WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3
 25X1
Approved For Release
25X1
25X1
Controversy in West Germany Over Polish
Accords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Radicals Elect Party President Favored
by Giscard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
French Government Acts on Military Unrest . . . 7
Communists Suffer Reversals in Portuguese
Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
"Hearts and Flowers" Dominate Zhivkov
Visit to Bonn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
25X1
Spanish King May Delay Choice of
New Prime Minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Terrorism in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . 18
ANNEX: The Rome Summit . . . . . . . . , 20
December 4, 1975
25X1
Approved For Release X2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002390130001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3
 Approved For Relea~e 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002300130001-3 I 25X1
Controversy in West Germany Over Polish
Accords
Controversy is growing in West Germany
over the bilateral agreements signed with Poland
in October. Warsaw, meanwhile, is seeking to in-
fluence German opinion in favor of ratifying the
accords.
Polish deputy premier Olszewski, while on a
visit to Bonn on December 3, announced that Warsaw
had granted exist permits to 2,800 ethnic Germans
last month. This was the second consecutive month
in which Warsaw had allowed more than 2,500 Germans
to leave Poland. In contrast, the Poles granted
only about 7,800 exit permits during all of 1974.
In one of the agreements signed last October,
the Poles agreed to permit about 120,000 ethnic
Germans to emigrate over a four-year period. In
return, the West Germans agreed to make a one-
time payment of about $500 million to a Polish
pension fund and extend a long-term low-interest
credit of about $400 million.
The agreements are not yet in force, and it
is obvious that in granting the large number of
exit permits, Warsaw is seeking to aid. the West
German government's efforts to win parliamentary
approval of the agreements. The opposition has
a one-vote majority in the upper house of parliament
and theoretically could block the pension payment
pact.
The agreements have become an issue in West
Germany's budding electoral campaign. Last week's
December 4, 1975
25X1
 Approved Fo
debate in the lower house of parliament quickly
developed into an acrimonious exchange between
spokesmen for the opposition, including chancellor-
candidate Kohl, and Chancellor Schmidt's Social
Democratic Party.
The governing coalition parties control the
Bundestag and passage of the agreements is assured
there. The prospects for passage of the accords
by the upper house are now uncertain, particularly
if the bitterness between the governing and opposi-
tion parties persists.
At issue is whether the Saarland's three delegates
to the upper house will vote with their colleagues
in the opposition to reject the pension payment.
The Christian Democrats govern the Saarland, but,
since last spring's election, do not have a majority
in the state parliament. The national government
hopes to persuade the Saarland government to vote
for the Polish accord in return for concessions
from the Social Democrats and Free Democrats on
the state level.
Some opposition leaders have predicted that
the Saarland will vote against ratification, but
others claim that the delegates will support the
government.
A compromise between the opposition and the
national government may be worked out eventually,
but it appears that the controversy over the Polish
accords will persist for some time.
December 4, 1975
Approved For
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3 I 25X1
Radicals Elect Party President Favored by Giscard
The Radical Socialist Party--a junior member of
French President Giscard's governing coalition--elected
Gabriel Peronnet party president last week, a move
viewed by many as likely to aid Giscard's effort to
broaden his political base. Peronnet fought off a
last minute challenge by Francoise Giroud, who was
backed by the Radical's former president Jean-Jacques
Servan-Schreiber. Peronnet had acted as interim
president since Servan-Schreiber resigned the post
last summer when it became clear that he could no
longer control the party.
Both Peronnet and Giroud are Secretaries of State
in Giscard's government, respectively responsible for
the civil service and women's affairs. Their rivalry
tarnished somewhat Peronnet's victory by emphasizing
the divisions within the party, but the result will
nevertheless still be pleasing to Giscard's political
strategists. Peronnet is a stable, experienced
politician with impeccable Radical Socialist credentials,
but he lacks national stature and is amenable to
Giscard's leadership.
Under Servan-Schreiber's eccentric; leadership
the Radicals had very little relevance to Giscard's
scenario for rebuilding the political center, which
virtually disappeared with the Fourth Republic. Giscard
believes, however, that Peronnet will improve prospects
for the party's reunification with the left Radicals
and might also attract some right-wing Socialists in
a way that Servan-Schreiber and Giroud would, or could
not. The left Radicals, who broke away to join the left
Alliance with the Communists and Socialists in 1972,
December 4, 1975
Approved For Release
25X1
 Approved For (Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00465AO02300130001-3
have recently opened a dialogue with the government
that has raised hopes in Giscard's coalition that they
can eventually be won back to join a new center coalition
focused on the president's Independent Republican party.
In a break from its concentration on personalities,
the Radical congress easily agreed that the party favers
limited decentralization of government power, application
of a capital gains tax, proportional elections for the
National Assembly, and a pro-European foreign policy.
It was unable to agree on the extent to which its
representatives in senior bureaucratic slots should be
held accountable for pressing these positions within
the government, however. 25X1
December 4, 1975
-6-
Approved For 65AO02300130001-3
 Approved For Relea;e 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3 I 25X1
French Government Acts on Military Unrest
The French government has acted firmly and
swiftly against radical efforts to organize soldiers'
unions in French military units stationed in France
and West Germany.
Alleging involvement of West German and Portuguese
extremists, as well as support from French opposition
parties and labor unions, the government has charged
15 recruits--who face 5 to 10-year sentences if
convicted--with violating the law and vowed to persist
in its efforts to build a disciplined and responsive
military force.
Reaction from the French left has been restrained,
but equally firm, insisting on needed reforms as
well as discipline and denying any intention to
try to unionize the military. Leftist, party and
union members charge that the government has overreacted
to the recruits' often legitimate aspirations to
civil liberties, such as greater freedom of expression
and association, as well as better grievance procedures
already available in other West European armed forces.
The basic issue of whether the accused are
guilty of actions "detrimental to the national defense"
has been lost in the debate. Confusion of the issues
has been compounded by the careless interchange
of terms such as "military unions" or "soldiers'
committees"--both of which are opposed by most French
political parties--and "military consultative commissions,"
which the opposition and even some government members
support.
The government's move may have been in response
to mounting concern among senior military men. Defense
December 4, 1975
Approved For Releas
25X1
IM- JUUIJUUUI-J
 Approved Ford
Ministry Secretary of State Bigeard told a US official
on 26 November that neither the defense minister
nor the president had been very concerned about
the recent activity until he and the chief of the
general staff threatened to resign if strong action
were not taken. Within a week the arrests were
made and on 26 November Prime Minister Chirac made
a hard-hitting speech to the National Assembly.
Chirac singled out the French Socialists for
a special attack, accusing them of trying to undermine
military discipline. Two Socialist party members
had been arrested for distributing to soldiers pamphlets
advocating unionization. The Socialists, who themselves
strongly oppose extremist activity among the military
and unionization in particular, were caught off-
guard by the arrests. According to a senior party
official, the two arrested were in the process of
being expelled from the party.
Chirac sees the Socialists as a major threat
to the Gaullist party which he leads, and his words
may have been sharpened by concern over the Socialists'
increasing popularity among recruits which reflects
a general trend in the society. So far, the clearest
result of the government's attack has been to close
the fragmented leftist ranks behind their main spokesmen.
While some recruits and outside agitators undoubtedly
can be blamed for certain excesses, French military
attitudes do not reflect those of the society. Sheltered
from most of the currents of change since 1968,
the army has resisted modernization while other
sectors of society from which the recruits are drawn
have changed with the times. Some of the problem
can be traced to budgetary constraints, but French
soldiers are well aware that it is not greater financial
resources that enables many West European armies
to grant more personal and political freedoms to
draftees than are available in France.
December 4, 1975
25X1
-8-
Approved For - 5AO02300130001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3 I 25X1
Communists Suffer Reversals in Portuguese Media
Communist influence in Portugal was dealt another
blow yesterday when the government nationalized radio
and television stations.
An official announcement said the stations would
be combined into a government-regulated nationwide
broadcasting service that would no longer be subject
to political or economic pressure. Fulfilling a promise
made by Prime Minister Azevedo in September, programming
will be restructured to guarantee "ideological pluralism."
Foreign-owned stations and the Catholic Church's Radio
Renascence were not nationalized.
The nationalization move had been expected since
government forces occupied the stations during last
week's abortive coup attempt. Although. the government
has not up to now directly implicated the Communists
in the attempt, media under their control have been
accused not only of contributing to the general atmosphere
that produced the uprising but also of urging support
for it once it was under way. An inquiry into the radio's
role in the uprising has resulted in the dismissal of
seven staff members and the suspension of 34 others.
Last week while the Lisbon area was still under
martial law, the Communists' grip on the national
press was loosened when administrative and editorial
boards of eight major newspapers were summarily dis-
missed. Top officials in the government news agency,
which served as a Communist propaganda vehicle, have
also been replaced.
With its once-powerful influence on the media now
greatly diminished, the Communist Party's right to a
place in the government is being challenged. Although
December 4, 1975
Approved For Releas - 300130001-3
25X1
 Approved For
Major Ernesto Melo Antunes, head of the dominant group
in the military, has said the Communists still have an
"essential role" to play, they have come in for severe
criticism from the democratic parties, who hold them
accountable for last week's uprising.
The center-left Popular Democrats are demanding
the immediate dismissal of all Communists from the
government, while the Socialists want the Communists
to repudiate the rebellion and swear loyalty to the
government in exchange for their continued participation
in the cabinet.
Both the Antunes faction and the Socialists probably
would like the Communists to remain in the government
to help ensure labor peace until a measure of stability
is restored to the economy, Continued friction between
the Popular Democrats and the Communists, however, may
force the military to drop the two parties from the
government and rule with the Socialists until an election
is held next spring.
December 4, 1975
-10-
Approved For a lease 7,101,212TI I : - , ~7 - 65A002300130001-3
25X1
 Approved For Releo
25X1
"Hearts and Flowers" Dominate Zhivkov Visit to Bonn
Bulgarian party and state leader Todor Zhivkov's
visit to Bonn last week (November 24-28) went better
than planned, according to the West German ambassador
in Sofia. An unexpectedly "cordial" atmosphere provided
an excellent backdrop for the visit which was predictably
economic-oriented. The visit continued the up-tempo
pace of bilateral contacts since diplomatic relations
were established two years ago, but there were no
significant political breakthroughs.
The Bulgarian leader met with a host of political
personalities, including President Scheel, Chancellor,
Schmidt, Social Democratic Party leader Brandt, Christian
Democratic Union chief Kohl, and Communist Party head
Mies. Zhivkov's conversations with Scheel covered a
wide range of international topics--Cyprus, the Middle
East, and post-CSCE Europe--and the two men declared
they share "identical interests" on many issues. They
also signed a bland "joint declaration" of principles
and a statement of "perspectives" for economic coopera-
tion. The foreign ministers signed a framework cultural
accord. It reportedly contains a "Berlin clause"--no
text is yet available--but is of limited significance
because the two were unable to negotiate an implementing
protocol.
The main thrust of the visit, however, revolved
around trade. Bonn is by far Sofia's largest Western
trade partner--absorbing some 22 percent of Bulgarian
trade with the non-communist world. Sofia incurs a
sizable deficit--somewhat less than $400 million in
1974. Zhivkov reportedly raised the sensitive issue
of redressing this imbalance, and twice asked for German
December 4, 1975
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A00230g130001-3 25X1
 Approved Fc
credits on concessionary terms. As expected, Bonn
turned down Zhivkov's requests.
Taking time out from his official talks, Zhivkov
also visited the factories of Daimler-Benz, Krupp,
and Hoechst, where he signed various contracts. He
treated all his audiences to the same pep talk, pro-
claiming that Bulgaria is an "equal and sought-after
partner" with an important role to play in bilateral
trade.
The Bulgarian leader seemed particularly pleased
with the special attention his German hosts lavished
upon him. Zhivkov undoubtedly feels all the hoopla
helped boost his much sought after image of an inter-
national statesman. Bonn reportedly pulled out all
the stops with special protocol arrangements,
"fantastic" flower displays, and pretty girls at
"strategic places." The Bulgarian, moreover, struck
up a lively repartee with his hosts, and reportedly
"charmed the German leadership" with his peasant
humor.
The West German ambassador attributed the
unusually warm reception to German "sentimentality"
and the traditional ties of friendship between the
two peoples. It seems more likely, however, that
Bonn is trying to play "catch-up" diplomacy with
those East European states that were among the last
to renew diplomatic relations. F7 I
December 4, 1975
Approved For
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3 I 25X6
Spanish King May Delay Choice of New
Prime Minister
King Juan Carlos' success in persuading the
Council of the Realm to nominate Fernandez-Miranda
for the presidency of the parliament earlier this
week may encourage him to negotiate for a more
liberal prime minister, but conflicting pressures
will probably cause the King to stay his hand for
the time being.
Juan Carlos probably hopes to replace Prime
Minister Arias in the near future. By choosing
a new prime minister with a liberal image, Juan
Carlos would emphasize his break with Francoism
and notify the leftist opposition that he is serious
about liberalizing the Spanish political system.
Adding to the pressures for an early change
are reports that the prime minister would like
to retire now--his personal loyalties lay with
Franco and he would rather end his career as Franco's
last prime minister than as Juan Carlos' first.
According to various sources, Arias is physically
and emotionally worn out from the stresses of Franco's
protracted illness.
There are, on the other hand, several reasons
for delaying the choice of a new prime minister:
--Rightists, miffed by their failure to secure
the retention of Rodriguez de Valcarcel
as president of the parliament and fearing
that Juan Carlos will appoint a liberal
prime minister, have apparently stiffened
their resistance to changes in the government
and thrown their support behind Arias.
December 4, 1975
Approved For Release - 2300130001-3
_CT
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79TOO865AO02300130001-3
--Almost any choice Juan Carlos could make
would alienate some sector of the political
spectrum.
--Disagreements among the 17-man Council of
the Realm over nominations for the presidency
of the parliament may have caused the King
to have second thoughts about the Council's
readiness to accept his choice for the more
important, and more emotionally charged,
appointment of a new prime minister. The
Council has the statutory power to refuse
to place the King's preference on the slate
of three names from which he must choose
the new prime minister.
--The tenure of a "transition" prime minister
would at best be precarious. It could well
last only a few months, until Juan Carlos
has had a better chance to gauge the political
temperature of the country.
If the King decides to replace Arias now,
he will probably wait a week or so until he and
Fernandez-Miranda are assured of enough support
from the Council of the Realm. Should Juan Carlos
decide to retain Arias for several months--according
to press reports, the King has asked Arias to stay
on "temporarily"--he will almost certainly balance
this concession to the far right by carrying out
a major cabinet reshuffle, bringing in figures
more acceptable to the center-left and the non-Com-
munist opposition.
The left, already impatient with the lack
of significant liberalization since Juan Carlos
took over, is stepping up its protest activity.
The Madrid construction workers' strike which took
place on December 3 was relatively unsuccessful--
partly due to confusion and poor organization--
but more serious strikes and demonstrations are
December 4, 1975
Approved For
e ease -
 Approved For Releas~ 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A042300130001-3 25X1
scheduled for next week. In Madrid, plans are
being made for a Socialist demonstration on December
8, a demonstration by political prisoners in the
main prison on December 9, and strike:; by construc-
tion and metal workers on December 10-?11. The
strikes will initially be confined to the Madrid
area, but if successful will spread to Barcelona
and various Basque cities.
The Communist-dominated Workers' Commissions
hope to use these local strikes to build support
for their long-standing goal of a paralyzing national
strike, perhaps in the early new year?
25X1
December 4, 1975
- 17 -
Approved For Release - 300130001-3 25X1
 Approved Four Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002300130001 J3
Terrorism in the Netherlands
South Moluccan terrorists that hijacked a Dutch
train on Tuesday and occupied the Indonesian consulate
in Amsterdam today are believed to be young men,
probably born in the Netherlands and outside the
control of the two known Moluccan independence groups.
One group has already disclaimed responsiblity, and
the other reportedly opposes violence to achieve its
aims. One of the hijackers is said to be a brother of
one of the members of the gang that attempted to
kidnap Queen Juliana earlier this year. Their
sentences come up for appeal today.
The hijacked train is being held by five
Moluccan terrorists and one report--thus far un-
confirmed--claimed that a hostage was killed earlier
today, presumably when a deadline set by the gunmen
lapsed. The hijackers reportedly have asked for a
plane to take them and some hostages out of the
country, but Dutch authorities have refused to allow
any hostages to be used in the escape.
The terrorists are part of the more than 35,000
former residents of the island of Ambon in the
Indonesian island group known as the South Moluccas.
When Indonesia received its independence from the
Netherlands in 1950, some Ambonese who had served in
the Dutch army and acquired Dutch customs, attempted
to gain autonomy from Indonesia. When their uprising
failed, about 12,000 Ambonese nationalists opted to
emigrate to the Netherlands.
Nearly all of the 70,000 residents who remain
in the South Moluccas support union with Indonesia
and have little or no interest in the independence
movement based in the Netherlands. Even the majority
December 4, 1975
Approved F r Release - 0865A002300130001-3
 25X1
Approved For Relea - 2300130001-3
of Moluccans living in the Netherlands no longer
seek autonomy, but wish merely to return to the
islands and live under Indonesian administration.
To facilitate their return, The Hague and Jakarta
have instituted a program to repatriate some of the
Moluccans that have not been identified with the
independence movement. For the terrorists, however,
there is little hope to return and even less that
Jakarta will grant any political concessions.
The Dutch government appears to be using a
"wait and see" policy similar to that employed by
the Irish government last month to secure the re-
lease of Dutch industrialist Tiede Herrema who was
kidnapped by Irish terrorists. The train hijackers,
however, killed two hostages when they took over the
train on Tuesday and possibly another one today.
Unlike the Herrema affair, where the Irish govern-
ment could have given into political demands, no
such latitude exists in the Moluccan case.
December 4, 1975
25X1
Approved For Relea e - 2300130001-3
25X1
 Approved Fot Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300140001-3
The Rome Summit
The heads of government of the EC Nine, who
convened in Rome on December 1-2 for their triannual
European Council, resolved a critical dispute with
Britain that could spell a net advantage for Com-
munity cohesion once the dust settles from the long
and sometimes bitter exchanges of the summit. The
compromise with the UK in effect marked progress
towards a common energy policy that has been stalled
for years. Decisions were also reached which signal
a long-overdue improvement in the management of EC
finances and potentially enhance democratic control
of community institutions.
December 4, 1975
-20-
Approved F - 0865AO02300130001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3
 A proved For Release 2005/02/17 :CIA-RDP79T00865A002300130001-3
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300130001-3