CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 22, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 24, 1952
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T01146A000900180001-4.pdf | 595.65 KB |
Body:
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SECRET
25X1
24 April 1952
25X1
OCI No. 5166
Copy No. 266
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office
of Current Intelligence.
25X1
RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB nc Tl l~#-1b Box A roved For Release - T01146A00090~1$QQq ?
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S ATESINFORMATION
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS
WITHIPTATHECMEANINGEOFATHE AL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ET WHICH ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
GENERAL
2e Orbit trade reprisals against Italy feared: American
Embassy o T s n ome a lave e r w initiate
serious retaliatory measures if two pending trade deals be-
tween Italy and the Soviet Orbit are cancelled because of the
s
Battle Acta One mill the
worth of rolling Parts to
dollars worth of coal; the second provides for shipment to
Czechc.slovakia of 194409000 dollars worth of "catagorv B"
ball bearings, a non-strategic size.
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Italy, which badly needs coal, fears that cancellation
ld bring Polish retaliation
mill shipment wou
of the rolling
lls for US coal.
d
o
nd he nce force it to expend
t a -mess to dispose of its
e
g
Comment: Poland's apparen
coal surplus, even at some disadvantage, was shown in recent
transactions with Scandinavia. Thus it would appear unlikely
paetaretaliation if Italy
that Poland would undertakenserious
failed to provide the
25X1
SOVIET UNION
fifty-nine
Little change in Moscow~s May Day slogans-
ee of The ftheiftySoviet
May Day s ngans issue y distributed by TASSe
Communist Part have been widely
Comment: As was the case last year, the first twelve
slogans ea with foreign affairs. They follow the same order
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as last year's with the notable exception that last year's
slogan greeting the "liberation movements" in colonial areas
was dropped in favor of a greeting to the Japanese people.
The phraseology was sterotyped for the most part. To the
slogans greeting "all peoples," the Germans, the Japanese, and
the Yugoslavs, fighting "for peace, independence, and democracy"
a phrase which emphasized the idea that they are "fighting
against aggressors" was added. Only the aggressors in Yugo-
slavia were identified -- the "fascist regime of the Tito-
Rankovic clique." The German slogan which last year ended
with the words "for Germany" now closes with the phrase "for
a German state."
Since the Kremlin's May Day slogans are usually a reca-
pitulation of current propaganda themes, it is noteworthy that
references to biological warfare and the colonial liberation
movement were omitted. Other communist parties have included
these issues in their May Day slogans.
The call for increased military preparedness, while new
to the May Day slogans, was the point of emphasis on the occa-
sion of Red Army Day, 23 February 1952.
The remaining slogans, dealing with Soviet internal af-
fairs and the state economy,reveal no notable changes.
EASTERN EUROPE
5, Build-up of antiaircraft defenses of Prague: The US
Military Attache in ague reports o servation of work on
four additional antiaircraft positions on the perimeter of
the city. This. brings the total of such positions under con-
struction to ten with an average of three 88mm guns per posi-
tion.
Comment: Development of the antiaircraft defenses of
Prague w? as Indicated by the accumulation of a pool of anti-
aircraft guns and equipment in the suburb of Bohnice. A
total of 103 88mm guns were counted at this air defense depot
and training center early last November. In late January,
only 40 pieces remained and it is believed that some of the
guns were shipped away from Prague.
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The activity around Prague follows the pattern observed
around Warsaw where a ring of 20 positions was established
last summer. Increased air defense activities elsewhere in
the Satellites have featured improved protection of the national
capitals and key rail and communications centers.
6. Hungary rejects Yugoslav proposals for a Mura Island
Settlement: In a note on 19 April Hungary rejected Yugoslavia's
proposals-for the establishment of a mixed commission to settle
the long standing Mura Island dispute. Hungary demanded ces-
sation of border violations, and satisfaction for provocative
attacks. The note was interpreted by the American Legation in
Budapest settle-
ment. 25X1
Comment: Hungarian-Yugoslav relations were strained
severely last December when a Hungarian armed force took poss-
ession of the island. The dispute has been used by both sides
chiefly for propaganda purposes. There is no apparent indi-
cation that Yugoslavia is prepared to implement its claims to
the island.
52
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FAR EAST
7, Indonesian Socialist reported in Moscow: Friends of
Sudja mo o; ormer ounse or o Indonesian Embassy in
Washington and prominent disciple of socialist Party chair-
man Sjahrir, report him in Moscow,but insist that he went
there not to participate in the Moscow Economic Conference,
but as a private correspondent of the Socialist daily,
Pedoman0 His associates admit his hope to visit various
areas In Russia and to proceed to Peiping.
American Ambassador Cochran notes the visits of prominent
Socialists to Iron Curtain countries and comments upon the
"newly invigorated anti-Westism and anti-Americanism" of
Pedoman.
Comment: The Socialist Party, under the direction of
former premier Sutan Sjahrir, strongly advocates the "third
force" principle and is believed to have been highly influen?
tial in Indonesia's adoption of and continued adherence to a
foreign policy based on this concept.
The visits of Socialists and Socialist-influenced
Indonesians" to Iron Curtain countries appear to be partially
a political gesture designed to augment the party's following,
and partially a sincere effort to study conditions in
eeis little indication of a Socialist
communist countries. There
orientation towad the
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WESTERN EUROPE
German Bishop believes Communists would accept a neutral
Germany, American o is a s in Berlin-believe that the recent
proposal of Evangelical Bishop Dibelius for all-German elections
to be supervised by the Evangelical and Catholic Churches is
primarily a maneuver to generate pressure for German unification
and for a four-power conference.
Dibelius, who is the head of the a.11-German Evangelical
Church, is alarmed at the thought of a permanent split of Germany,
which would mean the division of German Protestantism. He tends
to believe that the Communists would agree to a unified, neu-
tralized Germany. He also, reportedly feels that the West, the
United States in particular,!is not sincerely interested in
Germany's unification.
Catholic circles give the impression that their Church
considers the proposal naive. nd will have nothing to do with
25X1 it.
Comment. Most West Germans believe that unification with
East ermany will be almost impossible to achieve under present
conditions. They resent, however, any Western action which would
preclude unity, and are concerned over the increasing Allied
25X1 insistence on integration.
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10. Economic dispute may be endangering Austrian internal
stabs ty a ustrian overnment s a lure to resolve a four-
mont controversy over economic policies is threatening serious
economic and political consequences. Mutual Security Agency
officials in Vienna believe that the prospects for agreement
on a broad economic program are now less, even though Chancellor
Figl claims near-agreement on measures to reduce the Austrian
deficit. They say that the continued withholding of counterpart
releases by the US in an effort to force agreement on an economic
program is aggravating an unfavorable employment situation, and
fear that further pressure may force the Austrian Government to
seek alternative financing. The American mission believes that
leverage over Austrian policy deriving from control of counter-
part funds has now substantially diminished.
Implementation of the economic program desired by MSA would
require major concessions from both coalition parties. Despite
claims of American support from both sides, the Socialists have
apparently suspected that the Vienna mission has undue sympathy
for the conservative position because of its initial emphasis
on a shift from long- to short=term investments and its failure
to achieve conservative support for across-the-board reforms at
the same time that major concessions have been demanded from the
Socialists. A principal organ of the People?s Party recently
denounced American criticism of restrictive business practices
in Austria as "interference in Austrian internal affairs,"
25X1
The consequences of a further exacerbation of conservative-
Socialist relations could be serious. Economic reforms achieved
at the expense of isolation of Austrian Socialism could jeopardize
future internal political stability in Austria.
Netherlands Government disturbed by US action against Dutch
bank. The et er an s as profest&-ff mer can i-etion iig
insets of the Slavenburg Bank for allegedly financing shipments
of strategic materials to Communist China- The Dutch claim
that it was up to them, as signers of the UN resolution on trade
with China, to investigate the charges and to determine the
action to be taken,
25X1 Furthermore, a Dutch official stated that the bank was
following accepted international practices and added that US
25X1
foreign trade statistics show that American importers are su
plying large net dollar balances-to the Soviet bloc.
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120 Swedish press sees Prime Minister furthering American under-
--
newspaper asserts that r me Minister Erlander's recent visi
to the United States has increased America's understanding of
Sweden's alliance-free foreign policy. The non-Communist press
generally ridicules Moscow's charge that his visit marked a
reorientation of the country's foreign policy.
25X1 25X1
Comment: While the press comment is designed in part to
enhance the prestige of Erlander for the September parliamentary
elections, it also reflects the Swedes' constant search for
evidence that their foreign policy course has not hurt their
reputation in the Western world. It thus suggests a degree of
uncertainty in their own thinking.
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TOP SECRET
24 April 1952
CIA No. 49624
Copy No. 46
TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT
TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
25X1
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X1
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For RblPasP 9nnsinl/9R ? (1A-RnP7gTO1146A000900180001-4
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TOP SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATIONNAFI ECTINGIN EONATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHI SECSe 793 AND 7g4v THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC,
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICBYH ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORISED PERSON IS PROHIBITED
FAR EAST
f diplomatic relations
o
Japan proposing establishment otenese
t o hig -rank~.ng o icy a o
with slap nations. A Japan
s
and
otes with officials ~Philippines that
-reign ice as informed nAme
has proposed an exchange o
treaty. A
Indonesia which would establish dip omapea
sheen pending relations their ratification Of the
similar offer will be Government.
resentatives
The official also neic
attached to the Allied e eaceftreatyabecomesbeffectiveoat
ordinar aliens after the
veral diplomatic missions
position of se
Comments The pgovernments will not have
now accred to SCAP, whbseApril, has previously been
ratified the peace treaty by 28
in doubt. In view of Japan?s reluctance etoederfine eatyCtalks,
sovereignty in the current japan-China
acal has not been
it may be significant that a similar prop
made to the Chinese Nationalists-
is in accord with the
This report indicates that Japan for the occum
chinery
the
contr United States viewthaACJ and theoFarl Commission,
comes into force-
potion, including the
automatically terminates when the treaty
There has been some speculation that the USSR might dispute
enciestvon the grounds that the
the termination of th~setTil].egalo
San Francisco treaty
disturbed over government?s lack of progress-.
2. Bao Dai zcan Minister Heat , Bao In an interview wit mer 3 to form a more
pointed out the uselessness of attempting
representative government until the actions of the local
p lie French regime make Vietnainsvicnt~~pe~o~ernrnenteaffairs and
deplored French meddling
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described as "intolerable" disregard of Vietnamese laws,
notably tax legislation, by French citizens.
Heath comments that Bao Dai is partially to blame for
the weak Vietnamese Government in that he has not rovided
energetic leaderships
Comment: The Vietnam Government is still unable to
attract tie popular support necessary to counter the Viet
Minh's appeal, The French have deplored to American
officials Bao Dai's inertia, but there is evidence that
they have not assiduously tried to arouse him to action.
The new French diplomatic counsellor in Saigon states
that Resident Minister Letourneau intends to replace "old
colonialist" officials with men not previously associated
with Indochina,
The French have been committed since early 1947 to
the formation of a genuinely Vietnamese Government, but
the proposed replacement of the "old colonials" in Indo-
china has not materialized.
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