MURPHY COMMISSION DRAFT REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030033-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 24, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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24 February 1975
NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Murphy Commission Draft Reports on Intelligence
Bill:
The Murphy Commission draft reports have been provided to
us as well as to Defense and NSA and comments were requested.
The question of how DoD proposes to proceed on the reports
impacting on their organizations was explored with Tom Latimer, ami
l It appears that they do not intend to comment on the
drafts, but will await a request to react to a final draft.
Fisher Howe assures me the Commission will be requesting comments.
The draft reports we have present some significant problems:
? Recommendations on organizational change are not
related to how these will improve the responsiveness of
intelligence or its performance in support of foreign
policy. That needs to be done, and Fisher Howe has accepted
the view with appreciation.
The report fails to provide an analytic basis
to support its recommendations. The report purports to
support a stronger DCI; e.g., more national level review
of NSA (EXCOM), as one major illustration, but it does not
arrive at this conclusion from an accurate factual base.
I've advised Howe of these differences, and he agrees the
report needs more work. He has asked for factual corrections, and
some of these are attached. (They do not address the recommendations
or validity thereof.)
Attachment:
As Stated
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24 February 1975
SUBJECT : Comments on Murphy Commission Draft Report
Introduction - no comments.
Section I, p. 8, last two lines of second para. - better words would be:
It. . . and as such is responsible for coordinating all foreign
intelligence activities of the U. S. Government."
Section I, p. 10, lines 8 & 9 under DIA:
Director DIA is no longer program manager for GDIP and SRV.
ASD(I) now has these responsibilities.
Section I, p. 11 - Under NSA. Second para. is incorrect. The Service
Cryptologic Agencies (SCAs) are under the operational and
technical control of Director, NSA. The SCA Chiefs also
perform certain cryptologic related functions for their parent
Services, for which they receive direction from the Service
Chief. Some of these Service peculiar functions do involve
maintenance of field units for direct support to military forces.
The relationship between NSA and the SCAs is not ambiguous.
Section I, p. 11 - NRO - I believe it is incorrect to describe NRO as a
part of "Air Force intelligence. " It is not a part, either
organizationally or in management and direction.
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Section I, p. 12 - Many possible errors in fact or interpretation
under Service Intelligence para.
-- I question the source, validity and meaning of the large
manpower figures given for Army, Navy, and Air Force intelli-
gence.
-- At least in the case of the Navy, it is totally incorrect to
say that, "ONI employs about
people. . . .
-- Given the inaccuracy of these figures, it is wrong to say,
in the second sentence, that "the three major Service agencies
are all (SIC -- each) larger than DIA. (ONI, for example,
actually has a world-wide strength of about
(people. )
-- It is also incorrect, as noted previously, to include NRO
as a part of Air Force intelligence.
(Check accuracy of USIB Committee Chart)
Section II, p. 1, line 5 - change DCI to CIA.
Section III, p. 5, 2nd para. I understand the designation of the DCI
as vice Chairman of NSCIC has never been made official. Letter
drafted but never signed.
Section III, p. 6, first line - strike out "director"
Section IV, p. 1, first para. , last line - IRAC is "Resources" not
"requirements"
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Section V, p. 1, first para - This paragraph conveys a very wrong
impression regarding the contribution of NSA, DIA and NRO
(see last sentence) when one reads the second line, "Most of
their effort is limited to 'tactical' . . . . " Perhaps use of
word "much" in place of "most" would be easiest fix.
Section V, p. 2, lines 5-6 and 9-10 convey a misinterpretation.
"Tactical" or military force support intelligence elements are
organic to forces as a part of the force enabling the Commander
to execute his mission. They are not "nice to have" or "more
comfortable" to the Commander as their reason for being, as
this paragraph portrays.
The second para. is a non sequitur. The 15-85 split refers to
"National" programs (Prog. III) and does not include "tactical"
resources, which may be as much as double.
Section V, P. 3 - "Tactical" figures are available, as are all DOD
budget items. All one needs to find "tactical" intelligence
resource figures is a definition of what to include.
Section V, p. 5, NSA para. , lines 4-6: I agree that military coverage
dominates the SIGINT business, but I will not agree that this is
"at the expense of other national needs" -- a connotation that
other needs are not being met because of military dominance.
Not True.
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Section V, NSA para. , last sentence, again connotes that non-military
needs are not being met because of military dominance. This
is not true and is the fault of DCI and USIB if it should be true.
Section V, second para. , lines 3-5. Comments on further career
aspirations hampering objectivity of DIRNSA is factually wrong.
Only one DIRNSA has ever been advanced in his Service, and only
one other has been advanced outside his Service. All other
retired, and one reverted to two-star status.
Section V, p. 7, lines 2-4. The only position in NSA traditionally held
by a military officer is the Director. All other senior positions
do rotate and all have rotated among civilians and military.
Section V, p. 7, second para. , line 3 -- word "cryptographic" should
be `'cryptologic. "
Section V, last para. on p. 7 and first para. on p. 8 are I rossly mis-
leading in impressions of relationships between NSA and SCAs
plus role of Service Chiefs. This was explained in great detail
to Mr. Wm. Harris.
I
Section V, p. 8, 2nd para. regarding CSS. The CSSis an abortion and
was deliberately engineered to be so by ASD(I) and a former
Director of NSA.
Section V, p. 13 - Remedies recommended to improve the Defense
Attache System are of little value. Promotion should not be
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treated as a reward for one tour of duty, as suggested. The
real remedy for DAS problems is to improve the prestige and
image of the Military Attache, and restore personnel reductions
which have cut the system by more than half.
Section VI, p. 6, full para. at mid page:
Discussion equates HUMINT to clandestine HUMINT, which is
wrong. Result is wrong conclusion and bad recommendation.
Section VII - no comments.
Section VIII - no comments.
CPAD IC
cy to:
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CENTRALIZATION OF DEFL~'4SE
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
After World War I, America's small military intelligence establish-
ment was reduced to an ineffective level. Yardley's famous "Black
Chamber" code-breaking operation was disbanded with the epitaph,
"Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen's mail. " With the advent of
World War II, intelligence units had to be hastily assembled to ineet the
varying and often parochial needs of field commanders. Quite understand-
ably under those cia cumstances, effectiveness, not organizational style
or economy, was the overriding concern. It was from these origins, and
in the face of Soviet advances in Europe, that an attempt was made to create
a capable, centralized intelligence authority after World War II. Yet,
even when'-the Central Intelligence Agency was formed in 1947, the military
Services managed to retain most of their previously established authority
and money under a key provision of the Act which made "departmental
intelligence" the responsibility of each Service intelligence agency.
In later years when numerous independent committees recommended
consolidation of the complex and often overlapping-elements of the Defense
intelligence structure to effect economies, reduce risks and achieve quality
control over the final product, the military Services fought successful
rearguard actions to maintain their independent capability. This was done
by maintaining individual Service intelligence organizations which were
only partially subordinated to such centralized authorities as the National
National Security Act of 1947, 5102 (d)(3), Title 50 U.S.C.A. s403 (d)(3)
(1970 ed. ).
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Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and also
by making tactical intelligence units directly responsible to combat corn-
manders in the same manner that rifle companies or artillery batteries
are responsible to a field commander. The military rationale for this is
understandable: All field commanders seem more comfortable if they
have direct control over vital support elements such as intelligence; the
trauma of surprise at Pearl Harbor created an aversion to some far-off
centralized authority responsible for crucial warning intelligence; and a
larger military intelligence effort could be maintained if it were scattered
throughout the Defense Department and thus obscured from Congressional
budget cutters and civilian resource managers.
Every previous report on the organization of the U.S. intelligence
community reviewed by this Commission has called attention'to the need
for centralized management in the massive DOD intelligence complex.
The proportions of the problem cannot be easily exaggerated. Although
the DCI is nominally in charge of the entire intelligence budget, more than
85 per cent of the resources are in the Department of Defense and every
responsible DOD official questioned by the Commission stated that the
Secretary of Defense has final authority over the use of those funds. Althougl
the National Security Agency was established in 195Z to be responsible for
all U.S. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Service Cryptographic Agencies
(SCA's) not only continue to exist, but actually perform most of the SIGINT
mission. Although the SCA's must accept technical guidance and "national"
tasking from NSA, and despite the fact that in 1971 the President ordered
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SCA's are responsible in a command sense to their Service chiefs and to
the tasking of the local unit commanders to whom they are assigned. Altho
the Defense Intelligence Agency was created in 1961 to centralize intelligenc
collection and production for DOD, a House investigative team found in 1968
that the size of the Service intelligence organizations had nearly doubled
in personnel since DLA was formed. Although the Schlesinger report of
1971 noted the tremendous disarray in Defense intelligence management,
and the President's subsequent directive ordered not only consolidation of
effort but reduction in the "tactical intelligence" budgets, the Commission
was unable to obtain any reliable figure
on the exact amount of current resources in the so-called "tactical" categor'
Technical Collection. The two primary means of technical collection
employed by ourselves and our opponents are satellite photography and
communications intercepts. Technical innovation and rapid advancement
in these two fields caused intelligence costs to double during the 1960's,
and today technical collection accounts for more than half of the entire
intelligence community budget. However, the processed intelligence is of
tremendous value, because it allows us to determine with great precision
the number and type of major missile systems developed by an opponent,
the movement of his conventional military forces and the degree to which
he is adhering to various arms limitation agreements.
Overhead Reconnaissance. The new opportunities for development
and exploitation of satellite photography created an intense rivalry between
CIA and DOD in the early 1960's. CIA turned out to have the best innovators
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 and Aspypsrtoe d F?r Release 2 atho/ug7 C A their per 002698 OOOo6000overruns were
highest), while Defense proved best able to manage ongoing satellite pro-
grams. Throughout, the USIB (on which both CIA and DOD are
represented) has been effective in establishing satellite requirement lists.
The rivalry was finally composed by making CIA and DOD jointly responsib:
for satellite research, operations and exploitation. There is, however,
a lingering concern that the DCI's final authority-to resolve disputes pro-
vides his agency with an unfair advantage, particularly in resource debates
where CIA is proposing a competing system. Although the compromise
organizational structure seems to be working effectively, the Commission
notes that the Schlesinger report did indicate in 1971 that substantial savings
might be realized if a single (unspecified) manager were placed in charge
of the entire overhead reconnaissance program. If that is the case--and
this Commission is not in a position to judge--then consideration should
probably be given to transferring complete authority for such programs to
DOD, which already has most of the money and operational responsibility.
The Commission does hold the strong view that a joint review of
satellite photography at the National Photographic Interpretation Center
(NPIC) by analysts from CIA and DOD acting independent of one another is
a useful redundancy. The source material is so valuable and so massive
that a built-in challenge mechanism facilitates total and effective exploitation.
National Security Agency. NSA was created by executive order in 1952
as a semiautonomous arm of the Department of Defense responsible for
coordinating the Service Cry-ptologic Agencies (SCA's). NSA has two mission;
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-- The collection of foreign communications for the purpose
of deriving intelligence. The resulting Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
is further subdivided into Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and
Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), the latter covering electronic emana-
tions, such as radar, which do not carry messages, but from which
useful data may be obtained.
-- The protection of U. S. communications from exploitation
by foreign governments. The Communications Security (COMSEC)
mission requires NSA to generate and provide security controls for
all U.S. codes, promulgate communications standards and procedures,
and engage in relevant research and development of prototyp3 hardware.
Both the need for COMSEC and the importance of SIGINT as a source
of valuable informatior are perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that the
USSR maintains the largest SIGINT establishment in the world. The resource
committed by the Soviets alone are nearly half again as large as the SIGINT
resources of the U.S. and its allies combined. The Soviet's SIGINT threat
is obvious when one considers the amount of daily business conducted by
Americans by electronic means, much of it over insecure telephones. More-
over, Soviet intercept operations are conducted against every facet of
American activity, not just military and diplomatic communications, but
economic, trade, industrial and research as well. _
The potential value of our own SIGINT operations and the threat posed
by our opponents, require that we maintain an extensive, secure, well-
managed effort which is responsive to the needs of all parts of our government
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?F zttonal Security Agency shoulc
control all U.S. Signals Intelligence and 11 S
a
IGINT assets now operated by
the Service Cr tolo{=ic A =encies
and GIA
h
,
s
ould be transferred to NSA.
The struggle between NSA and the JCS,
through the Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCA's), for control of our SIGIN'
assets has been unending. A peculiar division of authority makes this
situation almost inevitable. The cryptographic programs of the SCA's are
coordinated by NSA, but each SCA receives its own budget to support its
own program planned in response to two sets of guidance--one related to
support of military field forces and the other designed to satisfy "national"
requirements. The Director of NSA (DIRNSA) is responsible for providing
technical direction and support to the SCA's and for levying requ remeaits
and producing intelligence on-"national" objectives. However, each SCA
is commanded by its Service chief at the headquarters level,and in the field
is under operational control of the local military corrirriarrder.
This situation persists despite the facts that the head of NSA is a Flag
Officer who reports directly the the Secretary of Defense, and military men
dominate the other senior positions in NSA. The Director of NSA is a three-
star Flag Officer who very often moves on to higher command and, therefore
is not particularly disposed to alienating his military superiors in the comrnal
structure.
The SCA problem is complicated by other factors as well. Cryptography
began in the military as an adjunct of communications, and therefore, althougL
its -product is obviously intelligence, it has no connection with the regular
Service intelligence organizations (G-2, ONI, A-2). Moreover, not until
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1970 were the : A's split out of the communiC..Lions command structure,
and then only in headquarters and not in the field. Although NSA is supposed
to be responsible for both COMINT and ELINT, the Services do not believe
NSA is putting enough effort on the latter. As a result, the Services are
circumventing a National Security Council Intelligence Directive assigning
authority for ELINT to NSA by retitling the activity "Electronic Warfare. It
If this most recent Service dilution of NSA authority is permitted to continue,
ELINT research and development could easily be justified on a fragmented
"Electronic Warfare" basis.
In 1971, on the basis of recommendations contained in the Schlesinger
report, the President ordered the creation of the Central Security Service
(CSS). The idea was to consolidate requirement and analysis assets in NSA _
headquarters which would provide tasking for the newly consolidated collec-
tion assets under the CSS. However, instead of abolishing the. SCA's, a new
military-style command structure was developed within NSA. The civilian
collection stations controlled directly by NSA were excluded from the all
military CSS, apparently because mixing civilian and military assets per-
forming the same functions would have implicitly demonstrated that the
"unique" needs of each Service could be met centrally. Another indication
that the intended fusion of separate elements under DIRNSA did not occur is
demonstrated by the expansion of his title to Director, NSA, and Chief, CSS.
The Commission believes it is now time to effect a genuine consolidation
of SIGINT programs under NSA. All other SIGINT programs, including
those of CIA and the SCA's, should be abolished and their assets transferred
to NSA. However, since in time of war many of these assets would revert
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to the c ro unit cornrnanc ers, it is reaso 3 e a a mi ed number
of cryptologic units should be assigned to field commands by NSA in a train-
ing capacity to insure their continued ability to respond to tactical require-
ments. If deemed desirable, personnel could be rotated out of NSA into
these units on a regular basis to insure adequate trained reserves. Even
these training units should be available for national level tasking if they have
a capability to contribute to requirements. As a further safeguard, SIGINT
liaison officers might be retained at all appropriate levels of the military
command structure, and NSA units should participate in military readiness
exercises. We believe these safeguards meet the concerns expressed in
the 1958 Eaton Report, which recommended centralization of functions under
NSA, but only after the Vietnam war and only if JCS wartime needs could be
-Security Agency should be established by (a) making CIA and DOD jointly
responsible for managing all SIGINT activities, and (b) revising directives
to allow either a civilian or military official to hold any senior position in
that Agency.
The Commission has concluded that the military is dominating the use
of the SIGINT collection capability at the expense of other national needs.
NSA is the only national cryptologic organization in the West which reports
to the Defense chief. Most of the rest are affiliated with foreign affairs
organizations, and the Communists have developed redundancy by creating
two major organizations--one under military intelligence and. the other
more extensive one under civilian intelligence. We are aware in making
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recommer tion for a more independent I\_ that civilian departments
are able to levy requirements on NSA through the USIB mechanism. How-
ever, the sheer volume of "requirements" permits wide collector discretion
and SIGINT resources are slanted heavily toward military targets.
The Commission is inclined to recommend joint CIA-DOD management
of NSA in order to protect the military's strong and legitimate interests in
SIGINT, while creating a climate in which the new intelligence needs of
civilian consumers can be addressed more fully by NSA. Such a manage-
ment structure would parallel the joint control which works well in the
overhead satellite program. Only the Schlesinger report comment that a
single satellite manager would save substantial sums is troublesome, since
it might well apply equally-to SIGINT. -However, the military stake in
SIGINT is.so high that the Commission rejected an alternate proposal that
NSA be made an independent agency-reporting through the Director of Central
Intelligence, not the Secretary of Defense.
However, the Commission definitely believes that the Director of NSA
should no longer automatically be a military man. Practices similar to
those which have come to govern the selection of` the leadership of CIA,
namely that either the Director or the Deputy should be an active duty or
retired military officer, would seem most appropriate to NSA's current and
prospective role in the intelligence community. We further suggest that the
Director of this critically important, and major Agency, be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. All other senior
positions in NSA should also be awarded on the basis of knowledge and merit,
not simply on the basis of traditional rotation of jobs among the military Servic
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should be created with the necessary authority to consolidate the
military intelligence effort and establish centralized control over int`i
gence collection, analysis, production and resource management.
The large size of the military intelligence effort, as well as the
redundancy built into the system, seems to stem from the shock of Pearl
HarLor and the Cold War conviction earlier held by all top governmental
leaders (not just military men) that World War III might break out at any
moment. Under those psychological conditions, he military approach
to intelligence became encyclopedic. The military view that our best
defense is to try to know everything about everything is a genuine and deeply
felt conviction, and not merely'a drive for big intelligence budgets and
empire -building--although that has been an inescapable consequence.
This acquisitive attitude is compounded by a strong sense within each
Service that its own concerns are of overriding importance. Like most
dedicated professionals, each military commander is inclined to believe
his own Service is the most important; therefore, his Service is best
suited to counter threats against American security; therefore, his Service
should collect and analyze as much intelligence within its field of interest
as possible. Since his Service's collection requirements are complex
and technical, they can best be satisfied by members of his Service. Further.
more, each unit commander feels that he can best safeguard his men if he
has personal control over much of the intelligence necessary to prevent
surprise and conduct operations.
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 Ixpprovg8 rd?` gigs' ~ 2MOM2I2!7 Id M DR86RG026.$ Q()t4.6QPOgQg3A
rvival has
disappeared, it has certainly receded--in part because our intelligence is
better, both as a result of technological breakthroughs by CIA and NSA and
accumulated analytical experience in many parts of government. Thus,
the separate Service approach to intelligence, however justified it may
have been originally, is now in need of major revision.
Centralized Management Authority. Every previous report reviewed
by this Commission which considered the Defense intelligence-organization,
noted the need to consolidate the fragmented military intelligence effort under
a single manager. The Joint Study Group in 19"0 observed that, although
the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was bringing about a stronger unified
command under the JCS, this was not curing the management problems of
Defense intelligence. The Joint Study Group proposed revising NSCID's to
assign the Secretary of Defense specific responsibility, which might be
delegated, to control intelligence resources and reduce waste and duplication..
When the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established in 1961, it
was supposed to have responsibility for the management of all Defense
intelligence assets and production, but DIA's later preoccupation with sub-
stantive matters led to the atrophy of its assigned management responsibilities.
The House Appropriations Committee Investigative Team (HACIT) report in
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1965 colauncnL,:d on this DIA failing, and the II roehlke report in 1969'
suggested remedial action by splitting off the management function and
recreating a position similar to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations) which had existed from 1953 to 1961 when DIA was
created. Secretary Froehlke believed that managing Defense intelligence
resources and representing Defense on all intelligence community matters
could be done on a part-time basis by the Assistant Secretary of Defense/
Administration. The Fitzhugh report of 1970 and the Schlesinger report
of 1971 noted that the ASD/A was ineffective in his intelligence role, because
he had never been given authority over all Defense intelligence programs
and because he was preoccupied with administrative concerns. Both reports
recommended a full-time manager of intelligence resources, and the
Schlesinger- report provided various options, including a powerful Director
of Defense Intelligence (DDI) with command authority over all Defense
intelligence activities and resources (including tactical), and alternately
an Assistant Secretary of Defense/Intelligence (ASD/I) with staff advisory
powers, but no command authority.
The ASD/I position was created in 1971, and since that time, separate
Service programs for security background investigations and mapping have
been consolidated; some small, marginal programs have been abolished;
resource trade-offs between the Services have been negotiated, and resource
reviews made within DOD and with the DCI have been conducted on a regular
basis. However, as a staff advisor, the ASD/I does not have control over
the separate Service intelligence organizations.
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The power of the Services in resource matters can be demonstrated in
various ways. Although DIAA, was intended to effect economies and centralize
functions, the HACIT report indicated that the size of Service intelligence
agencies nearly doubled between 1961 and 1968. In the past five years, when
total manpower in the entire intelligence community was being reduced by
approximately 45 per cent, the cuts in order of magnitude were taken by
NSA, CIA, DIA and then the military intelligence Services. Today, manpower
in Service intelligence units totals slightly more than twice that in DIA.
The Schlesinger report noted that very substantial sums are spent- on
"tactical intelligence;" that these funds are controlled by field conuna.nders
rather than the Service intelligence chiefs; and that it is therefore difficult
to determine the overall total which DOD is spending on intelligence. In his
1971 letter, the President instructed the Director of C antral Intelligence to
look to tactical intelligence as an area where management and great savings
could be achieved. Yet, the DCI has so far been ineffective in implementing
this instruction.
The Commission found that different people used different figures for
tactical intelligence, depending on the point they are attempting to demonstrate.
Even more disturbing is the fact that all figures equal or exceed the total cost
of our largest technical collection program.
The Commission believes that "tactical intelligence" is an outdated
phrase, because intelligence necessary to protect against major future con-
flict is most likely to be strategic, rather than tactical, in nature. We further
believe that tactical intelligence is relevant to this Commission's inquiry for
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severar rea: s. This technique permits th, siphoning off of resources
which could be better applied to other DOD programs, possibly including
centralized intelligence activities. DOD already has control of 85 per cent
of the total U. S. centralized intelligence budget, if tactical intelligence costs
are added the military-civilian imbalance in intelligence collection is
further magnified. Two major Commission recommendations--increased
DCI authority over the intelligence community and centralization of DOD
intelligence activities--cannot be made relevant if tactical intelligence
activities are excluded.
Defense Intelligence Agency. It appears that DIA was created in responst
to the Joint Study Group report in 1960, which called for centralization of
Defense intelligence functions. DIA was originally expected to control all
Defense intelligence assets and products, but, according to the HACIT report
in 1968, was unable to implement its charter because the. Services failed
to provide DIA with a sufficient number of officers trained in management.
The HACIT report also noted that while DIA was originally intended to pro-
duce all finished intelligence for all Defense components, much of its basic
work was being subcontracted back to the Services; and DIA was tending to
become more a manager of production than a producer. The Director of
DIA was originally supposed to replace the three Service chiefs as a single
Defense representative on the USIB. However, representatives of the
Service chiefs soon rejoined USIB as observers "with voice but no vote,"
and later the ASD/I also became a USIB member under the same ground
rules.
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Today, the Director of DIA is the principal substantive intelligence
advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the senior intelligence staff officer
on the JCS. His organization is the primary producer of military intelligencE
at headquarters, but not in the unified and specified commands where the
individual Service organizations are represented rather than DIA. DIA can
review and coordinate Service intelligence activities, but has no command
control over their resources. DIA manages only those military intelligence
activities, such as the military attache program, which are not assigned to
field forces or national programs.
Director of Defense Intelligence. Consolidation of Defense intelligence
activities has been a dominant recurring theme in reports made by every
previous committee that has reviewed the Defense intelligence establishment.
This Commission endorses the proposal that a Director of Defense Intelligence
(DDI) be established. This idea was delineated by the Blue Ribbon Panel
under the chairmanship of Mr. Fitzhugh in 1970. As then described, the
DDI would be the Defense representative on USIB; direct and control all
Defense intelligence activities not organic to combat forces; review all intelli-
gence programs and recommend resource allocations; establish requirements
for collection and production; conduct periodic evaluations of Defense intelli-
gence processes and products; review and consolidate intelligence R&D; and
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dcvelop procedures to protect sources and niethc,us.
The DDI proposal was resubmitted for Presidential review as the first DOD
option of the Schlesinger report of 1971, but apparently not adopted despite
its obvious benefits, because the President decided to avoid making changes
in the intelligence community which would require Congressional action. The
Commission believes this may be a more appropriate time for fundamental
reform of the Defense intelligence establishment.
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THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE
AND COVERT ACTION
The clandestine service of the CIA has primary responsibility for the
conduct of those operations popularly associated with "spying"--the recruit-
ment and management of agents who (a) provide information on the actions
and intentions of others, and/or (b) themselves take actions to promote our
polio ies abroad. This is an exacting business requiring a high degree of
professionalism, because the rewards for success are often great and the
penalties for failure usually include embarrassrr.ent (or worse) for American
officials and incarceration (or worse) for the exposed agents.
RECOMMENDATION : CIS, should retain responsibility
for secret operations abroad. The clandestine collection and covert action
functions should remain under the unified control and direction of a single
clandestine service chief. -
The possibility of splitting off the clandestine service from the intelli-
gence analysis and estimating activity of CIA has been reviewed in many
previous studies. All have recommended that CIA remain intact, including
produced
the Bay of Pigs postmortem report which was/under the cloud of President
Kennedy's initial public statement that he would like to "scatter CIA to the
winds. "
This Commission again reviewed this fundamental question. A principal
argument for separation is that placing collectors in one organization and
analysts in another would assure objectivity in analysis. Yet, within CIA,
analysis has always been organizationally compartmented from collection
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 .n. no major consumer is known to have complained about any lack of
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objectivity in CIA rerrting. A second argument is . at estimators derive
most of their information from open sources and can enhance their interpreta-
tion of events by establishing close-working associations with other institu-
tions such as universities. Such vital associations, which were so
strong in the early days of CIA, have tended to atrophy. CIA is trying to
cope with this problem by encouraging its analysts to become active in pro-
fessional organizations and by declassifying material of interest to the
academic community.
An argument for retaining covert activities within CIA is that an
important part of the raw intelligence used is derive.1 from sensitive sources
whose security must be protected most carefully. Another argument is
that analysts gain valuable insights through their association with collectors
C~ C,
and the latter can improve their product if they better understand analysts'
needs. Also, the quality of CIA analytical research and estimative personnel
is high and the turnover has been low, notwithstanding the association of the
clandestine activities with the estimating and analysis functions.
A second organizational change sometimes suggested is the creation
of two clandestine services, one to collect intelligence and another to engage.
in ro=,-ert action operations. The argument made for separation of the two
activities is that a covert action organization which also collects intelligence
mil *_ tend to bias its intelligence reporting to support and justify its
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 operational programs. Although this is a danger, adequate safeguards can
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be established with a single organization. The a,,sments against separa-
tion are more fundamental. First, a clear line between the two activities
cannot be drawn, because a single individual can often collect valuable informa-
tion and also take positive actions of benefit to the U. S. It would be wasteful
in the extreme to have two clandestine elements of our government competing
for his services, or even worse, separately rewarding him for his efforts.
Second, many successful covert action operations create sources with the
capability and motivation to provide important information to our government.
Third, trying to compartment recruitment and. communication lines for the
two purposes in a single country would be, and indeed in past experience
has proved to be, not only impractical but dangerous.
In summary, the c:.rrent organizational arrangement seems to be most
appropriate, and thus the disruption of ongoing activities and the added expense
of dividing collectors from analysts or intelligence from covert action cannot
be justified.
Human Intelligence (Hurnint). Although satellite photography can provide
previously unavailable and often incontrovertible evidence about past develop-
ments and current events, it can tell us nothing about the political dyn3rnics
of other societies or the intentions of foreign leaders. Therefore, clandestine
agent operations (known in the intelligence trade as Humint) are still crucially
important.
1v ar,y people abroad are ready to assist U.S. intelligence. They view
cooperation with America as an important way to safeguard their own national
.interests, or as a vehicle for bringing improved conditions to their countries,
or as the only effective method of protest against the unjustices of a repressive
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Locating a person with access to the data we require who is also willing;
to cooperate is no easy task. This is particularly true in the closed
Communist societies where individual mobility is severely restricted,
secrecy is ingrained, and the leadership carefully compartments information
as a control technique.
Conversely, in an open society such as ours much important informa-
tion is readily available to potential adversaries. By simply subscribing
to a weekly aviation magazine, the Soviets can obtain the type of essential
technical data we must spend millions of dollars to collect secretly. Given
this obvious advantage, as well as their announced interest in reducing
tensions, one might well imagine that Soviet intelligence activities must
have been reduced. However, the trend is actually in the oppos'ite'direction.
According to our best estimates, the USSR annually commits more resources
(both people and money) than the U.S. to all phases of intelligence--satellites,
communications intercepts and Humint. (NB: FBI figures may be added at
this point when available.)
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 REC011MENDATlON The Collection of improved Ilumint
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on the intentions of i. reign governments must be ma_..; a matter of priority
national concern. The CIA should have exclusive responsibility for clandestine
Humint operations abroad during peacetime.
The Commission endorses previous President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board findings that the DCI should generate the type of national
effort which during the past decade caused seemingly impossible obstacles
in the field of technical collection to be overcome. While the problem-solving
techniques are totally different, the advantages of success are comparable
because even a single agent of the caliber of Colonel Penkovsky can greatly
reduce the uncertainties and dangers of great power politics.
The military has, over the years, been phasing out of Humint, and
this is a trend which should now be carried to its logical conclusion. Several
past studies have criticized the military for lack of competence in agent
operations; the risks involved do not justify further military efforts generally
aimed at low level targets; and the Schlesinger report noted that some.
economies can be effected by centralizing the function.
The only exception should be DCI discretionary authority temporarily
to sanction military clandestine collection units providing essential support
to operational commands for current operations and contingency planning.
All other such units abroad should be disbanded, but especially talented and
valuable military personnel might be assigned to CIA stations if deemed
advisable by the DCI. No change should be made in established arrange-
?rents which provide that CIA clandestine assets will be subordinated to
military commanders in time of war.
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RECC 1%1ENDDATI0N The 111,. iLary attaches stem should
be a railed as career sspeciality and be made more res onsive to CIA
Humint tasking.
The attaches, which are not part of the military covert collection
organization, can contribute significantly to.Humint reporting if their
work is properly coordinated with the enhanced CIA effort we envisage.
The importance of the attache corps should be given greater recognition
within the Defense establishment. The quality of attaches should be improv
by increasing their promotion possibilities. Fewer senior assignments
should be considered retirement posts, and more attaches should have
an opportunity to achieve Flag Officer rank. The attache corps should
be made more attractive to bright, young officers. The Commission is
concerned that the sharp reduction in the number of attaches abroad has
been mainly felt among junior officers. Yet, their age is an-important
advantage in contacting their counterparts in Communist Embassies and
the young foreign military officers sho are most often responsible for
sudden political upheavals.
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criticism is not strictly an intelligence activity at all. - Covert action is,
however, a traditional function of intelligence organizations, and it is a
weapon. maintained in the arsenal of all governments--whether autocratic
or democratic--which have important foreign obligations and interests.
The term covert action includes those propaganda, political and para-
military actions abroad carried out in support of U.S. policy, but in a
manner not attributable to the U.S. Government.
Authority for covert action is implied under the National Security Act
of 1947, which empowers the CIA "to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct." This intentionally vague,
but purposeful, language has been elaborated upon by several secret NSC
directives. It has been made specific through the use of ct_vert action by
every postwar President under constraints requiring CIA to obtain inter-
agency policy approval for each operational plan.
RECOMMENDATION The U. S. should maintain the capability
to carry out covert action. This capability should be used sparingl'y'
The Commission has heard testimony against covert action and has
discussed the pros and cons of covert action.at length. It is mindful of the
arguments against covert action: that such activity is offensive to the moral
standards of a great democracy; that covert action runs counter to the
respect for international law which the U. S. is attempting to inculcate in
others; that the means used are more important than the ends achieved;
that CIA activities have done much to undermine the reputation of the U. S.
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 and its diplomacy around the world; that our intervention abroad has helped
to alienate many Americans from their government; that the risk of "leaks"
has become greater as the strong public consensus behind policies to
"contain Communism" has waned; that CIA has contributed to the eventual
creation of undemocratic, dictatorial governments; that covert action,
possibly defensible in wartime situations, is inappropriate in peacetime;
that the Cold War has been prolonged by covert action.
Critics also question the effectiveness of covert action, and it is true
that badly mismanaged operations, such