S 3382 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001500190001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 29, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN

S 3382 Approved For RecaNGVANWHOALCREEMSBOQ32611A0g500190001-4 march 2,9, 1984
by the Department of the Treasury's
reversal of policy with regard to the
Customs air program. My subcommit-
tee, on which the Senator from Arizo-
na serves as ranking member, was inti-
mately involved in the negotiations be-
tween the Department of the Treas-
ury and Department of Defense re-
garding air support for the Customs
Service. DOD agreed that aircraft
would be provided to the Customs
Service to detect, track, and intercept.
The only concern DOD had was that
the equipment loaned would not be
adequately maintained. To assure De-
fense of our commitment, a new ap-
propriations account totaling $31 mil-
lion was included in the fiscal year
1984 appropriation to provide oper-
ations and maintenance funding for
the loaned aircraft.
The drug problem in this country is
epidemic. We are fighting a war, Mr.
President. Unfortunately the other
side is better funded and better
equipped. I am committed to winning
that war, but to do that I fully believe
we must provide the support necessary
to men and women of the Department
of the Treasury, Justice, Transporta-
tion, and Defense who are performing
that difficult task. The Customs air
program is an integral part of that
effort.
The fiscal year 1985 Treasury re-
quest for the air program and other
Customs efforts is significantly re-
duced from fiscal year 1984. It is based
on the premise that the Department
of Defense is going to pick up the
O&M costs. Mr. President, the simple
truth is that DOD has no intention of
covering operation and maintenance
costs. That was never part of the origi-
nal agreement. In fact the basis of the
agreement was that Customs would
provide proper maintenance.
Last week, the Deputy Secretary of
the Treasury testified before a House
subcommittee that it no longer should
be in the detection business, but con-
centrate on tracking and interception.
Mr. President, this revelation came as
an incredible surprise to me for I re-
ceived a request on March 13 from the
Commissioner of Customs requesting
reprograming authority which contin-
ued the detection mission by proceed-
ing with the P3A conversion program.
I -wholeheartedly agreed. Then last
week the 180-degree change.
This amendment does that. It pro-
vides funding -to give the Customs
Service the equipment they need to
continue the fight. I hope my col-
leagues will agree with me and support
the amendment.
Mr. President, as I close, I want to
reemphasize that we are in a war. We
are spending an unprecedented
amount on the battle, but quite frank-
ly we are losing ground. These days we
must watch very closely at the way we
spend the money available to us. Not
many Members of the body watch it
much closer than I do. I do not oppose
money well spent. I assure you this
will be money well spent.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I
only want to say in behalf of the -man-
agers of the bill that we are willing to
accept the amendment, if the Senator
would like to move its adoption.
Mr. DECONCINI. I so move, Mr.
President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there further debate? If not, the ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 2858) was
agreed to.
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which
the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I
move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished chairman and
also the chairman of the Foreign Op-
erations Subcommittee for permitting
me to offer my amendments at this
time, as well as the distinguished Sen-
ator from Hawaii for setting aside his
amendment, and also 'the distin-
guished Senator from Massachusetts,
and certainly the Senator from New
York, who has been waiting around
for some time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
_Jigss_York is recognized.
air?,..111(1Yaigagal..Mr. President, in
this pending appropriation bill, the
Senate is being asked to provide an ad-
ditional $21 million for paramilitary
activity in Nicaragua. The specific lan-
guage of the report of the Committee
on Appropriations is:
The committee recommends an appropri-
ation of $21 million to continue a program
of covert assistance in Central America ? ? ?
In November of last year this body
authorized, by vice vote, $24 million
for the same program. As / noted
then, despite some differences be-
tween the House and the-Senate over
this program there was one fundamen-
tal point on which the House and
Senate Intelligence - Committees
agreed. This agreement was reflected
in section 109 of the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for fiscal year 1984
which repeated findings found earlier
In the House's authorization bill:
The Congress finds that by providing mili-
tary support (including arms, training, and
logistical, command and control, and com-
munications facilities) to groups seeking to
overthrow the government of El Salvador
and other Central American governments,
the Government of National Reconsiruction
of Nicaragua has violated Article 18 of the
Charter of the Organization of American
States which declares that no state has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatsoever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other state.
It is the judgment of the Intelli-
gence Committee that Nicaragua's in-
volvement in the affairs of El Salvador
and, to a lesser degree, its other neigh-
bors, continues. As such, our duty, or
at very least our right, now as it was
then, is to respond to these violations
of international law and uphold the
charter of the OAS.
Specifically, arms and materiel still
flow from the Communist bloc through
Nicaragua to the insurgents in El Sal-
vador. Yesterday, many of my col-
leagues will have read the reports in
various newspapers about testimony of
the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Fred C. Ikle, in which he con-
firmed that approximately half the
weapons used by the Salvadoran guer-
rillas were captured or acquired from
the Salvadoran Armed Forces. This is
undoubtedly true. It is also true, how-
ever, that the other half, or the great-
er part thereof, come via Nicaragua
and further that the intelligence com-
munity's latest and best estimate is
that a predominant percentage of
their ammunition, about 80 percent,
still comes via Nicaragua. Estimates
about the remaining materiel is simi-
lar. What the House Intelligence Com-
mittee stated last May is in our judg-
ment still true:
(The insurgency in El Salvador] depends
for its lifeblood?arms, ammunition, financ-
ing, logistics, and command-and-control
facilities?upon outside assistance from
Nicaragua and Cuba.
In sum, the Sandinista support for
the insurgency in El Salvador has not
appreciably lessened; nor, therefore,
has their violation of the OAS Charter
abated.
As I have attempted to indicate,
there is in a certain sense little that is
new here. However, I do wish to make
some additional comments.
Given the extraordinary patriotism
and sacrifice of so many of the men
and women who make up our intelli-
gence community, it may at times
seem unreasonable arid wrong that
there continues to be such apprehen-
sion about the role of that community
and its attendant institutions, especial-
ly the Central Intelligence Agency.
May I suggest, however, that this ap-
prehension arises in much the way
that in early times our forebears
feared the idea of a standing army,
and were at great lengths to achieve
parliamentary control over military
expenditure, including the now per-
haps antique but once vital procedure
of annual military appropriations.
The fact is that a standing intelli-
gence community can be used by a
Chief Executive to subvert the will of
Congress and of the pecple. Given
that fact, it is our proper business to
be concerned, even as we assert OUT
utmost respect and regard for the in-
stitutions which pose this threat.
I believe there is a tendency on the
part of this administration?as of prior
ones?to substitute secret policies and
secret actions for public policies and
public actions in foreign affairs. The
reason is simple. Covert action seem-
ingly circumvents the invariably com-
plex and demanding, and frequently
unavailing effort required to achieve a
democratic consensus in matters of
foreign policy. When such a consensus
could be achieved, the resort to covert
action instead is a form of avoidance
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 3383
of duty. When such a consensus could
not be achieved, covert action subverts
the democratic process.
The general question arises for us in
the most specific form in the appropri-
ation bill we are considering today.
Last 'November 3 I was the manager
on this side of the aisle for the Intelli-
gence Authorization Act for fiscal year
1984. That act contained funds for the
present program of support for several
insurgent groups operating in Nicara-
gua. The legislation was as open in
this regard as such legislation could
be. In a floor statement, I described
the process by which the committee
had come to accept a strictly limited
set of objectives for that program. An
earlier Presidential finding submitted
for comment to the committee had
been, in our view, much too expansive.
It would have constituted undue inter-
ference in the internal affairs of Nica-
ragua, which was the ground on which
we were willing to support opposition
to such interference by Nicaragua in
the affairs of others.
I stated at the time in some detail
that sequence:
On September 20, a new Presidential
Finding was presented to the Committee by
Director Casey and the Secretary of State.
George P. Shultz. Its goals were more pre-
cise and much more limited than what we
had been briefed on in August. In large
measure, the new finding reflected the con-
cerns the Committee had raised with Direc-
tor Casey in that prior meeting. The next
day the Committee approved funding for
the redefined program.
Not unexpectedly, an account of our deci-
sion found its way into the nation's papers
the following day ISeptember 22, 1983). Of
particular Interest was the discussion of the
matter in the New York Times which
quoted an Administration official as saying:
We are always being questioned . . . on
whether we were going beyond our program
of interdicting arms. Now we say. "Yes, we
are supporting the rebels until the Nicara-
guans stop their subversion in neighboring
countries."
The article went on to say that:
The Administration official stressed that
this approach should end the argument over
whether the Administration was violating
its pledge by doing more than just stopping
the arms flow. The official also said that
there was no thought of the Administration
backing the insurgents in trying to over-
th:-ov. the Sandinista Government.
This was a welcome statement.
Thereafter the committee voted
moneys for the new finding.
This morning, however, we read an
interview with the President given to
Mr. Francis X. Clines and Steven R.
Weisman of the New York Times in
which the President specifically
states that our objectives in Nicaragua
are precisely those which the select
committee rejected. Our Present
formal policy, the policy for which
Congress has appropriated these
funds, is not directed to the overthrow
of the Government of Nicaragua, or
otherwise to interfere unduly in its in-
ternal affairs. The President, however,
states otherwise:
And I see no dichotomy in our supporting
the Government, the democratic govern-
ment of El Salvador and the Contras here?
and we made it plain to Nicaragua?made it
very plain that this would stop when they
keep their promise and restore the demo-
cratic rule and have elections. Now, they've
finally been pressured, the pressure's led
them to saying they'll have an election.
The President goes on to say that
there is nothing to indicate that this
election will be other than "the kind
of rubber stamp that we see in any to-
talitarian government." In this I
agree. But note: If the government
there cannot be changed by elections,
how is it to be changed save by violent
overthrow? That is a necessary if unin-
tended conclusion to be drawn from
the President's statement yesterday.
This is understandable. The Presi-
dent desires a democratic government
In Nicaragua. Who does not, save the
present rulers of that unhappy
nation? But Congress has not author-
ized a covert action program to bring
about any such outcome. To do so
would undermine the very legal foun-
dation on which we base the program
we have authorized. ?
Has the President deceived us? I
doubt this; it is not his nature, nor
that of his associates. Rather, I would
suggest that there is an inherent tend-
ency for an administration gradually
to adopt the agenda of the foreign in-
struments of covert action, even when
that agenda increasingly diverges from
the goals which we, the United States,
set out to accomplish. That may be too
complex a way to state a simple truth.
What the Nicaraguans fighting the
Sandinistas want and what we want
are different things.
That of course is the frequent per-
sonal tragedy associated with covert
action, and further argues its sparing
use as an instrument of American
policy.
But that is a subject of general
policy that can wait. What must be
stated today Is that the President has
misstated his own policy. If we vote
today, or tomorrow, to approve the ad-
ditional $21 million recommended by
the committee, we do not vote to do
what the President says he would like
to see done. We vote simply and exclu-
sively for the provisions of the Presi-
dential finding of September 20, 1983.
I am sorry to detain the Senate in
this matter, and obviously I am uneasy
to bring such matters into yet more
public debate. But I take that to be my
responsibility, given this extraordi-
nary. wholly unexpected, and deeply
troubling turn of events.
In sum, the danger of using covert
programs in this fashion is that they
run too far ahead of the public con-
sensus over what constitutes threats
to our security and the proper policies
to respond to those threats. There is a
grave risk here that Americans may
decide, as they did a little more than a
decade ago, that the Government does
not reflect their judgment. This is no
small matter for a democracy. As I
warned a previous President just
before his inauguration, "The sense of
institutions being legitimate?especial-
ly the institutions of government?is
the glue that holds society together.
When it weakens, things come un-
stuck."
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to
yield to the distinguished Senator
from Hawaii.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the
Senator's clarifying statement on the
legislative intent of the action taken
by the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence in authorizing the $21 mil-
lion is absolutely correct. I think the
record of our committee, although
classified and secret, will bear this out.
So, if I may, I should like to associate
myself with the Senator's statement.
It is correct, it is precise, and it is one
that should be studied very carefully
by every Member of this body.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished senior Sena-
tor from Hawaii. the manager of this
measure, for his reassuring remarks,
which are exactly my understanding
of the matter.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, I rise on this occasion to compli-
ment the Senator from New York on
his statement and to thank our col-
league on the Select Committee on In-
telligence, the Senator from Hawaii,
for associating himself with these
comments. I, too, associate myself
with the statements made by the dis-
tinguished Senator from New York.
I had not intended to comment at
any length on this subject, but the
? point that the Senator from New York
makes about the statement of the
President of the United States, which
we all read this morning, compels us?
at least, it compels me?to rise and
share a few thoughts with our col-
leagues on this subject, because it
probably illustrates if not the difficul-
ty of making policy in this area, at
least the difficulty for others to un-
derstand whatever policy may exist.
I was personally associated with the
effort the Senator described, which
began last spring and carried through
the summer, until September 20, and I
was pleased with the outcome. I
thought that whether in a bipartisan
sense or an institutional sense, we had
been quite successful in discharging
our responsibilities, as the Senator in-
dicated, for policy in Nicaragua.
Mr. President, the executive branch
request for additional funds for its
covert activities regarding Nicaragua
presents all of us with a difficult
choice. It is especially significant,
therefore, that the Intelligence Com-
mittee voted with no dissents to sup-
port a limited, carefully monitored in-
crease in those funds.
The risks inherent in this operation
are well known. Support for paramili-
tary operations could provide the
spark that ignites a real war in the
region. Paramilitary activities could
also bring other countries into the
conflict; the reported injury to five
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S 3384 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
Soviet seamen due to a mine in Puerto
Sandino harbor reminds us of that
risk. An unsuccessful paramilitary
campaign may increase, rather than
undermine, the legitimacy of the San-
dinista regime. And a moderately suc-
cessful campaign could lead to a situa-
tion in which counterrevolutionary
forces, with goals of their own, could
.draw the United States into greater in-
volvement than was intended or was
wise.
I am satisfied that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency is doing all that it can
to minimize these risks. In particular,
the CIA is not trying to overthrow the
Government of Nicaragua. -And the
CIA does bear in mind the need not to
provoke a wider conflict that would
harm U.S. interests. The Intelligence
Committee's action last year, which
required the executive branch to reex-
amine its program and revise its covert
action finding, served a useful pur-
pose.
I am also impressed by the extent to
which people in Central America, in-
cluding democratic and left-of-center
elements in Costa Rica, fear the ag-
gressive policies of Nicaragua. To its
neighbors, the Sandinista regime is
not reformist, or even revolutionary.
Rather, the Sandinista leaders are the
prime supporters of both terrorism
and guerrilla violence in Central
America. They supply arms and am-
munition not only to -insurgents in El
Salvador, but also to terrorists and
guerrillas in Honduras, Guatemala,
and Costa Rica. They even harbor
Basque terrorists, who repay the favor
by undertaking assassination missions
in Costa Rica.
Little wonder, then, that the people
of Central America urge us to counter
these Sandinista efforts, which have
been described eloquently by the Sen-
ator from New York. And little wonder
that the Intelligence Committee is
willing to support a carefully con-
trolled covert action program. -
It is important to note, moreover,
that we are not giving the CIA a com-
pletely free hand with these funds.
While $7 million in new funds will be
made available immediately, the other
$14 million will be put in the CIA's re-
serve for contingencies. They will have
to come back to us and explain what
they are doing and why the extra
finds are needed, before they gain
access to that additional money.
Yet it was still difficult to support
increased funding for this program.
There is no real evidence that the
covert action effort, itself, has brought
about changes in Sandinista policy.
There is no real evidence that it has
lessened the flow of Cuban and Nica-
raguan arms into El Salvador, al-
though the contras are clearly striking
at some targets that are part of the
Sandinista support structure for Sal-
vadoran guerrillas.
Most importantly, there is no real
evidence that the executive branch yet
has a coherent policy to guide either
this covert action program or the sev-
eral overt arms of policy that are em-
ployed in Central America.
The executive branch has fine goals:
An end to Sandinista support for guer-
rillas and terrorists; an end to Soviet
and Cuban advisers in Nicaragua; scal-
ing down of the tremendous military
buildup in Nicaragua; and the preser-
vation of a pluralist political system in
Nicaragua, as the Sandinistas original-
ly promised. But the executive branch
continues to lack a means of deciding
how much emphasis to put on each
goal, as one must always do in the real
world.
Similarly, the executive branch has
an impressive set of measures it has
undertaken to influence the situation:
Not only covert action, but also mili-
tary assistance; maneuvers and train-
ing; economic aid; and political sup-
port both for needed reforms in indi-
vidual countries and for the Conta-
dora effort of Central American coun-
tries to negotiate a solution to their
problems. The difficulty is that, there
seems to be no real coordination of
these efforts.
I wish I could assure my colleagues,
as long as I speak from this side of the
aisle, that covert activities directed at
Nicaragua were carefully coordinated
with a serious effort to negotiate our
differences with that country. I wish I
.could say that our military assistance
efforts in the region were designed
also to further the economic and polit-
ical reforms that we all agree are nec-
essary in several countries. I wish I
could say that the executive branch
was carefully fine timing both its ac-
tions and its objectives so as to achieve
maximum success in the region. But
my colleague from New York has dem-
onstrated in his remarks why I cannot
make that claim.
The best I can say Is that many of us
are trying to convince the executive
branch to get its act together. In the
meantime, we are supporting current
initiatives to keep the pressure on
Nicaragua and to keep the Central
America situation under control.
But I hope, Mr. President, that
President Reagan appreciates the
depth of our concern. The current
policy may have our support, but it
does not yet merit our confidence. The
President must take control of that
Policy and give it ccherent :11rection.
There are bound to be further crises
down the road?due not to Congress,
but to the difficult nature of the prob-
lems in Central America. Covert action
is not enough. Even covert action plus
half a dozen other, uncoordinated
measures are not enough.
There must be well crafted policy
and consistent direction of U.S. efforts
in Central America. That is what lead-
ership is about, and we look to our
President to provide it before it is too
late.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President.
may I express my total admiration for
and agreement with the statement of
the Senator from Minnesota. It is a
moderate statement. It is a careful
March 2.9, 1,984
? one. It is a plea for coherence and an
offer of cooperation.
I think I would not reveal anything
not known and public to observe that
it was not until April 1983 that the
President came to Congress to discuss
Central America, by which time the
press reports of covert action in that
region had been taking place for 14
months; and that it was not until some
time after the President spoke that a
bipartisan commission was established
and came forward with a much more
coherent and comprehensive state-
ment of the matter.
We do not want to obstruct, but we
have an obligation to say: Do you, Mr.
President, have a policy and can we
help you formulate one, and do you
know where this is getting to?
I hope that we might have some re-
sponse from the statements which the
three of us have made today, and we
make them not in an accusatory
manner. It is a factual and descriptive
one, at least in our view it is. Some of
the facts cannot be in, doubt, and I
hope there will be some response, and
I certainly am here as one willing to
Partake in any such effort, as the Sen-
ator from Minnesota has been, but it
is alarming to find our message does
not seem to have been received.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent. I thank my colleague a great
deal.
I do not intend to belabor this issue
any more. I do have another issue I
wish to discuss.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me one moment?
Mr. DURENBERGER. I yield.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, in
recent days we have heard much about
the mines in Nicaragua ports and the
concerns that have been expressed
about the legality and wisdom -of the
tactics.
I asked ?the Honorable Kenneth
Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, to
provide a legal analysis on the issuez,
of mines and self-defense both in a
classified and unclassified form.
In his characteristically cooperai ice
manner he did that. These statements
are available in the Intelligence Com-
mittee. If any Member of the body
wishes to read them, we will, of course,
be more than happy to make them
available.
I thank the Senator from Minneso-
ta.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, I had at this point intended to
offer an amendment dealing with the
subject of conditionality. I do not
intend to do so, but I wanted to take a
few minutes to express some concerns
that I understand are shared in part
by quite a number of my colleagues
and also in an additional part are
being dealt with at this moment in the
Foreign Relations Committee.
Mr. President, a growing number of
us in Congress have been discussing
and debating the question of our
policy in Central America for as long
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March 29, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
as I have been in the Senate. We have
considered such questions as emergen-
cy foreign assistance for Nicaragua
shortly after the Somoza regime was
troppled; military and economic assist-
ance for El Salvador as that country
struggles with its problems; increased
trade and aid benefits for the coun-
tries of the Caribbean Basin; the com-
mitment of U.S. troops to training ex-
ercises in Honduras. Every day, most
of us deal with these and other ques-
tions in numerous ways. We deal with
them in conversations with our friends
and colleagues; in responses to our
constituents; in our reading at night,
and our staff meetings at day.
But I wonder, Mr. President, just
how much effect all our work has
really had. Can we really say that we
know much more about these complex
questions than we did 5 years ago?
Can we really say that our debate and
our concern has done much to alter
events? In my opinion, I do not think
we can.
Today, we are considering an emer-
gency supplemental appropriation
which contains, among other things, a
large sum of money for El Salvador.
But it is not clear that we are really
debating any kind of national policy.
Certainly, we have touched on a wide
variety of issues during this debate,
ranging from the recent elections to
the battlefield situation. But I cannot
figure out how we have fitted these
things together in any kind of way
that gives us a sense of what U.S.
policy really is or what we feel U.S.
policy should be.
We have heard talk about having to
support and live with the President
who emerges from the Salvadoran
elections, and we have heard talk
about how our vote on this bill might
be affected by who that President is,
but I am disturbed that little attention
has been paid to how this relates to
the concerns of the American people.
What is our policy to be? For how
long? At what cost? And how will we
handle the various contingencies
which might radically affect the situa-
tion throughout Central America? As
we have learned, events often move
faster than our policies, particularly in
Central America, but my fear is that
we have no sense of what plans we
might adopt in the event of changes.
When Central America first became
a major item on our agenda, following
the revolution against Anastasio
Somoza and the emergence of the new
regime in Nicaragua, there was a brief
time when this body actually looked at
long-term policy questions. For in-
stance, throughout the fall of 1979
and the winter of 1980, a number of us
stood here on the floor of the Senate
and discussed another emergency sup-
plemental appropriation. That time, it
involved economic assistance for Nica-
ragua to help that tragic country get
back on its feet after years of looting
by the Somoza regime and fighting in
the streets.
The debate which we Undertook at
that time was both wide ranging and
forward looking. These days, by con-
trast, we discuss certification, not
policy. We have, in other words, acted
more as auditors, seeing if the forms
are filled out correctly and if the col-
umns add up to the right numbers,
and less as legislators, sharing in the
task of enunciating a long-term policy.
To be blunt, we have abrogated our
proper role for the sake of a periodic
box-checking exercise by the Presi-
dent.
By now, Mr. President, the record
should be clear. Certification, however
laudable its origins, is a flawed device.
Why? For several reasons.
First, it does not help to bring about
what it seeks: the measure of condi-
tionality which most of us agree is
necessary to make our policies in Cen-
tral America workable and which is
not there. What is conditionality?
Simply the assurance that funding will
continue only to the extent that our
policy is successful?a statement that
we will feed success, not failure. ?
There is more to this than simply
the desire to fund nice things we like.
Conditionality is of necessity bound up
in the desire of the United States to
insure that its dollars are spent to pro-
mote reform, not repression. But that
desire follows from the hardheaded
recognition that our long-term hopes
for stemming a major blow to U.S. in-
terests in Central America will come to
naught unless we encourage countries
like El Salvador to foster reform in
order to forestall revolution.
If, for instance, the Government of
El Salvador does not move to break
the back of the death squads, it simply
cannot hope for, the allegiance of the
people which is so vital to denying the
Initiative to Marxist revolutionaries.
Revolutions do not occur in a vacuum;
they spring from grievances. They can
be stolen by brutal people, as we have
seen in the Soviet Union and else-
where. In El Salvador, there is that
risk. And the best way to prevent that
risk from becoming reality is to pro-
mote policies which end the sources of
revolution. We must act, therefore, to
condition our assistance on acceptable
progress toward the adoption of poli-
cies which promote our policy goals.
To do otherwise is more than just a
waste of time; it is a recipe for disas-
ter.
Conditionality, in other words, is
crucial to the success of our policy, a
point recognized both by the Kissinger
Commission and by the Vice President
in his courageous remarks in San Sal-
vador. But how serious have we really
been about this in the past?
I fear that we in Congress cannot
and do not take the issues involved as
seriously as we should so long as we
rely on certification rather than on a
genuine debate. Certification is at best
an index, not a policy. And in the case
of Congress, it can ,serve as a copout,
not a condition. Certification is noth-
ing more or less than an invitation to
S 3385
the President to send over a pro forma
good news report while the money
flows on and on, unimpeded by condi-
tionality or by congressional judg-
ment.
Earlier today, the junior Senator
from Connecticut, who I credit, at
least in part, for this certification
process that was first thrust upon us,
made some very astute observations
about the role we should play, but
which we play so seldom. And I agree
with all of those comments. That is
why I object to certification.
Certification is the worst of all
worlds, for it invites critics of policy to
snipe, knowing that they will not have
to take responsibility for any real
action, and it puts supporters of our
policy in the untenable position of
having to accept as fact a matter of
judgment which is narrow in scope
and which is confined only to the
latest items to make the reporting re-
quirements list. Perhaps worst of all,
the certification process arouses parti-
sanship in our foreign policy, rather
than promoting the kind of compact
between the executive and Congress
which is crucial to sound policy.
So the second reason why I feel cer-
tification is a flawed device is that it
lets us have it both ways. It permits
those of us in Congress to escape the
burden of commitment, the responsi-
bility of action, the necessity to
choose. It lets us talk, but it permits
us to avoid the consequences of that
talk.
For instance, some might suggest
that we should keep the certification
provisions in this bill because they
signal our commitment to a policy
which is based in some measure on
conditionality. But is this really the
case? Does this not really mean that
the provisions will let us vote for con-
tinued aid while criticizing the policy?
And is that not just a shorthand
device for abrogating our own respon-
sibilities?
If you doubt this, ask whether there
are critics of our policy who will vote
for this package, hiding behind the
cloak of the certification language. If
so, then those critics want it both
ways. For they can hardly be surprised
when the next certification report
comes over from the executive an.
nouncing that the President has deter-
mined that the Government of El Sal-
vador has made satisfactory progress.
Will the existing certification provi-
sions alter the reality which should be
the baseline for our policy? Or will
they just succeed in shifting the focus
of our debate from conditions in El
Salvador?where the focus belongs?to
conditions in our own executive
branch? The issue in Central America,
Mr. President, is T.J.S. policy, and we in
this body bear a measure of responsi-
bility for that policy. It is not the
President's policy alone, and we
should not pretend it is simply for the
sake of convenience.
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S 3386 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
So what can we really say about cer-
tification? It does not give Congress
any capacity for Independent analysis
and judgment. It does not strengthen
the President's hand in dealing with
recipient nations, for It is not backed
up by any *Marna congressional
intent or any willingness to adjust
funding levels to conditions. It is
simply a money machine, rationalized
by rhetoric.
In short, !dr. President, while I
.strongly support the concept of condi-
tionality in our aid "prograrn?a con-
cept which was endorsed by the Kis-
singer Commission itself-1 believe
that it is time to face up to the fact
that oertification is not the way to
proceed with it.
What I propose, therefore, is potting
the question of determination and
judgment where it properly belongs?
in the hands of individual Members of
Congress who must ultimately decide
whether to vote for or against aid.
I first raised this idea some weeks
ago in a letter to our colleague, Sena-
tor PERCY, the chairman of the For-
eign Relations Committee. I was con-
cerned that when it came time to take
up the question of a policy which is
prospective, mature, and regional in
scope, we would resort once again to
the flawed device of certification. I,
therefore, suggested that we append
to the Jackson plan a provision to con-
dition our aid on a joint resolution of
approval, following debate on a com-
prehensive report to be written by our
experts on the authorizing commit-
tees. At this point, Mr. President,! ask
unanimous consent that a copy of my
letter to Senator Pettey be put in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
US. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON PENAWCE,
Washington, D.C., February 9, 3984.
Ron. CHARLES R PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
DEAF Cuucx: As you know, the Congress
will soon confront the issue of Presidential
certification of human rights in El Salvador
and other countries. The debate over the
Kissinger Commission report, the continu-
ing controversy over President Reagan's
pocket veto of certification language, and
the action by the Rouse yesterday virtually
ensure that this will be a highly contentious
issue.
In my view, a great deal of the controver-
sy is both unnecessary and counter-produc-
tive, for It detracts attention from the main
issue: conditionality attached to assistance
programs. There is a widely-shared consen-
sus that aid should be conditioned, a point
made with equal force by the Kissinger
Commission and by the Administration. Un-
fortunately, the ongoing furor over certifi-
cation has missed this point, for it has con-
fused an installment with a goaL
I'd like to suggest a possible solution: Con-
gressional rather than Presidential determi-
nations, under the lead of the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
Presidential certification has a number of
drawbacks, as both its proponents and its
opponents have come to recognize. Perhaps
the chief flaw of the process is that it virtu-
ally eliminates Congressional Judgment
from the decision about whether to appro-
priate assistance. Once an instrument of
certification is filed, money is virtually guar-
anteed. There is little Congressional analy-
sis of the facts presented in the certification
document, and even less independent Con-
gressional fact-finding.
Congress has broad Investigatory powers,
and the Committee has ample staff support
from trained experts who can travel to Cen-
tral America and arrive at their own conclu-
sions. Regular reports irons Congressional
committees to the membership would go a
long way toward restoring the proper role
we play in foreign policy?a role defined by
broad oversight and goal-setting.
Resider Congressional reports would have
at least two other advantages over certifica-
tion First, the contents of the report would
not need to be determined through explicit
specification on the floor of the Senate. In
other words, the report could be constructed
on the basis of regular consultation with in-
terested members and could address itself to
broader Questions of context
Second, the report could to some extent
minimize the perils of partisanship. If sena-
tors and representatives are to debate the
significance of a set of findings, rather than
simply the findings themselves, they must
be free to do so with the least possible taint
of partisanship. Just as it would be difficult
for a Democrat to criticize a Presidential
report without being accused of partisan-
ship, so too it would be difficult for a Re-
publican to support a finding without the
same problem. This is even more the case in
an election year. A report originating from a
bipartisan Congressional committee can
overcome that problem.
Perhaps most important, however, regular
Congressional reports?perhaps on a semi-
annual basis?would provide the basis for a
genuine debate, something -which we have
thus far engaged in too seldom. It would ,be
my hope that such reports would provide
the basis for regular votes on aid levels.
'Thus far, we have relied on such hasty vehi-
cles as continuing resolutions to move ap-
propriations, with little opportunity for re-
flection. If appropriations were linked to
Congressionally generated findings about
the status of human rights in recipient
countries, we could begin to play the role
- which we have thus far abrogated.
I hope that you -will let me know your
views, for I would like to share this idea
'with others if you feel it worthwhile, and to
begin working on appropriate legislation.
Sincerely,
DAVE DURENBERGER,
ILS. Senator.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Since then.
SenDIOTE INOUYE and ICASSEBAUM?who
had expressed similar concerns?have
joined me in drafting a concurrent res-
olution to put these ideas into effect.
Senator HEINZ has joined us as a co-
sponsor. And, just 2 days ago, I re-
ceived a letter from Senator MATHIAS
outlining a comparable proposal. So I
am confident that, over the long term,
we will begin both to foster the dura-
ble policy that is needed and to play
our proper role in monitoring that
policy.
But that is the long term. What do
we do until the Jackson plan is actual-
ly written Into law? Do we continue to
kid ourselves that certification is the
way to proceed? I hope not.
As Senators know, I was prepared to
offer an amendment today. After con-
versations with members of the For-
March 29, f 984
eign Relations Committee, I have
learned that the committee is address-
ing the concerns I and others have
raised, so I will not proceed. But I
want to outline the procedure under
which I feel we should operate.
First, we should peek a period
report?not determinations about
whether progress is satisfactory, but
simply a statement about actual condi-
tions. Second, we should ourselves
debate a joint resolution of approval
for further funding requests. A debate
in which members ean decide for
themselves whether progress is satis-
factory.
I want to clarify and emphasize sev-
eral points about this concept. First, it
would not Impede the existing funding
request of $61.7 million. Frankly, the
existing bill which states that funding
may not be obligated or expended
until a Presidential report is filed does
not impede it either, no matter what
the words in the bill may say. It is
going to get an automatic checkoff.
Only the conditions are different from
the last time it went through here.
But it has got six or seven boxes that
deal with all the mandatory subjects.
And I credit the Senator from Wiscon-
sin for putting the boxes together be-
cause it was about the only way this
bill was going to get to the floor.
But I am satisfied that the appropri-
ation that is before us today is justi-
fied. I am satisfied in particular by the
insight and the leadership that our
colleague from Hawaii has displayed
In this whole issue. I era disappointed
with the role that our administration,
and those in responsible positions in
my party, have played in this whole
issue. But I think the Senator from
Hawaii has shown us not only what
some might characterize as a difficult
way out of an impossible situation, but
he has given to the President and he
has given to this Congress an opportu-
nity to once and for all provide a pro-
spective resolution to the whole prob-
lem of conditioning aid in Central
America today.
I am satisfied that the appropriation
is justified. But to those Senators who
might feel otherwise, let me say that
the existing camouflage of a Presiden-
tial certification will not alter the fact
that $61.7 million will go to El Salva-
dor. So, to those who say that a pro-
spective resolution would not impede
existing funding, only future funding,
say this represents no change in the
reality that funding is going to go to
El Salvador,
Second, I do not purport to be the
authority on just what conditions
should be promoted in El Salvador or
elsewhere. So the joint resolution
called for would not hinge on a simple
yes-no answer about whether a given
set of goals had been achieved. In-
stead, it would hinge on a comprehen-
sive report covering every relevant
factor, and would put the final ques-
tion of judgment. where it belongs--en
each of us here in the Congress. There
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March 29, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
would be no trigger provision, no
magic threshold which must be met to
continue funding. Those triggers and
thresholds are matters of individual
Judgments, and they should be deter-
mined by each of us acting as mem-
bers in debate. They should not be de-
termined a priori, by authors of a bill
or by the President. Only we in this
body can determine whether progress
is satisfactory.
Third, Mr. President, this approach
would not be an unwarranted or new
Intrusion in the day to day world of di-
plomacy and foreign policy. It is often
said?correctly?that we cannot afford
to have 535 secretaries of state. I
agree. But equally, we cannot afford
to have our shared powers in foreign
policy virtually abandoned because we
ourselves are uncomfortable with the
necessity to weigh trade-offs, -under-
stand nuances, and grapple with the
complexity of a challenging situation.
Our past refusal to treat Central
America with at least the seriousness
that we feel is merited in the Middle
East or Europe is causing us to persist
In the trap of seeking black and white
analyses, to erect checkoff boxes on
forms, and to stifle the kind of com-
prehensive discussion which is vital to
a long-term and mature policy. Most
of us are more than willing to oversee
and act upon a wide variety of issues
elsewhere in the world. Just a few
days ago, more than 50 of us wrote to
the President to comment upon the
proposed sale of Stinger missiles to
Jordan. Virtually every day, we are
called upon to praise or chastise a
given policy. It seems that only in this
crucial region of the world do we mask
our unwillingness to act behind the
facade of certification.
Finally, Mr. President?and this fol-
lows from the point concerning the
constitutional role of Congress in for-
eign policy?we have an obligation
today to the people of America to play
a role in the permanent resolution of
our relations with Central America.
I am convinced, after watching this
President for 31/4 years since his elec-
tion, that he has not yet developed a
policy for Central America. Instead,
he has four or five policies for that
region, and these policies are shaped
and reshaped by four or five people
claiming expertise and benefiting from
access to the oval office.
I will not take words out of the
mouth of the Senator from Connecti-
cut because he expressed it so well ear-
lier today. It would be preferable for
us to take on issues of policy on the
floor rather than debating under the
pressures of a lot of weekend visits to
El Salvador whether or not $61.7 mil-
lion is an appropriate policy in El Sal-
vador.
- But as I said, I am convinced that
the President has not developed a uni-
fied and coherent policy for Central
America. Instead, he has four or five
policies for that region.
I am Convinced that the prevalent
bent of these policies is ideological.
that they are too often based on a
belief in the supremacy of political
considerations, and that they too
often suffer from the premise that
might makes right.
It was years ago, Mr. President, that
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: "America
Is great because she is good. If she
ever ceases to be good, she shall cease
to be great." Those sentiments were
echoed in the Kissinger Commission
report, as fine a blueprint for action in
Central America as any we have seen
in recent years.
We need to move toward a prospec-
tive -policy for the Americas, Mr. Presi-
dent, one which is based on a firm rec-
ognition of our own past as well as the
present reality of the rest of the hemi-
sphere. Our own heritage, as we have
often forgotten, is one of change. We
invented revolution. It was our Nation
which first demonstrated to the world
that people would eventually take
matters into their own hands unless
government was responsive to their
needs.
So with all the enthusiasm over the
most recent elections in El Salvador,
elections which we all heartily wel-
come, I beg by colleagues not to con-
fuse the evident need of 41/2 million
people for dignity and simple justice
with the belief that, all of a sudden
just because we have had an election,
just because we have appropriated $61
million, everything is going to be
better. Let us not confuse a milestone
with change. Let us not capitalize on
the emotional starvation of people
who have known only misery and vio-
lence but have seldom seen a policy
except one which happens to be con-
venient.
Only when we in this country begin
to treat Central America with the seri-
ousness it deserves?and only when we
recognize that we ourselves have con-
tributed to conditions through our ig-
norance and apathy as much as
through our action?will we have a
hope for undertaking the kind of bold
and humane policy outlined by the
Kissinger Commission. And we will get
nowhere so long as we in this body
continue to resort to the convenient
camouflage of certification. We must
begin to draw our own judgments and
live with our own consciences. Other-
wise, we will contribute to still another
failed policy.
Mr. President, the approach I have
outlined needs expansion, and I am
gratified that the committee is consid-
ering it. The approach should mirror
our policy: it should be regional in
scope and comprehensive. The ap-
proach is not designed to block policy,
or to impede future funding, or cur-
rent funding for that matter. The
idea, instead, is to foster the means by
which Congress can begin to do what
it claims to want to do?study, assess,
and pass upon the wisdom of our
policy. Without that kind of commit-
ment, we will not have a policy at all.
Thank you, Mr. President.
S 3387
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Hawaii.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I wish
to commend and recognize the work of
my dear friend from Minnesota for his
leadership in trying to bring about a
resolution of the Central American
problem and, more specifically, the
matter of conditionality. It has been
my privilege to work with him and his
colleagues in drafting what we consid-
er will be not only appropriate but
meaningful language. I am certain
that will make some change in how we
deal with our friends to our south.
Once again, I wish to commend my
colleague for his statement. It was
courageous. It was correct, and it is
worthy of consideration of this body.
k you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING Ole.FICER. The
Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I
would like to respond very briefly to
the statement of the Senator from
Minnesota. First of all, I thank him
for the discussion and also for deciding
not to offer his amendment at this
time. As the Senator stated, we do
have conditionality language in this
emergency appropriation bill. The
conditionality language which we have
adopted is language which tracks di-
rectly from the Kissinger Commission.
I, too, am disappointed that the ad-
ministration has not been willing to
embrace and work with the condition-
ality language of the Kissinger Com-
mission. Also the administration has
not been forthcoming in terms of
working with the Congress and with
other interested people outside of
Congress as we wrestle with this over-
all group of problems.
We are going to have an authoriza-
tion bill which the Senator from Min-
nesota correctly said is being debated
right now in committee. In addition,
we will have the 1984 regular supple-
mental and the 1985 appropriations
bills. I am hopeful and I am optimistic
that in the appropriations process and
the authorization process we are going
to be faced with a number of the ques-
tions that the Senator from Minnesota
has dealth with today. I also believe
that it is likely that a number of sug-
gestions and elements of his amend-
ment may very well be included in the
language of either the authorization
or the appropriations bills.
I look forward to working with the
Senator from Minnesota, along with
the Senator from Kansas and the Sen-
ator from Hawaii, as we wrestle our.
way through this very complex and
difficult area. I thank and congratu-
late the Senator from Minnesota on
his statement. -
Mr. President, we have been here
since 9:30 this morning. We spent a
couple of hours on this issue yesterday
afternoon. I see that the Senator from
Connecticut might want to make a
statement. I simply want to say to the
Senate that the Senator from Hawaii
and the Senator from Wisconsin are
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April 4, 1984
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 3765
the ends; and we should not use our
foreign aid to harass or overthrow the
existing Government in Nicaragua.
Mr. 'GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I
have repeatedly spoken in the past of
my opposition to a policy of targeted,
active subversion of the Government
of Nicaragua by the United States. Ad-
ditionally, I have spoken clearly of my
own political critique of that regime.
Lastly, I have made clear that the evi-
dence for Nicaragua's active policy of
arms exports to allied military units in
neighboring nations is clear and must
be stopped.
If the present amendment were
more exactingly targeted toward as-
suring that active overthrow of Nica-
ragua by the United States would not
be carried out, this measure might re-
ceive greater support. Unfortunately,
as is the case with other amendments
to this bill, the proponents of the
amendment have created a dilemma
for those in this Senate who are con-
cerned that our attacks on Nicaragua
as subversive of its neighbors can
easily be turned back on the United
States.
However, the evidence of Nicaraguan
action in daily, weekly, and monthly
covert arms smuggling into neighbor-
ing countries is overwhelmingly clear
and suggests a strategy of Nicaraguan
Involvement in military action outside
its borders--a condition I find deeply
disturbing and threatening to those
weakened nations which are attempt-
ing to develop democratic institutions.
Thus, I must oppose this amendment
because it would halt even the efforts
to interdict weapons being transferred
from Nicaragua to other countries for
the purpose of supporting subversion
of our close allies.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield
such time as the Senator from Arizona
y desire.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
have listened with a great deal of in-
terest to the debate on this amend-
ment, particularly to the remarks of
my friend from Massachusetts (Mr.
KENNEDY). During the course of his
discussion, he made a statement; that
this program is illegal.
Mr. President, there has been a good
deal of discussion as to whether the
covert paramilitary operation directed
against the Sandinista regime in Nica-
ragua is a legal activity. In fact, many
Members of the House of Representa-
tives have stated publicly that this
covert action program is illegal?that
it violates the so-called Boland amend-
ment, or it violates the U.N. Charter
or the charter of the Organization of
American States. Mr. President, I do
not believe this is quite right.
I do not think that anyone questions
The President's legal authority to con-
duct 'covert action. Under the provi-
sions of 22 United States Code 2422,
Presidential findings constitute both
the legal authority and the policy
framework for covert action programs.
These programs are routinely briefed
Committees which, in turn, report au-
thorization legislation to .fund them.
Occasionally, covert action proposals
are not authorized by: the Congress,
and funds are withheld according'''.
Let me summarize several points on
the issue of the legality of this covert
action as follows:
Every State Mr. President, has the
right under international law to
defend itself against attempts by an-
other State to assist insurgent groups
In its territory, and furthermore, has
the right to seek and receive support
from friendly countries in doing so.
The right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense is specifically eecog-
nized by the U.N. Charter and the Rio
Treaty. Each American State has ' a
duty under the Rio Treaty and the
OAS Charter to assist other American
States in defending themselves against
aggression.
This principle of international law
clearly applies to what is happening in
Central America. The governments of
Cuba and Nicaragua have been engag-
ing in a serious and sustained effort to
overthrow the Government of El Sal-
vador through the direction, support
and infiltration of arms to insurgents
In that country. Much of this infiltra-
tion has violated the territory and sov-
ereignty of Honduras as well. All of
this clearly amounts to an armed
attack under international law.
El Salvador and Honduras have a
clear right to defend themselves
against this armed attack, and the
United States has a clear right to
assist thin; lo collective self-defense.
Mr. President, I believe that most
Members of the Senate will be satis-
fied that the intelligence community is
living up to its obligations under the
law. The Secretary of State and our
Ambassador to the United Nations
have said, "The U.S. Government is
not breaking the law." I concur with
this point of view in the context of the
covert action program in Nicaragua.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator
yield on the point of legality?
I have put into the record a list of
the law professors from many of our
most distinguished law schools all over
this country who believe that this is a
violation of international law. I
wonder whether the Senator from Ari-
zona had a similar brief from those
lawyers who sustain the position of
the Senator from Arizona that this is
a legal action? I wonder if those who
support the covert action have been
able to fashion or shape any body of
legal opinion within this country that
would state, on the basis of law, that
this is a justifiable action, leaving
aside the question of policy?
Mr. GOLD WA rhaa. I say to my
friend from Massachusetts, we had the
opinions of the State Department, of
the intelligence family, and of mem-
bers of our staff and others who have
studied it. We feel, after long discus-
sion, that we are operating within the
Now, I have no doubt that we can
find people who agree with the Sena-
tor from Massachusetta we can find
lawyers on all sides of the fence.
Mr. KENNEDY. The reason I ask
the question is that I think once=
Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator
will wait a mbaute, I will be glad to put
In the RECORD in the next day or two a
list of the legal authorities that we
have on our side. I think that will
answer the Senator.
Mr. KENNEDY.-! -would appreciate
that, because the references the Sena-
tor has cited represent those who have
supported the administration's policy.
There we outside independent legal
experts who feel it does violate inter-
national law, including some distin-
guished lawyers from the Senator's
own State, for instance, Andrew Sil-
verman, professor of law. University of
Arizona College of Law. And -there a
number of others who I would think
could be considered to be virtually in-
dependent of a policy position on this
and yet have questioned the legality. I
know we will debate the policy consid-
eration, but on the question of legality
I was interested in what independent
authority the Senator has. I will wait
to see what he provides.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I will be very
glad, Mr. President, to supply a list of
authorities that participated in our
formulation of this position. We dis-
cussed this and debated it in the Intel-
ligence Committee at some length. In
fact, we have been on this problem for
.a little over 3 years.
Now, Mr. President, on another sub-
ject, a statement was made that the
purpose is to overthrow the Sandinista
Government.
It seems to me that the crua of this
debate :involves whether or not the
US. Government is trying to over-
throw the Marxist military regime in
Managua, Nicaragua. Most of my Col-
leagues will remember that when the
Sandinista forces took control in Nica-
ragua in 1979, they enjoyed the sup-
port of almost all poltticz- groups in
their country. They I s,f. force of
over 15,000 well-arme: a-:.).d trained
guerrillas. Both the Ca-.',ez administra-
tion and Castro"s Cubs strf,po;ted the
ouster of President Sur, ,azz., who even-
tually fled with his pal.,.ce guard to an
estate in Florida. Late:', he was mur-
dered by a Sandinista death squad in
Paraguay.
Since 1979, the Mar.-,ist Sandinista
Government in Nicaragua has devel-
oped the largest military force in Cen-
tral America. They have improved a
dozen of their existing hazes, and have
constructed almost 4.0 new military
bases. They have built up a regular
military force of over 20,000 troops,
with reserves of over 20,000 and a mili-
tia of over 30,000. With this force, the
Nicaraguans can field over 90 infantry
battalions of varied combat efficiency.
Obviously, Cuba has played an im-
portant role in the success of Nicara-
.601tAiNtifW?n Program. Their
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military forces are patterned after
Cuba's. Thousands of Cubans serve in
a variety of roles in Nicaragua. Sub-
stantial amounts of Soviet military
supplies flow into Nicaragua every day
by way of Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Now, Mr. President, do any of my
colleagues seriously believe that this
Marxist military machine is going to
be brought to its knees by several
thousand Nicaraguan and Moskito
Indian freedomfighters? I believe that
the Soiiet-supported Sandinista Gov-
ernment is fully capable of defending
itself from anti-Sandinista insurgents
operating out of the territory of any
of its neighbors. Furthermore, Nicara-
gua is capable of launching strikes
against El Salvador, Honduras, and
Costa Rica. After all, Kt Salvador is in
the throes of a Nicaraguan-supported
Insurgency, Costa Rica maintains no
standing array at all, and Honduras is
left pretty much alone against the
largest military force in Central Amer-
ica.
Mr. President, I will not labor the
point. Winston Churchill once said,
"you cannot argue against arithme-
tic." The arithmetic in Central Amer-
ica simply does not support the thesis
that a relatively small band of anti-
Sandinistas is going to overthrow the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Un-
fortunately, Mr. President, the odds
all seem to favor Nicaragua's Marxist
military machine doing all the over-
throwing, now and into the future. So
let us not be deceived into worrying
about whether there is any purpose or
intention to overthrow the Marxist
government in Nicaragua when there
is no apparent capability to do so.
COMMITTEE ACTION ON CENTRAL AMERICA
Mr. President, because this debate
will eventually get into committee
action, I want to summarize briefly
the committee actions we have taken
on this program.
Ever since President Carter signed
the first Presidential finding on Nica-
ragua, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence has engaged in effec-
tive oversight of covert action directed
against the Sandinista regime of Nica-
ragua. Although all Members of this
body have full access to all documents
pertaining to this oversight under the
provisions of Senate Resolution 400, it
may be useful to review some of our
oversight activities on this program
over the past year.
On May 6, 1983, the Intelligence
Committee voted 13 to 2 to authorize
and fund a covert paramilitary action
program directed against the Sandin-
ista regime subject to certain condi-
tions stipulated by the committee. The
committee placed all funds requested
-by the President for fiscal year 1984
into the reserve for contingencies for
the purpose of supporting a redirect-
ed, redefined covert paramilitary
action program based upon formula-
tion of a new Presidential finding.
I inform my colleagues that later,
either today or tomorrow, the major-
ity leader will read a letter on that
subject from the President of the
United States.
Some of my colleagues may recall
that at the time we asked the Presi-
dent to come up with a new program
on the whole of Central America
before September 30, 1983.
The committee subsequently met on
September 20, 1983, to consider the
new Presidential finding on Nicaragua.
Witnesses at the hearing included Sec-
retary of State Shultz, the Director of
Central Intelligence, Casey, and the
Assistant Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The committee met
again on September 21; and, after
careful consideration, the committee
agreed overwhelmingly to approve the
covert paramilitary action program for
Nicaragua. Our vote was bipartisan in
nature with only two dissenting votes
cast.
On November 3, 1983, the Senate
passed unanimously the Intelligence
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1984.
Among other things, this legislation
authorized funds for the covert para-
military action program in Nicaragua.
Subsequently, there was a joint
House/Senate conference on this legis-
lation. House and Senate conferees
agreed that $24 million would be made
available in fiscal year 1984 to fund
the covert paramilitary action pro-
gram in Nicaragua. This figure of $24
million was a cap, and it was agreed
that any further funding for this pro-
gram would have to come in the form
of a supplemental request approved by
both Houses of Congress.
On March 8, 1984, Secretary of State
Shultz and Director Casey appeared
before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence .to discuss this pro-
gram. Unfortunately, the agenda of
that meeting changed dramatically
when we learned that the administra-
tion was attempting what appeared to
be an end run of the authorizing com-
mittees. Secretary of State Shultz tes-
tified that what had happened was a
mistake and he apologized to us for it.
I, for one, believe him and do not
blame him for what happened.
On March 13, 1984, the full commit-
tee met again to consider this matter.
At that session, we voted unanimously
to raise the ceiling of moneys author-
ized for this program by $21 milli9n.
The day following our meeting, the
Senate Apporpriations Committee also
agreed to raise this ceiling by $21 mil-
lion. That vote was unanimous as well,
I am told.
Mr. President, my point in recount-
ing this background is to emphasize
the importance which the committee
places on carefully evaluating this pro-
gram and its role in the President's
foreign policy for Central America.
Our committee has worked long and
hard on this issue. At the same time,
and with only a few exceptions, I be-
lieve the administration has made a
good faith effort to accommodate our
Interests.
It is my sincere hope that this spirit
of bipartisanship can continue as we
April 4, 1984
act on the urgent supplemental appro-
priations bill here today. I also hope
this spirit of bipartisanship and coop-
eration will continue as we move into
our conference with the House on this
portant issue.
Mr. 'CRANSTON addressed the
Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
'yields time to the Senator from Cali-
fornia?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield such time as
the Senator needs.
AoAnorr TERRORISM n.czar' ram. hamarca
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, we
have never known modern war upon
our continent in the United States.
But is coming closer and closer.
Soviet submarines carrying nuclear
missiles are moving closer to our
Shores, and we are moving missiles in
Europe closer to the U.S.S.R.
We are involved?directly and indi-
rectly?in hostilities that lie down the
Pan American Highway in Central
America. You could get in your car
and drive to the war raging there.
California is about as close to Nicara-
gua as it is to Washington, D.C.
Americans have already died in hos-
tilities in Grenada, El Salvador, Hon-
duras, and on the border of Nicaragua.
We are getting in deeper and deeper?
and the worst of our actions are those
aimed at Nicaragua.
Ronald Reagan has justified admin-
istration policy initiatives in Lebanon,
Grenada, and elsewhere as key to
American efforts to combat interna-
tional terrorism. Secretary Shultz de-
nounced _ state terrorism, but the
Reagan administration is supporting
International terrorism in Nicaragua.
The Reagan administration is bank-
rolling a mixed group of thugs, merce-
naries, freedom fighters, former Somo-
cistas, and disaffected Sandinistas who
are trying to terrorize the Nicaraguan
people into taking up arms against the
Sandinista regime. Amer!.can taxpay-
ers' dollars are helpinE to perform
such missions as the boning of com-
mercial oil facilities, Vac_ bombing of
the civilian airport in th: Nicaraguan
capital, Managua, and tk mining of
Nicaraguan harbors on ,_..^..)th the At-
lantic and Pacific seabosz.:.
We are involved in acti,-:ties directed
at overthrowing the Gcverrunent of
Nicaragua, coming at Nicaragua from
the east, the west, the north, and the
south: from the east, the mining of
harbors in the Atlantic; from the west,
the mining of harbors in the Pacific;
from the north, from Honduras; from
the south, from Costa Rica.
Through its funding of counterrevo-
lutionaries, the U.S. Government is
systematically intervening in the in-
ternal affairs of Nicaragua and is
clearly violating the charter of the Or-
ganization of American States, which
the 'United States led the way in draft-
ing.
The Reagan administration has
made clumsy efforts to keep its clumsy
covert war a secret in order to stifle
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April 10, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
of the majority leader, I would say
that that would resolve my own partic-
ular concerns. I cannot speak for
others.
With understanding, I wonder if it
would be appropriate for me to inquire
how the majority leader would expect
to vote on this particular amendment?
Mr. BAKER. After the agreement is
entered into, I will vote for the amend-
ment.
Mr. KENNEDY. I would appreciate
an early decision. I thank the majority
leader and the minority leader for
their cooperation.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I person-
ally have no objection to this agree-
-merit. The -chief author of the amend-
ment has Indicated that the agree-
ment is all right with him. I have no
problem -with it. I would, however,
have to run our hotline on the request
before I could finally agree to it.
The majority leader has indicated
that his side had a meeting and has in-
dicated the outcome of that meeting. I
have not had a chance to run this pro-
posal by any Members on our side of
the aisle. I owe them that obligation. I
would suggest that the majority leader
put in a quorum call and give us, say, 5
minutes to run the hotline. Once we
have done that, I will be back to him
and report to him.
Mr. BAKER. I will be happy to do
that.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object and I shall not
object, just to be sure that there is
nothing misunderstood, it is that there
would be a vote on the first half of the
Kennedy amendment and that the
second half will be withdrawn.
Mr. BAKER. That is correct.
Mr. HELMS. And that there will be
no further amendments in order relat-
ing to Central America on this bill.
-Mr. BAKER. That is correct.
Mr. HELMS. And the Senator be-
lieves that in a short while, there will
be a vote?
Mr. BAKER. Yes, Mr. President, I
do believe that.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we
should begin with a general caveat
that it does not advance the U.S. na-
tional interest at any time to talk
about specific covert actions, even if
they are successful. There are those
who may have the opinion that covert
actions in and of themselves are
unwise. I do not take that position. I
feel that the President of the United
States has the constitutional authori-
ty to conduct our foreign policy. The
use of covert actions is a classic tool of
foreign policy. When we elect a Presi-
dent, we elect him to use his judgment
In the employment of that tool.
We should also begin with the gener-
al assumption that the United States
should not, as a general rule, accept
the juriseEction -of the World Court in
matters of our national security. The
sovereignty of the United States
should remain paramount In our con-
siderations.
Mr. President, if we surrender juris-
diction to the World Court in some-
thing that the President judges will
Impact on our national security, then
we would be surrendering our sover-
eignty. It is all very nice to speak of
the "rule of law"; but the rule of law is
an ideal that is seldom met in a world
of conflicting cultures, traditions, and
Ideologies. We must not put our own
paramount national interests in jeop-
ardy by submitting to the judgment of
an international court. In the long
run, the most fundamental right of a
nation is the right to protect its secu-
rity.
All this having been said, we should
also take a look at the substance of
the controversy. If the covert actions
which the press says have been taken
have actually been taken, then I could
easily understand the considerations
which might have led the President to
make the judgment to implement
them. The country of Nicaragua has
become a vast storehouse for arms
threatening the national security of
the region, including our own security.
It has become the Libya of the Carib-
bean, a forward base for the logistics
of supplying revolutionary movements
In the Western Hemisphere.
?The prime providers of those arms
are the Soviet Union and Cuba. Those
arms are a present danger to Costa
Rica and Honduras. They are the
proximate danger to the free elections
In El Salvador. The Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs recently
heard testimony from Dr. Fred Ikle,
the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. Dr. Ikle said:
A year ago, I reported to this Committee
that in 1981 the Soviets had delivered 63,000
tons of arms to Cuba, the highest yearly
total since 1962. Today I must report to you
that the Soviet deliveries have increased
further, to 68,000 tons in 1982?about one
billion dollars worth of military assistance.
Mr. President, those deliveries to
Cuba indicate the growing presence of
Soviet military arms in the region. We
also know that those arms are being
shipped from Cuba to Nicaragua, as
well as directly from other Soviet bloc
ports on Soviet vessels. Nicaragua has
admitted to having increased the
number of military and securityforces
to 138,000. This includes 39 percent of
all the males over 18.
According to a Sandinista official,
the first training class of 30 pilots?
part of about 70 Nicaraguans training
in Bulgaria?was due to complete its
training in December 1983. Mean-
while, improvements have continued
on existing landing strips in Nicaragua
to allow them to accommodate modern
jet aircraft. There are presently 36
new military bases and garrisons in
Nicaragua _now under construction or
completed
Approximately 50 Soviet tanks have
been introduced into Nicaragua,
enough to form a second battalion.
Nicaragua has received about 1,000
East German trucks, 100 antiaircraft
guns, and three brigades of Soviet ar-
S 4193
tillery that can achieve ranges over 27
kilometers. Nicaragua has also ob-
tained additional assault helicopters
and transport aircraft to improve their
mobility.
Mr. President, this and similar
equipment is coming difectly from
Soviet bloc ports to Nicaraguan ports.
It seems to me to be an entirely pru-
dent and responsible action to take ap-
propriate steps to stop such ship-
ments. Such considerations could well
have led to a decision to mine the
ports receiving the military equip-
ment.
Those who object to such policies
should be prepared to take responsibil-
ity for the alternative?the collapse of
neighboring countries into MarxhIte
Leninist hands. Nicaraguan freedom
fighters have irresistible reasons for
doing everything in their power to see
that their country ,does not fall irre-
versibly into the-hands of a totalitar-
ian power which considers Castro,
Stalin, Lenin, and Marx as a suitable
successor to the imperfect political
tradition and the ardently Christian
culture of Nicaragua.
We owe at least the same to our
allies in Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador. Whoever is dropping mines
into the waters around Nicaraguan
ports, wherever they are from, are
working for the best interests of the
Nicaraguan people, and of all the
people of the region. Whatever role, if
any, may have been played by U.S. of-
ficials should not blind us to the fun-
damental truth. What we should do is
applaud.
'We should not and must not do any-
thing which will concede anything of
our national-sovereignty to any inter-
national body, or to any group of ,jour-
nalists, or to "international opinion,"
or to the "international community,"
whatever that is. A policy which ap-
peals to the rule of law to destroy the
basis for a rule of law?that is to say,
the fundamental._ freedoms of people
everywhere?can have no part in our
thinking. We cannot stand idly by and
wait until the military buildup be-
comes irresistible.
?MI:: MOYNIHAN. Mr. President,
may I simply make a brief statement
for the information of the Senate with
respect to the second section of the
amendment of the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts? It holds that "The United
States shall immediately withdraw the
modification submitted on April 6,
1984, to the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice over the
United States with respect to disputes
with any Central American state or
arising out of or related to events in
Central America."
May I inform the Senate, as I am
sure many learned Members know,
that the United States does not have
the right under our original agree-
ment with the Court to make the pro-
posal which the Secretray of State did
make on Friday to the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations. The ratifi-
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S 4194 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
cation which the Senate agreed to,
stated by President Truman, indicated
the four areas in which we would
submit. to jurisdiction, then concluded:
Provided further, That this declaration
shall remain in force for a period of five
years and thereafter until the expiration of
six months after notice may be given to ter-
minate this declaration.
Mr. President, by our own previous
agreement, we do not have the right
simply to declare that we will no
longer accept that jurisdiction. As a
matter ? of fact, in the report of the
Committee on Foreign Relations pre-
sented to this body on August 2, 1946,
it was specifically noted:
The provision for 6 months' notice of ter-
mination after the 5-year period has the
effect of a renunciation of any intention to
withdraw our obligation in the face of a
threatened legal proceeding.
Mr. President, bow it could come to
pass that the Department of State
would not know what were the agree-
ments which the United States has
rm-Ide, what the commitments are that
it has made, and what is the legislative
history explicit of those agreements is
a matter of wonder to this Senator in
all events.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that I may have printed in the
RECORD at this point the declaration of
the United States accepting the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the court with
respect to other nations who did the
same with respect to certain specific
subjects, and also the report of the
Committee on Foreign Relations
which provides the specific legislative
history behind the provision that re-
quires 6 months' notice before any
such exclusion can take place.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
DECLARATION
I. Harry S. Truman. President of the
United States of America, declare on behalf
of the United States of America, under Arti-
cle 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, and in accord-
ance with the Resolution of 2 August 1946
of the Senate of the United States of Amer-
ica (two-thirds of the Senators present con-
curring therein), that the United States of
America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation
to any other State accepting the same obli-
gation, the jurisdiction of the International
r.ourt of Justice in all legal disputes hereaf-
ter arising concerning?
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact Which. if es-
tablished, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation
to be made for the breach of an internation-
al obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not
apply to?
(a) disputes the solution of which the par-
ties shall entrust to other tribunals by
virtue of agreements already in existence or
which may be concluded in the future; or
(13) disputes with regard to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the United States of America as de-
termined by the United States of America;
Or
(c) disputes arising under a multilateral
treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty af-
fected by the decision are also parties to the
case before the Court. or (2) the United
States of America specially agrees to juris-
diction; and -
Provided further, that this declaration
shall remain in force for a period of five
years and thereafter until the expiration of
six months after notice may be given to ter-
minate this declaration.
Done at Washington this fourteenth day
of August 1946.
(Signed) HARRY S. TRUMAN.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to
whom was referred the resolution (S. Res.
196) providing that the Senate advise and
consent to the deposit by the President of
the United States with the Secretary Gener-
al of the United Nations of a declaration
under paragraph 2 of article 36 of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice
recognizing as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement. In relation to
any other State accepting the same obliga-
tion, the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice in certain categories of
legal disputes hereafter arising, hereby
report the same to the Senate, with an
amendment with the recommendation that
the resolution do pass as amended.
A. TEXT OF RESOLUTION
Following is the text of the resolution, as
amended by the committee;
-Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein), That the
Senate advise and consent to the deposit by
the President of the United States with the
Secretary General of the United Nations of
a declaration under paragraph 2 of article
36 of the Statute of the International Court
of justice recognizing as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, in re-
lation to any other state accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in all legal disputes
hereafter arising concerning?
"a. the intepretation of a treaty;
"b. any question of international law;
"c. the existence of any fact which, if es-'
tablished, would constitute a breach of an
International obligation;
"d. the nature or extent of the reparation
to be made for the breach of an internation-
al obligation.
Provided, That such declaration should not
apply to-
-a. disputes the solution of which the par-
ties shall entrust to other tribunals by
virtue of agreements already in existence or
which may be concluded in the future; or
"b. disputes with regard to matters which
arc essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the United States.
provided further, That such declaration
should remain in force for a period of 5
years and thereafter until the expiration of
6 months after notice may be given to termi-
nate the declaration."
B. HEARINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
On November 28, 1945, Mr. MORSE submit-
ted Senate Resolution 196 for himself, Mr.
TAFT, Mr. GREEN, Mr. FULBR/GHT, Mr.
SMITH, Mr. FERGUSON, Mr. AIKEN. , Mr. BALL,
Mr. CORDON, Mr. WILLEY, Mr. TOBEY. Mr.
IVIAGNUSON, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Caroli-
na, Mr. MYERS, and Mr, MCMAHON. The res-
olution was referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations, On June 12, 1946, Chair-
man CONNALLY appointed a subcommittee
consisting of Senator Tetosaas (Utah) as
chairman, Senator HATCH and Senator
AUSTIN to hear witnesses on the resolution
April 10, 1984
and to recommend any amendments that.
might seem appropriate.
The subcommittee held hearings on July .
ii, 12, and 15, with Senator Morse, Dean
Acheson (Acting Secretary of State), and
Charles Fahy (legal adviser of the Depart-
ment of State)?appearing and a number of
other witnesses testifying on behalf of im-
portant private organizations. Outstanding
jurists and international lawyers also sub-
mitted statements for the record. Witnesses
appeared or statements were submitted
from the following organizations:
American Bar Association.
American Society of International Law.
American Association of University
Women.
General Federation of Women's Clubs.
Young Women's Christian Association.
Americans United for World Government.
Friends Committee on National Legisla-
tion.
National League of Women Voters.
Federal Bar Association.
Women's Action Committee for Lasting
Peace.
Federal Council of the Churches of Christ
in America.
Catholic Association for International
Peace.
Pennsylvania Bar Association.
National Council of Jewish Women.
National Education Association.
C. OVERWHELMING PUBLIC SUPPORT
The subcommittee was Impressed by the
fact that all the witnesses who appeared
were enthusiastically In favor of the accept-
ance on the part of the United States of the
jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice with respect to legal disputes. The
general feeling seemed to be that such a
step taken now by the United States would
be the natural and logical sequel to our
entry into the United Nations. Twelve
months' consideration since the signing of
the Charter has strengthened the convic-
tion that this action would immediately in-
crease faith in the efficacy of the United
Nations to promote order and peace.
This relative unanimity of American
public opinion was demonstrated on Decem-
ber 18, 1945, when the house of delegates of
the American Bar Association, without a
dissenting vote, passed a resolution urging
the Presideot and the Senate to take appro-
priate action at the earliest practicable time
to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
court. The American Society of Internation-
al Law, on April 27, 1946, likewise adopted a
favorable resolution by a unanimous vote.
Many other national organizations, with
large memberships, including the American
Association of University Women. the Gen-
eral Federation of Women's Clubs, the Fed-
eral Bar Associatism, the Inter-Ainerkan
Dar Association, the Federal Council of
Churches, the National League of Women
Voters, the American Veterans Committee,
the National Education Association, the Na-
tional Council of Catholic Women, and the
American Assc.f.,iation for the United Na-
Lions, have similarly endorsed the proposal.
D. FAVORABLE ACTION BY FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
On July 17 and 24 the subcommittee re-
ported its findings to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. After a discussion of
the legal and constitutional issues involved
(see secs. G and J below) the committee re-
ported the resolution to the Senate for fa-
vorable action. The vote, which was taken
on July 24, was unanimous.
E. PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION
The immediate 'purpose of the resolution
is to authorize the President to file with the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE S 4195
secretary General of the United Nations a
declaration accepting the compulsory Air's-
diction of the International Court of Justice
over certain categories of legal disputes aris-
ing between the United States and any
other nation which has accepted the same
obligation. The United States would acquire
the right and duty to sue or be sued in re-
spect to such other States and would give
the Court the power to decide whether the
case properly falls within the terms of the
agreement.
The ultimate purpose of the resolution is
to lead to general world-wide acceptance of
the Jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice in legal cases. The accomplish-
ment of this result would, in a substantial
sense, place international relations on a
legal basis, in contrast to the present situa-
tion, in which states may be their own judge
of the law.
The United States has now become a
member of the Court, but membership in
itself means comparatively little. It is true
that Stales can agree to submit specified
cases to the Court, but they have always
been able to settle their disputes by arbitra-
tion. assuming they could agree to do so. So
long as individual members can refuse to be
haled into the Court a regime of law in the
international community will never be real-
ized. The most important attribute of this
or any other court is to hear and decide
cases. For this function it must have juris-
diction of the parties and the subject
matter.
F. OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
The undertaking of this obligation by
members of the United Nations is a logical
fulfillment of obligations already expressed
in the Charter. The preamble expresses the
determination of the peoples of the United
Nations?
"To estalish conditions under which jus-
tice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained," and to this
end "to insure, by the acceptance of princi-
ples and the institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interest."
Among the purposes of the United Na-
tions set forth in article 1 is?
"To bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settle-
ment of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace."
One of the principles of the Organization
as set forth in article 2 is that?
"All members shall settle their interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and secu-
rity, and justice, are not endangered."
Article 36. paragraph 3, of the Charter
provides that the Security Council should
-take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the
parties to the International Court of Justice
in accordance with the provisions of the
statute of the Court."
In addition, by virtue of the general right
of states to bring disputes before the Secu-
rity Council, any state is liable to have its
political disputes brought before the Coun-
cil without its consent and to be subject to
such moral obligation as attaches to a rec-
ommendation of the Council (arts, 36 and 31
of the charter). It is incongruous that such
rights and obligations should exist with re-
spect to political disputes but that there
should be no similar obligation for the mem-
bers of the United Nations to submit their
legal disputes to adjudication.
0 JURISDICTION CONFERRED, DEFINED, AND
UMmo
The scope of the jurisdiction to be con-
ferred pursuant to this resolution is careful-
ly defined and limited.
There is, in the first place, a general limi-
tation of jurisdiction to legal disputes. The
resolution, like article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Court statute, states this limitation in
general terms and proceeds to define the
foal' categories of disputes thus included.
These are:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
C. the existence of any fact which, if estab-
lished, would constitute a breach of an in-
ternational obligation:
d. the nature or extent of the reparation
to be made for the breach of an internation-
al obligation..
A second major limitation on the jurisdic-
tions conferred arises from the condition on
autocracy. This is again specified in the res-
olution in the language of the statute, the
pertinent phrase being as follows: "recogniz-
ing ? ? ? in relation to any other state ac-
cepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice."
Jurisdiction is thus conferred only as
among states filing declarations. In addi-
tion, the similar phrase in the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice Was interperted by the Court as mean-
ing that any limitation imposed by a state in
Its grant of jurisdiction thereby also became
available to any other state with which it
might become involved in proceedings, even
though the second state had not specifically
imposed the limitation. Thus, for example,
if the United States limited its grant of ju-
risdiction to cases "hereafter arising," this
country would be unable to institute pro-
ceedings regarding earlier disputes, even
though the defendant state might not have
interposed this reservation.
A third limitation specified in the resolu-
tion is that the United States should bind
Itself only as to disputes arising in the
future. The United States may not, there-
fore, be confronted with old controversies as
a result of filing theproposed declaration.
A fourth limitation provides that the pro-
posed action shall not impede the parties to
a dispute from entrusting its Solution to
some other tribunal if they so agree. The
same provision is found in the Charter of
the United Nations, article 95.
The fifth limitation is that the proposed
declaration shall not apply to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jursidic-
tion of the United States. A provision simi-
lar in principle is found in article 2, para-
graph '1, of the Charter, providing that
nothing in the Charter shall authorize the
organization to intervene in essentially do-
mestic matters. The committee feels that
the principle is also implicit in the nature of
International law, which, under article 38,
paragraph 1, of the statute, it is the duty of
the Court to apply. International law is, by
definition, the body of rights and duties
governing states in their relations with each
other and does not, therefore, concern itself
with matters of domestic jurisdiction. The
question of what is properly a matter of in-
ternational law is, in 'case of dispute, appro-
priate for decision by the Court itself, since,
if it were left to the decision of each individ-
ual state, it would be possible to withhold
any case from adjudication on the plea that
it is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. It is
plainly the intention of the statute that
such questions should be decided by the
Court, since article 36, paragraph 6, pro-
vides:
"In the event of a dispute as to whether
the court has jurisdiction, the matter shall
be settled by the decision of the Court."
It was also brought to the attention of the
subcommittee that a number of states, in
filing declarations under the statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice,
interposed reservations similar to that of
the resolution under consideration, but in
no case did they reserve to themselves the
right of decision. The committee therefore
decided that.a4reservation of the right of de-
cision as to what are matters essentially
within domestic jurisdiction would tend to
defeat the purposes which it is hoped to
achieve by means of the proposed declara-
tion as well as the purpose of article 36.
paragraphs 2 and 6. of the statute of the
Court.
The resolution provides that the declara-
tion should remain in force for a period of 5
years and thereafter until 6 months follow-
ing notice of termination. The declaration
might, therefore, remain in force indefinite-
ly. The provision for 6 months' notice of ter-
mination after the 5-year period has the
effect of a renunciation of any intention to
withdraw our obligation in the face of a
threatened legal proceeding.
Hon. John Foster Dulles, adviser to the
State Department in relation to the Dum-
barton Oaks proposals and adviser to the
United States delegation to the United Na-
tions Conference on International Organiza-
tion, which drafted the Charter and the
statute of the Court, filed a memorandum
with the subcommittee favoring agreement
by the United States to submit to impartial
adjudication its legal controversies. He
pointed out that failure to take that step
would be interpreted as an election on our
Part to rely on power rather than on reason.
Mr. Dulles advocated that the United
States ought now to make the declaration
submitting this country to the jurisdiction
of the Court according to article 36(2) of the
Court statute. He suggested, however, clari-
fication of certain matters in the declara-
tion to wit:
"1. Advisory opinions: The compulsory ju-
risdiction should presumably be limited to
disputes which are actual cases between
states as distinct from disputes in which ad-
visory opinions may be sought."
On this point the committee view is that
the jurisdiction to be accepted pursuant to
Senate Resolution 196 is coextensive with
the jurisdiction defined in article 36(2) of
the Statute of the Court, which is limited to
legal disputes as distinct from the broader
category of cases referred to elsewhere in
the statute.
With respect to Mr. Dulles' suggestion,
Hon. Charles Fahy. legal adviser of the
State Department, made the following
reply:
"The declaration under article 36 (2)
would grant jurisdiction in 'all legal dis-
putes,' as therein described. But the juris-
diction of the court (art. 36 (1)) extends to
'cases which the parties refer to it' and 'all
matters especially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or the trea-
ties and conventions in force.' Thus the
Court's possible jurisdiction is broader than
the jurisdiction conferred by a declaration
under article 36 (2). The provisions of arti-
cle 36 (2) are limited to 'legal disputes.' This
compulsory jurisdiction clearly excludes
cases which are not legal disputes, such as a
case to be decided ex acquo et bono under
article 38 (2) if the parties separately so
agree. Such agreement, of course, would be
over and above any jurisdiction accepted by
the proposed declaration under article 36
(2). The only jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to advisory opinions (art. 65) is as to
a legal question on request of whatever
body may be authorized to make such a re-
quest under the Charter. It is entirely apart
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S 4196 tAiNGKESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 10, 1984
from the compulsory jurisdiction which a
state grants by Its declaration under article
36 (2). No provision in the declaration would
seem necessary to make it clear that the
declaration under article 36 (2) is indeed
limited to the jurisdiction covered by that
article.
"2. Reciprocity: Jurisdiction should be
complusory only when all of the other par-
ties to the dispute, have previously accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
The committee considered that article 59
of the Court statute removed all cause for
doubt by providing:
"The decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in re-
spect of that particular case.
If the United States would perfer to deny
jurisdiction without special agreement in
disputes among several states, some of
which have not declared to be bound, article
36 (3) permits it to make its declaration con-
ditional as to the reciprocity of several or
certain states.
Mr. Dulles' objection might possibly be
provided for by another subsection in the
'first proviso of the resolution, on page 2,
after line 14, reading:
"c. Disputes arising under a multilateral
treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty af-
fected by the decision are also parties to the
case before the Court, or (2) the United
States specially agrees to jurisdiction.
"3. International law: If the basic law of
the case is not found in an existing treaty or
convention, to which the United States is a
party, there should be a prior agreement as
to what are the applicable principles of in-
ternational law.
The committee considered both the policy
and the parliamentary problems this sug-
gestion raises and decided to leave Senate
Resolution 196 unchanged as to this point,
for the following reasons:
Article 92 provides:
"The International Court of Justice shall
be the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. It shall function in accordance
with the annexed statute, which is based
upon the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and forms an inte-
gral part of the present Charter."
The Charter cannot be amended by a
mere declaration of some of the states par-
ties to the present statute. What a state
may do is limited by article 36 (3):
"The declarations referred to above may
be made unconditionally or on condition of
reciprocity on the part of several or certain
states, or for a certain time."
This does not permit a state to condition
submission upon different principles of in-
ternational law than those which article 38
commands to be used, thus:
"1. The Court, whose function is to decide
in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
"a. international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
"b. international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law;
"c. the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations;
"d. subject to the provisions of article 59,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the var-
ious nations, as subsidiary means for the de-
termination of rules of law.
"2. This provision shall not prejudice the
power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto."
To accomplish substantial alteration of
the applicable principles of the internation-
al law would require consent of all the other
parties to the Charter. The purpose of this
declaration is to avoid the procedural neces-
sity of "Special agreement" and to recognize
jurisdiction Ipso facto over the specified
subject matter and parties.
Hon. Charles Fahy, legal adviser of the
State Department, in a memorandum pre-
pared for the committee, replied to Mr.
Dulles' suggestion as follows:
"3. Mr. Dulles suggests there should be
prior agreement as to what are the applica-
ble principles of international law if the
basic law of the case is not found in an
existing treaty or convention. He feels that
to permit jurisdiction of legal disputes
concerning "any question of international
law" is too vague at this time.
"It is most inadvisable to accept this view.
It would seriously impede the progress of
the Court in the accomplishment of its pur-
pose. The procedure followed in the case of
the Alabama arbitration, referred to as an
Instance where previous agreement on the
applicable law was had, was long before the
establishment of the Court. The Charter of
the United Nations and the present statute
of the Court are designed to enlist sufficient
confidence in Judicial determinations by the
Court to enable it to become a useful organ
In the settlement of legal disputes. To re-
quire now an agreement, in advance of sub-
mission to the Court, on the applicable prin-
ciples of international law would take from
the Court one of the principal purposes of
Its creation. The United States should not
Insist on such a requirement. Whatever risk
to the United States is involved in entrust-
ing cases to the Court for its determination
of the applicable basis of decision under in-
ternational law is outweighed by the tre-
mendous advance which would be made by
our acceptance of such risk in the develop-
ment of judicial processes in the world
order."
Other points referred to the committee by
Mr. Dulles for clarification related to the
problem of domestic jurisdiction, the possi-
bility of resorting to other tribunals, and
the desirability of establishing a time limit
for any declaration the United States might
make.
As has been indicated above, domestic ju-
risdiction is safeguarded by article 1 (1) of
the Charter of the United Nations, limiting
the purposes of tlie United Nations to inter-
national disputes or situations, by article 2
(7) excluding domestic jurisdiction. The
committee accepted article 36 (6) of the
statute as covering this point.
"In the event of a dispute as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall
be settled by the decision of the Court."
-The right to submit disputes to other tri-
bunals is reserved in Senate resolution 196,
page 2, line 8. This reservation is permitted
by article 95 of the Charter.
With respect to a possible time limitation,
Senate Resolution 196 provides for 5 years'
duration, plus time of 6 months following
notice of termination of the declaration. A
further discussion of these points will be
found in the first part of section (G) above.
H COMPULSORY JURISDICTION PRIOR TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
The first important step in the direction
of compulsory jurisdiction was taken by the
Advisory Committee of Jurists appointed by
the League of Nations in 1920 to prepare
the Statute of the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice. This committee, which
included among its members the Honorable
Eithu Root, former member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of
War, and Secretary of State, recommended
a draft providing for general compulsory ju-
risdiction over specified categories of legal
disputes. It was proposed that this should
be binding upon all parties to the statute.
This provision proved unacceptable to some
of the larger powers when it was presented
to the League Council and Assembly, and
there was substituted for it a provision very
similar to article 36, paragraph 2, of the
present statute, enabling such states as de-
sired to do so to agree among themselves to
accept the jurisdiction of the Court as to
the enumerated categories of legal disputes.
Under this provision some 44 states. in-
cluding 3 of the 5 states now permanent
members of the Security Council (Great
Britain, France, and China), at one time or
another deposited declarations accepting
this jurisdiction.
Proceedings were invoked in ii cases
under these declarations two of which pro-
ceeded to final determination. One of these
was the Eastern Greenland case, i,nvolving
conflicting claims to territory by Norway
and Denmark. Upon the rendering of the
decision of the Court, Norway withdrew the
decrees affecting the territory which had
precipitated the dispute. The second ease
which went to decision involved a claim by
the Netherlands against Belgium for alleged
wrongful diversions of water from the
Meuse River. The other nine cases were ter-
minated on procedural points or were with-
drawn.
I. COMPULSORY JURISDICTION UNDER THE
UNTIED NATIONS
The negotiations leading to the conclusion
of the statute of the new International
Court of Justice saw a renewal of the effort
to obtain general compulsory jurisdiction. It
is indicated in the Report of the 1945 Com-
mittee of Jurists, which met in Washington
to formulate proposals relating to the judi-
cial organ of the proposed world organiza-
tion, that a majority of the Committee was
in favor of compulsory jurisdiction. At San
Francisco the discussion was renewed, and
again a very substantial body of opinion was
shown in favor of general compulsory juris-
diction. Due to the opposition of some states
and the doubtful position of others, it was
felt, however, that such a provision might
endanger acceptance of the Charter, of
which the statute was to be an integral part.
This was the position of the United States
delegation. It was, therefore, agreed to
retain the optional provision in a form simi-
lar to that employed in the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice.
This is the present article 36, paragraph 2 of
the statute, ? pursuant to which the action
envisioned by present resolution would be
taken.
The San Francisco Conference added an
additional paragraph to article 36 of the
statute, according to which declarations ac-
cepting the jurisdiction of the old Court,
and remaining in force, are deemed to
remain in force as among the parties to the
present statute for such period as they still
have to run. Nineteen declarations are cur-
rently in force under this provision.
A further indication of the sentiment pre-
vailing among United Nations delegations at
San Francisco was the adoption by the Con-
ference of a recommendation to the mem-
bers of the Organization?"that as soon as
possible they make declarations recognizing
the obligatory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice according to the pro-
visions of article 36 of the statute."
J. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES INVOLVED
During the discussion which took place in
the subcommittee three important constitu-
tional issues were raised. These issues were:
(1) Can the proposed action be taken by the
treaty-making process or is a joint resolu-
tion of the two Houses preferable; (2) is it
proper 'procedure to obtain the advice and
consent of the Senate prior to the deposit of
the declaration by the President; and (3)
would the deposit of the declaration by the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
President establish treaty relations between
the United States and the United Nations or
between the United States and the various
members of the United Nations who have
deposited similar declarations. _
With respect to the first issue, a declartk
tion of this kind is no doubt unique so far as
the United States is concerned. No one how-
ever. can doubt the power of this Govern-
ment to make such a declaration. The ques-
tion is one of procedure. During the debates
on the United Nations Charter the problem
was d'-cussed at some length on the floor of
the E ? late, and it was generally agreed that
the F:esident could not deposit the declara-
tion rlithout *congressional action of some
kind granting him the authority to do so.
To clarify the issue Senator VANDENBERG re-
quested an opinion of Mr. Green Hackworth
then legal adviser of the Department of
State. The pertinent paragraph of this opin-
ion. Which Senator VANDENBERG read on the
floor of the Senate on July 28, 1945, follows:
"If the Executive should initiate action
to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court under the optional clause contained
in article 36 of the statute, such procedure
as might be authorized by the Congress
would be followed, and if no specific proce-
dure were prescribed by statute, the propos-
al would be submitted to the Senate with re-
quest for its advice and consent to the filing
of the necessary declaration with the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations."
Since that time both the President and
the Secretary of State have indicated that.
In their opinion, either the procedure out-
lined the Senate Resolution 196 (calling for
a two-thirds vote of the Senate) or that out-
lined in House Joint Resolution 291 (calling
for a simple majority vote of the two
Houses) would furnish a satisfactory legal
basis for acceptance by the United States of
the compulsory jurisdiction clause.
Inasmuch as the declaration would involve
important new obligations for the United
States, the committee was of the opinion
that it should be approved by the treaty
process, with two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring. The force and effect of
the declaration is that of a treaty, binding
the United States with respect to those
States which have or which may in the
future deposit similiar declarations. More-
over. under our constitutional system the
peaceful settlement of disputes through ar-
bitration or judicial settlement has always
been considered a proper subject for the use
of the treaty procedure. While the declara-
tion can hardly be considered a treaty in the
strict sense of that term, the nature of the
obligations assumed by the contracting par-
ties are such that no action less solemn or
less formal than that required for treaties
should be contemplated.
With respect to the second issue the
answer may be found in the Constitution
itself, Article 2, section 2, provides that the
President shall have "power, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to
make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur." It is evident that
the advice and consent of the Senate is
equally effective whether given before,
during, or after the conclusion of the treaty.
In fact, President Washington approached
the Senate for its advice and consent prior
to the negotiation of treaties, and this prac-
tice was followed on occasion by other Presi-
dents. While the practice of prior consulta-
tions with the Senate fell into disuse after
1816, a recent precedent may be found in
the convention of 1927, extending the Gen-
eral Claims Commission, United States and
Mexico of 1923. The treaty was signed on
August 16, 1927, pursuant to a Senate reso-
lution of February 17, 1927. A sirniliar ex-
ample is the convention of 1929, again ex-
tending the life of the Commission. The
convention was signed on August 17, 1929,
purusuant to the Senate resolution of May
25, 1929.
With regard to the third issue, the pro-
posed declaration would not conatitute, in -
any tense, an agreement between the
United States and the United Nations. It is
rather a unilateral declaration having the
force and effect of a treaty as between the
United States and each of the other States
which accept the same obligations. It is
merely an extension of the general principle
that any two states may agree to submit
.cases to arbitration or judicial settlement.
The so-called optional clause would permit a
large number of states to take such action
with respect to the four categories of legal
cases enumerated.
As to whether the United States can enter
into a treaty with the United Nations, the
question is not here at issue. In any event, it
is clear that the United States can conclude
agreements with the United Nations, inas-
much as the United Nations Participation
Act authorized the President to take such
action in conformity with the pledge of the
United States to make armed forces availa-
ble to the Security Council under article 43
of the Charter. Moreover, there appears to
be nothing in the Constitution which for-
bids the conclusion of a treaty between the
United States and an international organi-
zation.
If it follows that the legal capacity of the
United Nations is all that is required to
enable the United States and the United Na-
tions to enter.into treaty relationships, arti-
cle 104 of the Charter would seem to estab-
lish that authority. Article 104 reads:
"The Organization shall enjoy in the ter-
ritory of each of its members such legal ca-
pacity as may be necessary for the exercise
of its functions and the fulfillment of its
purposes."
K. DESIRABILITY OF SPEEDY ACTION
Most of the witnesses appearing before
the subcommittee expressed the hope that
the Senate would act speedily in order to
demonstrate once more the conviction of
the people of the United States that peace
will be possible only if law and justice are
firmly embedded in the foundations of the
United Nations. To be sure, the extension of
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice will not usher the
.world automatically into an era of peace; it
Is only one important step in man's long and
painful march toward a warless world. The
acceptance by the United States of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction clause, however, would
constitute a step of great psychological and
moral significance. It would help develop a
spirit of trust and confidence, particularly
on the part of the small states, toward the
United States. And it would give impetus to
the principle of the peaceful settlement of
disputes as the judges of the new Court
begin their work at the Peace Palace in The
Hague.
On July 28, 1945, the Senate ratified the
United Nations Charter by the overwhelm-
ing vote of 89 to 2. Since that time the
people of the United States, the Senate, the
House of Representatives, the President,
and the Secretary of State have repeatedly
asserted the conviction that the foreign
policy of the United States must be cen-
tered about the activities and the organs of
the United Nations. The International
Court of Justice is one of the principal
organs of the United Nations. It would seem
entirely consistent with our often pro-
nounced policy for the Senate to take
speedy action in order to ensure our full co-
operation with the work of the Court at the
earliest practicable date.
S 4197
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
in its report to the Senate on the United Na-
tions Charter, expressed the following view:
"Unless we are prepared to take all steps
which are necessary to effecturite our mem-
bership in the United Nations, we would be
merely - deceiving the hopes of the United
States and of humanity in ratifying the
Charter."
Mr.
KENNEDY. Mr. President, 2
weeks ago, I expressed the opinion
that the debate we were about to have
would be the most important debate
we would have this session. Today, we
are about to take IC vote that could be
the most significant vote of this
decade. -
This vote Is significant bacause it in-
volves the lives of innocent people.
Today, we will vote to save innocent
lives, or we will vote to take innocent
lives.
With this vote, we will also deter-
mine whether the United States of
America, under the direction of Presi-
dent Reagan, will continue its march
toward war in Central America. With
this vote, we will decide whether U.S.
funds should continue to-be used for?
and whether U.S. personnel should
continue to be involved in?the indis-
criminate mining of territorial waters
In Nicaragua.
On March 29, just as our debate
about Central America was beginning,
we learned that U.S. personnel were
being used on reconnaissance misgions
over El Salvador to assist the Salva-
doran'Army in combat with the guer-
rillas. And last Friday, after our
debate had ended, we learned that
U.S. personnel were being used to
mine the harbors and territorial
waters of Nicaragua. That same day,
the Secretary of State quietly with-
drew this Nation from the jurisdiction
of the World Court with respect to dis-
putes with Central American nations.
But we did not know about that then,
and we did not learn about that until
yesterday.
President Reagan is moving us
toward war. He has moved U.S. citi-
zens up to the edge of combat, and he
has involved U.S. citizens in the hostil-
ities.
Lp.st week, we debated /whether the
United States should continue to pro-
vide military assistance to the Contras
in Nicaragua. Last week, on the floor
of the Senate, we debated whether
such assistance was in violation of in-
ternational law. We were repeatedly
assured that the Contras were not en-
gaged in efforts to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua. We were re-
peatedly told that the Contras were
not conducting a war to destroy the
economic infrastructure of Nicaragua.
If that were true, many Senators said,
we would not be voting to support the
Contras. And even the President of the
United States got into the debate. He
sent a letter in which he assured us
that the United States did "not seek to
destabilize or overthrow the govern-
ment of Nicaragua; nor to impose or
compel any particular form of govern-
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S 4198 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
ment there:" But 2 days later, the
United States of America withdrew
from jurisdiction of the World Court.
The question before the Senate is a
fundamental one: Will we take any re-
sponsibility at all?or will we abdicate
completely to the executive branch?
Will we condone terrorism and sabo-
tage? Will we let the Reagan adminis-
tration pursue a policy of sneaking
war into Central America?
We have turned our backs on diplo-
macy.
We have turned our backs on inter-
national law.
Will the Senate watch paasively as
this administration sovietizes Ameri-
can foreign policy?as it adopts the
standard that the end justifies the
means?as it avoids our constitutional
process and misleads the Congress?
The truth is confessed only when
the administration is caught in the
act. Such confession is not the kind of
consultation which the Congress de-
serves or should demand. Such sur-
prises are not the basis for bipartisan-
ship.
Often in this debate, I have raised
the question of our obligation to histo-
ry. I raise it again. How will the Sena-
tors here explain someday that Ameri-
can sons are dying in an unwinnable
war in Central America because we
lacked courage to take a stand?or be-
cause we followed a political calculus
which held that the administration
should be permitted to twist slowly in
the political wind?, For what is being
strangled rapidly now is the hope for a
peaceful settlement.
The administration said we had no
combat role in El Salvador. Qn March
' 29, we learned this was untrue?and
that our forces were engaged in
combat reconnaissance in that coun-
try.
The administration said that we
were not seeking to destabilize the
Government of Nicaragua; we only
sought to interdict arms and supplies
for the rebels in El Salvador. Now we
have learned that this is untrue?that
we have mined a port far from any
point of arms shipments to El Salva-
dor?and that our mines may blow up
the ships of our NATO allies.
We know the evasions, the rational-
izations, the fabrications, for we have
heard them from this administration
until they have become as tattered as
they are untrue. We have no excuse
for continued inaction.
Let us end escalation by surpise in
Central America.
Let us at long last exercise the
power we were elected to use?and let
us say to this administration, "Enough
is enough. You shall no longer move
toward war before trying for peace."
A/fr. (1.0T,T)WA'TV.P. Mr. President,
?There has been a good deal of discus-
sion in the press recently about re-
marks I allegedly made on the floor of
the Senate last Wednesday night,
April 5, 1984.
An article in the Wall Street Journal
on the following day stated:
During Senate debate this week. the Intel-
ligence Committee Chairman, Barry Gold-
water, (R., Ariz.) surprised other Senators
by openly referring to a document or paper
Indicating that the administration had di-
rectly authorized the mining. Mr. Gold-
water's remarks were dropped from the pub-
lished record made available yesterday, and
while an aide to the Senator dismissed the
matter, two other sources indicated that
such a paper or staff memo did exist.
As well, an article in the New York
Times this Monday stated:
Senator Barry Goldwater, the chairman
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, inad-
vertently referred to the covert operation in
floor debate. A Senator said Mr. Goldwater,
an Arizona Republican, later had his re-
marks .deleked from the Congressional
Record.
There may have been other refer-
ences to this matter as Well.
Mr. President, in almost 30 years
service in the U.S. Senate I have never
had my remarks deleted from the
Rzooan. However, what we were con-
fronted with last week was a rather
unusual situation?in fact, it was a
unique situation which I have never
encountered before.
, When the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence was established in the
spring of 1976, Senate Resolution 400
gave the committee jurisdiction and
authority to. consider all legislation
and other matters relating to authori-
zations for appropriations for the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. Section 501
of the National Security Act of 1947,
which was enacted as part of the Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for fiscal
year 1981, imposes an obligation upon
the Director of Central Intelligence
and the heads of all departments,
agencies, and other entities of the
United States Involved in intelligence
activities to keep the Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence of the Senate and
the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Repre-
sentatives fully and currently in-
formed of all intelligence activities
which are the responsibility of, are en-
gaged in by, or are carried out for or
on behalf -of any department, agency,
or entity of the United States, includ-
ing any significant anticipated intelli-
gence activity. ,
Section 662 of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961, as amended by the
Intelligence Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1981, requires that each op-
eration conducted by or on behalf of
the Central Intelligence Agency in a
foreign country, other than activities
intoned solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence, shall be considered a sig-
nificant anticipated intelligence activi-
ty for the purpose of section 501 of
the National Security Act of 1947.
Mr. President, I am providing this
background to make it clear to my col-
leagues that if the CIA was engaged iri
the mining of selected harbors in Nica-
ragua, this fact would of necessity
have been briefed to me and to my
committee or committee staff ahead of
time. I say it would have been briefed
of necessity, Mr. President, because
April 10, 1984
this is the law. Now we may all debate
whether this Is a good law or a bad law
or an indifferent law, but it is the law.
Now, last Wednesday night, during
open debate on the floor of the
Senate, a member of my committee
came to me to ask if I had seen a docu-
ment which indicated that the Presi-
dent ordered the mining of selected
harbors in Nicaragua. I responded to
him by saying that I had seen no such
document and that I could not believe
the President could have, approved
such a program since our committee
had not been so briefed. Nor had I re-
ceived any such briefing. After a few
minutes' investigation, I learned that
the document my member had re-
ferred to -was simply an Informal
memorandum !mai a staff member to
a Senator. It had been hastily pulled
together in response to a couple of
questions on the mining, and bad no
official standing as far as I was con-
cerned. Although I conveyed these
findings to my colleagues on the floor,
I felt the matter deserved further in-
quiry, and ray remarks were struck
until such a time as further clarifica-
tion could be obtained.
Mr. President, this afternoon, CIA
Director Casey appeared before my
committee in closed session to brief us
on this issue. I learned to my deep
regret that the President did approve
this mining program, and that he ap-
proved it almost 2 months ago. Fur-
thermore, I learned that in spite of
the legal requirement that the intelli-
gence family keep the members of our
committee fully and currently in-
formed on this sort of matter, .we had
not been so informed. By contrast, the
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence had been fully briefed
on this matter several weeks ago.
Now I have written Director Casey
that this is no way to run a railroad. I
am forced to apologize to the members
of my committee because I did not
know the facts on this case, and I
apologize to all Members of the Senate
for the same reason.
Mr. President, I have always felt
strongly about the issue of leaks and
of protecting the legitimate secrets of
our Nation. So I will not comment fur-
ther on this matter for the public
record. However, I am prepared to pro-
vide any Member of the Senate with
further details on this matter in pri-
vate if they so desire. As well, Mem-
bers of the Senate may wish to visit
the offices of the Select Committee on
Intelligence to review documents and
transcripts on this matter, as well B.?
to talk to our cleared staff. I consider
this a matter of great importance, not
just to the members of our committee,
but to the Senate as a whole. And I am
prepared to share whatever informa-
tion we do have at this time..
MINING OP NICARAGUAN PORTS
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am
voting in support of this amendment
because I am concerned that the re-
ported CIA involvement in the mining
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 4199
ot Nicaraguan ports is part of a broad-
er U.S. covert effort that effectively
supports the overthrow of the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua in violation of the
congress legislative statement of 1982.
Last week I supported an amendment
to delete $21 million for the covert war
against Nicaragua.
While the official purpose of U.S.
covert aid to Nicaraguan Contras is
the interdiction of the flow of arms
from Nicaragua to El Salvador, the ex-
press goal of the Contras is the over-
throw of the Sandinista government.
While it may be argued that the
mining of Nicaraguan ports will help
to interdict the flow of arms between
Nicaragua and El Salvador, the effect
Of the mining goes beyond this limited
goal. Mines are blind to the cargo and
nag of the vessels that trigger them,
damaging commercial vessels as easily
as those transporting Soviet and
Cuban armaments. I am concerned
that our actions in and around Nicara-
gua have dangerous repercussions
beyond our stated goals, and that our
present involvement is contrary to the
stated intent of Congress. The Con-
gress has not declared -war against
Nicaragua, yet the mining of another
nation's harbors, like support for a
group whose expressed objective is the
overthrow of a government with
which we have full diplomatic rela-
tions, may be interpreted as an act of
war.
If it is the will of American people to
wage, either directly or indirectly, a
war against the Government of Nica-
ragua, let Congress debate and so de-
clare its intent. If it is not the intent
of the United States to overthrow the
Government of Nicaragua, let us not
engage in support of activities that
may be interpreted as acts of war.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to
state my strong support for Senator
KENNEDY'S amendment?and to voice
my strong opposition to administra-
tion policy. American participation in
the mining of Nicaragua's harbors is
more than a mere contravention of in-
? ternational law. It constitutes a policy
that is strategically wrong, politically
stupid, and morally outrageous. It is a
policy that comes dangerously close to
being an act of war?and I say it is
time for Congress to bring it to a halt
Let there be no mistake about what
is at issue today. We are not talking
about whether the United States
should be involved in Central Amer-
ica?or about whether we should pro-
vide financial assistance to democratic
elements in that region. I have long
voiced my support for economic and
military help to the governments of El
Salvador and other central American
countries?and so have a majority of
my Senate colleagues. I have long
voiced my concern over Nicaragua's
seeming desire to export revolution in
that region?and so have a majority of
my Senate colleagues. Like you, I be-
lieve the United States has an obliga-
tion to encourage the voices of moder-
ation and democracy in Central Amer-
ica?and to discourage the forces of
tyranny and dictatorship.
But those goals are not at issue
today. What is at issue is the Reagan
administration's cavalier attitude
toward basic principles of internation-
al law. What is at issue is the adminis-
tration's continuing love affair with
gunboat diplomacy and the politics of
force. And what is at issue is the ad-
ministration's blatant disregard for
Congress role in the making of U.S.
foreign policy.
Apparently, Mr. Reagan thinks that
when .it comes to the use of military
force, the job of Congress is to keep its
eyes closed, its checkbook open, and
its mouth shut. He seems to think-that
it is all right to violate international
law and to spit in the eyes of our
allies, and he apparently expects Con-
gress to dutifully go along and do only
what we are told.
Well, I say enough is enough. I say
the time has come for us to stand up
and serve notice on this administra-
tion: to serve notice that we are not
content to be silent partners in a mis-
guided policy that ignores our national
interests and betrays our national
principles. Let us serve notice that
when American lives are at stake, Con-
gress can no longer be expected to
first look the other way?and then to
rally round this administration's fail-
ures.
By directing the CIA to participate
in the mining of Nicaragua's harbors,
the Reagan administration has embar-
rassed the Congress and the country.
It has put us in the ridiculous position
of laying mines that our Western Eu-
ropean allies may help to remove. It
has put us in the preposterous posi-
tion of attempting to topple at worst
or bully at best a government we rec-
ognize and with whom we have diplo-
matic relations. And it puts us in the
hypocritical position of opposing state-
sponsored terrorism when it is direct-
ed against our friends?and of condon-
ing and even conducting it when it is
directed against our real or imagined
enemies.
Finally, Mr. President. let me say
that I am deeply concerned about
what this latest action by the adminis-
tration may signal about its future for-
eign policy intentions. I need not
remind you that the mining operation
was carried out without the knowledge
of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
I need not remind you that virtually
our entire foreign policy in Central
America?from the use of training
funds to build military infrastructure
in Honduras to the not-so-secret war
in Nicaragua to the mining of that
country's harbors?has been conduct-
ed outside the normal policymaking
framework of this Nation. And I am
sure I need not remind you that just
this past weekend, unidentified White
House advisers were darkly warning
about the probable use of U.S. combat
troops in Central America?although
not until 1985 and not until this year's
election has safely passed.
Mr. President, I believe there is a
pattern here?and I believe we must
show the administration that we find
It to be completely unacceptable.
Again. I am not calling for a retreat
from our responsibilities in Central
America. Nor am I suggesting that
there are no circumstances under
which the use of force in that region
-would be acceptable. But I am suggest-
ing that no US. foreign policy?in
that region or any other?can be sue-
eessful unless it has the support of
Congress and the American people. I.
am suggesting that it is time we call a
halt to the administration's high-
handed attitude and underhanded tac-
tics. And I am suggesting that it is
time Congress asserted its rightful
place in the making of American for-
eign policy?and stopped the wrongful
mining of Nicaraguan harbors. I ask
my colleagues to give this amendment
their wholehearted and enthusiastic
support.
YINING NICARAGUAN HARBORS
Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President,
the disclosure of the mining of Nicara-
guan harbors by the CIA has raised
the most serious questions about U.S
policy and the effectiveness of the in-
telligence oversight process. It is very
disturbing that the Select Committee
on Intelligence was not fully and prop-
erly informed of this matter, which
was so clearly and directly relevant to
our consideration of the .recent supple-
mental appropriations bill to provide
additional funds for CIA operations in
Nicaragua.
Had I been aware of the mining ac-
tivities, I would have voted against any
funds for that purpose. That knowl-
edge would also have given cause for
me to reconsider my support of the
supplemental appropriation for the
entire operation.
The records of the Select Committee
have been reviewed, and we have
found only one reference to mining ac-
tivities. It did not convey the nature,
extent, or seriousness of what has
been going on.
It is very important for all of us to
understand why the mining of Nicara-
guan harbors is so objectionable. The
fundamental problem is that it is in-
discriminate. rather than directed
against specific targets. I could sup-
port action to interdict a particular
vessel known to be carrying arms to
Nicaragua that could reasonably be
expected to go to guerrillas in El Sal-
vador. That action could be justified
as necessary to protect El Salvador
from outside-military intervention.
However, the mining operations that
have been carried out are far differ-
ent. They pose a danger to ships from
entirely innocent countries, carrying
nonmilitary cargo. Our closest allies,
such as Britain and Prance, have had
their ships and the lives of their citi-
zens placed in jeopardy. Moreover, in-
nocent fishing boats manned entirely
by civilians earning their livelihood
are placed in danger.
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It makes no difference if the mines
are constructed so as not to sink the
ships. They still do damage to proper-
ty and endanger human lives.
Over the past year I have tried to
work with my colleagues on the Select
:Committee to insure that the adminis-
tration's operations against Nicaragua
would be subject to the closest possi-
-ble oversight scrutiny and review. Un-
fortunately, the oversight process has
not worked in this case to keep the
committee fully and currently in-
formed of all significant anticipated
Intelligence activities, as contemplated
by the congressional oversight provi-
sions enacted in 1980.
We need to learn from this experi-
ence. The risk of the type of paramili-
tary operations undertaken against
Nicaragua appears to be that they in-
evitably get out of control. The Select
Committee has attempted, in a biparti-
san way, to prevent this from happen-
ing. We will continue to do all-that we
can to insure that the administration's
use of the CIA's sensitive capabilities
Is held accountable through congres-
sional oversight to the principles and
interests of the American people.
? Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I am
convinced that the vast majority of
the American people could be de-
scribed as political moderates. They
tend to distrust both the extremism of
the right and of the left. They do not
want government to be so active that
It stifles individual initiative but they
do not want it to be so inactive that it
fails either to protect equal opportuni-
ty of all citizens or to provide for
those who are unable to help them-
selves.
In foreign policy they are not naive
isolationists who would concede our
vital interests in the world to our ad-
versaries. Neither are they reckless in-
terventionists who would squander our
power carelessly in situations which
we cannot win or which needlessly en-
danger the lives of our young people.
Our country has been well served by
the commonsense and sound moderate
judgment of our people. It has gener-
ally been reflected in the ability of our
political leaders to form a consensus
around which most Americans could
rally both in terms of domestic and
foreign policy.
For moderates, however, these are
difficult and frustrating times. The
process for picking our national lead-
ers seems to favor those who tend to
the polar positions instead of those
closer to the reasonable mainstream of
the total population.
Our sense of community has been
fragmenting. More energy is spent in
appealing to narrow single-interest
groups than in uniting all Americans
for the common good. Too much time
is spent in scoring partisan political
points than in forming nonpartisan co-
alitions to solve problems.
The moderate majority is often left
to select the lesser of evils among ex-
treme choices. The current situation is
an example of just that kind of dilem-
ma.
As my colleagues in the Senate
know, I earnestly hope for a bipartisan
consensus on foreign policy. To me,
.politics ideally should stop at the
water's edge. Each of the 535 Members
of Congress cannot be Secretary of
State or Commander in Chief. If Con-
gress secondguesses every decision by
a President, we will send an uncertain
signal to the rest of the world.
Others around the world have come
to wonder about the ability of the
President to speak for the United
States. Even our allies publically ques-
tion our ability to live up to our com-
mitments. Our frequent changes of di-
rection have left our credibility in
doubt. Our family fights have been
watched by the entire world.
To be perfectly honest, neither the
President nor the Congress, Demo-
crats nor Republicans, can be very
proud of the record of the last decade
when it comes to healing the wounds
of the sixties and building a spirit of
bipartisanship in foreign policy. The
President was not fair in blaming Con-
gress for the failure of the administra-
tion's policy in Lebanon. It was a
flawed policy in the beginning. Inject-
ing a small number of American
troops into a long, bitter, religious war
among several factions would not have
succeeded even if Congress had voted
unanimously to support it.
On the other hand, there were those
in Congress who were too quick to
criticize the President when he took
decisive and appropriate action to use
our power to protect our interests in,
Grenada. The objective was limited
and the chances for success were ex-
cellent.
Some have used the Vietnam t xperi-
ence to argue for complete isolation-
ism. They seem prepared to criticize
any possible use of American power,
under any circumstances or in any
part of the world. Such a policy would
render the United States impotent in
the eyes of the world. It would encour-
age our adversaries to test us and
would increase the risk of conflicts.
As I said earlier, I believe that the
vast majority of the American people
reject this naive isolationsim which is
in short a policy of international capit-
ulation.
I cannot believe that the American
people want us to simply give up Cen-
tral America and allow regional insta-
bility in our own backyard to move
ever closer to our I,800-mile frontier
with Mexico.
On the other hand, if we reject isola-
tionism, we must not embrace reckless
interventionism.
I have tried to follow a moderate bi-
partisan course. Last week, I voted
consistently against amendments
which I felt would unduly tie the
hands of the President in responding
to emergencies in Central America. I
voted against amendments which I felt
would set unwise precedents altering
April 10, 1984
the President's constitutional powers
as Commander in Chief.
I voted to support administration ef-
forts in El Salvador to help the people
there help themselves. As an observer
to recent elections in that country. I
am convinced that they were basically
fair and honest. I have no doubt that
the vast majority of the people there
'want the ballot and not the bullet to
determine their future. Their demo-
cratic process deserves our encourage-
ment and support.
While the outcome is far from cer-
tain, it would appear that there is at
least a chance that El Salvador may be
winnable. To me, the administration
seems correct in wanting to give our
best effort to attempt to stabilize the
situation there.
In Nicaragua, the situation is less
clear. The legacy of the past dictato-
rial government has clearly created
some significant support for the cur-
rent government. While it has been a
close question in my mind, I voted to
continue our efforts in Nicaragua
aimed at stopping the flow of arms to
hostile forces in other nations.
I have clearly done my best to build
bipartisan support for a reasonable
policy in Central America. We must
test every aspect of that policy by
weighing the moral issues involved
and by carefully balancing the risks of
the policy against the chance for suc-
cess. To me it is clearly moral and in
our interest to attempt to support the
democratic process in El Salvador.
It is at least possible to argue that it
Is proper for us to interdict by practi-
cal means the flow of aggressive arms
from Nicaragua.
The indiscriminate mining of Nicara-
guan harbors in my opinion, however,
clearly fails the test. It is subject to
attack on moral grounds. It clearly
runs grave risks because of the danger
It can Cause to ships of many nations,
some of whom are allied to us. It could
cause a major international confronta-
tion if it resulted in loss of life of for-
eign nationals. While this tactic runs
grave risks, they are certainly not bal-
anced by any significant gain which is
achievable by using it.
I deeply regret that this action has
been taken. By resorting to careless
use of our resources, the administra-
tion has at least in the short run only
strengthened the position of those
who would criticize what I believe are
legitimate uses of our power in other
areas in Central America.
My conscience and best judgment-
lead me to support the pending sense,
of the Senate amendment which con-
demns the mining of Nicaraguan har-
bors.
In reaching this decision, it should
be clear that I do not embrace any
policy of retreat or isolationism in
Central America. Perhaps this current
state of events will make it absolutely
clear to both Congress and the Presi-
- dent that we should urgently get on
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April 10, 1984 CONGRESSION AL RECORD ?SENATE S 4201
with the task of developing a biparti-
san policy.
Let us hope that America's moderate
majority will make itself heard. It is
time for both Congress and the Presi-
dent to call a moratorium on the esca-
lating rhetoric. We must forget past
differences and sit down together. I
hope that the President and congres-
sional leaders of both parties will sit
down together and in candor and good
faith resolve their differences. Volun-
tarily agreeing to accept the congres-
sional -view that the mining of the
harbor should be stopped would be a
good first step on the part of the
President. If he should take that step,
Jet us hope that Congress would also
be prepared to respond, positively..
vs. INVOLVEMENT OF NICARAGUAN TERRITORIAL
WATERS
Mr. JEPSEN. Mr. President, last
week, the Senate voted on several as-
pects of military 'aid to Central Amer-
ica in the context of the urgent sup-
plemental appropriations bill. Among
the areas that were extensively de-
bated, was the question of so-called
covert aid to the Contras in Nicaragua.
As the record shows, I have supported
funding the amounts requested by the
administration for these activities.
However, my support has been con-
tingent on several' principles involved
with our aid to those groups within
Nicaragua who are fighting to push
Nicaragua back toward the path of a
democratic and free society.
These principles included:
That the main goal of the funding
was the interdiction of military sup-
plies flowing from Nicaragua to the
guerrillas in El Salvador.
That the aid be used to help only
Nicaraguan nationals in their struggle
against the Sandinista government.
That the aid not compromise the
commitment of the United States to
bringing about the rule of law in inter-
national relations.
Over the weekend, I began to read
stories in the press of much more
direct 'U.S. involvement in the contra
operations that may, in my view,
jeopardize ? everything that we have
been attempting to accomplish there. I
speak specifically of the reports of
direct CIA involvement in the efforts
to mine the territorial waters off Nica-
ragua.
When I read such reports, I am in-
creasingly skeptical of the ability of
some policymakers in the administra-
tion to develop successful strategies to
deal with the growing number of chal-
lenges to the United States in the
world.
Now I number myself in that group
who want to put maximum pressure
on the Sandinistas to fulfill the prom-
ises that they made to the OAS and to
stop shipping military arms and am-
munition to the guerrillas in El Salva-
dor. Cuban and Nicaraguan interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of the
duly-elected Government in El Salva-
dor is the major stumbling block to
peaceful resolution of the many con-
Diets in that country. Seen in the light
of what we are trying to do in Central
America, this most recent operation
off of Nicaragua is plain dumb.
If viewed strictly in the light of
narrow logistical and operational con-
siderations, mining the coastal waters
off Nicaragua may seem attractive as
one way to put additional pressure on
the Sandinistas. But if political and
social factors are taken into considera-
tion, the plan should have been reject-
ed. To consider that political and
social concerns would be bypassed by
keeping such a large-scale operation
"covert" shows an ignorance of history
and an inordinate dose of wishful
thinking.
If there is any relationship between
reality and what I have been reading
In the press, and I will be first to
admit that the relationship is not
always there, the U.S. involvement in
the mining of Nicaraguan coastal
waters violates many of the basic prin-
ciples on which "covert operations"
have been supported in Congress.
The best way to view the mining op-
eration is to set up a balance sheet of.
costs and benefits. The benefits that
the Contra mining could be expected
to accrue are the following:
Mining the waters of Nicaragua
would seriously damage the ability of
Nicaragua to export her recently har-
vested commodities that are virtually
the sole resource of foreign exchange.
The result of this could be to stop the
arms shipments to El Salvador and to
fulfill the promises they made to the
OAS.
Slowing the importation of oil could
have the long-term effect of hamper-
ing the Sandinistas ability to carry out
military operations against the Con-
tras.
It appears that mining is being con-
ducted in such a way as to stop short
of sinking large ships, but merely
serves as a deterrent to ships heading
for Nicaraguan ports.
Against these so-called plusses a con-
siderably greater number of minuses
can be set.
Because of the sophisticated nature
of the operation, U.S. citizens and non-
Nicaraguan nationals hired by the CIA
appear to be directly involved. This is
an essential change in our role in Nica-
ragua.
Our open society and the size of the
operation has virtually guaranteed a
leak to the press.
Participation in the act of mining
the territorial waters of another coun-
try is considered an "act of war" in the
international community.
Damaging third party shipping
raises serious questions about the U.S.
commitment to freedom of the seas.
Once again the star of the Sandinis-
tas is rising in Western Europe as
world sympathy is aroused by our ac-
tions. There are now even discussions
among our allies about helping to
clear the mines from Nicaraguan
waters.
This latest action has given the
Nicaraguans the very limited amount
of credibility they needed to bring a
case against the United States to the
World Court, the same body that we
appealed to to obtain the release of
American hostages in Teheran.
As a result, we have had to formally
declare that we will no longer accept
the jurisdiciton of the World Court in
matters involving the United States.
We have given the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment an open opportunity to blame
the United States for an economic fail-
ure that is in reality the fault of mis-
management by the Sandinistas.
The long-term effects of our involve-
ment in the mining of Nicaraguan
waters will be hard to predict, but we
should terminate a policy which has
and will continue to undermine our
credibility in the international arena.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi-
dent, this is' a most painful of occa-
sions. For at least 5 years, many of us
have been trying to help our executive
branch forge a workable policy on
Central America. Our progress has
been difficult and slow. Now, in the
last few years, we may be witnessing
the unraveling of what little policy
there was.
Faced with this crisis?and for once
there is a crisis?the Senate has a re-
sponsibility. Our role must be to
rescue American policy from its own
excesses. We must not be the wrecking
crew, but the salvage team.
The mining of Nicaraguan harbors
Illustrates the complexity of any activ-
ist foreign policy. It is one thing to
decide on the broad outlines of such a
policy?the one will engage in covert
action in Nicaragua, for example, or
that one will attempt to interdict arms
flows into El Salvador. It is quite an-
other thing, however, to implement
that decision successfully.
I can understand why the executive
branch would want to mine Nicara-
guan harbors. Despite the doubts of
my colleague, the senior Senator from
Massachusetts, one might well feel
that mining harbors was one way to
stem the flow of arms from Cuba to
Nicaragua, and from there into El Sal-
vador. One might also hope that eco-
nomic pressure on the Nicaraguan
Government would lead that govern-
ment to consider making its peace
with its neighbors, with the United
States, and especially with its own
people, so many of whom fought for
Nicaragua in 1979 and are now fight-
ing for the Contras.
Presidents and executive branches
seem less inclined to consider the
downside of their policies. In their
quest for activist solutions, they are
hardly eager to ponder whether a
tactic will actually do more harm than
good.
The difficulty of combining a covert
action policy with reasonable tactics
has been present from the very start.
When we first heard about this pro-
gram, many of us wondered whether
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covert action would?either by design
or by accident?become an effort to
overthrow the Government of Nicara-
gua. That risk was inherent in a policy
of support for the Contras, as my able
colleague, the senior Senator from
Maine, so eloquently explained .last
night.
As a result of these concerns, the
Boland amendment was passed in
1982. Over the ensuing months, many
people became convinced that the
overthrow of the Sandinistas was,
indeed, our psalicy.
I did not, and do not, share that con-
cern. We on the Intelligence Commit-
tee have had many briefings on the
covert action program. We have sent
staff members to get more material.
And both Members and staff have
made trips to the region. On the basis
of all that material, I am convinced
that the executive branch?and, in
particular, the CIA?are faithfully
obeying the Boland amendment.
I am also convinced, Mr. President,
that the policies and actions of the
Government of Nicaragua fully war-
rant a strong response. As I noted last
week, even Democratic and left-of-
center elements in Central America
fear the aggressive policies of Nicara-
gua. They see the Sandinistas not as
reformers, or even as revolutionaries,
but rather as the prime supporters of
terrorist and guerrilla violence in the
region.
We must stand up to Nicaragua, and
our objectives are surely honorable:
An end to Sandinista support for for-
eign terrorism and guerrillas; a slicing
down of Nicaragua's frightening mili-
tary buildup; a fond farewell to Soviet
and Cuban advisers in Central Amer-
ica; and a return to the pluralist
system that the Sandinistas originally
promised to the people of Nicaragua.
What is less certain, in this complex
enterprise, is whether the implementa-
tion of our covert action policy has
been rational or effective. Last year,
we were faced with reports of Contras
slitting the throats of teachers and
other civilians, and the Contras
seemed more concerned with showing
the press what the Nicaraguan moun-
tains were like than with undertaking
actions that would rally local support
or interdict arms flows.
So last year the Intelligence Com-
mittee told the President to rethink
this program and to draft a new, more
coherent finding that would set forth
objectives and approaches to achieving
those objectives. This was done last
fall, and I think it was done well. The
last year has seen less Contra grand-
standing, apparently less reliance
upon former Somocistas, and even
some operations against targets that
seem to be part of the Nicaraguan sup-
port chain for guerrillas in El Salva-
dor.
On two points, however, I am sorely
disappointed. One is the continuing
-gap between policies to pressure Nica-
ragua and policies to resolve the con-
flict. The other is the most recent evo-
lution in our policy.
The gap between activist policies to
pressure a country and efforts to
settle disputes is an old one. What is
sad is how little we learn from the
past. For example, surely history
teaches us that the chances for real
negotiation are often fleeting, and
that such chances are pot to be dis-
missed. But what happened when the
United States invaded Grenada? There
was an initial period in which Fidel
Castro, rightly frightened by-this suc-
cessful U.S. activism, counseled cau-
tion to his proteges in Nicaragua. The
Sandinistas, in turn, showed true con-
cern -over U.S. intentions and gave
hints of flexibility.
Did we take advantage of that brief
opening? Perhaps I blinked, Mr. Presi-
dent, and did not see it. What I did see
was a policy that kept up the pressure
with military maneuvers and construc-
tion in Honduras, but did not combine
that pressure with active efforts to de-
termine what sort of accommodation
the Sandinistas might be willing to
make with their neighbors, with us, or
with their own people.
Now it is harder. Now Nicaragua is
'moving toward elections?not truly
free elections, but close enough to fool
much of the world; not elections that
give their people a real chance to
reject Marxism-Leninism, but timed
just before our own elections so that
we will be too preoccupied to deal ef-
fectively with this challenge.
Now we are in the aMazing fix of
having some Contra groups offering to
lay down their arms if a truly free
election could be guaranteed, even
though there are important other ob-
jectives to be gained as well. Now we
have the most respected Members of
the Democratic opposition to the San-
dinistas refusing to participate in the
elections, even though most of the
world is likely to view those elections
as valid. Now we see the Democratic
forces in Nicaragua weak and divided,
even though the daily flow of Nicara-
guans into neighboring lands and
Contra camps suggests that the people
of Nicaragua might well reject their
current masters in a free election.
And what do we see in the mining of
Nicaraguan harbors? Does anybody be-
lieve, Mr. President, that the executive
branch gave a thought to allied reac-
tion when British and Dutch ships
were struck by mines? Does anybody
believe that the executive branch con-
sidered, before it went ahead, that
Nicaragua might go to the U.N. Secu-
rity Council and the World Court to
gain a propaganda victory? Is there
any sign that the executive branch
ever considers how its own credibility
with Congress is damaged when it does
something like this and does not even
tell the committee that is defending
its policy on the floor of the Senate?
Most importantly, Mr. President,
one wonders whether Presidents and
their aides appreciate how each inept
exercise of power, of which this is cer-
tainly one, erodes their credibility
with the American people. This is not
the first executive branch to squander
that precious coin. But when, one won-
ders, when will they learn?
It was Thomas Jefferson who re-
quired us all to observe "a decent re-
spect to the opinions of mankind."
Now that was not a call for inaction.
Rather, it was a call for coherent
-- policy, cogently presented. But as the
senior Senator from New York might
well have said in our colloquy last
week, a confusing newspaper interview
will not measure up to the Declaration
of Independence. And the Kissinger
report, which is the closest thing we
have to a coherent statement of Cen-
tral America policy, is all but ignored
by policymakers who mistakenly see
activism as only a short-term thing.
Mr. President, I have given condi-
tional support for the provision of
funds for the Nicaragua covert action
program, despite my misgivings. Be-
cause I see good reasons to keep some
pressure on the Government of Nica-
ragua to change its policies, I voted
with the executive branch to defeat
four amendments on Nicaragua last
week, as well as one on Honduras and
eight on El Salvador. But it makes no
sense to support a self-defeating tactic,
and that is what the mining of Nicara-
guan harbors has become.
Our unseemly flight from World
Court jurisdiction is just one sign, but
perhaps the most telling sign, that the
mining tactic is a colossal loser. We all
know that other countries break inter-
national norms. Nicaragua's indiffer-
ence to the norm of leaving one's
neighbors alone is the reason that we
began this covert action in the first
place. But international law exists to
put limits on our behavior, even when
we are in conflict with others, in order
to preserve certain standards that
benefit us all.
And we, Mr. President, are the ones
who almost always benefit from inter-
national law. The World Court is not a
pack of guerrillas, or even a conclave
of liberation theologists. It is the
guardian of international standards
and tradition. It stands, very largely,
for what we believe in. So when the
United States runs away from the
court, we run away from those who
would hold us to our own standards of
conduct.
Such policy is foolishness, Mr. Presi-
dent, short-sighted foolishness. It
gives the appearance of arrogance,
even though I suspect that it is much
more the product of haste and des-
peration. And the great pity is that it
Is unnecessary, a feckless aberration to
shore up an unwise tactic that serves a
policy that?ironically?Ls still worth
saving.
What shall we do in such a situa-
tion? What shall we save, and how?
First, Mr. President, let us clearly
state that this is not the fault of the
CIA. The Central Intelligence' Agency
has been the faithful servant of our
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could be considered an act of war.
Moreover, the President has empha-
sized that he Would not rule out the
use of U.S. military force to respond to
such an eventuality.
How can the United States have this
policy with respect to Iran's threats
while we act in a similar way by
mining Nicaragua's waters?
To make an already bad situation
even worse, the administration now
says that it will ignore the World
Court's jurisdiction over matters re-
ferred to it involving U.S. actions in
the region.
Although it may be technically legal
for the United States not to accept
World Court jurisdiction in matters in-
volving Central America, such an
action?taken in response to informa-
tion that Nicaragua is about to bring
charges against the United States?
makes a mockery of the rule of law.
However, there is a constraint
against the administration's action re-
garding World Court jurisdiction, a
constraint it has violated. In August
1946, the United States accepted com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In a
report to the 79th Congress, the
Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions unanimously said:
policymakers. The CIA has imple-
mented its covert action very careful-
ly, with due attention to the Boland
amendment even before it was passed.
They may make mistakes from time to
time; they may have yet to learn how
to keep the Intelligence Committee up
to date on what is happening. But the
CIA is not responsible for policy-
makers who will not coordinate covert
action with other elements of policy.
The CIA is not the agency that is sup-
posed to seize the opportunities that
overt or covert actions provide, to seek
g resolution of conflict. If we can bring
about a more rational policy, the CIA
will serve that policy as well.
Second, Mr. President, and here I
speak to my colleagues who join me in
concern over the mining issue, let us
not jettison a whole policy just be-
cause one aspect is ill-conceived. If we
end the mining?and I think that we
would be well advised to do just that?
there will still be extremely troubling
arms flows into Nicaragua and El Sal-
vador. If we end the covert action?
and I think it would be wrong to do
that at this time?there will still be
Sandinista interference in its neigh-
bors' affairs, while Nicaragua will still
lack the freedoms that the Sandinistas
promised nearly 5 years ago.
Let us tell the executive branch that
Congress would end this self-defeating
tactic of mining harbors, especially
when the mines affect our friends as
much as our foes, threatening civilian
cargoes as much as military ones. Let
us tell the executive branch that Con-
gress would not run from World Court
jurisdiction, like some criminal jump-
ing bail. Let us encourage the execu-
tive branch, instead, to make the best
case we can in both the World Court
and the court of world opinion, for
there is quite a case to be made that
Nicaragua's support for guerrillas and
terrorists warrants countermeasures.
Finally, Mr. President, let us call
upon the President and the executive
branch?loudly, if necessary?to get
our Central America policy in order.
Let us call for a true coordination of
means and objectives, for a policy that
will recognize the need for flexibility
in implementation and will not merely
push forward, willy-nilly, when the
possible adverse consequences of our
facts are so great. This President has
shown great sophistication on so many
Issues, from social security to working
out budget compromises, that I am
sure he can bring that same skill to
our Central America policy. I truly
look forward to that great day.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the
simple and plainly visible truth about
our covert assistance to the Nicara-
guan Contras is that the chief use to
which it is being put?an attempt to
overthrow the Government of Nicara-
gua?violates U.S. and international
law. That is -a clear and undisputable
fact, evident to anyone who looks at
the record.
What the Reagan administration is
doing in Nicaragua is discrediting the
United States in the eyes of all those
who we ask to believe in respect fpr
the law.
It is undermining our efforts to call
the attention of the world and of our
own people to the fact of international
terrorism, and to condemn and combat
it.
In short, our covert assistance to the
Contras is destroying our credibility.
It is not difficult to see why.
This program, as it is being operat-
ed, violates article 2(4) of the Charter
of the United Nations, a multilateral
treaty ratified by the Senate. This
treaty prohibits the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity
or independence of any state.
It also violates article 15 of the
Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, of which we and Nicaragua
are members. That treaty was also
ratified by this body. Article 15 bans
direct or indirect intervention in the
internal affairs of any member state.
As established by our Constitution,
all treaties made under the authority
of the United States are the law of our
land. A violation of such a treaty?
such as the U.N. and OAS charters?is
a violation of U.S. law. Our Govern-
ment has violated both of those trea-
ties and has broken our own law.
Moreover, in 1982 Congress enacted
a law prohibiting the use of funds by
the Central Intelligence Agency or the
Department of Defense "to furnish
military equipment, military training,
or advice, or other support for military
activities to any group or individual
not part of a country's armed forces,
for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of Nicaragua or provok-
ing a military exchange between Nica-
ragua and Honduras."
That is the law of this country. Yet
we are providing arms and money,
training and guidance to the Nicara-
guan Contras whose publicly professed
goal is to overthrow the Government
of Nicaragua.
In the past few weeks President
Reagan has made such ambigious and
conflicting statements on our objec-
tives in Nicaragua that the majority
leader last week was impelled, under
the obvious pressure of then-pending
votes on this matter, to get the Presi-
dent's views in writing.
Despite this last-minute attempt at
clarification, what is and remains clear
is that the administration's actions in
Nicaragua violate American law.
The direct participation of the CIA
In mining several harbors of Nicara-
gua, publicly disclosed late last week,
aggrevates the situation and makes
the U.S. action even more plainly il-
legal. Mining a harbor is an act of war
and a violation of international law.
Let us not forget that Iran, in recent
months, has threatened to shut off
the Persian Gulf by mining the Straits
of Hormuz and its approaches. Repeat-
edly, President Reagan has expressed
his view that such action by Iran in-
volving these international waters
would violate international law and
The resolution provides that the declara-
tion should remain in force for a period of
five years and thereafter until six months
following notice of termination. The decla-
ration might, therefore, remain in force in-
definitely.
The report then continued?and this
Is the key sentence:
The provision for six months' notice of
termination after the five-year period has
the effect of a renunciation of any intention
to withdraw our obligation in the face of a
threatened legal proceeding.
It is clear from this report that in
accepting the World Court's jurisdic-
tion, we relinquished any right to
withdraw our acceptance as a result of
the bringing of a particular legal pro-
ceeding against us?as Nicaragua said
it will do on the harbor mining issue.
The administration's announced inten-
tion where the Court is concerned
thus directly disregards and trans-
gresses a fundamental commitment
embodied in the Senate's ratification
resolution and in our acceptance of
the Court's authority.
All of this amounts to cynicism
beyond any we have seen to date by
our Government in its actions and
statements in Central America.
What are we to make of this flouting
of law, of the intent of the Congress,
of the will of the people of this coun-
try, and of common sense?
What are we to believe when our
Government, stung by the death of
hundreds of U.S. marines in the
Middle East at the hands of terrorists,
nonetheless continues its support of
terrorists engaged in killing, in indus-
trial and economic sabotage, and in
the mining of the ports in Nicaragua?
Have we become a nation to whom the
ends justify any and all means?
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S 4204 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE ? April 10, 1984
Mr. President, there are many who,
faced with the facts and with the con-
tradictions between the words and the
deeds of our Government in Central
America, are now coming forward to
question, to criticize and to doubt. I
call on them to demonstrate that
there is no disparity between their
own words and deeds. The answer to
the questions I have asked here today,
in other words, lies in a vote to sup-
port their amendment to stop the
unwise, unnecessary, and illegal
mining of Nicaraguan ports.
Mr. DENTON. Mr. President, I fully
understand the concern that many of
my colleagues have about the issue
that has been raised by the Senator
from Massachusetts. At the same time,
however, I am grievously disturbed by
the tendency of many of my col-
leagues to rush to judgment on this
issue, as on many other contentious
issues of foreign and defense policy.
One thing that life teaches, both per-
sonal life and public life, is that deci-
sions made hastily and in heat are bad
decisions more often than not.
I have spoken on this floor on many
occasions about the evils that ensue
when we try to conduct our foreign
policy with 535 Secretaries of State,
when one is sufficient to the chal-
lenge. It is all the more the case be-
cause that one is probably better in-
formed and advised about the details
of our foreign relations than are all
the 535 others taken together.
We forget, in our debates in this
body, that we derive our position from
a constitutional system that has
served our country well for nearly 200
years. It is a system that gives the
Senate of the United States a particu-
lar position of power, Mr. President.
but also one of responsibility, Mr.
President, of responsibility.
The Senate has power and responsi-
bility to oversee the conduct of foreign
affairs, to provide advice and consent,
but the Constitution confers upon the
President the authority and the re-
sponsibility to conduct the foreign re-
lations of our country. Indeed it man-
dates that he do so. We in the Senate
tread upon dangerous, dangerous
ground when we interfere with the au-
thority and the responsibility of the
President. When we decide to do, and
it should be rarely, it should be cooly,
after careful study, consideration, and
examination of all the information
that we can obtain.
The amendment before us has none
of the hallmarks of such a process. It
can do nothing other than to serve as
an outlet for emotion and to send a
message. Unfortunately, it would send
a message to the. wrong people.
I hope that we have the good sense,
Mr. President, to realize that the mes-
sage will be conveyed primarily to
those who seek to exploit our division
and our distress, that it will cheer our
enemies and dishearten our friends,
that it will confuse and dismay the
American people, that it will promote
no good but that it will precipitate
great harm. For that reason alone, al-
though there are other reasons, we
should defeat it.
Mr. President, I understand the seri-
ousness of the issue. I am willing, if
that is the will of the body, to engage
in factfinding, in analysis, in debate,
and in legislation about our policy in
Central America. If we are to do that,
however, let us do it properly, guided
not by our emotions or by the partisan
attractions of an election year but by
our responsibilities as Senators and as
elected leaders of our country. I urge
my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle, colleagues whom I know are
thoughtful, serious, and responsible
Senators, to lay aside the temptation
to vent emotion, and to defeat the
amendment before us.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am
deeply worried about our country's ac-
tions and policies regarding Nicaragua.
The reports that we are responsible
for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors
and territorial waters cause me deep
concern. These actions are shortsight-
ed and ultimately self-defeating.
We have responsibilities in Central
America. We have a responsibility to
help those countries that desire and
request our help. We have a responsi-
bility to aid El Salvador to achieve sta-
bility and conduct meaningful free
elections. But, our reported actions
toward Nicaragua are not a fulfillment
of our responsibility, but rather an ab-
rogation of that responsibility.
Our responsibility as a nation and as
a member of the world community is
to adhere to the rule of law. Partici-
pating in the mining of the waters of a
nation with which we are not at war is
not adhering to the rule of law.
Our Nation can no longer hide
behind the fiction that we are simply
funding people who may have a differ-
ent ultimate goal than we do. We can
no longer hide behind the fiction that
we are not actively responsible for ac-
tions that are judged by many to be an
act tantamount to war.
Our responsibility is to meet the le-
gitimate needs of our friends in the
region. Mining the harbors and terri-
torial waters of a nation with which
we have full diplomatic relations is not
the legitimate way to do it. Indeed, it
is ultimately counterproductive.
Such actions confirm the worst fears
of our friends in the region and in the
rest of the world. Not only do they vio-
late our best traditions and aspira-
tions, they ignore history.
This heavy-handed behavior will not
help us achieve our goal of a stable
region free of Soviet influence. It will
only gradually reduce our own influ-
ence. We should step Up to our respon-
sibility and adopt this amendment.
UNDERMINING UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN
FRIENDSHIP
? Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, the
failure of the United States to notify
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and
other Central and South American
countries that we were providing the
Mines and assisting in laying them in
Nicaraguan harbors will especially
hurt our relations with our friends
and trading partners of this hemi-
Sphere. There should be a special re-
sponsibility to them stemming from
the Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Treaty,
and the Organization of American
States. This action of participating in
mining harbors in a country where
their ships might be damaged is an-
other blow to common neighborliness
that has brought U.S. policies toward
Latin American countries in ill repute
as a callous disregard of their vital in-
terests.
The stated policy of the Contadora
groups?Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
and Panama?has been to dissuade the
United States from military action in
Central America. Other Latin Ameri-
can countries have quietly expressed
similar views. This comes at a time
when most Latin American countries
are hard pressed economically and are
attempting to work out conditions for
loans through the International Mon-
etary Fund and private banks, many
of which are American. It takes cour-
age for them to voice objections to ad-
ministration policies.
To have ships from their country
damaged by the mines the United
States made and assisted in laying in
Nicaraguan harbors is adding insult to
injury. This is a serious act of war. In
my judgement it is wrong.
Not to notify friends and allies is a
serious blunder admitted even by
many who approve the action.
Whatever else can be said?and
there is a great deal more that will be
said?the sum and substance of the
blunder is that the administration
cannot defend its action. Unless the
President wants to ask for a declara-
tion of war, the best thing he can do
now is to order the CIA to hire the re-
moval of each and everyone of the
mines.
The President can give the order to
the CIA overtly or covertly. The
friends we have in this hemisphere
will be relieved.,
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. BAKER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader is recognized.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the mi-
nority leader needs time to conduct
his clearing process. In order to do
that, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
the PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. -President?
The PRESIDING Ok`FICE.R. The
minority leader.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, our
people have been contacted. We find
no objection.
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Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP86600269R001500190001-4
MEMORANDUM FOR:
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s 15350Approved For Releasstatn7aUSAlillie@MVERMINIV0001-4 December 18, Is&
The Army. as a matter of policy, does wish
to inform you that in 1983 It wiU consider
for conversion only vacant positions or
those technicians who volunteer for conver-
sion, and will not eliminate any technician
position as long as an Incumbent chooses to
remain in the technician program.
The Secretary of the Air Force.
... our proposal is not forcing any Invol-
untary conversions to full-time active duty.
Thus, we have minimized personnel turbu-
lence that might otherwise result. .
In summary, Mr. President, the
1,200 conversions scheduled for fiscal
year 1983 could save the Army Guard
and the Air Guard 2 percent and 3
percent respectively, and only vacant
positions and voluntary conversions
will be changed to full-time military
status.
I ask unarnious consent that the var-
ious documents to which reference has
been made be printed at this point in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
? [The material referred to will appear
in a subsequent issue of the RECORD.]
Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, I
want to express my concern over the
proposal of Senator THURMOND'S
amendment providing for the conver-
sion of 600 Air National Guard and
600 Army National Guard technicians
to full-time military positions. The
proposal has been considered by the
Appropriations Committee and found
to be flawed and they rejected it.
The Defense Appropriations Sub-
committee opposecLthe continued con-
version of civilian technicians to full-
time military positions. In its report
on the defense appropriations bill, the
committee said: - ?
The cost effectiveness of any additional
conversions ? ? ? is questionable in light of
the increased pay and allowances military
members now receive. Accordingly, the
Committee directs the Department to make
no further conversions. ? ? "
The committee also directed the be.
partment of Defense to increase civil-
ian manpower ceilings in the Army
and Air Force to fill these positions.
I have heard the arguments by the
proponents of converting civilian tech-
nician positions to military slots. They
say that it improves the Guard's capa-
bilities and makes the Guard units
more combat ready. That may be true,
but is it worth the additional money it
costs. The Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee says no, and I agree
with them.
I personally know many of the civil-
ian technicians who work for the Air
National Guard at Great Falls, Mont.,
during the week and serve in their al-
lotted weekend duties in the Air Na-
tional Guard. The same is true of civil-
ian technicians for the Army. They
are committed and capable people and
they 'serve us well. There is no need
that these positions be filled by full-
time military personneL
When I was first appraised of this
situation, I was told that the civilian
positions had been eliminated by the
Appropriations Committee and there-
fore it would be necessary to create an
equal number of full-time military ?
slots to keep the Guard's manpower
up to strength. However, that is not
the case. The Appropriations Commit-
tee directed the Defense Department
to raise the civilian manpower ceilings
to make sure that we had sufficient
numbers of civilian technicians availa-
ble for the Guard's mission. 1
The amendment seeks to convert ci-
vilian technician positions to full-time
military positions. I do not agree that
this is a wise policy, and it is likely
that the final decision of the confer-
ence committee considering the final
report will also reject amendment.
CONVIIISION OP NATIONAL GUARD rscnivicuns
SO PULL-TIM sin.rmaY posrriors
? Mr. =ON. Mr. President, I rise in
support of the amendment offered by
my colleague, the senior Senator from
South Carolina.
As we come to rely more and more
on our National Guard and Reserve
Forces, it is imperative that we en-
hance the readiness and deployability
of our Guard units. One way to accom-
plish this goal is to allow the limited
conversion of certain civilian techni-
cians to full-time zisilitary positions.
? I believe that we must maintain the
citizen-soldier concept of our National
Guard, Mr. President If I thought
that support of this amendment
would, in any way, endanger that con-
cept I would not be here today.
The plain and simple fact is that our
Army National Guard provides ap-
proximately 30 percent of the combat
divisions in our overall total Army
Force; '70 percent of the separate bri-
gades; 30 percent of our special forces
groups; 40 percent of our armor battal-
ions; and 60 percent of our field artil-
lery battalions.
Our ' Air National Guard provides
over 60 percent of our continental air
defense; about 20 percent of our tacti-
cal fighters; roughly 20 percent of our
aerial refueling; over 30 percent of
U.S. tactical air= and over 40 per-
cent of the tactical reconnstiance in
our total Air Force.
Mr. President, we-are today relying
on our Army and Air National Guard
as never before. These forces must be
ready to go to war on a moment's
notice. It is our job here in the Con-
gress to insure that they have the re-
sources?human as well as equip-
Inent?to get the job done. The full-
time manning program is one of those
resources which the Guard needs.
I urge the adoption of the amend-
ment.*
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who-
yields time?
Mr. HATFIELD Mr. President.. I
.yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. TuuktMOND, Mr. President. I
yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFET? etat.. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment.
The amendment (UP No. 1540) was
agreed to. -
Mr. HATFIELD Mr. President, l
move to reconsider the vote by which
the amendment was agreed to.
? Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President,
move to lay that motion on the table
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. HATFIELD: Mr. President, the
next order would be for the Senator
from Connecticut (Mr. Donn).
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, he
Is on his way to the Chamber. Be
should be here any moment?, -
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield to the Senator from Connecticut
for his amendment.
Mr. President, I only want to say,
first, that all Senators who have
amendments should be on the floor
because otherwise we are going to just
drop the Senator to the bottom of the
list and he will have to wait. We
cannot just wait around for Senators
to drift in. If .any Senator has an
amendment which has a unanimous
consent agreement, he should be on
the floor ready to take It up any
moment because some Senators are
withdrawing their amendments or
planning to withdraw their amend-
ments, and that means we drop down
to the next slot -
We are going to push this bill
through, and I am going to ask for
third reading if we have no amend-
ments.
P 45=14551M4T WO. 1541
To declare congressional support
for restrictions on certain types of oper-
ations in Central America.) .
Mr. 4.1MJL.P13. Mr. President, I send an
amenMi7t to the desk and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant_ legislative clerk read
as follow=
The Senator from Combed:kat-1mi: MOW'
proposes an unprinted amendment num-
bered 1541. ?
To the end of HJ. Res. 631, add a new sec-
t
"Sze. Congress hereby declares that nc
funds should be obligated or expended, di-
rectly or indirectly, after January 20, 198.
In support of Irregular military forces o-
paramilitary groups operating in. Centm.
America."
DODD. Mr. President, I thin'
this amendment speaks for itself l'o'
those who heard it read. Basically,
amounts to a policy declaration by tin
body that no funds should be expenr,
ed directly or indirectly in support o
paramilitary activities. operating
Central America.
I should say at the outset, Mr. Presi-
dent, that I offer this amendmen,
with a degree of reluctance. I wisl
there was a more proper vehicle which
would enable us to conduct a longez
and more detailed debate about what
consider to be a very importan
matter. - ?
Mr. President. I would prefer that
we were offering this at another time
when we had more than 30 minutes te
debate. It is what I consider to be one
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December 18, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
of the most pressing and threatening
foreign policy issues that this country
faces.
Mr. President, I offer this amend-
ment not because I am in any way in-
terested in simporting, defending, or
apologizing for Sandinistas in the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua or the Govern-
ment of Honduras, but because of my
deep concern of what I believe our
country is about to enmesh itself into
unwittingly. It is sort of a dela vu of
20-odd years ago when we began a sim-
ilar set of activities without the kind
of public, open debate about a set of
activities which eventually threw us
into a larger conflict
Had we then, at the outset, had a
better opportunity to - debate the
rationale for our original decisions, we
might have dealt with the larger issues
we confronted later more intelligently.
I happen to believe, Mr. President,
that we are presently involved, or
could be involved, in a far more ex-
panded conflict in Central America
than already exists. We are all too well
aware of the problems in El Salvador
and Guatemala, and we certainly are
aware of the potential threats that are
posed by the Government of Nicara-
gua.
One of the reasons that we run the
risk for an expanded conflict in Cen-
tral America is because we may be sup-
porting paramilitary groups in Central
America .which are determined in their
way, whether or not we are, to over-
throw the Government of Nicaragua.
I believe that that kind of activity is
going to lead exactly to that result
There will be a substitute amendment
offered to this amendment which I
have offered this morning. The substi-
tute amendment will say that none of
the funds tin this particular continuing
resolution can be expended for the
overthrow of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment. That amendment was offered in
the other body as a substitute to an
amendment