LETTER TO THE HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS FROM FREDERICK M. EATON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001400150002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 16, 1968
• Content Type: LETTER

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16 August 196$
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The Honorable Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Helms:
Enclosed herewith is the Report of General Laurin Norstad,
Dr. Eugene Fubini, .Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant and
the undersigned responsive to the Terms of Reference of 11
September 19b7. The following reflects, in very general terms,
its findings and. recommendations.
1. There is need for along-range National Intelligence Plan
within which periodic guidance can be provided. to assure that the
moat effective resources are available and used. to meet the present
and foreseeable requirements of the United States Government.
2. Guidance must be target-oriented and- relate the value of
information received to the particular resources which produced it.
3. The creation of the National Intelligence Resources Board
and the broadening of the programming and planning staff of the
Director of Central Intelligence should. be helpful in providing both
.such along-range plan and the required periodic guidance.
4. There is need for a point of central xeview within the
Department of Defense where all intelligence programs, including
COMINT and ELINT, are looked at as a whole. Otherwise, as
targets multiply both in numbers and sophistication, the magnitude
of the effort will reach unacceptable proportions. In the reduction,
..the most effective resources may suffer along with the least.
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5. There must be authoritative management over each of
the several COMINT and ELINT programs,
6. Authority of the Director, National Security Agency,
over all COMINT resources must be reaffirmed and clarified,
including his authority over the Service Cryptologic Agencies as
to all COMINT resources within their control. He should have
the right to enter objections to the inclusion within the Service
Cryptologic Agencies of other resources to the extent they would
detract from the major mission of the Agencies in carrying out
the NSA mission.
?. The Director, NSA, should strengthen his programming
and planning staff by including more high-level military and
civilian personnel from other agencies .having expertise in the
Cryptologic area. In this connection, consideration should be given
to integrating the programming and planning staffs. of the Service
.Cryptologic Agencies into NSA. Military tours of duty at NSA
should be extended and. the establishment of career ,opportunities
for military cryptologists within the Armed Forces should be
encouraged.
$. The removal of resources by the military from the control
of NSA should be discontinued. This will only be .successful ~if the
military can be assured that the COMINT resources developed by
NSA will effectively perform in both the Direct Service and Direct
Support roles. .
9. The overall centralization of ELINT resources within NSA
as contemplated by the Security Council Directive of 1959 is neither
workable nor necessary, and the Directive should be amended
accordingly. This is essential if the present confusion and duplication
of ELINT resources is to be eliminated and avoided in the future.
10. Those ELINT resources essential in providing radar order
of battle and conducting electronic warfare should be designated,
assigned to, and programmed by the Services and included within
their several budgets.
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11. Those ELINT resources not falling within these classifi-
cations should..be managed by the National Security Agency. There
should be placed within the Services only those ELINT resources
which provide information which cannot adequately be supplied by
the National Security Agency. The several types of ELINT are not
subject to exact definition but decisions can.and. should be made on
a case-by-case basis. Some duplication will, and probably should,
result.
12. The NSA should provide, and the Services should use, the
training, technical and other support facilities essential to-the
operation of military ELINT resources within their control.
13. The management, collection and processing of satellite
ELINT is generally satisfactory. Some clarifications in the directive
establishing the National Reconnaissance Office are suggested to
reflect currently satisfactory practices.
14. An effort should be made by NSA and NRO to eliminate
the least efficient ELINT satellite payloads and more importantly,
to ascertain whether some substantial part of ground, sea and air
efforts cannot be eliminated with the increasing effectiveness of
satellite collection.
15. Authority over the tasking, collection and processing of
satellite COMTNT and Telemetry should be definitely placed within
the NSA as these satellites become effective.
16. The present effort to consolidate and close overseas bases
should be encouraged and extended. Caution should be exercised
not to abandon, voluntarily, any area of the world far reasons of
economy, if they may one day become important again, and once
abandoned cannot be re-entered. Caution must also be exercised
in returning second-echelon processing to the US to ensure that
military requirements, both present and future, will not suffer.
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19. No firm recommendations have been made with respect
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In conclusion, there must be no slackening in the ~JS cryptologic
effort if essential military and other national needs are to be met.
The task of the future will be to determine those resources best
calculated to meet the growing requirements and to assure their
efficient management.
Unfortunately, many of its recommendations do not meet with their
equal enthusiasm.
Fredrick M. Eaton
Enclosure: a/s
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Copy No.
14 August 1968
GENERAL COMMENTS
1. A re-evaluation of the COMINT and ELINT efforts of the US
Government is appropriate because of developments in the mare than
fifteen years since the establishment of the present organization for
the management of COMINT and in the ten years since ELINT was
placed in the same framework.
2. The vast increase in signals subject to interception, the rapid
advance in the technology for interception from the ground, air, sea
and space, the new geographic areas of interest to the intelligence
community, give rise to new problems in the. programming of :require-
. menu and. the provision of resources to meet them, now and for the
foreseeable future.
3. The intelligence community is generally satisfied with the
quality of the product, its dissemination, the technical competence of
personnel and the maintenance and modernization of resources.
4. There are problems, however, with respect to several aspects
of COMINT and ELINT. These problems, together with suggestions as
to how they may be met, are set forth below.
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PROGRAM GUIDANCE
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1. There is need for along-term National Intelligence Plan setting
forth objectives, targets and priorities essential to provide that guidance
to the Secretary of Defense, the intelligence community and formulators
of intelligence programs which will assure an adequate and efficient
allocation of resources. responsive to the present and foreseeable require-
ments.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence, in providing such guidance,
must make authoritative and consistent determinations as to the importance
of such requirements in relation to the probable costs of their fulfillment
and express authoritative judgments as to the relative effectiveness of
intelligence collection programs in the satisfaction of intelligence needs.
Thus, requirements of minimal importance can be ruled out or relegated
to low priority in favor of those whose cost-benefit ratio appears more
favorable. The present listing of Priority National Intelligence Objectives
is inadequate for this purpose.
3. Within the scope of such along-range Plan, which xnus't be updated
as conditions change, there is need far periodic guidance to program
formulators in connection with annual reviews of the various intelligence
programs.
4. Such guidance must be sufficiently specific in character and so
relate the value of information to the resources which produced it as to
provide a basis for decision as to which .resources can be reduced,
eliminated or expanded and what new resources are required.
5. Guidance can be meaningful only when given against knowledge and
recognition of the cost involved, the capabilities of all available resources
and a considered determination of the particular resources which will best
cover the target.
6. Guidance must be target, rather than collection, oriented, with
resource assignment recommendations where appropriate. This is
essential to avoid redundancy of resources and dupli