LETTER TO MR. J. PATRICK COYNE FROM THOMAS A. PARROTT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
56
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 20, 2006
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 8, 1968
Content Type:
LETTER
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 1.04 MB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2Q06/12/28 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
8 October 1968
Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.
I am enclosing herewith two copies of the Central
Intelligence Agency's Aamnal Report to the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
Sincerely.
Enclosure
O / DC I/ NIPE : TAP:dm
Distribution:
#1 w/c s #1 and SW At.
.
#2 w/9-l#j - ~
?3 w/CY'#+ - ER via DDCI and ExDir
#4 w/cys #5 and #6 - NIPE/PFIAB
ogy of 4
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
30 September 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Annual Report to the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Organizational Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Intelligence Collection Requirements . . . . . . . .
SECRET Copy 1~ of 6
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5 T
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
2. Information Handling and Retrieval Systems . 60
G.. Intelligence Production
1. Current Intelligence Analyses . . . . . . . . . . 72
2. National Intelligence Estimates . . . . . . . . 79
3. National Intelligence Surveys . . . . . . . . . . 83
4. Geographic and Geodetic Intelligence . . . . . . 86
5. Economic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
F. Processing of Raw Intelligence
1. Photographic Interpretation . . . . . . . .
6. Military and Military-Economic Intelligence . .
97
7. I I . . . . . . . . . . . 102 25X1
8. Scientific and Technical Intelligence . . . . . . 105
9. Personality Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
10. Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
I. Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J. Scientific and Technical
(Organization and Coordination) . . . . . . .
M. Problems and Deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Legal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
P. Legislative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
A. ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The attached organization charts show:
1. Central Intelligence Agency: Organization and
Functions (to Deputy Director level)
2. Office of the Director
3. Directorate for Plans
4. Directorate for Intelligence
5. Directorate for Science and Technology
6. Directorate for Support
There have been no substantive organizational changes
during the past year.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Production of political, economic, military,
and geographic intelligence, and National
Intelligence Surveys. Overt intelligence
collection. Storage, retrieval and dissem-
ination of intelligence information. Exploi-
tation of imagery (photographic) informa-
tion.
Central Intelligence Agency
ORGANIZATION & FUNCTIONS
Director of
Central Intelligence
Deputy Director
Executive Director-Comptroll
Deputy Director for
Science and Technology
Research and Development in support of
Agency missions. Technical collection.
Processing and production of technical and
scientific intelligence.
Deputy Director for
Support
TOTA
BY DI : (in parentheses)
Support Services, including Personnel, Medi-
cal, Security, Training, Finance, Logistics,
Communications, and Emergency Relocation
and Records Center.
Deputy Director for
Plans
Covert intelligence collection. Covert op-
erational activities.
SECRET
w G oYPiI ixc
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET`
The amount of training in foreign languages reached a
plateau this year. A second annual survey of the Agency's require-
ments for foreign languages was begun. The program to validate
language proficiencies through testing was expanded. Our "bank"
of language skills now includes i Itested proficiencies.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
T(lP qF(''R FT
D. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
As will be recalled from last year's report, the Agency's
intelligence collection requirements process was studied intensively
and an Information Requirements Advisory Group was established to
develop common standards, procedures, and action among Agency
components.
During the past year the Advisory Group developed cri-
teria and procedures designed to standardize the review, validation,
and processing of all human source requirements and evaluations.
After a three-month trial period, these standards and procedures
were officially approved in April for common use by all Agency
components. By the end of the fiscal year there was a notable
improvement in the quality of our requirements and evaluations,
but it is still too early to judge effects in terms of significant reduc-
tions in reporting of information of marginal value.
The principle of "validation at an appropriate level" also
has been applied to the requirements and evaluation process within
the SIGINT and imagery reconnaissance systems. During the year,
for example, as the Information Requirements Staff reviewed the
proposed tasking requirements for the Agency's covert intercept
program in terms of the degree to which such taskings related to
our priority intelligence information needs, these judgments were
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
TOP SFCR FT
validated at the Directorate level. Also, new guidelines were
developed for the processing of imagery exploitation requirements;
included were provisions for validation of all such requirements at
an appropriate supervisory level.
The Information Requirements Staff now serves as the
central requirements and evaluations facility for the intelligence
producing components of both the Intelligence Directorate and the
Science and Technology Directorate., This mechanism has enabled25X1
us to support collection planning and programming by providing
25X1
coordinated Agency positions on the need for and value of information
from various collection systems.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
10. Foreign Broadcast Monitoring
and Publications Exploitation
a. Radio and Press Monitoring
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) expanded and improved coverage of Communist China,
Vietnam, North Korea, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the USSR,
and Eastern Europe. The consolidation of broadcast and publications
monitoring, instituted on 1 March 1967, was largely responsible for
this improvement. Increased press monitoring in field bureaus
resulted in more timely distribution of significant press information
and facilitated the consolidation of broadcast and press monitoring
-nublications .
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
Coverage of all audible North Korean trans-
mitters was undertaken in late January following the seizure of the
USS Pueblo and the accompanying sharp increase in tension in Korea.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
Rapid and complete coverage of significant
developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe, in particular the
Soviet-Czechoslovak confrontation toward the end of FY 1968,
was greatly facilitated by the new Press Monitoring Unit
Soviet press monitoring, formerly
41
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
In FY 1968 FBIS consolidated and reorganized
its publications.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
G. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
1. Current Intelligence Analyses
The procedures and timing of production of the
President's Daily Brief have not been altered,
Because of the increased workload during off hours
in processing the new Bulletins for early morning delivery, ahd
because of continuing substantial requirements for overnight
publication of memoranda and other special products, it has become
necessary to bolster the night editorial staff on a six-day basis.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
In addition to producing its various regularly
scheduled finished intelligence reports, OCI continues to prepare a
large number of ad hoc memoranda, briefing materials, commen-
taries, and situation reports. Some of these are self-initiated but
many are in response to requests from outside the Agency.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET'
Within the CIA Operations Center, the task force
technique for around-the-clock reporting on crisis situations was
used effectively on several occasions in the past year. The Cyprus,
Greek, Pueblo, Tet, Czechoslovak, and French crises were handled
in this manner.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
G. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
2. National Intelligence Estimates
Sixty-seven National Intelligence Estimates, includ-
ing National Intelligence Projections for Planning, were completed in.
FY 1968 compared with 70 the previous year. In addition, the Office
of National Estimates (ONE) completed 80 substantive Intelligence
Memoranda compared with 65 in the previous year.
The number of estimates produced (67) is nine more
than the average yearly number of estimates produced (58) during the
18 years that ONE has been in business. There was continuing
contact between members of ONE and various policy-making com-
mittees of the U. S. Government, and considerable time was spent in
providing assistance and written critiques for them.
An estimate entitled "World Trends and Contingencies
Affecting U. S. Interests" was prepared at the specific request of
General Robert J. Wood, U. S. Army, chairman of a joint State-
Defense study group concerned with future U. S. base needs throughout
the world.
In response to the need for timely assessments on
developments in Vietnam, a large number of estimates and
memoranda were prepared, often under very short deadlines,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
relating to the war, the political situation in Saigon, and the
negotiations in Paris. Instability elsewhere in Southeast Asia was
covered in papers on Laos, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the
Philippines.
Events in Korea, especially the Pueblo incident,
necessitated the preparation of several special estimates and
memoranda on that country.
Estimates on Communist China concentrated on the
impact of the Cultural Revolution on foreign policy, military
readiness, and political and economic institutions. China's military
programs, especially those for the development of advanced weapons,
continued to receive considerable attention, as did Peking's
intentions with respect to the Vietnam conflict.
The heaviest estimative load, however, remained
the regularly scheduled major estimates on Soviet military policies
and capabilities as well as the National Intelligence Projections for
Planning, the largest single project for which ONE has responsibility.
Additionally, estimates were completed on the Soviet space program,
Soviet anti-satellite capabilities, and the chances of weapons of
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
mass destruction being clandestinely introduced into the U. S. This
last estimate was done at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Outside the military-technical field, estimates were prepared on
Soviet foreign policy as a whole and Soviet interests and activities
in the Middle East.
81
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
G. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
3. National Intelligence Surveys
The NIS activities during the year focused on the
requirement that scheduled papers directly support national security
planning, and emphasized the effective and efficient employment of
the specialized production capabilities of participating agencies.
A long-range production plan was approved by USIB
in April 1968. The plan establishes NIS area priorities for the one-
volume General Surveys and specifies for each area the supplementary
topical coverage required over and above that provided by the
General Survey.
A new concept of supplementary sociological
coverage has been developed that permits more effective use of
resources and consolidates into a single volume the sociological
material previously contained in three separate volumes. A supple-
mentary unit on Manpower is being phased out in favor of a somewhat
expanded treatment of the subject in the more frequently revised
General Survey.
Programmed production of 32 General Surveys for
the year included initial coverage on six new areas, increasing to
114 the number of such surveys available. More than one area was
sometimes combined into a single unit in the 182 supplementary
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
units produced during the year in order to provide expanded. coverage.
With the publication of the July 1968 NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook,
a new high in the extent of world coverage will be reached, as 180
countries and dependencies are now included. The Factbook, produced
semiannually, now makes substantial use of automated intelligence
data in its periodic updating. About 15% of the surveys published
during the year utilized a computerized photo-composing EPIC
system (Electronic Printing for Intelligence Composition). In addition,
some NIS producers were equipped with automatic typewriters that
simultaneously create hard copy and a paper or magnetic tape which
is ultimately used in the EPIC system.
To make the product more useful, classification
designations are now assigned individually to subsections within
each NIS volume.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
G. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
5. Economic Intelligence
The production of economic intelligence in support
of policy and action officers of the government was accelerated
during the year. The publication of 75 Intelligence Memoranda
by the Office of Economic Research (OER) in the first half of
calendar year 1968 equalled the number published in 1967. Many
were produced in direct response to requests from policy-level
officers of the White House, Department of Defense, and Department
of State, and all were of direct or indirect interest to such officers.
In addition, OER prepared a large number of unpublished
memoranda, which were issued only to the requester. As a result,
the Office was forced to cut back its production of detailed analytical
Intelligence Reports, which are used primarily by intelligence
analysts as background material or inputs to other intelligence
production.
An Indochina Division was formed to provide more
effective management of the increasing volume of support work
related to the war in Vietnam. At the end of the year, more than
one-fifth of OER's professional production personnel was engaged
full time in this work. More than 100 support papers and 38
published Intelligence Memoranda were prepared on Vietnan-1-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
related subjects at the request of the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and other senior officials. Major support included such
subjects as assessment of the effects of the air war, infiltration of
personnel and supplies into South Vietnam, manpower in North
Vietnam, shipping to North Vietnam and Cambodia, use of Cambodia
by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, Soviet and Chinese
aid to North Vietnam, and logistic requirements. CIA chaired a
major intelligence conference on estimates of enemy strength.
Participants included representatives from MACV, CINCPAC, the
military services, OSD, and member agencies of USIB. Support
was given to the Vietnam conferees in Paris.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release,;006 2~2D CSI.A- ,DP86B00rrn 269R000700010008-5
6. Military and Military- Economic Intelligence
Elements of the Directorate of Intelligence which
are responsible for military and military-economic intelligence
production were consolidated into a single office--the Office of
Strategic Research (OSR)--at the beginning of the fiscal year. The
consolidation resulted from a recognition of the need for closer
intermeshing of the research and current intelligence reporting
activities in this field, which is distinctive from other aspects of
the Directorate's work in terms of sources, analytical techniques,
and consumer requirements. It provides a single office which
other Agency components and other government agencies can look
to for military and military-economic intelligence support.
In its first year of operation OSR progressed in
several analytical areas which are important to our understanding
of foreign military capabilities and how they may develop in the
future.
TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-R DP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE
Communist China continues to be a more difficult sub-
ject for military and military-economic analysis than the Soviet Union.
China's military programs are more obscure, and evidence on them is
harder to obtain.
A persistent challenge for OSR analysts is the problem
of handling the large amounts of diverse data collected on military
subjects and synthesizing it to produce meaningful conclusions. OSR
has turned increasingly to the computer to assist in this process.
With the assistance of other Agency offices, basic
data have been converted to machine form to the extent that
personnel resources allowed. The analysis done for the joint
25
TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Re13 30SII~?RB A ZM 0, 9 9p700010008-5
ground forces study, for example, led to the initiation of a computer-
ized file which holds promise for application to many aspects of
military intelligence problems.
A second approach has involved the use of computer
models to correlate and manipulate data on a given subject as an
analytical tool. Several models have been under development for
some time and they have recently begun to realize some of their
potential.
TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-R DP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: IA-R DP86B00269R000700010008-5
TOP SECRET RUFF TR THE
The results of OSR research and analysis were
expressed in many forms in the course of the year: contributions
to national military estimates, formal memoranda and reports,
handbooks, direct replies to specific intelligence questions from
other agencies of government, briefings, and consultations with
senior policy officials.
The Soviet decision in late June to begin discussions
with the U. S. on strategic arms limitations resulted in added
requirements for OSR services. The Office has supported the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency and other agencies involved in
the forthcoming talks by providing up-to-date substantive information
and guidance on intelligence aspects of the monitoring problem. It
has worked closely with the Office of National Estimates in the
production of Estimates related to this question. As proposals and
counterproposals unfold during the talks, OSR's support efforts will
probably need to expand.
TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
J. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
(ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION)
As previously reported, a Future Threats branch was
created at the end of last year in the Physical Sciences and Engineer-
ing Division of OSI. This organization was established to help in
obtaining as much lead time as possible in identifying future Soviet
military systems and to develop an improved approach to long-range
planning of the scientific and technical intelligence collection effort.
During the past year the effort of this branch was con-
centrated along two main lines of activity. Initially, considerable
effort was spent in exploring different approaches to predicting
threats and evaluating different forecasting methodologies. The
effort now is concentrating primarily on adaptation of a deductive
technological forecasting methodology and its supporting computer
programs to long-range intelligence forecasting. This effort is
being pursued with the assistance of external contractual support
I
disciplinary in nature, requiring scientific, technical, economic,
strategic, and political analysis and, therefore, ultimately will
involve other intelligence production offices.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
This rather extensive undertaking is inter - 25X1
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Next 47 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 20012/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
TOP SECRET
M. PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES
2. Intelligence on the War in Vietnam
Among the problems associated with the production
of intelligence on Communist capabilities to prosecute the war in
South Vietnam are those related to quantitative estimates of enemy
strengths and transportation and logistics.
Enemy Strengths. During the past year CIA has
made a major effort to reconcile its estimates of enemy strengths
with the lower estimates of the U. S. military intelligence agencies.
The inability to reach agreement arises from basic conceptual
differences, inadequacies in available data, and differences inherent
in the use of estimative rather than OB-maintenance techniques.
There are deficiencies in the amount and reliability of data on the
identification and personnel strengths of enemy units, and most of
the information used to estimate enemy strengths--KIA, losses,
infiltration, recruitment--is soft and difficult to quantify.
Several steps are being taken to resolve these
problems. The collection effort is being restructured and docu-
ment exploitation intensified. New basic studies of enemy forces
are under way at Agency headquarters and in Saigon. CIA and DIA
working jointly have formulated new definitions and criteria that
are now being negotiated with MACV. On the basis of these
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
TOP SECRET
proposals CIA and DIA are also undertaking joint estimates of enemy
force elements and a new attrition study for discussion with MACV
and CINCPAC.
VC/NVA Logistics System. Knowledge of the
organization and modus operandi of the logistics system is insufficient,
and there are sharp disparities and unevenness in road watch coverage
of actual logistics movement in Laos. The establishment of a
Logistics Branch in the Office of Economic Research sharpened the
focus of analytic resources on logistics problems. The recent
campaigns in the A Shau valley also provided an abundant take of docu-
ments on logistics units, and these are now being exploited. In
addition, interrogation of POW's is giving more attention to the
problem.
Road watch coverage is being improved in several
ways. The entire program has been expanded, and more effort is
being made to put teams into previously uncovered areas. Team
reports are being given closer scrutiny for consistency. In. addition,
the establishment of new sensor programs is being intensified to
provide data on truck movements.
Truck Kill Data. The validity of truck kill data is
a chronic problem, and recent radical changes in the nature of this
reporting make the data inconsistent with other intelligence.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 200)6/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
!lP SF(:-P1 T
CIA, working closely with DIA, is exploiting this data rigorously to
eliminate inconsistencies and duplications. In addition, a statement
of the problems is being formulated to serve as a basis for field
discussions between CIA and 7th Air Force personnel. Require-
ments have also been levied on the Clandestine Services to determine
the extent to which road watch and agent teams can collect data on
truck kills.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
TOP SECRET
The institution-building effort in South Vietnam
continues to suffer from the lack of Vietnamese experience and the
hostility of the local government toward nongovernmental institutions.
An acceleration in the Revolutionary Development Cadre program
appears dependent upon a number of factors: improvement in
territorial security, better exploitation of information concerning the
Viet Cong infrastructure, increased Vietnam Government understand-
ing of and support for the program, and improved cadre training and
direction in the field.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SF(`.R FT
M. PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES
14. Early Warning of Enemy Attack
The intelligence community is attempting to achieve
the best possible capability to maintain continuous surveillance of all
elements of Communist power in order to provide advance warning of
signs of preparations to attack the continental U. S. , U. S. forces or
installations abroad, or foreign nations allied with the U. S.
Constant innovations are required in our intelligence
collection, transmittal and analytical techniques to keep pace with
Communist advances in developing new weapons systems, new
security measures, greater mobility, and broader force deployments.
205
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
0. LEGAL
The Office of General Counsel (OGC) continues to provide
legal assistance and advice to other Agency elements in a wide
variety of situations
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28 : CIA-R DP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
P. LEGISLATIVE
John M. Maury was appointed Legislative Counsel,
effective 1 May 1968, vice John S. Warner, who was appointed
Deputy General Counsel.
217
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
SECRET
During the year the Agency provided general intelligence
briefings on major current issues to the full Senate Committee on
Armed Services and to the CIA Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Armed Services. The CIA Subcommittees on Appropriations in
both Houses were briefed in depth on intelligence matters and on the
Agency budget for FY 69. In addition, intelligence briefings were
provided to the following committees and subcommittees at their
request:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee
on Preparedness Investigation
House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Defense
House Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee
on National Defense Posture
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee
on Policy
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5
Approved For Release 2006/12/28: CIA-RDP86B00269R000700010008-5