LETTER TO THE HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS FROM (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000800010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 16, 1968
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release
16 August 1968
The Honorable Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
Enclosed herewith is the Report of General Lauris Norstad.,
Dr. Eugene Fubini, Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant and
the undersigned responsive to the Terms of Reference of 11
September 1967. The following reflects, in very general terms,
its findings and. recommendations.
1. There is need for a long-range National Intelligence Plan
within which periodic guidance can be provided. to assure that the
most effective resources are available and used to meet the present
and. foreseeable requirements of the United States Government.
2. Guidance must be target-oriented and. relate the value of
information received to the particular resources which produced it.
3. The creation of the National Intelligence Resources Board
and the broadening of the programming and planning staff of the
Director of Central Intelligence should be helpful in providing both
such a long-range plan and the required. periodic guidance.
4. There is need for a point of central review within the
T)epartment of Defense where all intelligence programs, including
COMINT and. ELINT, are looked. at as a whole. Otherwise, as Mp RI/DDF Pages 1-29,
targets multiply both in numbers and sophistication, the magnit d.e
of the effort will reach unacceptable proportions. In the reduction,
the most effective resources may suffer along with the least.
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NRO and DIA review(s) completed.
JCS and OSD review(s) completed.
NSA review(s) completed. TOP SECRET
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5. There must be authoritative management over each of
the several COMINT and ELINT programs.
6. Authority of the Director, National Security Agency,
over all COMINT resources must be reaffirmed and. clarified,
including his authority over the Service Cryptologic Agencies as
to all COMINT resources within their control. He should have
the right to enter objections to the inclusion within the Service
Cryptologic Agencies of other resources to the extent they would.
detract from the major mission of the Agencies in carrying out
the NSA mission.
7. The Director, NSA, should strengthen his programming
and planning staff by including more high-level military and
civilian personnel from other agencies having expertise in the
cryptologic area. In this connection, consideration should be given
to integrating the programming and. planning staffs of the Service
Cryptologic Agencies into NSA. Military tours of duty at NSA
should be extended and. the establishment of career ,opportunities
for military cryptologists within the Armed. Forces should. be
encouraged.
8. The removal of resources by the military from the control
of NSA should be discontinued. This will only be successful if the
military can be assured. that the COMINT resources developed by
NSA will effectively perform in both the Direct Service and Direct
Support roles.
9. The overall centralization of ELINT resources within NSA
as contemplated by the Security Council Directive of 1959 is neither
workable nor necessary, and the Directive should. be amended
accordingly. This is essential if the present confusion and. duplication
of ELINT resources is to be eliminated, and avoided in the future.
10. Those ELINT resources essential in providing radar order
of battle and. conducting electronic warfare should. be designated,
assigned to, and programmed by the Services and included within
their several budgets.
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11. Those ELINT resources not falling within these classifi-
cations should. be managed. by the National Security Agency. There
should be placed within the Services only those ELINT resources
which provide information which cannot adequately be supplied by
the National Security Agency. The several types of ELINT are not
subject to exact definition but d.ecisions can and, should be made on
a case-by-case basis. Some duplication will, and probably should,
result.
12. The NSA should provide, and the Services should use, the
training, technical and other support facilities essential to the
operation of military ELINT resources within their control.
13. The management, collection and processing of satellite
ELINT is generally satisfactory. Some clarifications in the directive
establishing the National Reconnaissance Office are suggested to
reflect currently satisfactory practices.
14. An effort should be made by NSA and NRO to eliminate
the least efficient ELINT satellite payloads and more importantly,
to ascertain whether some substantial part of ground, sea and air
efforts cannot be eliminated with the increasing effectiveness of
satellite collection.
15. Authority over the tasking, collection and. processing of
satellite COMINT and Telemetry should be definitely placed within
the NSA as these satellites become effective.
16. The present effort to consolidate and, close overseas bases
should be encouraged and extended. Caution should be exercised
not to abandon, voluntarily, any area of the world for reasons of
economy, if they may one day become important again, and once
abandoned cannot be re-entered. Caution must also be exercised
in returning second-echelon processing to the US to ensure that
military requirements, both present and future, will not suffer.
17. The management of 's generally
satisfactory, except with respect to the technical and, tasking
authority of NSA which must be more fully recognized and utilized.
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19. No firm recommendations have been made with respect
to either the programs.
In conclusion, there must be no slackening in the US cryptologic
effort if essential military and other national needs are to be met.
The task of the future will be to determine those resources best
calculated. to meet the growing requirements and to assure their
efficient management.
This Report could not have been prepared without the unfailing,
indefatigable and, above all, understanding effort of
Unfortunately, many of its recommendations do not meet with their
equal enthusiasm.
Enclosure: a/s
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14 August 1968
GENERAL COMMENTS
1. A re-evaluation of the COMINT and ELINT efforts of the US
Government is appropriate because of developments in the more than
fifteen years since the establishment of the present organization for
the management of COMINT and in the ten years since ELINT was
placed in the same framework.
2. The vast increase in signals subject to interception, the rapid
advance in the technology for interception from the ground, air, sea
and space, the new geographic areas of interest to the intelligence
community, give rise to new problems in the programming of require-
ments and. the provision of resources to meet them, now and for the
foreseeable future.
3. The intelligence community is generally satisfied with the
quality of the product, its dissemination, the technical competence of
personnel and the maintenance and modernization of resources.
4. There are problems, however, with respect to several aspects
of COMINT and ELINT. These problems, together with suggestions as
to how they may be met, are set forth below.
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