CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNON THE 'NEW CLASS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 22, 1960
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA=l
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVI
THE "NEW CLASS"
HEARING
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FURTHER TESTIMONY OF ALE, KSANDR Y. KAZNACHEYEV
JANUARY 22, 1960
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1960
Approved For Release 2004/09/23: CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
COMMITTEE ON TIIE JUDICIARY
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, (1atrman
ESTES KEPAUVER, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
THOMAS C. IIENNINOS, in., Missouri ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L, McCLELLAN, Arkansas KENNETH D. KEATINO, New York
JOSEPH C. O`MAIIONEY, Wyoming NORRIS COTTON, Now Hampshire
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan '
SUBCOMMITTEE To INL'ESTIGATE TIIE ADMINISTRATION OF TIIE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTUE:RINTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTO:S1, South Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
SAM J. ERVIN, Ja., North Carolina KENNETH D. KEATINO, Now York
J, 0. SouawL'eE, Cbunsd
Di,NJAUIR M.thDzL, Director of Rcararcb
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
FEBRUARY 24, 1960.
RESOLUTION
Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, That the testimony of Aleksandr Yurie-
vich Kaznacheyev given in executive session on January 22, 1960, with
the consent of the witness, be printed and made public.
JAMES 0. EASTLAND,
Chairman.
THOMAS J. DODD,
Vice Chairman.
OLIN D. JOHNSTON.
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN.
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.
ROMAN L. 1IRusKA.
EvERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN.
KENNETH B. KEATING.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
The "New Class"
FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 1960
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMr I'EE To INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF TIIE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee mete pursuant to call, at 1.1:10 a.m., in room 312,
Old Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel, and Benjamin Mandel,
director of research.
Senator DODD. Would you stand and raise your right hand and be
sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the
subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. KAZNACIiEYrv. I do.
Senator DODD. All right, Mr. Sourwine, proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ALEKSANDR YURIEVICH KAZNACHEYEV
Mr. SOURWINE. Your full name?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEv. Aleksandr Yurievich Kaznacheyev.
Mr. SoURwINE. And you have testified before this committee on
a previous occasion?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SorRwINE. Mr. Chairman, a good deal of the testimony in the
previous hearing had to do with matters related to Burma. Much of
the discussion today will relate to conditions in the Soviet Union with
respect to which this witness is also competent.
To establish that point, sir, you left the Soviet Union in 1957?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes, the last time I was in the Soviet Union
was in the fall of 1957.
Mr. SOURwINE. You have, since 1957, maintained various contacts
with persons more recently from the Soviet Union?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes, I had many acquaintances that had just
come to Burma from the Soviet Union.
Mr. SOURWINE. Can you therefore discuss conditions in the Soviet
Union, as of your own knowledge up to 1957 and from your knowledge
of Soviet citizens and others that have been in the Soviet Union since
that time?
Mr. KAZNAOHEYEV. Yes.
1
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
2 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. SouawINE, I show you an article entitled "Soviet 'Operation
Burma"' which bears your byline and which appeared in the January
18 issue of the New Leader, and ask if you wrote that article.
Dlr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes, I wrote this article.
Mr. SOURWLNE, Now this is cumulative of the testimony we pre-
viously had, but I think it ought to go into the record.
Senator LoID. Very well.
(The document referred to reads as follows:)
[From the New leader, Jan. 18, 1900, pp. 13-151
SOVIET "OPERATION BURMA"
(By Aleksandr Y. Kaznacheyev)
Aleksandr Y. Kaznacheyev is a young former Soviet diplomat who
defected from his post in Rangoon last June. His report on Soviet
activities In Burma-and his views on the situation inside the
U.S.S.R., which will appear here next week-are of particular inter-
est because, in family background, education, and career, his story
Is typical of the now Soviet generation. Born In 1932 of parents
who were members of the Soviet Intelligentsia-his father was an
electronics engineer and his mother a doctor-he was graduated
from a .lioscow gymmnasitim in lt1;,1. From 1951 to 1951 he studied in
the Chinese department of the Ministry of Higher Education's Ori-
ental Institute. After 2 more years of work In the eastern division
of the Foreign Ministry's International Relations Institute, lie was
attached to the Soviet Embassy in Burma in March 19:57, as an infor-
mation officer and Burmese language and area specialist.
In the fall of 1957, while on leave in Moscow, I was Informed by high-ranking
KGB (State Security Branch) officers that I had been selected to do political
Intelligence work In Burma. The two men who directed me to join KGB were
Vladimir Us and Boris Galashin, whom I knew in Burma as high-ranking Soviet
Embassy officers. They told me that I had been selected for KGB since I knew
Burma, and the Burmese language. This was a decision that I could not accept
or reject. They were only telling me what KGB headquarters had decided.
They bad me sign a paper which was an oath to do my best in performing
tasks assigned by intelligence superiors and to keep deadly silent about my work.
The last sentence of the oath stated that, if I willingly or unwillingly revealed
secrets, I should be ready to accept any punishment, including the death sentence.
Its and Galashin gave me the false name of Kaznkov. After this, they told me
what my duties would be for Soviet Intelligence to Burma.
I was to translate, from Burmese to Russian, secret documents obtained by
the Rangoon element of Soviet political intelligence. I was to develop contacts
In Burmese political circles, In order to gather Information. This would lead
to my developing cooperative politicians, In order to turn them into paid Soviet
agents. I was to estarblish contacts with foreigners In Burma, in order to gather
Information on tine work of foreign Embassies and to penetrate them. Lastly,
I was to observe the behavior of other Soviet citizens In Burma and report on
them.
I had instructions that my intelligence affiliation should be kept secret from
other members of the Soviet Embassy In Burma. including the then-Ambassador
Alexci D. Shihorin himself. The KGB is supervised by the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, This organization plants Its rest-
dents abroad under cover as diplomats, Embassy workers, representatives of the
State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), Sov-
exportillm, Sovinforrubureau, and as Interpreters or technicians working with
Soviet aid projects.
In Burma. the KGB unit's chief was IvanVoznly, who had the rank of colonel
of state security. Boris Galashin, the man who "recruited" me for intelligence
work In Moscow. had the cover rank of attache'. He was responsible for my
political reliability.
The assistant to the chief of the group was Igor Trushkovskiy. He had the
cover job of VOKS representative In Burma and the rank of second secretary
and cultural attachtr, Two other members of the group were Mikhail Vologzanin,
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100980007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
who had the cover job of Sovexportfilm representative, and Dimitry Dityatev,
who had the rank of second secretary and was head of the Embassy consular
office. There are of course other people, including special technical personnel
such as radio operators and code makers, who work only for the intelligence
group.
The activities of the Soviet Intelligence in Burma are to subvert the national-
ist political forces and politicians, gather secret information about the Burmese
Government and to carry out special psychological warfare. The group also
had the responsibility to observe and report on all Soviet citizens in Burma, to
discover the unreliable elements and those that had been influenced by "capital-
ist" propaganda and surroundings. The group also carries out espionage work
by seeking to penetrate foreign Embassies in Burma, especially the American.
The KGB in Burma is responsible, only to its headquarters in Moscow. The
Ambassador himself is kept under constant physical and technical watch, and
reports on his activities are regularly sent to Moscow by the group.
This intelligence group works with its agents in the political parties, such as
the pro-Communist National United Front. The largest part of my work was the
translation of reports and documents of these agents who penetrated the politi-
cal parties, in addition to governmental departments and the Burmese Army.
The main bases from which the secret intelligence activity was carried out
were the offices of the Embassy, VOKS, Sovexportfilm and Sovinformbureau.
The group uses three separate units of special radio equipment for its work in
Burma.
The KGB element has a special assignment from the CPSU Central Committee
to maintain contact with the legal Communist parties above ground and the in-
surgent Communist underground. These contacts are maintained by exchanges
of letters and messages and by secret personal meetings. Personal contacts can
be carried out at very high level, such as that between Bobodshan Gafurov, a
member of CPSU Central Committee who visited Burma, and U Ba Nyein, a
leader of the Communist National United Front. In Burma, I worked as an in-
terpreter at secret meetings between these two men.
One of the most important activities of the group In which I personally par-
ticipated was special psychological warfare that embraced the entire southeast
Asian region. The Rangoon group of the KGB regularly planted in the Burmese
press articles prepared in Moscow KGB headquarters. These articles were
forgeries about political parties and political leaders of other southeast Asian
countries, accusing them of being tools of imperialism, dishonest and corrupt.
They were aimed at isolating and liquidating anti- and non-Communist parties
and leaders. They were also aimed at spoiling relations between the people of
these countries and the anti-Communist world. There were forgeries about the
American support of the Indonesian rebels, American bribery of the Indian Fi-
nance Minister, frequent violations of Cambodia's sovereignty and Japan's "sub-
versive" activity in southeast Asia. And many, many more.
The complex planting of the articles in the Burmese press worked as follows:
Articles in the Russian language were received in Rangoon from Moscow on
microfilm, through intelligence channels, and reproduced as photocopies at the
Embassy. I translated the articles into English and Burmese. The Moscow
articles were then planted in Burmese newspapers, through trusted Burmese
agents. It was then my duty to check the articles (in both the Burmese and
English languages) against the original Russian text. My notes on the accuracy
of the translation and reproductions of any variations from the Russian original
were sent back to Moscow, this time through Tass channels. The Soviet In-
formation Service, T'ass, Radio Moscow, official Soviet diplomatic representatives
abroad, and other newspapers were then obliged to publish and redistribute these
materials all over the world as true stories.
The main Burmese newspapers used by the group for this work were the
Communist-controlled Mirror and Botataung ; the People's Journal, the New Light
of Burma, the Path, the Mandalay Ludu, and the English-language Burman
were also used. The Dagon Publishing House was also exploited by Soviet
Intelligence In Burma.
One of the best examples of such fabrications was a pair of articles planted
in the Mirror by the Voznly group at the very peak of Indonesian insurgent
activity during the spring of 1P58. One of the articles reproduced a letter, pur-
portedly from an Indonesian rebel leader named Sjamsuddin to the American
Ambassador in Tokyo. The other purported to be from "Admiral Frost," of
the U.S. Navy, to another Indonesian rebel leader. At Vozniy's direction, I
translated both of these "letters" from the Russian-language photocopies Into
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
4 CONDITIONS IN TIIE SOVIET UNION
English, and later checked the articles published In the Burmese-language Mirror
against the original Russian photocopies. The Sjamsuddin "letter" was dated
March 15, 1958, but was published in the Mirror In May. In it, Sjamsuddin
asked the U.S. Ambassador for help and talked of aid for the rebellion from the
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. The Frost "letter," which was published
In the Mirror in early June, advised the rebels not to surrender and stated that
the United States would continue to help them. These articles were signed by
the Mirror's "Special Correspondent In Djakarta." These Rangoon Mirror ar-
ticles were then distributed among Indonesian political circles, played up In the
world Communist press, and even republished in an Indonesian-language news-
paper, the Ilintang Timur, which was also controlled by Soviet intelligence.
This activity of the Rangoon intelligence group is only part of the large Soviet
press network throughout all of southeast Asia. In Indonesia, Soviet Intelligence
uses such newspapers as the Bintang Timor; in India, Blitz and the Delhi
Times; In Thailand, La Patrie was used in the same way.
In Burma there is now the celebrated Kortancnko case, which has been going
on for many months. Koviunenko is the Toss representative in Burma who, in
the spring of 105 9, published an article in the Tass bulletin which said three
Burmese newspapers (the Nation, Guardian, and Reporter) were used by the
American Embassy to undermine Burma's polley of neutrality. This article was
written in Moscow originally, planted In the Delhi Times, and signed by their
nonexistent Rangoon correspondent, The article was then sent to Rangoon for
distribution through Pass channels. In this case the Soviet propaganda nma-
chinc did not work well and a definite mistake was made In the last link of the
chain. The channel of distribution was not properly selected and the editor of
the Nation sued Kovtunenko for defamation of character. Kuvtuncnka hid out
in the Soviet Embassy to escape trial. As far as I know, he is still afraid to
come out.
Besides the Intelligence group In the Embassy, there are other groups with
Intelligence duties. The GRIT (military intelligence) group Is operated by the
military attache group. The former chief of this group was Colonel Stryguine,
whose unsuccessful attempt to defect to the Burmese Government is well known.
Stryguine's replacement was to be Col. Anatully Popov, a highly experienced
intelligence officer,
Another group is the Refereutura, which Is responsible to the No. 10 Depart-
ment of the Foreign Office in Moscow. In this group are intelligence officers
such as First Secretary Mnksin, and Ambassador's Secretary Aleksandr Razvin,
and another section of codemakers and radio operators. The Refereutura Is
responsible for keeping files of all secret documents and communications with
Moscow. It also has the responsibility of reporting on the behavior of Soviet
citizens in Burson and for technical work.
An economic intelligence service works through its economic advisor, Vaslliy
Panov, who is the representative of the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations (GKES) In Burma. This group has detlulte intelligence duties.
There Is no doubt that the real Intention of the Moscow and Peking regimes is
to achieve a Communist Burma. The original Stalinist plan for gaining this
objective through the armed efforts of the Communist insurgents has definitely
failed. The Insurrection was started on Moscow's orders in 1938, but the Chinese
People's Republic soon appeared and direct control over the Burmese insurgents
was passed to Peking. The failure of the insurgency was recognized by Moscow
in 1954, and all stress was shifted to bringing the Communists to power by
subversion and other "legal" means.
The above? round Communist parties of the National United Front were as-
signed the main role in this new approach, while the Insurgents had a supporting
role. Both were directed and supported by the Soviet and Chinese Embassies.
A determined, and to some extent successful. nttempi was made to achieve power
by parliamentary means In the 1956 general elections, when with the financial
aid of the Soviet and Chinese Governments and coercion of the voters by the
Communist Insurgents, the National United Front won about 40 seats in the
Burmese Parliament.
Conditions became quite favorable for the Communists after the 195G elections,
especially after the split of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL)
in early 1958. The split occurred with the aid of Soviet Intelligence. This
progress for the Communists was Interrupted in October 10:38, when Prime
Minister U Nu transferred the premiership to Gen. Ne 'in. Several hundred
Peking and Moscow agents were arrested and the Government began to achieve
great successes in the liquidation of the Communist Insurgents.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN. THE SOVIET UNION 5
Thus, the Soviet and Chinese plans were frustrated. The Soviet Embassy, in
reports to Moscow, labeled the NO Win Government "proimperialist" and
"fascist" and accused it of "liquidating the. people's freedoms and rights." The
Soviet Embassy was especially angered by the Government's attitude of true
neutrality.
As a result of the changed situation in Burma, a new plan has been developed
for the Communist achievement of power. Two months prior to my departure
from the Soviet Embassy, the Embassy received a document from Moscow that
laid down the official line for Soviet action in Burma. According to this direc-
tive, efforts were to be made (1) to increase all possible support for the Commu-
nist National United Front; (2) to split the leadership of the Burmese Army by
all possible means; and (3) to split and weaken the influence of the AFPFL.
The final goals of Peking and Moscow in southeast Asia are the same, although
there are some differences in their tactics. Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia
are considered to be in China's sphere of influence, while the Soviet sphere of
influence includes India, Ceylon, and Afghanistan. Moscow's immediate inter-
est is to have Burma as a weak but friendly neutral, with the Communists
working slowly toward achieving a Communist government by parliamentary
methods. The rebellion is considered a lost cause by the Soviet Government and
even harmful to Soviet interests. The Chinese generally don't believe in the
usefulness of neutrality and have therefore maintained support of the Commu-
nist insurgents and kept the Burma border problem. unsettled.
While the Soviet Government hopes to seize Burma's hand in order more easily
to seize its throat, the Chinese Communists endeavor to seize Burma's throat
directly. The result is the same.
Mr. KAZNACHr-,YEV. This is the first part of my statement that I
made at a press conference in New York.
Mr. SoURwINE. Yes. I show you a photostat of an article which
appeared in the Sunday Times of London, December 6, 1959, entitled
"Voice Out of Russia."
I ask if you have been given an opportunity to read this article?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes, I read this article in the Washington Post.
Mr. SouRwINE. This article was subsequently reprinted in the
Washington Post?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does this document seem to you to be authentic?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I think it is the original document. The author
looks to be perhaps a teacher in high school, a member of the intelli-
gentsia.
Mr. SorRwINis. Would you, in large part, endorse what the writer
of this article says from your own observation?
Mr. KAZNACiIEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask .that that may go into the
record.
Senator DODD. It may.
(The document referred to is as follows:)
[From the Sunday Times, Dec. 6, 1959, p. 11]
VOICE OUT oI' RUSSIA: "WHAT I WANT THE WEST To KNow"
A REMARKABLE DOCUMENT REACHES THE SUNDAY TIMES
An extraordinary and revealing document has reached the Editor
of the Sunday Times from the Soviet Union. The message that
accompanied this moving essay simply said the writer wished
to offer an honest answer to the fundamental question always in
the mind of foreigners who talk with Soviet citizens, but hardly
ever answered with complete candor: What do the Russian people
really think and feel about life in the Soviet Union?
The Editor has reason for believing that this document, which
was transmitted through channels that must remain secret, is.au-
Approvedd or Felease 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
6 CONDITIONS IN TIIE SOVIET UNION
thentic. He is aware that the writer belongs to a class favoured
under the Soviet regime, that his contribution to Soviet life Is im-
portant, and that he was born after the Bolshevik revolution of
1917, It is presented to our readers as a personal expression of
faith from behind a Curtain which, although lifted a little of late,
still stops the free Interplay of minds.
"At that time nobody bad heard of the Communists or Socialists or of the
so-called levellers in general. All the same they existed--in vast numbers,
moreover."-M. E. Saltykuv-Shebedrin, the filth-century Russian satirist.
A French writer once said that Russia is a land of steppes In which stands
tho Asiatic capital of Moscow-and Moscow Itself was often thought of as
being a town with at large number of churches.
It was to one of these churches (hat my grandmother used to take me as
a child of five. I remember my feelings of terror at the stern faces of the
congregation, at the darkness and gloom of flip church.
It was a world which seemed to have slipped out of time and to have
stopped. It seemed that these same old women must have prayed for the
defeat of Napoleon In 1812.
This ancient bygone world, which has been declared extinct a thousand times
and yet which always appears again from somewhere, does not unite all
Russian peoples But it reminds every individual of something Inside him, and
of the fact that, like It or not, he Is n Russian and can never be anything else.
It Is not easy to describe this "Russianness." Less than 100 years ago Russia
ceased to be a serf-owning State. The feudal system left as its legacy masses
of wretched, downtrodden peasants, a large class of officials corrupted by ar-
bitrary rule, pollee officers, spies, bailiffs, bloodsucking merchants and other
riffraff who despised the People because they had come from their ranks and
knew that the People had no mysterious potential still to be awakened.
They despised their masters-the Russian nobility-for their idealism and
lack of practical sense.
This last class-the Russian aristocracy-were the smallest, but their role in
our Russian history is enormous. Just as Athens (which in ancient Greece was
smaller than :tioginsk, in provincial Russia) appears to our Imagination as an
immense town, a whole world, so the Russian aristocracy, which was a thou-
sandth part of the population, seems to us to have been the basic factor of
Russian life.
Within this class an extraordinary, original Russian culture was created-
a culture which gave us such masterpieces as "War and Peace" and "The Brothers
Karamazov." I have mentioned only two works, probably the best known in
the West, but there are Innumerable other masterpieces of literature, art and
music created by Russian aristocratic culture. And if one remembers that In
the narrow circle of this aristocracy the majority spent their time looking after
their estates or living largely abroad, or spending their time in high living,
then you can see that Russian culture was created by a handful of people.
But there is nothing strange or surprising about this. Think again of the
ancient world. Desperate and enterprising people, fleeing from vast Etastern
despotisms, settled down on the wild shores of the Balkans. These were fierce
and brave people, not averse to pillage and looting; but the main thing about
them was their boundless love of freedom. Once free, these martial people
created the Aegean culture which then became II'ellenie culture-a culture on
which the whole of our civilization is founded.
How many times has mankind been told by philosophers and poets that if man
were made free his talents would blossom and his power become boundless!
But one must accept this with the whole of one`s heart, for sometimes material
success, the wealth of the State and the unity of the People seem more important
than freedom. Everyone must understand for himself that if there is freedom,
there will be everything.
If you are not entirely convinced, but need facts to persuade you, look at the
example of Russian history.
IDEAS BE4AN TO STIR
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Russian autocracy had great
power and importance in world affairs. After the reform of Peter the Great
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION 7
and the brilliant age of Catherine, the Russian nobility tried to adopt European
education and lustre. Coarse pleasures and merrymaking no longer satisfied
them once they had savoured Western culture. The needs of the developing
intellect were such that ideas of humanism and freedom began to stir.
Of course the nobility, while paying lipservice to fashionable sentiments about
pity for one's fellow humans, continued to maintain themselves in idleness at
the expanse of a horrifying poverty among their serfs; but the ideas circulated
The young and ambitious Alexander I flirted with democracy and saw him-
self as the Enlightener of the People. One way he saw to win over the more civi-
lised among the nobility was to found a lycee in Tsarskoe Solo. It was built
in the immediate neighbourhood of his palace, and it was Alexander's idea that
the children of noble landowners, having graduated from the lycee, would provide
an intellectual and loyal support for the Throne.
How naive were even kings in those days! Alexander imagined that the mere
fact of his benevolence and the proximity of his Royal person would be enough
to win their devotion to the Crown for the rest of their lives. He did not concern
himself about the education and indoctrination given by the lycee.
And so, in the shaded parks of Tsarskoe Selo, there grew up an atmosphere of
exceptional freedom of thought. Separated from their parents and the realities
of life on feudal estates, left almost to their own devices, at liberty to read
books, hold discussions and parties, stimulated by freethinking, progressive
teachers, these young men did not develop in the way Alexander intended, but
in the way human nature always does if it is given a free choice.
There was much these young hearts did not understand ; they lived in a world
of fantasy and bookish ideals. But from this unreal world emerged the most
real thing in the world-the free human spirit.
Neither before nor since have there been such conditions for the free develop-
ment of the personality as when the lycee was founded. Russia could not miss
such a moment. Pushkin appeared. You English cannot know what Pushkin
is for us. He is our pride, our hope, and our love. He is the Sun of our art, and
without him there would have been neither Tolstoy nor Dostoevsky ; for it
was Pushkin who gave impetus to slumbering Russian. thought, fertilised Rus-
sian culture, and by his genius gave this culture its direction.
It is Pushkin who makes us feel that Russian man is infinitely gifted and can
create treasures of the intellect if only he is left in peace by the hundred-headed
Hydra that constantly claims its tribute, freezing his soul with its vile, brutish
demands.
Perturbed by the bright light of dawning freedom, the Hydra bestirred him-
self and Pushkin was destroyed. He lived only thirty-seven years, but each
day of his life means more to u.s than any of Suvorov's victories.
The Hydra "restored order" In the lycee (and in the whole of Russia) and
waited to see what would happen. This is what happened. It proved impossible
to stein the feelings awakened among Russian people of culture. The rich
noblemen did not wish to return to barbarism ; some realised that the pleasures
of civilisation were finer than the orgies of their forbears ; others, having -tasted
the joys of creative activity, could no longer do without them. So the nobility
became freethinking, and the Hydra-State had no choice but to appease the
noble caste on which it depended, together with the martinet's discipline, and
more towards freedom of publication, open frontiers, and the elimination of
extremists by court procedure instead of by secret terrorism.
It was this group of internally free Russian noblemen that created our culture.
Within the limits of this group there was freedom and freedom of thought.
People spoke about what they wanted and thought about things that seemed
important to them. Their opinions were guided by their consciences. On this
ground grew up those flowers of art which still fill the world of culture with
their fragrance. All this would have been splendid if this small free world of
the well to do had existed on the moon. But it was on the earth, and existed
side by side with an unfree, materially wretched world, inhabited by an anony-
mous grey mass of people. This malodorous world. not only fed the noblemen,
it nurtured their art with popular talent. They could not close their eyes to
this. Like a tuber cut off from the sun, the small, creative caste of noblemen in
Russia stretched out its shoots towards the masses, coalesced with them, and
distributed among them the jewels created in freedom.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
8 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
And what of the Hydra? First we have to know what the Hydra Is. Is he
Tsnrism, the Communist Party, or the State in general?
We Russians are specialists on the hydra. Although he watches us constantly
and thinks he knows nil our thoughts, we know more about him than he knows
about us. The Hydra, you see, is phenomenally dull witted, whereas we are
quick witted and have an artistic flair. We realised a long time ago that however
he disguises himself-as Nicholas I, as Arakcheev, Stolypin, or Pobcdonostsev,
whether he has a gendarme's cockade. or a general's epaulettes, whether he calls
himself a party member, a monarchist, a Communist, a democrat, an instrument
of authority, a dissident, a progressive, an old Bolshevik, a devil, or an angel-
the hydra Is always the Hydra.
It is because of the Hydra that only scoundrels may walk the earth while
everybody else bides in corners ; that only scoundrels go unafraid, while the rest
walk in terror ; that only crooks and traitors may count on praise, while everybody
else Is expected to give thanks for the privilege of not being In gaol.
"RENDER UNTO CAESAR"
Christ says: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God
the things that are God's." We Russians understand this in our own way. In
these words we hear an admission that we should ncrt concern ourselves with the
ordering of our own lives: the Hydra looks after this for us. And even if we
tried to do It ourselves, the Hydra would push us aside with his dirty paw and
say: "Don't meddle In the affairs of Caesar. After all, I have left a few small
joys for you and I have promised you more to come; soon there'll be enough
maize, for Instance. What else do you want, new impressions?"
"Enough of that," we would reply. "Not long ago our fathers got new impres-
sions and studied the geography of the northern and eastern regions * * *"
[Translator's note: i.e., the concentration camps of the Far North and Siberia.]
If one were to allow open competition between honesty and crookedness, could
honesty win? The honest use only honest methods, whereas the crooks use
every weapon. The honest hesitate and doubt, while the crooks undermine them ;
[lie honest, even if they win, are forgiving, whereas the crooks, when they will,
torment you till only pride prevents you from crying out.
The crooks rage, shout at the tap of their voices, blackmail, hoot, threaten, lie,
and then laugh in your face and try to hit you from behind, or while you are
sleeping. At last you grow tired of this orgy at your expense, you say "to hell
with It," and render unto Caesar what is Caesar's.
Then, if you behave yourself for a long time, the crooks may even pat you on
the check xvith their greasy hands, saying: "Iion't forget, carp, there Is a pike
In the pond."
Forgive me for this historical digression. Without understanding the recent
past you could not understand Russia's present.
Yes, present-day Russia concerns practically the entire Western World, but
If you were to ask each Individual what precisely it Is that concerns him, the
majority would not be able to give a clear answer. I think the main question for
people from the Western World is: "Why don't Lite Russians live as we do,
and why do they want everybody to Live as they do?"
In talking of present-day Russia I shall take these questions as my starting
point. You can learn about external aspects of life In Russia from your corre-
spondents and tourists. But the Internal life of the Russians-these people who
resemble all others In the world in their spiritual qualities, their desires, their
good and bad points-sometimes escapes the observer.
Nevertheless, despite the way In which the visiting foreigner Is dazzled by the
Ilolshoi Theater, by the round of receptions, by university visits, by trips to
Sochi, to Yalta, and by other steps taken to entertain and divert hint, the In-
telligent traveler notices that people In the U.S.S.R. are reluctant to state their
opinions, and that his attcanpts to meet the ixs Ple "off the record" and to get to
know what they think are thwarted. A vacuum forms wherever he tries. Is
this to be ascribed to the mistrustfulness of the Russians?
Suppose you had been arrested In 193? for the least misdemeanor, or more
probably for none at all, but just because of an anonymous denunciation, or
because of the need to keep up a quota of arrests. Suppose you had been
tortured, sent to forced labor fur life, indeed, had been eliminated as a human
being. And suppose this had happened not only to you, but to millions of your
fellows.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONtIPIONS IN THE SOVIET ti'NtO1t
Incidentally, many of the people arrested then-and although only a small
proportion survived, even this number adds up to a groat many-are now re-
turning home. These are the so-called rehabilitees. They are broken, 111,
scarcely really living, just dragging out their last days. Once these were loyal
party people, good engineers or honest soldiers. Here, surely, is a subject for
a film. An old wreck of a man returns and is given a chit for an apartment by
the same local party secretary who once tormented him and then avoided him
like the plague when he was arrested. When he moves into his new apartment
the old man puts his felt boots (a typical feature of concentration camp dress)
Into the corner, just in case.
Suppose, after the war, you had again been reminded of the existence of
the "pike in the pond," suppose it had been dinned into your head every day
and every hour that you must not speak with foreigners because they are spies,
that you had read repeatedly in the newspapers about slanderous books on your
country published abroad by tourists and correspondents-would you, after all
this, throw yourself on the neck of a complete stranger and pour out all your
thoughts without the least idea of the use to which he might put them?
To understand what is going on in Russia one must take as one's starting
point the fact that our social life is dominated by universal crookedness. Just
try to understand this and everything will be clear to you.
[From the Sunday Times, Dec. 13, 1959, p. 11]
VOICE OUT OF RusslA-2 : FIGHTING THE HYDRA
This is the second part of a remarkable document which came
through secret channels out of the Soviet Union. A message with it
simply said that it was an honest attempt to answer the question :
What do Russians really think and feel about life under Khru-
shchev?
Before deciding to publish this "testament of faith," the editor
was at pains to satisfy himself that it is authentic. He also sub-
mitted it to Dr. Ronald Hingley, the expert on Russian affairs, who
writes : "This fascinating document rings completely true ; indeed,
to many Western readers it may give a healthy shock. Many of us
brood on Soviet intentions but * * * we can easily lose sight of the
fact that ordinary Russians cannot speak. Here is one who has
spoken."
Boundless crookedness-triumphant, cynical and hypocritical-that is Russia
today. Sometimes it becomes supercrooked and begins to reveal its own dark
deformities. This was so in the case of the scandalous "Khrushchev letter"'
on Stalin's crimes. Khrushchev was Stalin's political accomplice all his life.
Then there were the relevations about the monstrous, debauched life of Beria.
I can imagine how Western people could be led astray by such matters as these.
All his life Beria was proclaimed, not least by Khrushchev, as a devoted
servant of the people, a Leninist, a saint. And then, suddenly, we have "the vile
crimes of Beria * * *." These things can be explained only by the rule of
crookedness.
The reason is simple. All these revelations, appeals to the people, economic
reforms, 7-year plans, conquest of the virgin soil, innumerable resolutions of
the Supreme Soviet and sessions of the Council of Ministers, do not have as their
basic aim an improvement in the life of the people. They are fundamentally
serving the strategy of the ruling group which strives to strengthen its power,
remove possible rivals, and seize all key positions.
When Khrushchev published his semisecret letter on Stalin's atrocities, he
was not moved to do so by feelings of righteous indignation, but by the fact
that Stalin had left behind him a vast personal bureaucratic apparatus, which
possessed enormous strength and which had claims to the succession. The
1 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.-Khrushchev's "secret speech" on Stalin at the Twentieth Con-
gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 was read out at semipublic
meetings in the form of a "letter" from the Central Committee. Hence Russians refer to
the "secret speech" as "Khrushchev's letter."
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
10 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
parallel apparatus of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev controlled, had
to discredit this hostile apparatus and destroy it.
Khruslwhev's letter, though unparalleled In Its cynicism, served his personal
ninis well. A little earlier, after Khrushchev had courted the old Government
oligarchy, they Joined forces with his Central Committee and together they
removed their most dangerous common enemy, Beriu.
The creation of the Regional Economic Councils was of no benefit hi the people,
but they were needed by Khrushchev to drive the lust stake Into the grave of
the.] Government oligarchy. New, unknown people arose; all who had been
powerful to any extent where brushed aside and eliminated.
All this may be elementary. The English after all are not children in
political matters. But why then do they not understand what is going on in
Russia today?
What is taking place in front of our eyes is a most normal thing In Russian
life --the reshuffling at the top of the powers of crookedness. One set of crooks
(even viler ones) step Into the shoes of others, and in this Internal struggle
they constantly appeal to the people, make declarations and revelations, organize
meetings, discussions of Central Committee secret letters, etc. (and it makes
you sick, I can tell you). Although the people realize that Beria's apparatus
was smashed once it had begun to threaten members of the Central Committee
themselves, they know that something could arise to take its place. And, since
the physical conditions of Siberia are very well known to them, the people take
it very lackadaisical view of these discussions and meetings. Something more
about the attitude of the people of Russia to Internal politics must be said
later on.
When it crones to external politics, we have a special factor. The Western
World exists and has no intentions of disappearing, but the Hydra of the State
wants it to disappear. The stupid one-track mind of the Hydra is fixed on
the West and utterly perplexed by It.
The Government crooks rule everything Inside Russia. They even believe
that ordinary citizens have collie to love then], have given them their blessing and
imagine that it is impossible to live In any other way but this--namely. standing
at attention before the crooks. But, to and behold, somewhere else on this
planet, people do not stand to attention but behave as they wish, express their
i.houghts, argue, write good books, make good films, travel abroad, are sad or
happy, commit good and bad deeds, and all this happens not under the oppressive
stare of crooks but In freedom.
The Soviet rulers, who are champions of intrigue, who have learned the
ultimate wisdom of how to sneak up to a man behind his back and crack his skull
with a brick, suddenly go out into the world and discover that it is not primitive
like theirs but vast and complicated In Its liberty.
Imagine a scoundrel who by Intimidation and violence has possessed and
dominated a woman. With blackmail and threats he has made her forget the
past and forced her to believe that he, the scoundrel, behaves like this not
because he is a scoundrel, but because this is the nature of things. And suppose
another loan suddenly moves In next door, a man who speaks freely, thinks deeply
about matters of life and death, indulges in speculation and dreams; a man who
is, in fact, free. Would not the scoundrel feel hatred for this neighbor? Would
lie not want to Isolate hila? Or make him also live the life of a scoundrel?
People in the West, do not overestimate the strength of these crooks. They
have terrorized everybody in our country, but for this very reason they themselves
are frightened of everything. They are accustomed to hypocrisy from the day
of their birth and know very well how to deal with other scoundrels, but they
do not understanding the psychology of freemen and therefore fear them.
Having almost achieved their dark dream of creating a kingdom In which the
dead eye of the Hydra dominates everything, the crooks suddenly notice one
incompreheislble detail which stubbornly threatens and casts doubts on all
their efforts.
This detail Is the law of the complementary by virtue of which the Western
World begins to value and safeguard its freedom all the more as It understands
more fully the power of the Hydra In Russia.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
The crooks realise instinctively that the whole of mankind will never submit
to the Hydra and that the free ideology created by the Hellenes, the English,
French, Russians, and the Americans is indestructible. Therefore the crooks try
to adapt themselves to the existence of the West. This is why the Hydra's efforts
to play up to the West and camouflage himself before the eyes of the West are
second only in importance to his efforts to consolidate his power in Russia and
the subject countries.
Throughout practically the whole of Russian history there has been an
enormous expenditure of money and effort to show a good face to the West,
although the futility of this is obvious. I, for one, do not believe that the present
clumsy efforts of official Soviet propaganda or the activity of certain of your
fellow-traveller writers can deceive anybody in Europe or America. So why
does the Hydra try so hard?
I think that the dull brain of the Hydra has given birth to a phantasmagoric
dream: "Since the West will not disappear, can't we come to an agreement with
it, whereby it would leave us alone, not abuse us, not make invidious com-
parisons between itself and us, and pretend not to see us?" Then the crooks
would be able to triumph completely in one country and they would be prepared
to give the West something in return for closing its eyes.
But the West will just not stop thinking and saying things which disturb the
Hydra. The West will not compromise with its conscience and close its eyes by
agreement with the Hydra ; the West does not believe any of the Hydra's assur-
ances, because it knows that the basic feature of the Hydra's external policy is
unprecedented hypocrisy.
And again the Hydra rages, threatens, writes notes only to stop short and
realize that he is not faced by the Russian man-in-the-street who can be
manipulated at will, but by Englishmen or Americans who disregard threatening
notes. Then the Hydra begins to play up to the West, plead with it, and spends
the people's money without permission on support for such dubious persons as
Nasser ; he covers his claws with gloves and fawns on them. But these external
policies always fall and, thwarted, the crooks again turn their eyes to Russia
and think, "Here anyway my eyes can rest, here everything is clear and smooth."
But is it?
"In the whole world there are only two forces : the sword and the spirit,
and in the long run the spirit always triumphs over the sword."-Napoleon.
Do not think, inhabitant of the West, that life under the Hydra is in any way
attractive or exotic. It is in general a rather boring business. Beginning with
the morning paper and ending with the late news on television, if you live in
Russia you are dogged by the eye of the Hydra, his lies and his vileness. At a
meeting, at your work, you are addressed by people whom you know perfectly
well to be the greatest of crooks but who, because of this, have power, and
you must listen to them. When you go on a trip abroad you are briefed by
surly, stupid, and dangerous idiots.
You meet an old friend with whom you have discussed from time to time
the views of the Hydra, and he tells you that he has joined the party. Then
you begin to speak to him in newspaper language, and although he notices this,
he is not embarrassed, but regards it as normal.
I have no time to describe in detail the average life of the average Russian.
For this a novel would be needed and a better writer than I. How do we
Russians stand it, you ask? Of course we are fed up. More than we can say,
we would like to look at a world free of lies and crookedness and show it to
our children.
NO RESPECT FOR KHRUSHCHEV
But how do these feelings of ours affect the course of events? This is how:
The present Russian Government has not the slightest authority among the
people. Anecdotes about Khrushchev, Furtseva, and the others, have become al-
most a sign of good form in the most varied circles. If Stalin was feared, he was
also respected (and many believed in him) ; Khrushchev, even if he is feared
a little bit (he is an expert with the brick) is not in the least respected. It is
impossible to respect him.
There is a mood of great lassitude among the masses. Everybody attends
to his own business and everybody hopes for something. This inertia has even
begun to worry the people at the top. They now organize countrywide discus-
sions and they call on the people to help the Government to improve the
economy, the administration, help in technical development, and in general to
be more active. But the people do not lift a finger.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
12 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
No, Hydra, we were active, we believed in ideals, but Stalin sent 5 million
people to their graves for being active. We really thought that we were moving
towards a free life, toward communism. We believed our leaders, but Khru-
shchev, with his shameless hypocrisy and his ability to go back on his own words,
has shown us that we can believe only in ourselves. Since they have assumed
charge of our souls and our lives, let them take charge of everything else too.
We shall work if they force us; when they tiny its our money, we shall take it.
The complete collapse of the Hydra's authority has enormous consequences.
In the first i,lnee war has become impossible. The people will sweep the Hydra
away If lie risks such a monstrous adventure. In conditions of atomic war with
the dispersal of ground forces, nobody would tight when be was away from
the Hydra's eyes.
In the second place the ruling clique themselves are beginning to under-
stand that they have gone too far In their crookedness and their cynicism and
even sonic of them are probably sick and tired of their Hydra existence, After
a]l, they spend their lives destroying rivals, cursing and swearing at people and
exiling them to the far ends of the country. They come home late from work and
spend their leisure hours In wild orgies. By the age of 45 they get heart disease,
but what sort of a life is it? You die and nobody remembers you, because all the
others will be crawling on their bellies In front of your successor.
SEEDS OF REVOLT
We Russians don't know how to live properly, but we are beginning to under-
stand this more and more. The seeds sown In this giant people by a handful
of its free representatives have been scattered far and wide. You cannot see
these seeds but they have not died. They live In the womb of the people and are
maturing.
These seeds live in the qualities of the Russian people, in their calmness,
In their incapacity for Lite trivial, In their scepticism, in their disbelief in words,
in their deep conviction that the newspapers tell only tics, in their patience and
fortitude, in their preparedness for great deeds and for hardship in the name of
truth and justice, in the name of a great cause which they cannot find, in their
contempt for the Hydra, and finally In their unshakable belief in their own
strength and in the idea that they are worthy of a better life, a free life.
Knowing the mood of Russians In all groups of society, I think that there is a
possibility of our society evolving. Perhaps some role will be played in this
by the expansion of China if we have to choose between China and Europe we
shall unhesitatingly choose Europe. Perhaps there will be some new people at
the tot: (Ishrushchev is mortal, after all), perhaps there will be a gradual
Europeanization owing to the extension of tourist and cultural exchanges. I
don't know. But perhaps sooner than you think, you in the West will see a
Russia that will bring you not fear but light.
Mr. SouittvINE. To clear up a couple of points remaining from
ibe last hearing, would you expand somewhat on what you told us
about tho relationship Between you, as it. Soviet representative in
Rangoon, and (lie people of Burma?
Mr. K 1ZNACIIElEV. I was recruited into a criminal organization,
the Soviet intelligence service, and given definite obligations to spy
on Elie Burmese people.
What I want to make clear here is how I actually fulfilled those
obligations..
Mr. SonltwINu. All right.
Mr. I AZ',;.tcIIEYEV. hay main obligation was to translate documents
obtained by the intelligence service. My assignment was to do this
technical job.
Mr. SOUI[WINE. So you did it?
Mr. Khz:NAMIRYLP. lies. I had to do this technical work. This was
my everyday work and I had no way of avoiding it. Some of the
knowledge I have about the work of Soviet intelligence was acquired
in the process of this work-translation of intelligence documents.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION 13
The rest I obtained while acting as translator in secret conversations
between KGB officials and Burmese Communist agents. Another of
my obligations which I was constantly forced to fulfill was to get
information on political parties. However, I did everything I could
to avoid reporting on my Burmese friends.
Mr. SOURWINE. But you are telling us you were deceiving your in-
telligence chief from the beginning so as to protect any confidential
relationships you had with the Burmese people?
Mr. KAZNACHIEYEV. I had very many acquaintances among the Bur-
mese people. Some of them were my real friends, and I never re-
ported anything about them. I carefully concealed from intelligence
my real attitude toward Burma and the Burmese people. I concealed
the names of all my real friends, and this was not at all easy to do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This was right from the beginning of your work:
in Burma?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes. After beginning my work for intelligence
it was some time before they began to press me to start operational
work-getting information.' At first I was entirely confined to the
technical work of translating documents. This period lasted for app-
proximately 5 to 6 months and it was during this period that I estab-
lished my attitude toward Burma and the Burmese people and
acquired many good friends. So, when my chief started to press me
to do operational work, I found a way to avoid actually doing it. I
have to add here that other of my acquaintances in Burma were people
from the pro-Communist parties. I met them at the Embassy recep-
tions and in the offices of the Soviet Embassy. They were very
friendly to me because I was Soviet and they gave me their in-
formation quite voluntarily. That information I reported directly
to intelligence.
Those people were, quite aware of what they were doing and were
just using me to transmit their messages and reports to the, Soviet
Embassy.
Mr. SOURWINE. What you are saying is that where a Burmese friend
of yours spoke to you in confidence, you respected his confidence?
Mr. KAZNAOFIEYEV. Yes. I did this because I despised the Soviet
regime and had long since become disillusioned with communism.
Mr. SOURwINE. Your loyalties were to your Burmese friends?
Mr. KAZNACIHEYEV. Yes, I had many difficulties in getting ac-
quainted with the Burmese.
As a rule, the Burmese were refusing to establish more or less con-
stant contacts with me and to meet me more than once, but usually
they changed their minds after they found out that I really wasn't a
Communist and in no way tried to use them for getting information
but was just seeking their friendship for the sake of friendship.
I enjoyed their company. I liked to study their language, culture,
and so on, through them.
Mr. SoURwINE. When you went to Burma, you had been instructed
to make contacts for information purposes?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SoURwiNE. At the same time you had been warned not to go too
far in making such contact because of the danger of ideological
contamination.
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. No.
51852-60-3
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
14 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Air. SOUIrwi-,E. That. didn't apply to you as an intelligence agent?
Mr. It` AZNAcJIEYEV. Yes. This warning was not applied to me as an
intelligence agent. Before recruiting me into the intelligence organ-
ization, I was carefully checked. 11Iy record was clean. Actually, at
that time I was uearly the only one in the Soviet foreign service who
knew the Burmese language well. So my bosses had confidence in me
and trusted me. They knew I was sometimes quite critical about
Soviet life but they thought my criticism was healthy criticism aimed
at improving the position of the. Communist regime.
Mr. SouRWItiE. The, warning about danger of ideological contami-
nation was applied, generally, to the staff of the Embassy?
Mr. K.NzN tciIFZ-sv. Yes it is applied, generally, to all people. Here
is a great contradiction of the Soviet diplomatic system. On the one
hand, all members of the staff of the Embassy are constantly forced
and, sked to get as many contacts as possible within the local popula-
tion, to mix with Burmese at every opportunity and to make friends,
especially in political circles, army, and business groups. Of course,
the inenll~ers of the Embassy were ordered to make friends with the
local population-not for the sale of friendship, but in order to get
valuable information, spread Communist ideas, and Soviet propa-
ganda. At the same time, the Soviets in Burma were instructed not
to go so far in these frnternizations as to become intimate with their
Burmese contacts. A warning was constantly reheated not to trust
anybody, to be very careful, and to be very cautious about foreign
intelligence services and rovoc.ateurs. We were also warned to re-
inember constantly about the capitalistic surrounding and capitalistic
inopag anda. The Soviets who have not been recruited into intel-
ligence as a rule do not like these warnings and restrictions. They
know that without becoming really friendly with people, it is impos-
sible to spread Communist ideas and Soviet propaganda and to get
really valuable information. They want to avoid complications and,
as a rule, avoid any contacts at all with the local population.
Mr. SOURWINe. That is the wa ? to stay out of trouble?
Mr. K;tzNACIiFrav. Yes. They tried to walk away from any
troubles.
Air. So nnwiNE. Now, in discussions with us, you have told us about
the master race psychology of the, Soviet representatives who go to
foreign countries. Would you tell us about that here for this record?
i, ir. K4ZNACIIEYrV. The Soviet. Government and the Communist
Party spare no efforts to indoctrinate all Russians with the idea of so-
called "Soviet patriotism." The education of Soviet youth and all
other people in the Soviet Union is carried out under the officially
adopted slogan: "Tice last Soviet man stands two heads higher than
the first man from a capitalist country." The teaching of "Soviet
propagates the idea of su-
patriotism" is evil and even criminal. country."
periorit , of "Socialist nations" and the Inferiority of "capitalist
nations.' The people, especially the youth, in the Soviet Union are
taught to look down on all "bourgeois" nations as second class and
inferior.
The effect of this teaching is that when many Soviet people come
abroad they have some prejudice against people in capitalist countries
and it takes time-- -and more than this, definite courage and determined
effort-to overcome these prejudices. I am going to state that these
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION 15
prejudices, are purposely cultivated and strengthened by Soviet prop-
aganda and the officials of Soviet Embassies.
When I came to Burma, my first step was to ask the people around
me what the country was like-what did they think about the Burmese
people, their customs, traditions, culture, and so forth. As a rule, it
was implied that the country was very poor, nothing was interesting,
the people were lazy, poor, and superstitious.
Mr. SOURWINE. Uncultured.?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. The general idea in the Soviet Embassy in
Rangoon is that the Burmese people are uncultured and the authorities
in the Embassy carefully encourage this,idea,
Mr. SouuwiNE. You told us of an incident in which a Burmese stu-
dent had married a Russian girl. Will. you tell us about that?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. One of three Burmese students studying
at Moscow University married a Russian girl. I met several Russians
who knew this Burmese student and his Russian wife very well. They
told me the girl was a very good wife. They are very happy in their
life. They already have a child.
Once I was present in the Ambassador's office when the question
about this Russian girl marrying the Burmese student was discussed.
The Ambassador was enraged and referred to the girl as a prostitute.
Mr. SOURWINE. Because she married a native of an inferior nation?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I think he felt this. Later, I met another
Burmese student who had just returned from Moscow. This was in
June 1959, just 2 days before my defection. Ile told me that this
Russian girl had refused to follow her husband to Burma because she
had been threatened by Soviet authorities.
I'll give you another example. I know another Burmese student in
Moscow. His name is Maung Maung Oho. He was invited to teach
Burmese at the International Relations Institute where I studied. He
was very friendly with Russian students and the Russian students
liked him in the same way. They visited his room in the hotel and
tried to help him in his life in Russia.
It was soon found. out by the institute authorities and all students
of the Burmese group were briefed to avoid any nonofficial contact
with this Burmese and even threatened with reprimands.
Mr. SOURWINE. Why?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Because the institute authorities didn't like their
students to be really friendly with the Burmese. They were afraid
that Soviet students would be told the truth about life abroad by the
Burmese student. Officially, the Soviet propaganda referred to
Burma in such a way that the majority of the Soviet people think that
Burma has become some sort of Peoples' Democracy.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You, yourself, became friendly with a great many
Burmese, did you not?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I had very may good friends in Burma.
Mr. SOURWINE. You spent a good deal of your free time with the
Burmese people?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I spent practically all my free time with
my Burmese friends. The working day in the Soviet Embassy in
Rangoon was from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. After 2 p.m. I usually started a
completely new life. I visited my friends. They often invited me
to their homes. I adjusted to the Burmese way of life to a considerable
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
16 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
degree. Sometimes Burmese told me they forgot I was a foreigner.
I hated being in the ?oviet Embass , as the whole atmosphere there was
tense and unfriendly. My real life started only when was with my
Burmese friends.
Air. SoumvrxE. You made friends with them
Air. MxzN .tGIEYEV. Yes. I mademany very good and even intimate
friends among the Burmese. I believed in them; they respected me
and were very sympathetic toward me.. Several of my friends knew
about my plans to defect for 5 months before I acted. I practically
put my life in their hands and they didn't betray me. More than this,
they tried to help me.
Air. SouawiNE. Did this friendship with Burmese cause you any
trouble with the Soviet people?
Air. KAzNAciIETEV. Very few in the Soviet Embassy knew about
my real life. Illy boss in Soviet intelligence knew only that I often
met Burmese, but as long as I appeared to be doing my job, lie was
satisfied and didn't. control my life much. As for other Soviets, I
had some friction with them on this ground. When they referred to
the Burmese in a condescending and even insulting way, I tried to
ex lain to them that they were wrong. I got the reputation in the
embassy of being t.oo pro-Burmese. I know that one of them, Pro-
fessor 6arshkov, who had been sent to Burma by the United Nations,
reported to Moscow about me. Ile wrote that I liked Burma too much
and had become infected by capitalistic surroundings and that, in
general, there was something suspicious about me.
So whenever I referred in a friendly way about Burma to the
Soviets, it was understood there was some suspicion around me. To
be nonsuspicious you should have an unfriendly attitude.
Mr. SOURWINE. You told us before that the isolation of the Soviet
Embassy people was aggravated by the attitude of the Burmese them-
selves; that. they didn't like Communists and were reluctant to contact
Soviet representatives.
Mr. KAZ ACI1ETEV. Yes.
Mr. Sot-nwi E. Will you expand on that?
Mr. ICUINAcIIEYEV. I personally met many difficulties in getting
acquainted with the Burmese.
MIy special efforts helped me. I tried to be sincere and open with
my Burmese friends and that opened the doors of their homes and
even their hearts to me.
From the very beginning, I found that the average man in Burma
hated the Commnunists. The Burmese Communist insurgents, sup-
ported by their foreign masters, have been attempting to destroy time
country for more than 10 years by carrying on what the Soviets
call a "civil war." They have killed thousands, destroyed people's
property, etc. This personal experience of the Burmese people with
the evils of communism is supported by what. can be observed of the
Communist governments in the Soviet Union and China. The Bur-
mese people well remember Hungary and are especially conscious of
Tibet.
So the situation is such that, on the one hand, personnel from the
Soviet Embassy are not willing or are prevented from, fraternizing
with the local population and, on the other hand, there is no great
desire on the part of the local population to fraternize with the
Soviets.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION 17
Mr. SOURwINE. In connection with your description of relations
between Soviet personnel and the local population, would you like
to make some comment about the book "The Ugly American"?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. The book, "The Ugly American," is in
my understanding a very useful book. Its value is that it stated that
the struggle between communism and the free world for the under-
developed countries is not only political and economic but also moral.
I am convinced that in this moral struggle the Soviet Communists
and Communists in general are losing.
The weak point of this book is that the authors were not correct in
estimating the appeal and abilities of Soviet officials. My own ex-
perience showed that the author's evaluation was wrong.
For instance, I was the only member of the staff in the Soviet
Embassy in Rangoon that could read and speak the native language.
Nobody else in the Embassy could do it.
Secondly, as I have previously stated, the whole system of the
Soviet foreign service is such that it prevents people from fraterniz-
ing, in.akina good contacts, and working with the native population.
This boo made a sensation by stating that the level of the work
of the Soviets is very high. It is said in the book that all of the
Soviets know the customs of the country in which they work, that
they knew how to appeal to the souls of people, that they know
native languages, and so on.
I shall give you one example directly contradicting the description
given in one chapter of the book. In this chapter a description is
given of a Soviet Ambassador to a Buddhist country. The book re-
lates that when the Ambassador arrived in the country, he did ex-
actly the right thing by immediately approaching the chief Buddhist
monk in that country, and then acted in such a way that he won the
monk over to his side.
I, myself, was present at a talk between high Soviet officials and a
group of very influential monks in Burma. It was in 1958 when
the Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Burma. They visited
Mandalay, which is the center for Burmese Buddhists. The Soviet
delegation was invited to meet a group of high-ranking Buddhist
monks in the Mandalay Hill Pagoda. The delegation was accom-
panied by the Soviet Ambassador. When the Soviet officials ar-
rived at the Pagoda, they were invited to sit. On the advice of the
Ambassador they refused. They were offered some food, which they
also refused to eat, because it was not good for Soviet stomachs.
The Soviet parliamentarians and the Soviet Ambassador did not
make the slightest effort to show their respect for the old monks and
the customs of the country. Quite to the contrary, all their be-
havior was disgraceful. It was an insult to the monks ,and the Bur-
mese.
One member of the Burmese Parliament immediately mentioned it
to the Soviet Ambassador, but the Ambassador replied to him with
irritation, "What for we will be sitting? In Russia, when we want
to show our respect to somebody, we stand."
Mr. SOURWINE. He was willing to show his respect for the Burmese
in Soviet fashion but not in Burmese fashion?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. Now in the book, "The Ugly Ameri-
can," who was the ugly American? dome particular character? Or
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
18 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
was that a term applied generally to the American people in this part
of the country or the American officials in this part of the country?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. I think that, as I understood the title of the
book, the ugly American was applied to one American that was ugly in
appearance butbeautiful in his actions.
Mr. SouawiN-E. That is right.
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Definitely, there are Americans who, due to
their ignorance, bring harm to the free world cause. The most harm
to U.S. prestige is caused by the many American films and cheap
books. They misrepresent the American people, show the whole life
in the U.S.A. in an ugly way. Communist propaganda exploits this.
Asa, result, many of the native population think that what American
films and books show is the real face of America. Also noticed is the
fact that your people do not mix with the natives as much as they
should. 'the middle classes in Burnaa. constitutes about 70 to 80 per-
cent of the whole population. These classes are out of the reach of
Soviets because of security considerations. But at the same time I
noticed no effort is made by Americans to reach this large part of the
population. In my opinion, what is needed for victory in the moral
struggle with communism for the minds of the millions of people in
the young countries of Asia is the controlled distribution of Ameri-
can films and books in these countries.
It is also most necessary to develop personal contacts with the middle
classes, and increase the attention devoted to them. Special attention
should be given to the students. They are the first target of (lie Com-
munists. Ten to fifteen American students, well prepared and re-
sponsible in their behavior, if sent to the Burmese universities, could
do a tremendous job and have it big effect. 1 want to state that poten-
tially all the people in Asia are against communism and are on the
side of the democracies and the West. The West should help them to
escape. communism. As for failures o f t ae Communists in their moral
appeal to the Asian people, this is not due to personal mistakes and
inefficiency but, instead, is due to the general evilness of communism.
The name "tine Ugly Soviet." in the direct meaning of this phrase can,
with complete justification, be applied to the Soviet officials in these
Asian countries.
Mr. SoumwI E. To clear up another point: In your earlier testi-
mony, you told us it was Soviet strategy to encourage a neutrality
policy in Burnma.
Will you explain just what you mean by a neutrality policy in that
sense?
Mr. Ii.%zNAc1n_)mv. The Soviet Government is not interested in reel
neutrality for Burma but. what they call friendly neutrality.
Mr. Sovnwl;E. And what does tlat mean ?
Mr. I1AZN, ACIIF.YEV. To Soviet officials, there is a big difference be-
tween the terms, "friendly neutrality" and "real neutrality." By
"friendly neutrality" they understand a leaning of the government of
the country toward the Communist bloc, opening the doors to Com-
munist propaganda, to Communist infiltration and subversion. In
short, under this "friendly neutrality" term, the Communists under-
stand the neutrality of governments in definite. countries to be neutral
between the real interests of these nations and international commu-
nism. This is tantamount to indifference to the fate of their own
country.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23: CIA-RDP63
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UN 00245R0001009?0007-5
Here I think it is useful to mention that, in the beginning of 1959,
the Soviet Government was very much concerned about the strong de-
sire of the Burmese Government of General No Win to establish law
and order in the country and wipe out Communist insurgency. The
Soviet Government was irritated by the determined desire of the Bur-
mese Government to have normal economic relations with all countries,
as opposed to Communist attempts to tie up the Burmese economy.
In the Embassy's annual report to Moscow in February 1959 the So-
viet Embassy in Burma declared that Prime Minister No Win was de-
stroying democracy and liquidating peoples' freedoms and rights. In
that repo rt it was emphasized that relations between Burma and the
Soviet Union had deteriorated since Ne Win came to power and that
the outlook for improving relations in the immediate future was not
good. The Soviet hostility toward the No Win government was
caused especially by the Burmese Government's new, more correct, and
more realistic understanding of neutrality. It was no surprise that
the Soviet Communists and their stooges in Burma immediately
opened a campaign against the new Burmese Government. They
based their campaign on the alleged threat of No Win's government to
abandon Burma's "traditional" polic of neutrality, accusing him of a
desire to bring Burma into SEATO and generally labeling it pro-
imperialist. The Burmese Government was labeled by the Communists
as "facist" and as "hostile" to the Soviet Government. So, in the eyes
of the Soviet Government, there is a great danger of Burma completely
shifting away from the policy of "friendly neutrality" to a policy of
real neutrality.
Mr. SOURWINE. I think that brings us up to date as far as the mat-
ters relating to Burma are concerned.
Now calling your attention to this article from the London Times, a
copy of which you read in the Washington Post, do you agree with
the author of that article that American tourists and official visitors
from the United States do not get the real reactions of the Russian
people, despite the desire of the Americans themselves to be sincere
and warm in their contacts?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, in stressing this point, I think that this
article is especially valuable.
On my own, I often tried to stress, in talks with Americans, that
what they think is sincere talk when they meet Soviet people, is in
fact not sincere. It is very rare, even amongst Soviets themselves,
for them to speak openly with one another. The Soviet people for a
long time have been living under great stress and repression. The
people are taught by all their experience to be mutually suspicious.
All the changes in the name of the secret police, MGB, KGB, etc., in
reality means nothing else but a change of name.
Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that people know that they are liv-
ing in a police state despite the changes in the name of the secret
police?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, the people know it very well and act auto-
matically because they were brought up in such a system.
Mr. SOURWINE. They have been conditioned to secrecy?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. I think that if the author of that article
was approached in Moscow or anywhere in the Soviet Union and asked
to repeat the same things,. I don't believe he would dare to do this.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
20 CONDITIONS IN TUE SOVIET UNION
Mr. SounwiNE. He does it only through the cloak of anonymity, to
be ppublished in a foreig 1 country?
bZr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, the anonymity of his article speaks for it-
self. American tourists after a short visit to the Soviet Union publish
articles or make irresponsible statements on how open the Soviets
were with them and how the Soviets say they like their Government
and the Communist system, that they are energetically working for
communism and to complete the creation of a Communist society in
the Soviet Union. All these statements would be at least laughable
to every Soviet citizen. Soviet citizens are extremely sophisticated
about life. They know that if they speak openly and honestly with
foreigners and their names appear, they will be punished accordingly.
You can be sure that nobody in the Soviet Union will dare to reveal
his real thoughts, real ideas, or real attitudes toward the Soviet sys-
tem in public.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember in conference with us since the
last hearing that you told us the Soviet people hate the regime, gen-
erally spei&ing, but are passive about doing anything about it because
their main desire is to live and work without disturbance; they don't
want to attract attention to themselves?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEEV. It is Only partly true.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Explain it fuly, please. Make it true.
Mr. KAZNACIIE1EEV. There is a definite group among the Soviets,
especially within the elder generation, who were taught by their life
experience to avoid cautiously any political talks or actions. Many
of them were deluded by bright Communist promises during the
Communist revolution in 1917 and the years afterward. Many of
them really believed that the Communist regime would brincr them to
the new classless society, to a happy and peaceful life. aen they
realized that all these promises of the Communist leaders were noth-
ing but a fairy tale, it was too late. Long years of suppression, con-
centration camps, purges especially terror of the bloody Stalin
period, convinced some of them that nothing can be done about it,
that it is much safer to put all their efforts into the struggle for
survival.
But I am going to say that the new generation in the Soviet Union
is a little different. They don't. want to live like their fathers. They
want to live useful lives, to become masters of their lives and not
slaves. It is not surprising that anti-Communist ideas appeal pri-
marily to young people and that open actions are taken against the
regime.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do the Soviet people regard the Soviet Government
as representing them, as being their Government?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Oh, no.
Mr. Sot mwiNE. How do they regard it.?
Mr. KAZNACUEYEV. They regard the Soviet Government and the
Communist Party as "they" and all the other people as "we."
"They" is the now class of which the higher Communist Party
leaders and Soviet Government officials are representative.
Mr. SomiwirtE. Are Soviet elections free?
Mr. KAZNecIIEYEV. What the Soviet Government calls elections is
in reality a comedy aimed at providing a camouflage of legalit to an
unlimited role by a small group of top party leaders and highest
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23: CIA-RDP63 0 245R000100Q80007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Government officials-the new class. I'll give you one example show-
ing the real nature of the elections in the Soviet Union.
In 1958 I worked as an interpreter for the Soviet Parliamentary
Delegation that visited Burma. Among the delegates was a member
of the Supreme Soviet, the First Secretary of Smolensk Reggion
Communist Party Committee by the name of Pavel Ivanovich Dor-
onin. Once, in the presence of one other member of the delegation,
a writer Babayevskiy, the Soviet Ambassador to Burma, the first
secretary of the Embassy, and me, Doronin complained of the diffi-
cultly of his job. He recalled the story of a recent election, nomina-
tion of a member of the Supreme Soviet from Smolensk City. Be-
fore the election, according to Doronin, all secretaries of regional
party committees from the whole Soviet Union are usually summoned
to party headquarters in Moscow. There, they are instructed who
should be elected in each region, which region should elect a worker,
peasant, member of the intelligentsia or a nonparty member. Doronin
was told that a representative of the local intelligentsia should be
elected from Smolensk.
On his return to Smolensk, he discussed this order with other po-
litical secretaries and they chose a teacher from a high school known
for his calmness, passivity, and obedience. This teacher was elected
by 99 percent of the votes. Everything was OK. This new parlia-
mentarian went to the first session of the Supreme Soviet with a
report in his pocket, supposedly his own but in reality prepared by
a party committee. On arrival in Moscow he attended briefings, re-
hearsals of the upcoming session. At these meetings every member
of. the Supreme Soviet was instructed when and what to say, and who
mght make what criticism, when to applaud, what question to ask,
and so forth. This delegate from Smolensk dutifully followed all
instructions until the 'budget for schools was discussed. He decided
on his own to make some remarks and even express unplanned criti-
cism. Immediately after the session, Doronin was again summoned
to Moscow to explain the incident involving his man. Soon it was
announced that this unfortunate teacher had become ill and the doc-
tors recommended long treatment in some sanatorium in the Crimea.
He asked to be allowed to resign from his Supreme Soviet post be-
cause of bad health. A new man was elected.
These last few sentences are an almost exact repetition of Doronin's
words which he expressed with laughter and open cynicism.
You can imagine how really representative a Soviet parliament is
when it is elected in such a way. The Communist Party boasts that
a majority in the Supreme Soviet are workers, peasants, and members
of the intelligentsia, with, an especially great number of women.
Maybe this is true, but the question is how they were elected and how
successfully they can defend the interests of their people and the
country. Can a plain worker or peasant or even a member of the
intelligentsia find the way through mounds of figures and complicated
government documents? Even for people with special education it
is not easy to see the Soviet Government's real nature behind these
figures and documents.
The Soviet Parliament is only a voting machine that automatically
approves and says everything that the Communist Party leaders
order it to do.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
22 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. SOIIRWINE. Have you any knowledge of the Soviet voting
procedure?
Air. K}ZNACIIEYEV. As a member of Komsomol, while studying at
the institute I was obliged to work as an agitator for different elec-
tions. I worked on this job for 5 years.
Usually I was given several houses which I had to visit at least
once a week, keep a list of voters, give them lectures on the Soviet
Government policies and decisions, to assure that all of them came to
elections and voted. As a rule the voters were passive and showed
no interest in the elections.
When they came to the polls, at least 50 percent of the voters don't
even know for whom they are going to vote though there is only one
candidate.
Everybody understands that these elections are just a comedy and
a trick.
Definitely these elections could give a possibility for people to ex-
press their general dissatisfaction with the Communist rule, but the
Soviet Government carefully destroys all such possibilities. I know
that sometimes the following voting mechanism is used:
Every voter is registered under his serial number; every ballot also
has a serial number.'
umber. When a voter receives a ballot, one of the mem-
bers of the election commission puts the voter's serial number next to
the ballot number. After that, the voter is free secretly to vote as he
pleases.
Normally such mechanism is not needed because people are taught
pretty well by their past experience and vote automatically without
any interest. There are other methods used by the Communist Party
in finding thozv who oppose them.
It is no surprise that 99 percent approve of the Communist
candidates.
Air. Souawixu. Your father was a scientist.?
Mr. ILUN aCHEYEV. Yes.
Air. SOUmVLtiE. You are familiar with the attitude of the Soviet
scientists and technicians?
Mr. KAZNACUEYEV. Soviet scientists have a fairly exclusive position
in Soviet society.
Soviet scientists are to some extent immune from suppression and
are given more or less a free life and more important, a better standard
of living.
It is generally thought in the Soviet Union that to become a scientist
is a way to escape from a. bad reality. But scientists cannot be con-
sidered to be a part of the new class.
Air. SoumvINE. You say they can or cannot?
Air. KAZNACIIEYEV. Cannot.
Air. Sornwm-E. Cannot
Air. KAzNACHEYEV. Cannot be considered.
Air. Souawn1E. They are not a part of the ruling class?
Mr. KA4zNACIIEYEv. I NO. In the book "New Class," Djilas described
the new class in the Soviet Union. This description is very true
although I cannot agree with Djilas on some points. I cannot ae-ree
with his estimate of how big this new class is. In my understandin
this ruling class in quite small. It starts from secretaries of regionag
l
party committees and reaches at the top the Central Committee mem-
bers and members of the Soviet Government.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION 2e3
Mr. SouiiwlNE. This is the new class and in your judgment is en-
tirely a political structure?
Mr. Kt1ZNACHEYEV. Yes. This is entirely a political structure.
Mr. SouRwINE. It doesn't depend upon brains or education or
training ?
Mr. KAZNAOHEYEv. No. It depends upon complete devotion to the
selfish interest of the ruling group, the new class, as contrasted to the
real interests of the country and the people. The policy of the Soviet
Government serves the interests of the ruling new class, not the real
interest of the country.
I can say here that the majority of members of the Soviet Com-
munist Party cannot be considered to. be real Communists and mem-
bers of the new class.
The majority of those in the Communist Party are forced to join the
party and they have practically none of the special advantages which
the members of the new class have.
Mr. SouxwiNE. How does one become a member of this new class?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEv. This new class is a very well protected and tight
group and to get into it is not so easy.
Only the more prominent crooks and individuals who ruthlessly
fight for the maintenance of the rule of this new class are admitted
into it.
It is exclusive to such an extent that even children of members of
the new class are encouraged to marry one another.
Mr. SouxwINE. Within the class?
Mr. KAZNACE;EYEV. Within the class.
Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that the Soviet Union has developed
some sort of a hereditary aristocracy?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, it is practically so. For instance the
children of members of this new class are sent to special schools that
are closed to other normal people. They are given preference in
filling the highest offices and have the most responsible jobs which are
denied to others.
They are encouraged not to mingle too much with people outside
and actually all of them are united by the common fear of the people.
Mr. SourwiNE. Does the favor of a member of the new class mean
a great deal to the ordinary Soviet citizen?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Excuse me?
Mr. SouizwINE. Can the friendship or favor of a member of this
aristocracy, this new class, mean a great deal to an ordinary Soviet
citizen?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I don't think so.
Mr. SOUR.wINE. You don't think so?
Mr. KAzNACIIEYEv. To every Soviet citizen, a prominent member of
the party or high government official is the same as a member of the
dreaded secret police. The favor of a member of the new class can
mean something from an economic point of view, but definitely dis-
graceful in the eyes of all honest people just as friendship with a
member of the secret police.
Mr. SounwINE. Would you say then that since the power of thisl
new class is used almost entirely to feed on itself to promote the
interest of the people within this class, it is a self-perpetuating group
which uses its power for its own aggrandizement?
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
24 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. In my understanding, it is so. Once a
definite group of people gets itself into power it tries by all means to
preserve its position and uses various methods to do this.
Mr. SOD1iwINE. And it is primarily concerned with preserving its
own power and its own rule?
Mr. KAZNACnm-EV. Yes. This is the main concern of the new class
in the Soviet Union. One of the main weapons this class uses is the
Communist doctrine.
Mr. SOUitwINE. Explain that.
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. The Communist doctrine is used by this class
to force the people to submit to their rule, to forget their freedoms
and their rights, in order, as officially stated, to create a full Com-
munist society but, in reality, to preserve forever the rule of one
party dictatorship, the rule of this new class.
Mr. SoutiwirrE. Do you mean they confuse the dictatorship of the
proletariat with the dictatorship of4the hereditary aristocracy?
Mr. KAZWAciitwiv. The term "dictatorship of the Proletariat" was
used by the new class up to 1952 to deceive the people. In reality
the term means nothing else but. "dictatorship of the New Class."
This was such an obvious lie that it could deceive nobody. At the
19th Party Congress in 1952 this term was abolished. The new class
now tries to avoid any mentioning of the word dictatorship. This
cannot deceive the people. Everybody in the Soviet Union under-
stands that the system we have in the soviet Union is open and com-
plete dictatorship of the ?New Class.
Mr. SouiiwixE, You are saying the people of the Soviet Union un
derstand who their real rulers are?
Mr. KAZNAOIIEYEV. Yes, they understand it pretty well. Early in
the morning, between 7 and 8 o'clock, on the streets of Moscow you can
find swarms of people dressed in unshapely dresses, looking gloomy
and tired. They are going to the workshops, factories, and so forth.
These millions are ironically or mockingly referred to as "The People-
Masters of the Country."
At 10 or 11 o'clock on the streets of Moscow you will see big, ex-
pensive cars, bringing well dressed, usually fat, and haughty looking
people to their offices. They, in the same cynical way, are referred to
as "The servants of the People."
Mr. SonliwiNE. Is this true to life?
Mr. INAZNAC1HEYEV. Yes, it is just taken from everyday Soviet life.
Mr. Somiwi rE. To return to the question of Soviet scientists, do
you recall explaining to us in conference why, although many Soviet
scientists want to do everything they can to benefit their country,
the regime itself prevents the country from securing the best benefits
of scientific progress?
Mr. lust Auu1il:v. Yes, it is very true.
Mr. Sounwlx'E. Explain that for the records how this comes about.
Mr. KAZNacirRYEV. Normally, all scientists and the members of the
technical intelligentsia are honest. people and want to work, not only
for their own benefit but for the benefit of their country.,
They try their best in making creations that can serve and benefit
their country. The only thin? is that their product is used by the
government, not for the benefit of the country but quite on the con-
trary.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION 25
Mr. SouRwINn. Are scientists given complete control of scientific
programs?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No, they do not. All Soviet scientists work
under the direct control of the party and its secret police, the KGB.
The Soviet scientists are working only on projects that are chosen by
the Soviet leaders. All scientific programs directly serve the interests
of the regime, strengthen the position of the Soviet Government in
the cold war, provide the Communists with means to make their propa-
ganda, and so forth. No scientific program that doesn't directly
promise to promote the interests of the new class can. be approved.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you mean that nonscientific people will have
the last word in a scientific project?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. I don't think so. The Communist Party pre-
vents scientists from good work.
Senator DODD. I was going to point out something for the record.
I think he answered your question negatively briefly and then an-
swered it affirmatively.
Mr. SoURwINE. May we go off the record?
Senator DODD. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SOURWINE. Is it possible for one or more scientists to circulate
petitions in the Soviet Union against official Government policy?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. No, this is completely impossible. Scientists in
the Soviet Union, like other people, do not enjoy fundamental rights
and freedom. It is true that scientists in the Soviet Union live in
better material conditions than other groups of people. Nowadays
they are allowed more freedom in experimental and theoretical work,
but this freedom doesn't carry over into politics. For, if any scientist
should make a petition against the government, be sure he will be
arrested and properly punished irrespective of his brilliant scientific
achievements.
Even in their work, that would be considered purely scientific in
other countries, they must be careful not to come into conflict with
official Marxist-Leninist dogma.
I know of one case when one scientist invented a vaccine that would
increase very highly the fertility of cattle. His invention proved to be
very successful and requests from all over the Soviet Union came in
for it. But in his theoretical work for making this vaccine, this
scientist expressed ideas contrary to the officially adopted theory of
Academician Lysenko. As a result, this unfortunate scientist was
expelled from all his posts, prohibited from scientific work, and even
deported to Siberia. Production of his vaccine was stopped.
Krushchev admitted this case at one of the sessions of the Presidium
of the Academy of Sciences 3 years ago. According to his own esti-
mates, the damage to Soviet agriculture amounted to no less than 2
million rubles.
Mr. SOURWINE. So that, for scientists in the Soviet Union, academic
freedom is bounded by the requirement that there be complete main-
tenance of the position in accordance with the Communist line.
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes, this is so.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you spoke of scientists having better living
conditions than others.
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. The word better is a comparative word.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
26 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Mr. Souuw'INE. What kind of living conditions do scientists have?
Mr. IsAZNACnnEYEv. Scientists are paid better and get better housing
than other people.
Mr. SotRWINE. What are the living conditions of the other people?
Mr. KAZNACnEI-Ev. There is a great difference between other peo-
ple and scientists and at the same time between scientists and the New
Class.
Mr. Souliw1NE. Well, let's put it this way. You were the son of a
scientist. What were your own living quarters in Moscow?
Mr. IiAZN CIIEYEw. I'll try to give you a comparative picture of the
difference in the living conditions of plain people, scientists and the
people close to the New Class. Until 1957" my family was living in a
room of 15 square meters in a big communal flat. There was my
father, my mother, and myself. Even that tiny room was not private
because it. was passed through by other families to reach their rooms.
Only in 1957, my father, on the personal insistence of the President
of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Mesneyanov, was given a
small separate one-bedroom apartment. 1'he separate one-bedroom
apartment is considered to be more than good for the average Soviet
scientist.
As for other people, I can tell you about. the family of my wife.
There were 3 different. families, altogether 9 people, living in an 18
square meter room. These conditions were considered to be very good.
Mr. SomRwix E. Very good?
llsr. I4 AzvAouM Ii T. Very good because the house was good and the
room was comparatively Dirge. It should also be mentioned that there
they lived not in a separate apartment but in a big communal flat
-where there were approximately 9 or 10 such rooms. For all of the
people, 50 or 60, there was 1 tiny bathroom and 1 kitchen, These
were considered to be normal conditions.
Mr. SDURWLNE. You have just said that 3 families with 9 persons
lived in 18 square meters?
Air. KAZN ACI IEYEV. Yes..
:1fr. SounwixE. That is two square meters per head.
Mr. KAZ;*TACHHEYEv. Row I } ill give you the third example that will
illustrate how big the difference is in the osition of the New Class
and all the other people. I had a girl friend who worked in the
apparatus of the Central Committee, She was only 19 years old. She
had had very little education and her job in the Central Committee
was most insignificant. She was a courier. She transferred papers
from one office to another.
Mr. SouR PINE. She was a messenger?
Air. KAZ NACTEYEV. Yes. She was onl;' a messenger. She was an
unimportant person but she, was a direct servant of the New Class
and therefore was close to the New Class. When she was admitted to
work in the Central Committee, she was immediately given an apart-
ment of two rooms. At the same time she was allowed to enter special
stores reserved for the people from the New Class and their servants.
She had free transportation, free visits to the sanatoriums, et cetera.
This young girl, practically a nobody, was living in conditions equiva-
lent to those enjoyed by Iii? h ranking scientists only because of her
position close to the New Class.
Air. SounwiNE. It. would appear from your testimony that although
scientists are given better living conditions than other people in the
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R00010Q~(0007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Soviet Union, these conditions are still below those of even the servants
of the New Class.
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. There is this great difference between the
standard of living of the millions and the very small group of the
New Class and their servants.
Mr. SouRwINE'. There can be no privilege, as I understand it, of
privacy in the living conditions that you describe.
Mr. KAZNACFIEYEV. No; no privacy.
Mr. SouuwINE. Don't these kind of conditions breed conflict, one
family with another?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Oh, yes; and very great conflicts. The Soviet
courts are filled with cases of quarrels between neighbors. Such cases
have become so numerous that recently the Soviet Government decided
to create a special Comrades court or Communist society court to try
all these communal flat and family cases. More than 90 percent of the
city population in the Soviet Union live in extremely overcrowded
and unhealthy conditions. What the Soviet Government tries to do
to settle this problem is as a drop in the sea. At the same time all the
national resources and riches are used for preparation for hot war,
waging the cold war, making propaganda, et cetera, and are used for
the selfish interests of the regime. The housing problem has become
a national tragedy in the Soviet Union, especially for the Great Rus-
sian nationality. The immediate result of such living conditions in
the Soviet cities is a very low rate of birth.
For instance, I myself have no acquaintances or friends in Moscow
who have three or four children. I never saw such a family. I can
more or less accurately state that 30 percent of the city population
can afford to have two children; 50 percent can afford to have only
one child; and 20 percent can't afford to have even one child. These
figures, by the way, are generally known in the Soviet Union although
treated as a secret by the Soviet Government. Such a condition means
quick decrease in city populations.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now we had a discussion in conference about the
Great Russian population in the Soviet Union. Do you remember
telling us about that?
Mr. KAZNACI I YEV. Yes.
Mr. SouRwINE. Will you tell us for this record?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. I think that the question about the position
of the Great Russian nation in the Soviet Union is very closely linked
with what I have said about living conditions in the Soviet cities.
Today approximately 80 percent of the Great Russian population is
living in cities under the conditions I have already described. You
understand, of course, that there can be no natural growth within this
80 percent of the Great Russian population.
The other 20 percent of the Great Russian population lives in
villages but Russian villages are the poorest in the Soviet Union-
for a long time they were the most exploited. Soviet statistics are
notoriously falsified but even false statistics cannot hide the fact that
Great Russian villages are the poorest in the Soviet Union. If you
come to the famous Moscow Agricultural Exhibition, you can see
figures pertaining to annual average peasant incomes in different re-
publics and regions in the Soviet Union. According to these Soviet
statistics openly displayed at the exhibition, in 1956 the average peas-
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
28 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
ant family income was: Georgia, 70,000 rubles; cotton growing repub-
lics in central Asia such as Uzbekistan, 40,000 rubles; regions popu-
lated by Great Russians, only 10,000 to 15,000 rubles.
Mr. Sociiwii: r. Are these statistics true, about Georgian and central
Asian incomes?
Mr. KAZN:ACHEYEV. No; I do not believe these statistics. The only
thing I want, to stress is that even the Government can't hide the fact
that Russian peasants are in the worst conditions in the Soviet Union.
The Russian ]people, especially the intelligentsia, are pretty well
aware of this situation and discuss it. The common conclusion is that
the Great Russian population decreased approximately 10 to 15
million in comparison with the prerevolut.ionaiy period and is de-
creasing now at an extremely rapid rate of 5 to 6 million every 3 or
4 years.
Mr. Soricwixn. What is the total Great Russian population. of the
Soviet Union; if you know?
Mr. KAzti:%cnEx-Ev. There are no direct figures published in Soviet
official documents because such information is considered to be ex-
tremely secret.
In 1913 the Great Russian population was 77 million. Now it is-
somewhere near 60 million. During the entire Soviet period, the pro-
portion between the various nationalities changed considerably.
Mr. Souinwi\E. How did it cliaiige?
Mr. I AZN iCIIn1-EV. According to official documents, the Great Rus-
sian population constituted 50 percent of the population of the Soviet
Union in 1919. Nowadays it is estimated to be no more than 30
percent. This change happened due to the fact. that 80 percent of the
Great. Russian population lives in cities and only about 20 percent
in the villages. At the same time about 70 percent of the population
of other nationalities in the Soviet Union live in villages and only
30 percent in cities. The result of this is that the other Soviet na-
tionalities are growing. The Georgian population in 1913 was
1,500,000; nowadays it is at least 4 million. The birth rate is also -very
high in the central Asian republics. I point out here only the most
striking figures but a closer investigation will give an even more
serious picture of the decline of the Great Russian population.
Mr. Souiiwi.Ns. Now, if your figures are correct, then the Soviet
Union's population in 1913 must have been approximately 150 million;
is that right.?
Mr. Ki zN.%CIIEyEV. Yes: in 1913 it was about 150 million.
111r. SoURwIxE. Of which 75 million or 50 percent were Great Rus-
sians. Now your population is 200 million?
Mr, KAZNAOLIETEV. Approximately 200 million.
Mr. Soft-itwLNE. This is true because of both the decrease in the
number of the Great Russians and the increase in the population of
other nations within the U.S.S.R.?
Mr. KAZN ACIIEI-EV. Yes; that is true.
Senator Donn. We will recess now until 2 o'clock this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at. 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene-
at 2 p.m., of the same day.)
Senator DODO. We will come to order.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN MITE SOVIET UNION 29
TESTIMONY OF ALEKSANDR YURIEVICH KAZNACHEYEV-Resumed
Mr. SouxwiNs. Are the figures with regard to populations put out
by the Soviet Government or are they withheld from publication?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Within the period of Soviet rule in the
U.S.S.R., there has never been an accurate listing of the population
figures for the various nationalities within the Soviet Union.
Mr. SouxwINE. They do print figures for the entire Soviet Union?
Mr. KAZNACIEYEV. Yes; they publish these figures.
Mr. SODUWINE. Do they print figures for the populations of cities?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. They publish populations of cities and popula-
tions of villages and professions.
Mr. SOURWINE. From which it is possible for one to add up cities
and villages and come up with a pretty good estimate?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes; such an estimate plus the figures of losses
during the First World War, Revolution, the Civil War, and the Sec-
ond World War. You then add the figures for the number of im-
migrants after the Revolution and subtract the figures for the vic-
tims of collectivization, concentration cams, and so on.
Mr. SouswiNE. The estimate you are giving us in based on the best
figures available?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes, the best figures that were available to me
when I conducted research on the subject while still in the Soviet
Union. What I want to accomplish by bringing these facts to your
knowledge is the lack of any basis for the claims often made in the
West that the Soviet Communist Government represents mainly the
interests of the Great Russian people over those of the other Soviet
nationalities. Also unjustified are the statements made in the West'
that Soviet foreign policy and the expansionist tendencies of Soviet
communism serve the interests of Great Russian imperialism. I want
to state here that those who propagate these ideas consciously or un-
consciously help the Soviet Communist rulers to camouflage the real
nature of their policy of divide and rule within the Soviet Union and
the divide-and-rule tactics of Communist imperialism in 'its efforts
to expand its control over jeoples outside the Soviet Union.
- The Communist regime in the Soviet Union is the enemy of all the
nationalities within the Soviet Union and of the Great Russian na-
tionality first of all. And, in its own turn, the Russian nationality
is enemy No. 1 of the Communist regime. The cause of all people
in the Soviet Union is common : to free themselves from Communist
tyranny. Thefreedom of any of these people separately is impossible
without freedom' at the same time for the other peoples, especially
the Great Russians.
Mr. SOURWINE. You will remember we had discussions in the staff
conference on the subject of what publications are read in the Soviet
Union. For one thing, I believe you said the American Daily Worker
is not circulated in the Soviet Union; is this right?
Mr. KAZNACH YEV. Yes, it is right. Even in the Institute of Inter-
national Affairs wherel studied, students could get the British Daily
Worker but not the, Alnerican Daily Worker.
Mr. SOURWINE. Why is this, if you know?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. I personally had a chance`. to see several times
the American Daily Worker, and I think the main reason is that,
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
30 CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION
maybe unintentionally, the American Daily Worker shows the real-
some items of the real picture of life of the American people.
Mr. Souaiw.LNE. Even though the Daily Worker is edited to reflect
(Ile Communist line---
Mr.KAZNACJEY-EV. Yes.
Mr. SOURwINE. It is also edited to be read by Americans?
i4 fr. KAZ:NACTTEYEV. Yes. So that it can go only so far in these lies.
Mr. Souni%INE. Are there any American periodicals permitted to
circulate in the Soviet Union ?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes. The magazine Amerika is permitted by
the Soviet Government for circulation in the Soviet Union.
Mr. SoURWI::E. Well, to what extent does this actually circulate?
Can it be bought f reely on the newsstands?
lfr. KAZNACITrYEV. To some extent, yes, it can be bought at several
points in Moscow. I personally know that. some 20, 30 copies appear
at several points in Moscow. the}. immediately are bought, and the
official price is 5 rubles, but people, immediately near a kiosk, a maga-
zine. newspaper kiosk, sell this niapazine Anierika, for 10 rubles.
Mr. Souitwis; . You said the official price is 5 rubles?
Mr. IC\ZrACIrEYEV. Yes.
Mr. SouawiNE. People pay as much as two dollars and a Half?
Mr. KAZN ACIIEYEY. Yes, and the fact is that very many people want
to buy this magazine.
Mr. SoL'RWiNE. Did we set that relatively high price or did the
Soviet Union set it?
Mr. KAZN.ACIIFYEV. I don't know exactly how this price was set.
Mr. SOURwINE. In any event it doesn't prevent people from buying
the magazine?
Mr. l .\zNACTTEYEV. It doesn't prevent people from buying and even
paying double the. official price. It shows the interest for this maga-
zine is very great. I know that people hunt for copies and ask their
friends and relatives to get copies, and at the same time I know that
the soviet Post Office Department. sends over half of the copies back
to the American Embassy stating that people do not want to read
their magazine. That is completely not true.
Mr. SounwiNE. Are copies of this magazine circulated through the
mails within the Soviet Union?
Mr. KAzNACirFYEV. I do not know. I know that this magazine is
sold. can be bought in. several places in Moscow, at newspaper stalls,
and it is distributed by several departments, especially political, such
its Tass and the Soviet !' oreign Office.
Mr. SouRwINE. Can you send American publications through the
mails in the Soviet Union?
Mr. KAZNACIrEYEV. I don't think so. First of all, foreign exchange
is not available to any Soviet, citizen. American publications can
reach some people, hut. mainly this is technical literature subscribed
for (hrough official channels and for official purposes.
Mr. Souiiw-iNa. T can go down to a newsstand and buy a copy of
Soviet Russia Today, which is the Russian-published American pe-
riodical, and carry it under my arm in complete freedom.
Can a Russian buy a copy of Amerika and carry it under his arm
in complete freedom?
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION 31
Mr. KAZNAor rYEv.; I know it is a fact that all Russians that buy
Amerika, at the same time buy a Russian newspaper and immediately
wrap it
MI'. SOURWINE. And wrap the magazine in the newspaper ?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes, and wrap the magazine in. the newspaper,
Mr. SOURWINE. All right.
You gave us some information on the subject of religious freedom
in the Soviet Union. Is religion free there?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. On paper, yes. But in reality religion and the
church are considered by the-Soviet Government as enemies of their
rule.
In the Soviet Union any movement and any organization, if not
Communist is inevitably thought to: be anti-Communist and, first of
all, it should be applied to religion and the church.
Those people who go to church and worship there, and have some
other ideas that are not Communist and which are not considered to
coincide with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine are practically rejecting
this official doctrine.
Mr. SOURWINE. Can a person who regularly attends church services
be a member of the Komsomol, the Young Communist League?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. No, it is impossible, and if such a member of
Komsomol is found visiting a church he would be expelled.
Mr. SOURWINE. And if you are not a member of the Komsomol in
the Soviet Union you cannot get a higher education?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes; that is true.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And many employment opportunities are barred
to you?
Mr. KAZNACIIEYEV. Yes. The higher jobs and especially now, with
the new educational system introduced by Khrushchev, universities,
and institutes are completely closed to non-Komsomol members.
Personally I entered the Komsomol 2 months before applying to
the institute, and I found that approximately 30 percent of the other
persons who applied to the institute also entered 2 or 3 months before
submitting their application.
Practically, the Komsomol is a compulsory organization, and I
don't think even the term "organization" can be applied as more than
90 percent of the youth are members of the Komsomol. It is com-
pulsory-just as it is to be a Soviet citizen or submit to being drafted
into the Soviet Army.
Mr. SOURWINE. They are definitely second-class citizens if they
don't belong to the Komsomols; is that right?
Mr. KAZNACHEYEV. Yes. There are 'aaso some citizens who refuse
to join the army because of their religious beliefs. But they are ar-
rested.and prosecuted under Soviet law.
If you refuse to be a member of the Komsomol you cannot be prose-
cuted by law, but you would be persecuted. You will be deprived of
the possibility to receive a higher education and to work in many,
many fields.
The net result would be that you would be restricted to being a very
low paid worker or a peasant.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Soviet Government show discrimination
toward or against any particular religious groups?
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP63T00245R000100080007-5
32 OONJMTIONN'S IN 't'I E SOVIET MO N
Mr. kAZN ACIIEYEV. The Soviet Government especially worries
about Baptists
Mr. Sou"RwiNE. Baptists?
Mr. I AZNACIIEVEV. Seventh-day Adventists and Witnesses of
Jehovah.
I think that, these sects are more appealing to the Soviet people
because of conditions in the Soviet Union.
Another point is that it is not as easy to control them as, for instance,
the Russian Orthodox Church. Their supervision is not as centralized
as that of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Mr. SoumvINE. The Russian Orthodox Church is well controlled
by the Soviets?
Mr. K. ZNACIIEVEV. That is a very well known fact..
Mr. SOL'RWiNE. It would appear, you say, that the Soviets are
worried about this or that religious sect; it would appear then that
in spite of all of this repression and discrimination against religion
there is still some lure for youth in what religion holds out in the
Soviet Union; is this right? Young people are still being brought
to churches, to religion in Russia?
Mr. K..AZNACIIEYES'. Yes; and I think it is especially true now.
For the last decade the Soviet Government was especially worried
by the fact of the growing revival of religion in the Soviet Union.
Mr. SocaIVINE. 1 ou think there is a religious revival there?
Mr. IiCZNACIIEVF:V. I think there is a process of religious revival.
The main reason of this revival is, I think, the growing dissatisfac-
tion among Soviet people, especially among the youth.
Marxist-Leninist official doctrine is not appealing to minds, hearts,
and to the souls of people, especially of the young generation. They
are looking for something else to substitute, to fill this vacuum, and
many of them turn to religion.
Mr. SOullwlNE. Now, the Soviet Union has recently renewed its
drive for atheism. I suppose that is a counter to this religious revival
that you speak of?
Mr. IKUNACiraYEV. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOUItw1NE. You spoke, of the special privileges accorded to the
now class or to the higher members of the political regime of the
Soviet Union. Do the Soviet people generally resent these special
privileggec~ ?
Mr. Ii`AZNAcIIEYEV. The Soviet. people understand what is going on.
Mr. SoumviNE. But they don't object?
Mr. L%ZN.tcIIErEv. Of course they do, they resent it, and they un-
derstand that factories, plants, land, and resources all belong not to
the people, as it is claimed by official Soviet propaganda, but actually
belong to that new class. Industrial development in the Soviet Union
is aimed to benefit this new class, not the people.
Mr. SoumviNE. As a general thing, do Soviet officials trust one
another?
Mr. I(kzNicIIEVEv. Because of the resentment on the part of the
people, there can be some unity within this class. IIo