(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700050035-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: CABLE

Approvfor Release 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP801!!1'1720R000700050035-8
SECRET
DRAFT CABLE
1. The tempo of drawdown of U. S. forces has added note of immediacy
to questions regarding the Phung Hoang Program. These questions
themselves are aligned into three basic categories:
(1) Is there requirement for continuation of U. S. advisors
[specifically identified for support to GVN Phung Hoang program?]
to the GVN's counter- subversion effort, whether or not the term
"Phung Hoang" and its associated committee structure is dropped?
(2) Will USG capabilities to provide such advisory assistance to
the GVN's counter-subversive effort [Phung Hoang Program] be
impaired by reduction of U. S. military personnel ceiling?
(3) What type of organization on U. S. side will be required for
follow up effort in post withdrawal period?
2. With regard to first issue, it is understood that meeting was held
with Prime Minister attended by all concerned U. S. agencies in Vietnam
where decision was reached that National Police Operations Centers would
be responsible for all anti-criminal and anti-VC activities.
This would eliminate requirement for duplication of facilities and
personnel for separate police operations centers, DIOCC's, and PIOCC's.
At this meeting we understand U. S. and GVN agreed that CORDS/PSD
would be responsible for strengthening of National Police institutions
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and advising elements of National Police, except Special Branch, which
may be involved with apprehending VCI. Concurrently, it was agreed
that OSA would maintain responsibility for advising Special Branch
activities concerned with police operations centers. It was agreed that
these advisory programs would effectively fulfill U.S. requirements for
advising anti-VC activities. Any advice, if required, to Chairmen of the
Phung Hoang Committees (GVN District and Province Chiefs) to be pro-
vided by senior U. S. District and Province Advisors. It now appears
that question as to which U. S. agency should bear advisory responsibility
to Phung Hoang has been overtaken by U. S. and GVN agreement that anti-
VC activities will be assumed by National Police operations centers and
not by residual Phung Hoang Committees. This approach would appear
eliminate requirement for specific advisors for Phung Hoang activities.
3. With regard to second issue, if it becomes apparent that continuation
of specific Phung Hoang advisory assistance is required, then a course
of action must be developed to continue availability of U. S. military
personnel. It has been recommended by jpersonnel feeling] persons
who believe a continuation of specific advisory services is required
that Phung Hoang advisory program be exempt from drawdown of U. S.
military forces in Vietnam. If this is the case, a reasonably accurate
estimate of number of advisors planned for November 1 is required as
soon as it can be calculated.
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4. With regard to third issue, it is important not to get hung up on the
term Phung Hoang_.That term may disappear, along with the present
structure of Phung Hoan committees. If it does, however, the problem
the Phun Hoan structure was erected to address will still remain:
namel , the institutionalized existence of a Communist subversive
apparatus determined to overthrow the GVN by any and all means
necessary, includin armed force - - i. e. , the VCI. Thus, with or
without the term "Phung Hoang, " there are several questions that
must be answered in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the
GVN counter- subversive program and the continuing U. S. advisory
input necessary to support it. [that will ultimately replace the U. S.
military advisory effort with Phung Hoang if such advisory effort is
determined to be necessary. ] The questions as we see them are as
follows:
(a) Who would advise various elements of the police on their
counter- subversive responsibilities?
(b) Who would advise various other elements of GVN which have
an anti-VCI responsibility, i. e. , MSS, Province Chiefs, District
Chiefs ?
(c) What would become of PRU? If it continues to exist, who, if
anyone, will advise it?
(d) What would be relationship between all counter-subversion
advisors, especially between USAID/CORDS police advisors and
[U. S.] OSA special police advisors?
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(e) Who would take responsibility for training facilities currently
used to support anti-VCI program?
(f) Who would take responsibility for making intelligence estimates
of VCI strength and capabilities?
5. It appears at this end, based on opinions of those who have had some
contact with the existing Phung Hoang Program, that answers to the
above questions not only require plan for a follow-on program to aid
the GVN in its anti-subversive activities but also must deal head-on
with constraints that have been placed on USAID operations. While in
past U. S. military advisory effort provided buffer between USAID and
counter-subversive activities of National Police, removal of that buffer
requires that we face problem of counter- subversive advisory roles
rather more squarely. If it is believed in field that operational and
numerical strength constraints placed on USAID
such that a cohesive advisory effort is jeopardized, then issue must be
taken up by NSC so that it can be resolved as soon as possible. With
regard to particular issue of organization on U.S. side, it has been
suggested that over-all responsibility for advisory effort should perhaps
reside in senior official of Mission, where coordination of various U. S.
elements could take place most expeditiously. The Deputy Ambassador's
office would look to us like logical place, particularly in view of
I background and expertise.
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6. Because of clearly urgent need to make necessary decisions on
how U. S. will structure its future advisory support to the GVN's ob-
viously essential task of combatting organized internal subversion, we
need your response to this cable and the questions it raises as
expeditiously as possible, but not later than [17] 24 March.
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