights of
American citizens is just almost beyond belief to me. I would hate
to live in a society in which the firemen would say, "Hey, there is a
guy on top of that apartment, it is burning up and we might lose
three firemen if we rescue him., one life against three, goodby buddy."
I would hate to live in a society in which the police would say,
"There is a gangster holed up with a captive and he has a virtual
arsenal and Nye might lose three or four policemen if we try to rescue
him," and therefore, bid the captive goodby, rather than losing more
lives than we gave.
I would hate to see a situation where the marines would be unwilling
to do what they did and take the risk they took and in some cases
snake the sacrifices they made because in the process we might lose
more marines than the American citizens whose hives they acted to try
to save.
Now, as I understand it, the reason for the loss of life was primarily
because they made the military decision that providing the normal
air cover would run the risk of endangering the lives of the people
they were actually trying to rescue and, therefore, they decided not
to do that and that this is one of the bases for the amount or loss of
lives that occurred.
If you wish, I will bring it up with the Defense Department, but is
that your understanding of the case?.
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that is true. I think for Mr. Winn's benefit,
we should get the record clear that the numbers he cited were not the
result of military action, the 41 lie referred to. A mechanical failure
of a helicopter in noncombat operation happens many times around
the world, not only in our forces but others and I think it is unfair to
include the lives that were lost in the transfer of personnel within
Thailand to be included in combat losses of the marines on Koh Tang
Island. And these figures are cited by the press and I think by this
subcommittee as being part of the, combat operation.
Mr. RrEGLE. Would you yield on that point so we can establish that
figure once and for all and I appreciate the gentleman doing so. I do
not think anyone on this committee suggested they were lost in combat
and I am sure the record would show that is not the case.
I think the assertion had been made, and I made it, was that the
loss of those troops occurred in this whole military effort and, if we
had decided not to take this set of military steps, of which this was
one backup step, then that particular movement of troops would not
have taken place.
Mr. INGERsoLL. There is another thing, it could have happened to
any helicopter.
Mr. RIEGLr. You can say what you want to, but the fact of the mat-
ter is it was related to this operation.
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272
11r. INGERSOLL. I did not say it was not.
Mr. RiEGLE. I did not think you did.
The fact is it was related to the operation and if you want to leave
the numbers off you can do so. I am troubled about the fact the ad-
ministration did not even reveal that information until several days
after the incident took place and it left the impression correctly or
incorrectly that facts were being hidden. It jacked up the numbers
and that took some of the luster off the operation. The fact is, it was
related to the whole change of military events.
Mr. I~c~r:rrsora,. I agree with you, sir, but I say that, it is not directly
related to the combat operation which is the implication that has been
gl veil.
1111'. Bl;cTrANAx. It would appear to me that a defective helicopter
would probably have fallen wherever it was flying and really it is
not fair to attribute that to some mistaken decision on the part of the
United States. Aside from that, I want to reiterate the point I started
to make, I want to repeat as forcibly as I can, I believe it would be im-
moral and cowardly of the President of the United States to say :
If I act in defense of these American citizens in protection Af their rights, their
lives and their freedom, it may cost me more people than I can hope to rescue,
therefore 1 will not act and I will let them go hang.
I think that would be immoral, scandalously immoral, and cowardly
as it basis for decision. I just wanted to register than, as strongly as I
can make it.
Mr. IN oERSOLL. I agree with you.
Mr. I3r.rrr,~rr:~x. I am glad that was not the case. a think. however,
we examine it and whatever kind of color we try to paint it front an
American point of view, there was a need for decisiveness and there
was a need for action and it went well beyond the Mayaguez and the
crew and the number of marines involved. The world needed to under-
stand we would act to defend our interests and our citizens. I think
for a great many of us in the United States, it is quite enough to know
that art a t-ime of crisis we carne up with decisive action in defense of
our people and our rights.
As to \vhether or not this was a deliberate taking of an American
vessel, you have indicated it is a matter of our information that a
number of ships had passed on this same sealane, yet of the three
ships that, were involved in this, one was one of our ,allies in the con-
flic?t ill Southeast Asia which was fired upon and ours was the one
which was in fact seized and the crew taken captive.
l fa v e we conic to the conclusion that the fact that they were A meri-
calls had nothing to do with the way they were handled? Are we ac-
ceptuuii the theory this was just a game of chance and they happened
to be the ones taken, it might just as well have been somebody else?
Mr. iNGERSOLG. I had not heard this until Mr. Wino mentioned it
this 3llor111rrg.
I was not here when Captain Miller made his te~tunony.
Ali'. BrcrrANAN. You know, I am a lousy fisherman but when I go
h 11 inscnrr.. I wonder if you went back and looked at the films that
the pilot. took at that time?
Mr. CLEMENTS. My recollection is that there were no pictures taken,
but I am not sure of that.
Mr. FAsCELL. That hurts me, Mr. Secretary. Here again I am acting
like a layman. I thought DOD is so thorough they would take pia
tures even if it was coal black dark and that the. film. would have it
time indicator on it that would say 11:01, 11:02, 11:03 et cetera so that,
when it got to the gameroom at the Pentagon, the guy could take a
deep breath and say : "Here is my roll. Look at it, br.by." It was black
and white or dark red, but there it is, with the time.
Mr. Cr,as>un,Nrs. My associate, Mr. Abramowitz, tells me I was wrong.
There were pictures taken. I have not seen them and I am not as curious
as you thought I was. The reports that came in from the pilot were
carefully gone over. These were visual. Ile was Owing over this gun-
boat at very, very close range and his reports coming back in were
carefully and thoroughly gone over. I did this personally as did other
people.
From the standpoint of our use at this particular time and with
the time sequence which Mr. Buchanan was talking rhout, I am satis-
fied that we acted promptly, based on those reports as opposed to
waiting for the, photographs. I would not have, wanted to do that. The
photographs were not available at that time.
Mr. Fxscrrr,. I understand.
Mr. CLEMENTS. We had to act on the information we had.
Mr. F,AscELL. I think GAO is trying to find out-and the Chair is
trying to find out-if they are available at. this time.
Mr. CLEMENTS. I am sure they are.
Mr. FA5CELL. I am just curious. I am not assuming that anything
is wrong here. It is critical because the whole operation hangs on the
pilot saying it looks like there are Caucasians on that boat.
Captain Miller told us they are the greatest guy;; in this world-
all those pilots. Not just this pilot but all the pilots. Ile said that guy
carne so close to that boat when they were truing to turn him around
that they were shooting and firing rounds right up to within 10 feet
of the bow. He thought they were pretty good.
Mr. C1.r:arENrs. Our information was that the pilots flew extremely
close to the boat,. And under these circumstances I considered that
their visual evaluation under the crisis management situation to which
you referred was the best information we had available at the time.
Mr. FASCELL. I would not argue that even though it is as difficult
as it is to fly over 100 miles an hour and try to decide anything at all.
Which series of sightings was this? Where was this vessel, the fish-
ing vessel, when the pilot said-which was the first identification-
that Caucasians might be on board? Do you have that handy?
Mr. CLrMENTS. No, sir, but we can get it for you, and we can trace
from his log when he picked up this boat. I can tell you in my recol-
lection that his picking the boat up, his trti:iling it, his trying to stop
it-and it, did stop fora while and lie had it more or less
[The information referred to follows :]
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SIGHTING OF FISHING VESSEL WITH POSSIBLE CAUCASIANS ABOARD
At 2103 EDT an aircraft reported sighting a fishing boat with possible cau-
casians huddled in the bow at 10 degrees 23 minutes North and 103 degrees 18
minutes East. This location is approximately 91/2 nautical miles East North
East of Koh Tang Island. From 2103 EDT until the boat docked at Kompong
Som, approximately 2315 EDT, this boat was under constant surveillance. Dur-
ing this period numerous attempts were made to stop or divert this boat, but
these attempts were unsuccessful.
Mr. FASCELL. I can't remember whether that was between Paulo
Wai a.nd Tang or between Tang and the mainland.
Mr. CLEMENTS. It was between Tang and the mainland. And I want
to add here, Mr. Chairman, that our judgment was, that based on
this information, there were Caucasians on. board. But-and I want
to make a big "but" here-we did not know for sure how many and
that is the key.
Mr. FASCELL. I understand that. You covered that in your testimony
very well. In the range of options which you had to consider in NSC
you had to assume that there could have been in one place or in three
places or in nine places?
Mr. CLEMENTS. That is right.
Mr. FASCELL. But the boat was picked up. I am trying to recall
Captain Miller's testimony. It seemed to me his testimony verified the
fact that the crew was on that boat at that particular time. Am I cor-
rect? Do any of you gentlemen recall?
Mr. CLEMENTS. That is right.
Mr. FASCELL. So, in other words, we have subsequent testimony
which verifies the pilot's information at that time, which was essential
Io decisionmaking in the NSC. NSC had indications that Caucasians
were being moved, and you had reason to believe they were members
of the crew, but you did not know how many or where they were
going.
Mr. CLEMENTS. That is right.
Mr. FASCELL. I keep thinking of this film rolling with the time
indicators in the side sprockets-when was that exactly?
Mr. CLEMENTS. Just a moment. Let me look at my records.
Mr. Chairman, that was 2152-that is, 9 :52 eastern daylight time-
on the 13th. The fishing boat with possible Caucasians abroad was
spotted moving toward the. mainland northeast of Koh Tang Island.
Mr. FASCELL. I would assume it is dark ?
Mr. CLEMENTS. No, sir. That is 12 hours later around the clock in
Cambodia. So that is morning.
Mr. FASCELL. So the time you gave me, 2152, is our time?
Mr. CLEMENTS. Yes. That is eastern daylight time. So, you have to
move that
Mr. FASCELL. I thought I heard you, but I wanted to be sure the
record did.
Mr. CLEMENTS [continuing]. You have to move our time forward
12 hours.
Mir. FASCELL. Which puts me on their time, at what time on what
clay?
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MN[. CLEMENTS. Eleven hours ahead on the 14th, the morning of the
14th.
Mr. FASCELL. So the morning of the 14th, at what lime?
Mr. CLEMENTS. At 8:52.
Mr . FASCELL. So it is broad daylight. And it is in -:he morning. Now,
we picked up that boat?
1[r. CLEXI N rs. 11Ir. Chairman, T want to make sure the record
show:; this because there has been confusion about the time. The rea-
son it is not 12 hours ahead is because we are on daylight saving time
and they are not. Normally, it would be 12 hours.
111'. FASCELL. We picked up the boat at 8 :52 in the morning of the
13th ?
M r . CLEMENTS. Cambodian time.
Al 1'. FASCELL. The time is one of the problems with this whole thin;
so we have to be very careful.
AI r. ('n nnNTS. We have it log here that we would. be happy to give
you.
111 1'. FASCELL. I thought we had already put that in,the record. You
said in response to Mr. Buchanan that you would do that, and I
appreciate that because that is obviously a fuller, more complete, log
than. what we have, which was too general and may have had some
incorrect times in it, too.
MI.% Secretary, I assume from the time we picked up the boat, we
never turned it loose, right? We followed it with oue reconnaissance?
Mr. CLZ;MENrs. No, sir. .[ don't think that is right. At a point,
that, boat went on into the harbor.
]Y[r. FASCELL. I know, but our reconnaissance Followed it all the
way, didn't it?
1l1r. (7LEMENTs. In the spirit you are using reconnaissance, the
answer is probably yes. We knew where the boat generally was.
Al 1'. FASCELL. What does that mean? I have an idea of a guy flying
an airplane wit ii a camera that would pick the, fly specks out of the
paper at 90,000 feet. We find the boat and we think the guys are
on there-and I am assuming when that happened an order went out
and said, "OK, you follow that baby no matter where it goes." Is that
what happened or did something else happen?
Mr. (%mnrENTS. No, sir, I don't think that is wl.at happened. Cer-
tainly, in. the sense of us keeping constant survei lance without any
interruptions and knowing full time, all the time, where that boat was
and where the crew was, that is not true. We did not know that.
Mr. FASCELL. You better tell us what happened now because I am
feeling a little flat.
Mr. CLEMEti rs. Well, for a sequence detailed, I a:n going to have to
lean on some of my associates here to make sure it is correct. May I do
that?
Mr. FASCELL. Absolutely.
Mr. CLru:Mrxvs. Mr. Chairman, we are going to lave to develop for
the record the exact details of how far in that boar was and when we
lost it-because of the proximity to the mainland-or because night
came on and similar details. I just don't have that. But we will provide
for the record to the extent that we have an accounting of that com-
plete sequence.
Mr. FASCrr.L. That would be very useful because it would close some
gaps and also answer some questions.
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Mr. CLEMENTS. That will be fine. We will be happy to do it.
[The information follows:]
DETAILED SEQUENCE OF U.S. EARLY RECONNAISSANCE EFFORTS
A field report transmitted at 2226 EDT on 1.3 May indicated that one 30 foot
craft with approximately 40 people aboard departed Koh Tang Island at 1830
EDT 13 May. The identity of the personnel aboard the craft was not discernible.
Earlier reports had indicated that the crew of the Mayaguez had been trans-
ferred from the vessel to Koh.Tang.
At 2103 EDT on 13 May a pilot observed a fishing boat with "possible cau-
casions huddled in the bow" at 10 degrees 23 minutes North, 103 degrees 18
minutes East. Attempts were made to divert the boat by strafing. From 2103 EDT
to 2255 EDT, when reports indicate that riot control agents were dropped on the
boat, numerous attempts were made to stop the boat or divert it from its course.
However, all attempts to divert this boat from its base course toward the main-
land were unsuccessful.
The boat was observed to reach the mainland at approximately 2315 hours
EDT. Surveillance was discontinued on this particular boat once it arrived in
the port of Kompong Som.
Mr. FASCELL. As I remember Captain Miller's testimony, they went
into the mainland and wound up on an island somewhere just off the
mainland. Am I correct? In order to get on the mainland itself, they
had to cross a bunch of bamboo bridges, or something like that. Does
that ring a bell?
Mr. CLE ME, NTS. Ile went to the mainland first--that is the informa-
tion-and then under the cover of night they were moved to an island.
Mr. FASCELL. I believe that is what his testimony disclosed.
Mr. CLEMENTS. I think that is correct.
Mr. FASCELL. Well, we will doublecheck.
Mr. CLEMENTS. We will make an effort to see what we can run down
from our records.
[The information follows:]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ESTIMATES OF CAMBODIAN STRATEGY
A review of the testimony provided by Captain Miller to the Subcommittee
on International Political and Military Affairs on 25 July 1975 establishes
the following chronology of the crew of the Mayaguez after diversion attempts
of U.S. aircraft failed and the crew arrived on the Cambodian mainland. Times of
these events were not provided by Captain Miller, but are estimated by DOD.
Arrived in Ream :
Were under surveillance by U.S. aircraft.
Tied up at fishing pier (600 persons were watching).
After 1/2-3/.r of an hour, captors were told to move by personnel from
another gunboat.
Estimated time of arrival by DOD sources 2315 hours EDT (1015 hours
local).
Moved down the harbor about II/2 miles and anchored off the beach about 50
yards:
A military compound and prison were located on the beach.
About 60 or 70 aircraft were over Kompong Som and Ream during this
period.
Crew had lunch aboard boat.
The crew and their captors were again ordered to move to island of Rong
Sam Loem :
Houses were built over the water on stilts.
The Second Military Command Post of the Kompong Som area was
based there.
The crew was met at the dock by the commander and an interpreter by
the name of Sam Kol.
Estimates arrival time of mid-afternoon.
After an interrogation they were fed (prior to a radio contact at 0700
hours EDT (1800 hours local) with Kompong Som).
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Mr. FASCELL. We need to get the record straight on that. If we lost
the boat somewhere, we lost it. It just happens. That can happen to
anybody.
Mr. CLENME TS. Mr. Chairman, we knew-when I say we knew,
we did not positively know-we felt it was our judglnc lit that if they
got to the mainland, it was going to compound our difficulties im-
aleasurably.
Mr. FASCELL. I would certainly arrive at the same conclusion, Mr.
Secretary. I would not argue about that.
Mr. (CLEMENTS. We strongly felt that our feeling was correct in
this regard, and we just lost track of the boat.
Mr. FASCELL. No argument. As I recall the testimony, the men of
the crew said they were moved from the mainland to this island in
broad daylight. It was not dark, but the record will disclose that.
But there, is another scenario which reads like this: Some guys
made it to the mainland. We don't know how many. So we know now
the parameters of our problem. We have two islands where we might
have some people, and we know positively or we arc pretty certain
that we have guys on the mainland. They are there. It, does not make
any difference whether they are 65 feet in or 500 miles in. They are
there.
The problem is the same no matter how far from the shoreline
they are. That is a possible scenario. By hindsight, you can't extend
the gift of prophecy to the guys who were involved in the operations.
You can't in this scenario, say they should have kr own. because it
was broad daylight that the crew was moved from the mainland to
the island, and the Cambodians did not have any idea of holding
them hostage. You can't arrive logically at that kind of reasoning.
That would be totally illogical.
Mr. CLEMENTS. We agree.
Mr. 1F'ASCELL. But the point is still valid. If a co iscious decision
was made, Mr. Secretary-and this is what you are going to have
to put in the record for us-if a conscious decision was made saying
they are on the mainland, that is it. Now we go back to the drawing
board and see what we do about it, and that conclusion would have
stopped your reconnaissance.
Mr. CLEMMENTS. No, sir, that is not true, and I will expand upon
that for the record.
The information follows:]
DETERS (NATION OF WIIEREAROUT OF CREW MEMBERS UPON ARR (VINO ON MAINLAND
In answering this question the following factors should be considered. First,
despite reports to the effect that there was a possibility that some of the crew
were on a fishing boat, at no time were aerial observers able to clearly identify
the crewmen nor determine how many personnel were aboard. Second, accord-
ing to previous reports, some or all of the crew had been transferred from the
lieyaguez to Koh Tang Island. Once the fishing boat clocked at Kompong
Som. it was believed that any further action would be unproductive in light of
more pressing requirements at Koh Tang where the majority of crewmen were
thought to be. Although continued reconnaissance of the area was directed.
the fishing boat was not designed as a target of significnn~ interest. The last
known report made identifying the fishing craft at Komp:mg Som was 2315
EDT on 13 May.
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Mr. FASCELL. f could see that as a logical sequence. And you would
say, "Well, yes, but we will still continue reconnaissance over the two
islands."
Mr. GLEMENTS. We had the coverage and the reconnaissance to the
maximum extent possible, in our judgment, not only on the islands
but also on the mainland, but you have to remember there was hostile
action on the mainland, too. We just did not. have completely free
passage in there to do whatever we wanted and--
Mr. FASCELL. Are you talking about air or water?
Mr. CLEMENTS. I am talking about air and not only there. The pilot
plane that you were so complimentary about, was taking hostile fire
when he was doing his job.
Mr. FASOELL. Small arms fire from the boat or antiaircraft from the
mainland ?
Mr. CLnnMENTS. No ; from the boat.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Secretary, I want to get 'back to CINCPAC
and to the initiation of reconnaissance in the first place. You indicate
that you have no information of any report by the tug Bianca to the
authorities in Manila or Subic Bay of this. Would you get somebody
to send a cable out to CINCPAC and see if they ever received such
a message, and supply it for the record?
Mr. CLEMENTS. I will be glad to. I have no recollection of it, but
we will check and make sure. We will provide the cable you ask for.
[The information follows:]
CABLE COMMUNICATION RECEIVED BY DErENSE DEPARTMENT
We have queried CINCPAC and they stated that they did not receive any coin-
munication from the tug Bianca. However, they did receive a message from
our attache office in Singapore which reported that the tug Bannock had received
a distress call from a vessel identifying itself as an American Rag ship named
Marlborough. The report indicated the transmission was not clear. CINCPAC
states that this report was received at CINC'PAC after they had received the
report from our Embassy in Jakarta Indonesia. A copy of the classified message
received by C'INC'PAC and retransmitted at our request was provided.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Jakarta notified at 5:02 a.rn., Washington. As a
part of the system, or is it a part of the system that there would be
any notification of CINCPAC at that point that maybe the Cambo-
dians have made OR with an American vessel? Would that be part of
the system or would it not?
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. A. W. ATKINSON, U.S. AIR FORCE,
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS FOR COMMAND AND
CONTROL, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General ATKINSON. I am not sure I understand your question, sir.
Mr. BUCZIANAN. There is a. report that someone had seized an Amer-
ican vessel within the area of responsibility of CIINCPAC and this re-
port was now coming through official U.S. channels. The embassy at
Jakarta has notified Washington, D.C. At what point, given the
system, would CINCPAC be notified, "Hey, you may have a problem
there, there has been a reporting of the seizure of a vessel in your area
of responsibility"?
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General ATI?`INSON. Normally the first thing that would be done
would be to call CINCPAC and ask them if they had additional in-
formation.
Mr. 13IrciIANAN. Was this done?
General ATKINSON. I can't answer that, sir.
Mr. BUCI IANAN. Will you provide that for the record?
General ATKINSON. Yes, sir.
[TIIe. information followsd
PRECISE TIMES OF NOTIFICATION OF SEIZURE
PACOMI first became aware of the Mayaguez seizure at 0514 hours Eastern
Daylight Time (EDT) on 12 May 1975, approximately the same time the message
was received in Washington. Records indicate that extensive discussions oc-
curred between the Pentagon and CINCPAG; at 0534 hours EDT, 0620 hours
EDT, 0702 hours EDT, and at 0730 hours EDT. Additionally, other consulta-
tions took place by telephone and message throughout the day of 12 May.
All'. ('I.EMENTS. Mr. Abramowitz has a comment.
Mr. AuntMowirz. I can't verify this, but I would assume that the
American Embassy in sending that message to Washington sent it
immediately to CINCPAC.
Mr. BUCIIANAN. I would think, if that is not part of the system,
it should be made so.
Mr. A BTIAl`MOWITZ. I would assume so, but I can't verify that at this
moment.
Mr. 11UCHANAN. I am not any high-powered admiral in the Navy.
I was once an enlisted man in the Navy. Maybe that created certain
prejudices on my part. But, if I were a high-powered admiral in the
Navy and I received a report at 5:02 a.m.-I don't know what time
that is, 4 o'clock in the morning-whenever it is-the time he was oper-
ating, if I received a report, I believe the very first thing I might do is
start making contingency plans for reconnaissance in tae area. Do you
think that would be an appropriate thing for a high-powered admiral
to do?
Mr. (' EMENTS. (Jr not even high-powered.
Mr.11UC IIANAN. No contingency plan, nothing at all.
Mr. CLEMMENTS. I feel here You have to put this in the context of
our normal business, and I mentioned earlier that we get daily from
all over hundreds of reports of incidents or potentially important
developments
Mr. 1BITCITANAN. Every day?
1\11'. (!LE-IrEN^rs I continuing]. And some are valid and some arc not
valid. As an example-and I won't mention the narie-but a very,
very prominent, powerful person in the Middle East, was rumored
to have been the victim of an assassination attempt. Well, it turned
out the, report was completely erroneous, but nevertheless it flowed
through the system and could have caused a real flap if we had reacted
v i of entl v like you are talki n g about.
Mr. BUCHANAN. No. I am not talking about reacting, violently. You
mean You get on a daily basis 500 items comparable to the seizure of
an American vessel? Do you mean you really get that kind of traffic?
Mr. CLEiTENTS. No, of course not.
Mr. BUCHANAN. And false reports or questionable reports?
Mr. CLI:MENTS. But at the same time we have to t_Ike into consid-
eration that-as I have already pointed out-that we (lid have in
exactly the same area two other erroneous reports which were to the
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effect that two of the other vessels had been seized. In fact, neither one
was seized-one was shot at and one was boarded and released.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Isn't that a warning in itself that somebody was
out there bothering somebody?
Mr. CLEMENTS. But we did not have that at that time.
Mr. BUCHANAN. They were not our responsibility. These were not
American vessels in the first place. I must say it strains my credibility
a bit to believe that the Pentagon or CINCPAC would receive on a
regular basis numerous reports of this type that might be subject to
question, so it would be inappropriate to start doing some thinking
about how you are going to handle it if it turns out to be true.
To describe that as a violent reaction-if that is violent for the
military-we have a very pacifist military.
Mr. CLEMBNTS. I think that what we are really talking about here
is a relatively small amount of time. If we had just jumped through
the hoop and done everything that possibly we could have done, we
are only talking about an additional hour or so saved in getting the
P-3 off the ground. Is that what you are talking about? You have to
narrow it down to specify what we are trying to do.
If you are saying-and I thought I had already agreed with you-
if you are saying that we could improve the system, the answer is
certainly yes, we can improve the system. Now, how much we could
squeeze of that 4 hours, I don't really know.
Mr. BUCHANAN. In the first place, according to my recollection,
from 5 c02 to 9 :57 is very close to 5 hours, not 4, but maybe there is
something wrong with my arithmetic in that instance. But where you
have a ship that has in fact been seized and is being towed to a hostile
shore, although it is not a military vessel-civilians, not military per-
sonnel on board-nevertheless you have a situation which might be-
come roughly comparable and certainly so far as the American people
are concerned, very comparable to the Pueblo incident, where you have
that contingency and that possibility having had this one bad experi-
ence just a few years ago, I still fail to see why it would not have been
a reasonable part of the system for CINCPAC to have some kind of
contingency plan to take over, at least to have somebody standing by
for possible immediate departure.
Mr. CLEMENTS. The point is well taken and we will try to improve
the system.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, let me get back to where we were. I
need to know specifically, in my own mind for judgmental reasons,
whether or not we have continuous film and whether it is from one
source or several sources, meaning one aircraft or several aircraft. I
also need to know, Mr. Secretary, how fast that film was reviewed in
Washington, what the procedure is, how it gets here, what the timelag
is, what you do with it. And, again, I want to say I am not being crit-
ical because I have no way of being critical yet. I am just struggling
with the procedures.
We now know there was a photograph of the fishing vessel leaving
Iiompong Sorn Harbor with Caucasians on board. We know that now
from our own film. And they went to Ream Island but obviously you
did not know it at the time. Question. Is that perfectly logical? Was
that because the guy that shot the film in that airplane had to get it
to Washington and it had to be analyzed by somebody-and I am re-
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79R01142A000600060009-8
 Approved FIi Release 2005/01/05 2- RbIA-RDP79R02A000600060009-8
constructing this scenario, I don't know whether it actually happened
or not-but by the time it was processed the incident was over. Or
was it over?
Was it because somebody in interpretations missed that particular
photograph, which is entirely possible if you are looking at. 10,000 feet
of film? You can't see everything. We need to know that. Did that
really happen? What is the timelag here? That brings us back to your
statement in which you say there are obviously improvements that can
be made in our intelligence system, and that comes back to just what
did you have in mind?
I appreciate your saying that. I think it is a very fair statement. I
don't think it imnpinges on your operation one way or the other, but
what did you have in mind in the way of improvement?
[Tho information follows:]
PROi I SSINO OF RECONNAISSANCE PIIo'rooRAP;I Y
The following information concerning the sequence of handling recozmais-
su we photography from the flying of a photo reconnaissance mission to the
utilization of processed photography by policy makers in Washington is
submitted.
The normal sequence of events are as follows :
(a) Picture of target is taken.
(b) Aircraft returns to its operating location (time depends on distance
from target to operating location (OL)) .
(c) Aircraft is downloaded and film brought to photo lab (up to 1 hour).
(d) Film is processed in labor [security deletion].'
(e) Photo interpreter (P1) readout begins and frames are selected for
electronic transmission.
(f) Duplicates (length of time varies) are produced for shipment to
Washington, D.C.
(j/) Chips (selected prints) are prepared for electronic transmission.
(it) Chips are sent to transmission terminal [security deletion].'
(i) Chips are transmitted to CINCPAC and