RECENT DD/R PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060009-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 13, 2006
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 21, 1963
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
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Body:
I
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP86B00269R00Q8DW60009-8
21 January 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Recent DD/R Problems with the Defense
Department
1. The major problem which has arisen in the past six to
nine months with DOD has revolved around the organization and
functioning of the NRO. Prior to the 1 May 1962 agreement and
even for several months thereafter, the NRO was only a paper organiza-
tion and did not function.
2. The NRO was originally conceived as a management
tool for the DCI and Secretary of Defense to provide them a means
of central direction for the legitimate programs of CIA and DOD
in the aerial reconnaissance field. In practice the organization
has.been almost entirely DOD-oriented and CIA has not been consulted
until after decisions have been made. Since the Cuban U-2
transfer, the DNRO has taken the view that the Agency is not a
partner in this activity and need not necessarily be kept informed
or consulted on the program. CIA proposals for actions to the
DNRO have been pidgeon-holed for weeks or even months despite
repeated attempts to raise the issues, and in general all actions
have been aimed toward transferring Agency activities in this field. to the AF.
Proposals are currently active in the Pentagon for the development
of purely DOD satellite reconnaissance programs duplicating the
CORONA and also for further transfers of the other aerial
reconnaissance activities.
3. An attempt was made to cut the Agency out of research
in the photographic processing field without any consultation and
after the Agency had negotiated an R&D contract with Eastman in
direct accordance with the views of the NRO staff.
for the U-2 had only lukewarm or frequently negative suppor
from the NRO.
NF: REVIEW COMPLETED
25X1
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Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060009-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060009-8
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4. In summary, it is my strong conviction that the Air Force
has been using the NRO as a mechanism for reducing the Agency's
role in aerial reconnaissance with little consideration of National
needs,
5. DD/R has had no new major problems with other parts
of the DOD in the ELINT or other R&D fields.
1fIV,RBERT SCOVILL , JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)
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Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060009-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060009-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/13: CIA-RDP86B00269R000800060009-8