POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA OCTOBER 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002900430001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
C
hina Political Monthly
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Top Secret
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24 November 1967
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
24 November 1967
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
OCTOBER 1967
Contents Page
I. October Transition 1
II. The Central Leadership 5
III. Current Status of Leading Organs of the
Political System
Politburo
Military Affairs Commission
State Council
Cultural Revolution Group
Cultural Revolution Group of the PLA
IV. The Provincial Situation
10
13
16
19
22
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I, October Transition
October saw a. continuation and intensification of the
drive of the central authorities to restrict and circumscribe
the more extreme aspects of the Cultural Revolution, but by
the end of the month there were signs that extremists were
again attempting to breathenew life into radical policies.
Disorders, which had racked China from end to end in July
and August, remained at a relativelyelow level in October,
and transportation dislocations and other economic disruptions
were greatly reduced. This trend appeared to be a reflection
of the more orderly policies introduced in September, and
tended to confirm reports that the military had taken a more
active and direct hand in maintaining order throughout the
country. Nevertheless, clashes between rival Red Guard groups
and between some of these groups and the PLA never entirely
ceased. By the end of the month and in the first week of
November the number and seriousness of these clashes again
appeared to be on the upswing. The level of disorder, how-
ever, remained far below that of last summer.
A series of central directives coupled with insistent pro-
paganda emanating from Peking in the first three weeks of
October appeared to indicate that the central authorities
were willing to be more forceful than they had been at any
time since mid-March in bringing disruptive Red Guard elements
to heel. Rival groups were enjoined to submerge their dif-
ferences and enter into "revolutionary great alliances"--
umbrella organizations composed of representatives from various
competing Red Guard factions, This line had been a subsidiary
theme of regime propaganda. since the spring, but now leading
spokesmen for Peking--not only relative moderates such as
Chou En-lai and Hsieh Fu-chih, but also "leftists" such as
Chen Po-ta, and Chiang Ching--claimed that establishment of
such alliances was the first order of business in China and
called on the military to assist the Red Guards in this task.
Mao himself endorsed this reversal.
. At the same time schools throughout the country were
ordered to open and students were told to resume classes,
Regime propaganda. put great emphasis on the importance of
a return to the classroom, but no new nation-wide curriculum
was promulgated, Red Guards who had been "making revolution"
in outlying areas were ordered to return to class or risk 25X1
expulsion, and a directive of the central authorities announced
that funds issued to Red Guards in the provinces would be cut
off and Red Guard "liaison stations" disbanded,
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In mid-October there were also signs that Peking was at-
tempting to re-order and strengthen its administrative apparatus.
In stressing the importance of the "revolutionary great al-
liances" Peking renewed instructions that these organizations
were to parallel existing administrative and economic "systems,"
which would tend to make them more easily c-antrolled, in the
pattern of the docile mass organizations functioning before
the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, renewed emphasis
was also placed on the establishment of "revolutionary com-
mittees"--larger catch-all organizations composed of Red Guard
representatives, regular cadres, and military personnel
piaced on the importance of making full use of regular cadres,
and a People's Daily editorial claimed that the cadres were
to formiecore and backbone" of the revolutionary committees.
Moreover, stress was placed on the importance of the role of
the Communist Party itself, for the first time this ye=r.
Nevertheless, Peking's primary instrument in the provinces
remained the PLA. In practice the military dominated the
revolutionary committees and preparatory groups in provinces
where they had been set up; elsewhere (in 14 provinces) the
PLA ruled directly through military control commissions.
Following guidelines established on 5 September, the PLA 'vas
in most places quick to put down overt outbreaks of violence,
and in the cities armed military patrols remained active in
an apparent attempt to keep clashes from occurring. Late in
October these patrols were apparently beefed up in many places;
in Peking they were reported to be operating on a 24-hour
basis. Military commanders played a very large role in the
1 October National Day celebrations, which tended to confirm
the supposition that the central authorities had taken mili-
tary sensibilities into account in ordering a cut-back in
Cultural Revolution activity in September.
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While the military has been reasonably successful in
keeping the level of violence relatively low, the PLA and
the central authorities have had much less success in re-
solving or even significantly reducing the underlying ten-
sions between rival Red Guard groups. Peking's tactic in the
current moderate phase has been to call both conservative and
radical Red Guard groups in a given area equally "revolutionary,"
and therefore capable of entering into the "revolutionary great
alliances" on equal footing. This approach has satisfied no
one, and has been particularly repugnant to the radical Red
Guards, who felt themselves to be the apple of Peking's eye
during the spring and summer. The radicals, who still generally
retain their organizational identity and propaganda outlets,
are almost certainly receiving at least tacit support from
militant leaders in Peking, although no direct evidence of
this has as yet shown up.
Despite the strong words of the central authorities, many
of Peking's instructions are still being ignored by Red Guard
elements, as they were last spring and summer, when less au-
thoritative and explicit appeals to end violence and factionalism
were issued. Peking's continued emphasis on the importance of
ending. disputes and on the necessity of a return to the class-
room strongly suggest that its demands in these areas are
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I un Tibet the a.sa authorities specifically an-
nounce a he regulations concerning a return of students
to their schools were to be "suspended until further notice"
because the local transportation situation made such movements
an impossibility. This attempt to mollify the militant Red
Guards was almost certainly endorsed by the central authorities,
although the impetus for its promulgation may not have origi-
nated in Peking.
The present approach, then, is to end Red Guard violence,
to circumscribe and downplay Red Guard activities, but not to
do away with the militant Red Guard groups entirely--except
insofar as these groups enter into paper "great alliances"
with their rivals. This approach contrasts rather sharply
with that of last February and March, when many militant or-
ganizations were suppressed outright and the Red Guard move-
ment was specifically attacked for "immaturity." This cautious
attitude probably reflects a feeling on the part of the
moderate sponsors of the present policies that their strength
is not great enough to run roughshod over the militant
Maoists in Peking.
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It may also represent a more subtle tactical approach on
the part of the "moderates" than evidenced in February and
March. The heavy-handed suppression of the militants at that
time created wide-spread resentment against the military on
the part of the young radicals, and this resentment was ex-
ploited by their leaders in Peking to hei.p to overturn the
policies of consolidation and retrenchment. The sponsors of
the present line may calculate that a more cautious approach
at this time will eventually defuse tensions among the Red
Guards, but at less cost than last winter.
Despite the care exercised thus far, there are signs that
the extremists in Peking have again begun to accuse the PLA
of being too harsh toward the Red Guards.. A continuing series
of editorials in People's Daily and Liberation Army Journal
in early November have warned that the military needs further
"education" and that PLA elements do not properly understand
mass movements. The most significant of these editorials,
published in Liberation Army Journal on 6 November, warned
military personnel Uiey should not "blindly obey orders"
when those orders conflict with the thought of Mao Tse-tung.
This line is a virtual incitement to disorder and violence,
and was prominently used last spring to exhort radicals after
the February-March pause in Cultural Revolution activity. Other
signs of resurgent radical. activity, such as large-scale poster
attacks on "moderates" and mass demonstrations against promi-
nent officials, have not thus far been noted, although they
were major features of the upturn in militant activity in
late March and April. The present muted attacks on the PLA
may be no more than a trial balloon put up by the Peking
Maoists; nevertheless, they are indicative of continuing
tensions and disagreements at the top-most levels of leader-
ship. Another sign of such disagreements is the charge on
2 November by conservative Red Guards in Tibet that their
radical rivals were attempting to tone down criticism of Wang
Li, a fairly prominent Peking "ultra-leftist" who had come
under attack by all factions in early September.
Although a. number of middle level "ultra-leftists" such
as Wang were discredited in September, prominent radicals--in
particular Lin Piao and Kang Sheng--remain in place and are
active. Articles lavishly praising Lin were a prominent
feature in the central press during early November. These
"leftist" leaders are very closely identified with the radical
policies of the Cultural Revolution, and it is unlikely that
they will permanently acquiesce in the current moderate
policies without further attempts to get them reversed.
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II, The Central Leadership
The Top Leaders
The abrupt switch to a more moderate line in early Septem-
ber suggested that changes of considerable magnitudeohade'
taken place in the Chinese power structure, This impression
was strengthened by the turnout of leaders for National Day
celebrations on 1 October. At this time men who had been out
of sight or in deep political distress throughout much of
the Cultural Revolution were accorded new prominence; others
who had played a large part in encouraging the political
convulsions of the past year seemed to be at least temporarily
in eclipse,
The New Line-up
In the aftermath of the violent disorder of last summer
several Cultural Revolution figures have fallen from favor,
chief among them CRG members Wang Li and Kuan Feng. Some. of
the remaining members may be in jeopardy. These men have been
linked to the "May 16 Corps," the propaganda target charged
in early September with opposing Chou En-la.i and the People's
Liberation Army.
The shape of the decision-making machinery which rules in
Peking, today, imperfectly known though it is, has now almost
certainly shifted quite far from the monolithic mode of opera-
tion of 1965 toward a looser and less predictable kind of
consensus politics. Chou En-lai, who appears to have had
a major role in working out the new policies adopted in Septem-
ber and October, can be expected to bring forward again those
leaders who had cooperated with him in the past but had
fallen afoul of Red Guard attacks, To date, the only evi-
dence that this has occurred at the top levels is the renewed
importance of such figures as Li Hsien-nien and Nieh Jung-then.
A better case can be made at secondary levels.
There were two groups of leaders, both associated with
the moderate end of the policy-making spectrum, whom Chou
attempted to shield from militant Red Guard attacks in January.
One of these groups consisted of five Vice Premiers more or
less consistently identified with the pragmatic policies
championed by Chou: Li Fu-chun, Chen Yi, Li Hsien-nien, Tan
Chen-lin, and Hsieh Fu-chih. Chou?s strong public defense of
the five probably put his own standing in jeopardy, but he
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managed to extract the perhaps reluctant support of Chiang
Ching and Chen Po-ta, who sided openly with Chou in defense
of his subordlnaes. As a result, Li Fu-chun and Hsieh Fu-chih
escaped from tae ordeal unscathed, and the attacks on the
other three abated during the thaw of February and March.
In May they began again, those on Chen Yi and Tan Chen-lin
becoming particularly virulent. It now appears that Tan
Chen-lin was permanently knocked out by those attacks. Li
Hsien-nien, who was never entirely counted out last spring,
has been appearing for the last two months in a position of
renewed importance.
Chen Yi is a special case. The Foreign Minister has
made only two publicly reported appearances since 18 August,
both at National Day observances. He has been conspicuously
absent on other occasions when his normal duties would have
required his presence, and it had seemed quite possible for
some weeks that he had finally been removed after months of
strong criticism from revolutionaries.
Nevertheless, there is now a substantial body of evidence,
none of it yet definitive that Chen may be slated for rein-
statement,
The last reported anti-Chen rally was held on 27 August,
and posters since then have pictured him as one of the victims
of Wang Li and the "May 16 Corps" outlawed in September.I
The second group criticized by Red Guards beginning in
J..Luary was primarily military: two old army heroes and MAC
members, Hsu Hsiang-chien and Yeh Chien-ying, and the head of
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the state's scientific and technical program, Nieh Jung-chen,
who is also an MAC member and Vice Premier. These men were
also defended by Chou, which suggests that they shared his
pragmatic viewpoint. Despite Chou's backing, it appeared by,
May that the roles of the three had been reduced to making mere
ceremonial appearances. According to poster reports, they had
been removed from some posts.
w
Of the three, the only one who appears to have been re-
instated thus far is Nieh Jung-chen, Despite an abject "confes- 25X1
sion" by Nieh and a public defense of him by Chou in January,
been instituted, Nieh gave the main speech at a 100,000-man
rally held in Peking to celebrate the formation of a "revolu-
tionary great alliance" among national defense scientific and
technological units and national defense industrial units.
Most of the top leadership as well as thirty military leaders
were listed in attendance. Nieh's keynote speech at this rally
was his first prominent appearance this year- but he has -
owever, several weeks after the new moderate policies had
peared several times since then
Representatives from the Military
A group of younger military leaders have apparently been
recently included in the policy making machinery. These men
have started to appear regularly at important functions and it
seems probable that they now dominate the military establish-
ment. Key men in this group are acting Chief-of -Staff Yang
Cheng-wu, Vice Minister of National Defense Su Yu, two Deputy
Chiefs-of-Staff--Li Tien-yu and Wang Hsin-tang--a.nd the respec-
tive chiefs of the rear services department, the air force,
and the navy. One point of considerable interest is the con-
tinued presence in Peking since 25 July--in circumstances that
enhance their political status--of Huang Yung-sheng and Chen
Hsi-lien, the commanders of the Canton and Mukden Military Regions.
They may be acting as the spokesmen at the center for regional
leaders. The individual roles played by these military leaders
in making policy is not clear, but their influence as a group
is probably growing.
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Several of the major figures most closely tied to radical
policy during the Cultural Revolution--Kang Sheng, Chen Po-ta,
and Chiang Ching--are still. members of the inner elite and, in
fact, are consistently so listed in all protocol turnouts.
Moreover, all three have publicly endorsee' the drive to re-
store social order which began in September. Nevertheless,
the position of at least one of these--Chen Po-ta--seems to
be somewhat shaky.
Attacks on the ultra-
leftists o the May 16 Corps," which began on 1 September,
conveyed the strong implication that some more important
member of the radical wing of the inner circle was involved.
Chen Po-ta, who has close connections with Wang Li and other
disgraced leftists, has seemed a likely candidate. It is
possible that Lin is using Chen as a scapegoat for the disasters
of the past summer, perhaps in an effort to deflect any poten-
tial moves against his own position.
Other leftist leaders, although less important, are
clearly in serious trouble. Several members of the Central
Committee's Cultural Revolution Group--a driving force in
the Cultural Revolution--fell in early September. Included
in this category are Mu Hsin, Lin Chieh and Kuan Feng, all
of whom have been accused of being sponsors of the discredited
"May 16 Corps." A somewhat more important figure who also
fits into this category is Wang Li--a man who had been given
a. hero's welcome in Peking in late July, following his brief
detention in Wuhan by forces responsive to the recalcitrant
former Wuhan Military Region commander. Wang has not ap-
peared in public since August and has been criticized by other
members of the leftist leadership in Peking, including Chiang
Ching. He has also been under severe poster attack both in
Peking and the provinces since early October. However, in
early November conservative Red Guards in Tibet were accusing
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their extremist rivals of putting up posters defending Wang,
and his "case" may become a cause celebre, to be exploited
by the radicals if they attem_To regain the ground they lost
in early September.
The Apex
In terms of his public image, Lin Piao has suffered no
discernible loss as a result of the policy shift adopted in
September, nor has Mao Tse-tung. Mao is still the near-deified
supreme leader, teacher, commander-in-chief and helmsman,
and Lin was reconfirmed on 1 October as his first deputy and
heir. Although both were conspicuously absent from public
view for most of August and September, Mao has been credited
with conducting an extensive "inspection" tour of troubled
provinces, and has been associated in central directives with
the new policy line. Nevertheless, a central directive issued
in mid-October found it necessary to assure the public that,
contrary to rumors, Mao was alive, in good health and working
in Peking. September's abrupt retreat from the radical
policies with which Mao has long been associated apparently
suggested to some that he was no longer active and perhaps
had died.
While Lin's public statements in September and October
were in general agreement with the more restrained stance
adopted in early autumn, the Red Guard press in at least one
instance has seen fit to publish afire-eating Lin speech
presumably delivered at the height of the radical push of
last summer. Another Lin speech delivered in early August
has recently been approved for wide dissemination and discus-
sion. Moreover, in early November a series of editorials
dealing with problems in the army made a conspicuous point
of lavishly praising Lin--a line that had been noticeably in
abeyance in late September and October. While it appears
that current policy has shifted from the line that Mao and
Lin would probably prefer to follow, their continued presence
at the apex of affairs raises the strong possibility that
they may again press for a radical resurgence of the Cultural
Revolution.
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III. Current Status Of Leading Organs Of The Political
System
In the past year four organizations have usually been
associated with the official directives of the decision-making
apparatus: the Central Committee--which in practice means the
Standing Committee of the Politburo; the State Council; the
Military Affairs Committee; and the Cultural Revolution Group
of the Central Committee. All four of these organs have
suffered considerable attrition in the course of the Cultural
Revolution. These changes are discussed below. In
addition to these four organizations, this report covers
the Cultural Revolution Group of the People's Liberation Army.
This body, though apparently largely inactive, includes in its
membership four of the more important rising younger officers
of the PLA.
Prior to the Cultural Revolution the Politburo was the
locus of power within the Chinese political system. In the
course of the struggle eight of its thirteen members have thus
far been casualties. If the alternate members are included,
eleven out of eighteen members have fallen. An assault of
such dimensions on the most significant political body in China
demonstrates the force of the impact of the Cultural Revolution
on the body politic.
The current full and alternate members represent both the
Cultural Revolution militants (Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and Sang
Sheng) usually associated with Mao Tse-tung, and individuals
thought to be more pragmatic (Li Hsien-nien, Li Fu-chun, Nieh
Jung-then, and Hsieh Fu-chih) and associated with Chou En-lai.
The events since August, especially the attacks upon the more
militant of Mao's aides in the Cultural Revolution Group (Wang
Li and Kuan Feng), leave the relative stature of the militants
in the Politburo in some doubt.
The spectrum of attitudes represented by the membership
of the Politburo makes an analysis of the dominant members
difficult. Recent policy decisions, however, make it quite
clear that some kind of moderate-pragmatic coalition, probably
led by Chou, has achieved at least a stand-off with the radicals
in the policy-making consensus process within the inner circle.
This situation is probably in part a result of more coherent
military opposition to the extremist policies of the past summer.
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(Inactive in parenthesis)
Ace Chairmen
Other Standing
Committee Members
Other Politburo
Members
Alternate
Politburo Members
October 1965
(Formal-1958, less
those who died)
Mao Tse-tung
Liu Shao-chi
Chou En-lai
(Chu TO
(Chen Yun)
Lin Piao
Teng Hsiao-ping
(Tung Pi-vu)
Peng Chen
Chen Yi
Li Fu-chun
(Peng Te-huai)
Liu Po-cheng
Ho Lung
Li Hsien-nien
Li Ching-Chuan
Tan Chen-Lin
Ulanfu
(Chang Wen-tien)
Lu Ting-i
Chen Po-ta
Kang Sheng
Po I-po
August 1966
Mao Tse-tung
Chou En- la i
Tao Chu
Chen Po-ta
Teng Hsiao-ping
Kang Sheng
Liu Shao-chi
(Chu TO
Li Fu-shun
(Chen Yun)
(Tung Pi-wu)
Chen Yi
Liu Po-cheng
Ho Lung
Li Hsien-nien
Li Ching-chuan
Tan Chen-lin
Hsu Hsiang-chien
Nieh Jung-chen
Yeh Chien-ying
Ulanfu
Po I-po
Li Hsueh-feng
Hsieh Fu-chih
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ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE POLITBURO, OCTOBER 1967
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Other Standing
Committee Members
Mao Tse-tung
Chou En-lai
Chen Po-ta
Kang Sheng
Li Fu-chun
Members Li Hsien-nien
Nieh Jung-chen
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MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION
Within the formal structure of the Chinese political
system the MAC still maintains its critical and potent position
as the key military body. In the turmoil of the Cultural
Revolution,however, its membership has been attacked, purged
and revised. Nevertheless, the critical role of the military
in enforcing and maintaining the present relative calm, and
the presence: of more pragmatically oriented individuals on
its board, makes the MAC one of the most important political
bodies in China.
The current group consists of three new members (Hsieh
Fu-chih, Yang Cheng-wu, and Su Yu), and three old members, with
the two top positions being held now--as in October 1965--by
Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao. As Mao is assumed to be the chair-
man ex officio, Lin has been consistently the acting chairman
of tH1s o since 1959. Nieh Jung-chen, 25X1
I is the third current
member of the MAC Who appears to nave survived the Cultural
Revolution. Although strongly criticized by Red Guards, Nieh
appears to have been completely rehabilitated.
The men added to the MAC are Hsieh Fu-chih, who is
primarily occupied with the Ministry of Public Security; acting
Chief-of-Staff Yang Cheng-wu; and Su Yu, the Vice Minister of
National Defense who emerged from a nine year term in political
limbo last fall. Yang and Su have both become more active and
influential during the course of the Cultural Revolution. Both,
however, have been identified with the professional military
structure rather than with the political""officer wing. Both,
moreover, are in their 50's, appreciably younger than the
dismissed members. Thus, the overall effect of personnel
changes in the MAC appears to be in the direction of a younger,
pragmatic professional leadership.
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October 1965
Chm Ex Officio Mao Tse-tung
Acting Chm
Lo Jui-thing
Ho Lung
Nieh Jung-then
Liu Po-cheng
Yeh Chien ying
Hsu Hsiang-chien
Hsiao Hua
MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (MAC)
TABLE II
Mao Tse-tung
Ho Lung
Nieh Jung-chen
Hsiao Hua
Liu Po-cheng
Yeh Chien-ying
Hsu Hsiang-chien
August 1966
Mao Tse-tung
Lin Piao
Nieh Jung-chen
Ho Lung
Hsiao Hua
Liu Po-cheng
Hsu Hsiang-chien
Yeh Chien-ying
(Chen Yi)
January 1967
Mao Tse-tung
Nieh Jung_chen
Hsiao Hua
Hsu Hsiang-chien
Yeh Chien-ying
(Chen Yi)
May 1967
Mao Tse-tung
Lin Piao
Hsieh Fu-chih
Yang Cheng_au
Su Yu
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ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 1967
Chairman ex officio
Acting Chairman
Mao Tse-tung
Other Standing Nieh Jung-then
,.Committee Members Hsieh Fu-chili
Yang Cheng-wu
Su Yu
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STATE COUNCIL
The State Council was, prior to the Cultural Revolution,
the apex of power within the governmental apparatus, but its
position in the political system was overshadowed by the
retention of ultimate political power in the hands of the
party. The destruction visited on the party machinery in the
course of the past year has probably shifted the balance of
political power to some degree, but whatever freedom the
gov-
ernment apparatus may have Y gained as a result was attenuated
d
by Red Guard harassment and the purge within its own ranks.
Attacks on government officials seriously hindered the admin-
istrative apparatus of the country, but several key members
of the State Council appear to have survived this onslaught
under the protection of Chou En-lai.
In the present calm the State Council has become an im-
portant center of moderate influence. Although it is dif-
ficult to assess the degree to which the Council is now
formally operating, it is safe to say that it is directing
the governmental apparatus in one way or another. Because
the active membership of this body is now small,it must be
assumed that much of the work done by fallen vice premiers is
now being discharged by subordinates, and that those men re-
maining on the Council, in particular Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien
and Li Fu-chum, have taken on additional responsibilities.
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MEMBER SIT I P OF TIIE STATE ('01 NU l'
October 1965
PREMIER :
Chou En-lai
VICE PREMIERS:
Lin Piao
(Chen Yun)
Teng Hsiao-ping
Ho Lung
Chen Yi
Ulanfu
Li Fu-chun
Li Hsien-nien
Tan Chen-lin
Nieh Jung-then
Po I-po
Lu Ting-i
Lo Jui--thing
Tao Chu
Hsieh Fu-chih
June 1966 August 1966 January 1967 May 1967
Chou Chou Chou Chou
Lin Lin Lin I-in
(Chen) (Chen) (Chen) (Chen)
Teng Teng
Ho Ho -- --
Chen Chen Chen (Chen)
Ulanfu Ulanfu -- --
Li Li Li Li
Li Li Li
(Li)
Tan Tan Tan (Tan)
Nieh Nieh Nieh (Nieh)
Po Po --
Tao Tao
Hsieh Hsieh
Hsieh Hsieh
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ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE STATE COUNCIL
Lin Piao
Li Fu-chun
Li Hsien-nien
Nieh Jung-chen
Hsieh Fu-chih
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CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP
The primary function of the CRG seems to be to serve as an
executive board for implementing the more extreme goals of the
militant Maoists. In this capacity, the membership in the CRG
has become associated with the militant side of the militant-
moderate spectrum.
As membership in the CRG brought previously unimportant
individuals into the locus of power, it also brought them
into the power struggle. It is difficult, however, to associate
the resultant purge of members of the CRG solely with their CRG
roles. The downfall of Tao Chu, party boss of the Central
South Regional Bureau, and his lieutenants Wang Jen-chung and
Chang Ping-hua in January 1967x--all former CRG members--wras
probably related to their attempts to build an independent
power base in southern China. The purge of Wang Li and Kuan
Feng last month, however, appears to be directly related to
their functions as implementers of militant Maoist policy.
Wang and Kuan had been two of the chief trouble-shooters for
the militants, and had exercised their power in the summer of
1967 by touring the provinces and settling local disputes in
favor of the more militant groups. When the political Ode
began to turn in early September, they were rewarded for their
fervor by being criticizedihd:iater purged. Recently the charges
against Wang have expanded; he is now accused of being a leader
of the outlawed "May 16 Corps," and with supporting Yao Teng-
shan, an extremist who had been brought back from his post as
chargd in Djakarta to lead the struggle against Chen Yi in the
Foreign Ministry. Mu Hsip, who fell at about the same time,
seems to be a direct victim of central power politics. He too
is charged with being one of the leaders of the extremist
"May 16 Corps" that has become the symbol of the militant-
moderate conflict in Peking.
In its year of existence the CRG has suffered a purge of
almost half of its membership, and the policies it has stood for
are presently not being pushed hard; thus its present influence
upon the decision-making apparatus is probably relatively low.
However, some individuals that compose its current membership
are still significant. Official references to the CRG and
public apparances indicate that they remain close to the locus
of power. If the Cultural Revolution should return to its
earlier state of frenetic activity, the CRG members would gain
greater significance. For the moment, however, the leading
spokesmen for the group appear to be adhering to the current
moderate line of the dominant coalition.
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MEMBERSHIP OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP
October 1966
(PORMAL3
C1h>rn Po'-ta.
January 1967
Deputy Heads
Tao Chu
Sang Sheng
Chiang Ching
Wang Jen-chung
Liu Chih-chien
Chang Chun-chiao
Chang Ping-hua
Wang Li
Kuan Feng
Chi Pen-yu
Mu Hsin
Yao Wen-yuan
Kang Sheng
Chiang Ching
Chang Chun-chiao
Yao Wen-yuan
Wang Li
Kuan Feng
Chi Pen-yu
Mu Hsin
Hsieh Tang-chung (?)
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ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP
.r -
Head Chen Po-ta.
Adviser Kang Sheng
1st Deputy Head Chiang Ching
2nd Deputy Head, Chang Chun-ohiao
Members Yao Wen-yuan
Chi Pen-yu
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CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
The public announcement of the reorganization of the PLA
CRG on 11 January 1967 and reports on its activities in the
following two weeks were the only real public manifestations
of its role in the Cultural Revolution. Prior to this time,
and immediately following this flurry of activity, the PLA
CRG has not played a public role.
Compounding the apparent inactivity of the PLA CRG since
the end of January is the high level of attrition suffered by
its membership. Virtually half its membership has been either
purged, severely criticized, or appear to be politically dormant.
Nevertheless, as with the CRG of the Central Committee, many
of the individuals that compose the current membership list are
important figures in their own right or are close to the inner
circle of decision-makers in Peking. The addition of two men-_
Chiu Hui-tso and Chang Hsiu-chuan--to the PLA CRG in late
summer has not clarified the current role of this body.
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CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA CRG)
Table V
11 January 1967
,FOR
Head
Adviser
Deputy Heads
Hsu Hsiang-then
Chiang Ching
Hsiao Hua
Yang Cheng-wu
Wang Hsin-ting
Hsu Li-ching
Kuan Feng
Hsieh Tang-chung
Li Man-tsun
Wang Hung-kun
Yu Li-chin
Liu Hua-ching
Tang Ping-chu
Hu Chih
Yen Chun
*Wang Feng
*Ho Ku-yen
*Chang Tao
Chiang Ching
Yang Cheng-wu
Wang Hsin-ting
Kuan Feng
Hsieh Tang-chung (?)
Li Man-tsun (?)
Wang Hung-kun
Yu Li-chin
Liu Hua-ching
Tang Ping-chu (?)
Yeh Chun
*Wang Feng
*Ho Ku-yen
*Chang Tao
*Appeared on the formal list, but were never mentioned after 11
January 1967.
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CURRENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION GROUP OF THE
M-B"IMM R
Head
Adviser
Deputy Heads
Wu Fa-hsien
Chiang Ching
Yang Cheng-wu
Wang Hsin-ting
Chiu Hui-tso
Chang Hsiu-chuan
Yeh Chun
Wang Hung-kun
Yu Li-chin
Liu Hua-ching
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IV. The Provincial Situation
There were few major changes in the provinces during
October. The military dominate the leadership in virtually
every province in the country (Heilungkiang is a conspicuous
exception). "Revolutionary Committees"--organs composed of
representatives of the Red Guard "revolutionary" groups,
regular cadres and the military, but in fact controlled by
the PLA--have been established in six provinces and in the
independently governed cities of Peking and Shanghai. The
regime has indicated that these bodies are to become the
governing bodies at the provincial level, and that similar
bodies are to be established at lower levels as well. Several
cities have already formed revolutionary committees of their
own. Five or six provinces have formed "preparatory groups"
that are eventually to lead to the establishment of revolu-
tionary committees. The military also dominate these bodies.
The remaining provinces are governed directly by the PLA
through Military Control Commissions.
Most revolutionary committees and preparatory groups
were set up prior to the September policy shift. Only two
changes have been noted since then. On 1 November a revolu-
tionary committee was formally promulgated in Inner Mongolia.
Announced leaders show no significant change from the
preparatory group previously in existence in Inner Mongolia.
According to a radio Lanchow broadcast, a preparatory group
was set up in Kansu on 5 November. In fact, earlier Lanchow
broadcasts and an NCNA account of National Day proceedings
in Lanchow indicated that this group has been in existence
since early August; the new announcement showed no change in
the leadership lineup. It would appear that the new announce-
ment was designed to suggest a sense of movement toward a
more stable and regularized situation in the province although
no such movement was actually taking place.
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Next 85 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY REGIONS
NORTHEAST
TSINGHAI
Lerocnou
41
NORTHWEST
SOUTHWEST
SZECHWAN
e^Ch'eng to
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UNIVAnI
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>IS!nan ?isingtao-
SHANTUNG
Chen3--thou
HONAN
HUPEH -%
Wu2h'an
CENTRAL-
SOUTH
Chang hn c
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F
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z2 r~t~oSe eh _
AS HV,EIN('
Hanvrhnw
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into (FUOChOW~
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Top Secret
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