LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JAMES FORRESTAL FROM W. STERLING COLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 2, 1947
• Content Type: LETTER

The Honorable James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.-
CORRESPONDENCE RE H.R. 2319 and H.R. 3469
April 2, 191+7.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
You will recall that on February 27th, in.reply to an
inquiry from me, you wired that no orders had been issued
to the members of~the Naval Service to support the agree-
ment made by yourself and the Secretary of War, relative
to the pattern of merging the military forces of the
nation..
In private conversation with Naval officers, I, find that
there is a general feeling of reluctance among them to
speak critically of the proposed plan.. This feeling is
so genuine that they refuse to express themselves even
in private conversation and certainly will not be critical
is denied,
military services withhold their views on the problem,
especially"those which may be critical of the proposed
plan,:'to that same extent full and. thorough consideration
in any testimony they might give to a Committee of the
Congress on the question.
d For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020
:: am aure.;thatouu.agree with me that any fundamental
reorganization-at our military establishment is of so
grave importance that.its implications should be explored
an&.considered thoroughly from all angles before a change
I m a d e . , , To the extent.that career officers of the
poses of publication.
Accordingly,, if it is the fact that Naval officers are free
to express their views on the cuestion, I think it highly
desirable for you to make suitable expression, either by
way of public statement or reply to this letter for pur-
With kind regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) W. Sterling Cole
NAVY review(s) completed.
10 April 1947
The Honorable W. Sterling Cole
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.
Dear-Sir:
Thank you for your letter of April 2, 1947.
I wish to assure you of my whole hearted con-
currence with your thought that all persons in the
military service should be free to express their
personal opinions on the important questions of funda-
mental reorganization of our military establishment.
In promulgating the agreement between the War
and Navy Departments which the President announced on 16
January,, I advised the naval service that the reorganiza-
tion plan was deserving of the support of all within the
naval service, In a later letter I expressed the hope
that study and consideration of the plan would lead all
in the naval service to conclude that it deserved their
support.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 Approver f or Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-p
As you know, the traditional policy of the Navy
Department is that every person in the naval service is
at liberty to voice his professional and personal opinion
on any subject when testifying before a committee of the
Congress or when engaged in private conversation.
I assure you that it is not my intention to
attempt to alter this policy. I know you will agree
with me that the public office which I hold in no way
empowers me to abridge the constitutional right of free
speech which every American citizen enjoys.
I appreciate your interest in clarifying this
Sincerely,
(Signed) James Forrestal
May ?2 , 1947
data, unite.,or merger the armed services.
by naval.-officers on- the pending proposal to consoli-
The Honorable,James Forrestal
Secretary of. the_ Navy.
Wahingt an,r ;
This, yia ins further reference to the question of
Departmental control over the expressions of opinion
and not given under pressure. So far, in the considera-
tion of the proposed legislation, only four professional
naval officers have testified. These four have been ver"T
thought that all persons in the military service should
feel free to express their personal opinions on the
important question of fundamental reorganization of our
military establishment. Permit me to extend my
genuine compliments to you for the very fair attitude
which you have-taken in this regard.
Now, the problem seems to be one of implementing
your declaration in such fashion that officers who might
be in disagreement with the merger proposal, will freely
voice their thoughts without fear of reprisal. While it
maybe true that it is the "traditional policy of the
Navy Department that every person in the naval service is
at liberty to voice his professional and personal opinion
on any subject when testifying before a committee of
Congress", the navy regulations prohibit any officer
from applying to Congress or any Committee or Member
thereof for Congressional action of any kind and, further,
they prohibit all remonstrances from any officer to
Congress on any subject of legislation relating to the
Navy'or the Marine Corps except by authority of the
Department. In vidw of these provisions of the Regula-
tions and ALNAV #21 which states that the merger plan
"is deserving of the loyal and wholehearted support of
all within the Naval Service", no member of the naval
service feels that he is allowed any latitude of expres-
sion. Certainly, the expressions made in your letter to
me of April 16, laudable though they are in themselves,
do not provide an official basis for unrestricted self-
expression by navy people on the merger question.
Any legislation, so vital as this, concerning the
military forces of the nation is so important that the
Congress must have professional information freely given
In your, reply to me of April 16, 1947, you give
assurance of your whole hearted concurrence with the
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
I.PP -
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
closely identified with the official policy of the Navy.
It is very questionabl
t
e
o my mind whether the official
policy of the Navy truly reflects the opinion of the
majority of the professional and reserve officers. It
is my belief that not less than 90% of these men are
opposed to this legislation in its present form - and
yet they dare not say so.
I am definitely unwilling to cloak those of the
.services who favor the proposal with a mantle of patrio-
tism, unselfishness and wisdom and at the same time
require those who disapprove the proposal to stand naked
in treason, selfishness and ignorance. Both groups
must be credited with the same degree of sincerity of
purpose and capacity of judgment. To be qualified to
pass upon this vital matter, the Congress must have the
truth and the truth cannot be had when only one side of
the matter is allowed to be expressed.
It is my present purpose to make inquiry of various
,responsible and prominent officers of the services in an
effort to b
t
arn
heir attitude on this question. In
order that they may have the freedom of.expression which
they and the question they discuss deserve, I respectfully
ask that the declaration contained in your letter of
April 16 be embodied in an immediate ALNAV, or that the
equivalent. be expressed by you b
lett
m
e
y
er t
,
upon' to
which Publication.,. will free the men of the service to speak
their minds.: Both you and the Congress owe this much to
them and the
t
coun
ry
The principlesinvolved in thi
s controversy are so
profound and the issues at st
k
a
e are so vital to the
security of our country that no element of pride, position
or ambition of an
i
di
y
n
vidual or group connected with it
should be allowed to color either n""-4"A
t
gmen
or our
courage.
The Navy in years gone by has possessed a high prestige
in Congress. Its great achievements culminating in victory
during the war just ended has elevated its prestige to the
highest position it has ever had in the minds of the people
and of Congress. I do not want to see this enviable
reputation lost or marred. It is, therefore, in this
spirit that ,I am again writing to you with the hope that
the same spirit will command your reply.
Very respectfully yours,
(Signed) W. Sterling Cole
M. C.
10 May 1947
My dear Mr. Cole:
Until I received your letter of May 2, I was under
the impression that it was generally recognized, as I said
in my earlier letter to you, that "every person in the
naval service is at liberty to voice his professional and
personal opinion on any subject when testifying before a
Committee of Congress."
I believe that anyone reading the recent testimony
of Admiral King, Admiral Halsey, Admiral Hart, General
Vandegrift, and General Edson will reach the conclusion
that officers of the Navy and the Marine Corps not only
possess-this liberty but also exercise it.
-3-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
As regards private conversations there has been no
restraint laid upon officers of either the Navy or the
Marine, Co.rpa and no denial of the right",&-express their
o
x
al~v
n
pe
e
iews on this question. It is true that I
issued. an ALNAV under date of '18 January 1947 sa
in
th
t
y
g
a
_ support of the Bill S. 758 and H. R. 2319 would be the
official position of the Navy Department and that I
'sinerely hoped the bills would command the support of.
all hands. . By implication this might cause some to be
reluctant to express their views in private conversations.
But realistically, I doubt if this assumption is soundly
based because in the cases of those persons.who disagreed
with- the. officially expressed policy of the Navy Depart-
ment eilerice.could be just as effective an instrument of
disagreement as speech. In other words, I am aware that
there is no way, nor should there be under our form of
government, of denying the right of opinion to anyone be
he??civil,ian or.service individual.
1-have tried to dissuade naval personnel from solicit-
ing:. the time of Members of the House and Senate to express
their views on this subject because I regard it as inappro-
priate for members of the Services to seek out Memb
r
f
e
s o
Congress in order to present their individual opinions.
Th
i
ere
s a proper pla f th
..ceore presentation of such
opi?Qne and that is in the Committee hearings.
V,, To sum..upt ` ' ere ?is no denial of free speech on this
or any other subJeot to officers of the Naval Service or
the;. Marine- Corps.. On the other hand
I shall continu
t
,
e
o
do my best to persuade these men that the proposed legis-
?lation constitutes- a desirable and imperative improvement
in
l
p
anning for ourtil
naona security.
Sincerely,
(Signed) James Forrestal
May 27, 1947
Dear Admiral Doe:
As you know, the?Congress has under consideration. & bill
(HR 2319) which represents the plan of the War and Navy
Departments relative to the consolidation of the armed
services, pursuant to the directive of the President.
In my opinion this is the most important measure to come
before the Congress so far as our national defense and
national security are concerned.
While it is true that the official position of the Navy
.Department is in support of the plan, substantial critical
and apprehensive expressions on the subject have come to
me from responsible persons in all of the services. As
a practical matter, it is impossible for all of those wh)
are vitally .interested in this problem from the standpoint
of national security to appear before an appropriate
committee of the Congress to give expression to their
views. Accordit.r3gly, my purpose in,writing you is to
seek an expression as to your judgment and recommendations
with regard to the proposed plan, or an alternative plan.
A copy of H. R. 2319, and also of H. P. 3469, the latter
representing my own personal suggestion of an alternative,
are enclosed.
I am sure that all will agree that some steps should be
taken in order, to bring about a closer co-ordination of
army, navy and air force operations. The pattern of this
step is the important factor. Because of your knowledge
-4-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP90=00610R000100020007-8
ofthe subject and your years of service experience, I am
seeking'your.advice.
Also, Qnclosed herewith are copies of communi
ti
ca
ons ea-
changed between the Secretary of the-Navy and myself with
re
ardt
th
g
o
e latitude of expression available to members
of the service. From this exchange, I hope you will find
it possible to express yourself freely and without hesita-
tion. If it is your wish, your response will be held by_
me as confidential; otherwise, I shall feel free to release
your expression to the Congress.
In-view of the fact that action may be taken by the Congress
on..,-this subject in. the near future, I hope that I may have
the benefit of your reply at an early date.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) W. Sterling Cole
M. C.
Pi-S. What=is the opinion of the men in the service on this
1% ii - 4- 4 .,w n
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approvedor Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-
REPLIES TO COLE LETTER OF INQUIRY
"My personal conclusions are that:
"(a) Much effort and study has been put into obtain-
ing the agreements resulting in H. R. 2319, by men of the
broadest war and administrative experience, and of the
highest integrity.
"(b) More good to the services and to the country is
to be gained by settlement of this question, as agreed upon
by our qualified leaders, in stability of organization and
a resultant spirit of co-operation, than is to be gained by
re-opening the study of the form such an acknowledged need
for improved co-operation should take.
"In answer to your question regarding the opinion of
the men of the service, my impression is that we can obtain
near y as many answers as the number of men questioned."
"My experience in the
l
settin
ast war indicates to me that the
g up of a new
separate
d
,
an
distinct Air Force, as
proposed. by. R. 2319,_ Would.ultimatel
which aggravate we. oxpert.;eneed.. from time to tim
h
s
e duringthe
last
war.
(although I must: say that I believe these instances of die-.
unity were exaggerated). It is obvious that a separate A'r
Force wouldconstitute a thi
rd entity which would engages n
a struggle for prominence and authority with the Army. and
Navy..
"I have`alweye felt th
t
a
unity a good deal of the lack of
of command in the field could have been avoided if
the practice had been foll
ed
ow
of ordering all subordinates
on duty in a certain area to report to the Area Commander
in the roll of oubord nates, i.e., if, for example, all
Army, Navy and. Marine Corps, Officers in Admiral Nimitz' area
had. received orders directing them to report tooAdmiral
Nimitz for duty and if it were clearly understood that all
such officers were in th
e same status and if all orders fron
Washington, intended for these subordinate officers,.would
.have come to Admiral !imitz, I believe that cofdiit-ions Iaoulc
have been improved.
"Perhaps I am venturing too far in this belief, but that
is the impression that I obtained from my travels to the
various combat areas. There was too much direct communica-
tion between Washington and Subordinate Commands in the area,
"I have felt, too, that the organization of a separate
Air Force must inevitably lead to additional expense without
commensurate increase in efficiency."
"I feel that in the best interests of national defense,
no bill should be enacted which would go beyond the pro-
visions of HR 2319 as written, or which would extend over
into the field of actual physical "merger" of elements of
the armed forces or of their integral su
I believe that such legislation would bringraboutsfullces.
coordination of the functions and operations of the
separate branches of the armed forces, and insure that all
feasible and justifiable economies would be realized.
"I would have no objection to an
bill which embodies the forma oin y reasonable alternative
to be basic, i.e., "effective coordination" without features
of merger"merger"."
Approved For Release 2066/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approvedor Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-(
"When I have studied H.R.3469, I will make further
reply concerning the Bill.
"With respect to H.R. 2319: I testified before the
Senate Armed Forces Committee on the companion Bill, S--"58P
and expressed my support of that measure, with certain
reservations; as Deputy Chief of Naval Operatione (Logistics).
my principal concern was with the logistical aspects of any
measure dealing with unification of the efforts of the
armed forces. The views that I expressed were my own, and
I stated that I was not instructed.
"The hearings on S-758 later convinced me that several
interpretations were being
lac
d
p
e
on the language of the
Bill, and that there was no certainty that the intent of the
language would be fulfilled by the Bill as written, nor
maintained without infringement should the Bill, as first
written, be enacted. I understand that S-758 may be modi-
fied by a preamble and certain safeguarding language designed
to remove the possibility of unintended interpretations or
infringement, but have as yet no first-hand knowledge of
any such new language.
"I firmly believe that the m
t
os
efficient and economi-
cal use of all of our national resources and strengths mist
be aought in. these days of
o
t
tal war and mass dostructiont
however; I also feel convinced that the measures and
techniques which crushed our en
i
em
es in 1945 must not be
abandoned in favor of untried theories. With those two
ideas., in mind, I strongly support (a) the theory tivecoordination at the polic l
?f effec-
y evel, b retention
of such war-tested agencies as the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Munitions Board, and (c) the autonomy of the
several Services within the framework of top-policy coordina-
tion. My meager political experience limits the value of
any opinion i might have as to what the organization
should be for effecting top-level policy coordination, bu-,
I am prepared to state my views on logistical implications.
"I appreciate your thoughtfulness in offering to hold
my response to your letter as confidential, but I do not-
wish to take advantage of your offer inasmuch as these are
freely expressed opinions voiced at the invitation of a
Member of the Armed Services Committee.
"With respect to your final question, I am unable to
make any worthwhile estimate as to th
e cross-section of
Service opinion in this matter other than to say that of
those with whom I have talked there is virtually unanimous
objection to merger, a single department, and the vesting
in a single Secretary of any power enabling him to
arbitrarily assign or change the roles and missions of
the Services or their components."
"I doubt that I will be able to make any substantial
contributions or submit a proper evaluation of the proposed
plan. 1feel that the Marine Corps has been most ably
represented before the committees of the Congress by our
Commandant, General A. A. Vandegrift."
Approved For Release 2003716722 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 ,'Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061'0R000100020007-8
"To me it appears perfectly legitimate for an indi-
vidual to present his views in writing to a Committee or
a member thereof when such action is initiated by the
latter and,. for whatever reason, conversations and appear-
ance before the Committee are not possible nor desirable.
"'his feature is not covered by.the o-orrespondence
enclosed with. your letter of 19 May. Does not clarifica-
tion on this, point seem to be in order if you are to
obtain the free expression of views which you seek?"
"As you suggest in your letter, no thinking person
will contest the need. for closer coordination of the
elements of national security. The problem confronting
the Nation:.today is that of finding an effective, economical,
and democratic method of effecting such coordination. In
my.,opinion H. R. 2319. is not a satisfactory answer to the
problem..
"It has frequently been claimed in support of H
2319
R
.
.
that- coordination of the military departments and the armed
services can come about only through the establishment of
an office with complete authority over these departments
and 8servtoea,k_. n .The, same argument might equally well be
applied`. t:o :any'. combination.:of Government departments which
.are requires to'closely coordinate their activities. But
I have_hheart no demands.for unification of such other depart-
men to. under:. "a,super-secretary. The fact is, of course,
that :1th.ere. i3: already In-existence a common head for all of
the executive--departments - the President. If the cooraiaa-
tion.ot.the executive departments exceeds his capabilities
,
.then," the 'proper answer would seem to be to give him the
necessary assistants - call them coordinators if you will -
to do the job.. It does not impress me as-good management
to inject a new echelon of command to solve every new
problem of coordination.
"I regard the building of super-departments and the
creation of super-secretaries as unnecessary, even
undemocratic - a poor solution to a management problem and
a dangerous one. The concentration of power in non-elected
hands is_an unsafe road for a democratic nation to follow.
"The provision for a National Security Council to serve
as the principal advisory body concerned with matters of
national security is basically sound, in my opinion. This
is an age in which warfare directly affects every segment
of the population and every element of the national life.
The Nation'al.Security Council should bring together the
diverse viewpoints of these elements and insure that
security measures truly reflect the national interests in
the broadest sense. Unfortunately, the composition of the
Council as proposed by H. R. 2319 is not such as to achieve
this purpose. The membership of the Council must be con-
siderably broadened if it is to do so.
"Broadening of the membership of the National Security
Council would also have the very desirable effect of dims-zish-
ing its military complexion. Under H. R. 2319 four of tie
six named members of the Council are spokesmen of the mili-
tary departments. I doubt if anyone will be so naive as `10
assume that their viewpoint would be a civilian viewpoint,
"The Central Intelligence Agency is open to the same
criticism of undue military influence. Such an agency has
considerable capacity for harm unless it is under firm
civilian control and its functions circumscribed by law.
-8-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
"I have no comment to make with respect to the National
Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board except to
state that I have observed considerable difference of opinion
over the relationship between these two bodies. Since this
relationship involves the important question of civilian
versus military control of the national economy in time of
war or emergency,'a concise.definition of the relationship
seems most desirable.
coordination of the military departments as a proper function
either for the National Security Council, which has a broader
function, or.for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
tion of the military departments. I do not regard the
were eliminated, on the other hand, the War Council coull
serve a most useful purpose as the agency for the coordina--
"The provision of H. R. 2319 for a War Council seems
to me to be unnecessary. I can see little purpose in
.establishing a War Council so long as a Secretary for
National Defense is permitted to exist. If that functionary
"The.prop.er functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
these functions be perpetuated.
which. the 'Joint Chiefs of Staff performed so ably in the war
just ended. I -regard it as essential that this body and.
military departments in any way. They are the same functions
the preparation of strategic and logistic plans, the estab-
lishment of unified field commands, and the strategic direc--
ti'bfi, of the' field commands. These are purely military
functions, and do not extend to the administration of the
"I: cannot aiibieribe, however, to the need for or the
Staff for assistance in the performance of Its functions.
"The perpetuation of the existing Joint Research and
Development Board as the proposed Research and Development
Board is a sound provision, and one which should be incor-
porated in any legislation for the coordination of the
armed services.
"charged with clerical and administrative duties should
adequately meet the requirements'of the Joint Chiefs of
desirability of a Joint Staff to serve the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, From my study of the history of, national general
staffs `I am convinced that such staffs are an instrument of
militarism and a menace to democratic governments. I there-
fore, believe that provision for a Joint Staff should be
,eliminated from the proposed legislation. A secretariat
"Coming now to the armed services themselves, it is my
belief that an independent air force should be established
under a separate Department of the Air Force. The exercise
of strategic air power,.including the defense of the United
States and its possessions against aerial attack, should no
longer be hampered by treatment as an element of land power
or sea power. It is a distinct and separate element of over-
all military power and should be treated as such.
"I cannot subscribe, however, to any philosophy which
would place all military aviation in a single air force. To
do so would be to flagrantly disregard one of the most
important lessons of the recent war - the lesson that the
ground forces and the naval forces must each possess their
own aviation components if they are to operate effectively.
Close support aviation is an essential element of land power
and an inseparable component of an effective ground force.
By the same token naval aviation is an essential element
of sea power -- perhaps the most essential element -- anti an
inseparable component of an effective naval force.
"The same philosophy which dictates that the naval
establishment should contain the necessary aviation to make
it an effective force for the exercise of sea power, also
requires that the Marine Corps be maintained as a part of
that establishment. History offers countless instances of
the truth of thin etataent.'here is no evidence that 't3
validity will be diminished in the foreeeable future.
Approved For Release 2003/10/229_ CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approve or Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8(
"Along with many other Marine officers who have had
the opportunity to study the pending unification proposals,
I am greatly concerned over the future combatant role of
the Marine Corps if H. P. 2319 should be enacted in its
present form. The vulnerable position in which the Marine
Corps will be placed by enactment of this bill has been
pointed out repeatedly in the course of the past few months.
It is this position of vulnerability, coupled with expres-
sions of intent such as those appearing in the 1478 series
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which arouses the fears of
Marines and their friends throughout the country. These
fears will be set at rest and their substance removed only
when Congress spells out in unmistakable language the future
status and functions of the Corps.
out. for each service a'clear-cut field of endeavor.
"I can. offer no suggestion which would improve the
statement of Marine Corps status and functions which
General Vandegrift, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
incorporated in the amendment which he submitted to the
Senate and House Committees considering unification. I
think it would be appropriate if Congress were to enact
similar statements of basic functions for all the services.
I can think of nothing which would do more to promote
future harmony among the services than legislation marking
P'oeseseing the views which I have outlined herein. I
a substitute for S. 758) the Senate counterpart of H.R. 23l9.
I have studied Senator Robertson's bill, S. 1282, and am
of the opinion . that ?it . is an admirable instrument for
national security.
"I have also given careful attention to H.R. 3469
which you have offered as a suggested alternative to H.I.2319,
and I am pleased to observe that your proposal also eliminates
many of the objectionable features of H. R. 2319. Inasmuch
as S. 1282 coincides more nearly with my views, however, in
that it provides for a War Council, establishes a separate
Department of the Air Force, and spells out the functions
of the armed services in what I believe to be the necessary
specific terms, my preference is for S. 1282 rather tha--,i
for H. R. 3469.
approximation to the ideal solution has been achieved by
Senator Robertson in the bill which he recently proposed as
that the problem is solvable, however, and that a close
problem confronting the Nation today -- that of achieving
the closer coordination of the elements of national secarit~y
in an effective, economical, and democratic way. I believe
be enacted in its present form.. It would require extensive
alteration of this bill.to arrive at a real solution for the
would consider it most unfortunate if H. R. 2319 were to
"In closing, I wish to thank you for the opportunity
you have accorded me to express my views on this important
subject. Again let me say that I have set forth my
personal views -- that I do not flaunt them, neither do I
have any desire to conceal them."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 :pJA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 Approve for Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8t
"On a subject of this nature it would be necessary
to interview a great many men to obtain a completely
accurate cross section of their views. I will, there-
fore, confine myself to those things which I have heard
.specifically mentioned by men in discussing the possibility
of unification. The majority of them agree that unity of
command is absolutely necessary but the following questions
invariably arise. (1) Are we justified in changing a ey:3tem
which worked efficiently and won the last war ? (2) Is
this the time to experiment and adopt a system, which, more
or less, was the one used by the Axis nations and which
proved a failure ? (3) Will there be any real economy
either in personnel or money ? (4) Will it create more
efficiency ? (5) Will oust national defense and security
be improved.?
"These are questions which can only be answered in
years to come, but you and the other members of Cor_grese
will have to make the decision which is so vital to-the
security of our country."
"With VJ day we emerged from the most devastating
war in the World's history, victorious over the stron
st
ge
enemies, in both an..absolute and relative sense, which
tha United States had ever faced. It seemed to many of
us'i
th
n
e Navy that thti th
e naon,e home front, the Armed
Services, and the Navy itself could well be proud of
this. achievement. It seemed to many of us that the war
making organization of our country had been thoroughly
tested, and within thelimits of human fallibilit
had
y
, .successfully passed that test, and therefore required no
radical. change to an untested organization. It seemed -Lo
many of us in the Navy that the war had brought a high
measure of appreciation and sympathetic understanding and
ability to cooperate among every element of the U. S. war
machine - including the civilian home front, the Army, the
Army Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard,
naval aviation, submarines, surface ships, amphibious forces.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.
"To our astonishment then, instead of an atmosphere
of mutual congratulation and good will and a determination
to continue the teamwork which had proved itself so success-
ful, the Navy found itself the target of an unrestrained
and intemperate attack, the object of abusive and extrava-
gant criticism with little regard for facts, logic or
reason in the charges that were made, emanating chiefly
from a certain element of a sister service whi
h
c
apparently
had devoted considerable effort, not to say expense,
before V-J day to planning an anti-Navy campaign while the
Navy was devoting all its energies to bringing about a
successful conclusion of the war.
"My only purpose in raking over these dead ashes is to
make the point that it all brought about a serious deteriora-
tion in the relations between the services, and therefore
impaired their ability to cooperate, and therefore weakened
the total of our military strength in the face of a serious
international situation which required unity and not dissen-
sion in the United States and especially in the Armed
Services of the United States. And this situation made .Lt
imperative that the wounds be healed, that some sort of
compromise be reached.
"As one who had no direct responsibility and no direct
part in the drafting of what has since become the substance
of HR 2319,. it seemed to me that, with minor reservations,
this bill represented about as good a compromise as could
be hoped for. I don't like it. I prefer the present
organization (with legislative authority for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and Central Intelligence). I don't i!c
SIR 2319, but at least it was arrived at by "democratic
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
-11-
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
process" of give and take, it was a compromise and it gave
promise of restoring the brotherhood-in-arms.of the various
elements of the Armed Services.
"As to HR 3469, 1 prefer that in principle to HR 2319
though my first preference is still the present organiza-
tion (with legislative authority for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Central Intelligence and comparable coordinating
agencies in other fields). It is most important, however,
that (a) the breach between the services be healed and
(b) that a firm decision be reached quickly. The particular
compromise, if any, which will beet effect these results is
the problem. If it were to be decided by a sort of Gallup
poll I should vote for the present organization. States-
manship might produce a different solution, possibly
n 3469 or HR 2319."
moo em, coordinated by a Director of National Defense,
than a, virtual,_three department system."
c
P e I feel that the national welfare will be
better served. by-iclose cooperation under a two department
t
, n effect, produce far more economies, and be more
conducive to the. national security than the original pro-
os
t bill
"Since my answer to your letter of May 19, I have
endeavored to study and compare the original Unification
bill, H.R. 2319, with that submitted by you, H.R. 3469.
It is my considered opinion that the Bill proposed by you
will i
"I am of the opinion that your bill provides th
.sufficient time to study your bill to permit detailed
comment. I am, of course, familiar with H.R. 2319.
"I consider that a two department organization as
envisaged by you to be the only logical guarantee for an
.air-sea Navy that can fulfill.its .missions effectively.
I am of the opinion that formation of a third Department
for Air will result in an unbalanced defense organization
wherein ground force and Naval requirements will gradually
be neglected to a point that may be catastrophic to our
country. I state this advisedly as the private and
public utterances of Air Force leaders leave me with no
illusions as to their future intentions concerning the
Navy and Naval Aviation when autonomy under their own
Secretary is achieved."
e
only solution to-the national defense problem and that
H.R. 2319 is entirely unacceptable. I have not had
"As much of an examination of the alternative proposal,
H.R. 3469, as.I have been able to make in thelimited time)
available, indicates that it will not accomplish the
improved efficiencyand economy of administration to the
extent intended by the President to result from the
organization of a National Defense Establishment administered
by a Secretary of National Defense."
-12-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
"The-greatest advantage in H.R. 3469 is its basic con-
cept of a coordinated two department organization. I believe
100% in this concept for a solution of our problem.
"In the first place, a third department or a third prong
to a corpulent single department cannot be.accepted as re-
presenting economy. It may very well be that closer
coordination will produce gradual economies in compariscn
with present practice but the overhead of the third depart-
ment will have to be faced. The same steps of coordination
are bound to produce greater over-all economies if applied
to only two departments or two prongs.
"With respect;to the actual coordination, the mechanical
and. mathematical advantage is of the order of 4 to 1 in
favor of.attaining success in the two department set-up where
only."a" and "b" must be pulled together. In a three depart-
metit set-up, the following coordination would have to be
effected: ab, bc,ac and finally abc.
"If we suppose that the need for coordination could be
eliminated in a real single department wherein, as one
example, personnel of all branches would be controlled
and detailed to duty by one Personnel Division, we would run
contrary to the experience of American big business. I
believe that:=a. merger of Montgomery Ward and Sears Roebu(.k
was onee considered and given up because the result would.
be too corpulent for efficiency.- Our military organization
dwarfs any existing business corporation. Even if such a
huge military. organization were manageable
it would prove
,
unhealthy by regimentation and the elimination of competition.
If-all automobiles were manufactured by a single concern,, I
doubt if
anyone'.in his right mind would expect to obtain the
best and cheapest product. Thus the two department ..military
organization will. provide maximum economy compatible with a
healthy fighting machine.
"If a separate department of air is set up
I foresee
,
a real weakening of our future military strength. I believe
that this will come about with the acceptance on the part of
the Congress and the public that such an air department will
be the source of all expert opinion on the application of
the military airplane in all fields. Competent as the. A.A.F.
has proved itself in its own field, it does not understand
(see postscript) or believe in naval air power whereas our
air power is the Sunday punch of the Fleet today. It would
be a National tragedy if naval air power were relegated to
an accessory role. The Navy.would be crippled and as the
weak link determines the strength of a chain so would aveak
Navy weaken-the whole organization. Neither the Army or the
Navy can be very effective today without air power and for
obvious reasons in order to exert maximum striking force the
air power should belong to the using service. To those who
demand coequal status for Air along with the Army and Navy,
I say that they are on the right track but they have not
gone far enough. What the country needs now is two services:
a Navy which is largely a seagoing air force but complete
with all necessary supporting and other components; and an
Army which has its heaviest striking power concentrated in a
land based air force but augmented by the necessary supporting
and other components. Each of two such services represents
a speciality and each is broad enough to absorb one's full
career. Thus Air would achieve more than a coequal status
or 33 1/3%; it would be the backbone of each service.
Military history supports the above position since victory
has been attained by the side which employs the dominant
weapon of the times most effectively. Today the dominant
weapon has proved to be the airplane. Tomorrow it may be
the long range guided missile. A two department organiza-
tion retains sufficient flexibility to adjust to future
requirements.
..13-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 Approve -For Release 2003/10/22 CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-&
It seems to me that setting up a single air department
would prove faulty in two other respects. First, such a
department would be built around a weapon -- if this had
occurred in the old days a department of horse, archers or
spear-bearers might have been the result. The history of
all weapons is transitory and the airplane can expect to
be superseded in time by the long ran
e
uid
d
i
il
g
g
e
m
ss
e.
Second, and in the meantime, the Air Force can be expected
to duplicate every function of the Ground Forces. The Air
Force will require its own engineers (to build fields, roads,
buildings), Artillery (AA defense of air fields), quarter-
masters, etc., plus airborne troops -- it will have to
develop tanks and artillery transportable by air plus the
personnel to man these tools. It will also have to develop
capsuled food and condensed fuels for air delivery. A
reexamination of the problem.within ten years will pose
the question, "In view of the duplication why do we have
the Ground Forces?" Thence if the Ground?Forces are turned
over to th
Ai
e
r Forces, we return to a two department
pattern but I contend that this is the hard way to do it.
."P.S. There are many examples of incomplete understanding
on'the part of the A.A.F. with respect to naval air power as
reflected by public statements of Generals, a few:
'The Navy eede.carrier aircraft for the
defense of the Fleet.'-
"As-a matter of fact these planes are the N
v
's bi
a
y
g offensive
power -+ these planes, their. flying "fields" and logistic '
support all move-together and they can strike some areas
long before-:land based bombers can get there.
'The time has come to admit that the Army and Navy
are only service forces for the A.A.F.!
"However, Navy fighters from carriers cl
d t
eare
he air over
Japan for A.A.F. bombers -- no other type of fighters could
be brought to bear.
'We will let the Navy keep its carrier aircraft
for the time being.'
"A clear forecast that the A.A.F intends to go after naval
air power."
"Referring to your letter of 16 May 1947, I heartily
endorse your Bill HR-3469 as being the plan best suited to
giving the country the best National Security of any
proposal, as regards to the armed services, that I have
yet seen.
"To my mind, your bill does two outstanding things:
1. It prevents a Super-secretary from having too
much power.
2. It safeguards the interests of the Navy, Naval
Aviation, and the Marine Corps by maintaining
a two-department system.
"I believe that a Coordinator is all that is needed
at the higher levels. To have'an all-powerful Secretary
would offer an opportunity for a strong man to become a
dictator.
"I believe that your bill gives the present Army Air
Forces all the independence they need. It permits them
to fight a war in any fashion they choose, and yet leaves
them under the Secretary of War who can order them to
support the ground forces when the ground forces need air
support.
-14-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 r ved F r Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
nave heard a good many arguments pro and con tout
the Vice President being the Coordinator of National Defense.
I strongly favor this because he is an officer endorsed by
the electorate. It has been said that his duties as Presi-
dent of the Senate might interfere, but the fact that we
have not had a Vice President for two years would lead me
to the opinion that if we had one, he could spare enough
time to coordinate the armed services.
"I believe membership of your National Defense Council
might well be reduced. The more people who are in on high
level planning, the more difficult it becomes to maintain
necessary secrecy of planned operations.
"I heartily agree that the Marine Corps should be
included in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I prefer that
the Coordinator of the National Defense be a member as listed
in your bill.
"All the objections I have to your bill I consider of a
minor nature.
"If we are to have a Navy, it should be a fighting Navy.
I recognize the predominant role of air power - which Includes
guided missiles - in a future war. I do not see how the Navy
can expect to maintain a Naval Air Force to fight with, If a
"Most of the naval officers with whom I have talked ar
e
heartily in favor of maintaining a two-department system,
and those who have studied your bill are favorably disposed
to it in'the main."
"There can be no question that modern war between-
great Powers, such as the United States now is, requires
the closest co-ordination between all branches of the Armed
Forces and a close co-ordination of the military effort
with the civilian effort on which the military effort is
based. I believe all of the proposals for legislation have
these ends in view.
"Insofar as the Navy is concerned, I am certain that a
Navy without efficient naval aviation is of little value in
modern war and that our Marine Corps is an asset of tremen-
dous value to both the Navy and the country. In any law
to co-ordinate the Armed Forces, I think there should be
included a sufficient description of the functions of each
Service to ensure the future status of naval aviation and
of the Marine Corps. From what I have read recently in
the daily press, this appears to be in process of accomplish-
ment by amendment to the bill. Such a description of the
functions of each Service should be broad enough to prevent
any attempts to whittle away or practically to take over the
functions of arty one Service by the others, and at the same
time not be so restrictive in its terms as to prevent
necessary adjustments between the Services being made from
time to time. I think a Declaration of Policy, such as is
contained in your H. R. 3469 and in Senator Robertson's
S. 1282, is a valuable addition to any legislation on this
subject.
"Whether or not the Army Air Corps should be continued
under the War Department as the United States Air Force as
in your bill, or be established as a separate Department
of the Air Force as in H. R. 2319 and S. 1282, is a
question on which my personal opinion favors your stand.
I believo that. both sea fighting and land fighting require
the closest integration with their respective air efforts.
If in the coming reorganization the Navy Department con-
tinues to have its naval and marine aviation-components 0
while the Department of the Army has to depend on the
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-006108000100020007-8
Department of the Air Force for its aviation, as in H.R.2'119
there is no consistent principle followed in this matter. _ ,_
If, on the other hand, the Department of the Army is to have
its own aviation as in S. 1282, then we set up strategic
bombing as the principal offensive function of the new
Department of the Air Forc
e; and we would have the aviation
used in major land fighting placed under two separate Dspart-
ments.
"The position of the present Army Air Corps in the future
military establishment is, however, something which is of
primary concern to the A_rny, provided that the efficiency
of naval aviation and, of the Navy is in no way impaired by
what is done in this respect. While I
perse
we would have a sounder organization with nthey' bseitve pre two Departments and with Army aviation closely integrated
with the War Department, I am inclined to think that the
setting up of a separate Department of the Air Force has
such backing both in the Congress and throughout the countr7
that it will be accepted. Any organization will work if we
get it staffed by able men who will pull together.
"Whether we have a Co-ordinator of National Defense as
in H.R. 3469 and S. 1282, or a Secretary of National Defense
as in H. R. 2319, is a subject on which I have no very
decided opinion. There is an i
this authorit ' p ov ded the President wishes to delegate
y. So long as the new position remains one of
co-ordination and of laying down policy and does not grow
into-one of administration of the separate Departments, I
believe the new official will serve a very useful function
in our Federal government. He must, of course, be given
suffhient assistance to enable him to act effectively, but
not enough so that another big bureaucracy will come into
being."
co-ordinatin mportant job to be done in
g -- for the President as-Commander-in.-Chief
the 'Army and Navy r i -
"I am in full accord with your statement that closer
coordination of Army, Navy and Air Forces should be affected.
As you point out, the pattern of the steps taken in this
direction is the important factor. However, I am in firm
opposition to certain proposals on these matters which arc,
being entertained in the Congress today.
"It is my view, Mr. Cole, that an important factor in
bringing the so-called Merger to the forefront of public
discussion was the highly voluble support given by the Army
Air Forces. The reason for this is not difficult to under-
stand since the Air Forces would revert to their original
status, under the Army Chief of Staff, unless some remedial
legislation were enacted. Tho Air Forces wanted a completely
autonomous position: their interest in closer coordination
with the Army Ground Forces or the Navy is today what it has
been for many years past, very limited indeed.
"For reasons set forth hereafter, I believe that the
Army Air Forces should be developed into a.closely integraed
part of the United States Army in very much the same relation
that Naval Aviation bears to the forces afloat.
"Tho first point I would present is that of cost, since
it is evident that for some years to come the Congress may
be expected to be decidedly economy-minded so far as concerns.
the Armed Services. The establishment of a third service must
obviously entail greatly increased costs, which at no time in
the future can possibly show economy over the two-service
system for a national defense establishment of equal strength.
Statements of expected economies in future resed
by various witnesses, apply to coordinated effortspwhichtare
applicable to either the two or the three Armed Forces arra=age-
ments, though less readily affected under the latter. Ras---"l>
Approved For Release 2003/101 CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
therefore, it is apparent that the taxpayer will get less
for his defense dollar with the formation of a third Armed
Service.
"So far as integration of Air with Army Ground Forces
is concerned, I cannot conceive of any effective Combat ,.round
Forces in this day and age operating without an appropriate
Air component. The usual explanation is that the separate
Air Force will furnish this eipport. Lacking interest,
lacking common understanding, lacking integrated planning and
direction, I cannot believe that the separate Air Force can
or will give intelligent and adequate support. In this
connection I invite your attention to the Air Arm of the Royal
Navy, which was provided by the Royal Air Force between World
War I and II. The efficiency'and effectiveness of that ser-
vice was of such low order, when its state compelled return to
the Navy in 1939, that it was late in the war before reaching
an acceptable standard, largely with American equipment. I
feel-sure that air support given our own Army by a separate
Air Force can be properly compared with that given the Royal
Navy by the Royal Air Force.
"It seems evident to me that a modern Army having con-
tinuous and major requirements for air transport and supply,
as well as direct support when in combat, will soon demand
that these components be directly attached to the Ground
Command. In such case it would seem impossible to avoid
direct duplication of large numbers of aircraft at greatly
added cost, or alternatively, reduction in strength of the
other services.
"There has been much ballyhoo the last year or two
about strategic bombing, with the suggestion that ultra long-
range super aircraft will soon be able to attack any spot
on the earth from bases in the-homeland. The fact is, however,
that senior Air Force Commanders are agreed that strategic
bombing in the pattern of the last war is finished. The
common availability to all nations of the proximity fuze is
the major cause of this, and the condition will become more
unfavorable with the early introduction of ground-to-air
target-seeking.rocket missiles.
"In this day of the atomic bomb it would appear that the
major air offensive power of the United States should consist
of a modest number of maximum performance aircraft especially
adaptable to "A" bomb delivery, together with the fighters
required to escort such bombers; both types necessarily of
moderate range. The bulk of our Air Forces, however, should
be closely integrated with the Naval and Ground elements,
and largely devoted to their support in capturing and holling
forward bases close to the enemies' borders. This means
amphibious operations much in the pattern with which we closed
the last war. And from all present indications we will fight
alone, in the manner of the ?acific War, rather than from
bases held for us by Allied, as was the case in Europe."
"Since the discussion of the merger of the Armed Forces
was initiated, there have been nee developments which, is my
opinion, further strengthen our position that we must no rush
in precipitately to change the basic orCanization of our
security forces. The development of guided missiles, planes
and projectiles with supersonic speeds, explosives of great
power, bacteriological and virus warfare, probable development
of radioactive materials which can be dispersed by guided
missiles, etc. -- all point to the desirability of building
on what we have rather than tearing down any part of our
existing organization. In other words, my thought is that,
for the time being at least, and until we have a much more
clear picture of the function that will be played by aviation,
as we knew. it in the recent war, we should not place all cf
our eggs in the "aviation basket," but should reserve decision
until we expand out kna-.rledge.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22,- IA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
"After careful consideration, I have come to the con-
clusion that we should stand on our original position - that
a completely integrated naval force, with supporting service
functions, including an adequate Air-arm, is essential for
the National Security. The character and scope of the Naval
Air-arm should be determined by strategists and tacticians,
not by legislators, nor as a result of a "deal" between the
Army and Navy."
"Despite the assurances given in the letters enclosed
from Mr. Forrestal, you will probably find that very few, if
any, active officers in the Navy will wish to have their
views held other than confidential. The officers who have
testified before Congress, mentioned in the Secretary's
letter of 10 May, are, with the possible exception of
General Edson, not in a position to suffer by any displeasure
which might be incurred through such remarks. None of them
have any future to worry about.
"Personally, I have been strongly against the so-called
merger of the Armed Services right from the start. I remember
when a Board., headed by Admiral Richardson, came through the
.Pacific early in 1945 and questioned all senior officers
available. The situation confronted us unexpectedly, sid I
had little time to give it thought, but spoke against it then.
Basically, it is my opinion that no one person can take over
such a tremendous job as is envisioned in H.R. 2319 and be
anything other than.a hindrance or a figurehead. To couple
with this the.control of about half of our national budget
would strike a severe blow at our democratic form of govern-
ment. This Secretary would in effect, combine four Cabinet
positions in himself. The Secretaries of the Armed Services
would be ciphers. I have felt all along that Congress would
never permit such a set-up to be made into law. Despite all
of the forebodings of my service and civilian friends, I have
had a sense of security in the good Judgment of the House and
the Senate in this matter and have not worried too much about
it.
"Now, if we do not make a Secretary of the National
Defense as envisioned in H. R. 2319, there is no urgent need
to do much of anything Ina big way, except perhaps to set up
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a little more secure basis than
at present. The President can always fortify and implement
the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself, and he has done so up to
the present time. This may be sufficient. However, there is
the danger that the civilian Secretaries might get into the
Joint Chiefs of Staff picture in wartime and cramp their
style. Right now anything that comes out of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff is accepted as gospel by everyone and obeyed without
question. Getting back to the Secretary of National Defense,
Section 103 is very dangerous if you do not wish a big military
staff set-up. What would you have but a military staff where
the Secretary of National Defense has four Special Assistants
and the power to detail as many Army, Navy, and Air Force
officers to duty in his office as he desires ? In order nor
such a Secretary to really function he must have a big staff
and will, in my opinion, absolutely dominate all other
military activities. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Section 111, are under his control, and would merely form a
part of his Staff.
"In regard to unity of command, which is really what this
is all about on a rather high level, I have had four years
of experience with it during the recent war. Thereis nothing
new about unity of command, and it has always been provided, and
known by the Army and Navy that the President may order it
whenever and wherever he sees fit, and this has been done at
various times, extending clear back to the Mexican War. It
has been my experience that whenever the President or the
Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered unity of command in a c?3riei,
Approved For Release 2003/1 0/2 $ CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
 Approv .,For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007 8
theater or for a certain campaign or operation, it worked
excellently when clearly stated and backed up. Regular
officers in the Army and Navy know how to obey orders and
they do so without quibbling.
"In regard to your own Bill, H. R. 3469, it has many
excellent points. Concerning your Co-ordinator for
National Defense, he is really a Chief of Staff to the
President, and you have him properly lined up under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the National Defense Council.
I would expect you not to limit his selection to that of a
civilian. It would seem the man himself is the thing wanted,
regardless, of his previous status.
"I am also with you in thinking that the Army Air Forces
should remain under the War Department,. though it is-hard
for me to visualize the Secretary of War having practically
two separate departments under him. He practically has
this now, and, as you know, there is considerable jealousy
and bad feeling. Perhaps in separating them by law we will
achieve more harmony and better results. I have always
felt that this Army and Air Corps trouble could, at any time,
be straightened out by the President."
"As Vice Chief of Naval Operations, I have maintained
close touch. with all aspects. of the unification issued. I
am in full accord with the views on this question expressed
by the Chief of Naval Operations before committees of
Congress. ,While I personally support H. R. 2319, which
reflects the agreements reached by the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy, I have been conscious of uncer-
tainty in the minds of certain officers regarding the
adequate protection of the interests of the Marine Corps
and. Naval Aviation under the original language of the bill.
"This legislation is of such far-reaching importance
that no effort should be spared to devise language that
will impart confidence and a sense of security to those whose
interests are directly affected. If the proposed new
National Defense organization is to be a success, it must
have the endorsement and whole-hearted support of all
implementing agencies and branches. For the abo,re reason'.
I favor amendments relating to the Marine Corps and. Naval
Aviation recently made by the Senate Armed Services
Committee which, I believe, will accomplish the purpose
desired."
"Subject to the above qualifying remarks,. I like your
bill better than I do H. R. 2319. My principal reason for
this is that your bill makes fewer changes in the existing
two department setup, which after all, has just carried us
through to victory in the greatest war in history. Perhaps
this is a somewhat smug point of view, but I believe that
you should not break up a winning team while it is still
winning. I do not believe in burning down the barn to get
rid of rats."
. "I consider that the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
General A. A. Vandegrift, has very ably presented my objec-
tions to the legislation in question. Any comments which
I might make about it would be, therefore, merely a repetition
of facts which are already available to you.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22191A-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
 Appproved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
Naturally, H.R. 3469 appeals to me because of my
firm conviction that the two services, Army and Navy with
their respective air and Marine components, are necessary
and sufficient, On the other hand, the National Defense
Council, as described in H.R. 3469, appears to be unneces-
sarily inclusive and unwieldy and I would prefer that it
be constituted as is the National Security Council in
H.R. 2319. is
"I believe that the organization structure as set forth
in H.R. 3469 more nearly meets the objections that have been
raised against 5.758 and H.R. 2319. It provides a more
effective integration of -ALL departments and agencies of
the government concerned with the national defense, and
closer collaboration between the fighting services.
"The creation of this third Department under 5.758 and
H.R. 2319 is absolutely contrary to any step leading to
closer coordination between the armed services and is
believed to be a fatal defect in these bills. Once all
connections with the Army are severed, it is logical to
believe that the Air Force will attain a status like that
of the Royal Air Force, with similar uniforms and ranks.
In this connection, it is not understood as to why the Air
Force requires more autonomy than it is now accorded in
order to exercise Its functions.
"The Air Force has conducted an extremely effective
publicity campaign through the newspapers with the result
that the public has been led to believe that the present
compromise bills are strongly desired. by all services and
any delay in their enactment into law can only show a
callous disregard for the future security of this country.
Those of us who have lived with the "merger" legislation
during the past 1J years know that nothing is farther
from the truth.
"I strongly believe that no Department of National
Defense should in essence be built around any specific
weapon. If we should proceed contrary to this principle,
we should be equally justified in a Department of Sub-
marines, Field Artillery, Guided Missiles, etc. While
the airplane is unquestionably one of our most dominant
weapons today, there is no reason to believe that it will
not be replaced with a more effective weapon in the near
future.
"Such controversial items as the creation of the office
of a Super or over-all Secretary or a Coordinator of National
Defense and the powers to be vested in such individuals
should be the subject of separate legislation in order that
the pros and cons of each major change may be thoroughly
and deliberately explored before their enactment into law."
"In the final analysis the success of any plan for
coordination of the military establishment will depend
on the whole-hearted acceptance of the plan by the per-
sonnel concerned, on the spirit of mutual trust, confidence
and sincere cooperation exhibited in its implementation,
and on the preservation of the morale and integrity of
the component forces. I feel sure that this favorable
result can be attained within the framework of H. R. 2319."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 Approve'for Release 2003/10/22 CIA-RDP90 00610R0001100020007 ~
experience. My specialty is aviation and. ray experience
v
in tht specialty is extensive. During the recent war I
served in the Navy.Dep?artment and overseas. I had ample
,opportunity both to observe and
ti
par
cipate in the planning
behind the war effort, particularly as related to Joint
Plans and Operations. Summarizing, I have had an oppor-
tunity to observ
th
e
e workings of the Armed Services under
pre-war conditions, war conditions under the changes made
under War Powers Acts, and I an familiar.. with most of pro-
posals for post-war reorganization.
"Tam firmly of tho opinion that the current statutory
organization of Armed Services must be changed, but I am
most seriously concerned over the manner in which the pre-
sent 1aove for change has developed, and the results therefrom.
The manner has been loud outcries from officers of the Army,
particularly'the Army Air Forces, against the conduct of war
and demands,r'or an immediate reorganization along certain
definite lines, all without impartial examination of the
criticisms or careful unbiased exami
ti
na
on of the proposed
changes. For example, so far as I can ascertain, the
demand by most of th
ff
e o
icers in responsible positions in
the Army Air Forces for a separate co-equal Department of
the, Ai..has been accepted., almost blindly, by the majority
of the public, the press, aft I believe the Congress as a
fundamental' requisite to-any reorganization, without any
real,unb.jaeed examination of the subject. The validity
of the demand, cannot be supported b
y war experience, if
anythfng the .experience supports, the contrary view.
Actually, thi
d
n
s
ema
d stems back many years. It is generally
admitted.that naval s,.awia__ L
lon
s
i
....
g
as
t now is integrated
with the Navy=as a whole. I see no reason why this thought
does not apply A-71-. ..w7'r
h
d. t
i egad
o tr=y Air and the
Army, a ce'tt the .Army.Alr Force Officers_ do not watt it that
way, T sir leaders. decided that back in. the early 20"'s..
There has developed, progressively an estrangement between,
the Array 'ground forces and air forces as a- result of this
attitude. .1 know fora fact that this is the reason the
proposal for a Separate Air Department has considerable
Army ground force support. The ground force is fed up
with the family argument. They know that separation is
not sound, but regard it as the lesser of two evils.-
"My assumption is that the primary purpose of all of
the bilis'under consideration is to im
e
prov
the efficiency
o'f ~tke military services in order to ehhance the security
of our country. The closest possible coordination is essen -
tial to efficiency. Three Departments will be four times
as difficult to coordinate as-two. (Call-the departments
"
a, "b"" and "c"". With two you only have to coordinate
T"a" with "b". With three it becomes "a" with , r"b" " "a'" with
r"c"r) "b" with "c", and "a", "b" and "c" together), . It is
my firm belief.that a separate Department of the Air is
unnecessary, will not strengthen the National Defense, will
add materially to the National financial burden and will
make-coordination much more difficult. I concur with the
proposal in Section 301 of your bill.
""In considering H.R. 2319 it should be recognized that
it is a compromise bill. *It was drafted after a long series
of arguments and in many cases without any real reconciliation
of ideas. It appears to me but natural that the language
which would be acceptable on points in dispute would be
language subject to different interpretations by those who
were parties to the drafting of the bill. This is borne cut
by a great deal of the testimony presented before the
Congressional Committees. I had no part in the drafting
of the bill. To me the language is clear and unmistakable.,-
Referring to Section 102 (a), it appears entirely clear
to me that the language gives to the Secretary of the
National Defense complete authority and control over the
Departments of the National Defense establishments, subject
Approved For Release 2003L1@/ : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approve or Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
only to such curbs as the President may apply by,Executive
Order or otherwise, which curbs of course may be modifiad
at any time. The language of this section appears to me
potentially to destroy the integrity of the Departments
and to reduce their respective Secretaries to the level of
Administrative Assistants. I regard that as dangerous and
wholly unsatisfactory. It is my understanding that this
Section is being re-drafted in Senate Armed Services
Committee but I have no first-hand knowledge of the revised
language.
"it is my opinion that the Secretaries of the Departments
of the National Defense Establishments should retain their
"Cabinet level"., I consider it in the National interests
that the President and the other members of his cabinet get
first-hand information regarding those Departments and also
.have available the advice and counsel of those Secretaries
on any other matters directly or indirectly affecting those
Departments. There is no language in H. R. 2319 dealing
specifically with this subject but there have been statements,
presumablyauthoritative, that the Secretaries of the Depart-
.ments will not be members of Cabinet.
"I favor the establishment as provided in H.R. 2319 of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munitions Board Security Council,
Central Intelligences Agency and Resources Board.
3469' (your bill) provides a "Coordinator of
National. Defense" and with certain rather minor exceptions
leaves it to the President to determine his duties. It
appears. to be the. intent of H.R. 3469 to reduce the importance
and authority of-the Coordinator well below that of the
Secretary of National Defense provided in H. R: 2319. If
Such is the casei I agree with the idea of reducing the
authority in order better to safeguard the integrity of the
Navy Department, but It appears that under H. R. 3469 the
President could delegate to the Coordinator any or all of
the authority he holds under the Constitution and Statutes.
"Section 102 establishes a National Defense Council with
a very widely spread membership: I question the need for, and
usefulness of, such a Council and specifically I question the
appropriateness of Members of Congress being included. The
National Defense Council appears to be in place of the War
Council and the National Security Council provided for in
H.R. 2319. As stated in paragraph 7 above, I favor the
provision of the boards, councils, etc., set up in H.R. 2319
and much prefer them to the provisions of H. R. 3469.
"I am heartily in favor of Section 301 of H.R. 3469
which creates the Army Air Forces as part of the Military
Establishment of the United States within the Department of
War. This subject was discussed in detail in paragraphs 3
and 4 above.
"The postscript of your letter inquired as to my views
regarding service opinion on the question of reorganization.
I believe I am safe in saying that a majority of the
.responsible officers would heartily endorse any measures
which would bring about a better coordination between the
Army Services, but want to be assured in advance that such
measures would accomplish that purpose without jeopardizing
the integrity of the Navy including its Aviation and the
Marine Corps. They have grave doubts as to whether H.R.2319
has sincerity of purpose behind it or whether it is intended
as a first step in gaining a control over the Navy towards
the end of depriving it of its Aviation and the Marine Corps
and eventually reducing it to a point where it could play
but a minor role in the National Defense. Their concern
in this matter appears to me to be justified by past and
continuing statements of officers in responsible positions
in the Army and particularly in the Army Air Forces. They
are extromely bitter o-ror the methods employed by those
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
-22-
 officers to drive through their plans. I believe navel
officers in general are fearful both of the future defense
of t ope R se:2002/$fl/R2 i --D O D0O Mi00 O GQ & of
the likelihood of the provisiona=of if. R. 2319 in its
present form becoming law. I am_reliably informed that
a considerable percentage-of naval aviators have reaches
the conclusion that if a separate Department of Air is
created, naval aviation is doomed, and have convinced
themselves that their individual interests beat would be
served by transferring to the Army Air Forces and that
the beet interests of the country would be also served by
such transfer, supporting this conclusion with the argument
that if the country's military aviation is to come wholly
into the hands of the Army Air Forces it is essential that
that organization have within i.t as soon as possible a
sizeable elemont that understands the application of air
power to naval warfare. The very serious effect of the
loss of this- experienced personnel from Naval Aviation is
obvious."
"You may gather from the foregoing that I do not concur
in either H.R. 2319 or H.R. 3469 as presently drafted. Of
the two I prefer H.R. 3469 although there are many changes
necessary to make it-suitable from the standpoint of the
country, the Army and the Navy."
"'In view of the controversy that has been going on
between the"Army'ind Navy over the subject of the consolida-
tion of the-two services and the bitter feelings that have
been. arous?d`,;, it ;is- my firm belief.. that no. l egislation to that.
end should; be enacted at the present time.
"Consolidation or rather co-ordination., is a matter of
education,a long step in this direction has been made
through the establishment of joint .schools-, such as the -
National War College at Washington and the Armed Forces Staff
College at Norfolk. -Officers from other services attend
the special'Army and Navy schools. It will be a matter of
several years before the officers who have passed through
these schools arrive at positions of high authority.
"It will take time to dispel the ill feeling-that has
arisen between the two services. This has been due in -cart
to two causes:
"(a) The efforts of the Army Air Force to hamper and re-
strict the expansion of Naval Aviation since the days of
General Mitchell. Naval Aviation has always been an integral
part of the Navy. Aircraft carriers are now the "backbone
of the fleet" but they are still Navy. -
"The Army Air Force has been working for its Independence
since the First World War. That has been their primary mis-
sion. At times their loyalty to the Army has'been dubious.
"(b) The Army's dislike of the U.S. Marine Corps and its
increased power to reduce Marine Corps strength and.eff'ciency
under a Unified Department.
"In case some legislation is considered necessary at the
present time, I prefer H.R. 3469 to H.R. 2319. It produces
the least disruption of the present organization.. It provides
a National Defense Council on which the appropriate Comnittees
of Congress are represented by their Chairmen, a most essential
provision.
"It leaves the Army Air Force as a part of the Army,
where it belongs."
.
_23-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 q1 e ur Reteoa .20R 03/1Q/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8 "
8 319, my principal objection is
to the separate "Air Force" proposed in that bill. The
very name is a misnomer, for approximately one-third of
the air forces of the United States are now and will re
main in the Navy.. But the important point's are: first,
that the difficulty of coordinating three armed services
and their parent departments will not just be fifty per-
cent greater than two, but three times as great
for three
,
main links of cooperation or coordination must be forged
instead of one; second, that the additional expense of
the new independent Department of the Air Force will offset
many of the alleged economies which the proponents claim
for it. ' I am confident that the Air Force would insist
upon its own supporting corps and services, duplicating
some of those in the Army, such as the Ordnance Corps and
the. Signal Corps, for instance.
"While cooperation, or the lack of it, between Army
Ground and Army (or independent) air forces is principally
their concnern, and not the Navy's, I cannot refrain from
remarking that there seem to be two major activities of
growing importance in modern warfare which involve both
these types of forces, and which, it seems to me, will be
accomplished more efficiently by their remaining in one
service than by separating. These functions are: (a), the
ti
i
an
a
rcraft defense, by a combination of air and ground
weapons, of both fixed and mobile ground positions, and (b),
th;e air-group ... operation., of airborne troops.. I think these
important acti?iti.es.dictate- an even closer bond between our
air and, ground forces
rather than a separation of one from
,
the other. The same thing is-true of tactical air support
...of groun& force combat operations. In fact, it seems to
.ma-..that: the. only possible excuse for a separate air force
isa..etrategi:c: air power.- Numerous aviators believe strate
ic
g
bombing: by manned-airplanes is obsolescent., General of the
in World War, II... has expressed this thought by saying that
y~
the recent war was the "last war of the pilots"
' If that i
.
s
so, and strategic bombing is to be succeeded by guided missile
b
ombardment surld
,ey no new an separate armed service is
necessary, since the latter type of arm will be essentially
nothing more than a glorified form of artillery.
"I view the creation of a complete new secretaryship
of National Defense, as proposed in H. R. 2319, with con-
siderable-apprehension. In the first place, the position
will surely lessen the prestige of the present Secretaries
of War and. the Navy, and may render difficult the procure-
ment of men of stature to occupy those posts. Then there.
will be a constant tendency to overdo the consolidation sob,
to search out dissimilarities and duplications in materiel
or procedures in the various armed services,?and arbitrarily
eliminate them, when in some cases, for beat efficiency,
they should not be eliminated., lest each service emerge with
some weapon or procedure which is a reasonably good compromise,
but not quite good enough for maximum efficiency for any
one service. And in war, "almost-good-enough" weapons or
tactics usually. have the same value as second-best poker hand.
"There is'also the danger of losing time in having to
refer too many matters to the super-secretary for decision.
Even such matters as are really of joint concern should often
be left to direct negotiation between the two organizatiois
for settlement; Army and Navy Ordnance settled many such pro-
blems between them smoothly and expeditiously in World War I7=
But that method probably would not satisfy some of the strong-
minded officers who would inevitably be drawn to the super
secretary as his assistants. Too often, they might feel he
necessity of persuading the Secretary of National Defense to
exert his powers of coordination to effect some economy of
material or manpower, and thus incur delay, whereas the third
element of war strength, time, might be the most important.
In other words, proper decentralization of effort and
authority becomes more difficult if the top management become.
too ponderous,
-24-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 PA3601p SFaVNIW8 gl/jQ'2?o RppQ ?IOFWOJROOOVgg7arr on of
"This is in reply to your letter of May the sixteenth
superimposed administrative echelon, only time would tell.
In peace, with the volume of purchasing greatly reduced. I
have serious doubts as to any net gain.
"Your alternative bill, H. B. 3469, seems to correct
most of the defects in H. B. 2319 which I have noted above.
I like the "Coordinator of National Defense" better than
the "Secretary of National Defense", as it describes better
the only functions which I believe this administrative
echelon should perform.
achieved. -Whether they would offset the additional expense
of the separate Department of the Air Force, and the new
the new secretaryship, undoubtedly some would eventually be
:secretary with complete supervision over the armed services
of National Defense, with limited authority, to a new super-
"Summing up, I believe the Army Air Forces have, in
the recent war, demonstrated their great value to the
national security,'and have earned the right. to complete
parity with the Army Ground Forces, instead of remaining
a mere supporting corps. But I see no need for a completely
separate air service. I fully believe it will be more
expensive, and no more efficient, than the present (not
the prewar).organization. Also, I would prefer a Coordinator
departments."
Aviation to bear against the enemy. A modern Navy must
be largely an Air Navy and it must have every facility it
requires to support that Air Navy and to use it for its
'designed purpose; that is, initially as a spearhead (and a
sustained spearhead at that) against the enemy; and later
as the on-the-spot mobile pounding force which enables
amphibious forces to do their jobs.
nor-.international security that will be effective without
a,highly mobile.-closely integrated Navy fabricated to
exercise-air-sea.power against any enemy. I become appre-
hensive, therefore,. when under a merger the Navy appears
to be considered entirely of ships, and air power seems
to be defined as all-inclusive of.every means of bringing
'national security..-1 can visualize no effective national
that comment I must state that ever since I first heard of
the so-called "merger" of the armed services.. I have been
alarmed at' 'the possible impacts of a merger.'on effective
in which you. asked my comment on H.R. 3469. Before making
"To repeat, my unease about the merger was occasioned
by my belief that under amerger Naval Aviatidn.would dis-
appear and with it the Navy would disappear..
"The past war, however, demonstrated very clearly that
there must be closer coordination of the various armed
services to obtain the greatest impact in the shortest time
against an enemy. There must be closer planning for war
including, not only strategic plans, but also logistic
plans; there must be closer coordination of training and.
training methods, but that coordination should not be exer-
cised to the point where individual. armed services become
weakened to the point of impotence.
"I have been apprehensive over the formation of a third
executive department to be known as the Department of the Air
Force because throughout the years of my service in Naval
Aviation the proponents of "Single Air Force'' have sharl-
shot at Naval aviation, belittling it and stating as early
as 1925 that.the carrier was obsolescent. And even now
there is too much talk of restricting the functions of
Naval Aviation's shore based aircraft to patrol the sealanes,
to anti-submarine warfare and to the protection of shipping-
The Navy should have the bombers to hit, at once, the
menaces to the sea lanes that the searchers and patrollers
25-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 t
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
find. In World War II the Navy patrol-bombers did just
.that and there was no question, that I know of, as to their
right and. duty to attack.
"Certainly no one with my long association with aviation
can be other than an enthusiast for,air power but, on tae
other hand, my experience convinces me that ground forces
and Naval surface forces and aviation are mutually dependent
upon each other to the extent that no armed service should
be deprived of that air power which is required to impose
its will on the enemy.
"I like the declaration policy in H. R. 3+69. It seems
to assure to the elements of the military structure the
balanced forces necessary for the exercise of their resnonsi-
bilities. Furthermore, the declaration-policy provides for
a sufficiently autonomous strategic air force to permit the
proper development of that air force without having it engulf
everything that flies to the detriment of other armed forces.
"If the concept of future warfare envisages air borne
armies largely supported by air, it seems entirely proper
that the proper integration and cooperation between the
Army and the Air Force will be assured by placing both of
them under the Secretary of War without strangulating effect
on either one. .However, I cannot see that a single promotion
list for the Air Force will have any healthful unifying
effect within the War Department.
"Regarding the Coordinator of National Defense, I like
the description of his duties with the restrictions imposed
on his activities.
"The National Defense Council appears to be large and
may be unwieldy when quick decisions must be made. I like
the idea of bringing representatives of the Congress into
the Council, but it might be advisable to reduce the total
membership of the Council-to provide for a smaller orgarniza-
tion.
"Summarizing: H. R. 3I.69, for the present, seems to
spell out the functions of the Armed Services in more
dependable form than does H. R. 2319."
"Regarding H. R. 2319, I am in agreement with Secretary
Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz, providing that this bill is
not a foot in the door for future emasculation of Naval
aviation or the Marine Corps for the Navy or for tanks
for the Army or for strategic air forces for the Air
component."
"I shall try to be brief. I feel that I am expressing
the thought of many officers, in that many of us fear that
the Navy and the Marine Corps may lose that complete autonomy
in the conduct of its own affairs which we feel necessary
in the beat interests of national defense. We feel that any
unification bill which may allow one man control of the
destinies of the armed forces may be to the detriment of
the Navy in the inner councils where two or more opinions
or votes (one for the Army and one for the Air Force) might
obtain against one for the Navy.
"We of the Navy hold the tradition that our service is
the strongest instrument by which our nation's policies may
be upheld throughout the world. We are trained and are
accustomed to sail to the farthest reaches of the earth
and stay there in support of these policies. We view with
apprehension the tendency on the part of some of our people
to believe the doctrines currently advanced by the Air Forces
that they may take over th4.e traditional role of the Navy
-26-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved or Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
policies with a show of force. We- know this premise is
.unsound.-- just as unsound as many of the other radical
ideas propounded in our public prints by the rabid advocates
of.air power, who would carry on all wars from the air alone.
.We are not unmindful of the fact that a majority of our citi-
zens were ready to believe the pronouncements of deSeversky
in 1942, and though these pronouncements have now been
thoroughly discredited, that many of the generals of our
Army Air Corps are making similar statements for public
consumption today -- with just as little factual sense but with the obvious objective of influencing public opinion
in favor of unification of the armed services.
and fly-to the uttermost reaches of the earth to enforce our
"Of late in the testimony of Admiral King
General
,
Vandegrift, General Merritt Edson and others there can be
no-doubt that in the opinion of many the provisions of this
bill might possibly allow the Army and the Air Corps together
to overslaugh the Navy to the detriment of the best interest
of our national armed strength. Personally, I feel the same
way about it.
"Science-is undoubtedly pointing the way toward "push
tion musv:.definitely ensure that there be no such single
detrirenta1to our national security. Unification legisla-
more extreme. spokesmen --.we shall.be led to a position
button" developments. If unification of the services is to
lead us to.a position whereby the Army Air Corps Is to push
all the buttons -- as stated publicly by some of the Air Corps'
"The question arises ab-tbzwhether the Arm and th N
.peace. In other words, we will come closer to obtaining the
essential support for each branch of the armed forces, if
they plead their cases to Congress separately.
civil coordinating'agencies mentioned above, the Army and the
Navy should each have its top civilian administrative official,
with inter-agency bodies to insure cooperative functioning.
"Based on an experience of 16 years in Washington, during
which I have had many contacts with the various Departments
of the Executive and Legislative Branches of our Government,
I am firm in my opinion that if we are to have the best Arm-v
and the best Navy within the limitations of our financial
resources, they must be kept separate administratively.
"This conclusion is founded on my conviction that with
one Secretary of the Armed Forces, whether he be, in fact,
the administrative head of those forces or whether he be
somewhat of a figurehead, as proposed by the so-called
Collins War Department Plan, he will inevitably be dominated
by one or the other branch of the Armed Forces and, depending
upon the limitations of his authority, that branch will be
more or less favored at the expense of _the other. The two
(or three) branches (three if we have a completely separate
Strategic Air Force) will be in a continuous struggle for tho
favor of the Secretary, I hope that this does not sound too
derogatory with respect to the independence of thought of
the prospective Secretary of the Armed Forces. I know, from
experience, that it will work out that way.
."The principle reason for my conclusion, however, Is that,
with separate civilian Secretaries having administrative con-
trol of the separate branches of the Armed Forces, each
Secretary reporting to separate Committees of Congress and
making his needs known to those Committees each service will
have greater opportunities to make known its requirements
and thus to overcome to some extent, at least, the proverbial
opposition to the development of the Armed Forces in time of
y e avy
should be tied together at the top administrative level of the
armed forces through the medium of a single Secretary of
Armed Forces or whether, below the President and the Supreme
Approved For Release 2003/10/222?TA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
 "While the Army and Navy are basically military organfya-
tiona, they-are also huge business enterprises, In-tima of
war 1#p yo aard a elMO I4W22b B4W6O"Pt(} OflAQW29ft07cike world.
In time of peace they must be organized for rapid and effi-
cient expansion to their war magnitu~dos. One of the chief
advantages' claimed by the advocates of merger._has to do with
the conduct of'the Army and Navy.as business e;nterpriees and
particularly with the procurement of goods and services.
"In this area, it is claimed that the proposed merger
would result in lowered costs and greater efficiency by
reason of elimination of duplication and reduction of overhead
Staffs in such matters as
(a) Production, procurement and inspection.
(b) Storage, packaging and issue.
(c) Transportation and distribution.
(d) Construction of facilities.
(e) Mobilization and training.
(f) Housing of troops and workers.
(g) Medical facilities.
(h) Disbursing, accounting and auditing.
(i) Communications.
(j) Internal Security.
(k) Real estate acquisitions and disposals.
(1) . Research and development.
(m) Administration and management.
"In an effort to avoid pure speculation, I have studied
the experiences of several of our large industrial organiza-
tions, where the, claimed advantages would accrue if the
reasoning of the advocates of merger is correct.
"The two greatest business organizations in America,
greater in magnitude of operations in time of peace than: the
Army and 'the Navy are the U. S. Steel Corporation and the
.General Motors Corporation. For the years between ware,
the Corporations spent more money and did more purchasing
than the Army and Navy. Therefore, since t e corporations
occupy an intermediate position between Army-Navy peace time
and wartime activities, it is reasonable to assume that pro-
curement policies of these highly successful business enter-
prises will give us something of a guide for proper Army-
Navy procurement organization.
"It may surprise you to learn that neither U. S. Steel
nor General Motors operate consolidated procurement services.
U. S. Steel is made.np of 34 companies each of which purchases
its own requirements in competition with the others as well
as with outside purchasers. Each subsidiary company operates
almost entiroly independently, its president having practically
a free hand. If he fails to make a profit, some one else
gets his job; but the parent corporation gives him no ready--
made alibis for failure by imposing restrictions on his
freedom of thought and action.
"Consolidation in the case of these great industrial
organizations brings very definite gains in such top policy
matters as labor relations, financial resources, selling
practices, and business contacts. But great care is taken
to leave with the responsible officers of each subsidiary
complete freedom to exercise their ingenuity and individual
talents,
"Private enterprise has learned through hard experience,
that more size does not in itself promote efficiency and
that the absence of competition within a large organization
may be the cause rather than the preventative of waste.
"The Army and the Navy is, each individually too lar33e
for efficient consolidation in procurement. For this reason
both Departments' have largely decentralized their procuromen
functions to the component organizations within their on
structures. In the Navy, procurement has actually been ds-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 Approve For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-
parsed so that the various Materiel Bureaus are now to a
considerable degree their own procurement agencies for
their own specialized technical equipment. Adequate
coordination is provided by the Material Division of
the Assistant Secretary's Office.
"This decentralization of procurement has contribued
notably to the speed and effectiveness with which the fleets
and their supporting activities have been sorved. It has
concentrated the responsibility for achieving an end ob,jec-
.tive in a particular Bureau and it has given that Bureau
all of the authority necessary to accomplish its mission.
If a Bureau were dependent upon someone else for the per-
formance of one or more of its vital functions, it would
be helpless in the case of failures of the other party to
make delivery.
"We must recognize that efficient procurement in itself
does not necessarily mean efficient end performance. We may
have an aggregation of very efficient components without an
efficient and objective. To illustrate: we tried out In
the Navy. Department at one time a system of centralized
stenographic services. An executive who wanted a stenographer
would touch a. button and a stenographer would arrive from
the.. central pool. It was not long beforewe learned that
whilevewere saving money on stenographic services, we were
vaeting,the.-I,time of-our top level administrative and execu-
tive#pers.onnel because of the unfamiliarity of the steno-
graphers with the specialized requirements. of those they
were. ae.ving<
?' "It is claimed that merger viii eliminate competition.
While that is true, in a sense, I cannot concede that this
is necessarily an'unmixed blessing. Competition is-the
very foundation stone of American enterprise. Monopolies
tend to become stagnant, unresponsive, and stultified. Cn
the other hand, competition within healthy limits leads to
greater. alertness, progressiveness, and efficiency; and
frequently contributes to new developments, technical advances,
and groater over-all effectiveness.
"Competition between the services resulted in the
development of the dive-bomber by the Navy. It has been
claimed at various times during this war.that the Marines
were, in competition with the Army and the Seabees in competi-
tion with the Army Engineers. Our war experiences has proved
conclusively that both Marines and Seabees have their
specialized functions to perform and both have amply justified
their existence.
"Competition is the life blood of progress. To
deliberately stifle it by consolidation would be a wanton
waste of one of our greatest American assets.. Domination
of the thinking of either service by officers who do not
have the "feel" of that service would have ruinous effect.
Much point has been made of the so-called "duplication"
of facilities between Army and Navy. Before entering upon a
discussion of this matter, we should define just what we
meo.n by "duplication." What we are-really seeking to avoid
i, waste resulting from the construction of excess or surplus
Facilities.
"Whether this excess or surplus results from the unneces-
sary duplication by one service of facilities built by the
other or is the result of excessive building within a service
is not, significant, since all of the money comes out of Uncle
Sam'.s pocket. If one of the services builds two hospitals
when only one is needed, the sin is just as grievous as if
each service built a hospital when one hospital would have
,been sufficient for both. -
29-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 " rA cbiiqi02 gpW8Cla-e [?.Pp100.?In00n
a2acee
of
s
exce6a"building within a service which appears. superficially
to be more flagrant p wasteful than the so-called "auplicsa-
tion" of facilities.
" "There has been, I believe, a disposition to speak of
duplication of facilities in such manner as t
i
th
o g
ve
e
impression that there was a vast amount of excess construction
by'both Army and Navy. While excess or surplus construction
by either service may be indicative of poor planning by that
service, consolidation of construction under one service would
certainly not have prevented such poor planning; on the con-
trary, the poor planning if it existed would have been
aggravated because of the increase in the work load..
in summary, I believe:
G& ar than the efficient accomplishment of the,
mission. The advocates of merger erroneously assume that
great size i.a automatically conducive to efficien:cy,. and.,
therefore, advocate a concentration of administrative control
at tha AY-nartao r.-P
"(a) That the proposal for amalgamation of Army and
Navy procurement and other service functions is based. on a
fallacious concept which emphasizes the efficiency of the
deans r +I-
That parallel operations is they
v
uc ve to great improvements in equipment and methods.
~._,_,,.,.
as oua phases
of procurement and other service functions are not per so
unwarranted and inefficient duplication, but may welt: be
cond 4
That complete late rata
9 culties and confusion, and loss of
direct contact an.-decisive action.
other hand, may easily lead to worseiconflictsUofon the
jurisdic-
tion internal diffi
I have listed-above does not. necessarilytinsure4roductioneone
in overhead,, savings in cost,. reduction. in the necessity
for coordination,-or increase in ff
"and (d) That the efficienc
f
y o
our combat forces would
not be improved by consolidation of procurement and other
service functions along the lines proposed.
"Organizations are. made up of human beings, not of email
rectangles outlined on a piece of paper.' Almost any organiza-
tion will work effectively, provided the people who compos,-i
it are imbued with enthusiasm, pride of organization, and the
will to win by working together. Therefore, that organize--
tion which is most conducive to the development of such
.spirit and enthusiasm is the organization which s.houla work
best.
"The American temperament is stimulated by competition
and by independence of thought and action.' In practice,
these are achieved by centralization of the determination
of policy but decentralization of the executio` that
policy. ~_.
"In considering the organization of our military forces,
we must give great weight to economy but wp must not permit
economy to be the-controlling factor. Expeneiitures for the
military services are productive only to the degree that the:y
contribute to the efficiency of those services in time of
war. -Expenditures for functions in the Army and Navy which
appear to be and are, in fact, duplications may well. be very
productive by stimulating competition in development of
personnel and material, and by instilling a pride of organi:Ta-
tion which will "pay off" in times of great stress.
"The most effective savings which we can make in financing
our military services is to so equip them that they are strong
enough to prevent wars and, if war does come, they can fight
it to a successful conclusion."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
-30-
 Approve or Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-7
"(a) From the beginning of consideration of the merger
of the Armed Services I have been opposed to the thesis that
merger is necessary simply because people who want the merger
say it is necessary as distinguished from serious study and
consideration of the pros and cons. I think we are all
agreed that better coordination can be effected in some
fields than existed during the war. As you must know
much
,
has been accomplished along this line since the war. To
accept, without critical examination, the views of high
ranking Army officers, who are not the beet qualified to
pass on naval matters, that the military forces must be merged
is to reject past experience, particularly that of.Germany in
World War II wherein many of its internal problems were clearly
attributable to domination of the Navy by the Army.
"(b) I consider that H.R. 31+69 as introduced by you on
14 May 191+7 representsa satisfactory approach to m1ution of
the problem. I consider also that the statement of Fleet
Admiral E. J King before the Senate Committee on Armed Ser-
vices, S. 758 - National Security Act of 1947, and other
testimony he has given as to merger, should be given careful
consideration. It was my privilege to serve on Admiral King's
staff on three separate occasions immediately before and during
the war. If the lucid and intellecturally honest position he
takes:in;this matter'ie not given due consideration, we shall
have failed to weigh evidence that is of the best,
t(c}.'You undoubtedly recall, perhaps some six months ago
,
an article on the subject of merger by George Fielding Eliot.
His thesis was that a few years of patient and honest examina-
tion of what is needed is preferable to enactment of a hastily
drawn bill which the Nation might live to regret. I believe
also that he advanced the view that a Master in Chancery might
well be considered. With these views I also , agree.. . . . .
"-(e) As to the opinion of the men of the service on this
question, I have yet to talk to a naval officer who favors the
merger in its present form. I am convinced that this opposi-
tion does not stem from the fact that the Army is the principal
proponent of the scheme but rather from a conviction - the
need for merger not having been demonstrated - that the Navy's
obligations to the Country are far more important, and should
be more convincing, than pressure, unsupported by logical
presentation, constantly being exerted by proponents of merger.
Put in other words, I feel - and have reason to believe that
many others are of the same mind * that immediate merger as
advocated would likely Jeopardize rather than improve overall
defense and security. I also have the impression that if the
proponents of merger would devote the energies they are now
expending in attempting to force it down the throat of the
Nation to an all out effort towards better coordination of
the machinery presently available, the need for merger would
then not appear to be so great."
"Admittedly, there is need for more coordination, and,
cooperation, if you will permit me. My simple opinion is
that a start in that direction should be made now by enacting
legislation to provide departments and agencies concerning
which there is full agreement on all but details of member-
ship. Further study on controversial issues seems justified
in view of sincere doubt as to their real benefit."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
-31-
 A proved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-
.It appears clear tame that whatever solution is made
that there are two basic matters that mus*e.eetablished"by
statute:
"(a Air Power made the predominant force.
"(b )) The series of Boards, Councils Wand Agencies to
coordinate and supervise the inter-relation of
the State Department, Armed Forces and the
civilian economy of the country to be activated.
"In regard to (a) above it is my conviction that it can
be best accomplished by establishing a three department
organization headed. by a "Coordinator" as outlined in Section
101 of your bill. However, all military and naval aircraft
and corresponding personnel must be a part of the Air Force;
in any operation involving aircraft as the major offensive
or defensive agent, that the command be vested
in the senior
.
Air Force officer present. This is inevitable in time of
.war and. therefore should,be established as soon as possible
-~so that the. rough spots (and there will be plenty of them)
can be workecl out at leisure while the stakes are low.
.Further,.this is the real long range intent of the Army Air
Force, in my opinion, and the public opinion which gained
.them, autonomy will compel a later re-work of the current
problem if a.partial solution is now effected."
"While strongly concurring in they purpose of both HR 2319
-andER.3e69, I am convinced that if HR 2319 becomes law
there
,
%
will-be a wider separation of the various arms of the National
Defense, less cooperation in command and. administration and
.greater cost: for a.lees effective, more cumbersome,, military
organization.,.; The bill should be termed a "Separation" bill
rather than a "Merger" bill. An additional and even more
'alarming probable result of*this bill will be the
radual
g
-= reduction of both the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation to
of either or both of these services is written into the-bill
in general terms or in detail. It will be accomplished
simply through the powers of the Secretary of National Defense
to "finally determine the budget estimates of the National
Defense Estailahmen " and control the budget program."
"I believe that a"Secretary of National Defense" with
specifically. defined authority would be more effective . than
a "Coordinator". The concept of a single military "Establish-
ment", headed, by a Secretary dealing with broad policy,
assisted by department Secretaries to handle the administra-
tion of the departments, seems to me to provide a sound
framework of authority, responsibility and administrative
machinery."
"The idea of keeping the Army Air Force within the War
Department b.y the method proposed in H.R. 3469 appeals to me.
In fact, my personal opinion is that close integration of
all.Army Air with other Army elements, as has been done in
the Navy, would bq even better for our military efficiency
if an amicable partnership could be established,"
32-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Appoved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R00010002Q007-8
? iii..-~'
"As for a true merger (where all the services combine to
a degree even comparable with the present merger of the sea,
ground, and air arms now existing within the Navy) I am an
uncompromising opponent. The degree of bureaucracy involved
alone would spell disaster. But aside from such bureaucracy,
the necessary "merger of thinki It
d
ng
ose not exist and no head.
(civilian or otherwise) could eliminate the schisms which
would exist within such a super-department. Furthermore,
even if we assume a close meeting of all military minds and
the absence of bureaucracy, the screening, channelizing and
crystalization
f
o
military thinking resulting from a single
Chief of Staff would deprive the Congress of one of its most
vital functions. The President and the Congress must con-
-tinue to-guide and direct us
Clemanc
u h
d
.
ea
a
good reason
for his famous statement that: "War is too important to be
left, to the Genera],s'.
"As for the so-called autonomy of the Air F
orce ae
represented by H22319, I again find myself in opposition.
Inevitably s s
t
epara
ion into three departments will be more
expensive, regardless of the many theoretical savings claimed.
But 'of even more vital interest to our national security is
the fatal blow this Will deal to Naval Aviation. Inevitably
every, Airy Force man..wou-ld grow to look upon every dollar
appropriated for Naval Aviation as a dollar:
t
f
cu
o
his pocket.
This would put Naval Aviation in a position of being an
activity within a department which is fighting:, the full
etr
n
h
f a
g
e
o
nother department..
".For-,the-foregoing reasons I am convinced th
t
y
'
a
an
move
away
from..the present.two-departmental. administration of our
-armed force, will be, a- step backwards not for
d '
war
. The Army
Air Forces have? Just fought a war under this system and It is
anunder
t
t
s
a
ement to say that its, performance compares
.favorably with the strategic bombing operations of-other
countries.
"I recognize the deep schism bxisting between the'ground
and air arms of the Army but I cannot see how this schism can
be.cured by further separation (the three-departmental system)
or integration (the one-departmental system). Only patience,
education and the fact that Air Power has come of age can
rectify the mistakes of the past, I believe the bill that
you have introduced follows this sound method of approach."
"It is my personal view that the Navy, as organized
today, is well balanced and equipped to carry out its essen-
tial mission, that of control of the seaways vital to the
defense of this country, Any law which might disrupt thia
balance, nor or possibly in the future,.I would consider as
Jeopardizing the National Security. I. of course, realize
that closer co-operation between the Army and the Navy
represents increased efficiency and economy; but I believe
the vital role that our Navy has played in the United States
history, and the vital role the British Navy has, in the past,
played in world history should not be lost sight of."
"I will say, however, that I fully realize the need
for such. coordination of the Armed Services'as will
adequately provide for team work between the Services both
in peace.-and In war."
"In view of the wide divergence of views concerning the
consolidation of the armed services and the noceosity for
realistic compromises, I cannot, in the time available off r
a sound recommendation."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Appoved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR00010002bQ07-8
Z, q
"At the risk of over simplification on a very compli-
cated and controversial subject, it is my firm conviction
that if there is created a separate Department of Air,
Naval Aviation will be subjected to ultimate and inevitable
strangulation, a similar trend will develop with regard to
the Marine Corps, and organizational barriers will exist
which will prevent the full realization of possible tactical
air support for the Army Ground Forces..
"I believe that these possibilities are so real as to
offer a threat to national security which will far outweigh
the advantages- of a three Department -system. I am therefore
definitely opposed to HR 2319 and favor HR 3469 in its stead.
"Regardless of the final bill which may be passed, your
.efforts to obtain and evaluate the views of responsible per-
sonnel on a broad basis are of inestimable value to the
nation. So few people-appreciate the fact that our national
existence may be determined by the work that you are doing
at this time."
"It is `a bit. difficult to put down my specific objec-
tions to this conception of a National Security Organization,
but I',uot don't like-it., It gives too much power into
'the hands or a non-elective official., It would permit
changes in composition and organization without sufficient
knowledge of resultant effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
It reduces the prestige of both Army and, Navy, and thus
also tende to lower morale and "esprit de-corps"
both of
,
which are vital in fighting-forcea.
"I am in full agreement not to set up a separate air
department. Such a separate department will be sure to
increase the expense of the military requirements, for there
is ,sure to be developed an organization as large as the
War or Navy Departments.
"May you have success in your efforts to-arrive at an
effective national security structure for I:believe you are
on the right track, and more power to you," .
"I believe that the organization struction as set forth
in HR 3469 more nearly meets the objections which have been
raised against HR 2319. I feel your bill provides a more
effective integration of all departments and agencies con-
cerned with national defense. I prefer the title of Coordina-
tor of National Defense, which I believe to be more accurately
descriptive of the functions contemplated for this high
.office, to the title of Secretary of National Defense. In
my opinion the coordinator should not be the head of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I feel it is unsound to make a
civilian the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or give him
membership since most all of the functions are strictly
military, One of the greatest advantages of your bill
(HR 3469) is its basic concept of a coordinated two depart-
ment organization which is more sound than a three department
organization. I believe in this concept 100%'for the answer
of our national defense problems.
"In diagraming your bill (HR 34691 in comparison with
the organizational pattern of HR 2319, I think that in
general the top of the pattern (composition of membership
and flow of responsibility) is better in your-bill HR 3469
with respect to the Coordinator for National Defense Council,
National Defense Council, National Defense Resources Board,
Central Intelligence Agency, Munitions Board, Research and
Development Board, than in Bill" HR 2319. I.,strongly feel
that there should be a two department organization, Army and
Navy with Air predominant in both by statute, with the ground
forces and surface forces (excepting submarines)) laying
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R00010CPO.20007->
-34-
 Ap(roved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
roles. From the lessons we have learned from World War II
it is shown that air will become increasingly predominant
in the years to come. So I say to give it the place it so
.rightly deserves in the nation's military structure now.
It has been said that no department of national defense
should be in essence built around any specific weapon
(airplane). I disagree as the airplane is not a specific
weapon but is a carrier of many weapons."
"I believo, therefore, that there is no more need for
a separate Army Air Force than there is for a separate Navy
Air Force. Each has its mission closely coordinated with
that of the Army and Navy respectively, and their separation
from those services would, to my mind, only tend to make
coordination in time of-war more difficult.
"My final recommendations are as follows:
. "Make no change in present organization of War and Navy
Departments with regard to merging same;
"Strengthen present coordination of activities of War
Navy-Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
"Add one more naval member to the present Joint Chiefs
of Staff, this member to be the senior naval aviator on duty
in !the Navy Department; and
"Initiate a comprehensive study of-supply problems of
both Departments with a view to unification of control of
certain features of their supply bureaus."
"In regard to the Secretary of National Defense, I
would much prefer that his duties of coordination be
effected by a "Coordinator" or "Assistant President" or
a "Deputy-President" and that the Secretaries of the
three services remain in the Presidents Cabine. It is
basic and fundamental in our country that the military
be subordinate to the civil-authority. Therefore, it is
highly desirable that the civilian head of each of the
armed services be in a position strongly to present the
requirements of each service without having to.by-pass
a Secretary for National Defense.
"It is my belief that the Air Force should be an
integrated part of the Army (as in H. R. 3469). However,
the Air Force has succeeded in breaking away from the
Ground Forces and has convinced the vast majority of the
citizens of our country that its importance warrants a
separate Department. Therefore, the separate Air Force
is acceptable to me and I have every belief that, once
established, it will cooperate with the other armed ser-
vices."
"On the other hand the bill H. R. 2319 seems tome to
have certain outstanding merits,-which are the War Council,
the provisions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint
Staff, the Munitions Board, the-Research and Development
Board, and the three agencies for the coordination of
national security, that is, the National Security Council,
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security
Resources Board. In summary, I would be relatively happy
with H.R, 2319 were the Secretary of National Defense to be
replaced by a Coordinator, leaving the three departmental
secretaries as Cabinet members, or, If the Cabinet were
enlarged by two, that is, the Secretary of National Def-insf
and the Secretary of the Air Force,"
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 AppLyed For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R0001000107-8
"I consider that your bill H.R. 3469
provides a
,
sound plan for national defense for the reason that it retaioe
the two-department organization of the services.
"I am opposed to the establishment of a third depart-
ment because I believe it is only natural that a separate
air force or department will develop along lines of inde-
pendent air action to the detriment of real coordination
or cooperation between the army, navy and air elements of
our armed forces. To me, it was apparent that the British
RAF had developed on the concept that the air force would
fight separately and independently of other forces and
little interest was shown in the requirements of the army
and navy for air support or in the development of suitable
equipment for the execution of these vital functions. This
was particularly apparent in the lack of development of
carrier aircraft, or for that matter, of carriers themselves."
"I know the purpose of your letter was to elicit a
perfectly frank statement from me on this subject and r
b
li
e
eve, as between the two plans, H.R. 2319 will be pro-
ductiv
f b
e o
etter results than your plan as contained in
a 77 n1.t.. to
"I do not believe that the central coordinatin
g
agency should be in the form of a Secretary, of National
based on the fear of lodging too much~power~i
A. -uvu
0i
~
n
one
ndivi.
dual. It is based on the belief that no one individual
h
th
,
as
e capacity to absorb the mass of data that must be
i
cons
dered before a vital decision affecting the National
Security can be made. It is my belief that such vital
decisions should be made only by the President after
consultation with a group of experts who have made a
complete study of the problem.
"In my opinion the Organizational'dutline under'
Titles I and II of H. R. 3496 is more appropriate, in
establishing the coordination and control required, than
is H. R. 2319. H. R. 2319 gives the Secretary of Defense
power of decisions in the War Council. H. R. 3496 places
the power of decision in the President.
"I sincerely believe that no appreciable savings in
funds will be realized from the establishments of a separate
Air Force or by combining the Marines with the Army. The
particular job to be done will require the same funds,
material and personnel in accomplishment, regardless of
the Organization assigned to perform the mission. Certain
specialized equipment and personnel will be required for
special (or different) types of warfare."
"Present legislation before the Congress to unify the
Armed Services (H.R. 2319) fails in its purpose for several
reasons. In the first place, it is anachronistic to approach
unification by creating a third department, namely the
Department of the Air Forces. At a time when integration
and coordination should be the result which we are seeking,
the initial step is a decentralization followed by a super-
imposing of an all-powerful secretary over the two present
departments and the new third department. Organizationally
this process is unsound. Another feature which should make
this bill undesirable is the failure to provide safeguards
for the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation at a time when
senior officers of the Army and the Air Forces have committed
themselves in writing as to their concept of the future
roles of both of these Naval branches. But even if thi-i
Approved For Release 2003/10/223:g1JA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100026007-8
safeguard were written in, there is still, the possibility of
a future change. Take for instance the case of Naval Avia-
tion. 'Should a separate Air Force be established, it is
only natural to suppose the nation as a whole would consider
this department to be the authority on military aviation.
In due course this department could and probably would point
out to Congress in future budget hearings that two air forces
are expensive, that the Air Force can perform all the missions
of Naval Aviation and'that there is no longer a necessity
for that branch. Today's Navy without its integral arm,
Naval'Aviation, is no longer an effective weapon in modern
warfare. Consequently, the logical conclusion to be reached
is the final relegation of the entire Navy from a fighting
force to a seagoing service force supporting the overseas
movements of the Army Ground Forces and the Air Force.
,,In conversation with officers of various rank in the
Army Air Forces, their one obsession is to get free of the
Army Ground Forces. They feel that through the years the
best Interests of the Air Forces have not been served by the
Army, which I am forced to admit is true. However, as much
as.I sympathize with their views, and as much as I realize
that their ambitions will be realized in an autonomous Air
Force, I cannot subscribe to the belief that such a move Is
in the best interests of the National Security. Today-we
have two well-functioning departments with Naval Aviation
as anIntegral part of the Nav
Th
y.
e same should be true
of the Army Air Force and the Army. And to those of the Air
Force who believe that air would not be properly recognized,
I say that-it is inevitable that those officers schooled in
air warfare, sea Warfare and land
warfare will by necessity
gravitate to the high command of the Services. When that
occurs
. we-Will h
,
ave then the most efficient fighting force
in the world, a complete Army and a complete Navy, thoroughly
indoctrinated in the princi
les
f
p
o
all kinds of modern war-
fare. And the quickest, most efficient way to accomplish
this is within a two-department defense system, coordinated
as indicated in your bill. I might add that to
quiet
few of those who fear the power of non-electoral coordinator,
the duties of that office might well evolve upon the Vice
President."
"Originally, being somewhat in doubt as to whether these
matters were really settled by the proposed legislation
(H.R. 2319), I was uncertain as to whether or not it was a
good enough answer to the problem. Finally, however, I
concluded that the need for definite action of some sort was
so great, and that H. R. 2319 -came so close to being the beat
that could be hoped for in the way of fair handling of the
disagreements that have militated against unity, that it
ought to receive early and favorable legislative action..
"I am opposed to the bill for a variety of reasons. My
main objection, however, is based upon the fact that history
is replete with examples of nations that have adopted a
single, or unified, air force with disastrous results. The
Naval component of that force has invariably been relegated
to a secondary position; assigned officers, men, and materiel
of such inferior quality and in such limited. numbers that
the result has been that it has been reduced to impotence,
"As noted above, the foregoing is my major objection to
the bill. Additionally, I do not understand how the proponents
of this bill can claim economy as one of its accomplishments;
I am not a student of Government, but I do not see how the
passage of the bill can fail to do anything but add tremendously
to the cost of the Nation's armed establishment."
-37-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 .. have given a lot of thought to the problem of con-
solidation f p e 0 pbff rclyf dt@o1j Qeea s~ /1 14 V Fi~@-~D~4-Ob8'n( 01~i 0AQ7 $ many
va service who are familiar with the subject.
.I am opposed to the plan proposed in H. R. 2319. Practically
every person with whom I have discussed the question is
unalterably opposed to this plan.. Although I must say in
fairness that there are undoubtedly some in the naval service
who think that H. R. 2319 is an acce
t
bl
p
a
e plea, I do not
personally know of anyone who favors it except the top
administration of the Navy Department. I also feel sure that
there are many people in the Army who are opposed to the
present plan but, in view of the administration's support
I think it would be very difficult to get them to express
their views in other than an off the record manner.
"The fundamental faults of H. R.. 2319 are: (1) a unifica--
tion or merger into a single establishment in fact; (2) asingle super-secretary of practically unlimited powers; (3)
relegation of the service departments to a secondary place
in the National Defense Establishment; and (4) the creation
of a separate Air Force., To so radically change the organiza-
tion of our Armed Forces at the present time is not only
unnecessary.,, but also is actually dangerous to our National
Security..., Certainly creating a third department will not
promote economy.
"Rather than ao in to n
t
: e ra of a bill to
implement ,.it, that is I believe sound, it, incidentally, is
very similar to 'vn~. s,~ 1 a ti .e.. ,.
---., -_- ..,. r,n~,.L r-a c,.tva ror
national security together with th d f
"Both H. R. 2.319 and H.R 3IL6g a t
r
ous rForcanches of the Armed
es. The major defects of H. R. 2319, in my opinion, are
as follows!
requirements of pp?ar a fulfill the
providing an agency under the President for
coordinating the efforts of the va
i
"(a) The Secretary of National Def
n
e
se appears to have
too much power, particularly over the budget.
"(b) The functions of the Services are not defined in
the Bill.
"Personally, as previously stated, I see no good reason
for separating the Army Air Force from the Army. But this
appears to have been accomplished, practically, already, and
it is in accord with the general trend throughout the world.
My principal objections to this step are the reduction of
the Naval weight in the councils of our national defense from
50% to 33 1/3%, the greater difficulty of effecting real
unity of command, and the danger of attempted interference
by Army Alt with the Naval Air and its proper function.
"I further regret to see the Secretary of Navy (and War)
lose cabinet status.
"To summarize, I believe that H.R. 2319, ae amended in
accordance with the aforementioned TIMES article and amended
further to include the definition of.the functions of the
Armed Services, as contained in the proposed Executive Order
submitted with the Joint War-Navy Agreement of January 16,
will afford a satisfactory solution of the problem of
coordinating the Armed Service s'. I believe further that this
opinion is probably shared by the majority of other naval
officers. The greatest apprehension has been the fear that
the Army might appropriate functions which properly belong
to the Navy, that the Army Air Force might attempt doing away
with or greatly decrease the Naval Air Force, and that the
Marine Corps might be abolished or reduced to relative impotence.
.I believe that the Bill, modified as stated, would provide
adequate protection against these possibilities."
-38-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 ved For Release 2003110/22 CIA-RDP90-0OS10RQ0010002( 0
"I am in favor of the merger bill now under consideration
by the Congress (HR2319). I have only slight misgivings rela-
tive to the power given the Secretary of National Defense be-
cause I have confidence that the man appointed to that
important office, assisted by his War Council, would impar-
tially utilize all of the armed Services in the best interests
of our country. I believe the proposed structure can be
effective, efficient, and economical.".
"One very simple approach to reducing the effectiveness
of any particular service is through the Budget. It is better
to have someone: connected with the services establish an over-
all budget. and a.budget for each service than to have the
present national Budget. Officer-state that there will be a
certain percentage out across the board, regardless of the
needs of any particular service. A "Secretary of National
Security" can serve a very useful purpose in this regard as
well as in the broad policy field.",
"Militarily there-is no need for either an.over-all
Secretary-.of the Armed Forces or for aseparate air force.
Economy--.alone speaks_foroibly against the establishment of
additional, bureaua,. ,departments or agencies -within the armed
forces organization,..especially when they add. nothing to the
national - security,- but.,;, on -the other hand. tend, to weaken the
military ,establishment..', Our ;experience has clearly demon-
strated the necessity of:integrating the air power of both
th&,,Army ?and 'the: Navy .within .those services,. Economy, and
coordination between and. within the services--can be accom-
plished by joint-committees without the additional overhead
of an. administrative organization with a secretary to exercise
:control over and, direct?:the-military services." .-
"My personal opinion as-to the merits of H.R. 2319 happen
to coincide with the opinions so ably presented by General
Vandegrift at your committee hearings.. I see no objection
to some-form of a merger of the Armed Services, provided such
a merger will affect the economy and efficiency of operation.
I an concerned as a Marine Officer in seeing that my Corps
does not lose its identity nor have its traditonal functions
curtailed or completely eliminated by this proposed legislation.
The suggested change in language proposed by General Vandegrift,
which I have just read in the current Army-Navy Register, would,
if enacted, insure against any. such possibility."
"Referring to question 1(b), the suitability of R.R. 2319
to accomplish the purposes outlined above, I doubt it. Doubt-
less it could be amended to accomplish the purposes spevified
in paragraph 3tb), (c) and (d), relative to. Marine Corps and.
Naval Aviation in particular. Probably, it could be amended
to define more specifically powers for the Secretary of
Natinnal Defense. Admiral Nimitz is reported to have stated
that if Congress feels H. R. 2319 should be so amended, "he
certainly would have no objection"..
"Regarding question l(c), suitability of your alternate
bill, H.R. 3469, in my personal view it would be preferable
although certain amendments might be desirable. Objections to
it have been raised that it does not provide: (a) a War Council;
(b) a Single Secretary with adequate power of decision; (c)
definite provision for integrating appropriations for all ser-
vices;,(d) inclusion of military membership in National Defense
Resources Board; (e) a separate Air Force.,.
-39-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000.100020007-8
"In my opinion, the natural and inevitable result of the
establishment of a third department within the single depart-
ment of National Defense will be the eventual elimination of
Naval Aviation and the U. S. Marine Corps. If the Public and
the Congress believe this will better provide for National
Security it is their prerogative and duty to decide and act
accordingly. I submit that the Public should not be deceived
as to what is taking place however. Nor, in my opinion should
the issue be confused by claims regarding economy. The -
criterion here is the effectiveness as a National Security
measure."
"!do not subscribe to the creation of a separate auto-
"What I fear, however, is that passage of H. R. 2319 would
"If it has now been determined by the Congress that the
President.'s Cabinet, for whatever reasons, is incapable of
coordinating effectively the departments of the Government
including the Military Services, and therefore find it essen-
tial through legislation such as H.R. 2319 or H.R. 3469, to
insure coordination not only of the Military Services, but
of this country's entire economic and manpower potential for
atomic warfare, then I favor, at least for the foreseeable
future, a .'bill such as H. R. 31+69 rather than H.R. 2319.
I believes that this: would inevitably spell-the doom of Naval
and Marine A-Viatioa under the guise of "economy" and "elimina-
tion% of- duplication". These two catch by lines have a great
appeal during peace, and are used to railroad through measures
which would take the tools from the hands of persons responsible
nomoue: United-StatesAir Force. Human nature being what it is,
result eventually in a weakened naval establishment lacking
naval air unite to conduct anti-submarine warfare and protect
naval task forces, with no comparable Air Force units capable
of performing these missions. The present Army Air Force has
little conception of the problems connected with operations
involving close coordination with. naval task forces, and is not
likely to exert sufficient effort, time, and funds to prepare
units for these specialized assignments."
"With regard to H.'R. 3469, I concur in general with the
provisions of the bill, but I believe the choice of the title
"Coordinator of National Defense" was unfortunate. In many
quarters there is a certain onus attached to the term "Coordi-
nator". I can see no need for any title other than "Chairman,
National Dofense Council". There are many who believe the
duties of the office should be assigned to the Vice Pres}dent
when we have one. I think that is a good idea, but might
require a constitutional amendment."
-"In the various comments which I have seen, I have been
most impressed by the testimony of Fleet Admiral King and Mr.
Ferdinand Eberstadt, and I definitely recommend that most
serious consideration be given to their testimony and recommenda-
tions, particularly that testimony recently given before the
Senate Committee."
-4o-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Ai~~ie~l'a~~o?i,~Rb?~bo~loac~osse~e' . set-up,
when ave just fought- the greatest: war -in the history .i the
under.these changes for a couple of years-, at least. -Then,
let's see where we stand."
majority of organizational changes envisioned in the
National Security Act of 1947, most people--heartily agree to.
Therefore, let's adopt. these changes forthwith. Let's function
use therein will be very similar to World War-II. Great- changes
are inevitable and we have the machinery now to ensure 1,heir
efficient usage, coordination and development. We shouJ.d main-
tain that system until another system is proven better. I Say
that we have no right, no basis, for such.change now though
definitely, I do believe that certain changes'.are in order.
Those changes, however, are in general agreement among all
services and are based on war experience. They deal primarily
with procurement, command functions, etc, These changes, together
with th
argument; experiment and-improvement since the birth of this
nation. And now,,of all times, we are trying to.chango a
proven system in such & manner that our national security may
be very seriously jeopardized. For at least 5. years, and more
likely, 10 years,what we know about warfare and the toots we
world successfully with a set-up which has-been the
eubect of
"I have been deeply concerned-over the proposedunifica-
tionever since it..came to my notice in the fall of 1945. 1
am etillappreheneive over the resultato,the Navy. and the
Natloa:, I. am opposed to the H.R. 2319 for the following
principal reasons
"(a) I believe that the political and military
powere accruing to, an office of such magnitude
are too great for any non-elected official of the
government.
"(b) I consider.that too much is left to-chanoe in
that the authority of the proposed Secretary over
the various Departments'is not clearly defined.
"Regarding H. R. 3469 I favor this or a similar bil-I
except that I believe the Coordinator of National Defense
should not be included in the membership of the Joint Chefs
of Staff, but in his stead the Chief of Staff to the President
as is the present practice."
"In response to your letter of May 27, 1947, I must say
that your proposed bill, H. R. 3469, comes nearer to my idea
of the*'merger'-or 'unification' than anything as yet--suggested.
"I like the two-department idea with-autonomy for the
'Army Air Force.' I'm fearful lest under H.. R. 2319,-irre-
spective of the safeguards for Naval Aviation, that oizr
country might be deprived of-what I consider its mobile weanon
namely, the aircraft carrier capable of.launching long-range
bowers, or guided missiles-from-any of-the-waters of.--the earth
into the heartland of our prospective enemy..
"I believe .1 can state that- practically all contempDraries
of mine'are very apprehensive-abo-ut the pending merger legis-
lation, and hold-.views similar to mine."
"As-foremy general comment on the proposed consolidation,
I am personally in agreement with the official position of the
Navy Department."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Appved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R00010002007-8
"In general, I believe that I am accurate in stating that
most of the experienced naval officers, who have had no rea--
ponsibility for the drafting-of the consolidation plan,
believe that it will do the Navy and the National Defense
irreparable harm. This belief stems from the following:
"1. There is too much power vested in the Secretary
for National Defense.
"2. While the overhead in connection with the Office
of the Secretary of National Defense, as drafted in
H. R. 2319, is modest, in a bureaucracy, the functions
of an office have a habit of growing beyond all belief.
"3. The duties and functions of the various armed
services are not definitely drafted and delimited
in the plan.
"4. The duties and responsibilities as well as the
strategic employment of the Navy, if not directly
controlled, will be too strongly influenced by the
military.
"Other than the above comment it would appear that
H. R. 3469 is a much more practical plan to achieve coordina-
tion than H. R. 2319."
"That what I may say may not be constructive is to be
.regretted, since it is so easy to find flaws in any positive
course of action yet so difficult to put forward something
better. In this case, however, the issue is so important I
feel entirely unsympathetic to the apparent widespread belief
that any course is better than none. The safety of the
country is dependent on the decision in this issue. It is
disturbing to me that a precipitant' course is to be
followed when there are such divergent views on the? matter
held by the services who in the end must implement any
decision that may be adopted.
it A merger at the top with the establishment of another
autonomous arm will not in my mind result in economy. We may
not spend more but I doubt we will spend less. The handling
of budgets will essentially be unchanged since they at present
are channelled through an executive office responsible to the
President.
"As for H. R. 2319 and H. R. 3469, I consider your bill
much the preferable of the two'since I believe some of the
thoughts above are already incorporated therein."
"If I recollect correctly, and I believe I do, the
original basis for all this discussion, so far as the-public
was concerned, was unification wherever overlapping functions
existed in order to effect economies in.our national defense
and to provide for unified command. in Washington. As I have
followed this matter through the press and the reports of
the hearings, it seems to me that the current proposed
legislation has drifted quite far afield from the original
concept. Economies will not be effected by the super control
agencies which are proposed and in securing a so-called
unified command in Washington we will establish a General
Staff system, the danger of which is very apparent if one
studies German military history."
"I am going to state in the beginning that I like the
two-department system, outlined in your HR 3469, and have
never cared for the three-department setup of HR 2319. I make
this statement based on what I have seen.
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Ap'roved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
"I realize that I have been rather critical of the forma-
tion of a third independent department, that of Air in this
country. ,
My remarks are not intended to be critical of our
present . Army. Air Force. While I am product of the Navy-Marine
Corps system, I had the opportunity-of attending the Army Air
Corps' tactical school at Langley Field in 1930. There I
became friendly with many of the leaders of the Army Air Force
today. Also I served with, under and over units of the Army
Air Force in the South Pacific during the past war. I never
saw an Army Air Folce'Officer that I didn't like personally;
they are the same as anybody else. However, I do not believe
that their case for independence, as outlined in HR 2319, is
Justified or for tht best of this country.' I believe that
their future activities are amply protected in your HR 3469."
"I consider ER 3469 as far more desirable than"HR 2319.
ER 3469 maintains the two-department system and, in my opinion,
fully provides for the Air Corps by giving it autonomy within
the War Department. While there is some doubt that the office
of the Coordinator of National Defense, which would be estab-
lished by ER 3469, would have satisfactory standing and pres-
tige in dealing with the various Cabinet members and others in
the proposed National Defense Council, it is believed that this
organization would be far superior, and would insure better
coordination. of the services, than the 'three-department organiza-
tion under a single Secretary of National Defense.
"There appears to be-a widespread fear, in which I share,
that if HR 2319 is enacted., the other services will be reduced
to minor proportions and status by budgetary action once the
air force-has been established as a separate department. While
this undoubtedly arises partially from self-preservation and
the fear of officers in the services that their careers will
arbitrarily be cut short, it-also arises from a real fear for
national security. Nothing has been presented, other than
extravagant -statements, to prove that the merger will result
in a better and more economical organization of national
defense, while there are indications, based on war experience,
that it actually will be inferior because of expected domina-
tion of one service over the others. Nothing that has appeared
in reports of testimony at hearings held on HR 2319 have served
to dispel this fear which has become aggravated by the public
statements during the past year of various Army Air Force
officers.
"I know personally no officer who does not subscribe to
views expressed above."
"Despite the fact that the present uncertainty regarding
the merger of the armed forces is adversely affecting the
general morale of the services, it is believed that the
Congress must not rush this matter through until it receives
more.information from operational personnel, Therefore, it is
strongly recommended that experienced naval aviators, general
line, and staff corps officers of the rank. of commander and
above be summoned fresh from operational units of the Fleet
outside the Washington area to testify before the pertinent
committees of the Congress, Cross examination is the age old
method of obtaining the truth and in my opinion it is the
best.
_L,.3_
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 the ,plkWE asIM(T3/f 6/2t'C IAAPD04@-ObTomoovvo0@t28 ea ous of
y whole unification get-up.
"The remarks of many Air Corps officers to the effect that
it was only a question of time before they would take over
Naval Aviation; the plans the Army has for the Marine Corps
which have been-so ably brought out by General Vandegrift;
and such reports as the Kirk plan which recently came out in
which the Army made clear its intent to combine all medical
services under them and the Lutes' report on logistics, all
tend to'make the Navy very suspicious of their Army compatriots."
"I do not like the power placed in the hands of the
Secretary of National Defense by H. R. 2319, particularly as
regards control of the budget and power of decision in the War
Council. I doubt if our country is ready to p l e this much
.power in the hands of one individual other than the president.
The difficulty of finding a man competent to handle this job
properly will be very great.
"As to the Army Air Forces, I see no particular objection
in setting. up the Strategic Air Forces as an independent
agency, in view of the fact that this force operated as an
independent agency during the last war. I.feel that the Army
should. keep its. ground support aviation under Army control,
similar to Navy aviation.. HoVeVer, the Army, as far as I
know,:,. does- not appear to be interested in this matter an I
t ---- L
'how's n
o
.{
"Many Naval officers feel that the r
epresentatives of
`the Navy Dopartmentwho finally acceded to the Bill (H.R. 2319)
did so because they felt that some sort of a unification bill
would be forced upon the Navy, and that the proposed Bill was
the beat compromise obtainable. I beliove th
t the
a
Navy repre-
sentatives do not think that Bill (H
R
2
1
)
.
.
3
9
contains the
best possible provisions for the security of the United States,
but that they think thi
i
s
s the bost that can be done, consider-
ing Army Air's attitude and the effect of the prolific publicity
which Army Air inspired. Everybody in the Navy realizes the
very bad effects that these inter-service fights have on the
morale of the personnel of the Navy, and probably of the Army
too. It. may be better to accept a decision which is not quite
right and raise the morale, than it would be to continue to
struggle with the ensuing demoralization of our combat
personnel.
"Also, Naval officers do not understand why, if unifica-
tion is so desirable, that autonomy of the Air Forces is
necessary. The two ideas are conflicting.
"I believe that H. R. 3469 is'a better alternative than
H.R. 2319, but I would like to reiterate that legislation alone
will not restore the Navy's former high regard for the inten-
tions for Army Air. This can be done only by the future actions
of Army Air."
"If the powers of the proposed Secretary of National
Defense were properly circumscribed and the necessary protec-
tion for the Marine Corps written in, I would not oppose its
passage. Your proposed alternative, H.R. 3469, seems to have
taken care of my first objection very well, but I was dis-
.app ointed to see that it did not include a statutory delinea-
tion of the functions of the Marine Corps."
-44-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
"The effects of H. R. 2319 and its companion measure S.758
,if enacted into law, will'be most profound; and I am personally'
apprehensive that some of the results will not benefit the &avy.
I believe with you that it is the moat important measure to
come before the Congress, with respect to our National Security,
and it should receive such seriou
s consideration that the
language of any law passed will in no .measure impair the con-
fidenco and interests of the Navy.
"I most certainly agree that the closest coordination
between operations of the Army, Navy and Air Forces should be
provided for; but I am not sure that unification, oven by law,
is a magic word that will b
i
r
dge all difficulties. I do not
believe in a single Secretary for National Security, except
in the role of Coordinator and Assistant to the President for
National Security Matters. I do not believe that he requires
cabinet status and I am personally opposed to any lose of
cabinet statue by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary
of the Army.
"I will not comment upon the propriety of setting up
the Army Air Forces as a separate Air Department, co-equal
with the Army and Navy, beyond the statement that U1 ieation
should begin at home and the creation of a separate Air
Department seems to me a
o
p
or solution for failure to integrato
the. Army Air Forces into the Army.
"In addition, I am impressed th
t
a
the original move for
merger of tho Armed Services, with creation of Air Department,
was generated almost entirely from W
?-_-_~--
ar
to which term it_is8moreadifficultrt
n
f
o
object; but
I question
the necessity of the steps
ro
p
posed to obtain unification and
coordination. I believe that the measures proposed are not
essential to unification
and I feel that they discount the
morale and esprit de cor
s of th
p
e Navy and the Marine Corps,
the priceless and. necessary ingredients in the success of
those organization
s.
am afraid that unification in the form proposed trill
lead to an Army-dominated Navy and Marina Corps. I shudder at
that thought when I think of the army dominated navies of
Germany and Japan
and even
f R
,
o
ussia and France. I am told
that I discount the morale and spirit in the Navy and Marine
Corps when I express the fear of Army domination; but my reply
is that the elements for such domination exist in the proposed
National Security. Organization and we should not be subjected
to a set-up that even requires efforts and thoughtin prevent
Army control and development of naval services.
"There are many good features in the proposed legislation
and they should be provided for by law and retained. The
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the
Secretary of the Air Force, if a separate Air Department a
created, should all be Cabinet officers. A Civilian Coordi-
nator for National Security as a Deputy, or Assistant, to the
President should be created;.e. War Connell should be pr.ovdded
as indicated, with the Civilian Coordinator as Chairman and
whore top decision is required it should cone from the
President in his Constitutional role as Commander-in-8hief
after obtaining recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
through the W.r Council; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board should
be retained with suitable staffs and secretaries. Further, for
national security there should be provided a National Security
Council, a National Security Resources Board, and a Central
Intelligence Agency as generally indicated, allowing for the
differences indicated above.
"The above proposals are little different from your
measure H. R. 3469, and I believe it could be modified easily
to.assure the features mentioned. Personally, I rather favor
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000106020007-8
 App
ved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R00010002c,07-8
k.,
your idea of giving autonomy to the Army Air Forces, but under
the Army organization. similar to our Marine Corps in the
Navy set-up. Naval aviation should be kept integrated with
the Navy, and the Marine Corps organization should be maintained.
The War Dopartment should be changed to the Department of the
Army-and its Secretary designated as the Secretary of the
Army. "
"However, in regard to H. R. 2319, I note that the
Secretary of National Defense is given the authority to
"establish policies and programs",, and 'to authority and control'. These poers areextensive. dIteseema~
to me that with this bill, the question is - how is it to be
interpreted and administered ?
based upon such legislation which tmight dlebe rulins
ssen?thoneffective-
ness of one Service. Such interpretations made by the Single
,Secretary would have the effect of law in so far as the Ser-
vices are concerned. A policy, program, ruling or intorprota-
tion.offected by the Secretary over the objections of one
Service would be difficultcfcorrection, and much harm could be
done, particularly, before such action could be overtaken by
corrective measures taken by the Congress or by Executive
action, Functions could be t
`
one, ransferred, one by one, from
Service to another
l
vi
,
ea
ng the former impotent. On. the
other hand,, l believe the duties laid down for the 'Coordina',
as presented in your 1,,. _ _ tor
B
l
-
,
. D tuy, would accom-
results desired as to coordination, effectiveness
and economy and. at the s
ame time
arbitrary action by one man, to the detriment ofstheiNational
Security.
"As for the Army Air Force, everyone agrees that they did
a fine job in their contribution to the winning of the recent
war. However, I do not believe that they would have beer, more
effective had they been organized under a separate Department.
With the advent of the guided missile and other new implements
of warfare, conditions of warfare will continue to change.
Guided missiles can be launched from the ground, from ships
and from aircraft. The introduction of the guided missile
and other implements of wa
f
r
are, will, in the future, tend to
reduce the relative importance of the piloted aircraft
rincluding the Strategic Air Force) as it now exists. I believ,;
that the War and Navy Department structures proposed in E.R.3L69
would promote desirable coordination and further, that the
results would be more offoctivo. On the other hand, I do not
believe that it would be economical to provide for a soparato
Air Force."
"Briefly, I favor (1) the continuance of the two Depart-
ments, with coordinating agencies, and without the addition
of a third Department of the Air; and (2) each with its air
component becoming increasingly predominant as the parent
department's other components become sublimated, in accordance!
(a) with lessons of the past war, and (b) with predictions
as to future methods of warfare. Such an organization of two
departments can more effectively,
greater facility perform the funtimore economi with
ons spelledcoutyfordthree
department organizations.
that you perusal of your proposed bill, H. R. 3169, indicates
you entertain similar ideas and I heartily endorse its
basic principles.
"Aside from the obvious military disadvantages in attempt-
ing to coordinate and correlate the activities of three separate
departments as compared with two departments, I am unable to
visualize the economies to be effected by organizing a third
department, that of air, as proposed in H.R. 23 I
bo me to'be an expensive horse-trade move; TheAir ForcePgeets$
full independence and de t
Approved For Release 1p0U3/P0?:2t:IAQO6`~I~RO~'I~D4~OOfl~~E3cPe
_)6-
 Ap roved For Release 2003/10/22 CIA-RDP90-00610R0001000O007-8
get perpetuation of their waning organization. The Navvy--
an innocent bystander--gets temporary guarantees of no
dismemberment of its Naval Aviation b
y one horse-trader and
no dismemberment of its Marine Corps by the other trader.
"There are those who argue that organization of a Depart-
ment of Air is due recognition of the distinguished services
of our Air Forces during the recent war. With no thought of
be-littling their splendid performance, I consider appropriate
recognition of the magnificent services of the Air Forces is
obtainable, at less cost and without sacrifice of national
security, by suitable reorganization within the War Department,
granting the air component the predominating position therein
to which it is entitled.
"Only time can give the correct answer to your question,
but in my opinion the merger is worthy of a trial run, and
somehow I am confident that it will wear well and improve
as time goes on, despite its size."
"I fully agree with you th 4-
Z, ee in S. 75
the Senate o as amended and as reported to
, represents a.sound solution, the best that could be
made to work - in fact the most practicable which has been
doviaod to date. I freely and fully support.that bill as
amended.
a
V ailed study of the
question I am. sincerely of the opinion that the pattern of
this.step as ez res d
er coordination of army, navy
and, air forceoperatione. After
d t
In- order to bring about 'a cloy a some steps should be taken
The remaining provisions of th
three military departments and the Secretaryeof abli
National Defense
are far more controversial. For many years I have opposed the
ideas of either a separate or a united air force or air depart-
ment, as being both unnecessary for and detrimental to our over-
all military efficiency. During the war, I was strengthened
in this belief by military developments in those countries which
had adopted the air force idea, notably Great Britain and Germany.
An examination of these developments reveals certain serious
dangers inherent in the separation of the air forces from the
other arms, and indicates that if 'such separation is undertaken
it must be accompanied by clearly defined safeguards to prevent
fatal weakening of the army and the navy, and the overall military
effectiveness. H. R. 2319, as originally introduced, does not
include these safeguards. i understand that certain amendments
along this line have been introduced by the Armed Forces Committee
of the Senate; but, since I have not seen them, I am unable to
comment on them.
"However, it seems to me that the over-riding consideration
is to adopt some plan which will attract the loyal support of all
the services. Without such support, no organization can produce
the unity of effort which we must achieve, Because of the strong
and sincere convictions on both sides of this question, it appears
that the three-department plan provided in H. R.
2319 which can attract this vital support. I believe ti
e9 ha the only two departments, each with it'sown air element,asounder organization
from a military standpoint; but an inferior plan, loyally supported
is preferable to a better plan which would produce continuing
friction and conflict between the services.
ureason.,
it appears wisest to adopt H. R. 2319, the this
t of
all responsible officials of both departments, provided It
amended-to define clearly the functions of each department."s
Approved For Release 2003/101-2~!tlA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
I am a captain in the Unit A St
active duty. etas Naval Reserve on
Y. It is not in that capacity that I volunteer this
letter but as a professional civilian, a newspaperman of suffi-
cient Washington seniority to have become (for illustration)
one of the. elders of the Gridiron, and who was before the war
head of a substantial news bureau in this city.
"My opposition to the Senate and House Committee versions
of the Armed Services Unification legislation - Senate 758 anI
House 2319 -. is therefore from the viewpoint of an informed
civilian. There are not many of us, even in the Congress or
in journalism, and outside tharse two categories the public in
dangerously uninformed and
dit
, e
orially, dangerously misin-
formed, of the threat to the national defense and indeed to
the republican form of government inherent in these bills.
For the public's ignorance i blame my colleagues of the press.
"You have tried to remedy the gravest danger by substitu-
tinga co-ordinator of the military departments for the
fantastically empowered single Secretary delineated in the
committee bills. If your amendment could be advertised and
explained to the public I believe it would produce such
popular support that that revision would be forced upon
Congress.
"What the committee bills propose is to delegate to one
man almost autocratic powers over the military establishments
of the nation.- The powers. to be conferred upon him exceed
those-suggested by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and
their military advisers.
"This legislation is not being written for the day, or
the next five years. It can not be gaged by the pes
al
statures of any likely candid
t
a
e for the office this ye
in.1949. It is to be the basic law for the administration of
the national security structure for as far as we can see into
the future.
"Who is this autocrat of our safety to be? He will be a
man rewarded witb.the office for his assistance in winning the
election for an administration. He will come to Washington
charged with the responsibilit
t
y no
only of maintaining the
nation's security but, to great extent, the peace of the world.
The chances are good that he will be an earnest, zealous,
loyal and ambitious public servant. The chances also-are,
by statistical evidence, that he will relinquish the office
as soon as it interferes with his personal affairs. And the
odds are that he will be as familiar with the enormous duties
with which this Congress is preparing to charge him as I am
about abdominal surgery or atomic energy.
"The inevitable result will be the domination of the
composite department by the professionally military, in
violation of the spirit of the Constitution, however the
proposed law is adjusted to the letter of the charter.
"No one can plead, except speciously, that the same
criticism applies to the President as commander in chief, or
that the President's ultimate authority remains intact. The
President is an elected servant of the people, a politically
appointed Secretary is not. Under the existing smtem, the
President's administration of the national defense is delegated
to two Cabinet:.officers, thus halving the likelihood of mal-
feasance. The proposed law would double it, besides creating
a self-perpetuating military staff in fact, although it may
not so be called in name, as the mentor of the innocent in
nominal charge. Will we not have a military bureaucracy,
concealed from the public and beyond reach of the Congress?
"Without going into too infinite detail, I believe that
the proposed unification -- which contains many desirable
and necessary improvements on the existing defense structure
--
contains all the germs of a militaristic organism which when
-48-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
implanted in the body politic can cancerously overcome it.
The law is being propelled to enactment by an hysteria pro-
duced by distorted images of approaching war. I can believe
that the bill, if made law, might even hasten conflict and
by the topheaviness of its creation, make that war costly
and difficult to win.
"Reverting to the letter of the Constitution, what con-
sideration has been given to the articles forbidding appro-
priations to the Army for more than two year? Will the
entire defense budget under unification have to be placed under
that time limit? The Constitution also says there shall be
an Army and a Ncl.vy. Will not then the creation of a cc-equal
Air Force be technically unconstitutional? Is not your re-
definition of the Army Air Force as analogous to the Marine
Corps unconstitutionally compulsive?
"These are practical questions, not rhetorical ones, and
the answers can not be evaded.
"The necessity of such integrating agencies as the
National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs and Central
Intelligence, are in any event above debate, and can easily
be established forthwith by non-controversial legislation.
Their establishment by law is all the nation now needs for
its coordinated security, until a completely objective,
unhurried., scientific, study of truly integrable defense can
be accomplished.
Sincerely,._
(signed) Wtilter Saris"
"I have not had the time to analyse the various pro-
visions in the two bills, also I have been out of touch with
naval developments in recent years. However, I like the
declaration of policy in H.R. 3.69. The detailed provisions.
of H.R. 3.69 appear to conform to the declaration of policy
and should provide for the coordination of the armed services
without disrupting any of the organizations which have proved
their effectiveness."
"I agree with you that close coordination of land, sea and
air operations is absolutely necessary. In obtaining this
coordination through the decisions of one man, I think the
command of a theatre is the highest limit which can be expected
of a human being even when advised by a well rounded joint
staff. For this reason I an uneasy concerning the interests
of the Navy when one man in Washington has the power to reduce
the activities and functions of the Navy by means of adjust-
ments within the overall security budget. History has repeatedly
shown that few men other than those with Naval training under-
stand the importance of control of the sea and just what is
involved in the way of means and operations required to secure
and exercise this control. The reports of the Fuehrer con-
ferences now being published by the Navy Department are
excellent examples of what happens to a Navy when under the
overall direction of someone who does not understand control
of the sea by sea-air power."
"Fleet Admiral King in his statement before the Armed
Services Committee of the Senate on May .6,1947 said., "I feel
that in the controversies and discussions that have so far
taken place (in relation to an improved organization for
national security) the emphasis has been wrongly placed; that,
so to speak, the cart has been put before the horse".
To me this is the essence of the present situation. Before
the country, the Congree or the services had time to evaluate
properly the results of the last war or the prospects of
-Ig-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
the future insofar as both pertain to a proper organization
for national security, we were plunged into a discussion of
detailed organization which largely missed the main point.
It is not so important to change the departmental organiza-
tion of the military services themselves as it is to sot up
permanently and quickly the machinery which will enable this
country to wage efficiently the total war of the future if
it ever becomes necessary to do so. From a national security
standpoint our most pressing need of the moment is an agency
which will coordinate and tie together all those activities
of government which have to do with the political, the
military, the economic, and the industrial factors involved
in the "common defense".
"As to the reorganization of the military departments
themselves, it is my feeling that by a process of evolution
and real inter-service education a truly single service might
become a probability within a generation. Any such solution
will of necessity have to await the arrival in command ranks
of military and naval men who are now starting their careers
and who, properly trained, can assess each others problems
with an understanding which is most certainly not existent
at the present time.
an. interxn organization. 1 am unalterably opposed. to
.the'proposal for three military departments containod in
H.R. 2319., It is organizationally unsound from a military,
standpoint becau
i
se
t would freeze the services into the
pattern of World War II... At-a time when. every prospect of the
future indicates a necessity for a sim
lifi
d
p
e
and economical
structure, it establishes an organization which multiplies,
complicates and one which will strain the financial resources
of this country to maintain.. Money badly needed for real
.military needs will be used for a greatly enlarged departmental
structure and overhead.
"The crux of the matter in this respect is of course the
demand of the Army Air Forces for autonomy. Without this
demand, we could proceed with an orderly coordination of
the two services on an economical basis and ultimately to a
single service.
"There is nothing, military or otherwise, that cannot
better be accomplished by two departments, as against three.
In so far as air is concerned, and I consider myself qualified
to speak, I feel that at the moment, as of today, the Air
Forces of the Army and Navy are the most essential offonaivc
and defensive components of our military strength. Nothing
should be done to weaken them in any way and "air mindedness"
must continue to be a requisite in all military and naval
planning and thinking. However, if the Army Air Forces attain
separate departmental status, it is my belief that they will
tend to become frozen in an outmoded pattern due to lack of
competition. They will soon become the only Air Forces of the
United States for I am ceri,in that the Naval Air Forces cannot
long maintain their present status and efficiency via a vis
a separate Air Department. Without air, the ground army and
the surface navy, still able to exert tremendous influence,
will tend.to become completely reactionary in their efforts
to maintain their own size and prestige.
"To my mind there is less reason for a separate department
of Air, now, than there was 25 or 30 years ago when proponents
of such action were just as strong in their convictions and used
many of the same arguments to back up their contentions. Had
they had their way then, there would have been no Naval Air
Forces in this war. This however is history,, certain details
of which will become more generally appreciated as better
histories. of World War II become available. What concerns us
as a nation now is the future. What of the future of military
Air? No one knows exactly, but in this connection I invite
your attention to Dr. J. C. Hunsaker'e letter transmitting th
32nd Annual report of the NACA to the President, dated January 13,
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 :5.QA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
1947 wherein-he says - 'The close'of the war-markod the end
of one whole-phase of development of the airplane as conceived
by the Wright brothers. The airplane in its present form is
no longer a sound basis for future nanl ing for thelnaticnal
defense'. This does not mean-that the strategic bomber is
obs~o]ete as of today but it does mean it is obsolescent as a
type. It also moans that air warfare of the future will bear
little or no resemblance to the air warfare of World War II.
"My personal recommendation for an immediate solution to
the problems involved in improving our organization for nationa
security would be a coordinated two department establishment
with adequate and positive safe guards for the air forces of
each department. Such an organization could be rolativsly
simple and-economical. What is more important, it~could be
made to lead to the eventual and ideal establishment-of a
`single service. It would also have the major advantage cf
maintaining within the ground army and the surface navy the
air mindedness which is so essential to each at this time.
"H. B.-32+69 more nearly approaches my ideas than any bill
I have-seen. It contains certain provisions which I would like
to see changed but I would take it 'as is' if it could be
substituted for H.R. 2319 because I consider the latter so
completely undesirable in its major features."
"However, the crux of the problem is whether or not to
have one overall head, such as the Secretary of National De-
fense. of 8. B. 2319. This I consider would. be inadvisable
'
d Isid thttl i throposed
an unnecessary. conera no onyse p position too much of.a task for one man, but also, and what
is more important, it gives too much power to one man. # much
prefer a continuation of the system of the Joint Chief of Staffs,
which was employed during the war, with its checks and balances
imposed.by the fact that all decisions had to be unanimous.
"As for the opinion of the men in the service, I can speak
only in general of my contemporaries with whom I have had contact-
mostly officers of my rank. The opinion is against any unifice=-
tion, as we know it, i.e., with one supreme head over all the
services. I'believe that most everybody feels that progress
can be made towards closer relationships.'between the services
and that some functions can be consolidated,' but that these
questions should be a matter of evolution and not revolution."
"I agree fully-with you 'that some steps should be taken
in order to bring about a closer coordination, of army, navy
and air force operations' However, after consideration of
.your alternative plan as represented by H. R. 3469, it is my
opinion that it will not accomplish the desired coordination
as well as the plan contained in H.R. 2319, or its companion
Senate Bill S. 758, with amendments as recently reported. This
latter plan as amended will I believe provide a sound workable
plan under which the several services can-operate."
"I firmly believe that a three departmental system for the
Armed Services is the worst measure we can take to improve our
National Security. Further, it is my considered belief that
retention of the two Department system administered by the
agencies proposed by Mr. Eberstadt, and eliminating separation
of the Army Air Force, can be made a workable, efficient instru-
ment of National . Policy. . A single Department is far more to be
desired than three."
_51- CA-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020 07-8
"Of tho..throo means for promoting national security exem-
plified by H. R. 3469, H. P. 2319, and S-2044, which was con-
sidered'by the last Congress, I prefer the type or organization
proposed in H. R. 3469. I,prefer it because it provides a
National Defense Council which is the most important deficiency
in the present security structure, 'because it continues the
basic structure of the Armed Services which has proven success-
ful in war, and because it provides additionalneans for rein-
forcing that structure by coordinating action."
"To.sum up briefly, it is my opinion that if it is
necessary at this time to change the present military setup,
it should be done with extreme caution. The.Secretary of the
Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations have assured us that
the bill, as proposed by the War and Navy Departments ade-
quately protects the Navy's integrity, including the Marine
Corps and Air Force. I accept their appraisal of the bill
with the provisos as set forth in the preceding paragrapi."
"If a consolidation of the services is effected under the
provisions of H..R. 2319, I am convinced that such action will
lea&,to. the eventual 'destruction of Naval aviation as it exits
today.. In doing so the Congress would be destroying one of the
moat potent weapons of the recent war. The Integration of Naval
aviation in the Navy had been accomplished over a period of
years prior to the war, and I belia'e its record during the war
speaks as. complete- justification for its continued existence.
The fast carrier task force, as an example, was a development
of.integrated Naval aviation and its value as a powerful weapon
cannot be questioned. "
"It is my opinion that the present plan, as supported by
the Navy Department, has been thoroughly and intelligently
considered from all angles by the various committees of he
Navy Department."
"I am strongly opposed to the provisions of H. R. 2319
establishing a separate Air Force. The experiences of Great
Britain and Germany along such lines have so fully demonstrated
the futility of the Air fighting an independent and uncoor-
dinated war that I dread the possibility of such a policy being
adopted 'by this country. If the amendments to H.R. 2319 pro-
tect us from such a danger, and protect the future operation
and development of naval aviation, (ship and shore based) some
of the disadvantages of HR. 2319 will have been overcome."
"Militarily there is no need for either an over-all Secretary
of the Armed Forces or for a aeprate air force. Economy alone
speaks forcibly against the establishment of additional bureaus,
departments or agencies within the armed forces organization,
especially when they add nothing to the national security, but,
on the other hand tend to weaken the military establishment.
Our experience has clearly demonstrated the necessity of
integrating the air power of 'both the Army and the Navy within
those services. Economy and coordination between and within
,the services can be accomplished by joint committees without
the additional o'v'erhead of an administrative organization with
a secretary'to exercise control over and direct the military
services.:
-jl-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
I am unalterably opposed to.H. R. 2319 and the revised
S. 758 as recently reported out 'of' Committee, and my ideas
are covered by some of the points included in your euggee-
tions embodied in H. R. 3469.
"With regard to your question of opinion of men in the
service, on the subject of Merger, Unification, etc., I am
going to testify that from conversati
ons with officers in the
Naval Service over a long period, I can say that 99% of these
were opposed to it. Just recently, I had the opportunity to
take a poll of about two hundred officers assembled and of
that number only two were in favor of it. This maintains my
previous estimate of 99%.11
"In conclusion I should like to say that your plan
appears to me to be much superior to the other. It leaves
to each service the determination of what it needs whether
it is in the air, ground or on the sea. It also retains
for the Army its air arm which I think is necessary..
Perhaps the beat solution would be one-such as we have with
the Marines in the Navy; they are 20% of the size of the
entire Navy. Perhaps tairt in each service could operate
on a fixed percentage in a similar manner."
"Although?H:R. 3469 coot i
.will. agree. that without this suIIe ervices. I am sure you
of effort will be 4m~-,avit,,? pport, coordination and unity
. features, I prefer S756 ? chieflyn'becauseeItamgof .theoopinion
that the latter bill would stand. a better chance of receiv-
ing the loyal 'support of the A A S
"With regard to your in
ui
q
ry NA- concerning the opinion of
n
they fear such a step might eventuallynresultiinldomination
of the Navy by the Army."
of
unification, I believe that
the majority are opposed to unifi
"I have given the matter considerable thought and it is
my belief that, under existing conditions, the latest draft
of the bill which the departments are now supporting is the
more favorable. It should provide 'both the required coordina-
tion and necessary safeguards. I believe that it would be a
decided improvement over the existing situation."
"it is my opinion that a third military department, as
provided for in H. R. 2319,'etems largely from the Army Air
Force's desire for autonomy and should be more carefully _
studied for its effect upon the efficiency and effectiveness
of our national defense system. I find it difficult to see
how a third department?with its necessarily large departmental
organization and overhead can be maintained without a perms..-
neat increase in cost over that required for a'two-department
system. ;Furthermore, if a United States Air Force is estab-
lished as a third department, it is reasonable to expect that
this force, with its Chief of Staff holding relative rank and
position with the Chief of Staff of the United States Army
and the Chief of Naval Operations and 'sitting as a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff,-will not only speak through the
Secretary of the Air-Force for all Aviation but be
generally
recognized'as the principle advisor'and final authority ronthe
development,'procurement, maintenance and operation of all the
Air resources of the United States, particularly so in the
integration of the Aviation Budget. The inevitable result
will be the relegation of Naval Aviation to a secondary or
minor role without regard for the records of World War II
in which the Navy, with an integrated air arm as its most
powerful weapon, not only established and maintained control
Approved For Release 2003#15 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8
 Apprjved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020(7-8
of the sea but provided air as well as gunfire support for
troops that were fighting beyond the range of Army tactical
air support. It will be difficult to impose restrictions
on a United States Air Force to protect Naval Aviation that
may not later be removed as theory replaces war experience
as the basis for military organization.
"The majority of officers with whom I have discussed
the subject of reorganization believe that the beat interests
of the United States would be served by a two-department
system with Air soundly integrated and playing a dominant
role in each department. It is difficult to reconcile an
ini endent United States Air Force which excludes Naval
Aviation."
-"In your letter you asked also what I considered tho
opinion was of the men in the Navy regarding H. R. 2319.
During the last several months I have talked with a great
many officers of the Navy, both regular and reserve. I have
been surprised to find so many of these men well informed
on the subject of 'merger' or 'unification', and many of
ahem are quite well acquainted with the details of the pro-
posed legislation in H. R. 23],9. All of the officers I have
talked. with are opposed to this legislation with the exception
of two. I believe it can be said at least 90% of the naval
officers are sincerely opposed to this proposed legislation.
`Included,. of course,-are the regular and reserve officers of
the Marine Corps.
"H. R. 3469 which,you inquired about in your letter
I
,
believe is an improvement over H. R. 2319 if in fact there
must be an overall law reforming and recasting our military
organization. Personally, however, I muoh prefer to use
great caution and consideration of all of the factors involved
before remoulding and reorganizing the whole military and
national security structure. It seems to me that it is much
better to consider improvements on a step-by-step basis. In
any organization so large as our military establishment, the
- necessity for improvement always is apparent. These should
be made forthwith as they arise. At the present time, I do
not see any reason or urgency for wide-sweeping reform
legislation. To avoid disaster, caution must be controlling."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
 Apprved For Release 2003/10/22 CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020(07-8
?"With regard to HR-2319, I believe 'that this bill does
not properly solve the questions involved but rather accen-
tuates them. It does not seem reasonable to me that
required integration is to be obtained by separation of
Army Air Forces from Army Ground Forces. On the contrary
it appears rather evident that experience during the past
war indicates strongly the need for closer integration,
rather than separation of these elements., As to the ques-
tion of political expediency, I can only say that if this
be a prime factor then the safe-guarding of the National
Interest is indeed in jeopardy.
"I view with considerable apprehension the creation of
the proposed office of the Secretary of National Defense.
.It seems to me that, unless proper and adequate safeguards
are written.in-the law, this office would tend toward such
powers -as would be improper for any single individual short
of the President, and therefore is not a proper appointive
office. Since this point has been raised many times no
further elaboration is required here. A further point which
I believe important is that the office would tend to
channelize all now.developments and-to eliminate all traces
of duplication, whereas a reasonable amount of competition
and duplication is not only healthy but sound practice for
prevention of stagnation.."
"i am'etrongly opposed to the enactment into law of the
grounds that=it is conducive to the establishment of a degree
of military control over the'Government of the United States
which-is not compatible with our democratic., constitutional
form of Government.
ture out of which will evolve a-military policy which will
`not meet the -peculiar military-situation of the United States.
Next,'I.oppose the National Security Act of 191+7 on the
I believe that this bill gill set up an administrative struc-
National Security Act of.19.7 for two basic reasons.. First,
"In my opinion the establishment of administrative parity
of the Army Air Forces and the Army Ground Forces with the
Navy of the United States will lead to a situation-where the
exponents of land; surface and air power will outweigh the
exponents of naval., surface and air power in a ration of 2 -- I.
A logical outgrowth of t.hi.s condition will lead to a situation
where the seapower of the United States, including the air
over those seas, is subordinate to its land power, including
the air over that land. The realities of global geography
make it clear that the control of the seas and of the air
over the seas, which can only be.exercised by naval forces,
is now and will continue to 'be the primary factor in the
defensive or offensive war which we will be required to con-
duct against our most likely enemy. If we control those seas
and the air over them we will be able to interpose insuperable
barriers against an attack through 80 per cent of the circle
which we must defend,. Admittedly, 20 per cent of that circle,
that is the Polar.route., maybe defended by the Army Air Forces.
If we control those seas and the air over them -we will impose
a decisive offensive threat against our most likely enemy
through 80 per cent of the.circle-which.she must defend.
Admittedly, hero again the Army Air Forces can impose a uhre-at,
though at much longer range, through 20 per cent of the circle.
"High powered propaganda has advanced the-absurd theory
that we no longer require ,a Navy because our most likely enemy
has none. The enactment of this bill will create the adminis-
trative structure which may dictate a military policy under
'which the United States will cease to have that naval power.
This propaganda has grown to such proportions that this ration
is'now considering the abandonment of sea power and air power
over the se-as-as our first line of defense. It-would have made
as much sense for England to cease-to be-a sea power despite
her dependence-upon the seas, or for. Switzerland to undertake
to become a-'-8'ea power despite her lack of'access?to the-seas.
Approved For Release 2003/10/225G1A-RDP90-0061 OR000100020007-8
 proved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100P20007-8
"With regard to my oppositi
t
on
o the National Security Act
of 1947 on the grounds of its incompatibility with our demo-
cratic form of government, I am concerned with the extent to
which that act places tremendous powers in the hands of an
official who is not elected by the people. I am concerned
with the extent to which this bill is supported by those who
have always cast admiring glances at the power and influence
of the German General Staff."
"All Americans have an instinctive distrust of the con-
centration of command of total land and naval power in a single
man. I share this distrust, in spite of the fact that I have
been in the naval servi
i
ce s
nce I was sixteen years old.
Such power is too heady a wine for any man, no.matter'how
competent and well intentioned.
"In times of peace the professional soldier and sailor
must fight to avoid stagnation. d
ai solidification of his
thinking in established groove
s. Healthy competition and.
divergence of thought between services during these periods
ca- help avoid this
F
..
or example, before the present war,
there was a. difference in o
ini
b
p
on
etween the Army and. Navy
Air Forces concerning liquid cooled and air cooled engines.
Itis fortunate that this div
ergence occurred. Another
.difference which has recently d-veloped, and which I think is
.a healthy.'one,, is the marked difference between the Naval
ROTC and the Arm
ROT
y
C. If the integration of the Army- and
Navy had, been so-firm as to require each service to use the
same officer training pro
ram
th
g
,
e new naval ROTC could never
.have been developed and approved by the Congress. I have
been intimately connected with the latter program and am
confident of its continued success
prove wrong, I believe the fact that thisvmethodehasfbeeenshould
tried cannot do other than make for better officer training
for both Army and Navy in the long-run picture."
Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP90-006108000100020007-8
 RearAi~ eldWbdfslebse BdM1, 82thCIA-ttQ[?@0-PQii10F Q@ OO UO(7a?id
Capt. Goo. W. Anderson, Jr. Cmdr. C. B. Lanman
Roar Adm. John J. Ballentino
Roar Adm. Donald B. Boary
Cmdr. J. T. Blackburn
Adm. W. H. P. Blandy
Vice Adm. G. F. Bogan
Rear Adm. John F. Bolger
Capt. F. A. Brandley
Rear Adm. Chas. R. Brown
Roar Adm. John H. Brown,
Capt. A. A. Burke
Capt; H. K. Latta
Adm. William D. Leahy
Rear Adm. E. W. Litch
Rear Adm. Chas. A. Lockwood
Vico Adm. Francis S. Low
Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry
Vice Adm. L. D. McCormack
Brig. Gen. W. L. McKittr ick
Cmdr. A. S. Major, Jr.
Rear Adm. J. J. Manning
Brig. Gen. Vernon E. Megee
Vice ;.dm. Earle W. Mills
Capt. Lucian A. Moebus
Capt. W.. A. Moffett
Lt. Col. E. A. Montgomery
Capt. J. A. Moreno
Vice Adm. Ben Moroell
Vice Adm. G. D. Murray
Vico-Adm. Robert B. Carney
Maj. Gen. Clifton B. Cates
Roar Adm. Joseph J. Clark
Capt. J. C. Clifton
Rear Adm. Chas. M. Cooke
Capt. J. G. Crommolin
Capt. E. A. Cruise
Rear Adm. Arthur C. Davie
Rear Adm. Glenn B. Davie
Adm. Louie E. Denfeld.
Capt. R. E.. Dixon
Rear Adm. A. K. Doyle
Capt. P. R.... Durgin
Admt,Richard S. '.Edwards
Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine
Cmdr. , E.. K.., Eynon
Capt
Rear
Capt
Rear. Adm. D. V. Gallery
.Vice Adm.. Thomas Gatch
Capt. Robert Goldthwaite
Capt.
G.
B. Hall
Maj.
Gen.
Field Harris
Rear
Adm.
Robert W. Haylor
Capt.
J.
H. Hoan
Adm:' Henry K. Hewitt
Capt. W. R. Hollingsworth
Vice Adm. J. H. Hoover
Adm. F. J. Horne
Rear Adm. Goo. F. Hussey, Jr.
Rear Adm. Thomas B. Inglis
Col. C. C. Jerome
Roar Adis. Chas. T. Joy
Ada.
Edwin C. Kalbfus
Capt.
Joseph
L. Kane
Capt.
Walter
Karig
Adm.
Thomas
C. Kinkaid
Adm.
H. E. Kimmel
Roar. Adn.' Raiph'.A: '.Ofatl e
Vica, Adm., J. B. Oldendorf
Rear Adm.Chas. A. Pownall
Rear Adm. Alfred M. Pride
Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford
Adm. D. C. Ramsey
Capt. J.. C. Renard
Rear Adm. John W. Reeves, Jr.
Capt. -W._ R. BiggB,'-Jr.
Rear Adm. Thos. Robbing
Capt. P ..W..-Ruble
Rear Adm. Allan E. Smith
Rear Adm. T. L. Sprague
Adm. Raymond Spruance
Adm. Harold; R. Stark
Capt. Edward C. Stephan
Rear Adm. Earl S. Stone
Capt. R. J. Stroh
Roar Adm. Clifford A. Swanson
Capt. R. H. Taylor
Capt. Steadman Teller
Brig.
Rear
Adm.
Gen.
Gen.
G.
C. Thomas
Adm.
W.
G.* Tomlinson
John
H.
Towers
Allen
H.
Turnadga
Capt. J. P. W. Vest
Capt. J. 0. Vossellar
Rear Adm. Frank D. Wagner-
Capt. R. R. Waller
Adm. R. F. Whitehead
Maj. Gen. Louis E. Woods
Adm. Henry E. Yarnell
Adm. Ellis M. Zacharis
-50-
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-0061OR000100020007-8