NEWS RELEASE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001400110002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 22, 1978
• Content Type: PREL

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ADLAI E. STEVENSON. ILL..
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, MAINE
WALTER 0. HIJOOLESTON, KY.
JOSEPH R. BIDER, JR., DEL.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN. N.Y.
DANIEL. K. INOUYE. HAWAII
CLIFFORD P. CASE. N.J.
JAKE GABN. UTAH
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAD. IS, MO.
JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
JOHN H. CHAPEL. R.I.
RICHARD G. LUGAR, NO.
MALCOLM WALLOP, WYO.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA., EX OFFICIO
HOWARD H. BAYLEY., JR., TENN., EX OFFICIO
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF aiRecrow
EARL D. EISENHOWER. MINORITY' STAFF OIRECTOR
OLC #7WAH
ADVANCE
For Release at 6 P.M. E D:t . THURSDAY, - Jun-e 22, 1978
ACTIVITIES OF "FRIENDLY" FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES:
A CASE STUDY.
REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
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2 6 JUN "1978
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This report sets forth the result of a year-long inves-
tigation into the role of United States intMigence agencies
with respect to alleged improprieties by the government,
representatives and agents of South Korea in the United States.
The Committee's investigation was conducted as a case
study of the activities of "friendly" intelligence services
in the United State's. The South Korean case was selected
because it was the subject of considerable public attention
and much information was already available. The Committee is
equally concerned about similar allegations that have been made
about the intelligence activities of some other friendly coun-
tries. The Comwittee will continue to seek to ascertain the
extent of the intelligence activities of other governments
with whom the United States has good relations 63 well as the
U.S. Government's response to these activities.
The particular focus of the Committee, in examining the
documentary record and interviewing key Executive Branch officials,
has been on the extent to which the U.S. Government knew of the
Korean government's activities, the decisions that were made,
arid the resulting actions which were or were not taken. The
knowledge which the. U.S. Government had, most of it based upon
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intelligence reporting, was extensive, detailed, and current.
That knowledge ranged from simple awareness as early as 1963
that the Korean intelligence service was monitoring the
activities of Korean residents in the United States, to know-
ledge by 1971-73 that the Korean government was attempting by
unlawful means to influence and sometimes intimidate hundreds
of Korean nationals who were living in this country. It included
knowledge-in 1971, not only of plans to improperly influence
Members of the U.S. Congress, but also of unlawful paments
that had actually been made that same year to members of the
legislative branch to influence U.S. legislative action.
Most of this information was received by the United States
intelligence agencies as a by-product of their routine foreign
intelligence work. None of it was obtained as the result of
specific levied requirements, and no intelligence agent was
ever directed specifically to focus on the subject in a compre-
hensive way. The U.S. Government never set as Eiln intelligence
collection priority the question of whether "friendly" foreign
intelligence services were conducting activities directed at
officials or other residents of the United States. Although
much of the information received was disseminated to those
components of the U.S. Government with law enforcement or
1/ For purposes of this report, the Committee is assuming
the reliability of the human sources whose information was being
reported. _A separate Comnittee study on the reliability of
such information is now underway.
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foreign policy responsibilities, some pieces of relevant
information were never passed on to anyone in a position to
take action. The intelligence agencies' dissemination of
the information was unfocused, haphazard, and without useful
analysis.
At no time before 1975 was a full and complete "package"
ever presented to anyone within or outside the intelligence
community reflecting the full scope, extent, and implications
of Korean activity. Although over several years much-of
the information was disseminated on an ad hoc basis to various
levels and components of the government, t was not until 1975
that any senior accountable Federal official, though
knowledgeable, addressed the problem in a comprehensive
way.
The Committee believes that some of the information which
was distributed was of sufficient significance to have merited
earlier action. The Committee has examined the 'full record of
the Executive 3-ranch and has concluded that prior to 1975 no
effective action was taken by anyone in authority to halt what
was going on. Some concerned officials did bring the key issues
to the attention of responsible government authorities; however,
those notifications were not acted upon in a manner commensurate
with the
magnitude of the activities involved.
The Coduitittee has also investigated the question of whether
there was Tan intentional "cover-up"-by Executive 3ranch officials,
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and we have discovered no evidence to support such a conclusion.
Viewed in the context of how the United States Government has
generally handled relations with friendly foreign intelligence
services in the past, the. lack of effective and timely action
is understandable, but we believe that new policies and new
must be devised to insure that this kind of problem
does not recur.
This study did not address the question of the efficacy of
U.S. counterintelligence efforts against hostile intelligence
services in the United States. The recent indictment involving
alleged Soviet intelligence activities in the New York City
area dramatizes the continued gravity of that problem, and the
Committee will specifically report on both the magnitude of the
Soviet threat as well as the adequacy of the U.S. response in
due course. It is beyond question that the activities of hos-
tile intelligence services in the United States pose a more
V
direct threat 10 the security of our nation and an even greater
infringement on the liberties of our citizenry than do a few
random, albeit intensive, operations by the intelligence services
of our friends and allies. Indeed, it is the Committee's view
that the amount of attention and resources required to be
dedicated to the threat posed by hostile intelligence serwices
could account for the lack of effective reaction in the Korea case.
In the past, our counterintelligence effort has focused
upon the intelligence services of our adversaries, not our
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friends and allies. Perhaps, as one counterintelligence officer
put it, "-We have enough to do just trying to stay up with the
KGB." Whatever the reason, it is clear that no means have yet
been designed to.prevent "friendly" foreign intelligence services
from acting in ways that have and still could subvert our laws and
subject our citizens to intimidation by foreign.powers. Our
intelligence agencies do not systematically ascertain the
identities of and/or the assignments of agents or intelligence
officers
of "friendly"
foreign
governments
who
are
coming to, the United States in "cover" capacities.
in cases where the United States Government becomes
in, or are
Moreover,
incidentally
aware that such an officer is in the United States to fulfill
an operational, as opposed to a liaison function, no steps are
taken to determine the nature of that function unless there is
some indication that he is violating United States law. The
U.S. intelligence colamunity does not command sufficient means,
resources, or manpower to monitor the activities of "friendly"
intelligence agencies' activities in the United States.
One of the key questions that must be answered is to what
extent the United States Government should knowingly permit any
foreiu intelligence officers to conduct operations in the
United States.
answered by our own need to conduct intelligence operations
The answer to this basic question is in part
abroad.. If the United States Government arrests or expels
foreign intelligence officers or agents, then it risks foreign
retaliation against U.S. intelligence operatives, innocent
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U.S. citizens, or the foreign policy interests of the United
States. As the situation now stands, there are no formal
rules, no written agreements, and no definitive limitations
governing the conduct of intelligence services. Perhaps it
cannot be otherwise. But, there must be a recognition that
the issues and practices revealed by the Korean case have not
been resolved, and unless they are, other cases of abuse will
surely arise.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Within weeks after this investigation began, it became
apparent that there were crucial issues to be dealt with which
went beyond the question of when the U.S. intelligence community
first became aware that agents of the South Korean intelligence
service (KCIA) were engaged in effprts to improperly influence
the U.S. Congress. A review of all available U.S. intelligence
reports concerning the KCIA made clear that KCIA officials were
"operational" in the United States as early as 1963, just two
years after the KCIA was formed. At that time, the Department
of State received a report from one of the intelligence agencies
that KCIA officers had been directed to monitor the activities
of Korean residents in Los Angeles and to solicit their support
for the government of Pak Chung-hi. There is no evidence that
any action was taken by any State Department official, nor was
any concern expressed, at that time.
It is reasonable to assume that there would be public
acceptance of-the stationing of foreign intelligence officers
in the United States for the purpose of liaison with our own
intelligence services to exchange information of mutual benefit.
Accordingly, the 1963 intelligence reports raised. for the Com-
mitee the imLiediate question of precisely what the practices
are.
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1. _ The U.S. Government is not usually notified by most
foreign governments when "friendly" foreign intelligence
officers are assigned here. Although our own intelligence
agencies are aware of who their own liaison counterpart
neither U.S. intelligence, nor any other pa