MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS OF THE SPRAGUE COMMITTEE REPORT: FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R001000010002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 99
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 27, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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PLEASE RETU C'
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
February 27, 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS OF THE SPRAGUE COMMITTEE REPORT:
The Sprague Committee report is being circulated to the
departments and agencies for consideration and any action which
they deem appropriate. I
The Sprague recommendation concerning the Operatj.ons
Coordinating Board has been rejected by the President. This de-
cision, however, has no bearing on other recommendations made in
the report.
Each department and agency is urged to consider care-
fully all the recommendations except the one covers g the OCB.
Those parts of the report which are found to be use l can be
acted upon, if appropriate, by an individual departm nt or
agency.
McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
NSC review(s) completed.
15 NOV ~g~
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES ABROAD
December 1960
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THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES ABROAD
MANSFIELD D. SPRAGUE, Chairman
GEORGE V. ALLEN
Director, U. S. Information
Agency
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence
GORDON GRAY
Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security
Affairs
KARL G. HARR, JR.
Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent
JOHN A. BROSS
Central Intelligence Agency
RAYMOND A. HARE
Deputy Under Secretary of State
JOHN N. IRwIN II
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
C. D. JACKSON
LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
ABBOTT WASHBURN
Deputy Director, U. S. Informa-
tion Agency
F. HAYDN WILLIAMS
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for National Security
Council Affairs and Plans
Executive Director
WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN
(U. S. Information Azencv)
en ra intelligence gency)
COLONEL J. I. COFFEY
(The White House Office)
Administrative Officer
ROBERT J. PHILLIPS
EDMUND A. GULLION
(Department of State)
ABRAHAM M. SIRKIN
(U. S. Information Agency)
COLONEL JOHN F. TWOMBLY III
(Department of Defense)
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Or %lnr I
Letter of the President to Committee Chairman Mansfield D.
Sprague, dated January 9, 1961, acknowledging receipt of the Com-
mittee report
Chairman Sprague's letter to the President, dated December 23, 1960,
transmitting the Committee's Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter I-The Role of the Psychological Factor in Foreign Pol-
icy and the Requirements for an Adequate Informa-
tion System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter II-Reinforcing the Foundations of the U. S. Information
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chapter III-The New Importance of Educational, Cultural and
Exchange Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Chapter IV-Psychological and Informational Aspects of Economic
Chapter V-New Dimensions of Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Chapter VI-International Activities of Private Persons and Organ-
izations, and of the Mass Media . . . . . . . . . .
51
Chapter VII-Organization, Coordination and Review . . . . . . .
59
I-Supplementary Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
II-List of Staff Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
89
III-Letter of the President to Committee Chairman Sprague, dated
December 2, 1959, concerning the establishment of the Presi-
dent's Committee on Information Activities Abroad . . . . .
91
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
January 9, 1961
Dear Mr. Sprague:
I have read with deep interest the conclusions and recommendations
of the Committee on Information Activities Abroad which were sub-
mitted to me with your letter of December twenty-third.
I am impressed by the comprehensive nature of the study conducted
by your committee and the breadth and vision which characterize it.
As you know, I am asking that study be started on it at once by the
departments and agencies involved in the matters it covers. Also, I
am having it placed in the permanent records of the Government readily
available for future use. With much of the report, and a great many
of its conclusions and recommendations, I am in full and instant accord.
Certain other conclusions and recommendations will of course require,
and receive, further consideration. Altogether, I think it is a document
of exceptional value to an informed understanding of this subject, and
for this reason have determined to put as much of it as possible into the
public domain. Your committee was not asked to make an unclassified
report and indeed you have dealt with many things which must remain
classified in the interest of national security. Even with these omitted,
however, it deserves-and I hope will receive-wide attention.
There are certain of your conclusions and recommendations which
merit particular notice. The first of these has to do with the emphasis
on the total U. S. information effort, particularly in Africa and Latin
America. I share the committee's view that there should be continued
expansion of these activities, carried out in an orderly way so as to permit
the preparation of sound plans and the recruitment and training of
qualified personnel.
Also worthy of serious attention is the stress laid by the committee
upon the training process so that those members of the Government
who engage in operations may fully understand the broad policy consid-
erations which underlie our programs and be fully equipped to act in the
total interest of the United States.
There would be, I hope, general acceptance of the view that in the
long run the soundest program of all might well be the one to give assist-
ance to educational development. Such a program should of course be
well defined in scope and timing before extensive commitments are made.
We have long recognized the values in the programs of exchange of
persons, and serious attention should be given to your committee's recom-
mendation that they be expanded, particularly with African countries.
Also, I fully agree that improvement in planning and making arrange-
ments for exchange personnel while they are in this country is a most
desirable goal.
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In our foreign programs, there will be wide agreement as to the
importance of giving careful attention to the impact of program actions
on foreign opinion both in the formulation of policy and in the execution
of programs. It is my hope that all agencies and departments will
continue to take appropriate organizational and training measures to
this end. As your committee properly points out, appropriate emphasis
also must be given to public opinion in the field which we have tradi-
tionally looked upon as formal diplomacy.
There is little question in my mind that the creation of the Opera-
tions Coordinating Board was a major step forward. I think it has well
justified its existence and I would hope that it will be continued as an
important element in the national policy machinery. In any event, I
share the judgment of your committee that regardless of any changes
that may be made in this machinery, the functions now performed by
the Operations Coordinating Board must continue to be provided for.
Finally, I express my personal thanks to you, and through you to
the members of your committee and to the committee staff, for the long
and arduous work devoted to the preparation of this study. I know
of the tremendous amount of time you and your colleagues have devoted
to this constructive effort. The country is indeed indebted to you all.
With warm regard,
Sincerely,
The Honorable
Mansfield Sprague,
90 Ponus Street,
New Canaan, Connecticut
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THE PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE
ON INFORMATION ACTIVITIES ABROAD
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.
December 23, 1960
I am pleased to submit herewith the Conclusions and Recommenda-
tions of your Committee on Information Activities Abroad. During the
past several months, in accordance with your letter of December 2, 1959,
we have carried out a comprehensive survey of what we have called "The
United States Information System". We have also considered the
psychological aspects of. United States diplomatic, economic, military
and scientific programs which have impact abroad. Likewise, we have
reported on several of the activities of private groups and institutions
bearing upon foreign attitudes toward this country.
This Committee effort is the second special study initiated by you to
help shape the evolution of policies and programs in a new and increas-
ingly important aspect of United States foreign policy. Like the Presi-
dent's Committee on International Informational Activities, chaired
by Mr. William H. Jackson, we have tried to be completely objective and
non-partisan. We have approached our task not as special pleaders for
informational and related programs but have attempted to relate them
to the total responsibilities of government in the international field.
We have consulted numerous persons in government, both within
the departments and agencies represented on the Committee and else-
where. We have also attempted to give weight to the views of knowl-
edgeable persons outside government.
We have taken the view that an ad hoc effort of this kind should
avoid intensive investigation of particular 'Operating problems, but
should concentrate on overall policies and programs. We have tried
to provide guidance and a coherent foundation of criteria and concepts
which will have continuing value to operating officials in dealing with
concrete problems.
The timing of this study is highly appropriate. Developments on
the international scene in the course of our work have continuously
re-emphasized, even dramatized, the relevance and significance of the
problems you assigned to us for study.
The Committee has brought a rich background of cumulative gov-
ernmental and private experience to its work. Out of such experience,
plus the deep and occasionally differing personal convictions of its mem-
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bers, a survey has been produced which we trust will have validity and
utility in the trying years ahead.
As you will see from our recommendations, the Committee has
formed three general conclusions:
a. On the whole, the United States informational system and
efforts to integrate psychological factors into policy have become
increasingly effective.
b. The evolution of world affairs, the effectiveness of the Com-
munist apparatus, and the growing role of public opinion interna-
tionally confront us with the necessity of continuing improve-
ment in this aspect of government, on an orderly but urgent basis.
c. This will involve the allocation of substantially greater re-
sources over the next decade, better training of personnel, further
clarification of the role of information activities, increasing the
understanding and competence of government officials to deal with
informational and psychological matters, and improvement in the
mechanisms for coordination.
While recommending greater efforts and expenditures, the Com-
mittee is mindful of the importance of balanced budgets. Informational
programs must be looked upon as part of the total National Security
effort. If this requires greater sacrifices by the American people, we
believe that they should be enjoined to make them.
During the course of our deliberations a number of salutary actions
have been taken within government in areas under discussion by the
Committee which otherwise might have resulted in specific recom-
mendations. Even with respect to some of the recommendations made
by the Committee, we understand that action is already being initiated.
The Committee has been encouraged in its efforts by such concrete ex-
amples of initiative and forward thinking.
The Committee has received the full cooperation of various govern-
ment agencies. We have been greatly impressed by the contributions of
many able people in government who on their own time and without
extra compensation prepared special materials for us.
The Staff of the Committee, whose names are listed elsewhere, have
rendered outstanding service. Without their able and conscientious
help this study would not have been possible. - Especially we should like to
commend Mr. Waldemar A. Nielsen, Executive. Director, who was loaned
to us by the Ford Foundation. His assistance was of the very highest
order of competence and dedication.
I should like to note that in addition to the valuable contributions of
the individual members of the Committee, the alternates for the repre-
sentatives of the Departments of State and Defense and for the Directors
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Information
Agency have been extremely helpful throughout. They are, respectively,
Raymond A. Hare, Haydn Williams, John A. Bross and Abbott Washburn.
The Committee will place in the custody of your Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs an organized collection of staff papers which con-
tain information and analyses which should be of reference value to the
operating officials concerned with informational and psychological
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matters. These working papers should be treated as such and not as
having been officially approved by the Committee.
Joining with me in forwarding the following chapters are the other
members of the Committee: George V. Allen, Allen W. Dulles, Gordon
Gray, Karl G. Harr, Jr., John N. Irwin II, C. D. Jackson, Livingston T.
Merchant and Philip D. Reed.
Respectfully,
MANSFIELD D. SPRAGUE
Chairman
The President
The White House
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Chapter I
THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR IN FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN
ADEQUATE INFORMATION SYSTEM
The Elements of the Problem
The 1950s have seen profound changes in the world, including the
consolidation of Communist control over the mainland of China, the
birth of the hydrogen bomb, and the launching,of Sputnik. The 1960s
will see even more; this period may prove to be one of the most convulsive
and revolutionary decades in several centuries.
Scientific progress has set some of the underlying forces in motion,
such as the world-wide population explosion which has resulted from
medical and other technological advances. Precisely where new break-
throughs will occur is unforeseeable, but that they will occur, and at
an increasing rate, is certain. Some ninety per cent of all the scientists
who have ever lived are alive today and the resources which will be
devoted to research in the next ten years will equal the total for all
past years since the beginning of history.
If progress is driving one wheel of the world transformation now
underway, the consequences of backwardness are driving the other.
Half of the people on earth still live under conditions of hunger, disease
and ignorance; but they have become conscious of the possibility of im-
provement and are now in active, often violent, struggle to improve
their condition. In this vast awakening are infinite possibilities for
constructive change and equally great potentialities of danger.
Even if world cooperation could be counted upon and world peace
assured, modernizing the societies in which the impoverished portion
of this world lives would be a complex and difficult task requiring
vigorous and sustained effort. But peace is uncertain and over-all co-
operation under present circumstances is out of the question. The
Soviet. Union, having acquired great industrial and military strength, is
pressing hard its drive for expansion and ultimate, world domination.
In doing so it is exerting all its power to counter our endeavors to help
build a free and a more stable world.
As of now, the Soviet Union probably prefers to achieve its ob-
jectives through means short of all-out war. Therefore the prospect
is for a period of protracted nonmilitary conflict between the Free World
and the Communist system. This conflict will reach into every portion
of the globe. Its background will consist of the presence within the
Communist Bloc of massive conventional military forces and the avail-
ability of great nuclear striking power. Its foreground will be charac-
terized by the continuous employment of economic, diplomatic and in-
formational instruments as well as of subversive and conspiratorial
action.
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The Free World's program is directed toward solving the political
and economic ills of the underdeveloped world through a aemocratic and
pluralistic type of state organization. To counter this, the Communists
maintain an effective world-wide apparatus-Communist parties, front
organizations of labor, youth and the like-which seeks to prevent the
establishment of democratic institutions in the new states, and else-
where to undermine already established and functioning free govern-
mental institutions.
We cannot rely solely on informational media, in the narrow sense of
the term, to do the job of countering such Communist activities. Tne
Soviets have forced themselves on the consciousness of people world-
wide, not primarily by their propaganda, but through the exercise of
power, through instilling fear rather than through persuasion, by the
tender of aid and services, and by exploiting nationalism and aspirations
for social reform.
Today we are facing a revolt of the have-nots, particularly in Asia,
Africa and Latin America. We have to deal with the Lumumbas, the
Castros and the Sukarnos. They are largely immune to persuasion; they
basically prefer a governmental system based on the dictatorship of the
proletariat with themselves as dictators, rather than any democratic,
representative type of free government.
We face situations in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America where
anything resembling free government has broken down. In some cases
such as Cuba, Guinea and Indonesia, the leaders are inclined in varying
degree to a Communist type of government. Other countries which are,
as yet, opposed to a Communist form of government, have resorted to
various types of military or civil dictatorship, despairing of the practica-
bility of achieving their political and economic aims through reliance
upon democratic procedures.
'If these military or personal dictatorships collapse, the people, left
without strong leadership, are highly vulnerable to the appeals both
economic and political of Moscow and Peiping. They can be persuaded,
based on the Moscow/Peiping experience, that they can achieve a strong
central government and, through a Communist type of industrial organ-
ization, more rapidly secure the benefits of industrial growth. They are
pushed in this direction by the closely-knit and effective subversive ap-
paratus of Communist parties and Communist front organizations.
Too many people have been deluded by the theory that in the rela-
tively underdeveloped countries the people value liberty more highly than
physical security and their daily bread. Such is not always the case.
They in fact tend readily to tolerate a governmental structure that
provides the latter even if it limits their liberties.
If the United States had an opportunity over the near future to
influence the form of government to be established in the Congo, in
Indonesia, or Cuba, for example, which would preserve personal liberties
and yet serve as a base for economic and industrial advance, what form
of government would we advocate? Initially, it would probably not be
one based exactly on our own Constitution, universal suffrage and the
like.
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One of our basic problems, therefore, is how to meet in these areas
of Asia, Africa and Latin America the pressing need for effective gov-
ernment that will provide security and promote economic well-being and
yet is not Communist controlled. Certainly one of the objectives of our
policy and of our actions must be to help in the development of forms
of government which will meet these basic requirements, will promote
stability, discipline and economic advancement without undue infringe-
ment of individual liberties, and which will not be incompatible with the
progressive development of free institutions.
It will be extremely difficult to accomplish this unless we can find
more effective means to deal with the world-wide Communist apparatus
which is dedicated to the destruction of free government. Communism
is a grave menace today in Cuba, in many countries of Latin America,
Central Africa, the Middle East and in parts of the Far East, particu-
larly Indonesia and Laos. Even in certain NATO countries, such as
Italy and France, there are powerful Communist parties.
The eventual outcome of the struggle, assuming that general war
can be avoided and that Communist subversion can be countered, will
depend in considerable degree on the extent we are able to influence the
attitudes of people.
Such is the context within which the present Committee has ap-
proached its task.
We begin with an obvious fact: the steadily mounting force of
public opinion in world affairs. Democratic countries are by definition
controlled in their policies by the opinion of their citizens. In the. Sino-
Soviet Bloc, where public opinion in the democratic sense is ineffective,
it nevertheless cannot be wholly ignored by the regimes. .If nothing
else, it determines how far the screw of oppression can be turned without
the outburst of revolt. In many of the less-developed and emergent
states the role of public opinion and the channels for its expression are
not yet clearly established. But it would be an_ error to assume that,
because of general backwardness or illiteracy, public opinion is unim-
portant. It may be inoperative on certain issues and may be manifested
only spasmodically, sometimes violently. But in these regions public
expectations, popular unrest and mass opinion are currently providing
the impulsion and setting the general directions for political as well
as economic and social change.
In part, the rise of this force can be explained by the growth of
literacy and education, and the introduction of new and wider channels
of communication. The radio and the motion picture, publications, and
now increasingly television, have brought tens of millions of people to
political consciousness. An underlying element has been the spread of
the concept of democracy, which although sometimes distorted or
perverted in form, has now reached the most remote corners of the earth.
In this century even the Communists pay lip service to the principle of
government by popular consent.
The trend is perhaps most vividly symbolized by the United Na-
tions, a diplomatic arena in which the economic and military power
of the participants plays an important part in the outcome of issues,
but in which world opinion is almost equally influential. The changing
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styles of diplomacy also reflect growing concern with the views of groups
beyond official circles. From the formalized government-to-government
communications of the classical past, we have now witnessed the advent
of epistolary diplomacy, electronic diplomacy, summit diplomacy, un-
official diplomacy, even undiplomatic diplomacy.
These innovations or aberrations are consistent with the increasing
tendency of governments, in addition to their official dealings, to estab-
lish relations with various groups and individuals in foreign societies,
including trade unions, intellectuals and opposition leaders. This trend
in turn derives from recognition of a simple, practical fact: unless gov-
ernments effectively communicate their policies and actions to all politi-
cally influential elements of foreign populations, their programs can be
impeded and their security placed in jeopardy.
In the case of the United States, we are concerned with our general
prestige in the world and our image as a dynamic and progressive society
not out of national vanity but because of their relationship to the effec-
tiveness of our leadership on crucial issues. We are concerned that
foreign leaders understand the principles and values of a free society
not simply out of evangelistic impulse but because their understanding
will influence political and social developments within their countries
and ultimately their international orientation.
In more specific ways, too, intangible attitudes translate into hard,
measurable assets-or liabilities. The durability and workability of our
treaties are directly affected by leadership and mass attitudes abroad.
The usefulness of our economic assistance in accelerating growth in
underdeveloped countries is deeply influenced by the degree of under-
standing and cooperation in the recipient country. In the case of our
strategic bases abroad, public opinion in the various localities will affect
and in some cases can even determine how long and under what condi-
tions those bases will be available to us.
Thus, in considering public opinion in the present world situation,
we are talking about something as practical as economics, as powerful
as hardware.
The fundamental question to which the Committee has addressed
itself is: how can U.S. performance be improved in reaching and influ-
encing opinion abroad, including that of officials, leadership groups and
the general public?
The question must be dealt with in two distinct but related parts:
first, the adequacy of governmental activities specifically and primarily
designed to influence opinion abroad-the overt and covert mass media,
cultural and educational programs, which this Committee will hence-
forth refer to as informational; and second, the adequacy of our efforts,
in shaping our foreign policies and programs, to build understanding
and support and to minimize resentment, confusion or opposition-
efforts which the Committee will refer to as psychological.
The Informational System
Since Benjamin Franklin went to Paris after the signing of the
Declaration of Independence, the United States has been engaged in
efforts to communicate its policies and objectives abroad. But today,
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because of the growing importance of public opinion, rapid technological
developments, explosive political evolution, and the omnipresence of
the massive Soviet propaganda apparatus, the problem of communica-
tion is both more urgent and more complex than ever before. The U. S.
Government in times past, as in periods of war, has temporarily created
specialized agencies to deal with information matters. But the exist-
ence of a large-scale, continuing set of programs and agencies to dis-
seminate information about the United States and its policies, educate
key leadership elements abroad, and counter hostile propaganda, dates
only from the Second World War.
During this period the principal information agency has been re-
named six times, reorganized four times, and until recently has been
subjected to great year-to-year variations in its appropriations, much
to the disadvantage of long-term programs, effective planning and
needed personnel development. The information programs of the Gov-
ernment have been subjected in the course of their brief existence
both to rapidly growing demands and to considerable abuse from the
Congress and the press. Comparatively little attention has been given
to this field by serious writers and scholars of international affairs..
A mere listing of some of the principal characteristics of the in-
formation system will indicate how heavy and difficult some of its prob-
lems are. It embraces a wide variety of mass media, cultural, educa-
tional and exchange programs. The scale of activity must be large
enough to meet urgent requirements in every major region of the globe;
no politically significant area can be ignored. Operating responsibilities
must necessarily be distributed among several agencies, whose efforts
in turn must be coordinated. The system must have offensive and de-
fensive capabilities-sound and vigorous programs in all media for the
presentation of U.S. policies and programs, and facilities to counter the
moves and expose the purposes of the Soviet apparatus. It must have
strategic as well as tactical capabilities-the ability to build enduring
relationships with foreign leaders and institutions and at the same
time handle daily issues effectively. Yet it cannot be muscle-bound.
It must accurately reflect the content of foreign policy, yet preserve the
qualities of humanness, quickness, subtlety and lightness of touch.
In succeeding chapters the Committee will indicate steps which it
feels will help the U. S. information system to meet more fully this ex-
tremely difficult set of requirements and to fill presently existing gaps.
Let it be noted, however, that very great progress already has been
made. The organizational and budgetary instability of the early years
seems to have been largely overcome. Despite great obstacles, staffs
have been considerably professionalized, and large and effective media
organizations have been built. Arrangements for the coordination of
day-to-day media output with policy have been vastly improved since
the time of the Jackson Committee report, and now on the whole work
effectively. Satisfactory arrangements also have been created to provide
policy guidance for covert operations, and for coordinating covert
activities with the overt programs of the government. Basic facilities
for dealing with the problems posed by the Communist propaganda
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apparatus have been built, and continuing programs established in the
field of exchange of persons.
Most important, these functions and services are developing on a
sound conceptual basis. Despite the seeming success on occasion of
flamboyant Soviet propaganda, the temptation to imitate it has been
resisted. Rather we have constantly sought to find solutions to the
problems of foreign communication and persuasion in terms consistent
with the principles and responsibilities of the United States. The view
has been that official foreign information programs for our kind of
government must reflect the true nature of our society and should be
integrated with foreign policy.
The progress which has been made provides an excellent base from
which to expand and improve our informational efforts to meet the
new requirements.
The Psychological Factor in Policy
The second general aspect of the problem of improving U.S. per-
formance in dealing with the psychological dimension of its foreign
policies relates not to the information programs themselves, but to the
substance of our action programs which influence world opinion.
"Actions speak louder than words" is a maxim which applies abroad as
well as at home, although it is erroneous to speak of actions and words
as if they were independent and alternative instruments for influencing
attitudes. They both speak, in fact, and we must find the means to
make them speak together, to the same objectives, and with combined
power.
We must, therefore, weigh psychological considerations not only
in the presentation but also in the formulation of policies and programs
having impact abroad.
It may be well to elaborate on what this basic proposition implies,
and what it does not imply.
1. It does not imply that foreign opinion and public reactions should
determine or control U.S. policies and objectives. Those are and must
be set strictly by U.S. interests and principles. But it does imply that
both in terms of the workability and results of our programs, and in
terms of our responsibility as the leading nation of the Free World, we
must show a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" in what we do.
2. It does not imply that psychological considerations should be
made dominant in the formulation of U.S. foreign policies and programs.
But because of the powerful and direct influence of foreign reactions
upon the results of our actions and efforts, we are forced in plain common
sense to take them into account before final decisions are made, on
the same basis and with the same care and competence with which we
take other relevant considerations-economic, military or diplomatic-
into account.
3. It does not imply the ornamentation of policy and actions with
psychological gimmicks. But it does involve a serious attempt to identify
and understand the prejudices, hopes, fears, misconceptions and customs
of people abroad which may impede the achievement of our goals.
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4. It does not imply that the only way to take psychological con-
siderations into account is to pander to foreign opinion, recede in the
face of foreign criticism, and solicit constant foreign approval. Nor does
it imply that the only way to be persuasive in our actions is to offer in-
ducements, incentives and accommodation. On the contrary, since our
objectives must be not popularity but long-term and durable relation-
ships of friendship, understanding and respect, we must stand firmly
on principle regardless of temporary storms of disapproval. Moreover,
the advancement of national policies will on occasion involve sternness,
the use of sanctions, and, in the defense of vital national interests, the
employment of military measures including the use of force. When
such action is necessary, the only psychological requirement is that it
be done in such a way as to be comprehensible to our friends and clear
in its implications to our enemies. In the long run, a nation like an
individual achieves stature and exercises leadership not by avoiding
criticism or seeking to please but by its character, strength and goodness
of heart.
The concept of integrating psychological factors in the substance
of our programs is by now well established. Seven years ago the Jackson
Committee in clear language stated the essence of it, emphasizing that
the psychological aspects of policy are not separable from policy itself,
but are inherent in and an ingredient of every diplomatic, economic or
military action.
Since then, this view has pervaded our statements of basic national
policy. Throughout the policy papers of the National Security Council,
for instance, the relevance of the psychological dimension of foreign
policy is recognized and numerous references are made to psychological
objectives to be fulfilled-to influence foreign opinion generally, to
change attitudes of specific leadership groups, to reinforce understanding
of specific policies and actions, etc.
Likewise the machinery for the implementation of policy includes
provision for the psychological dimension: The Operations Coordinating
Board shall advise and consult with the various departments and
agencies regarding "the execution of each security action or project
so that it shall make its full contribution to the particular climate of
opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world."
Thus, the concept is imbedded in both policy and structure. The
improvement now needed is to convert the concept more fully into
reality.
Hardly anyone now denies the relevance and importance of psycho-
logical factors to effective foreign policies and programs. But doubts
and attitudes of resistance remain, especially at the middle echelons
of the Government, which find expression in various ways. One ap-
proach concedes their relevance, but holds that the best way to deal
with them is to ignore them since they are presumed to flow auto-
matically from sound policies and programs. A variation is that they
do not require special attention because it is contended that any good
governmental official naturally takes these things into account in making
his decisions.
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Frequently reservations are expressed about the extent to which psy-
chological factors should be taken into account. It is believed by some
that while such factors are important, when a choice must be made,
they should in all circumstances give way to considerations of a diplo-
matic, economic, military or budgetary nature.
Even among those who agree that psychological considerations
should be dealt with, there continue to prevail at least three markedly
different views on the time at which such considerations should be taken
into account:
1. The minimal view is they should be considered only in handling
the publicity about actions already decided upon. According to this
concept professional public relations personnel should sit in or be in-
formed whenever major decisions are being made but only in order to
be better equipped to write news releases and answer press inquiries.
At present even this minimal view is sometimes ignored in practice.
Occasionally, the public affairs elements of departments carrying on
foreign programs and the staff of USIA learn of major decisions after
they are made and must therefore scramble to catch up with the back-
ground needed to deal with the news media.
2. The intermediate view is that psychological factors should be
considered in planning the timing and manner of carrying out a policy
already decided upon.
3. The third view is that psychological factors should be fully con-
sidered when substantive decisions themselves are being made, as well
as in planning the timing and manner of carrying them out. It is this
position which is endorsed by the Committee.
This is a view which is authoritatively stated in basic governmental
documents but which in practice needs to be accepted and applied more
vigorously and consistently.
In our view, efforts to assign rigid theoretical order of importance
to the various ingredients of policy is sterile and dangerous. There are
cases in which psychological considerations are secondary or inconse-
quential and when they should give way to other overriding factors;
there are other cases in which they are of great moment. The necessity
is, therefore, that they be considered along with and on the same foot-
ing as other factors in the formulation and the execution of foreign
policies and programs.
This is in no sense an argument for the primacy of psychological
factors. It is an argument against neglect of, or prejudice against,
timely and serious consideration of them. Inadequacy in dealing with
the intangible elements in our foreign policies, under present and pro-
spective world conditions, can be just as fatal to their outcome as in-
adequacy in dealing with the more traditional and tangible aspects.
Breaking down remaining barriers of resistance to, and misunder-
standing of, psychological factors on the part of noninformation officers
of government is not subject to quick solution, nor to resolution merely
by changes in machinery. This is a task of education and motivation
which can be completed only over the long run. At the highest levels
an awareness of these factors normally exists. However, below the top
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echelon in our diplomatic, economic, scientific and military agencies psy-
chological factors are often overlooked. Specialists in these agencies
can become so involved with their particular programs that they begin
to see them as ends in themselves, as activities unrelated to over-all
foreign policy objectives, not as means for the achievement of these
objectives. To overcome this tendency, strong articulate leadership from
the top is required.
In this connection, it is instructive to examine the Communist ap-
proach. The Soviet system and Communist ideology give an important
place to agitation and propaganda. Within all elements of the Soviet
Government political and psychological factors are authoritatively in-
jected through the presence of the parallel structure of the Party and
its commissars in every agency. Communist governments go to great
lengths to advance their objectives by psychological and informational
means. They do not, of course, hesitate to flaunt world opinion and
incur disapproval when they feel it necessary to protect their vital in-
terests. But even here psychological considerations are not ignored, for
Communists frequently use intimidation to create fear as well as blan-
dishments to win popularity.
In contrast to the Soviet Union, the United States is an open society
without formalized dogma. Our administrative agencies are not linked
together and controlled by an ideological and propaganda organization
like the Communist Party. The United States cannot copy Soviet models
in solving its problem of international political communications. Never-
theless, consistent with its own character and principles, the United
States must seek to achieve greater effectiveness in this field. In the
short term, organizational adjustments will be helpful. In the longer
term, we must develop fuller understanding on the part of our officials
of the broader psychological and political requirements of their work.
In both the short and long term, we must by word, deed and directive at
the top echelons of Government bring home to all affected branches, to
the Congress and to the general public the vital importance of our infor-
mational and psychological activities.
Even those who grasp the importance of psychological factors some-
times feel a vague sense of impropriety about systematic efforts to deal
with them. This confusion of thinking we owe in large part to the
totalitarian states, which have corrupted and misused words and the
communication of ideas, just as they have corrupted diplomacy, eco-
nomic policy, and military power. However, the immorality is not in
recognizing the importance of world opinion nor in using instruments
to influence it; it is in the motivation and purposes of the user.
Achievement of full consideration of psychological factors, however,
will not magically simplify our foreign policy problems, for psycho-
logical factors are just as complex, just as contradictory and just as
confusing as any other. Whether the problem is Algeria, or the off-
shore islands in the China Sea, or the unity of the Atlantic alliance,
differing estimates of foreign opinion and contradictory recommenda-
tions for dealing with it are inevitable. Despite their complexity, how-
ever, psychological factors must be given proper consideration because
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bhulihl'
they are now more important than ever before to the success of our
foreign policies, the protection of our security and the effectiveness of
our leadership in the world.
The unified and dynamic effort in our foreign actions and relations
which the times call for requires that psychological factors in policies
and programs be identified, planned for and dealt with at all levels of
government by able people conscious of their importance in the achieve-
ment of U.S. world objectives.
In the following pages the Committee outlines some of the steps
which might be taken to strengthen our information agencies and pro-
grams, and to assure the more effective translation into action of the
psychological objectives set forth in basic policy papers.
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Chapter II
REINFORCING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
U. S. INFORMATION SYSTEM
Scope
The fields of primary interest of this Committee have been (1) in-
formational programs of the .United States Government, directed toward
the countries of the Free World and also of the Communist Bloc, for
the purpose of influencing the attitudes and increasing the knowledge of
their governments and peoples about this country, its actions and its
policies; and, (2) programs designed to expose, combat and undermine
Communist attempts to subvert the countries of the Free World.
Mass media programs are carried on not only by the U. S. Informa-
tion Agency,) 6ts
important paa by
the Ijerense Department which is extensively involved in foreign broad-
casting both to American servicemen and, through the Voice of the
United Nations Command in Korea, to foreign populations in the Far
East. Exhibits for overseas showing are prepared by ten Federal
agencies, including the trade fairs program operated by the Department
of Commerce. Cultural, educational and political action programs in-
clude a significant portion of the activities of USIA (book programs,
English teaching, libraries and binational centers),, the exchange of
persons programs conducted by the Department of State with the help
of USIA staff overseas, the performing arts program financed under
the President's Special International Program, important projects of CIA,
and the contributions of the United States to the cultural and educa-
tional activities of the United Nations and other international bodies.
In the current fiscal year the Government will spend approximately
$300 million on these activities. In addition another $375 million will
be spent on programs conducted primarily for other purposes but closely
related to our informational efforts, such as the training of foreign mili-
tary personnel, technical training programs of ICA, and grants and
credits of ICA for educational materials and communications equipment.
Thus informational activities broadly defined constitute slightly
more than one per cent of the approximate total of $50 billion spent
annually for national security.* This one per cent, of course, does not
cover the large expenditures by the Government for economic assistance,
military activities and scientific research and development which also
have major impact on foreign attitudes.
? The principal elements of this figure are the budgets of Defense, AEC, State,
ICA, USIA, CIA, OCDM and NASA.
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Due to the importance of education and exchanges and the unusual
opportunities which they present, the Committee discusses certain
aspects of this category of information activity separately in Chapter III.
Informational Needs and Opportunities Abroad
The Committee has studied the psychological and informational
problems confronting the United States in the several major regions of
the world and has reviewed the total effect of U. S. informational activi-
ties in those regions. On the basis of these studies, we have attempted
to determine whether any important needs are being neglected. The
task of dealing with many of these will necessarily fall to the Govern-
ment; but to the extent that private activity in educational and cultural
fields can be extended, this would on several grounds be highly desir-
able. The following is a summary, by major geographical regions, of
the principal problems and opportunities with which the U. S. informa-
tion system must deal, as seen by the Committee:
In Western Europe, the scale of U. S. information activity has been
substantially reduced in recent years and the growing need for addi-
tional facilities and operations in the emerging nations-if total re-
sources for information remain at present levels-will have to be
financed in some part by further cutbacks in Europe. Except for ex-
changes, this process of reduction has gone as far as it prudently should.
European solidarity with the United States has been dramatically dem-
onstrated in recent tests. But the successful outcome of these crises
should not lead to the complacent conclusion that Europe is now a "safe
precinct". There are in fact serious weaknesses and vulnerabilities, in-
cluding questioning of U. S. intentions and capabilities, considerable
neutralism, a continuing internal Communist threat, and the possibility
of damaging intraregional frictions. Because Europe is the corner-
stone of U. S. security arrangements, it is of the utmost importance that
the people of this area understand American objectives, have confidence
in our leadership, and cooperate actively in mutual undertakings.
Given the close historical ties of the Atlantic nations, the level of Euro-
pean political sophistication and the full development of independent
mass media in Europe, American policies and actions far more than
official information programs will influence attitudes. But informa-
tional and cultural activity will continue to play a valuable supporting
role.
The Soviet Bloc, core of the threat to Free World security and to
peace, is growing rapidly in power and influence. Within the Soviet
Union, despite the apparent success of the Khrushchev formula for
combining the carrot and the stick, there are growing pressures for
more individual freedom and more contact with the non-Communist
world. In some of the East European satellites, the more flagrant and
overt forms of Communist oppression and control have been moderated.
There may now be somewhat more resignation to the situation, but
the basic anti-Communist, anti-Soviet attitudes of the populations have
not changed. Partly in response to these pressures the regimes have
allowed new channels of communication with the West to open. Not-
withstanding some retightening of communications controls in recent
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months, the Committee feels that the long-term movement toward
wider contact probably will not be suppressed. From a security point
of view, just as it is necessary for us to take every possible step to main-
tain attitudes of confidence and cooperation in the NATO area, it is
equally important that we take every opportunity to penetrate the
Bloc countries with influence, information and ideas in hope of lessen-
ing to some degree the hostility and aggressiveness of the governments
and to increase frictions among them. Adequate appropriations should
be made in order to exploit fully opportunities in the Soviet area for
exhibits, cultural presentations, publication programs and other types
of informational activity.
Communist China, despite staggering problems, is emerging as a
world power. From the standpoint of American policy, the China ques-
tion involves not only our relations with the mainland but our entire
system of security arrangements in Asia. As China progresses with its
program of forced industrialization, further develops its already exten-
sive propaganda-cultural-economic-diplomatic offensive in other parts
of the world, and particularly after it detonates its first nuclear weapon,
which could happen in the next few years, the dangers to peace will
grow significantly worse. For informational activity, the problem is as
baffling as it is threatening. The difficulties are all too evident: The
regime is in its most militant and virulent phase; contact with the
outside world is virtually cut off; the circulation internally of unau-
thorized information is severely limited by controls and harsh sanc-
tions. The 600 million people of the area are being subjected to the
most extensive (and seemingly successful) "Hate America" campaign in
all history. Realizing the unique difficulties of the situation, the Com-
mittee urges sustained government-wide action in preparing long-range
plans, in developing resources, and in seeking new approaches to in-
fluence more effectively the people of Communist China.
Throughout the less-developed areas, despite important regional and
country-by-country differences, the United States faces certain com-
mon information tasks. We must, in the face of the sweeping social,
economic and political revolution now underway (1) explain U. S. poli-
cies, objectives and way of life; (2) wherever possible, identify ourselves
with the forces of progress toward stable and democratic institutions
and disengage ourselves from the outmoded and resented aspects of the
status quo and the colonial past; (3) determine who are the individuals
leading this vast upheaval and rebirth and establish effective communi-
cation with them; (4) expose and counter insofar as possible the multi-
faceted Sino-Soviet offensive against orderly development of these areas;
and (5) provide effective close support through informational means to
U. S. development programs. Our informational programs and facili-
ties must be strengthened if they are to meet these demands.
In Africa, the pace of political developments has outstripped our
informational preparations. We lack basic knowledge of the processes
by which information and ideas are communicated within these primi-
tive societies; we lack sufficient information specialists trained in the
languages and cultures; we lack sufficient physical facilities; and we
lack adequate covert mechanisms and contacts. In the judgment of
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the Committee, Africa presents the United States with a challenging
opportunity to build friendly ties and to throw back Communist efforts
at penetration and take-over. While recognizing that an important in-
hibiting factor in the development of U. S. information activities in
Africa may be the attitude of the metropoles toward any such expan-
sion, the Committee recommends a drastic and prompt upward revi-
sion of all plans, estimates and preparations for information activi-
ties appropriate to the area. A unique and major opportunity in this
region is to participate in and help shape the development of the mass
media, which to date are rudimentary.
In Asia, our primary informational and psychological tasks will
be to help accelerate development and to bolster resistance to the grow-
ing power and influence of Communist China. Our economic assist-
ance programs must be reinforced with large-scale efforts to disseminate
knowledge of new techniques of production, distribution and manage-
ment. For example, India because of its sheer size will be looked to
as an indication of the success or failure of the alternatives to the Com-
munist system. Within India, extensive educational and cultural ac-
tivity, much of which has recently been planned for, will be necessary
to help insure that development takes place along democratic lines.
In India and throughout the rest of Asia, measures must be taken to
offset propaganda disparaging Indian accomplishments and magnify-
ing Soviet and Chinese undertakings, so that whatever progress India
does achieve is made known.
In Latin America, the immediate outlook is more ominous than
promising. Governments in the area are not keeping abreast of the
demands put upon them by expanding populations and rising popular
expectations. New groups are growing in power which are highly vul-
nerable to seizure by alliances of Communists and nationalists. The
principal weapons of the Communists are their various national Commu-
nist parties and their subservient affiliates. In addition the fervor of the
Castro revolution now exerts wide influence on the underprivileged classes
throughout the hemisphere and serves as an important vehicle for the
advancement of Communist objectives. American economic policy with
respect to the hemisphere has undergone recent modification and
strengthening, but informational activities have not been equally re-
inforced. Fortunately, the U. S. information agencies, overt and covert,
have extensive experience in the region and a nucleus of relationships
and effective instrumentalities, such as the binational centers. But
greater efforts are needed to counter Communist penetration of political
parties, trade unions, the mass media, intellectual elements and educa-
tional influence while at the same time strengthening U. S. influence
with these same groups. The Committee recommends that a study be
made to determine more effective means of combating the influence of
Communism, Marxism and extreme radicalism in the educational insti-
tutions and teachers' unions of many Latin American countries.
The Financial Aspects of the Informational System
This Committee has not attempted to make a detailed analysis of
budgets of the departments and agencies concerned with the informa-
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tional system. However, we have reviewed the requirements for infor-
mational activities abroad based upon our appraisal of the current
world situation and estimates of probable developments over the next
decade. In comparing these requirements with present informational
programs, we have concluded that there is a growing need for greater
efforts generally, both overt and covert, and an urgent need for sub-
stantially increased efforts in the critical areas of Latin America and
Africa. These increases are over and above those required to meet the
rising costs of current programs and to provide adequate representa-
tion in the newly independent countries of the world. In the various
chapters we indicate the fields in which we believe increased expendi-
tures should be made.
The extent to which information budgets should be further in-
creased in future years can best be , determined in light of changing
circumstances. However, it is likely that the scale of the total U. S.
information effort will have to be progressively expanded for some time
to come. The Committee urges that, if and when such expansion is
contemplated, the Executive Branch seek Congressional approval for
planned and orderly growth of these activities. Useful programs in
this field cannot be produced overnight. They require many months,
and sometimes years, of lead-time to conduct the necessary operational
surveys, to prepare sound plans, to recruit and train qualified personnel.
Speed and flexibility of operations are an essential component of
many informational programs and often can enhance substantially the
psychological impact of noninformational programs. If we are to com-
pete successfully with the regimented Communist system, we must be
able, when necessary, to match its inherent maneuverability. This does
not mean that the great bulk of informational programs cannot be
planned and budgeted through the normal processes. But the Execu-
tive Branch must have the authority and the funds to meet sudden
opportunities and unforeseen developments. It is true, unfortunately,
that swift action in the early days of a crisis is often of greater psycho-
logical significance than later programs, no matter how intrinsically
sound. The Committee, therefore, recommends that adequate con-
tingency funds be appropriated for the Government's informational and
psychological operations, or, as a minimum, that adequate flexibility
to transfer between accounts be provided.
American efforts to develop contact with influential elements
abroad should not be diminished by niggardly allowances for official
hospitality. Because the development of close personal relationships
with influential individuals and groups is of very great importance, the
Committee recommends that renewed efforts be made to obtain Con-
gressional approval for adequate representation funds.
In making recommendations for budget increases, the Committee
has sought to find areas in which it might properly recommend reduc-
tions or eliminations of programs. We have concluded, however, that
with one exception there is no realistic possibility of providing for addi-
tional needs by cutting back present programs;. nor is it feasible for the
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United States to stretch present resources by deliberately neglecting
urgent needs in any major region. However, we offer three suggestions:
1. The U.S. Government should encourage the other advanced
Free World nations, particularly those in the NATO area, to help bear
the load of expanded informational programs which are needed in the
underdeveloped areas. Their help would be especially useful in the
fields of foreign educational development and exchange of persons.
2. Government-sponsored educational exchange with Western Eu-
rope might be somewhat reduced in view of the higher priority need for
such exchanges with less-developed parts of the world. Mitigating the
effects of such a cutback is the fact that a large number of exchanges
with Western Europe now take place under private auspices.
3. Periodic evaluations should be made of the effectiveness of spe-
cific U. S. information activities, both world-wide and in individual
countries. Tough-mindedness in redirecting or eliminating operations
which prove to be ineffective or of marginal value for the purpose in-
tended is mandatory.
Organizational Arrangements
At times in the past the activities now carried on by the U. S. Infor-
mation Agency have, been a part of the Department of State. In 1953
the overt information activities of the Government, except for the edu-
cational exchange programs, were placed under a separate U. S. Infor-
mation Agency, which has continued to receive its day-to-day policy
guidance from the Department of State. The exchange of persons
programs remained in the Department, but with overseas operations
conducted by USIA field personnel.
Because it is outside the scope of the Committee's terms of refer-
ence, the structural relationship between the Department of State and
USIA has not been examined. However, the Committee believes that
the present allocation of responsibilities has functioned reasonably well
and that practical means have been worked out to insure necessary
coordination. *
Special Recommendations
The Committee has not attempted to review in detail each of the
numerous programs and projects now being conducted. Purely in
terms of time and available staff such an examination would have been
infeasible. More important, the Committee believes that the role of
an ad hoc body is not to audit or second-guess the daily operations
and decisions of information agencies and officers. Rather, we have
concentrated on clarifying basic concepts where necessary and analyz-
ing those few major problems of administration and program which
the normal processes of government for one reason or another have
Mr. Reed wishes to have it noted that, as a member of the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Information, he is on record as favoring a single separate
agency to operate the exchange and information programs of our Govern-
ment now lodged in the Department of State and USIA.
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31 Uk , I'
proprietaries which have outlived their usefulness.
formational tasks. The Committee therefore recommends:
1. To the extent that an existing proprietary can effectively and
appropriately carry additional responsibilities, encouraging it and en-
abling it to expand to new geographical areas and types of activity.
By the same token there should be no hesitancy in eliminating any
not been able to deal with successfully. The Committee urges that
attention be given to the following needs:
A. Strengthening covert facilities
Openness has been and should remain the ideal and eventual objec-
tive of U.S. information efforts. But the rough reality is that under
present circumstances the world is too full of skepticism about gov-
ernmental propaganda and too full of Communist efforts to poison the
flow of international communications, to allow the U.S. Government to
lay aside the weapon of unattributed or covert information activity.
Indeed, the probability is that in coming years the necessity and use-
fulness of this approach will grow, not decline.
The Committee, therefore, firmly endorses the importance and
propriety of unattributed information activity. Both USIA and CIA
-have an important role to play in this activity.
One technique in particular deserves to be used more extensively
by CIA, viz., the creation and use of "proprietaries" (organizations con-
trolled and financed by the United States). These have impressively
demonstrated their power and effectiveness in carrying out certain in-
NSC
3. Periodic review, by outside specialists where appropriate and
B. Measures to deal with the world-wide Communist Party organi-
zation
Closely related to the need for strengthening covert facilities and
for creating a more receptive climate for our other informational activi-
ties is the problem of exposing, harassing and, wherever possible, under-
mining the Communist parties and their various subsidiary and front
organizations which are operating in the Free World.
In many countries of the Free World these organizations are given
a measure of respectability. In at least some of these countries the
Communist Party is legally recognized or permitted to carry on its sub-
versive activities under the same protection afforded democratic politi-
cal institutions. This is largely true in Italy and to some extent in
France and Greece. The party is becoming more and more dominant
in Indonesia and is controlling in Cuba. It is a grave danger in many
more countries. It has a world-wide apparatus and there is a hard
core of Communist "faithful" in practically every country of the world.
feasible, of the covert operations of the CIA in the mass media field,
which are now reaching considerable proportions.
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aruil "
The recent Italian elections are only a fresh reminder of the con-
tinuing success of the Communist Party in a free and relatively affluent
society. There the Communists polled over 24 per cent of the vote and
with their left-wing Socialist allies control just under 40 per cent of
the total vote. This is well past the danger point. It is a good example
of the fallacy of the much repeated theory that raising living standards
alone is the death knell of Communism. In France the Communists
manage to get over a quarter of the popular vote. Due to the de Gaulle-
inspired electoral laws, which have rejected the dangerous proportional
system, Communist parliamentary representation has been greatly re-
duced. Today in France the Communists have an organization that
is strong enough to threaten with a popular front government, if de
Gaulle should fail and be temporarily succeeded by an authoritarian
military regime.
All of these situations call for an even more vigorous effort on our
part to supplement present activities and to develop further programs
of action, overt and covert, to counter the international Communist
threat. Such programs should include unmasking the leadership of local
Communist parties, disclosing the directives and support which these
leaders receive from Moscow and Peiping, exposing the nature of the
Communist conspiratorial and subversive programs, and demonstrating
how the Communists abuse the freedom allowed in democracies in order
to destroy democracy itself.
In many countries of the Free World we can further develop our
efforts to secure cooperative action. We should be able to find additional
ways, without interfering in the domestic affairs of others, to lend more
effective aid to those who are directly threatened by Communist subver-
sion and are engaged in a drive to meet it. Where such a drive does
not exist, we should help to get it going in order to deprive local Com-
munist parties of the assets and of the respectability which have made
them so dangerous.
For obvious reasons the full scope of such programs cannot be de-
veloped within the confines of this document. We believe, however, that
the general policies and actions recommended should be developed
promptly, to supplement the very considerable contribution we are
already making. To this end further country-by-country or area-by-
area studies should be made of the particular form the Communist threat
is taking and of the assets and potentialities available, or which could
be developed locally, to help to meet the threat.
C. Expansion of training programs
To achieve the objectives urged by the Committee, a fundamental
requirement is the expansion of training opportunities and programs
along two fronts: broad training in the psychological and informational
fields for officials in those governmental agencies whose programs strongly
affect foreign opinion; and specialist training of staffs directly engaged
in information programs.
Broad Training. We must seek steadily to deepen and broaden
the understanding of the various components, including the psycho-
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logical, of "total diplomacy", among our diplomatic, economic, informa-
tion and military officers.
Within the Government, even in American society in general, there
is a tendency toward specialization, and perhaps toward overspecializa-
tion. Our economists, political officers and military officers are without
peer in their own fields. But the growing size of governmental ma-
chinery and the growing complexity of technical questions are leading
them to greater and greater concentration on narrower and narrower
matters. This in turn has sometimes led to a segmental approach to
problems, a feeling on the part of specialists that their particular fields
of action are or can be divorced from political or psychological con-
siderations.
The Committee therefore urges that long-range efforts be made
to qualify more top officers engaged in economic, military, diplomatic
and scientific work in the psychological aspects of policy, and to de-
velop more information officers with adequate background in nonin-
formation fields of foreign policy. By this approach, a basic improve-
ment in the psychological aspect of our operations can be obtained. For
example, the Committee believes that an economist sensitive to psy-
chological considerations and an information specialist trained in eco-
nomics might succeed in working out aid procedures which would com-
bine economic effectiveness with a high degree of public acceptance
and cooperation in a way which specialists pursuing their own "pure"
lines could not match.
We therefore recommend greater stress upon psychological and in-
formational matters in the various in-service training institutions and
programs of the Government. It is important that these matters should
be dealt with adequately in the war colleges and the Foreign Service
Institute. Training in these fields can also be improved through gradu-
ate study in universities for governmental officers and through seminars
and discussion groups which periodically bring together governmental
and academic persons and informational specialists.
Another means of providing broader training is through the method
of cross-assignment between information and noninformation agencies.
In the future, when officers reach high responsibility in the diplomatic,
economic or military fields, they should have had in the course of their
career development substantial experience in or exposure to the psycho-
logical and informational aspects of policies and programs. Cross-
assignment might also create a greater awareness on the part of non-
information officers of the complexities of governmental public relations
and appreciation of the expertness in this field which can be acquired
only by practical and sometimes painful experience on the front lines
of contact with public opinion.
Knowledge of a country's language is an important factor in suc-
cessful representational efforts and in sensitive reporting on the climate
of opinion by our Foreign Service officers. Pending such time as lan-
guage instruction in our schools and universities can take up the slack,
the language-training efforts of the Foreign Service and the other serv-
ices should receive greater Congressional support. Prior to departure
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for new posts executive personnel should be required, whenever possible,
to undergo an adequate course of language training.
It seems to the Committee, however, that there is still a further
requirement, namely, some provision for bringing together more people
in the top echelons of the agencies dealing in the international area
in a high-level institution for training in the interrelated economic,
political, informational and military aspects of the present world
struggle. The Committee therefore recommends consideration of the
establishment of a National Security Institute under the National
Security Council.
Similar proposals have been generated in the recent past in the
Executive Branch, in Congress and from private sources. There are
several good arguments for such an institution but this. Committee will
mention only two. One is the beneficial results which are likely to
flow from the association in a course of study of several months of able
people from State, Defense, CIA, USIA and ICA, as well as representa-
tives of other departments and agencies as appropriate. The cross-
fertilization of experience and knowledge would be almost as valuable
as the study program itself. Another argument is the need for con-
centrated exposure to and study of Communist philosophy, techniques
and world-wide operations, as well as of our total governmental cold
war resources and how best to orchestrate and use them. The course
of study should not be limited to these subjects but they should receive
great stress.
The Committee does not feel prepared to recommend the form such
an institution should take. However, if it is judged infeasible to create
a separate National Security Institute, consideration should be given
to broadening the character of the National War College, the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, the Foreign Service Institute and other
agency training programs to meet these needs.
Specialized Training of Information Officers. The foreign informa-
tion services are now staffed with an impressive number of competent
officers whose operational experience and knowledge in this specialized
field is unmatched outside the Government. If the scale of activities
is increased as suggested, additional staffs will have to be recruited and
trained. Moreover, many of the most highly qualified officers now
handling these programs feel the need for further training on subjects
pertinent to their tasks.
The requirements of the work are formidable: a knowledge of the
subtle and complex problems of gauging foreign attitudes, of various
media and the processes of communication, of American life and culture,
of the structure of foreign societies, of international relations and the
various aspects of governmental policy, and not least, of the methods of
managing large staffs and substantial operating programs. American
private life offers no counterpart to these combined responsibilities, and
fully qualified persons do not therefore come already trained to the re-
cruiting offices of the Government.
The Committee recommends that more attention be given to training
of informational specialists in media techniques and in the relevant
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behavioral sciences. In considering personnel ceilings of information
agencies account should be taken of requirements for adequate training.
For a variety of reasons, information work in the Government has
not always been able to attract and hold enough of the talented people
required. Limitations and uncertainties of career opportunities have
been important factors. The Committee therefore endorses the need
for legislation which would establish a career service for USIA personnel.
Such a service, in addition to raising and stabilizing the status of in-
formation specialists, should be flexible enough to insure acquisition and
cultivation of creative and original talents.
D. Increasing knowledge about potential leaders, key audiences,
media effectiveness and opinion trends abroad
On the basis of their own experience as well as a limited amount
of -research, the officers operating our foreign information activities have
built up a body of practical knowledge and techniques which is con-
stantly being improved and refined. However, many of these officers are
keenly aware of the deficiencies in their knowledge about some of the
major factors which can determine the success or failure of their efforts.
More information is needed about the opinions, attitudes and aspira-
tions of influential elements and potential leaders in each country, the
credibility and relative influence of its communications media, and the
effectiveness of U. S. information activities. In the emergent societies
particularly, more light is needed on the way information and ideas
travel and how attitudes are formed or can be changed.
The darkest continent of all is the relationship between public atti-
tudes and the actual political behavior of populations and of govern-
ments. In what countries and on what kind of issues is popular opinion
a factor of importance in the determination of governmental action?
When can it be taken as a valid indicator of national conduct when
choices must be made or crises faced?
We should know more about the effects of both our actions and our
words on foreign opinion; about how to detect, measure and analyze
opinion trends; about the extent to which they can be influenced by
our actions or information output; in brief, about what we might say
or do to strengthen our foreign relations, assert effectively our leader-
ship, and advance our objectives.
Not all of these questions can be answered by research. But some
of the information needed to answer them can be ascertained fairly easily
by modern research techniques at a reasonable cost. The Committee
recommends that the various agencies involved in foreign informational
programs re-examine the adequacy of their research programs. In this
re-examination, they should draw upon the best available advice from
private sources.
E. The establishment of over-all themes-or armatures-for words
and actions
Beyond the difficult daily problem of the intelligent administration
of specific information projects and programs there lies the need to
give the total image of the United States definition, proportion and com-
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prehensibility. Without an over-all pattern, deliberately and effectively
imposed, our official statements and actions lose impact.
There is at present no central agency or mechanism which regularly
plans selected themes to be embodied in actions and coordinated informa-
tion programs throughout the Government. The several information
programs set and follow themes for their own activities; and noninforma-
tion programs follow their predetermined policies and plans. But no
element sets the larger framework, the general keynote to be stressed,
symbolized, and dramatized by all elements, informational and non-
informational.
The general purpose of establishing such themes would be to orches-
trate the major influences and instrumentalities of the Government so
as to impress on world opinion selected principles and policies essential
to the advancement of U. S. objectives. More specifically, they would
make possible the following benefits:
Coordination. By giving emphasis and priority to a given theme,
a dynamic coordination of effort can be achieved, not through the static
process of threshing out differences of view among the various agencies
on relatively timeless issues of policy, but rather through the enlist-
ment of positive action and collaboration in support of a concrete, im-
mediate program.
Timing. A theme selected for a definite period can serve to affect
the climate of world opinion in advance of an important negotiation or
to lay the psychological foundation for some intended major policy de-
velopment requiring the support of world opinion. Other themes may
be chosen for emphasis for a period without relation to a current or
impending event. Control of timing is an important ingredient in
the strategy of "seizing the initiative".
Concentration. Through the employment of total themes all gov-
ernment programs, by giving priority attention to the same ideas at the
same time, can thereby achieve the valuable effects of concentration of
effort, of mutual support by positive collaboration.
Repetition. Planning a series of actions and statements to drama-
tize and clarify a few selected themes makes it possible to repeat the
central thoughts without monotony.
The following operational guidelines are suggested in carrying out
this general recommendation:
1. The number of over-all themes employed at any given time should
be severely limited, not more than three or four at most. Selectivity
and limitation are essential. If the concept of over-all themes is adopted,
one or two might be employed initially as pilot projects.
2. Any given theme would be kept in effect for a period which might
vary from one month to one or two years, depending on the particular
case.
3. If such themes are to clarify rather than further confuse the
present outflow of U. S. official influences upon world opinion, they must
be accorded clear dominance and government-wide priority. Thus, they
must be based on the direct decision of the President and command the
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full cooperation of members of the Cabinet and all top officials whose
responsibilities have significant bearing on foreign attitudes.
4. Wherever possible, the program in support of a theme should be
initiated and sustained by actions which give it substance and which
symbolize and dramatize it. Such actions might be those that would
have been taken at that time in normal pursuance of policy or they might
be measures that would have been taken earlier or later under normal
circumstances. However, it is not suggested that any actions be taken
which have no inherent value. There is an almost unlimited number
of imaginative things to be done in every foreign policy area which are
useful and constructive in themselves and which have psychological
value as well.
These are the operational and organizational considerations. There
remains the conceptual and creative task of determining the content of
the themes, the armature-ideas themselves. The necessary generalities
can be briefly stated: Such themes must relate to the fundamental wants,
needs and values of other nations. This means that they will relate to
the universal desires for security, for freedom and independence, and
for progress. The United States must demonstrate by words and actions
that we are militarily invincible yet supremely devoted to peace; that
we are zealous in our support of the aspirations of other nations and
respectful of their sovereignty; and that we are a progressive society
actively in support of progressive change, greater material well-being
and social justice everywhere.
However, such generalities are not sufficient. They must be trans-
lated on the basis of study and imagination at the highest level of the
Government into concrete, dramatic and timely form. This labor of
identifying and giving active support to the ideas which will reach the
hearts and minds of people around the earth comes close to identifying
an important part of another much used and abused term, "leadership
of the Free World".
The Committee is under no illusion that this prescription can ever
fully be filled. Generating great and moving ideas, advance planning,
clear fixing of priorities, and effective coordination of government-wide
operations-these constitute the very tasks which any vast bureaucratic
machine finds most difficult. And in the American system there is no
realistic possibility of neatness, perfect order, and a command-and-
obedience relationship among the parts of the Government.
But we must and can achieve some approximation of unified effort
in reaching world opinion. To be comprehensible, the influences we
project must have proportion, pattern and clarity. Over-all themes can
serve as a focusing lens to give these qualities to our various activities.
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Chapter III
THE NEW IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL
AND EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES
The Committee has concluded that in certain areas a great and
as yet insufficiently exploited opportunity lies in the direction of edu-
cational, cultural and exchange programs. Changing world condi-
tions are generating a particularly rapid expansion of needs in these
fields.
In the Soviet sphere, radio broadcasting until recently has been
the principal available means for penetrating the curtain by which
the dictatorships isolate their subjects from outside influences. Such
broadcasting, both official and unattributed, remains an important
instrument, but new possibilities of cultural, scientific and scholarly
contact have now appeared. In the future as in the past, the official
Soviet gatekeepers repeatedly will alter the width of the openings, but
it is essential that at any given moment we make full use of the access
allowed. Not to do so is to fail in some degree to assist long-term
tendencies toward lessened hostility and greater understanding through
increased contact with the Free World.
With Western Europe the problem is different, but the indicated
line of action is the same. Here, we have a fortunate asset in that the
mass media are highly developed, communication with the United States
is extensive and unrestricted, and relationships are intimate and funda-
mentally friendly. Hence, continuing private and governmental pro-
grams of intellectual and cultural interchange provide an effective ap-
proach for U.S. efforts to reinforce cohesion of the alliance.
In the less-developed areas, still other factors emphasize the de-
sirability of concentration on building durable relationships with present
and potential leaders. The people of these nations, largely illiterate
and technically unskilled, are hungry for education and are on the
threshold of a monumental effort to expand and reshape their schools
and universities. The direction which that effort takes and the outlook
of the persons leading it can profoundly influence the political future of
the world. While it is useful to attempt to inform the leaders in these
areas about the daily flow of international events, it is even more im-
portant to influence their values and to increase their understanding of
fundamental economic, social and political concepts. This by its nature
is a long-term task of education and of concentration of effort on selected
groups and individuals.
The Committee believes that in the present world struggle we have
not adequately capitalized on our cultural and intellectual resources,
our educational traditions and institutions, and even our language itself.
There is need for new emphasis and for substantial increase in levels of
effort in those fields.
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By building on these assets we will serve effectively the several aims
of our foreign policy. More adequate response by the United States to
the opportunities offered through educational, exchange and cultural
programs will strengthen over the long run our political ties, reinforce
our economic assistance programs, advance social development and sta-
bility, and add to our chances for peace and security.
At the same time action along these lines will help correct a wide-
spread distortion of the American image. We will place into perspective
alongside our military, political, economic and technical programs our
enduring concern for the individual,'for learning, and for the relation-
ship between education, democracy and social progress.
Fortunately, the activities which can contribute to these ends are
what much of the world wants us to provide. Our techniques are re-
spected and sought. Increasing numbers of foreign students are attend-
ing our universities. English is increasingly recognized as the pre-
eminent language of this era and people seek by the tens of thousands
to learn it. The world admires, wants and needs what we can offer
scientifically and educationally.
Imaginative expansion of educational, cultural and exchange pro-
grams should evoke support by important elements of American society.
For our many citizens with a strong sense of humanitarianism, with
deep feelings about the right of individuals to educational opportunity,
and with a conviction that the American approach to world affairs should
be constructive, idealistic and democratic, the suggested emphasis should
have great meaning. When in the past we have been able to combine
high spiritual aims and down-to-earth practical values in a single pro-
gram, support has been forthcoming from the American people.
Foreign Educational Development*
A new approach in assisting foreign educational development holds
great promise. The Committee believes that certain measures in this
field, if taken boldly, will have a significant impact on the way the
world thinks of the United States and will strongly affect the atti-
tudes of emerging countries toward their own modernization and politi-
cal development.
The psychological gains to be realized from- educational assistance
are in part general and symbolic. They are also concrete and specific.
Such assistance will build a basis for future communication on all mat-
ters with these new countries. The mere dissemination of information
about current world affairs and American policies will not suffice as a
foundation for political relationships with areas where the leaders
have no real grasp of the concepts of law and order, political freedom
and social justice, and the fundamentals of economies. Unless and
until understanding of these values and concepts can be created, feel-
ings of race hatred, anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism will make
effective communication impossible. For that task, only the steady,
slow processes of education will make much difference.
? Mr. Gray has certain reservations on this section with which Mr. Merchant
wishes to be associated. Mr. Gray's comments appear at the end of the
chapter.
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In the long run the development of the human resources of the
less-developed areas through education and training may be the most
remunerative form of economic assistance which can be given.
Educational development will contribute also to the larger goal of
building viable, competent societies and governments. History amply
demonstrates that literacy and education do not lead necessarily or
immediately to political stability. (The reverse may well be true in
some situations for longer or shorter periods.) But without the de-
velopment of a "cultural infrastructure", without larger numbers of
people who can read and write, without more schools and leaders
trained to perform at least the basic functions required of a twentieth
century society, it is hard to imagine that many of the newly-emergent
countries can long exist as free and independent entities.
Through various programs and agencies, the United States Gov-
ernment is already providing considerable help to education and train-
ing abroad, particularly to persons from the less-developed countries.
These programs, though valuable, are diffuse and frequently not readily
identifiable with the United States. They are subordinate elements of
agencies and activities directed principally to other things. They have
no single voice or general leadership. They are not based on a coherent
and avowed over-all policy or legislative enactment. They therefore
fail in large part to realize their great symbolic and psychological
potential.
To realize fully the opportunity presented, there must be a general
determination to move with conviction in giving new accent to our
assistance to foreign education.
This should be made concrete in the form of a new declaration of
policy in support of long-term assistance to foreign educational develop-
ment by the President and the Congress. In declaring our readiness
to work with the less-developed nations in a generous and disinterested
spirit for the development of their educational systems, we must scrupu-
lously avoid any tone of cultural imperialism. Education is a particu-
larly sensitive aspect of national sovereignty and this must be taken
fully into account in our work in this field.
The proposed program might include the continuation or initia-
tion of such projects as the following:
1. Assistance in building and equipping schools, laboratories and
libraries as visible symbols of American help.
2. The creation, under UN, multilateral or bilateral arrangements,
of new regional institutions and training centers in such fields as public
administration, agricultural technology, and the management of enter-
prises.
3. The development of large, mobile training centers to provide
basic technical skills in health, agriculture and mechanical trades to
thousands of trainees at a time.
4. The mounting of experiments in the use of television to spread
literacy and teach basic skills on a large scale.
5. The contribution of funds for "opportunity scholarships" in
various countries which would enable talented young people from all
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social classes on the basis of open competition to acquire an education
in their own country.
6. A major program for the training of teachers from less-de-
veloped countries and the establishment of teacher training institutes
in these countries. This program might be launched with an offer of
fellowships to such countries for advanced training for selected faculty
members from their colleges and universities.
7. A program of training and orientation for young Americans who
would spend several years abroad performing basic tasks such as teach-
ing in elementary schools, working in civil services, and acting as staff
assistants in village development programs.
Organizational steps to insure an effective program of interna-
tional educational development could take any one of several forms.
The essential requirement is that the organizational approach adopted
should give the program visibility and leadership and thereby serve to
identify the United States in the eyes of the world with one of the
great universal ideals-education. It would also be most desirable if
the organizational pattern adopted lessened the apprehension of for-
eign countries in accepting outside assistance for the development of
their educational systems.
One possibility which would help fulfill these requirements would
be the creation of a new quasi-independent Foundation for International
Educational Development. Such a body might accomplish the following:
1. It could provide voice and over-all leadership to American efforts
in support of foreign educational development.
2. It could help link Government, university and private foundation
efforts.
3. Since it would not be a direct arm of the diplomatic, economic,
informational or military agencies of the Government, it might be able
to work more effectively with foreign countries on educational problems
without offending their sensibilities.
The foundation might be directed by a board made up of representa-
tives of foundations with foreign educational programs, of private citizens
eminent in the field of education, and such others as appropriate. The
Government's interest in the foundation could be maintained through
some mechanism for liaison with the board. The head of such a founda-
tion should be a person of outstanding qualifications.
If such a foundation were created it should mount programs of its
own, using foreign currencies and dollar funds appropriated directly to it.
In a certain sense it would resemble the National Science Foundation
which has enabled the Federal Government to operate effectively with-
out transgressing the traditional inhibitions upon the Federal Govern-
ment in dealing with matters of science and education.
The Committee draws attention to the fact that a program of assist-
ance to foreign educational development adequate to achieve major psy-
chological impact and symbolize effectively American identification with
educational opportunity will require substantial funds over and above
those currently available for such purposes. To some extent the pro-
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posed program for foreign educational development could be financed
by a shift of emphasis in present economic assistance. The recom-
mended expansion should be financed wherever possible by foreign local
currencies now available or to become available in the years ahead. In
addition, however, fresh dollar funds would be required of a substantially
greater magnitude than have been provided for foreign educational
projects up to the present time.
If it were possible to have the proposed foundation grow out of pri-
vate rather than governmental initiative and if some of the initial financ-
ing could be provided from private sources, the result would be to launch
the enterprise under particularly auspicious circumstances.
The United States as a World Cultural Center
The United States is the political fulcrum of the Free World, and
Washington is the recognized hub of leadership. The United States is
the economic giant of the world, and our markets and exchanges regulate
the daily pulse of trade and capital movements. The United States is
also the center of enormous cultural, scientific and intellectual activity,
but in these areas there is a huge disparity between the reality and the
appearance.
A contributing cause to this is the fact that most of the international
gatherings of thinkers and scholars take place elsewhere. Very few of
the major international festivals in the fine arts take place here, and
even fewer of the major world prizes for intellectual and creative achieve-
ment are American. In the eyes of many of its large population of for-
eign representatives, our national capital itself is regarded, from a
cultural standpoint, as a provincial town.
Our activities and achievements in the arts and in scholarship
deserve better than this. Our international position requires that we do
better than we have. There are practical steps which can be taken.
It is recommended that efforts be made through a combination of
governmental and private actions to generate:
1. The establishment of a continuing series of international festivals
and exhibitions of the arts in the United States, including if necessary
governmental subsidy of transportation and facilities.
2. The development in Washington of a cultural center to include
operatic and ballet presentations, symphony concerts, and special com-
petitions in the arts. Initiatives in this direction are already under way
and, with well-planned and vigorous Presidential leadership, much of
the necessary financing can probably be found from private sources.
3. A permanent increase in the number of major international meet-
ings held in the United States in the humanities, social sciences, philos-
ophy, the exact sciences and the fine arts. In some instances, this may
require selective relaxation of visa requirements and governmental and
private assistance in lessening the economic obstacles involved.
4. The establishment of a series of major American awards for out-
standing achievements by men and women of all nations in science, art,
government, education, and human welfare.
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These activities will add lustre to the prestige of the United States
throughout the world. Equally important, by bringing outstanding
individuals from many fields to the United States, we will enrich our
own institutions and individuals working in these same fields. Not
least, we will gratify the pride of other countries by showing interest in
learning about their creative and intellectual achievements.
English Language Teaching
In all parts of the world there now exists a vast, spontaneous demand
for learning English. Applicants by the thousands are being turned
away from the doors of binational centers and English language insti-
tutes, and waiting lists for admission are long. English is becoming
the language of the century. The desire to learn it springs from general
recognition of its economic, cultural and prestige values.
The Committee believes that it would be both feasible and advan-
tageous to U.S. foreign policy objectives to intensify the efforts now
being made to teach English to foreigners and to expand the use of
English as a universal language. In so doing we will facilitate the
transmission of technical information and skills useful to economic
development. We will widen our channels of communication with for-
eign leadership elements. We will expose increasing numbers of people
to the social and political ideals of Western civilization. We will as a
consequence of these benefits reinforce our ties and enhance our influence
throughout the world.
The Committee recommends that the present English-teaching
programs of the Government be strengthened by:
1. The establishment of a clear and explicit policy within the
Government to promote the acceptance and use of English as a universal
language.
2. The encouragement through diplomatic efforts of the adoption of
English as the official second language in certain countries, with due
regard for the sensibilities of all the countries concerned. Efforts should
also be made to prevent regression in countries where English already
has official status.
3. The promotion through governmental and private efforts of the
teaching of English in national school systems. This can be done
through such measures as providing teaching materials, the training of
English teachers, and through other forms of technical assistance.
4. Exploration of the possibilities of more massive short-term
efforts-parallel with long-term programs-to achieve a rapid increase
in the number of foreign students and. adults able to use English as a
working tool. These might involve the use of new techniques of teaching
by television, and the development of a large and dramatic program
using gifted American college students and teachers of English to con-
duct summer language camps each year in selected foreign areas.
5. Encouraging greater efforts on the part of the British Council
and other organizations sponsoring English teaching abroad. We should
also coordinate our efforts more closely with those of other English speak-
ing people. For example, it might be less expensive to train English
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teachers from certain areas in the United Kingdom or Australia than
to bring them to the United States.
Exchange of Persons Programs
The U.S. Government is extensively engaged in exchange of persons
and the training of foreign specialists and leaders in this country. These
activities, which are important to our long-run foreign policy objectives,
are in need of reappraisal. They are insufficiently coordinated, lack a
clear framework of policy and require better arrangements for the
handling of exchangees after they arrive here. These programs involve
large total outlays and extremely heavy unit cost. They represent great
concentration of effort and expenditure upon a single individual to
increase his competence or affect his general understanding and orienta-
tion. The potential benefits of this individualized approach are realized,
however, only to the extent that arrangements for training, for counsel-
ing and for continuing contact with exchangees after their return home
are effective. Both governmental and private exchange programs provide
fully for transportation and basic administrative costs. But there is
a tendency to scrimp in outlays for other necessary aspects, with the
result that a portion of the potential benefits is lost.
The Committee recommends:
1. That official exchange of persons programs be progressively
expanded (except with Western Europe) ; that priority be assigned to
expansion of existing U. S. programs for aid to African education and
training, including exchange of students, specialists and leaders; and,
that the United States press for speedy implementation within the
United Nations framework of the proposals made by the President to
the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1960.
2. That a policy be formulated by the Executive Branch clarifying
and relating the objectives of the several exchange and training pro-
grams now in being. Such a statement should emphasize that all
exchanges, technical or otherwise, should in addition to their narrower
purposes serve to the greatest feasible extent in advancing the foreign
policy objectives of the United States. This will provide a basis for
adjustments needed in varying degree in the policies for selection, train-
ing, administration, and follow-up now governing existing programs.
3. That a more concentrated effort be made to identify potential
leaders and activists in the emerging countries as prospects for exchange
grants. There should be a pooling of current information about such
individuals from all normal embassy contacts and intelligence sources.
Special inquiries and research projects for this purpose should be under-
taken where necessary and feasible.
4. That there be an adjustment in the division of funds between
transportation costs and the other aspects of exchange programs, includ-
ing selection, training, administration and follow-up. The goal should
be to give every exchangee careful, continuous, individual attention,
and an experience in the United States suited to his interests, to the
needs of the country from which he comes, and to his special psychologi-
cal requirements. The implications of this goal are considerable.
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UuvirL i
If total funds for exchanges are held at present levels, then the
number of exchangees should be reduced in order to provide resources
for their better handling and training while in this country. If the
present number of exchangees is maintained or increased, then addi-
tional funds would have to be made available for administrative costs.
The Committee recommends the provision of additional funds rather
than a general reduction in the level of present exchange programs.
To make possible a more effective handling of exchangees, funds
will be required for such needs as :
a. The expansion and financial strengthening of our specialized
agencies handling foreign students and leaders.
b. The creation of an adequate nation-wide system, based on
the voluntary help of local citizens and groups, for hospitality and
intelligent exchange of views with important foreign visitors.
c. The provision of special courses and guidance to meet the
needs and situations (often very different from those of the Ameri-
can student) of the foreign exchangees being trained under govern-
ment sponsorship.
So far as possible the handling of foreign students and leaders on
a routine basis must be avoided. This necessity only grows more im-
perative as exchange programs are increasingly focused on nations whose
history, culture and stage of economic and political development are
greatly different from our own.
5. That the U. S. Government, with respect to the university stu-
dents it brings to this country, consider providing a supplementary
grant to the school itself to help defray the special costs of facilities
and training provided by the university for such students.
6. Exchanges with the Soviet Bloc countries and programs of recip-
rocal exchanges as provided under the U. S.-USSR Exchange Agreement
should be continued with such expansion and governmental financing
as may be appropriate. We should continue our efforts to provide maxi-
mum opportunities of exposure of Soviet visitors to new ideas and to
politically sophisticated Americans able to hold their own in ideological
discussion.
Comment by Mr. Gray (with which Mr. Merchant wishes to be associated) :
I am? in agreement with the other members of the Committee as to the
importance of the activities discussed in this section. It is conceivable
that an emphasis on foreign educational development as discussed in this
chapter could become a matter of major importance to the interests of
the United States. I agree that a new declaration of policy in support of
foreign educational development by the President and the Congress would
be of powerful assistance. My difficulties with the program suggestions are
that they are imprecise, largely open-ended, and need further definition as
to scope and timing.
I also have some difficulty with the new quasi-independent Foundation for
International Educational Development. I am not convinced that it is
a practical suggestion and feel that it needs further consideration. For
the programs the U.S. administers directly, it seems important that all
types of aid be closely coordinated on a country basis rather than frag-
mented into specialized functional agencies such as education, health, agri-
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culture, industry, etc. Furthermore, it is very probable that the U.S. may
want to continue to provide some assistance for educational programs
through the United Nations, especially to the new countries in Africa.
The idea of saving money by using foreign currencies is in many cases an
illusion, especially in the new African countries where the U.S. does not
possess any local currencies. It may be better to seek regularly appropriated
funds and thus have the flexibility to provide training in this country, assist
in orientation expenses, etc., as recommended in the rest of Chapter III.
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Chapter IV
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND INFORMATIONAL ASPECTS
OF ECONOMIC AID, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
AND MILITARY PROGRAMS
U. S. economic assistance agencies, scientific research and devel-
opment agencies, and the military establishment exert enormous in-
fluence upon foreign opinion as a result of their activities. The Com-
mittee has considered various measures which might be utilized by these
agencies to assure adequate integration of psychological factors in
the formulation as well as in the execution and public presentation of
their policies and programs, as called for in Basic National Security
Policy.
Foreign Economic Assistance
In the decade of the 1960s, the demand upon the United States
for economic assistance will undoubtedly increase. The need will be
concentrated in the less-developed areas, not in the industrially advanced
countries as in the immediate postwar years. Aid will be concerned
with modernizing total societies, not with the relatively simple labor
of economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. Aid programs will
pursue their objectives in a seething atmosphere of tension, turmoil
and misunderstanding.
In many of the countries in which our aid programs will operate,
we find practically none of the elements required for the development
of the conditions we seek to promote. These countries in many cases
are characterized by emotionally charged nationalism, visions of over-
night industrialization, vast impatience with the slow processes of
economic growth, and lack of skills in dealing with the technical and
managerial functions of a twentieth century state. Within these so-
cieties, governmental instability and corruption are to be found along
with powerful and entrenched groups resistant to change. Omnipresent
and alert to every possibility of disrupting constructive effort is the
Sino-Soviet Bloc with its growing programs for subversion, economic
warfare, propaganda and intimidation.
Clearly, the problem of inducing and assisting foreign economic
-development has many dimensions. In part it is a matter of providing
machinery, materials, technical advice and the transference of skills
of production and distribution. But it necessarily involves parallel
attention to broader and even more complex tasks of building or reno-
vating social and economic institutions. Apart from unacceptable
forms of forcible intervention these changes can be brought about only
to the extent that attitudes and deeply imbedded cultural patterns can
be modified.
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The importance of changing basic institutions and attitudes derives
not only from the necessities for economic growth, but from the over-
riding political objectives toward which all our foreign programs,
economic and other, must be directed. To some degree there has been
a lack of understanding and acceptance by the Congress, our aid officials
and the general public of the principle that economic aid programs are
a means to acideve national and political objectives, not ends in
themselves.
A reflection of confusion between means and ends is the issue of
"impact" projects, discussion of which sometimes takes on a moralistic
flavor, i.e., the value of "sound" economic projects versus "wasteful"
projects intended to affect a local climate of opinion. This kind of
distinction overlooks some of the broader and deeper purposes of eco-
nomic aid. In the view of the Committee, any project which has economic
merit and in addition constructively affects attitudes of people in the
recipient country has a special quality of "soundness" in terms of the
long-run national interest. In the present power struggle between
Communism and freedom a major element, and one which in the long
run may be controlling, consists of the attitudes, attachments and con-
victions of the hundreds of millions of people in the less-developed areas.
It is therefore not only relevant but indispensable to give the most
careful attention to psychological and informational matters in the
formulation and execution of aid programs. However, the purpose of
such attention should be to facilitate the achievement of the goals
of economic development and of U. S. foreign policy, not to arouse
extraneous sentimental manifestations. Psychological and informa-
tional targets must be set in accord with functional requirements, not
out of sentiment or belief in publicity for its own sake. The attitudinal
obstacles to the adoption of better methods of production and distribu-
tion must be identified. Procedures and policies which unnecessarily
generate friction or misunderstanding must be modified. The key
groups which can block or advance progress must be identified and
made priority targets for informational and educational efforts.
In the long run, we can hope by giving aid to hold the friendship
of recipient countries and to strengthen ties of mutual respect and
cooperation. But it is naive to think that our aid programs-affecting
as they do basic social and economic institutions in the recipient coun-
tries-will be or can be universally understood and applauded. Our
long-range goal in giving aid is not to subsidize and perpetuate out-
moded structures and relationships but to help them to evolve. The
process inevitably will be accompanied by a background rumble of
complaint by those elements who feel their interests have been adversely
affected or inadequately favored.
In brief, we must see clearly the role of our aid program in the
larger context of the over-all objectives of U. S. foreign policy. But
we must see equally clearly those psychological objectives which are
really worth pursuing in advancing development and political relation-
ships, and those which are merely gratifying to our self-pride.
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SJ Uk E'1'
As a result of the establishment in the Department of State of
the Office of the Coordinator of the Mutual Security Program, greater
attention is now being given to political and psychological aspects in
the formulation of assistance programs. Within individual aid agencies,
however, administrators must give greater attention to these factors
in the presentation and execution of their programs.
The informational problem with respect to foreign economic assist-
ance has an important domestic as well as foreign aspect. Flexible,
creative and effective economic aid programs are very difficult to achieve
when public support at home lags, when Congress interferes with
detailed operating problems, when domestic political pressures intrude
into basic decisions about the form and character of assistance, and
when the administrators of these programs are constantly harassed
and badgered in the political forum and in the public press.
The Committee makes these recommendations:
1. The most vigorous Presidential and other high-level effort is
needed on a continuing basis to strengthen the domestic base of under-
standing and support for our economic assistance programs as a vital
instrument for the advancement of the national interest.
2. The increased domestic information effort in behalf of these
programs already undertaken by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the
Department of State should be supported and accelerated.
3. The steps being taken to coordinate our many and diverse foreign
economic programs and to establish closer relationship between them
and our foreign policy objectives, including the attribution to the
Under Secretary of State of special responsibilities in this regard, are
proving psychologically valuable and should be continued. The multi-
plicity of agencies concerned with foreign assistance makes excessively
difficult the task of linking U.S. aid to a common set of political and
psychological goals.
4. The psychological potentialities of foreign aid programs should
be fully considered both in their formulation and in their execution.
This is not to say that the criterion of psychological impact should
be controlling in the selection of aid projects or the determination of aid
procedures. On the contrary, it will normally be of secondary impor-
tance. But in every project and policy decision, the psychological
aspect deserves to be taken into consideration along with other relevant
factors, economic, military and political.
In addition to the application of psychological criteria in the
selection of specific aid projects and procedures, special attention should
be given to: (a) means of increasing the broader value to U. S. objectives
of the training given in this country to foreign technicians; and (b)
making greater use of U. S. aid personnel as "communicators" with the
tens of thousands of key foreigners with whom they are in daily contact.
5. Information efforts overseas in support of economic aid programs
have been strengthened recently. These efforts should be continued
but they will require increased Congressional support for personnel
needs.
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The transfer of responsibility for foreign publicity about U. S. aid
programs to USIA in 1953 resulted in a gain of coherence and coordina-
tion of over-all U. S. foreign information activity. But the cost has been
a loss of focus and vigor in informational support of aid programs. The
principal step required is for USIA to intensify markedly its efforts
in this direction and to give particular attention to the recruitment
and in-service training of personnel dealing with economic information.
An object of such an intensified informational effort overseas should
be to clarify understanding of basic economic issues, including the
nature of the U. S. socio-economic system, the difference between the
Western and the Sino-Soviet "models" of development and the objectives
of U. S. assistance. In addition, it should aim to create attitudes of
understanding and cooperation-or to reduce redoubts of antagonism
and resistance-among groups essential to the success of assistance pro-
grams.
Scientific and Technological Programs
A startling new development in the period since the Jackson Com-
mittee report has been the increasing impact of scientific and tech-
nological achievement upon world opinion. Without question the
launching of the first Sputnik gave the Soviet Union a psychological
triumph which has profoundly affected its image as a technically ad-
vanced nation and as a great military power. Its feat in one branch
of technology has been systematically exploited-and with considerable
success-as evidence of the dynamism of the entire Soviet system.
The United States has had, and continues to have, over-all su-
periority in science and technology. Nevertheless, since the launching of
Sputnik I there has been considerable evidence that the average man
in most countries believes that Soviet capability continues to grow
relative to that of the United States, and that the Soviet Union leads in
certain important aspects of space technology. Short of some now
unforeseeable and revolutionary scientific breakthrough, it will be ex-
tremely difficult to re-establish the degree of American technological
prestige and pre-eminence relative to that of the USSR which existed
prior to October 1957.
The Committee feels that, since throughout the world the status
of the nation's science is increasingly taken as a measure of its power
and dynamism, two things are indispensable psychologically: (1) that
the U. S. maintain a continuing stream of scientific and technological
achievements; and (2) that these achievements be more effectively com-
municated to the world than has been the case in the past.
The Committee feels that, despite the improvements which have
been made, there is still an inadequate awareness of the psychological
importance of our scientific activities in the administration of these
programs and that arrangements for publicizing and dramatizing to the
world our achievements are inadequate.
The Committee therefore makes the following recommendations:
1. The scale and effectiveness of our overseas information efforts
to communicate the facts of U. S. scientific achievements should be
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increased. This will require particular attention to the recruitment and
training of qualified information specialists who are at the same time
competent in technical subject matter, plus additional appropriations for
special projects such as exhibits.
In stressing the need for more vigorous informational support of
scientific programs, it is important also to caution that premature
publicity and "leaks" that appear to promise more or quicker technical
progress than can practically be realized can prove most injurious to
U. S. prestige.
2. These increased efforts should be designed to improve our com-
munications both with scientific elites and with the general public.
Many governmental agencies have extensive and varied programs to
communicate with foreign scientists. But only USIA and ICA (through
its technical assistance programs) are making large-scale efforts to
convey information about our science and technology to those outside
the scientific community.
3. There needs to be increased coordination between the announce-
ment of American scientific and technological achievements and other
governmental activities. Interdepartmental efforts to provide a sys-
tematic means for considering the timing and method of announcement
of scientific actions in relation to diplomatic, military and other pro-
grams should be continued.
4. Recent organizational measures to give new prominence to the
role of science in our government have indirectly been of value to
psychological and informational activities abroad. The Committee
would like to cite particularly the establishment of the offices of Presi-
dent's Assistant for Science and Technology and of Science Adviser to
the Secretary of State, and the appointment of science attaches at our
principal embassies abroad. Further exploitation of these activities can
help improve understanding abroad of our progress in science and tech-
nology.
5. USIA, in consultation with the appropriate agencies, should iden-
tify programs with unusual interest and psychological impact and recom-
mend special actions or support that may be indicated. In the field of
applied technology two types of projects appear to have special psycho-
logical value:
First, spectacular feats with dramatic possibilities representing solid
scientific achievement but not requiring new fundamental research.
Second, the accelerated development of new low-cost products, ma-
chines and techniques which could directly affect the daily lives of people
abroad. Such possibilities might especially be sought in fields like ap-
plied chemistry (e.g., plastics, fibers and antibiotics) and public health
technology, where American leadership is outstanding. Government
support may be required to develop some devices for which there are
not adequate commercial possibilities.
6. Where particular needs are identified, agencies of the government
participating in technical assistance should be asked to expand and
intensify certain programs for teaching and transmitting American
technical knowledge. This is already being done on a large scale in
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the field of agricultural technology. Other possibilities would appear
to exist in the field of medicine-especially in physiotherapy where
American leadership is marked-and in new teaching techniques such
as educational television.
The dramatic and highly useful curriculum developments in the
various fields of science education should be.exported in a planned, co-
ordinated program involving the several agencies concerned with foreign
information, education and exchange of scientific knowledge. Fuller
exploitation of developments in science education would have the two-
fold value of providing genuinely useful materials to countries that
need them and at the same time demonstrating American advances in
technical and scientific fields.
7. Joint scientific and technological programs with other advanced
countries of the Free World should be encouraged and the psychological
benefits therefrom fully exploited.
The Committee has also given study to a problem of greater com-
plexity, namely, whether the pattern of governmental support for basic
research should be directly influenced by psychological considerations.
Obviously if the United States were able to score "firsts" in such areas
as the significant prolongation of life or controlled thermonuclear re-
action, the value to national prestige would be enormous. There is
the practical question, however, whether basic scientific discoveries-
which are by their nature unpredictable-can be accelerated by focusing
research funds in general fields of psychological importance.
The best assurance of a continued flow of major scientific discovery
which will serve the broad spectrum of human needs and thereby the
nation's prestige abroad is ample unprogrammed financial support for
basic research. However, it is also desirable that some basic research
should be concentrated in those fields which hold the most promise for
scientific discoveries that will enhance, our prestige abroad. Therefore,
the Committee recommends that the President bring to the attention
of the Government's scientific administrators and those responsible for
budgetary allocations to scientific research, the relevance, propriety and
importance of taking psychological considerations into account in de-
termining the relative amounts. of support- to be given to the various
areas of basic research.
Military Programs and Policies
The American military establishment is a huge and powerful system
to protect the nation in the event of war. In the course of protracted
conflict short of war-which is the prospect for the indefinite future-it
will also exert enormous influence in every part of the world in behalf
of the objectives of U. S. foreign policy. It will exert such influence
primarily by the reality of its military power, its forces and weapons,
but also through many and important "collateral effects": the presence
of hundreds of thousands of service men and their families on foreign
soil, its broadcasting activities, its relations with foreign leaders and
military personnel and its expenditures abroad, to catalog only a few
of the more obvious examples.
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The Department of Defense and the armed services have made im-
portant progress in recognizing the economic, social, political and psycho-
logical importance of these side-effects of military activity, and they have
taken steps to capitalize upon them. The plans and policies which have
been developed and the structure of special committees and working
groups which has been created represent a movement which is still in
its early stages but which is of great significance.
The Committee therefore makes the following recommendations:
1. The excellent steps taken within the Department of Defense to
organize consideration of the collateral effects of military activities have
focused attention on the armed forces' mission of supporting our national
political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural objectives
without diluting their primary military mission. These measures
should be continued and intensified, particularly among the lower
echelons of command.
However, if we are to maximize the potential political and other
nonmilitary benefits which can be obtained as a by-product of military
activities, military personnel at all levels will require greater under-
standing of the role which the armed forces should play in this under-
taking. The Committee believes that additional measures should be
taken to create a greater awareness of the nonmilitary implications of
military activities, a better understanding of the importance of these
implications and an increased knowledge of what can be done by the
armed forces to enhance the positive and reduce the negative side-effects
of their essential activities. Within the framework of the present Defense
budget, greater resources may have to be devoted to this end.
2. Increasing emphasis should be given the political, economic and
social side-effects of training foreign military personnel. In many parts
of the world military forces and military elements have a growing im-
portance politically and are significant and constructive elements for
economic and social change. Identifying the potential military leader-
ship in underdeveloped countries, providing training and orientation
which will deepen understanding of democratic institutions and Ameri-
can objectives, and, importantly, maintaining the established relation-
ships after the training period is finished, can create assets which will be
valuable in all countries and could be decisive in some.
3. The Committee feels that if its recommendations for vigorous ac-
tion by the armed forces to implement their collateral missions in the
psychological and informational fields abroad are accepted, two condi-
tions must be fulfilled:
First, the Department of Defense and the individual services must
continue to maintain close supervision over military activities bearing
on political or other nonmilitary objectives.
Second, there must be the closest coordination and cooperation by
the Department of Defense with the Department of State and with
other agencies of the Government responsible for psychological and
informational activities abroad.
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4. For reasons lying deep in national psychologies and historical
experience, foreign troops in a country in time of peace often offend
conceptions of national sovereignty and independence. While in most
cases these objections are offset by the security which our forces provide
and by actions on the part of our armed forces overseas to minimize
the negative effects of their presence, there are exceptions. In certain
countries, particularly those not geographically contiguous with Com-
munist areas, significant segments of the population tend to view U.S.
bases located in their countries as attracting rather than deterring pos-
sible Communist nuclear attack and see no need for these bases in
terms of their own local security. There is also a feeling on the part
of many in these countries that the presence of U.S. bases commits
them to our side and prevents their taking a neutral position interna-
tionally. In some areas the situation is exacerbated by extreme na-
tionalism which views the presence of foreign troops as a form of
colonialism and incompatible with independence. Such attitudes have
already forced us to agree to the evacuation of our Moroccan bases and
during the next decade could cause the loss of others.
While there is no assurance that any psychological and informa-
tional measures can prevent this, the Committee nevertheless recom-
mends that the United States make full and integrated use of psychologi-
cal and informational assets to help retain these bases for as long as
they are strategically needed. Individual country plans and programs
could spell out the considerable contributions which can be made by our
armed forces.
5. The armed forces have two primary roles that involve psycho-
logical and informational considerations: They must deter aggression
and hold the respect and confidence of our friends and allies. While
the achievement of these objectives rests fundamentally on the reality
of our military power, it cannot be assumed that they will automatically
be realized on the basis of purely military considerations since deterrence
and reassurance are not accomplished through the application of mili-
tary force but through the image of our military power held by foreign
peoples and their leaders.
During the process of reaching decisions on the size, composition,
equipment, armament, training, deployment and strategy of our forces,
we must consider the probable reaction of foreign peoples in terms of
deterrence and reassurance. The Committee believes that those respon-
sible for our military force posture and strategy must continue to be
fully aware of the importance of psychological and informational consid-
erations and give these factors due weight in their decisions.
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Chapter V
In some historic periods deep shifts in the mission and style of
diplomacy occur. We seem now to be in such a period. The changes
taking place reflect the growing importance of psychological factors.
In the past century, diplomacy has been adjusting to technological
changes and to the foreshortening of the diplomats' world by accelerated
transport and telecommunications. As one consequence, the relative
responsibility of the foreign office at home for the formulation of policy
has grown and in recent years ambassadors have been required in-
creasingly to share responsibility with a visiting foreign minister or
chief of state. The spread of popular education, of more widespread
participation in government, and of mass media communications have
forced diplomacy to pay vastly more attention to sensing and influ-
encing public opinion abroad and to keeping abreast of it at home.
Today our diplomacy is confronted by still newer challenges in a
radically changing world framework. Of overwhelming importance is
the persistence of the ideological, economic and strategic struggle with
the Communist world. Its terms are not static and its shifts con-
stantly call for new skills and new awareness in our diplomacy. In
the Soviet scheme of things, psychological warfare is an integral ele-
ment of diplomacy. The whole Soviet system from the beginning has
placed great stress on propaganda, both at home and abroad. Whether
U.S. diplomacy is adequately armed for this struggle with the Soviet
leadership, whether it is directed from the top and provided at every
level with sufficient sensitivity and skill in dealing with psychological
factors, are key questions in our inquiry.
In the next ten years, the conduct of our foreign relations and the
organization of our diplomacy will have to be modified further to cope
with new forms of this struggle, particularly in its transference to
new arenas in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Since 1946, beginning with Jordan and the Philippines, no less than
37 new states with a total population of over 800,000,000 have come
into being. In 1960 alone 17 new countries have been admitted into the
United Nations. The political institutions of many of these new states
are often inchoate, their leaders inexperienced and sometimes incom-
petent, and their regimes transitory.
A number of older countries are faced with similar problems. In
Latin America and South Asia, governments of tenuous authority must
cope with an explosive growth in population, a transformation of their
preindustrial economies and popular impatience fed by the rising ex-
pectations of their peoples. Since 1953, governments of no less than
30 countries have changed hands by other than constitutional means.
The successor governments in most cases have represented not only a
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change but a rupture with the ideas, individuals and groups predomi-
nant in their predecessors.
In both the new countries and the older ones going through the
crises of modernization, formal and traditional diplomacy of the pre-
dominantly government-to-government type often plays a limited role
because of the lack of a durable sovereignty with which to treat and the
absence of common antecedents of history, ancestry or diplomatic usage.
Moreover, the power of U.S. diplomacy to influence these countries
is inhibited by still other factors. Many of these states regard us as the
backers and profiteers of colonialism. Our own activities may be viewed
through a prism of doubt and in some areas we may find we can op-
erate effectively only through multilateral arrangements.
Lacking a number of familiar levers or means of contact, our in-
fluence on the "new" peoples must first be addressed to the development
of a responsible opinion. In some places, our efforts cannot hope to be-
get stable, democratically oriented countries until they can inculcate
some respect for the very idea of government itself and some notion of
the social contract.
What does all this mean for the function and formation of our
diplomacy?
It means that diplomacy increasingly must understand and use
public opinion in all countries, open and closed, old and new. It means
that there needs to be more emphasis on psychological factors in all as-
pects of our diplomatic behavior: our handling of conferences and
negotiations, our representation abroad, particularly in the emerging
countries, our selection and training of personnel and our treatment
of foreign visitors.
Attention to Psychological Factors
As the principal foreign policy agency of the Government the at-
titude of the Department of State with respect to the integration of
psychological factors in plans, policies and programs, as well as its view
of the importance of informational activities in general, is of central im-
portance.
The Committee recognizes, first, that the Department, with its re-
sponsibilities for the conduct of foreign relations, must exercise ex-
traordinary care and fidelity in its methods and approach. It must
avoid risky experimentation and have no part of frills or fads. The
Committee advocates no psychological gimmickry nor does it speak for
those who see in psychological warfare an independent and somehow
magical branch of foreign policy.
Considerable progress has been made in the recognition and ac-
commodation of psychological factors in the outlook and practices of the
Department of State.
The Committee feels nevertheless that recognition of the impor-
tance and propriety of psychological considerations should prevail more
widely in the Department and Foreign Service. On some important oc-
casions these factors have been inadequately weighed in the formu-
lation of policies, plans and actions and the available experts in psycho-
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logical and informational matters have been inadequately consulted in
the formulation of policies and plans.
The Committee therefore recommends that, in discharging its
broadening and changing responsibility, U.S. diplomacy should strongly
develop its capability for sensing and influencing world opinion and it
should be better equipped to bring U.S. influence to bear on public opin-
ion, especially in the new and emerging states whose evolution will sig-
nificantly determine the course of the next decade. It should be in-
creasingly effective not only in government-to-government contacts but
also with selected elements of foreign populations. It must still fur-
ther develop its skills in multilateral and "conference" diplomacy which
now exerts dramatic influence upon world attitudes.
General Representation Abroad
If it is to have useful influence abroad, particularly in the developing
states, our diplomacy should gird for an activist phase in the years
ahead. It must not only deal with transitory governments but must
also penetrate and seek to condition the social strata which will pro-
duce new leaders and the "government after the next". It should know
how to make use of the full armory of diplomatic weapons, including
economic aid, propaganda and covert influence.
Our diplomacy must be able not only to establish close and friendly
relations but at times to stand aloof, to know and use opposition, to
withhold U.S. favor, and, if necessary, to be unpleasant. It must have
ambassadors, career or noncareer, who are ready and able to take the
initiative, to influence opinion in the society in which they are sta-
tioned, and to contribute to the formation of American policy.
The Committee believes that the adoption of the following recom-
mendations would assist the Department and Foreign Service in car-
rying out these tasks:
1. Direction and Coordination. A decisive element in the integra-
tion of psychological factors with all other factors in our diplomacy
abroad lies in the role of the chief of mission and his country team.
Presiding over the staffs of several agencies, the chief of mission must
operate as 'a good executive in coordinating, orchestrating and giving
direction to their work and influence. This he can achieve best by
means of his country team, comprising the major arms of his mission.
On this team the information elements should be fully and regularly
represented. Special attention should be given to improving the aware-
ness of chiefs of mission of the necessity of integrating psychological
factors into the planning and execution of programs.
The seniority and paramount responsibility of the chief of mission
among representatives of other agencies should be maintained. While
the country team is only advisory to the chief of mission, more imagina-
tive employment of the country team concept in all parts of the world
is desirable. Where feasible and consistent with policy, the chief of mis-
sion should be encouraged to exercise latitude and discretion. The
practice of periodic reviews of U.S. programs by country missions is
commendable. This practice should be regularized and applied to all
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missions. The country teams should be fully consulted in policy rec-
ommendations growing out of such reviews.
Provision should be made to achieve rapid action, especially in new
states and crisis areas, in installing or redeploying missions or con-
sulates, together with such public affairs, intelligence, and other skills
as may be immediately required.
The special value of the consular offices for grass roots informa-
tional activities and influence should be recognized and developed. Con-
sular personnel, whose duties bring them into contact with the public
in centers of influence outside the capital cities, have a most important
role in extending the range of embassy sources of information and in
projecting the image of America. The Department of State should con-
tinue and, where possible, extend its efforts to enhance the morale,
stature and rewards of consular work. A tendency toward excessive
centralization of informational and other functions at the capital city
should be resisted.
To get the benefit of political and psychological experience on a
regional basis, chief of mission conferences and regional consultations
which include public affairs officers, USIA representatives and others
as the Department may find appropriate should be encouraged.
2. Reporting. The Department of State and the Foreign Service
have the over-all responsibility for reporting on foreign political develop-
ments, including attitude trends having political importance. They
also have continuing responsibility for the general assessment of the
significance and policy implications of such trends.
Admittedly there do not exist, either in American private life or
in the Government, persons who can be considered fully "expert" in
analysis and assessment of such a formidable and intangible subject
as psychological developments abroad. However, there is an important
body of theory and practice in the social sciences, serious journalism
and current historical writings which can be applied to some degree and
with profit to the reporting processes and methods of the Foreign
Service.
The Committee recommends that the scope and methods of For-
eign Service reporting on political and psychological developments
should be studied, particularly in the light of the continuing ideological
struggle and its projection in the emergent countries. Such a study
should be made for the confidential guidance of the Secretary of State.
3. Active Representational Role. American diplomatic representa-
tives abroad should take an increasingly active part in influencing for-
eign opinion through the development of close and influential contacts
with all key leadership groups. Dealings with 'all major sources of in-
fluence in foreign societies will be of increasing importance in years to
come. In this task, chiefs of mission and Foreign Service officers, along
with other more specialized members of the country team, must play a
direct and active role. Means should be found to make it possible for
political officers to devote more time to broadening their relationships
with officials in labor organizations, in mass media, in educational and
intellectual circles, among military officers, etc.
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4. High-Level Visits. Visits to other countries by the President
or the Secretary of State can have extraordinary political and psycho-
logical value. To the extent possible they should be planned and man-
aged in ways which will increase and prolong their favorable impact on
local leaders 'and populations. Because of the complexity of psychologi-
cal considerations that may be involved, the greatest care should be
exercised in deciding the timing and detailed arrangements of the visits,
and decisions should be made in the light of the relevant information
available from 'all sources. To permit the fullest advantage to be taken
of the opportunities presented, there should be USIA participation in
the planning of such toursfrom the earliest discussion stage.
5. Behavior and Obtrusiveness. All agency missions should con-
tinue to report periodically upon efforts to hold their numbers to mini-
mal operational requirements. A renewed effort should be made to re-
duce the size of certain of our missions abroad, particularly in coun-
tries where elements attached to the embassy are disproportionately
large. The corps of inspectors of the respective agencies and special
manpower survey teams from Washington or regional bases should as-
sist in this endeavor.
The number of requests for diplomatic privileges should be held
down. Representational allowances should not be used for ostenta-
tious entertaining unrelated to the mission's purpose.
Negotiations on a World Stage
~ Major diplomatic conferences and negotiations now require more
careful planning and preparation than ever before, in part because our
adversaries commonly try to convert them into propaganda jousts.
In this area, the Committee feels that more consideration must be
given to psychological factors and to their effective integration in poli-
cies and plans. The Committee also believes that greater attention
must be given to mobilizing public opinion in support of our proposals.
The Committee has selected two cases in which these factors are
important to illustrate the approach which it believes should become
characteristic of our diplomatic practice.
A. The United Nations
Since the inception of the United Nations, debates in that body
have dramatized major international issues and given an additional di-
mension to diplomacy. The UN has been important not only as a
means of discussing issues and, on occasion, of settling disputes, but
also as a sounding board.
The most recent session of the General Assembly has demonstrated
more sharply than ever the increasing problems and opportunities pre-
sented by the UN in its varied aspects.
In the underdeveloped and emerging countries, public opinion and
the mass media follow UN developments with special intensity. These
countries tend to equate, membership in the UN with sovereign status.
The delegations they send to the UN have great but confused expecta-
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tions. Many are making their first contact with the United States and
their first individual judgments between East and West.
The entry of so many new countries into the United Nations this
year has, on the one hand, enlarged the opportunity for the United
States to deal within the UN framework with certain peoples with
whom we have. hitherto had only slight historical associations, little po-
litical vocabulary in common, and only a few if any bilateral diplomatic
dealings. Theoretically the treatment of the problems of these areas
on a multilateral basis and through UN agencies ought to help avert the
extension of the cold war to areas such as Africa.
On the other hand, the rapidly changing composition of the United
Nations presents acute problems. Many of these countries are neutral-
ist. Some associate the United States with their erstwhile colonial
masters.
On certain issues, the United States will probably have increasing
difficulty in holding substantial majorities. On some, it will be 'faced
with 'a difficult choice between support of its allies and sympathy with
the aspirations of newly independent peoples.
The Soviet Union, playing heavily on what it conceives to be the
psychology of the new states, has called for a reorganization of the
Secretariat and of UN bodies in what amounts to a campaign 'against
the executive powers of the UN Secretariat. This Communist offensive
actually darkens the hope of using multilateral UN action as a means
of preserving the territories of the new states from cold war rivalries.
It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union has correctly inter-
preted the new-state psychology, whether Khrushchev's bullying tac-
tics were well judged, and whether his bid for increased Afro-Asian rep-
resentation in UN bodies has successfully masked the Soviet effort to
render the UN ineffective.
Either way it is clear that the United States must be more than
a match for the Soviet Union in its understanding of psychological fac-
tors at the UN-among the old as well as the new delegations-and of
the use of the UN to influence the psychology of peoples and the climate
of diplomatic negotiations.
U.S. representatives must be prepared for a more spontaneous,
quick-breaking kind of debate. And the facilities for aiding or influenc-
ing the new, sometimes hypersensitive and hyper-exigent delegations
must be imaginative, wide-ranging, and effective.
The United States should take more active and effective interest in
the psychological and informational aspects of our participation in the
United Nations than heretofore. Specifically, the Committee recom-
mends:
1. For each major meeting of the United Nations and its special-
ized agencies, and for continuing programs, operational plans related to
major objectives for psychological and information activity should be
developed-under the leadership of the Department of State.
2. The United States should make the fullest use of UN meetings,
including those of the specialized agencies, to launch major new plans
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and proposals, and to reiterate its position on a selected few issues of
continuing importance, such as its approach to economic and social de-
velopment and its support for the independence and integrity of emer-
gent states. Such occasions will be of particular importance in reach-
ing audiences in the less-developed countries. Through such initiative,
and in other ways, the United States should seek to advance its own ob-
jectives and to counter the increasing use being made by the Soviets of
the propaganda opportunities offered by UN gatherings.
3. In the makeup of delegations to the United Nations and of as-
signment of U.S. personnel to UN affiliated organizations, careful at-
tention should be given to the ability of the representatives to deal ef-
fectively on the psychological and informational front. Key personnel
must possess a particular flair for intangibles, a broad knowledge of
world affairs, a natural articulateness, adeptness at improvisation and
the quick response, and a capacity to be impressive not only in intimate
conversations but also in debate before a large public. Experience in
international conference work and training for it should be more wide-
spread in our services, especially the Foreign Service.
4. Greater attention should be given to UN affairs by U.S. Govern-
ment information media and to dealings with the press to explain U.S.
positions.
5. Far greater attention should be given to the responsibilities and
opportunities of the United States as "host" to the UN. Many coun-
tries, especially the new ones, consider the position of representative
to the UN one of high prestige. They, therefore, frequently appoint
leading and influential personalities. The opportunity to shape the
thinking of such men and to broaden their understanding of the United
States during their UN assignment should be exploited systemat-
ically. As the most recent session of the General Assembly has dem-
onstrated, the impact on the delegates from new states of their recep-
tion, housing, and general treatment is a factor of real political impor-
tance. Far more personalized attention to these persons by members
of U.S. delegations (and by unofficial groups and individuals also) needs
to be provided.
B. Arms control
Arms control, or disarmament, is a subject which will be with us
for a very long time. The basic fears and hopes of humanity are woven
into it. Actually one of the most complex of issues, it lends itself par-
ticularly to oversimplification and to propaganda manipulation.
The disarmament effort must be conducted on two levels: the
laborious, intricate process of negotiation between governments, and
the continuous consultation and education of public opinion so as to
gain approval and support for proposals. Obviously, negotiations are
affected by psychological factors not figuring in the position papers.
With only a modest continuing official informational effort the United
States has been reasonably successful in gaining a measure of public
support for its proposals at home and abroad. This has been largely
owing, however, to certain striking executive initiatives rather than to
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a sustained information program. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for
Peace" 'address to the United Nations in 1953, and the "Open Skies"
proposal at the 1955 Summit Conference, for example, contributed
greatly to the positive image of the United States as a peace-seeking
nation. Moreover, these dramatic offers, even though not intrinsically
disarmament proposals, have been largely responsible for conserving
and even extending support for U.S. positions on disarmament.
Today the world is on the threshold of another important new era
in disarmament negotiations. It is therefore timely to reexamine the
adequacy of arrangements and concepts for handling the psychologi-
cal aspects of these negotiations.
Specifically, the Committee recommends:
1. That the importance of psychological factors be fully recog-
nized and considered in the formulation of plans and policies, and in
the determination of U.S. positions with respect to such matters as the
controlled reduction and limitation of atomic and conventional weap-
ons and armed forces, the regulation and limitation of nuclear testing,
and the lessening of the dangers of surprise attack and war by mis-
calculation.
2. That in the recently reorganized governmental machinery to
deal with planning, negotiation and administration of an updated dis-
armament policy, the resources for influencing world opinion in favor
of U.S. proposals be strengthened by such steps as:
a. Maintaining continuity in the leadership of disarmament
delegations, expert staffs, departmental direction and public af-
fairs counsel. For example, since 1946 U.S. delegations to such
negotiations have been led by 14 different chiefs.
b. Assigning to the U.S. Disarmament Administration selected
persons skilled in information and who are or who will become ex-
perts in the subject matter.
c. Continuing to insure that key personnel in foreign missions,
consular offices and USIA establishments are fully and currently
briefed on disarmament matters and able to present not only the
U.S. position but also to discuss the weaknesses of Soviet proposals.
d. Maintaining and expanding the procedure for briefing for-
eign embassies and missions in Washington, at the UN and at the
site of negotiations.
3. That the U.S. Government make a stronger and more timely
effort in 'advance of negotiations to prepare a synchronized world in-
formation program to mobilize support for its position through diplo-
matic channels and through appropriate media. Among the practices
which should be followed in effectuating such a plan would be the fol-
lowing:
a. Encouraging heads of U.S. delegations to provide full and
frequent background briefings for the world press.
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b. Insuring that statements by all Government officials on dis-
armament, or bearing on the question, are effectively coordinated,
especially during a period of negotiations.
c. Renewing and expanding consultation between those re-
sponsible for U.S. disarmament efforts and academic groups, foreign
affairs councils, industry, etc.
d. Paralleling efforts to reach world opinion with measures to
inform American opinion, both on the sophisticated and popular
levels, about disarmament issues and the implications of agree-
ments.
e. Bringing new major proposals or developments in disarma-
ment to world attention through speeches by the President and the
Secretary of State.
Calibre of Personnel
To perform effectively the multiple tasks of modern diplomacy, our
representatives abroad and at the conference table need to be equipped
with an impressive number of qualifications.
Our chiefs of mission and professional diplomats not only should
be good negotiators, creditable representatives and perceptive reporters
but must also be alert in recognizing and cultivating the rising ele-
ments of influence and power, especially in formative societies. They
should be able to organize the preparation of operational plans and pro-
vide recommendations for action. They should be fully conversant with
public opinion values and techniques, and with strategic and economic
as well as political factors.
To acquire and develop such professionals for the Foreign Service,
the Committee recommends that the selection, training, deployment
and evaluation of the members of the Foreign Service and of other
agencies operating abroad should take account of the need for aware-
ness and competence in the informational field.
The ability to use public opinion media and techniques should be
sought out and developed along with the capacity for initiative, for long-
range planning and for analytical writing. To accommodate the selec-
tion process to this need, appropriate changes should be made in en-
trance requirements and examinations. Such changes might in turn
affect university curricula designed for students planning Foreign Serv-
ice careers.
Because of the particular importance of achieving deep understand-
ing among our negotiators and representatives abroad of the psychologi-
cal and political problems of emerging nations, plans should be made
to insure that more officers of the various foreign services have experi-
ence in new countries and underdeveloped areas.
Visitors to the U. S.
The Committee believes that better arrangements are needed for
receiving and influencing both foreign dignitaries and ordinary visitors
to the United States.
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At a time when comparatively large numbers of heads of fledgling
nations will be making their first state visits to the United States as
well as to Sino-Soviet capitals, the question of protocol and reception
of such dignitaries should be considered a matter of high political sig-
nificance. It does not seem fitting for the United States to have to rely
so extensively for support of this activity upon unvouchered funds. Ad-
ditional funds should be appropriated for protocol and official hospital-
ity. At the same time, ways should be found to make the burdens on
the time of our top officials more tolerable. To the extent possible,
efforts to provide imagination, sensitivity and some pageantry in the re-
ception of chiefs of state and high-level dignitaries should be stimu-
lated. The utility of consultative citizens' committees should be con-
sidered for this purpose.
Because of the importance to international understanding of the
impressions of ordinary visitors to our shores-tourists, businessmen,
students-measures should also be taken to improve their reception at
ports of entry. Although somewhat lightened and humanized in recent
years, the procedures of our various port authorities remain more rigor-
ous than those in most other countries. This is because of health,
security, fiscal and statutory reasons. We suggest, however, that the
sensitivities and reactions of the foreign visitors, whose image of Amer-
ica is sharply affected by their arrival experiences, be given greater
weight in determining the methods, manners and procedures of our re-
ceiving officials.
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Chapter VI
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF PRIVATE PERSONS
AND ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF THE MASS MEDIA
A society like that of the United States-huge, vigorous and
open-pours forth upon the world a constant flood of influences af-
fecting foreign opinion. In mass, the greater part by far results from
the private and voluntary activity of individuals and organizations.
Tourists, persons with friends and relatives abroad, business firms, reli-
gious groups, scientific bodies and countless others contribute to this
interflow. Vast already, these relationships and activities in an era of
improving transportation and communication are likely to increase in
scale still further.
The free and uninhibited contact of an open society with the rest
of the world contrasts sharply with that of.a totalitarian system like
the Soviet. There the population is sealed off from uncontrolled in-
fluences, and the trickle of permitted intercourse is planned and po-
liced. Nor should the existence of a multitude of international cultural,
professional and "friendship" groups sponsored by the Soviet Govern-
ment be confused with associations of a private and voluntary charac-
ter. The former are working parts of the apparatus of the Soviet Gov-
ernment, reflections of the total mobilization of the life of a nation
for political purposes.
This situation has led some persons to feel that the U.S. Govern-
ment should begin more vigorously and extensively to stimulate and
coordinate private international activities as an adjunct to official
policies and programs.
The Committee believes that private activities abroad, in addition
to their primary and direct value in economic, cultural and personal
terms, have importance in a generalized way to the world's image of
America and that they contribute significantly to international under-
standing-and misunderstanding. We also feel that certain steps, dis-
cussed elsewhere in this document, should be taken to counter the use
being made by the Soviets of their various "front" organizations.
However, it is quite possible to have too much governmental in-
itiative in this field. If enough resources were applied to achieve the
goal of making every American an amateur diplomat, as some en-
thusiasts advocate, the results could be damaging rather than helpful
in creating an attractive image of our voluntary and pluralistic society.
The Committee therefore has this reservation with regard to any
wholesale effort to "mobilize" private international activities: however
voluminous they are or may become, they do not offer a substitute for
sustained and systematic informational activity by the Government.
A great part of private activity is marginal or at most indirect in its
relevance to the issues and objectives of foreign policy. It is not focused
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on areas or individuals of political importance. Indeed, private activity
tends naturally to be concentrated upon those countries and elements
with which we have the closest ties and greatest familiarity. It is of
fundamental value in the endless and unlimited process of the interna-
tional exchange of information and ideas. But this is not to be con-
fused with the need for steady, concentrated efforts by the Govern-
ment to advance its political objectives through psychological and in-
formational means. In stimulating private activity, therefore, a highly
selective approach is necessary.
People-to-People Program
With governmental support through USIA, this program has suc-
ceeded in engaging the interest of numerous American communities,
professions and groups in developing activities and contacts abroad.
On a selective basis these activities can be profitably expanded. But
in this as in other areas of voluntary effort the possible gains in terms
of governmental objectives must be weighed carefully against the prob-
able cost in terms of time, effort and resources. The Committee there-
fore recommends that the Government limit its efforts to expand or
to achieve greater focus of People-to-People activities to those which af-
fect audiences of special significance politically, or which are influential
in strategic geographical areas, and which would not take place without
governmental exertion.
These same criteria should apply to governmental efforts in regard
to private activities generally, whether or not they are part of the for-
mal People-to-People program. The Committee will comment on five
areas of such activity: business and labor organizations, universities,
private foundations, and international sporting competition.
Business Firms Abroad
The need exists for foreign private investment abroad to supple-
ment foreign aid programs. But the climate of opinion for foreign in-
vestment is deteriorating in many areas where the need is greatest.
Even in countries where official policy is to attract them, American
business firms may be subject to suspicion and hostile criticism both on
an official and nonofficial level.
This is due in part to Communist propaganda and to deep-running
currents of Marxist thought; in part it is a heritage of earlier days
when charges of political interference and exploitation had a basis
in fact. In those countries where one or a few American firms domi-
nate the economy, their visibility if nothing else has made them a fa-
vorite target of extremist leaders riding the new wave of nationalism.
The situation presents a triple task: hastening the trend now
evident among some U.S. companies to adapt their policies and prac-
tices to new political and social requirements; countering pervasive
misunderstanding of the U.S. economic system and skepticism about its
relevance to the development problems of emergent areas; and build-
ing an atmosphere in foreign areas conducive to the inflow of private de-
velopment capital.
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Accomplishment of these tasks depends on determined effort by
business and government. The necessary business associations exist-
such as the Business Council for International Understanding and the
International Chamber of Commerce-to give leadership; they have al-
ready undertaken some activities in this field. Individual firms are com-
mendably beginning to face their responsibilities for good corporate
citizenship abroad. Such progress must continue at an accelerated
rate. The organization in some countries of councils of American and
local businessmen to discuss common problems is an encouraging de-
velopment which might be copied elsewhere. More companies should
develop community relations programs abroad as they do at home.
Governmental information efforts, especially those directed at key
government, labor and intellectual leaders, can be helpful in checking
the growth of adverse attitudes. There should be more vigorous gov-
ernmental efforts to encourage the best practices by U.S. firms, as well
as to assist them in supporting their legitimate claims. A clearer under-
standing of the Government's objectives and policies will make U.S. busi-
nessmen abroad more aware of their personal responsibilities as Ameri-
cans and better able to mesh their own activities with the broader na-
tional interest.
A general requirement will be continued close cooperation and con-
sultation between the U.S. Government and U.S. business officials, both
in Washington and abroad. The State Department's present program
to improve the selection and increase the number of commercial at-
taches in our embassies abroad should be continued.
Labor Organizations
Increasingly labor organizations must play a significant part in
international political developments. The international Communist
movement has committed major resources to capture organized labor
and to use it for political purposes. In certain areas, such as Latin
America, the dangers on this front are ominous. The United States
should give high priority to selected operations directed at this prob-
lem.
U.S. labor organizations provide a uniquely acceptable channel of
communication with their counterparts abroad. They can be far more
effective than direct governmental intervention in strengthening for=
eign union organization and in influencing labor attitudes. In response
to the need, U.S. labor has become increasingly involved in world affairs.
Whether their response has been adequate to the challenge is a matter
of some dispute, but in any event what the various organizations have
done in countering the spread of Communism in labor organizations
abroad is to be commended.
Government obviously cannot and should not become involved in
supporting all the foreign activities of U.S. labor organizations. But in
certain countries efforts by American unions alone will not be adequate.
The Committee approves of Government support for effective interna-
tional work by free trade unions in combating the Communist drive to
take over the leadership of organized labor in the Free World.
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One factor which inhibits the international activity of U.S. trade
unions has been the shortage of qualified personnel prepared to go
abroad. The Committee recommends that the various branches of the
Government involved in foreign labor matters join in a fresh effort to
develop feasible plans for alleviating this problem. Training programs
to increase the competence of trade unionists in international affairs
are one basic requirement.
U.S. representatives abroad should give increasing attention to con-
tacts with foreign union leadership and to the development of their
competence in this important field of economic and political action. The
further expansion of the system of labor attaches would be particu-
larly valuable in this respect.
Universities
As world affairs become more important to the nation, and as our
international involvements increase, the demands upon our universities
for training, research and operational support for governmental pro-
grams likewise necessarily grow. Our universities since World War II
have devoted steadily increasing attention to research on foreign prob-
lems and to training American students in international affairs. They
have been faced with severe difficulties in trying to provide for the spe-
cial needs of the 50,000 foreign students who now study in this coun-
try. Although some have done a great deal in this regard, much more
attention to this problem is required.
Economic development and technical assistance programs of the
Government are placing a heavy strain on universities by drawing upon
their specialized experience and personnel in connection with foreign
projects. A special study group, the privately-sponsored. Committee on
the University in World Affairs, is already at work on the general prob-
lem of university relationships. with the U.S. Government as well as
with universities and other institutions abroad.
This Committee feels that it would be highly desirable to clarify
and strengthen the role of a single agency of the Government to deal
with universities on the over-all and long-range policy questions pre-
sented by the requirements of the various governmental agencies
working abroad. This office should presumably be that of the State
Department's Bureau of International Cultural Relations, which has
already taken commendable initiative in stimulating discussion and
gathering basic information. Likewise, it would seem desirable for the
universities themselves to bring into existence a permanent council to
deal with fundamental problems of government-university relations.
Private Foundations
The international activities of private foundations provide an im-
portant and independent channel of American communication with in-
fluential scientific, cultural and academic leaders abroad. In some
countries, the contribution of the foundations to international relations
and to economic, social and educational development has been outstand-
ing.
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However, not enough foundations have extended their work to in-
ternational problems, and those which have need encouragement to go
further. The Committee believes that foundations can make no more
vital contribution to the national welfare than by selected activity
abroad in their fields of special competence, and it urges the trustees
of all foundations not barred by charter or other legal inhibitions to
consider seriously such activity.
As governmental development programs touch broader fields of
science and education, the possibility of overlap with foundation proj-
ects increases. For this reason, effective communication and consul-
tation between the Government and the foundations working overseas
is increasingly important. The significance of foundation activity can
also be increased thereby, for an examination of the geographical and
subject matter emphasis of foundation projects abroad reveals impor-
tant gaps as seen from the perspective of the Government.
The independence of action of foundations is to be valued and pro-
tected. However, the Committee recommends that periodic, informal
consultations be arranged between top officials in the Government and
senior officers of those foundations with major overseas operations. In
preparation for such gatherings, the governmental participants should
have the benefit of careful and detailed analyses of the pattern of for-
eign projects of the foundation or foundations represented. On this
basis, discussion can be centered on concrete problems, and the out-
come can be a beneficial form of constructive influence without unac-
ceptable pressure.
International Sporting Competition
The recent Olympic Games have aroused considerable public discus-
sion about the political and psychological implications of such contests
between athletes from the various Free World and Communist nations.
The Soviet Union obviously attaches considerable propaganda impor-
tance to these events as a means of projecting an image of its dynamism
and progress. It spends large resources and marshals hundreds of
thousands of its youth to dedicate themselves at governmental expense
to becoming international sporting champions. It heralds its triumphs
as proof that the Soviet system represents the wave of the future.
The Committee believes that Soviet victories in international sport-
ing competition do have propaganda value, particularly with younger
people in many countries and with those not ordinarily concerned with
international political issues. Free World efforts to remove factors of
national prestige and ideological significance from international ath-
letic competition are not likely to succeed in the foreseeable future.
The problem does not justify any fundamental departure from the
established American practice of participating in the Olympic Games
on a private and amateur basis. However, it does serve to underscore
the great importance to our standing abroad of the work of the Presi-
dent's Committee on Youth Fitness and the role of the armed forces
as a leader in the physical development of our youth. It would seem
worthwhile if many of our institutions, including our schools, were to
encourage development of greater skills in gymnastics and other ath-
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letic events in which the United States demonstrated weaknesses dur-
ing the recent Olympics. Government assistance is desirable to facili-
tate transportation of outstanding American athletes to enable them to
participate in sporting events abroad.
The U.S. Government has assisted many small nations in the im-
provement of their sporting activities through exchanges of athletes
and physical training teachers. This program has had considerable im-
pact and should be continued.
The freedom and independence of U.S. mass media are rooted in
basic principles of our democracy. These private commercial enter-
prises are, however, clothed with a public interest. Their special in-
terest to this Committee derives obviously from their direct influence
upon the international flow of information, ideas and news, and
thereby upon foreign opinion and international relations.
The News Media
The international network of the news media provides the means
by which the world obtains its daily account of events. Insofar as it
can be assumed that policies and actions of governments are "auto-
matically" transmitted to the world without special governmental in-
formation effort, it is due largely to the functioning of this news sys-
tem. Because the parts of the system form elements of an inter-
related whole, it must be analyzed on a world-wide basis.
Two main problems which it presents are:
1. The needs of the less-developed areas in building up the com-
petence and objectivity of their media as literacy and the interest in
political developments of their populations grow.
2. The obstacles which exist to the international flow of news, par-
ticularly between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World, but also within
the Free World areas.
The Committee is keenly aware of the essentiality of preventing in-
appropriate governmental interference with the traditional rights of a
free press. However, we feel that there are four kinds of actions which
governmental and private elements, separately and together, can
properly and usefully consider.
The Committee recommends:
1. Under .the leadership of the Department of State, that all U.S.
Government agencies increase their efforts to arrange assistance for for-
eign correspondents in this country to report more fully on develop-
ments and that correspondents be helped, through provision of travel
and other facilities, to develop a fuller understanding of our institu-
tions and principles; and that private organizations and corporations
be encouraged to do likewise.
2. That the United States continue to provide to the world an ex-
ample of freedom in access to and the transmission of news, and that it
demonstrate vigorous interest in promoting the rights of the news
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media to freedom of travel for correspondents and freedom from censor-
ship. It should continue to give the most vigorous support to the
UN Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
3. That there be parallel efforts by private media, by professional
journalistic bodies, by private foundations, and by the Government, to
help strengthen the news media in the less-developed areas, to develop
standards of journalistic objectivity, to improve the quality of person-
nel, and to increase contacts between editors, broadcasters and corre-
spondents of various Free World countries.
4. That a standing interagency group be created to plan and guide
a continuing effort to expose and condemn the Soviet blockade of the
free flow of news, and to break down gradually the dangerous practices
of censorship, jamming, and controls which are now followed. This
complex problem can at best be ameliorated gradually. But by draw-
ing attention repeatedly to flagrant examples of unequal treatment of
events by Soviet and Free World media, by offers of reciprocity of radio
and television programs from time to time, and by other measures, use-
ful pressures for improvement can be generated.
Motion Pictures
American entertainment films are enormously popular throughout
the world, being seen weekly by some 150,000,000 foreign viewers.
Their effects upon the image of the United States are a matter of long-
standing debate. The Committee is aware of the great concern of a
number of responsible persons in the Government and outside about
the impact abroad of some of the poor productions. However, the Com-
mittee is not prepared to recommend governmental sanctions or con-
trol. The present voluntary arrangements between the Government
and the film industry appear to have worked reasonably well, at least
in modifying some types of objectionable material while films are still
in the production stage. The difficulties and dangers which would be in-
volved in going beyond such arrangements do not seem justified in
terms of the probable gains to be realized. Present cooperative
arrangements should be strengthened where possible and the situation
kept under review.
Television
The rapidly growing export of American television programs pre-
sents some of the same problems as the export of motion picture films.
In addition, special needs and opportunities are presented because of the
rapid spread of television broadcasting to the less-developed countries
and because technological progress has now made international televi-
sion broadcasting a practical possibility. A dozen emergent countries
are expected to inaugurate television broadcasting in 1960-61 and some
20 more in 1961-62. Their primary interest will be in utilizing such fa-
cilities for education and for national political, economic and social pur-
posts, not for entertainment.
The Committee recommends:
1. That there be developed a coordinated, Government-wide policy
to guide and extend U.S. participation in the future overseas expansion
of television.
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2. That consideration be given to the expansion of present efforts
to assist underdeveloped countries in their television development, par-
ticularly by providing programing materials and technical engineering
assistance.
3. That under the leadership of the State Department steps be
taken now to develop policies to clarify the roles of the U.S. Government
and private broadcasters in international telecasting and to plan inter-
national proposals for frequency allocation which would prevent chaos
on the international airwaves once international telecasting begins.
Books and Publications
In terms of U.S. national objectives, a most pervasive, powerful
and constructive influence is that exerted by U.S. books and periodicals
distributed abroad. In a time of new technical marvels of communica-
tion, the fundamental importance of the printed page in the trans-
mission of information and ideas is sometimes overlooked. Since World
War II the volume of U.S. books exported abroad has increased tenfold.
It would be valuable, however, to facilitate the circulation of U.S. and
other useful publications in those countries and among those groups
abroad where for a variety of economic and other reasons their avail-
ability is still sharply restricted.
The Government should continue to play a twofold role in this
field: to stimulate and facilitate private and commercial distribution
of publications; and, where commercial publication or distribution is
infeasible, to carry on supplementary activities of its own. Since several
agencies are now operating in this field, it is important that their activ-
ity be effectively coordinated.
The Committee recommends the continuation of the Informational
Media Guarantee program and, where feasible, its extension to cover
those areas where the shortage of dollar exchange continues to be a
serious hindrance.
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Chapter VII
ORGANIZATION, COORDINATION AND REVIEW
In the preceding chapters, the Committee has urged greater and
more consistent awareness and consideration of the psychological factors
involved in the international actions of our Government. It has also
stressed the importance of greater coordination among the departments
and agencies in the planning and execution of policies and programs
having an impact abroad.
Accordingly the Committee has certain recommendations to make
regarding: (1) organizational steps to be taken within governmental
agencies to assure attention to psychological factors; (2) the role of the
Operations Coordinating Board in psychological and informational mat-
ters; and (3) the need for periodic review of such activities.
Organizational Steps Within Departments and Agencies
Ideally all officials dealing with matters which have impact abroad
should take account of psychological factors in their planning and
decision making. But since what is everybody's business often turns out
to be nobody's business, the Committee feels that within the appropriate
departments and agencies consideration should be given to adopting
those organizational measures which will insure that psychological
aspects of policy are, in fact, consciously and fully considered.
The Departments of State and Defense have already moved in this
direction. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs and the public affairs advisers attached to the several geographi-
cal bureaus have been increasingly concerned with psychological factors
in our foreign policy. Thus personnel familiar with informational tech-
niques and foreign public opinion are increasingly involved in the
decision-making process. However, there appears to be a need for further
improving their regular and effective involvement in major policy prob-
lems. This cannot be accomplished by fiat; it will depend on growing
confidence throughout the Department in the political judgment as
well as the specialized advice of public affairs personnel.
In the Defense establishment the device of "collateral activities com-
mittees" has been developed. These have made a useful contribution,
including improving the psychological side-effects of military programs.
The Defense Department should be encouraged to continue its efforts
to go beyond the "collateral" concept and insure adequate consideration
of psychological factors in substantive decisions.
In fiscal, economic assistance, science and other departments and
agencies whose activities have major impact on foreign opinion, the
need exists for initial organizational steps or assignment of responsibility
to assure the integration of psychological considerations in policy
formulation.
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The' Committee recommends that the President reaffirm to all
departments and agencies the importance of adequately considering
psychological factors in the formulation of policies and the execution
of programs which have an impact on foreign opinion; that he request
the Departments of State and Defense to continue and reinforce the
efforts already made to this end; and that he ask the heads of other
departments and agencies to take whatever organizational or procedural
steps may be necessary in this connection, leaving to their discretion
the determination of the particular methods to be used.
The Role of the OCB in Psychological and Informational Matters
The coordination of information activities in the general structure
of the U.S. Government is a formidable problem. They are conducted
by a number of different departments and agencies and they are both
diverse in character and substantial in scale. Even more complex is
the task of integrating psychological factors in the substantive programs
of the Government affecting foreign opinion.
The creation of the Operations Coordinating Board in September
1953 represented a major step forward in improving the effectiveness of
U.S. psychological and informational activities. Although the activities
of the Board have been the subject of continuing debate, there can be.
no question that it has performed and continues to perform a number
of vital functions in the coordination of information activities and the
integration of psychological factors in substantive programs of the
Government.
The weekly executive sessions of the Board provide its members with
a unique and high-level mechanism in the Government for the expe-
ditious and effective handling of a whole spectrum of interagency mat-
ters including those related to the climate of world opinion. Its working
groups and committees carry on part of the continuing task of inter-
agency coordination of information programs. Most important, the OCB
is a point high in the governmental structure where security programs
and policies are considered in relation to their psychological as well as
other aspects.
In the judgment of the Committee it is essential that, whatever
changes may be made in national policy machinery, the functions now
performed by OCB continue to be provided for.
We believe that the most effective means for insuring the continua-
tion of these functions, particularly those related to psychological and
informational matters, is through the continued existence of the OCB.
If the OCB did not exist, it would have to be invented; its creation
was the logical outgrowth of the increase in U.S. information activities
up to 1953 as well as of the growing importance of public opinion and
communications in foreign affairs.
Furthermore, we believe that the OCB should not only be continued
but that its potentialities should be more fully recognized and realized.
There are certain specific measures which, if taken, would enhance
the effectiveness of the present organization without giving the OCB
powers incompatible with the responsibilities and prerogatives of the
various executive departments and offices.
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Continuing strong Presidential interest in making the OCB effective
is the crux of the matter. It is especially important that the President
make clear to the individual members of the Board that he expects them
to see that matters agreed upon by the Board in the implementation of
policy are dealt with effectively in their respective departments and
agencies.
Raising the level of representation on certain of the OCB commit-
tees and working groups would also be desirable.
Since one of the OCB's most important functions is to assure the
coordinated execution of governmental policies and programs in the
informational fields, special attention should be given to increasing its
effectiveness in this respect. To help achieve this objective, the OCB
should not only continue to identify agency operational responsibilities,
but should also stimulate and coordinate planning at the various levels.
This requires greater attention to anticipating major opportunities and
problems, identifying the requirements for trained personnel and physi-
cal facilities on the scale and at the time needed to deal with upcoming
situations, and mobilizing all the informational assets of the Government
in support of national objectives. The OCB should also play a primary
role in formulating and establishing over-all themes around which to
build sustained action and information efforts.
At the country team level, all elements-political, military, economic
and informational-under the active leadership of the ambassador,
should develop a detailed operating plan in support of the OCB country
plan. This should be a fully integrated plan in all aspects, including
the psychological, and should point up the practical contributions which
each element of the team will make toward reaching stated objectives.
The Committee believes that it is important to achieve program eval-
uations of a more objective and critical character than has been the
case in the past. There is some question whether such evaluations, given
the understandable concerns and perspectives of operating agency rep-
resentatives, can be most effectively accomplished through the committee
approach. Nevertheless this Committee firmly believes that the respon-
sibility rests with the Board itself, and that the Board members should
give greater attention to meeting it.
The problem of dealing with the increasingly effective activities
of the Communist apparatus continues to present a very important
double need for constantly improved operational planning. One aspect
of the problem is to expand our influence on the people and governments
of the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The second aspect is to
counter the world-wide efforts of the Communist system outside its
own orbit. These problems are sufficiently urgent to warrant the
continuous effort of our best talent.
In the areas of foreign educational development, exchange of
persons, English language teaching, exhibits and trade fairs, and radio
and television, there is need for increased integration and coordination
of current efforts.
We believe that the OCB should address itself to the specific means
by which these various requirements can best be met. One device would
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be the establishment of additional interagency mechanisms under the
OCB.
Recently an OCB committee was established to assure that new
scientific developments are presented abroad in such a way as to con-
tribute to the image of U. S. achievement. The charter of this com-
mittee might be broadened to provide a means of considering how
psychological factors can be integrated into governmental scientific and
technological programs.
Periodic Over-all Review of Information Activities
Since World War II, two committees have been appointed by the
President to examine the field of governmental information activities
abroad. The predecessor to this Committee concluded its work in
June 1953.
During the past -seven years the Communist threat has assumed
an immediacy and reality far beyond its previous dimensions. This
has created a whole new range of problems in the informational field
which will continue to multiply in the decade ahead. The Committee
therefore believes that more frequent independent reviews of the over-
all balance, interrelations and effectiveness of U.S. information activities
is desirable, perhaps not less than once every three years.
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Appendix I
The following supplementary recommendations have the general
approval of the Committee. They have not been reviewed in as much
detail as the foregoing chapters and their exact language is not spe-
cifically endorsed by each of the Committee members.
The recommendations are presented in the same order as the cor-
responding material in the foregoing chapters. There are no supple-
mentary recommendations for Chapters I, V and VII.
Chapter II
1. The strong desire within Western Europe for relaxation of cold war
tensions has been manifested in considerable neutralist feeling and
some support for the idea that Europe should be a "third force" between
the U. S. and the USSR. Our main informational problem in Western
Europe will be to maintain European firmness against Soviet threats
and blandishments, in an environment of increasing apathy, cold war
weariness, and preoccupation with material well being.
Recommendation:
Our information efforts should be directed toward reinforcing
the image of Western Europe as a part of a closely knit Atlantic
Community and undercutting the idea of Europe as a possibly
neutral center of world power.
2. Due to the sensitivities of European NATO powers concerning infor-
mational programs, NATO information programs have not made as sig-
nificant a contribution as might have been anticipated in building
European public support for NATO nor in overcoming misunderstanding
or suspicion of NATO in non-NATO Free World countries.
Our allies should be encouraged to strengthen their national
information programs supporting NATO. We should also en-
courage fuller coverage of NATO by European media, and urge that
NATO members accept an expanded NATO information program.
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SOVIET BLOC (Excluding Communist China)
3. We have not sufficiently exploited the potential offered by exhibits
within the Soviet Bloc. Exhibits have a unique importance in this
area. Often this is the only means of direct approach to the general
public which the Communist governments have shown a willingness
to open to us. The person-to-person approach afforded by the use of
American guides and the display of real objects, which exhibits per-
mit, have the further advantage of enhancing credibility where this
has been deliberately undermined by Communist propaganda.
a. Adequate funds should be provided for the three exhibits
in the USSR which are currently being negotiated, for the use of
these exhibits in Poland, for three exhibits in Rumania, also being
negotiated, and for participation in the Plovdiv, Bulgaria, Fair
in 1962.
b. The U. S. Government should take the initiative in proposing
further exhibit exchanges with the Soviet Bloc.
4. There are additional opportunities for contact with Bloc peoples
which we should exploit.
a. Special radio and TV programs should be prepared for ex-
change with the USSR and possibly some of the satellites.
b. Mailing operations and person-to-person publication pro-
grams should be expanded.
c. Additional contacts should be developed with Bloc visitors
to Western Europe and other areas.
d. Our resources for obtaining the maximum value from Bloc
visits to the United States and from American visits to the Bloc
should be improved. This will involve recruiting and training of
Americans to deal with Soviet Bloc visitors as well as to brief and
debrief American visitors to the Bloc.
e. Language teachers and language experts should be selected,
trained and sent to the USSR, as required by a provision in the,
exchanges agreement advanced by the U. S. and accepted by the
USSR.
f. Under the President's Special International Program, at
least one major cultural attraction and several other attractions
should be provided for Eastern Europe each year.
5. The development of the East-West contacts program has been a
significant step forward toward greater contacts with people of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. It is understood that the current judg-
ment of the responsible Government officials is that the United States
derives a net advantage from this program. It is important that the
programs be conducted in such a manner as to maintain this advantage.
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Recommendation:
The East-West contacts program should be reviewed periodically
to determine whether or not the United States continues to derive
a net advantage.
6. Since one of our objectives should be to maximize free contacts and
communication between all peoples, avoiding the cumbersome and un-
desirable formalities of governmental agreements, we should resort to
governmental exchange agreements only when essential for such pur-
poses as breaking through the Soviet curtain.
Recommendations:
a. In reciprocal exchange agreements provision should continue
to be made for additional exchanges and contacts beyond those
specified in the agreements.
b. When feasible, we should shift from agreements to normal
free communications between peoples and make this ultimate ob-
jective clearly known to all.
c. Our insistence on reciprocity should be limited to exchanges
involving technical intelligence and cases where reciprocity will
force more openness by the Communists.
7. Many of the Soviet educational leaders and university students are
eager for more contact with the outside world and resent restrictions
on foreign travel. Extending Government invitations to students in
the Bloc for study in the United States, even if these offers are rejected
or whittled down, would contribute to the ferment which may lead to
more evolutionary changes in the Bloc.
Recommendation:
At an appropriate time, perhaps in connection with a concen-
trated psychological effort on the "openness" theme, the Govern-
ment should extend invitations for an expanded number of Soviet
leaders and students to study in the United States.
The Government should reconsider the question of the proper
means of supporting deserving exiles from the Soviet Bloc who can-
not be integrated into the economies of the United States or Western
Europe in a normal way.
9. There are two measures which might put the United States in a
better position to increase its informational and psychological impact
upon the people of Red China.
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Recommendations:
a. More language-area specialists in Chinese affairs and Sino-
Soviet relations should be trained.
b. The Radio Broadcast Policy Committee should study the
effectiveness of current U. S. and allied radio broadcasts, including
content, audience potential and impact, availability of receivers,
signal strength, coverage and jamming, with a view to strengthening
our radio broadcasts to this area.
10. In many of the less-developed countries there is a need for trained
specialists in such fields as administration, education including English
language teaching, public health and other technical areas. This is
particularly true in Africa where the departure of European specialists
will create many vacancies. It would be advantageous to the United
States if a significant proportion of these positions were filled by
Americans or American-trained personnel. There would appear to be
a considerable reservoir of the required skills among American retired
teachers, military personnel and civil servants who might fill this need
either as U. S. Government employees, as employees of foreign govern-
ments or of private enterprise.
a. Appropriate agencies of the Government should compile
information on the needs for technical personnel in the various
underdeveloped countries. The information obtained should be
made available both to Government agencies and private organ-
izations.
b. A survey should be made to determine the number of retired
American personnel qualified and available to fill these needs. If
the potential is sufficiently large, programs should be established
to channel the talent into useful overseas activities, and action
should be initiated to remove administrative and legislative obstacles
to their employment.
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12. We do not want to encourage an arms race in Africa. But we
know that these countries will insist on having some sort of security
forces and may turn to the Communists if the Western nations do not
help them. Furthermore it is highly probable that the military in
these nations will become a major political power element.
We should seek to influence the development of African internal
security forces along lines that will contribute to political stability,
economic viability and social improvement and which will create
sympathy with Western objectives and policies.
NSC
13. In many areas of Africa local communications media are in a
rudimentary state of development and thus offer us an excellent oppor-
tunity to assist and influence their growth along democratic lines.
should consider a coordinated, long-range
program to assist and influence the development of effective African
communications media, such as TV, radio and the press. The
program should include, where appropriate, assistance in obtaining
communications equipment, training communications personnel,
cultivating broadcasters and journalists and encouraging Africans
to join non-Communist organizations of journalists, broadcasters,
etc.
14. We have a continuing problem in countering the massive influence
of Communist China on the bordering countries in Asia. This problem
is largely the result of the growing strength of Red China and the
USSR, Asian belief that some accommodation with the Communist
system is inevitable, and effective action by local Communists in manipu-
lating the neutralism and political-social revolutions in Asia.
a. American studies programs in Asian universities should
be expanded.
b. The educational, training, cultural and research activities
of SEATO should be exploited.
c. There should be an increase in programs to communicate
our scientific and technical knowledge and achievements to Asians,
particularly to the Japanese and Indian scientific elites. This
should include exploitation of opportunities such as those offered
by the Pacific Science Congress scheduled for the summer of 1961
in Hawaii.
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O r %% i
d. The geographical and cultural position of Hawaii should be
utilized more fully in fostering Asian-U. S. relations. We note with
satisfaction the creation of the Center for Cultural and Technical
Interchange between East and West in Hawaii and recommend
the continuation of efforts to develop this into a first-rate institu-
tion.
15. Although there remains a reservoir of good will towards the United
States in Latin America growing anti-American sentiment in the area
demands our increased attention. The partially successful efforts of
the Communists to encourage this sentiment have received a powerful
boost through the collaboration of the Castro apparatus. Both of these
forces are making major increases in their propaganda activities
throughout this area.
Recommendations:
a. There should be an increase in existing programs designed
to neutralize Communist penetration of the press, radio, and tele-
vision in Latin America, and to expose the Castro-Communist con-
spiracy to revolutionize the area and deliver it to international
Communism.
b. We should seek to convince the traditional vested interests
of Latin America that their very survival depends on prompt po-
litical, social, and economic reforms to satisfy the legitimate aspira-
tions of the people, many of whom feel that they have no stake in
present regimes.
c. There should be further exploitation of the opportunities
afforded by our military missions in the areas to develop the
military of these countries as positive factors for political stability,
social improvement and economic viability.
d. We should. make greater use of the Puerto Rican example
in our informational programs and consider the creation of a
North-South cultural center there along the lines of that being
developed in Hawaii.
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF INFORMATION PROGRAMS
16. The tying of appropriations to specific years often creates obstacles
to the effective execution of information programs. The difficulties im-
posed by this practice have already been recognized in the budgeting of
funds for the President's Special International Program, which is funded
through no-year appropriations. However, annual budgeting continues
to reduce the effectiveness of our exchange of persons activities in that
it forces administrators to fill annual quotas with second-choice candi-
dates in numerous instances in which the high-priority nominees
changed their plans late in the fiscal year.
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Recommendation:
Congress should be requested to provide no-year appropriations
for exchange of persons programs so that quotas could be filled
by the best candidates.
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21. Research in the separate agencies concerned with psychological and
informational programs tends to be carried out with insufficient consid-
eration of what other agencies are doing. There is no broad plan cover-
ing the needs of management in these agencies for research to aid in the
planning and evaluation of their programs. A coordinated plan for
research might avoid duplication and provide the basis for a division
of research effort among these agencies; the lack of such a plan has
contributed to large gaps in the knowledge required by the program
planners and operators. The clearing house for Government research
recently established by the NSC should help to correct these deficiencies.
a. Coordination of the planning of Government research in the
psychological and informational fields should be improved.
b. There should be better pooling and coordination of research
findings among Government agencies in order to improve the use
of present knowledge, avoid duplication, and locate gaps in coverage.
c. Planning and execution of Government studies involving
interviews with foreign nationals should be coordinated. (For
sary on a reimbursable basis.
d. The experience of the NSC research clearing house should
be reviewed at an early date to see whether its responsibilities should
be expanded.
22. To win the contest for men's minds, our national statements and
actions must appeal to at least five fundamental needs of most nations
and individuals: peace, security, dignity, independence and progress.
The following concepts should be considered as possible themes
around which Government action and information programs could
be built or as general principles under which specific themes could
be developed :
(1) Strength. Our national military, scientific, economic
and social strength must be beyond doubt. Otherwise the Bloc
will exert a magnetic attraction on those nations and individ-
uals who might shift their support merely out of fear or in
anticipation of privilege or favor.
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(2) Striving for Peace. The issue of human survival in-
creasingly dominates the thoughts of people everywhere. We
are being carefully judged all over the world in terms of the
understanding people have of our policies and actions relating
to peace, including our military activities, dispositions and
pronouncements, our disarmament policies and our behavior
in the UN.
(3) Openness. We have barely begun to capitalize on one
of our greatest strengths, our open society. We should con-
vince the world of the danger to peace inherent in systems
dependent on concealment and the basic weakness of nations
which fear the free movement, thought and voice of their own
peoples. Actions supporting the openness idea may be the
single best way to influence developments in our favor within
the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
(4) International Pluralism. Our concept of a pluralistic
society is not just domestic, it is also international. We do not
have a blueprint which we seek to impose on other societies.
We must make this clear to emerging peoples, who find it hard
to dissociate us from the past behavior of some of our allies,
from the motivations of the Bloc, and perhaps from some of
our own past actions. Our sympathy and support for the inde-
pendence and self-determination of the developing nations can-
not be assumed but must be demonstrated in imaginative
actions as well as words.
(5) Rule of Law. By our actions and stated goals we must
show the world the practical possibility of an alternative to
the precarious balance of terror, or to world-wide monolithic
tyranny. We must lead in strengthening the international
institutions which can increasingly take on the burden of
keeping the peace.
(6) Freedom. We can do much to extend the powerful
influence on the minds of men in many lands of our revolu-
tionary traditions of national independence and individual free-
dom. We should make it clear, with the help of our Free World
partners and even the more advanced of the emerging nations,
that no country need go backward politically in order to go for-
ward socially and economically and that totalitarianism is not
essential to industrialization and social welfare.
(7) Progress and Change. We must demonstrate to those
in the newly developing countries eager for progress our sym-
pathies with their aspirations. Throughout Asia, Africa and
Latin America we must demonstrate that our revolutionary
principles have not been forgotten, that we do not cling to
the status quo, that we are eager to help nations toward political,
economic and social advancement, and that the principles on
which our free society is based are far more forward-looking
than the outdated dogmas which the leaders of the Sino-Soviet
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Bloc want to foist upon the world. We should make every
effort to reach the younger and freer spirits behind the Iron
Curtain with fresh ideas which affect the arts and sciences
and the thought and action of those who live in open societies.
These ideas can exert a tremendous pull on those who may one
day hold key positions in the Bloc countries.
(8) Truth. As a corollary to openness, we must demon-
strate our devotion to truth. Our dedication to truth is proved
by our openness, under which ideas can be debated in freedom.
We must show that in natural and social sciences, in history,
philosophy and the arts, we believe, unlike the Communist
world, that the test is truth and not dogma. Through VOA we
can help establish ourselves as a source of truth on current
affairs and all other spheres of knowledge. By helping to
speed up the education of foreign peoples in that vast body of
knowledge which is the heritage of our civilization, we can
show that our type of education does not seek to suppress alter-
native ideas by force but seeks to determine truth.
(9) Service to Humanity. Our economic, medical and edu-
cational aid programs may serve sometimes as useful themes
for sustained efforts combining action and information. We
can focus attention both on our own bilateral activities, and
on UN operations to which we contribute and which are per-
haps more acceptable to some peoples. By demonstrating
through our actions genuine concern for the welfare of individ-
uals, we can gain greater understanding from those who judge
nations by spiritual and humanitarian criteria.
RADIO
23. The allocation of functions among official and unofficial stations is
logical: The Voice of America deals primarily with the American scene;
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Radio in the American Sector
of Berlin concern themselves mainly with European and Bloc develop-
ments and give more emphasis to a European point of view.
Recommendation:
The missions of official and unofficial Government radio sta-
tions should be periodically re-examined in the light of political
and technical developments.
24. VOA should be the official radio presenting the policies of our Gov-
ernment to foreign audiences clearly and persuasively. Its broadcasts
should present a balanced and comprehensive picture of American
society, thought and institutions. VOA should build its credibility
through consistently reliable, accurate, objective presentation of the
news. It is recognized that editorial leeway in reporting discussion will,
from time to time, be useful for supporting foreign policy objectives of
the Government.
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the relevant m er epar -
mental mechanisms should kee under review the possibility of
stepping up these broadcasts, F should be free to expand
them if necessary after appropriate policy decision.
OVERSEAS EXHIBITS AND TRADE FAIRS
32. During the past few years exhibit and trade fair activities have
become increasingly important throughout the world as an instrument
of foreign relations. Where the international fair was once considered
primarily a device to promote international trade, it is now a useful
forum for exchange and competition of ideas and techniques, especially
in the Bloc and in the newly developing countries. Sino-Soviet Bloc
exploitation of the exhibit medium was greater in 1959 than ever before.
Although the Bloc participated in a number of Western European fairs,
it was most active in the less developed and newly independent coun-
tries. The increasing number of its exhibits would seem to indicate the
Bloc's conviction that such exhibits have major impact. The lack of
sufficient funds to meet the growing demand for U. S. exhibits and
participation in international fairs has prevented us from meeting this
challenge and exploiting new opportunities. These activities, which
often depend on foreign invitations, require contingency funds to permit
effective participation in cases where the timing of the invitation pre-
cludes use of the normal or even supplemental budgetary processes.
Recommendations:
a. The Government should prepare a comprehensive policy
statement on overseas exhibits, emphasizing their psychological
and informational objectives.
b. Increased appropriations should be provided for exhibits and
U. S. participation in trade fairs, including contingency funds for
these activities.
33. There should be a systematic evaluation of our overseas exhibit pro-
gram, including measuring our total efforts against Soviet Bloc activities
in this field. The appraisal must include all U. S. efforts and should,
therefore, be developed at the interagency level.
Recommendation:
The Operations Coordinating Board should evaluate systemati-
cally overseas exhibits programs, with particular emphasis on our
ability to meet the challenge of Soviet Bloc activities.
34. Exhibits, even small ones, are a focus around which general infor-
mation campaigns can be built and which generate automatically a great
volume of local attention, publicity and discussions. Major exhibits
provide a vast audience for appearances and addresses by top level U.S.
officials.
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Recommendation:
In the planning of large exhibits consideration should be given
to their possible value as a stage setting for visits by high officials
or for the announcement of new programs.
35. As the over-all USIA budget in the last few years has been spread
more thinly to cover new posts and new activities, funds for its own
exhibits program have been sharply reduced. Other agencies have
attempted to offset this cutback by developing their own facilities. The
Committee questions whether this trend has been to net advantage;
responsibility has been diffuse and scarce professional staff used less
economically. There is an evident need to insure operational unity-
as well as satisfactory economy and quality-by tying the various pro-
ducing units more closely together. It would seem as illogical for the
Government to have ten agencies in the business of producing foreign
exhibits as it would be to have a like number making documentary films
for the general public overseas. This diffusion of effort may well have
contributed to the fact that when in direct competition with other
nations, our exhibits have sometimes failed to achieve the distinction
which this country's reputation demands. An integrated activity, mak-
ing best use of professional staff, should help to raise quality standards.
Recommendation:
Consideration should be given to the greatest possible integra-
tion in USIA of the planning and production of all Government
exhibits for mass audiences. USIA should be consulted in connec-
tion with technical exhibits for special audiences prepared by other
agencies.
Chapter III
ENGLISH TEACHING
36. Too often our teaching methods are aimed only at a superficial
knowledge of English and quick improvement of language skills for
special purposes. This does not foster a broad understanding of demo-
cratic institutions and ideas or develop a command of English that
would enable students to gain their own knowledge of democracy.
Recommendations:
a. More foreign students should be given sufficient instruction
to enable them to read and converse in English.
b. Greater use should be made by other Government agencies
of English language teaching materials now being developed by
USIA.
c. All USIA media services should participate more vigorously
in English teaching activities by such means as radio and TV pro-
grams, visual aids and daily columns on English instruction for
newspapers.
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37. It is important that this new emphasis on English teaching pro-
grams be accompanied by periodic evaluations of the programs in various
countries both as to instructional proficiency and as to psychological
benefits derived.
Recommendation:
There should be more thorough evaluation of the results of
English language teaching projects, and systematic follow-up of
language-training graduates of the binational centers.
38. In our exchange programs we must outdo the Sino-Soviet Bloc in
selection of leaders and students with leadership potential, quality of
programs offered, and treatment accorded visitors. In addition, we
should handle our exchange programs, both general and academic, in
ways that achieve net political gains.
a. Selections for exchanges should concentrate on individuals
and professions most likely to be important in shaping the society
and policy of foreign countries. In some countries where our Ful-
bright and Smith-Mundt exchange programs overly concentrate on
academic personnel, we should put more emphasis on selecting
leaders, but take into account the needs and wishes of those people,
institutions and governments cooperating with us and recognize
that the programs have long-range as well as more immediate
objectives.
b. There should be greater emphasis on the selection of stu-
dents and teachers desiring to study social sciences and less on those
specializing in cultural and esoteric subjects.
c. The Government should examine the practicability of easing
some of the bothersome limitations and restrictions on earnings
by foreign students and leaders during their stay in the United
States.
39. In many countries persons with leftist sympathies and affiliations
have great leadership potential and at the same time little understand-
ing of the United States. Through selective visits here we should try
to influence some of these people. Existing legislation makes it dif-
ficult to offer them grants without administrative complications (the
"exceptions" procedures are cumbersome to invoke) or possibilities of
serious embarrassment.
Recommendation:
In order to facilitate visits here by selected leftist. leaders, the
Government should revise cumbersome visa clearance procedures
by issuance of administrative instructions which would allow wider
use of the permissive provisions in existing legislation.
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40. Some foreign leaders whom it would be desirable to invite to the
United States find it impossible or awkward to accept exchange grants
from foreign governments in general or our Government in particular.
Recommendation:
The Government should encourage the arrangement of more
visits by such leaders under private auspices.
Chapter IV
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
41. The Soviets readily employ economic aid and promises of such aid,
like other instruments of state policy, in the pursuit of their goals.
They have derived some important benefits from their efforts so far.
They have secured a new sort of legitimacy for their policies by changing
their image from a menacing scowl to a more benevolent though still
inscrutable smile. Simultaneously, they have laid a base for subversion
in many areas, and greatly broadened the once very narrow base of
political communication between Soviet leaders and the developing coun-
tries, whose emergence is now regarded by Soviet ideology as being of
decisive significance to the future course of world history. The sub-
stantial psychological and political success of the Soviet economic of-
fensive has altered fundamentally the nature of the East-West con-
frontation in the less-developed areas and placed new requirements on
Western policy and aid programs.
Recommendation:
There should be an increased effort by our information programs
abroad to reveal the manipulative and colonial character of Soviet
aid tactics. For example, Soviet failure to meet agreements, de-
livery of poor quality goods, and political maneuvers on trade must
be exposed. Efforts along these lines will require careful handling
and must be subject to definitive guidance.
42. Although we have long recognized that the psychological impact of
our economic aid programs could be increased by a better understand-
ing of the objectives of foreign aid and by better procedures and tech-
niques, we have not given this matter adequate attention. Improve-
ment could be made in such areas as recruitment and training of per-
sonnel, the form and terms of bilateral aid agreements, methods of
offering and announcing assistance, the terms and conditions of loans
and grants, the balance between project and commodity aid, privileges
for aid personnel abroad, use of lines of credit, and a reduction in the
complexity of procedures and paper work.
Recommendations:
a. A comprehensive study should be made of our economic aid
policies and practices in terms of their psychological impact.
b. The Coordinator of the Mutual Security Program and ICA
should consider the suggestions for improving the impact of tech-
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nical aid contained in a staff study titled "Agricultural Technical
Assistance and the American Image", made by Michigan State
University.
43. A confused image of American aid has frequently resulted from the
habit of labeling aid with the alphabetical tags of the various lending
and granting agencies.
Recommendation:
Official releases and other materials issued by agencies con-
cerned should clearly emphasize the "American" nature of help
rather than using exclusively the title of the specific agency in-
volved. Measures to this end have already been introduced in
certain areas including India.
44. There are a number of measures which deserve consideration as
means to improve the flow of information concerning our scientific
and technological achievements. Communication with the scientific
elite can be greatly improved by further dissemination of professional
books and journals, encouraging the establishment of science informa-
tion centers and science institutes abroad. Communication with non-
scientific elites could be improved by: preparing written materials and
audio-visual programs on U. S. science specially designed for laymen;
establishing binational or regional science institutes abroad to study
local problems; and, increasing contacts between U. S. scientists and
foreign leaders. Aside from the slow process of education, effective
communication with the masses depends primarily on motion pictures,
television, radio, the. press, and other mass media. Science exhibits
appear particularly promising.
Recommendation:
The OCB should study ways and means of improving communi-
cation between scientists and non-scientific elites and mass
audiences.
45. The USSR has carefully and successfully exploited its real attain-
ments in science and technology. Sometimes it has also made inac-
curate and misleading statements, exaggerated or patently false claims,
and has tended to slight the contributions of Western science and
technology. There are real obstacles and administrative difficulties
inhibiting our efforts to counter Soviet propaganda.
Recommendation:
To the extent possible, we should improve our capabilities to
counter Soviet scientific propaganda by:
(1) Subtly and indirectly refuting Soviet claims, or placing
them in perspective.
(2) Informing the press as to the nature of various Soviet
scientific propaganda gambits.
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(3) Getting high Government officials to make appropriate
public comments.
(4) Better orienting U.S. personnel abroad as to the real
status of Soviet scientific achievements so as to enable them
to present the situation in proper perspective.
46. Because most American scientific activity takes place outside
Government, and much of the activity sponsored by Government is
actually handled by non-Government groups, Government cannot con-
trol all of the factors which contribute to the image abroad of our
science and technology.
Recommendation:
Efforts should be made to increase the awareness by private
individuals and organizations, including mass media, of their
roles and responsibilities in shaping the image abroad of U.S. science
and technology.
MILITARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
47. There is no adequate substitute for real military power for the
security of the United States. However, informational and psychological
measures are necessary to enhance the image of U.S. strength abroad,
since the effectiveness of deterrence and reassurance is determined, in
large part, by the opinion of others concerning our military strength.
Recommendation:
Additional research should be undertaken on informational and
psychological measures needed to enhance the image abroad of U.S.
military strength.
48. It is important that the activities of the various military components
overseas be tied in with the over-all country team effort in the various
countries, in order to obtain maximum collateral benefits from military
activities. While the importance of such cooperation is not limited to
military assistance activities, this portion of military activities over-
seas offers major potential for possible collateral benefits.
Recommendation:
The Department of Defense should take steps to insure that
all U.S. military elements in any foreign country are effectively tied
in with the country team in accordance with the Presidential
memorandum to the heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
of November 8, 1960, dealing with the functions of chiefs of U.S.
diplomatic missions.
49. There should be more conscious effort by all U.S. personnel engaged
in training foreign military personnel to see that their military projects
produce the optimum collateral effects consistent with military objec-
tives. However the military should not engage in any activities which
might be interpreted as "propagandizing" foreign military personnel.
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The Rand Corporation has made a study of the "Political Side-Effects of
the Military Assistance Training Program", which is available as one of
the staff papers of this Committee.
a. More officers experienced in psychological operations should
be assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups and missions.
b. Training of U.S. personnel assigned to MAAG's and missions,
such as that conducted by the Military Assistance Institute, should
include, where practicable, indoctrination in psychological tech-
niques.
c. The contacts of MAAG and mission personnel with local
military leaders should be utilized to obtain information essential
to our political objectives.
d. Personnel working in the Military Assistance Program should
be apprised, through prior orientation and through instructions
and guidance to the field, of the potential collateral impact of
military assistance programs.
50. Military activities abroad suffer from a lack of sufficient competent
linguists. Voluntary off-duty language study is desirable but cannot
produce the fluency required in official contacts with foreigners. Im-
proved college-level language instruction for candidates for service com-
missions might help to correct these language deficiencies.
The Department of Defense should conduct a comprehensive
study of ways of improving its language capabilities and its utiliza-
tion of language-trained personnel.
51. Troop and dependent orientation for overseas duty could be improved
by fuller utilization of the wealth of orientation material available to
military commanders and by more Defense guidance to the field.
Recommendation:
More Defense guidance for troop and dependent orientation
programs should be provided to the field in order to meet minimum
orientation requirements for overseas duty.
52. It is important that relations between U.S. armed forces and those
of our allies be permeated by an atmosphere of mutuality. In particular,
efforts should be made to create a feeling of mutuality of interest and
an awareness of collective interdependence.
Recommendation:
Defense should take measures to increase mutuality in rela-
tions between our armed forces and those of our allies. Specifically
we should consider ways and means of sending more U.S. officers
to, foreign armed service schools, using foreign military instructors
in language and area courses in U.S. service schools, requiring
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U.S. officers assigned to bilingual allied headquarters to speak the
foreign language concerned, and requesting foreign military stu-
dents who attend U.S. service schools to lecture on their countries
and military experiences.
Chapter VI
BUSINESS FIRMS ABROAD
53. The most important role which American companies can play abroad
is to demonstrate the best practices of American companies at home,
i.e., efficiency and responsible corporate citizenship.
The State Department and other agencies in their contacts with
private business organizations operating abroad should encourage
the following business practices:
(1) Exercise of the highest standards of ethical behavior
in the foreign operations of American business firms.
(2) Cooperation in a substantially increased trade fair
program designed to contribute to understanding of the United
States.
(3) Pooling of the public relations knowledge of the more
experienced companies and making it available to other United
States companies planning to work abroad.
(4) The employment of significant numbers of local na-
tionals in responsible positions in their operations.
(5) Efforts to obtain a substantial percentage of local
capital participation.
(6) Fuller participation in local civic activities by em-
ployees of American business firms abroad.
.54. The role of American labor organizations. in international affairs
in the next decade will continue to be exceptionally significant and
influential. They must provide affirmative leadership in strengthening
free institutions and in thwarting Communist operations in the labor
field, and yet they must avoid appearance of domination within the
world of free labor movements. Local free trade unions, particularly
those in the less-developed areas, can help to develop responsible leader-
ship and serve as an educational force to strengthen democratic insti-
tutions. More American trade unionists should participate directly
in training abroad to provide non-Communist unions with the organi-
zational and administrative skills necessary to meet the needs of their
members and to resist Communist penetration. In less-developed
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countries, local training centers are needed. Preferably these should
be established by the international trade secretariats or the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, with the aid and active participa-
tion of American labor organizations. While action by American labor
organizations is the key to an effective approach to foreign labor, the
Government must take into account the limitations of labor's resources,
particularly personnel, and should strengthen its own programs to
inform and encourage free trade unions abroad.
a. The government should plan its overseas operating programs
with increased awareness of the vital political and economic im-
portance of worker organizations, particularly in the developing
countries.
b. Government exchange programs should place more em-
phasis on participants from foreign labor unions and ministries
of labor. By exposing these people to academic instruction and
to conditions of work and labor organization here, we can help
offset the shortage of American unionists able to go abroad.
c. USIA should expand its efforts to influence labor audiences
abroad by promoting understanding, respect, and confidence in free
trade unionism and the American economic system.
UNIVERSITIES
55. Present American university capabilities in world affairs clearly
require considerable expansion. The universities must be made aware
of the needs, and urged to move more energetically to cope with them.
a. Universities should be encouraged to act more energetically
to insure:
(1) Greater emphasis on courses on international affairs,
languages and area studies.
(2) Development by more universities (especially the major
ones) of plans for study abroad, designed as serious educa-
tional efforts to attract not only language specialists but the
best students in political science, history and economics.
(3) Improvement and adaptation of courses of study in
American universities to the training needs of foreign students.
b. Those responsible for overseas development programs which
require university participation should carefully select universities
which have the necessary resources and specialization for the
particular problems involved. These universities should be included
early enough in the planning process so that they can work with
the foreign governments in such long-term programs as teacher
training, exchanges, and development of technical and vocational
institutes and school systems.
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Qrl%_11 I
56. There should be a close working relationship between voluntary and
public agencies, particularly in technical assistance. Government rep-
resentatives in the newly developing countries can profit from the
experience and wide personal contacts of the field staffs of the voluntary
agencies. Guidance from the specialists and technicians in the public
programs is often useful in voluntary health, educational and technical
cooperation programs. The American Council of Voluntary Agencies
for Foreign Service and the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign
Aid help coordinate official and private activities.
a. The Government should continue selected assistance to the
foreign activities of American voluntary agencies and, if possible,
encourage their expansion, particularly in Africa.
b. There should be greater sharing of experience and planning
in the field among personnel from governmental and private agen-
cies engaged in this type of work.
57. Travel is particularly helpful to international understanding; it
helps rectify false impressions, and builds a new identification on the
part of the traveller based on firsthand knowledge. Generally speaking,
visitors leave the United States more favorably impressed than they were
on their arrival, and, equally important, disseminate their views widely
after their return.
a. The Government should expand its efforts to promote travel
to the United States because of the importance of such travel in sup-
porting the psychological as well as other objectives of foreign policy.
b. Measures now underway in the Department of Commerce to
stimulate tourist travel to the United States should be supported.
c. The close working relationship between. Commerce and USIA
should be continued so that psychological factors will always be
considered along with economic factors in developing policy and
machinery for a new program of tourism.
d. The Government should develop an educational campaign
for the American public to insure that America will be a good host
to foreign visitors.
e. Research should be conducted to evaluate tourism's effec-
tiveness in meeting our psychological objectives, and to identify
favorable and unfavorable aspects of the image of America which
visitors carry away with them.
f. Consideration should be given to the feasibility and desir-
ability of establishing information services at ports of entry to the
United States to assist foreign travelers arriving in this country.
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58. In a majority of cases the newspapers that maintain foreign corre-
spondents in the U.S. cannot afford to pay present communications
rates. The U.S. has done less than certain other Free World countries
to assist foreign correspondents to overcome this problem. Even though
the problem is complex, it should at least be examined.
Recommendation:
The possibilities of encouraging communications companies to
provide lower press cable rates from the United States should be
considered.
59. The Government should help improve the competitive position of
U.S. news agencies operating abroad vis-a-vis Reuters, Agence France
Presse and particularly Tass, New China News Agency and Prensa
Latina, taking care to avoid giving the impression of Government con-
trol of U.S. news agencies.
Recommendation:
The Government should consider means by which the com-
petitive position of U.S. news agencies operating abroad might be
improved.
60. Journalists of foreign countries, particularly those of the underde-
veloped areas, often need assistance in raising journalistic standards
of objectivity and in achieving a greater understanding of America.
There are measures which can be undertaken both by the Government
and by private organizations which will assist in these efforts.
Recommendations:
a. The Government should encourage duplication by other or-
ganizations and expansion of such activities as the Nieman Fellow-
ship at Harvard for American and foreign journalists, the special
program for foreign journalists at the Columbia School of Journal-
ism, Inter-American Press Association scholarships, and seminars
conducted by the American Press, International Press and Govern-
mental Affairs Institutes.
b. The fullest use should be made of the Fulbright and Smith-
Mundt Acts, and other official exchanges and assistance programs,
to train U.S. and foreign journalists in American and foreign affairs.
c. Special consideration should be given under the State De-
partment leaders program to media editors from the underdeveloped
areas.
d. American wire services and our other media should be en-
couraged to give more experience in America to their "local hire"
employees in foreign countries.
61. The open nature of our society and the closed system in the Soviet
Bloc create disadvantages for the United States and the Free *orld
in the international flow of news. There is need to counter distortions
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spread around the world by the Communist controlled media. The
asset of our openness can be used to challenge the Soviet addiction to
secrecy and manipulation of fact.
We should correct significant misstatements in Bloc media about
the U.S. and other Free World countries and should press the So-
viets to publish our corrections. Other Free World countries and
international organizations of editors and journalists (such as the
International Press Institute in Geneva) should be encouraged to
do the same.
62. Although motion pictures are particularly important for the people
of the emerging nations, who often lack other means of entertainment,
there is a shortage of movie theaters in many of these areas, particularly
West Africa.
Recommendations:
a. USIA should make greater use of mobile field units in these
areas.
b. American firms should be encouraged to assist in the con-
struction of commercially owned theaters in West Africa. A study
should be made of what role, if any, the Government might play in
this endeavor.
63. Private and governmental efforts to assist in the application of
television for instructional purposes should be expanded. This is a
field of clear American technological superiority at.present and offers
a promising possibility of simultaneously helping emerging countries
and of gaining prestige for the U.S.
a. The adequacy of U.S. facilities for training foreign people in
television programming and technical matters should be reviewed.
b. The help of the television industry should be enlisted in im-
proving the content of TV exports from the point of view of national
interest.
c. A study should be made of the role the Government might
play in providing foreign television audiences with an undistorted
picture of the United States and its people.
64. There are additional measures which the Government can take to
facilitate distribution of books and publications abroad.
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a. The Government should seek to reduce tariff and postal
rates and other barriers inhibiting the international flow of publi-
cations, including Congressional enactment of legislation imple-
menting the Florence Convention approved by the Senate on Feb-
ruary 23, 1960.
b. There should be increased use of subsidies and inducements,
on a selective basis, to make the cost of American publications com-
petitive in certain areas abroad and to permit the publication of
low-cost translations of certain American books and the printing
and circulation of useful books by foreign authors. An integrated
Government translation program should be developed for each of
the major languages of the emerging countries. There is immediate
need for such a program to provide books in French and Arabic for
many countries of Africa and Asia, and in Spanish for.. Latin
America. .
c. There should be encouragement or direct commissioning of
books to be written to fill special overseas needs not met by books
published under commercial auspices.
d. In technical assistance and exchange programs more atten-
tion should be given to the development of competent and vigorous
local publication and distribution industries.
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Appendix II
Africa
Agricultural Technical Assistance and the American Image
American Business Abroad
American Labor in International Affairs
Asia
Communist China
Disarmament and the Factor of Public Opinion
The English-Teaching Program
The Exchange of Persons Programs of the U. S. Government
The Impact of Achievements in Science and Technology Upon the Image
Abroad of the United States
Information Efforts in Support of Mutual Security
The International Communist Propaganda Machine
International Flow of News
International Radio and Television Activities of the U. S. Government
International Travel
Latin America
The Middle East
People-to-People Activities
Political Side-Effects of the Military Assistance Training Program
Private Foundations
The Problem of U. S. Public Understanding of International Affairs
A Program for International Education Development
The Psychological Impact of American Voluntary Foreign Aid
Psychological and Informational Aspects of Foreign Economic Aid
Research Programs and the Allocation of Limited Informational Re-
sources
The Role of the American University in International Relations
The Role of the Armed Forces in Psychological and Informational Ac-
tivities Abroad
The Roles of Attributed and Unattributed Information and the Divi-
sion of Responsibility Between USIA and CIA
The Soviet Bloc
Soviet Use of Education as a Weapon in the Cold War
Themes
The United Nations as a Public Opinion Forum
Western Europe
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Appendix III
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
December 2, 1959
Dear Mannie:
I have decided to establish a committee to be known as the Presi-
dent's Committee on Information Activities Abroad. In general, the
purpose of the Committee will be to review the findings and recommenda-
tions of the Committee on International Information Activities in its
report dated June 30, 1953, and consider changes in the international
situation which affect the validity of the findings and recommendations
in that report. In a sense I view the undertaking as one of bringing
the earlier report up to date. The review will not concern itself with
those organizational matters dealt with in Chapter 7 of the June 30,
1953, report.
I should like to ask you to serve as Chairman of the new Com-
mittee. Those participating will be high-ranking representatives of
the State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency
and the United States Information Agency, as well as the President's
Special Assistants for National Security Affairs, and Security Operations
Coordination. In addition, there will be a limited number of non-Gov-
ernment members.
I attach considerable importance to this undertaking and feel it
would be well managed under your chairmanship.
Of course all executive departments and agencies of the Federal
Government will be authorized and directed as a matter of common
concern to cooperate with the Committee in its work. Such cooperation
will include the provision of the staff assistance which you and your
committee will require.
I very much hope that you can accept this appointment. If so,
in my absence from the country, I would appreciate your working with
Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, in
the constitution of the Committee and in making plans for staffing
and other related matters.
Sincerely yours,
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Mr. Mansfield D. Sprague
American Machine & Foundry Co.
261 Madison Avenue
New York 16, New York
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