INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS SEPTEMBER 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00005R000100040014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
AND
THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS
SEPTEMBER 1962
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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
September 1962
Copy / of 5
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Page
A. SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. THE ESTIMATING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Estimating Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. OPERATING TRENDS AND PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Staffing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Board of National Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Consultants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Miscellaneous Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Administration, Support and Space . . . . . . . . 39
Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations
and Regional Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Priority National Intelligence Objectives . . . . 44
Post Mortems and Validity Studies . . . 45
25X1 C8A ONE . . . 47
Promoting e Use of Estimates . . . . . . . . . . 19
ONE Guidance on ORR and OSI Research Programs 49
Estimating Relationships between ONE and the
USIB Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
DD/P - ONE Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
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"Surprise, when it happens to a government, is
likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic
thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but
also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously
delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in
intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string
of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to
give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that
fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so
often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert
watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out
by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed.
It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but
also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking
care of. It includes straightforward procrastination,
but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement.
It includes, in addition, the inability of individual
human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure
it is the occasion--which is usually too late."
From the Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling in Pearl
Harbor, Warning and Decision by Roberta Wohlstetter,
Stanford, 1962.
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S E C R E T
A. SCOPE
1. The production of national intelligence estimates as a
coordinated effort of the United States intelligence community
has been under way since the establishment of the Office of
National Estimates (ONE) in the Fall of 1950. The structure,
formats and the principal procedures in estimating have shown
substantial continuity down to the present time. At its present
stage of evolution the estimating process constitutes a
remarkably small evaluative effort at the apex of the broad
collection and analytical efforts of the intelligence community.
A guiding doctrine in the shaping of the system to date has been
the separation of estimating from policy in order to assure the
presentation by the intelligence community of unbiased compre-
hensive judgments to the policy makers. In this climate few
participants in the estimating system will hazard a guess as
to the influence of estimates on policy decisions.
2. The critical nature of the estimating function has made
the system the object of relatively frequent top-level Government
review and evaluation. The Hoover Commission Report of 28 Decemb=r
1948 and the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee Report of 1 January
1949 examined the subject in detail and laid much of the groundwork
for the establishment of the Office of National Estimates. The
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Inspector General conducted a "Survey of the Office of National
Estimates" in April of 1951+. A Task Force on Intelligence
Activities under General Mark Clark issued a report in May 1955
dealing at length with estimating. Background material in the
Clark Committee files dealt with most of the key issues brought
to our attention during the current inspection.
3. Another medium for more general discussions of the
purposes and problems of national estimating has been the
quarterly Studies in Intelligence now in its sixth year. Many
members of ONE, of the Board of National Estimates, and of other
components of the intelligence community have contributed
firsthand accounts and judgments on important aspects of the
subject.
1+. Finally, in the past 12 months the Joint Study Group on
the Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Governia nt
and the present Director's Ad Hoc Committee on Organizational
Matters both chaired by Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick have completed
studies with implications for the estimating process. These were
explored orally by the inspectors with Mr. Kirkpatrick.
5. A three-man team from the Inspector General's staff spent the
months of July and August 1962 reviewing primarily the organizational
and management aspects of the national estimating process. The
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bulk of the survey was concerned with the Office of National
Estimates which provides most of the apparatus and the day-to-day
coordination of the community's effort in national estimating.
Discussions were held with all members of ONE and the Board of
National Estimates, with many other senior officials of CIA and
with selected contributors and users of estimates in the
Government.
6. An Agency inspection of this intelligence community
system necessarily stopped short of a detailed examination and
comparison among the United States Intelligence Board (UuIB)
member organizations of their levels of effort, quality of
performance, and standards of management. Such review would be
essential to a coordinated USIB effort to appraise and improve
the estimating process. The US.IB community approach to estimat iig
was frequently characterized to us by its participants as a loose
federated system of very uneven quality and performance. The
USIB does not maintain a formal management group to analyze and
propose solutions to non-substantive community problems, for
example, in estimating. In the past the excellence of the
example set by the ONE estimators appears to have been the
principal stimulus to improved community performance.
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7. This review of the estimating process would not be
complete without mention of the continued presence at the helm
of the Office of National Estimates of Sherman Kent, who has
probably made the largest individual contribution to the present
highly respected stature of his office. We encountered a wide
range of warm personal tributes to Mr. Kent.
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Revised: 23 May 19 2
(1) MISSION. The Assistant Director for National
Estimates is charged with the production of
national intelligence estimates.
(2) FUNCTIONS. The Assistant Director for National
Estimates shall:
(a) Direct the production of national intelligence
estimates. This includes the setting of
priorities and the assignment of production
responsibilities among the components of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and among the
intelligence agencies of the Federal
Government.
(b) Prepare national intelligence estimates for
issuance by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(c) Sit as Chairman of the Board of National
Estimates.
(d) Provide CIA representation and intelligence
support at the Staff Assistants level of the
National Security Council Staff.
(e) 25X 8
(f) Give appropriate guidance to the intelligence
research agencies.
(g) Give appropriate guidance to the intelligence
collection agencies.
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B. THE ESTIMATING SYSTEM
8. Authority pertaining to the production of national
intelligence estimates is provided in National Security Council
Intelligence Directives (NSCID) Numbers 1 and 3 and in Director of
Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) Number 1/1. DCID's 3/3, 3,14+,
and 3/5 which establish under the United States Intelligence Board
the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), the Guided
Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), and the
Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC) incorporate a standard
paragraph providing for the participation of these Committees in
national estimating. The inspectors encountered no concrete
proposals for the modification of these directives.
9. Within CIA the Office of National Estimates is designated
as a component of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence, and
specifies that the Deputy Director
(Intelligence) (DD/I) is "responsible for directing and
coordinating the activities of the Office of.. .National
Estimates...." The relationship between DD/I and Assistant Director
for National Estimates (AD/NE) has varied with the incumbents
depending in large part on the relation desired by the Director of
Central Intelligence with his AD/NE. There is an evident need for
keeping the DD/I fully and promptly informed on the programming of
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ONE assignments. Further, the DD/I clearly will need to oversee
the exchange of views between his staff in ONE and in other DD/I
offices to insure maximum reconciliation or full identification of
differences of position between himself and the Board of National
Estimates on national security problems.
Components
10. The Board of National Estimates consists at the presenb
time of 12 members selected by the Director of Central Intellige:zce
on indefinite tenure to give both substantive and procedural
guidance to the national estimating process. Present members have
been selected for their civilian or military experience in academe,
military or intelligence pursuits. The Board is thoroughly
integrated into the ONE structure but its members are freed of all
administrative duties. The AD/NE is Board Chairman, there is a
deputy chairman, and the Deputy Assistant Director for National
Estimates (DAD/NE), who is responsible for the administration of
the Office, is also a member of the Board.
11. The Board's existence rests on the authority of the DC L.
There is no cognizance of its existence and functions in the
directives of the National Security Council. DCID 1/1 spells our.
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Board functions in scheduling and assigning work on estimates,
in setting terms of reference and in coordinating estimates for
final presentation to the USZB.
12. The Board was an integral part of the original conception
of the national estimating process. In the early years its
composition and purpose were visualized, however, as an assembla;e
of independent authorities of the highest national reputation,
acting in a corporate capacity, to develop the substantive product
of the estimating effort. This concept has been substantially
modified through time with the growing professionalism of the
Estimates Staff. The Board enjoys the services of many gifted
individuals, but the demands of coordination have restricted their
contributions in the strictly creative sense of conceiving estimmites
and highlighted their skills in criticism and negotiation.
13. A second feature of the evolution of Board functions has
been the sharp reduction in the functioning of the Board as a
corporate body in coordinating estimates. The given estimating
project is today steered through the system by a panel of two or
three Board members, one of whom is designated chairman with widfn
latitude to impress his personal views of coordinating procedure
on the community effort. Efficiency in coordination has risen
through the years and the panel approach with the use of strong
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chairmen has enabled the Board to handle a larger volume of
business without community complaint concerning the objectivity and
fairness of the process. questions concerning the selection,
career management, and alternative uses of Board talents are
discussed in detail in Section C of the survey.
14. The Estimates Staff is a group of intelligence officers
maintained in ONE to perform the final drafting of national
estimates. These men are responsible first of all for keeping
themselves comprehensively informed on the areas or subjects for
which they have assigned responsibility. Their effectiveness at
drafting derives from personal command of a subject field and from
utilization of the estimative contributions from the intelligenc=e
community. Their product may in turn undergo substantial
modification at the hands of members of the Board of National
Estimates and during the interagency coordination of the draft
prior to its submission to the USIB. The growing competence of
the ONE staff has been a notable feature of the evolution of ONE
to date and has contributed to a relatively autonomous status fa
the staff vis a vis the Board in ONE.
15. The measure of a staff man is his ability to weigh
events and trends in the given area or subject field, to make
perceptive judgments of their significance for intelligence and
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policy planning purposes, and to communicate these ideas effectiiely
orally or in writing to the varied ranks of Government officials.
Objectivity of analysis is of the essence both in the preparation
of a draft estimate, a commissioned memorandum or a self-initiated
appreciation of a foreign situation, and in its defense before the
Board of National Estimates, and subsequently in the market place
of the intelligence and policy community. The characteristic
influence of such experience on the individual cannot yet be fully
appraised, but there is an evident premium on initiative and
forcefulness. There is a distinct pull on the most aptly suited
individuals to move from this arena of evaluation into positions
of command both in CIA and elsewhere in the Government.
16. The Support Staff provides for the administrative need.:
of both the Board of National Estimates and the Estimates Staff.
These activities include maintenance of an Information Control
unit, reading and reference rooms, a Publications and Reproduction
unit, and research, secretarial and clerical services. There is a
substantial volume of publishing and dissemination of revised
drafts of estimates, much of it occurring outside regular workin;
hours. The skills and dedication of the staff were widely
commended by ONE's professional members.
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Estimating Procedures
17. The estimative product may take any one of many forms,
depending on the nature and urgency of the problem being dealt
with by the policy makers of the Government. The majority of
estimative papers are commissioned by the DCI, the White House
staff, the policy planning mechanism of the Department of State,
policy task forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military
operations authorities. There is a substantial demand for
estimative memoranda by the DCI and the USIB and, finally, a
lesser volume of self-initiated ONE staff and Board memoranda.
Channels for requesting estimates are informal and vary from
direct contacts between outside requesters and members of ONE to
command assignments delivered either directly from the DCI or
via the DD/I.
18. The USTB or the DCI on its behalf must approve the
scheduling of a national estimate. The USIB approves each
quarter a program of national intelligence estimates for the
succeeding six months which is prepared by the Board of National
Estimates. The next step is the preparation of terms of refe.ren~e
for the estimate which define the subject to be covered, and pos>
the questions to be answered. The terms of reference are draftei
in ONE and submitted to the USIB agencies for review. Repre-
sentatives designated by the USTB agencies to coordinate the
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production of the estimate then meet with a panel from the Board
of National Estimates to confirm the terms of reference, and to
assign responsibility and deadlines for the production of
departmental contributions. The contributions from all sources
are delivered to the Estimates Staff of ONE and a designated
estimates team proceeds to draft the estimate for Board
consideration.
19. The drafting of estimates is by and large the
prerogative of ONE and is the source of some contention on the
part of contributors to estimates in other agencies. The probleii
is to produce a cohesive estimate written in an effective style.
Such integration must come in the last analysis as the performance
of one individual. It derives from the individual drafter's
command of pertinent information, his ability to focus and make
perceptive judgments on the essential problems, and his skill
in presenting them lucidly and convincingly. The authors of
contributions from the other agencies inevitably tend to
challenge the style, if not the judgments, in the final draft
and to question the discard of their own conscientious and
sometimes excellent efforts.
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C. OPF WING TRENDS An PROBLEM:
General
20. ONE and the estimating process have been operating in a
climate of organizational stability for some years. There is a
general lack of sentiment among the participants for radical
change in the basic features of the system. There are a number
of factors that help to account for this stability. One of the
most important is that ONE has been able to attract high caliber
staff and to satisfy them with the working atmosphere. ONE is
a market place for ideas and it offers both the freedom and the
pressures conducive to strong performance by perceptive individuals.
Any tendency in the individual participant to relax in comfortable
established procedures is likely, we judged, to prove a relatively
short-lived condition.
21. A second factor making for stability is the reputation
that the system and the product have established for themselves
in the U.S. Government. There is a wide readership for estimates,
tending to be more comprehensive the higher placed the individual
official. Our discussions outside the Agency indicated that the
estimates are read at the operating level by the authorities
responsible for the areas and subject fields with which they deal.
The construction and style of estimates are regarded as professional
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in quality. A good job is done in handling facts and background
data. The timing of estimates was regarded as generally satis-
factory. Every observer also had views on the inherent limitations
in estimating and these are dealt with in more detail below. But
the reservations were prefaced with expressions of respect and
appreciation such as are noted here.
22. A third factor keeping the system on its present course
is its record of substantive accomplishment. Particular satisfaction
was expressed with the demonstrated capability of ONE and the DD/1
area in general to help formulate as well as coordinate the
estimative judgments on military subjects, sometimes involving
issues that the military had failed to analyze or coordinate
effectively among themselves. Independent civilian analysis of
military/strategic problems was considered by at least one observer
as perhaps the most significant current contribution of the
estimating system to the national security. Many individuals
expressed. the opinion, always an intangible one as to concrete
evidence, that the policy commitments of the other USIB
organizations influence their estimative judgments. The absence
of such commitments enhances the objectivity and usefulness of
the estimative contributions produced by CIA.
23. There was also a consensus among participants and obser%er:s 11
of the estimating process that various features and procedures in
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the system are defective but lacking obvious remedy. The broadest,
of these criticisms was that the estimates tend to be too general
in scope and their judgments axe too heavily hedged to be useful
to policy makers. Since estimates deal with problems in which
essential information is frequently lacking and even the policy
makers of target countries are unable to foresee and control
developments with precision, it would seem that this criticism
is more in the nature of a description of one of the basic
features of the game.
2--. A close corollary to the preceding point, however, was
the observation from many estimators that they have very limited
contact with policy makers. They are never fully satisfied,
therefore, that they appreciate the context and the precise issues
in the mind of the requester of an estimate. SNIE's were judged
by some participants and users to be less, open to this criticism
than the more formal scheduled NIE's. One highly placed user
considered a recent SNIE (58-5/1-62) "Communist Reaction to
Additional U.S. Courses of Action in Laos and North Vietnam" to be
a model of estimative treatment of a strategic problem.
25. The relation of estimators to policy makers has long
been a subject of debate, and ONE broadly speaking has been
operating under a doctrine perhaps best expressed by AD/NE himself
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"The only institutional safeguard (for impartial and objective
analysis) is to separate as absolutely as it is possible to do
so the staff which executes from the staff which investigates.
The two should be parallel but quite distinct bodies of men,
recruited differently, paid if possible from separate funds,
responsible to different heads, intrinsically uninterested in
each other's personal success.
For these reasons, what is unquestionably gained in guidance
may well be lost in.the integrity and objectivity of the
operation. The absorption of intelligence producers by the
intelligence consumers may prove to be too heroic a cure for
both disease and patient.
The only way out of the dilemma seems to me to lie in the
very compromise that is usually attempted: guarantee
intelligence its administrative and substantive integrity
by keeping it separate from its consumers; keep trying every
known device to make the users familiar with the producers'
organization, and the producers with the users' organization."
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy,
Princeton, 1951, pp. 200-201.
Our review of the ONE Quarterly Report of Staff Activities tended
to support the conclusion that ONE personnel at present have very
limited contact with senior policy-making personnel in the
Government. The record is by no means black or white and such
contacts have perhaps been on the increase of late. The change
in emphasis by the present. national administration from regular
use of the formal National Security Council policy-making
apparatus to increased use of task forces and estimative
memoranda were viewed favorably by many ONE personnel. The
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change has tended to enliven the work and to increase the sense
of usefulness of the estimating effort.
26. Another area of estimating under frequent criticism is
the quality of performance of the other USIB organizations. The
level and priority of effort and the quality of the contributions
are generally regarded as uneven. Some contributions are excellent.
Many are regarded by ONE as clearly deficient. The contributions
occasionally fall behind schedule. Coordination is frequently
characterized as cumbersome because it tends to become editing
by committee rather than a lively exchange of informed views.
Some participants are regarded as professional meeting-goers who
make little useful contribution to the substantive questions at
issue.
27. The USZB agencies make uneven investments in the research
essential to estimating in their assigned areas of responsibility.
Economic research on some areas of the free world, geo-political
questions in Africa, interrelationships among military weapons
systems ire cited as examples of subjects on which community
research efforts are considered deficient by ONE. Recommendations
on these matters are provided in paragraph 81 of this survey.
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Staffing Policy
28. We interviewed all professional and clerical personnel
on the ONE staffs. The staffs currently have ^ professional
personnel on board out of a T/O of
Without exception, we
were favorably impressed with the dedication, intelligence, and
intellectual curiosity of each of theFlprofessional officers
we interviewed. It is significant to note that each of these
officers admires and respects all of his staff colleagues, both
professionally and personally. Morale, except for the overcrowded
working conditions, is excellent throughout the staffs.
29. Each member of the Board of National Estimates (BNE)
rates staff personnel as high-quality and outstanding. The
reputation of the staffs is also high with other CIA components
as well as with outside departments and agencies.
30. The backgrounds, experience, and interests of staff
personnel are, to a large extent, remarkably similar. Almost
every one did undergraduate and/or graduate work in a social
science at one of the better known universities. Many have had
teaching experience, and there seems to be a continuing desire
to write for academic journals. Interest in an academic career
has never completely waned, and current job satisfaction is
attributable in no small measure to the academic and intellectual_
atmosphere pervading ONE. A large number of staff personnel
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served in OCI and/or ORR and a few in the Deputy Director (Plans),
(DD/P) before coming to ONE. The other staff personnel were
recruited directly from the universities. All employees inter-
viewed felt that the blending of Agency and university people is
an ideal arrangement for ONE.
31. Despite the fact that the staffs are only three under
professional strength, ONE has had considerable difficulty in its
recruitment efforts. At the universities, ONE has encountered
stiff competition from the academic community, business world, and
other Government agencies. Since ONE has had only limited success
in university recruitment, it would seem that most of its people
in the future will again have to be recruited from other CIA comq>o-
nents. Many able employees in other CIA components aspire to work
in ONE, but their supervisors are naturally reluctant to lose
these good people, particularly since they too have serious recruit-
ment problems. To avoid animosity and friction with these compo
nents, ONE should begin to develop a program wherein the careers
of its employees should include rotational tours in attractive
positions in other parts of the DD/I as well as in the DD/P. At
the same time other components should seriously consider and plan
for the assignment of promising talent to ONE for a tour of duty.
These components would be more willing to release people to ONE if
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they were assured of getting ONE people on occasion for a specif:ic
tour of duty. (See Recommendation No. l)
32. ONE staff personnel today express little interest in work-
ing elsewhere in the DD/I area. This attitude is at least sympto-
matic of a condition of overcompartmentation in the DD/I Offices..
These ONE personnel now view the other DD/I Offices as offering only
routine assignments and limited headroom for advancement. Sharper
delineation of a DD/I career service with assurances of opportunty
to move with more freedom through more areas of DD/I operations
should tend to remove the present somewhat parochial attitude. At
stake for the DD/I is the cultivation of a corps of officers who
appreciate estimating in relation to other DD/I programming prob-
lems, who bring versatility to their assignments, and who regard
the entire DD/I as an exciting place in which to work.
33. ONE has had a large turnover of staff personnel over the
years. At the time of the 195+ IG Survey, there were
serving on the ONE staffs. Six remain today, of whom four are
serving in supervisory or specialized capacities. There is an uj-
written philosophy in the office that personnel either go up or
out, and we believe that this is a sound philosophy. When we
consider that the national intelligence estimate is one of the
most important studies produced in the United States Government,
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it is obvious that ONE must be staffed with top-flight career
people. The caliber of the present ONE staff is most impressive.,
and when an estimator demonstrates outstanding talent and intere.>t
in this type of work, a career service would presumably take
these factors into account in career planning.
34. It is generally recognized that four to five years of
continuous estimating for most people should be followed by a
change of scenery to permit the development of fresh approaches
and new ideas and to prevent stagnation. A periodic change of
scenery would be rewarding if it involved rotation to another
stimulating DD/I assignment, a sabbatical at a university, or an
overseas tour. An overseas tour, wherein he would acquire area
background and experience, would be refreshing and invaluable to
the individual as well as to the Agency. The individual would
return to ONE with added knowledge and expertise, and his overseas
performance may serve to eliminate some of the barriers and
prejudices that exist between DD/I and DD/P personnel. We are not
suggesting that the DD/P fill classical clandestine positions
overseas with ONE personnel, although we believe that some of thc?m
could serve with distinction in such positions. However, we do
believe that ONE personnel, as well as other DD/I personnel, cou.Ld
make significant and valuable contributions as substantive intel,-?_i-
gence advisors to chiefs of station.
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The Board of National. Estimates
44. The Board of National Estimates (BNE) is at the apex
of CIA's estimative process and as such is responsible for the
estimates produced. The Board reviews the terms of reference
and the draft of an estimate before it is coordinated with the
USIB agencies. A Board member is assigned to chair the meetings
during the interagency coordination process. The BNE decides
when an estimate is ready for USIB consideration, and the
Chairman of the Board and the member charged with responsibility
for the particular estimate attend the USIB meeting to defend
the paper on behalf of the interagency group producing it.
145. The concept of the Board dates back to an IAC meeting
in October 1950 when General Smith, then DCI, referred to "a
panel of five or six individuals constituting the top brains" of
the new estimates organization. The BNE was mentioned in ONE's
first approved Table of Organization in January 1951. The present
group is made up of 10 members plus the Assistant Director for
National Estimates, who serves concurrently as Board Chairman,
and the Deputy Assistant Director. Of these 12, two have been
on the Board of National Estimates since its inception, four are
alumni of the ONE staff, one is a senior economist from the Office
of Research and Reports, and three are retired general and flag
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rank officers representing the three services. Of the remaining
two members one has a legal background and came to the BRIE a
decade ago from ECA while his colleague, coming from the State
Department, joined the group not long after. A senior station
chief from the Deputy Director (Plans) will join the Board in a
few weeks. With the exception of the retired military and some
of the DD/I office alumni, the Board members have been in place
for over half a decade.
46. The original Board was largely composed of individuals
described as "outstanding scholars of national repute, experts in
the fields of strategy, political science, economics, and other
social sciences...." We believe the concept of having both out-
siders and insiders, as it were, on the Board is a healthy one.
The possibility of eventual promotion to the Board gives the
senior staff member a goal. The outsiders bring to the Agency a
fresh approach and help to stifle any tendency towards intellectual
inbreeding.
1+7. It is apparently difficult to attract "name" scholars to
become semi-permanent members of the Board. The inspection team
believes the concept of part-time or short-term Board members frout
the outside is to be encouraged. For several years a member of
the Princeton faculty has spent the bulk of his summer holiday
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serving as a most useful and productive Board member. We believe
this infusion of fresh ideas should be encouraged and that a
vigorous attempt should be made to attract other eminent
academicians from different disciplines to join the Board for a
number of successive summers, for a sabbatical year's leave or
even a semester.
48. There is an almost unanimous opinion that the quality of
the Board is uneven. In particular, we were advised that more,
than half of the military officers who served on the Board over
the years made negligible contributions, although the contributions
and performance of some military members have been outstanding.
The general feeling exists that there is no longer any justifiable
need or significant reason to continue to have representation from
each of the three military services. We believe that there should,
be some military representation on the Board, but the abilities
and qualifications of each individual candidate should be careful )y
and thoroughly assessed by the DD/I and .AD/NE to eschew possible
error. There should be no compulsion to recruit one officer from
each of the services and to maintain three military officers on
the Board at all times. If, on the other hand, one service were to
nominate two outstanding officers for Board membership at the same
time, we see no reason wh; both officers could not be appointed.
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It is recommended that: No. 9
The AD/NE request the Director of Central Intelligence
to ask the State Department for the services on the Board
of National Estimates of a named individual of ambassadorial
rank.
50. Since the Board's inception there has been a change in
the nature of its contribution and in its work habits. Originally
it was thought that a Board composed of prominent men with nation-
wide reputations was needed in order, through their quasi-judicial
procedures, to enhance the estimates by conferring on them the
Board members' own prestige and authority. The NIE is now
recognized as authoritative in its own right. The workload in
the early years was light enough so that the final form of each
.estimate represented the Board's corporate view. The increase
in demands on the Board's time has made the corporate deliberation
impossible in most situations and almost all NIE's are now handled
by a panel from the Board consisting of the paper's chairman and
two panel members. The chairman lends an aura of impartiality to
the interagency discussions of the paper and the staff personnel
are freed to concentrate on substance. Also there are public
relations overtones to placing the Board's stamp of approval on.
an estimate or memorandum.
51. The increasing workload appears to have curtailed quite
sharply the amount of time the individual Board member can devote
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to creative thought and writing on intelligence problems. The
role of Board members has become largely critical. By promoting
one of the luminaries of the Estimates Staff to the Board, ONE in
effect promotes him to a position where his specialized knowledge
has less impact as time passes. The survey team is strongly of
the opinion that greater opportunity should be provided for the
younger members--Board members range in age from 41 to 64--to
replenish the wellsprings of creativity. We are of the opinion
that there is high caliber manpower available here that is not
being sufficiently stimulated intellectually and that some
revitalization of the BNE's role is necessary.
52. Board appointments are made personally by the Director
of Central Intelligence. At times, earlier DCI's have sought
the views of Board members on a variety of problems. It may be
that the present BNE is not to be utilized in this manner. We
would favor some experimentation to achieve a more stimulating
role. It is possible that a closer relationship between the
DD/I and the Board whereby the latter would serve as a high
caliber reservoir to be tapped as needed for staff work would
provide the creative opportunities now lacking. The team sees
no loss in reducing the size of the Board panels to provide the
DD/I with this informal staff assistance.
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It is recommended that: No. 10
The AD/NE explore with the DD/I ways and means of
enhancing the Board's role so that good men can be
attracted and stimulated.
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Miscellaneous Problems
Administration, Support and Space
59. ONE has succeeded ever since its inception in keeping
its administrative, support and secretarial elements to a minimum.
Out of a total on board strength of 68 there are 12 secretaries
or typists and a Support Staff of nine. The latter group is
composed of an Information Control Branch of four who perform
the normal document routing and registry functions for the office.
The group also handles document logging for the DD/I's immediate
office. A Publications Branch of three individuals cuts stencil'
on the drafts of NIE's, proofreads drafts and printer's galleys
of NIE's and runs off such other documents as the Daily Status
Report. The Reading Room Branch with a staff of two handles the
library facilities in the special intelligence area.
60. ONE is having a difficult time in finding and keeping
adequate clerical assistance. ONE's situation in this regard is
not unique but is a part of the larger Agency problem of
encouraging secretaries to commute to the Headquarters Building.
The team does wish to record its belief that ONE requires a
high priority for secretaries in view of its already spartan
staffing arrangements and, if necessary, its clerical grade
structure should reflect this priority.
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Post-Mortems and Validity Studies
71. The post-mortem is a study prepared after the completion
of a national intelligence estimate to record and highlight the
deficiencies and gaps in information pertaining to the estimate.
The study is coordinated and approved by the USIB and disseminated
as an official USIB document. Essentially the post-mortem
represents a guide to the collector, but the extent to which the
collector relies on this study per se is dubious. There is
naturally considerable overlap between the deficiencies recorded
in a post-mortem and the regular requirements submitted by other
CIA components and the rest of the intelligence community. The
usefulness and value of a post-mortem is questioned by ONE, but
two examples were cited wherein specific collection action was
undertaken in apparent response to a post-mortem.
72. Initially a post-mortem was prepared routinely after
the completion of each estimate. Fewer post-mortems were preparel
in succeeding years despite an increase in the number of estimate:;,
since ONE often considers a post-mortem unnecessary and of dubiou3
value. There appears to be no clear-cut policy pertaining to the
preparation of post-mortems. Today a post-mortem is prepared
only if the drafter or chairman of an estimate or a USIB
representative determines it to be worthwhile.
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