ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050059-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: June 9, 1945
• Content Type: MEMO

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9 June 1948
UKKORANDUM
SUBJECTs A)MIU/STRinA Ant-MANAGEMENT, CIA
General
1. Administration and Management (A 4:10 is charged with matters per.
taining to budgetary cotton, accounting and fiscal support, logistics and
ces and unagenent. It is a moderately large unit of some
25X1 Since the 0-operation of Reference Center and its reconstitution
48Collection and Disseminations A AM has four branohes, t.
Budget and inance Branch, Services Branch, Personnel Branch and Management
Branch.
25X1 2. enlisted in the regular
Arey at Nale 4g0 ox ?0 and by 1943 had risen to the temporary rank of Colonel.
Ha retired from active service in 1947 as a mister sergeant at the age of
42. His background appears to be mostly administrative, and he is probably
a capable administrative officer. From several talks eithl I I
would judge him to be shrewd and somewhat calculating, with a desire for
power =debility to have his. finger in every pie (this may be slightly.
colored by outside opinion, but 25X1 ltold me that he considers him-
self as a oombination of G.1, 0-3 and 0-4), I believe him to be determined
end ambitiousai
25X1 3.
him twice. he tan made no vel have talked with
ff-Flear impression. I.belleve he admires
25X1 I I and is imbued with the A et IA spirit.
Budget and Finance *such
1. Chief of the Budget and Finance Branch is Edward L. Saunders, BSC
and MSC, Southeastern University, Washington, D. C. Saunders has a long
background of Government experience, mostly in *Mire of budget and flumes.
He appear* to be a rather mild man, perhaps slightly leaking in forces but
he is enthusiaatic about his job and, I believe, know e his business. He
claims that his relations with the Bureau of the Budget and the GAO are ex-
cellent, thAt he has never had a budget pared down, and is confident of
his ability to obtain supplementary funds when mossitery. His Branch is
divided into three divisions., totalling approximately.
2. Budfak4ivision
This Division is responsible for preparation of the annual budget
and for handling of all CIA budgetary affairs with the Bare= of the .
Budget. They also coordinate with Management Branch in the establishment
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of ling,. no:tinders discussed briefly the various steps in preparation
of the budget. There are various hidden items ahlen CU guards jealously.
Saunders also told ma that he mould be delighted to show us a oo4 of the
oomplete budget, but he felt that this ought to be done cn a high level.
If the Committee is to ese the budget as a whole and go Into the various
items in it; composition, r feel thkIt one of the group should take this up
with the Director.
25X1
3. Fieesi Division
Special clervicee Division
This Division deals exclusively eith budgetary and .ceounttn problems
of 000. This needs more spplificstion but, needles to ioy, did not
want to diseass sueh funds in detail. .
Services Branch
1. This Branch, Oomprising five main divisions, is responsible for house?
keeping functions and logistic support for C/A. It consists of wroximately
pexsnnel. Chief of the Branch La)who appears to be 25X1
forceful and, as far as I could judge, efficient. tie nAls a background of
Government work since 1934 and ass in OSS from 1942 up until his assignment
to CIA.
2. Transportation Division
Is responsible for operating a motor pool for transportation purposes
a pool of 24 trucks for delivery of supplies and equipment in
n and also the occasional delivery of equipmlnt I 25X1
eaberkation points for shipment to formign installations.
3.Reproduotion Division
This Division handles all reproductions cOnsisting of photostat.,
micro-films, photographs, mimeographs, IT/B material, etc. Printing is
done bya0P0 unit which handles lostly CIA end State Department .products.
All personnel are fully cleared. I in Karel this Division25xi
processed approximatoly 4.600,000 reproductions of all kinds.
4. Supply Division
This Division handles all bids, contracts, reonisitiono, purchases
and supplies. They are also responsible for peeking and shipment.
5. Property Control Division
In responsible for property accounting procodure and the maintenance
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44 Serviees Division
Is responsible for couriers, interior telephone maintenance, space
?patrol, building maintenance and edminietrative activities in rslatin to
moving rum installaticne abroad and in this country.
7. The Services Branch is vitally interested in the pose bilit
25X1 more (mistral/nation. I _ !told as that at this time CIA had 90M0 400,000
nape fest of space in 19 buildings, Some smiths ago, studies were zeds
of various locations and building ,litinates with the idea in mind of putting
all of CIA under one roof. They were unable to find a spot centrally located
which they considored adequete, and they discovered that ebuilding of the
time necessary would oast approximately I, The plan was temporarily
shelved as it was felt that the time was not propitious to embark on such a
project.
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Personnel Branch
1. This Branch is primarily interested in recruiting, maintaining per-
sonnel position control system to reflect budgetary, olossifieetion, and
organisational status of all positions. It also provides medical and *spiv*,
relation servloes and has approximately/ wimas j, Lourt25X1
Chief of the Branch, is a young man of 30 who book an AB degree at Boston
College in Political Science and Business Administration. From 1940 until
his assignment to CIA in 1946, he had diversified exvrience in various
Government departments. Me was also Chief of Personnel:th the STO and MEMO
daring 1945 and 1946. I have had several talks with telly and find him a
hard-working, enthueiastic individual, who is aware of the many difficulties with
shish his Branch is confronted, and all in all, node a favorable -impression on
as. Incidentally, although recruiting and personnel problems are a very sere
point throughout CIA, I have never heard any criticism of telly personally.
2. Problems of recruiting and turnover of personnel will be discussed
later on.
NessAseent Bren9h
1, This Branch conducts over-ell management surveys, supervises organi-
25X1
sational matter''', establishes personnel ceilines and provides operational
2. anagement Surveys
thee* surveys are not produced at regular intervals but onlyin
specific: instances an required by the directorate or the Ixecutive for
25X1 A is 16 'gat= that his Mrench keeps closely ih touch with day to day
operations end suggests from time to time improvements In methods and pro-
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sedates. So that a cceplete survey Is seldom necessary. Ea feels thet the
functions of his arena should be sore preventive than gratin t enters.
3 Opefitt4Jnal Anaiyiis
A sextons has been devised for the varieus offices to report their
activities on a monthly basis. These reports are summarised see oresented
graphically where poesible by the Branch with the intention of showing
treads in intellieence production, requeote for collection and dissemination,
eta. Only four copies of this report are produoed, and it is very jealously
geardlede
4 One always feels that a management branch, to justify it existence,
must have a tendency to continually over?manage. Howevor lathougb 25X1
young and fired with great seal, attempts to approach els proem* with
moderstion.
Cnityisa of Adetnistration and Manafiement
' 1. Criticism of A & M necessarily comes from inside CIA and, Isom
specifically, from 00 and ORE. There is a considerable amount of criticism
on such minor matters an spa?e, delay in obtaining euppliee, etc. There are
however, five major subjects which are worthy of discussion.
2. The. principle criticism leveled aoainet A & M is to the effect that
there has been created by teeinIstratien a virtually impenetreble layer
between the Director and the Assistant Directors for the operatIng ?faces,
25X1 and that' 'personally wields far too much authority and hos hoopoe
the closest and most important advisor to the Director. This criticism would
appear valid. The whole quostion of staff levels seems to be wrong. Whereas
in theory the Executives and Assistant Directors are en the same level, in
practice this is not so. Whether by chyme, progressive encroachment, or
deliberate uourpation of prerogatives and power, the Executive for A &. M nes
become the most influential staff member, and the Assietent Directors find
them/lives on a someehat lower level. The fact that CIA is soodecentralized
increases teie difficulty as the Assistant Directors are located at a con?
siderable distance from the Director. To ey mind, the Assistant Directors
of the operating Offices should forma close advisory group to the Director.
At the present time, this doee nr:t appear to be so. There have been so
many directives for erocedure timed, and se many channels for reporting
have been bet up, that it is very difficult to forword important papers to
the Director and receive favoroble consideration. There appearo to be
very little discussion on major problem' between the Director and Assistant
Director*, 4nr.! / am told, that, at prevent, the weekly staft meeting consumes
less than half an hour, tole that no current problems are diacuased in detail
at those meetings. The success of CIA will depend upon the efficiency of the.
epereting Offices and not upon performance of A & *.
3. There is criticism 01 the predominance of Service and State poesonnel
in high braekete, end the fact that replacements are frequently made from
outside and not by promotion. Tia criticism would also appear valid. At
present, key slots are reserved for approxivatelyr?lrepreeentatives of each 25X1
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25X1 a the Areed Services andl for State Department. The Service oersonnel
25X1 il_enseestionably consider their assignment to CIA as a two-year toor of duty.
'claims that this eonstant change brings in new personnel .
with.fresh ideas who are in touch with the latest Service thidtnc;. On the
ether hand, I believe that it at destroy continuity. It also means that
eocasionally replacement in these reserved slots are made by selection of
a Service or State representative with too little consideration of the fact
that there miy be better quelifted civilian personnel Available. When re-
placement is made fra outeide in this manner and not through pronotion, it
oa
tends to discouroge CIA personnel. For instance, lbe we
Oen. Sibertes Deputy in 00, has been promoted to he Assistant Director in
Genera Sibertle plows. However, his Deputy, instead of ileing brought ee
through the tanks, is going to os procured from one of the Services.
claims tht gradually the number of these Service slots will be whittled
25X1 down from the present I Unquestionably, there should be
some service and State personnel in CIA, but Volta is a very grave question
in my mind as to whether the present number is not fir too large.
Ii. The vise of A & N has often b.n criticised and it has been stated
25X1 I I I as not quite
to s or c as , as it in besee on perovinel figures
25X1 of approxisietelJor A & K and approximately Ifor CIA. Reference
enter has been rewved from A & it (although it sill unquevtioni:bly remain
A & I personnel to approximatelPhitrely The CIA figure of of influence), which will reduce the
does n-
H*1 very much sithin thel
elude wo personnel. If the ono personnel figure were 1.E;a ot in
1 In the CIA
total and Reference Center were deducted from A 4.116 tho result.hnt ratio
meald be very much mole favorable to A- & K. On this comparative basis, the
sise of A & K does not appear unreasonably large, and it Ls probable that
A & X is acomplishing its normal mission of service, supply, pereonneI
prom/anent, etc. In an adequote manners
5. /Personnel recruiting within CIA also seeme to be the subject ol such
unfavorable comment, end the proportion of turnover has been mentioned
severe]. tines. Actually, for the eeriod I February 1947 through 30 April
25X1 1946, there were a total of separations. This figure does it include
OSO. During the sane period, accretion amounted tol I both through
recruiting and absorption of entire unite ouch as the Nep Division of ORE.
Recruiting, however, does present many difficulties. At the present time,
there is a noticeable shortage of clerical personnel and severe cempetition
between the various Lanington Departments and agencies. New and temporary
agencies such as ECA are asking drives for clerical pereonnel and, in some
Giles, aro obis to offer them better positions than the existing departments.
Chlef of the Personal Branch, has been in aloes contact with schools
in Rashington ond feels that upon graduation in June he will hare between
100 and 150 candidate, lined up. I feel that he is Ling everything within
his power to solve this problem. Recruiting for ORR, 00 and SO also presents
problems as requirements in many cases are specialised. For leetence, 00 in
25X1 theirl 'Branches require a large number of people
with towe or more language backgrounds, stle, intelligence experience and, in
many eases, considerable area knowledge. As many of these people are foreign
bore the security question is rather acute. This, to a certain extent, is
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also true of ORE. Kelly feels that he is tapping elery available source.
Vs is combing the lists of reserve OK, Air Intelligence and Arity ThtelLgence
edifices. le is in close contact with many colleges and Universities and
other institutions In the country. His Branch has manned, for instance,
the list of ECA applicants. He now has recruiting teams that travel about
the country calling on colleges, large banks and corporations. The recruiting
problem in a new and growing organisation is always difficult, but I feel
that thu program, given time, mei show results..
6. As is usually the case, there has been criticism of the difficulty
in obtaining promotions. Kelly states that Personnel Branch only checks
promotions on the basis of available slots and time in grade, and he says
that about 90 per cent go through on recommendation of the Branch Chief.
This may be true, but on the other hand, / as told by
25X1 Ithat. CIA has changed, more than once, the time in grade re
quirementa. In one specific camO, he stated that they had taken ewe P44
with the understanding that within six maths he would be promoted to P-5.
After the man had been hired, time in grads requiremehts had been changed
to a year and later 18 months, so that as fir as I know, man is
Still a P-14. By and large, however, promotion problems are probably not
more acute than in other departments and agencies.
Batters that Preibly Respire Further EtuSy
1. Whether the Executive for A Ag X occupies too powerful a position in
relation to the Assistant Directors.
2. Whether A & V has become a barrier between the tirector and the
Assistant Directors, thereby Wu:Faring the Assistant Directors in the per-
formance of their normal function as close advisors to the Director.
*bother this is due to red tape, channelizing? physical decentralisation
of buildings personalities or other reasons.
3. That the question of Service and State slots is one that merits
attention due to the attendant 1ck of continuity in higher brackets brought
about by the return of such personnel to their parent Service after a two-
year tour of duty.
4. Whether it might be wise to further review the recruiting program
in light of clerical personnel problems anci the difficulty through special
qualifications of recruiting for CFI, 00 and OSO. It is admittedly a
difficult thing to make a survey of a personnol program, and the Chief of
the Personnel 3ranch does appar to be energetic and to be attempting to
tap every source.
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leateeeleged:
jaw 1:-,-;4L1
irate,:r.laoar trilp La 1 OOh1 ting qnd Fla nnin :Ann'
1. ICAP is survivor of -the .i:oroer conception of tho Central
Into 111 .ore Oroup ao fi cooporative intordepartmental enterprise. Its
rombers are all appointed ao repreeentativos of their respective
agencies" -with tte, Pam tioo of advising the Director of Contra :testelli
.genoe on the coordination of interdepartoental activities of Ow IAC
agencies. The Membership incln000 .tee followings two from State Kepart-
oent, incluelne the Chaireau of ICeee, ooe Navy oaptain, one Any
colowl (poet now vacant), two Air Force colonels,
2. ICP ii Ps the reoponsibility of acting as a e'eoretartat far
the IAC generally, advising the Director of Contiral intelligence
on the coordination of intordeparteentol aotivitles. tiatter s now
pending before it include tho folloeings the preparation of a standard
oporating procedure for the clearance of papers; a State Departoont
plan for the .creation of scientific attaches, which has been -under
consideration for orthzj a prop000d intalligenoe directive eegarde
inetiebollection of intellieenco; tee le.oeram for the produotion of
mtionel intall:k!enceW.'N't3y6 ('Lndbooks of basic intellicenco); a pion
for the prooaration of intellio.emo production schedules. In addition,
EMI") of the tonzelors of ICP have opeoial rosponeibilitios. .The
Chairman, Ur. Chiles), reprosents CIA at the mistime of tho C staff
for preparation of teX; papers, 'out is oomotimee accompaniod by reprooenta-
tives of ORE,. The oth,x :.itrto Department member of IMPS represents: CIA
on a ektifICC euboomitteo concerned with plans for psycholiegioal warfare
organization. OMof tho force members of ICAPS, while performing no
active :taw cervice, epos moot of hie tioe as a on% liaison GI:floor
with the Joint, Intolligence Cheneet of lee) Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3, There is Leerrol.1ocoesnt approaching unfittimitr that thore
an important job of intorooparteental coordination to be doze 7;vhich IMPS
Is not doing and which ita roiabIrs are not qualified to do. Criticism
of ICAPS, both .wited.n CIA and outside, is oonsidorable. Inside CIA
there is uzuch resentment becauno of the foot that MAPS or its members
represent CIA in maw interdopartoontal essittors that oould more- effectively
be handled by the operoting sections of CIA. Theo it is regarded, in
part, as an instrument whioh serves to keep the oporating sections away
from contact with outside agenciee,and from !vnowleAgo of CIA gang 40#
policies. Thisreueoont is partectuerey strong DOOOUSO OK Tne zooming
Witt seores to be justified that the morsbors of 'CAPS aro, on the whole,
incompetent. Affecting this situation* however, is the fact the t the
whole interdepartmental nethince7 for coordination of intelligence is
not working properly, and the ineffoctivonese of 'CARS is largely a
reflection of tho ineffectiveness of Ihe-intelligenceo4dvisozy Comeittee
as pointed out above. .44,4: rots
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Doter-Qepartment oordinattrg 10 June 1948
and Planning Star
441 It is probable that a move to do away with IMPS would
.ncawitsr initial objections from the member agencies of 'AC, who
probibly reglad ICUS as an existing, however, poor, link with CIA.
The conception of having an interdeparbeental staff to advise the
Direct*, of CIA can, hammer, be ereotive only if the 'AC becomes a
smme effective body than it nos is and if MAPS is started with more
oompetent personnel, Dowever? liven if these conditions were met, it
is open to serious doubt whether a staff such as ICAP8 can more Wee?
tivelypromote interdepertmental coordination than the cometent
personal in the operating sections of CIA. This view mu clearly
Stated in a reosntmenerendum to the Director of CIA tram lir, 3abbitt,
AsSiatantDirentar for the Office of Research and Isiimates, in which
he 'reposed that a staff council, eorprising the assistant directors
of the several offices of CIA, replace 'CAPS as a staff advisory bo4y to
the Director,
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
lonl$1115
IWUM :' INThILIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
1. The IAC created by NSC Intelligence Directive NO. 1 is a
successor to the former Intelligence Advisory Board which existed dur-
ing the life of the Central Intelligence Groep under the National
Intelligence Authority. Some of the present difficulties concerning
the IAC can best be understood by reference to its development out of
the former 14B.
2. The IAD was created by the Presidential letter of 22 January
1946 which set up the Central Intelligence Group. This letter was
implemented by NIA Directive No. 1 of 8 February 1946 which provided
that CIG "shall be considered, organized and operated as a cooperative
interdepartmental aotivityn. The NIA directive also established the
composition of the IAD and provided that "all reoommendations, prior
to submission to this Authority (i.e. NIA) will be referred to the
Board for concurrence or comment". The general effect of this situa-
tion was to give the IAB a position coordinate with that of the Director
of the 010, stemming from the same authority that controlled CIO.
3. The National Security Act which created CIA made no reference
to an Intelligence Advisory Committee, although it included, among
its general provisions, an authorization to the Director of Central
Intelligence (as well as to other officials created by the Act) to
appoint such advisory oommitteee as he deems necessary. When, last
fall, discussions be :n as to the setting up of an advisory committee
to work with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency created
by the Act, two divergent points of view were brought out in sharp
opposition to each other. On the one hand, the Director of Central
Intelligence held that a new Ike should simply be created by him by
virtue of the general authority granted him under the Act, and that
this Committee would be turned to by him for advice* The departmental
agencies, on the other hand, held that a now Ike should act in a IMMO
as a board of the directors to the Director of CI. They refused to
accept membership on an advisory committee simply set up by him and
agreed to serve only on a Committee created by the National Security
Council. The Department of the Army was particularly adamant during
this controversy*
? 4. Finelly4 after several months of discussion, the present IA0
was created by DSC Intelligence Directive No. 1, of 12. December 1947.
In the words of the Directive, in order "to maintain the relationship
essential te coordination between the CIA and the intelligence organize
tions, an Intelligence Advisory Committee ... shall be established to
advise the Director of Central Intelligence". Under the Directive,
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the Director of Central Intelligence is required to obtain the views of
the ii0 before making any recommendations to the National Security
Councilpertaining to the intelligence activities of the various depart-
ments and agencies. In the event of non-concurrence by one of the
Malmberg of IAC, the problem is to be referred to the National Security
Council for decision. The Members of the TAO, sitting under the
Chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence, consist of the
respective intelligence Chiefs from the Departments of State, Army,
Navy and Air Force, the Joint Staff, and Atomic Energy Ccomiesion.
5. It is not clear, even to the people in CIA, whether the IAC
has held one or two meetings since its creation; in airy case, no more.
The one meeting which is clearly established was called on the initia-
tive of the Executive Secretary, NBC, to discuss a specific question
pursuant to the wishes of the NSC. (This question was that of hoe to
protect the intelligence agencies flema being required to disclose confi-
dential information to Congressional Oommittees). The IAC has never met
to consider:actual foreign intelligence situations and intelligence
estimates, elthough Admiral Hillenkoetter seems to be somewhat confused
on this point and has made statements to the contrary. However, the LW
has cleared and submitted to the NSC eight National Security Council
Directivess:Which have been approved by the -Council.
6 In practice, IAC 'action has been carried out through the
touting of mere for concurrence and by the delegation of responsibility
for the Preparation of intelligence directives .and other interdepart-
mental intelligence papers to a Standing Committee comprising
representatives of each of the ILC agencies, usually from the planning
*teat This Stanang Committee has just recently considered the
advisability of further delegating its responsibilities to a subcommittee
under it.
740 The fact is that the IAC machinery has not been effective in
promoting interdepartmental coordination, and there see= now to be a
feeling, at least in CIA, that it is preferable to avoid meetings which
usually give rise to formal statemente of position by the various
representatives and, instead, to use informal channels for obtaining
approval of necessary papers.
8. One fact contributing to the failure of the I&C has been the
co-existence of similar bodies, comprising somewhat the same membership,
With important responsibilities in the intelligence field. The member-
ship of the U. S. Cuummmications Intelligence Board is almost the same
as that of the DC, and the four Members of the Joint Intelligence
Committee are, at the same time, four of the seven Members of the I&C.
I
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9. The baaio weakness reaches back to the unwillingness of
the XAO Mother's to OA% their ha; 000peration if they are to be
punaly adviSory and the absence of strong CIA leadership *doh would
be necessary to everoome this unwillingness and make IAG effective"
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15 June 1948 5vIdEr
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Executive for Inspection and Security
General
1. The Executive for Inspection and Security (I 8: 0 in charged with
formulating and supervising the implementation Of security'pelicies per..
taming to the safeguarding of classified information, the security'of
operations, personnel, eqeipment and installations of CIA; special in-
spections and investigations es directed by the Director; security clear-
ance of all personnel; examinations and audit of all CIA fiscal transaction-84
25X1 I ti"Spwith at presentl Ion duty, has two main branches, namely, the
Security Branch and Inspection and Audit Branch.
2. Col. Sheffield Edwards, Executive for I & S, is a regular Army
officer with a. diversified background. I have known Col.)&leards for the
last five years and / consider him an intelligent, enthusiastic and capable
officer.
25X1 3. is Deputy to Colonel Edwards. Mr.1 !has
spent the years between 1929 and 19143 in the banking business and from 1943
to 1946 was in the Marine Corps and WS. I have had 'several talks with
25X1 Kr. and he also impressed me favorably.
Seeurity Branch,
1. The Security Branch, in general, is responsible for the develoPme*
and enforcing of security regulations governing personnel, property and
intelligence materials. It is also responsible for the conduct of special
investigations, liaison with the FBI, and investigation and security clear-
ance of personnel. The Branch has on duty easel land is divided
into Physical Security Division, Investigation lemadslon and Security- Control
Staff.
25X1 2. Mr. Chief of downy Branch, was with the
Department of Agriculture from 1930 to 1936 and with the Department of
State ste a special agent and security officer from 1936 to his assignment
to CIA in 1947. I have had several talks with and believe
him to be capable.
3. Physical Security Division
This Division is responsible for direoti.ng the program:designed.
for thevprotection. and security of all classified dOcanantsvinetallatione,
equipment and personnel. More speeificaIly, it is responsible for. pane
oontroll Plikguards, day and night inspections, security procedures, finger
prints, photographs, etc.
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4. Investigation Division
imeludes a Personnel Security Section, Appraisal Section and
lanieon Section charged withe
Security clearance of personnel
Conducting exit interviews
Liaison with other Government agencies on security qusttone
Appraisal of recruited personnel, based on security chcke
and other information
Security Control Staff
Ai to 011.intente and purposes & policy &
duties:imetades
(a) Develops, in cooperation with other Government ,cies,
uniform security control policies and practices
(b) Prepares .over?all security control policies for the
collection and dissemination of intelligence materials
(e) Develops coordinoted security programs for regulation of
internal security praatices
(d) Plans specific security projects as may be directed by the
Director
ing group. Its
Inspection sn4 Audit Pranoh
1. This Branch conducts audits of the manner in which special funds
are used and makee reports of financial transactions involving special and
regular :Undo. It also conducts Inspections to ascertain the adequacy and
effectiveness of service and support. The Branch has only Flpersons and
La broken down into Audit Division and Inspection Division.
25X1 2. Deputy to Colonel Edwards, is also Chief of the
Inspection and AuditBranch.
3. Audit Division
This Division Is responsible for the conduct of audits and special
examinations of eouchered and unvoechered funds. They do general periodic
audits. They also prepare reports for the Director and make recomendations
on policy regulations and procedures for greater efficiency in accounting and
budgetary activities.
h. Iv/action Division
This Division is responsible for the conduct of inspections in the
Bated ;7,tates and foreign countries of all installetiens, Includino 00 and
OCO. They-melts annual general inepections and such special inspections as
*gybe directed by the Director. During the reorganisation of OCD, the
Inspection Division was assigned the function of determining timeliness and
quality of CIA output. Col. Edwards states that due to his request, this
/Unction has now been reassigned to SCAM.
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Moe Branch
t 1910, there will be organised and ope
to beadle complete CIA security clear.
OLkik C I
rT
to set up a small administrative staff in T. & S and the
"investieators, clerical and aftinistrative personnel,
This is in addition to the present I t 3
oned in the first paragraph. It is hoped that
to adl? IRlearances a month, and that by October of
fee for a sing d. 'stance *ill be reduced to between fly'
25X1 1411
25X1 ,persennel
25X1 they mill be
this year, the
mad OA weeks. col, Edwards estimates that on a yearly basis, clearances
25X1 itUasouet to around There is in the file for I s more detailed
wesereadem on this matter.
artt4A,"
The functions of I & .5 are primarily routine and, therefore, one hears
Li els 0021.011to There is, however, one universal ?Iritieimm in regard to the
darer in security clearances. Until I January 1945, this. clearances were
handled by the rin and were taking, during the later *oaths, opproximately
14 weeks. In October, 1,947, the FBI stated that they could, no longer handle
CIA clearances and an eventual deadline was set for 1 January 1948. The
reason for this tersination was the dale of FBI that their workload had
been :materially Increased by Government loyalty checks, ECA clearanceso etc.
Ss attempt ea* made by CIA until after the first of this year to set up
their own clearance OrpIliZatiOns and this unfortunate delay has resulted
in the pa...et/cal stalling of the processing of recruits. I as told that,
the Oirecteer mas in hopes that Sr. Hoover would reconsider the rn position
in relation to clearances and was therefore reluctant, at an early date, to
initiate steps to set ap his own clearance branoh. During the interim
period, there has been an attempt lay 030 to aid in clearances but this has
been most ensatisfectory.
41.1rit4411. TIPPkt 10414re Turther 5%u&
14 Seeurity clearances as mentioned in the previous parse
in some doubt as to whether it will be possible to persedde rn
take on CIA Clearances end at this late date with a CIA Clearance Brunch well
an its ley to being established, it might be impractical. However, I do feel
that a CIA Clearance should be on a mach higher priority lora than Government
Welty cheeks, Undoubtedly, FBI ie better eenipeed to handle such clear..
amass, and the creation of the CIA branch is a costly duplication. (/ em
advised by Col. Edwards that the cost of a fell clearance under IA will be
approximately $200 as compered with !100 paid to the FBI). In consideration
of this duplication and expense involved, the clearance eitestion, even at
thie late date, might warrant SOMR th011641t.
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SF(REI
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Consideration might be given to the creation of some designation
cove? tame for ell of CIA. At the present time, all CIA buildings are
'swim as such. ?here are signs in some corridors with arrows marked "CIA*
and pointing to CIA offices. All personnel are allowed to say that they
'edrk for CIA.
Ptthan established organisatin as Largo as tall.
it eight be difficult to provide any cover designation-, ami the comtantion,
ef / &B is that with such an agencmeretted by *testate, it is preferable
to Operate under its reel designation. HOwevel4 the question of security
ter 0150 and its persomoel arieeslfrom the point of view of recruiting and
inspection and general 'mutant with other units and personnel ia CIA. Do
prevents for covert operations visit CIA offices? Are they recruited by
Parionnel Branch? Can the,- be in any way connected with CIA? During the
survey of CO the security question might be investigated.
SECRET
.4.
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21 June 1948
=MN FOR PILE
SUBJECT' The Office of Collection and
1 The Office of Collection aud Dimming (00) perform for
internal service or handting requirements, oollsetien and die.
maintaining referenoe lihrarn orating and maintaining
icee and registers. It is also called on to perfect' common
Under the broad coordinating function gensumAy assigned to
25X1 CIA under RSCID No. 1 and I J 00u accept' requirements bras
outeide agencies and supervise* the collection and dismardnation of the
required information. Under =ID No. go CIA is given the apriew
responeibilitir for the maintenance of biograpkisal data on foreign
soi4ntific and technological pereonalities.e This, needier* to seva
is a cowmen iservices OC O also perforate co mon services through its
).ibram foreign industrial register* reading *enter* eta. Although
001) is charged with oertain duties in relation to coordinating collection
of intelligence, no outside amney is prohibit.44 item &treat liaison with
One or sore agenoios outside of CIA in regard to collection and diesesdne..
24 OGD perforins Ainotton vital to gyrations of.CIA* both internally
and externally, but its hiptery has beim varied Onfluneatist
Inception* it has bean eonstantly criticised by Other Offices
and by agencies outside of CIA. Due to this risingtido of oritielsna
Management Brant% made a survey of the Office some mouths, ago with the
25X1 result-that* won retirmentinfOrwa 0011,m0Lm4410410ft
Reference Center weer wie ameoutive for AdrdnLsttstion end Nanagermant*
We lasted several vast*e and then the combined Beferonce center ???? 00D
was reconstituted on the Office level as the Office of Collection and
SlesenInstion.
y* The *Aetna ?Co*with some I lincluded three
Branches, I. e.* Requirements Braneh, uolleotion
Breach*
h and Dissesination
l'unctione includedi
(a) Yoraulation of policies and procedures reining to
and diseestmaimef intelligence and inOlseenting prodeduree este
UAW in accordance with Nli
CO Continual surveys and contacts among federal agencies to
ascertain obat intelligence they need but cannot *apply from their
own sources.
Sfetlij
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(e) Detereinilien of the collectieti and dissemination require.-
weft ter intialligense to meet needs not cuirreetly satisfied,
(4) Determination at eterther collection and dissemination amp
seeplished by- CIA action has Ulm adequate and timely.
(e) Reeeptions eeerCnation and proce,ing of all rot& moats
for intelliiennes
(r) U111150411 at necessary collectien directives.
(g) kneArsing collection capa-11;itiiis or governmental and CIA
roperting services.
Reeeption and
remixed IA, or prepared
(i) Preparation of
(34 iiiilit4URASO of a readi -*eater.
test
fUnction
the functios or till,
11 me% develop new sources
relati-n to oonstantly arising guestiam, but
collection and disoeminatioa.
determine priorities,. Cki requirements necessitating
te sad pages' on the priority established OY the
rculd spiser to be the best solution as 41 is not
oritise been ORE* State end the SIOnricedie
O n unit rankly receives simaltseeously tam or
with the same priorp44
plans OC; (combined 0C-1.410ihrence Zeater will
25X1 and consist of the folicelag seven divisions*
Ca G.ntt1 In
25X1
rereign isiustrial Register
(4) itogrepbisal Register
Orophic liotsrials rivislon
library ilivIsten
Lial/WXL ANJOU:Oil (Old a.A.1)
James )1. Andreas. .oraor C4-4cf of eZmsoe Cantor, is AsLsteiit
ice of Collocation and utesemination. kadren is a pratesz.ional
t and was Dr. !botanic assistant at liervard. bofure joining GIA
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25X1 5.
is a. graduate of -ILIA
record* He eas Che
therefore, 0011 acqualathd
E6TR000500050059-7
..ft It and oonrusinj ttmo in eonhining twelve
to Sgr that :le main idea is to cut red tape. Me drives
unvestiorAblx able, open to reason n..1 ougvstiono and I
ipod job with 00.
25X1
ie Deputy As stint
Int and a regullr Air rare
the Collection Branch of
1 past troubles and future hope*
ehoulli work wall with Andrews,
This is a reference index of all ltbxiry singzipiic se
head by- CLA0 It is the intention to also -build up an index of su
held outside ' CIA in Washinrton and other parts of the canary.
si
to
25X1
Regi ote r
as much Info tion as
minerals, pe roleums
b e on foreign
c ma
41.11 be th
photographs, etc. 11
held by CIA can be 01
Din
custodisn.
will
tanede
IfibraryLlviolon
e jivision will vrform ft oeneral lthrer function? It will
posoession of more vusa 4000 reference works and willoleo
on hand ram of all CLA product an also material derived frac otner
ic tecrials smah as maps,
incx wilpre such materials not
141006.*4 Divivion
1. The Requirorents Orarch ( the
ted, ankl its renaln.w. functions are ve.
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who is the Chief of
roctvI by OCD are processed by
lo eateries they will be handled
the registers. Dr. Andrews e
roveets to 00 are of a documon
coming into 00D is scanned by
passed to the varietal Regions
vi1on. Ail med. reno nts
t4ey are purely documental7 25X1
Library Division Or ODO Of
approximately 30 per cent of the
? Virtually wrery other request
submitted to ORE where it is
a. There IS ar agre)ament
whereby they will net delete or change in awing' the original request, but
they era at liberkr to add additional requirements of their ospo This having
boon done, the original request goes hack to aad an official col-
lective diruettvis is issued, 25X1
2* The uolliation and Ii ezttnatiort Branches o have been
totally eliminated sad their fnncttensoncentrated in tour desks, namely,
atateitleak, Aimv-kir Desk liaw-Son-lAC Desk and CIA Vedic Each of these
OSke Wai one or mare 0 _ lr:tat extent1 perform the functions
of the old ii?tcaisation BhP he zmake also include a liaison officer
wl,th en assistant eh*, in *dttion to performing normal liaison duties with
the Services or state Departieent, will also tam over the functions of the
old collection Bauch* a
3. A ractiaeat frau Mix/ would be processed ea what as followe* The
reqvost would be received one special Dona 'Which has born supplied to
ORE/ the Services and State Dopertnente Thio fora mead incorporate the
informationrequeeted and the priority, deadline, am previous coordination
stile:no for pc:feeble souree.. The request is firet-00anned by Mr.
25X1. chief of Liaison Avisions who detortinsa whether this request le
ocumentary crneeeseitates field action.- If the reqeest is purely
eny or can be satisfied by material held in Reference- Cantors it is
as a simple library /Unction. if th4frequost necessitates field
ns it is passed to ORE for aly additional reviresents that they ser -
ean to add and for coordination on a working level., The request
25X1 Is thon returned be ho sonde tt to tho appropriate - desk and suimests
sources for collo? on. he desk then writes the collection directive ahow-
ing the roqueatoro the naturo of the requostl other agencies receiving a
collection directive* the Priority, an1 the deadline, 4 file- is then opened
and as reports from the field are received, they are checked by the die -
seminator OA the desk and entered. when the material is complete* the
dissemina
25X1 it to
to the o
25X1
and the Chief of the desk check its oleos the file* And pass
who cheeks the completed material. It is then dieeeeluated
requester and any other interested seenolee- If the requeet
is urgent, terial is forwarded to tile requester as received by- OCD without
waiting for the corpletiOn of the Tile, Reporte go to the.reqgester in
their eiginal form and are in no way edited by 000. In dealing with
requeots necessitating field Collection, OCD alai that they nee great
care in not sending We to collectors who will be unable to eupiay the
information',
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There had been sufficient criticism so Mit thew' wore on the de-
on ever; request checked, double ?hooked, and analyzed to prermmxt
saw poesibt/ita of error. This eaa a vary earefel procedures but militated aoeinet
any rest or collection airectivo being processed in a reasonable amount of time.
Under the old OCes in the case of a purely documentary rovests various steps eme
tailed examination of the musette. the three Seenehes, an analysis of the request
itself an analysis of the manner in which OCa socomplimhed its mieston in relation
to the request and .ive or six different forms with inmemerthle copies. Under the
new OCD? the documentary reqeest will be simply a library flancticn with no trouble
or delay involved. OCD is aleo atteepting to expedite dieseminetion and field
colleotion torouen elielnation of red tapes complex procedures and ;aver work.
2* Delve In dipseminati The old Dissemination eranchs accordiun to er*
Andreae, used to read In dotal of the 300 to 1000 donemontsi received datly*
They are at resent tryine to %sod up this process and war in all proheedlifan
scan documents quickly and not read teem at length. A Readina Panel in .e.inte sot
up in latch they hope to have permenent fulletiee ropreeentative., tree: the Services
and State Department. Zola* leaden, will scan all iccaming infornation and doter-
mine what itoas their poront Service would be interested in. At prompts reading
cantors are aaintained by the aervices and States but it is hop ee teat the in
Paladin: Panel will operate at the CIA Heading Center, Thwe will allows be eupli-
caticne of aeaaina Panels, eowevera unless all matertel put out by the nervices
and atate is disseminated to Cie. If CIA received all 611.041 32t41411134 4 ni3.1.4.12113
Readina Panel at CIA netIld obviate the necessity of the present Roadie-a Panels
at State and the Services* Nerale in the old eineemination Deench a very' bad.
This increased tne delea in dissemination.
25X1
3. Poor soi?on. There bac been enve criticism of the ab lity of Oa
to determine proper d s&at.ton. 1 of the Scientific Brinoh, ORE, has
stated that he does not receive nearay into ar the scientnfic informatiqn disseminated.
Out or TO reports received in one month lapmeirlamitekv
300 did not reach Areva one nearly 400 di.; not reach Air. This brings up the 25X1
qualifications of OM to determire diseomination* The Office will from now on, -
however, ask coflecttn %nits to sueeect their own dieesoination*
40 It has boon said that OCU is a ',bottleneck an performs oousoful
The fiat part of thin statementawas unquestionably true, and it rema
seen other ;t will boequally true in the DOW OCD. E0 prODOS3inj 1.1Dit# acmevera
processes a document as :Maas the oriainator or the eventual recipient deems ?
necessary. OC:a can, however, perform a *Ueefte. function'', Seca unit meet
physioelly collect and diseeninate and a good case can be made out for this unit
to be a part of (or in close touch with) the depository for referent's works,
intelligence files and card indigoes (Reference Center). Recreants and reqmiremsnts
must be ecreensd, but taws is sore to ac-urate collection and disseminatine than
the physical saufalino of papers*
5. It haa boon nentioned several tans* that atfctve personal watects are
hindered by the CaOn functLon uf arranging conferences* Under the old eetes, if
Scientific Branch, Mai, deeired a meetang with Air Technical Intelligence,
would bs-arranged by aCaruni one of OCD 's representativea would provide. This is
amount, and tho DYW OCe prefers close contwat on all wyrking levels, without
OCD knowledge or interferon**
4CRET
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64 Military inoomportence in pa has been critici
tar and ts Meecutivu Aasictant Director of the new
holteves that. Via will fbrnish the answer to mach gni-
nmionq
1. That tol
creatinc de
funoting in a
Id del: failed in tho perform of its
confer/ono and lens instrumenisJ in greyer
moly and e'ficient manner.
2. .That important duties were v-sted in oc-c snd that
aus newt:leery for the pro;eir performance of thvee .itatiss*
3. That
clearly delineu
oordlimti:: eat twit" and function, of idGi,are sult
4* That present to oeracnnol ar attmapting to meke 000 a service
mot a "bottlensae
5. tnojitof thvrit OCD ia az 'jot
i?y- be a4.:sum4 that a sero attcept is being made to corm'
fault's that a period of trial and error mutt be expected bo.f.
?marg. in ,t-nal fora; thet close ecrutini and able direct on and advice
must be 61~ during tt.4a I'leriod of crystallization*
'i4mtittleas
I. Is it proer
those of physic 1
one unit librar7
and disemUnatlon7
2* Is it proper to add tu t!',oubove the wore, operattma1 tuAct4.on
detormtning requiremente and ocord?nnting interdsPertman collection,
3.
ke
uhat quftlietaiitionn nes OC r,; for deterz'ni,g the
ources for, collection?
Is proper di nation atsured under
5. She. 14 to ei,stam of realin centers and
reviewed'?" Mou:d it be possible to have one clned ro
at G1A thro4, sti,oh would peas all material from IAC mem
at rtods 44
64 is the present irctlx,0 or detormthotion of prloriti
Various ,onelc,ts ;Iropor?
7. tnr
departmontal agenoiee
calved by Ci for mvre
4,;erielAgil to pass risque
center
no prohibition azainst direct contact batmen
colloction, ahoula a cop; of all requests be re.
fploto coordination? (This wnvld not obligate
through OCD).
B. Under WICID No, 2, perklraph 1
-6. SIE
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a
re5porw1b71ities for
3, tho-o forth
of daninant tnterooteo
watch collection At.
nAing dulilIcaton and aasuring truc cori
pilozAt 0,
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Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP8 1300269R000500050059-7
24 July 1940
0
UBj CrtObaeryationo on the Ve3rl Harbor Report
The Joint Congressional Comsittee which undertook the definitive In-
tion of the Pearl Harbor Master of 1941 node & most careful study
of the intelligence infatuation available in Hawaii and in Waehington ;odor
to the Japanese? attack, and reached a number of conclusions as to the ato.
coley of the information, its interpretation, ani the sidminiatrative action
based won it. The Ceadettoes study was primarily of the mbetance of the
intelligences Hastever, judging frac what the intelligent* thawed, IA* in
fact received it cud what instructions or docieione mare formulated as a
ocesequenceo Th. ecanittect made certain recasaandaticava as to the handling
intelligenot.It has not, however attempted to navies the crisis with
a view to deciding whetlaer the intelligeneo to:111aq* disPlaed, bY the go'vh.
CM the adlitery authorities. in Hawaii was either necessarily 4%4.0040
02' devooped, Or to &aware it with other of intelligence hand!.
van better results. Its apch hoe thus been *seen*
VS, tht for the pittres of the Intelligence $urvey it
has d dcd:1.e to alder the handling of Pearl Harbor intelligence as?
is thus an attempt to determine what mete
anavilable what swethode lama used in briming
Wm* eat with what especial Impose in mind* Sint* the
the most signifiCant
conclusions *Ash may be reached tisy
Can
national crisis*
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ehaU der first the intelligence materials which were aaU
Able, These fail into six categories'
(a) Diplomatic intercepts. This was the single most significant
source of information which figured in the crisis. It included some. hundreds
of meseages? ewe of them of considerable length, and represented the worms-
pendende of the Japanese government with its diplomatic and silitary.repre- -
sentatives abroad during the entire period of the growing crisis of 1941 and
earlier It included the vitally important exchanges between the Japanese
government and its ambassadors in Washington, an well as communications be-
tween Tokyo- and other strategically placed diplomats in East Asia and Europe,
particularly Germany. Altogether, it provided a broad and continuous picture
of the development of Japanese official thinking during the negotiations with
the U. S. Probably few governments in history, engaged in protracted and inp-
tricate negotiations was a =Jar foreign power, have had such complete access
to the secrets of its antagonist as occurred during those negotiations.
(b) Espionage intercepts. This material is in the same category as
the diplomatic intercept material, but was less voluminous and lens significant
in terms of foreign policy. It comprised for the most part correspondence
between the Japanese government and consular agents on the West Coast of the
Us S. in 0Oxico and Central America, and in Hawaii who were conducting local
espionage operations. Since the operations themselves were not notably sue-.
ossaful, in Hawaii as elsewhere, the intercepts were of limited importance.
At lout one decisive item of intelligence, however, the so-called wbomb-plotn
messages was derived from this traffic.
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(d) U. S.
of
U.
ac
,tiiree largely in the
thraujh 04 of the movement of Japecteaft troop tram-
p. )
tic report., Theso include the regular diplomatic
to Oixtrntwith U. 3. missions abroad particular
25X1
kip
7
A
more than an hour before they
ar1ere on the some, none of
itt
an effective wa to the aaxvisrs on the se, 1.
tion on the zaove*nt of Japanese coirvayc ie ayib1e to 0.4,
and was oiroulated to ONI end the State Department, as moll as
levels of the government. The moot single striking thing about
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Approved For-Release 200
ofi nte
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mining into1iinoe i*tarials, and most notably the vital intereept traffic
both diplomatic and eepionnees, Yea available only to a singularly small group
of the p po1ioy authorities of the nations to rreeident?Reesevelt Som.
and Moil, Generale Narshall8 Oerow and Mee; Admirals
Norm Sehuireacm Col Bretton; OnVtaa Kramer and
end Car O1 This State Department's reports from its Ads-
dons &biroact were also furnished to the President and the secretaries either
in drat Sozn or as reported viarbafly by Secretary ItuU4 Virtually none of
the inteUigsnee ai particularly not the diplomatic intereePt saterial, Was
intelligence agencies of the servioes, or
h is
on
in the Rep.
of Pearl Harbor intelligences and
228 it seq.) is the delay in trans?
leting ne of the se intercepts,. Certain of these, which in retrospeet
at least bore st*' upon the projected attack on Hawaii, were not available
for bonn or deys after the Japanese struck. This repro/ante some deficiency
in the 0 torai*iie and anslating branches of the Army and Navy (although
n (14 231) both of these units) but has little
bearth on how the intelligence available before the attack was handled.. It
is another of th tine mmieht have boons* of the time and does not al?
tar conclusions on I.. pit information was distributed and who took
responsibility for slyzin, and evaluating its broad moaning,
It should also be noted that the Japanese officials of the Yereign Office
who were eonduoting the neotiationa with the United States were In all
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5*
k Zit, 6.141 imam,
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=
way
probability aware of the i.lan for the attack by the Imperial Navy and also
aware of its intended tarcmt, The espionage swages sore also inspired 1317
authoritiee of the Japaneee Navy mho were presumably avers of the nature of
the intended blow. This fact seems to rule out the leneee44Witer of divining
the Japanese intentions ab BUMS peint by etudeing their messages. Certainly
in retroepeot.-althow7h hindsight is notoriously mere exact than foreeight-ii.
it seems clear that the information prior to December 7Yea adereate upon vhieh
to prepare an intelizence estimate panting out the extreme gravity of the saw.
uation and euggestinc the possible MOMS by ehidh the Jepeneae might attempt to
resolve it.
Teo things t abott the handling of if 104
prior to the attack. ?fret, the intercepts and U3 diplomatic earrespcodiment
Imre ciroul ted to the President and the Secretaries as "rave intelligence*
Until eerly in November the President had been receiving briefs of the Japanese
meseacee; afteryarde he reoeived the, complete drafts, aa did the ether officials
mentioned above who mire intimately involved in the attain. These drafts mere
in almost precisely the form in ientch they lore sent by the Jepeneee Foreign
Ofrioe Eind diplooatio officials. The American military and naval interception
agencie$ (Signal Intelligence Servile,. and Ope2)eC). were strictly teohnioal,
with networks or radio listening poets, orYptanilytio specialiets? translators,
ete,, bet Yithout inteIligenoe analysts. Intercepted meseagee were thus occa-
sionally distribeted under the rubric "an interesting message," but no effort
mos made by SIS or op?200.0 to bring them together, analyze then as to content
and neaning, and make an estimate of their implications before sending them on
to the topmost authorities of the government. Thieves not by reason of over..
eight bat because these agencies were not expected to perferm more then *Ad-
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ifik*
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Departmeat for st
formation reaching government which might have had an indirect beerinc .Apon
Javonese.keerican relations and their mdlitary implications. The cenerals and
admirals and senior Departmant officials who had ammo- to this material
were not analysts in this senses and habitually disebersed senior administrii.
tire rather than sabetantive intelligence responsibilitiee in their aortal
capacities. Not only whore they busy and distracted people, but they ewe
intelligence analysts either by assignment or training.
far as the Report of the Joint Conaittes states, t
mates at the !situation prepared by the departments meet Jowl three
ere neat =ad' On November 27$ secretary rull and Undersecretary Welles had en
their d*eks a report by D. Stanley K. Hornbooks political adviser to the S4o0.
antitad roblen of Far Santora Relationtirsete of Situation and
es.
in which Hornbeck xreeoed the egregious opinion that
lone en the immediate verge of 'ear* in the Pacific"
va b
de
period of time and in the light of all other low
few astir-
the Far fest
the U.
oe november 23 G.2 provided Secretary 5t1neoned.th a mew,
information repArlinc Japeneee military and naval movements in
4). It dome not appear to have been an estimate in the 'text
sense, but 3timson carried it to the President and sugessted that it be reed to
the oar Council. On Desenkamil, Commander VOCellum of OM prepared a Denarlmg.
du m outlining the critical situation in the Far Beet (p. 207), but this ets47
icured enly as it provided the beekground for a later suggested message to the
cn4er in Chief of the fleet of Detesaber 4 *doh was not gents but *Joh is
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Ss
'e
a but oce2ii.ng apesu3atiort as to
AettoCly, it is diffioult to amnia the
tes? but since thej are barely even-
ghout its dismission, onyhaeis is plaesed
by intercepts and evaluated by
kir Nal t seems probable
l3.y important, perticulsrly in a situation
at an level below the seerstariee
A
rounded the tial:eriace intermit in
citly to the Director, /4m, rilkinson and to
&stern Dram:she Neither was on the ?working le
estimates, rereanallz as a =ma thing, and nei
undivided attention to the development of the wide. Officers in the Argf and
Navy at this level, vereover? eers fully consedous that their superiors end the
heads of the goverment lore skinc the most active and personal interest in
the kroblesse raised, and nEc: have been reluctant for this reason to present their
tSIVWithoUt solicitation in advance. They Warta also concerned rimarily vdth
military and rum' police/ rather than idth national policy*
0
inte
heed of
Prnared
a position to
esti
or
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"Wrentkired
10026cili1000500050059-7
the tirtal and crucial inteUience ova
the President, the Sacretari
of and the Chief of Naval epera
outside consultation except with eadh
tics ens done by the
of State, war and
These individuals
and, as indicated,
tions were such thnt no one outside of this Ryon had eufti'w
vailable to bin upon ehish to base a judgment or estimativthe
have beam helpful to the makers of polieys 0141, indeed, had
cation function to Nar Plans Division. Thee, individuals
at no poisu &ought the production of any *national estimate* from anyone out-
side themselven? and there is no intimation that need for this crossed their
minds, at least before Deeember 7. They fat themeelvee reeponsible, and con-
sidered that no one could be mere competent than they to see the situation in
its broadest aspects; and so eambined in themselves the funetiona of intelligence
estimation and policy decision.
The Deport of the Joint Committee on page 253) 'That there be
a oonplete integration of Army and Miyy intelligence agencies in order to avoid
the pitfalls of divided responsibility. ? .1 and that ?friars be selected for
interneme work who poem's, the background, etc., for snot eork4 a an Am.
ever valid this oonolueion any be, it does not fellow directly from the rale
played by departaental intelligens. in the Pearl Harbor crisis, Thsoo IsdeNews
excot for their topmost menhirs, placed well above the level ehere useful
Wilma? analysis is supposed to be done, Imre not involved at all. It is
very possibly tree that neither ai..2 nor ON! had available the intelligens* OM*
eers of the Gelber re-_uired to deal ademately with the information *doh night
have been made available to then, This may have been a practical reason for
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withholding it true the parti leers than at work in tee epodes.
let assuming that intelligence analysis is an art and a mimeo, and that able
and intelligent persons can be trained to perform it in a more effective serf-
nor than persons without such training, this argument is only practically and
not generically sound. If there was a reason for having regional Intelligence/
organisations in the military departments and the 5tato Department (not there
salled an 'intelligence', unit), there sae even greater reason for allowinu.
their members tormsiem in detail the only significant information bearing upon
preeminently threatening situation
Assumiag it to be true that the heads of the government acted as their own
intelligenoe analyst, during the crisis, wee there any reason in Prinoilai
they ahead exclude the established analytical agencies at their disposal ?here
mei seem to have been an element of pervereeneea on their part in this almost
onscioes divorcement fros facilities which might have stood them, in good stead,
and the implicit assumption seems only too evident that it they had relaxed their
overwhelming eecurity preeautions and had attempted to share the intelligenes
problem*: the Japanese crisis with more trained individuals, the result might
have been different. This sea only be presumed, however; and sertainlY there
can be no demonstration beyond dodbt that the results would neeessarily have
been different had intelligence analysis occurred in depth, and had a succession
of Notional estimates? of the developing situation been laid on President Reese..
veltts desk each morning.
There is a, further element hoaever: Considering the nature of the crisis,
and of their responsibility in it, could the President the 3eoretariee, the
Cofs and CNO hove been expected to rely upon the estimates of departmental or. of
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of en
for
sponsiblefor
the problem by
Well that in its ehapinn
poliey teknow everything
Bent
10#
DP86300298R000500050059-7
tar which went to the very bamrt of thsdr
? they could ttot rely upon then to the 40,1,
to be followed lopliour
ros at ail Desta the nears
any
ht iore theft one agency can share the responsibility
no matter how well staffed, no wetter bowman
ta (but excln4ed from the conversations of those row
e which would add to the rowierstanding of
Is perhaps the eharacter of national crisis
there is room only for those in ?antral of
and to Judge action in the light of this knowledge
Nay there not be an inevitable tendency in each times for the persons ultimately
responsible to place themselves in the line of receiving all factual information
from which they draw their own conclusions in the lidht of their understanding of
national Ora ons nnd ideals? If this is the gem, it suggests that no slop.
group, not in the chain of command and not ownyVine alrthe
nature of its statutory or constitutional boats an implicit responsibility for
national poltay, canexpect to read,* the information adernate for the fOrmatiom
of inclwie aM jt4icious estimate uhich 'Quid exert influence upon the Freedu.
dent and his b ale. Certainly the emperimme of 1941 Move that all
intellimnee ?etima capabilities of the goverment lore in feet disregarded
by the heeds of the state. The experience there, moreover, euggeets that their
allure to share the burden of estimating the implications of the 'Available in-
formation goes beyond the mere limitations of security and AMMO' the fore, of
an inevitable oharaeterietie of pulley formation an the highest level in tam of
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extreme orisin. The ;olio-, authorities) alone share the "broad vise t4 hev?
the information"; theirs alone is the heavy responsibility for nationel
policy; theirs, as a result ie the function of intelligence estimation.
In the light at the foregoing discussion, it is possible to melte sorm geo..
era obeervations which may have bearing on the preeent handling of intelligens*
within the government?
(a) Intelliginee evaluation, as suoh. at the tIne of ieari Harbor,
most exclusively a function of the poliey authorities on the highest level The
same has been true of arises in 1948. when the poligy authorities have been their
own estimators, basing their conclusions on perusal of more or lacy rewintellii.
gems
(b) There would have l*en in the nature of things, little reltcmce upon a
central Intelligence Agency of the sort that now exists hod it been finnetioniad
in 1941* sinilerlys there has been little relianoe on CIA, exoept for the poUnu.
tialimetibution of 50, in repent irises*
(c) The ooneept of intelligence evaluation and estimation by at ?impartial
eggnog whits/epees everything? may not be valid, for the reasons thet it cannot,
in the nature of the case, pose everything" promptly, and its removal from policy
responsibility in the time of oriels rakes its views academie to those who are
responsible*
(d) A *Antral s*y y perhaps serve better in suoh tiz*s tough its
*Common servioes? tat through its estimating fUnstion4 The raw intelligenoe
which SO may provide ean be of the highest importance irreopeotive of *ether
or not an estimating staff also exists
There is some further evidence in the arises at this year to support the
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12*
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vm that eatImationis etZectivciy performed onl,Y lAY the resPen-
es In the Berlin difficultr of the pmeent eacrent the
have been in the hands of State and service depart-
i,*ntal chief 5, with the being kept informed for his information and
ertene. Those rot coneezd have been t;Corotary Yorreeta/0 Undersecretary
Lovett sr, Nt and Air seeretaries? their chiefs of eta: so and their
staff sug intelligence officer,, C.1 has appeared only to the extent of di
gestinc certain tate Deportment communications in its Deily; in commenting upon
the situationj Its teo%ly (eitheut noticeable effect on volley); in circulating
eertain room raperte secured by fk; and in producing, US of several 'mole Wore
the development of thw emerEeney, a rather generalized disruisition upon the oats,.
sideratione involved it maintaining our atake in the German capital As of the
present moment, when the matter is moat vexed, our polley seams to depend to a
large extent uper a sonzie basic eatimatet that the Russians are not prepared
for war, e44 will not fight merely to throw us out of Berlin* But VII* judgment,
for all that is evident in the output of CIA, appears to have been achieved in-
dependently of t or its estimators* The overall estimates of Russian intentions
appear to have been formulated in the 5tattt Department, and to have been aseepted
by the military agencies It is entirely clear that CIA dose net even receive
certain of the bride correspondence in which our policy is discussed between "ash..
ington and Domani
t mey again be true, as it vas at the time of lean Harbor,
au horititta of the government de not place guff/dent reliance in the existing
estfttii agenoy--CTA.040 provide it with all possible information, and to mit
views as having a significant bearing upon their decisions, As in 1941 this
my be in part because of security oonsiderations; but in the *leo* automatic
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234
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od1int at the cr!i&s by the policy authorities ooneerned, both as to inter'-
to: of raw int 115i as to decision on American poligyi one secs
estimation, by an ammey not responaible
Dor policy, has more effecti/0 existence in theory than in fact.
In an effeetive vest the same seems to have applied to other major events
at theyear involving American security. CIA'. 'contribution in the alienation
of via from the Soviet sphere has been in terms of paraphrases of State
Dapsrtnt items in the Daily 3ummarys not omsamated upon with an ovvrabundanoe
at itstghtj similar digests of available information in -Miehly Summaries; and
the e*aiaeicn t all offieial information from Yugoslavia has coLa from the
mince no SO reports have been received. Insofar as Amrioan
policy with respect to Yugoslavia has been eoneernsd, GIA has filled the role
of spectator rather than participant
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ILLEGIB
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SFCRET
MNMORANDUM
SUBJECTt Scientific Intelligence
There are certain peculiarities which affect the field of
Scientific intelligence and the position which it occupies in relation
to other forms of intelligence. In the first.place, there is the
absence of an agreed understanding of what is involved in "scientific
intelligence", including .the question of Whether it is concerned
primarily with "pure science" of "applied science". There is also
the fact that scientific intelligence is of general interest to the
entire scientific world and does not affect only the national security.
This is unlike the field of military intelligence, for example, which
is almost exclusively of interest to professional military people.
One aspect '7/this situation is that in science many of the most
competent personnel' are outside of Government service and certainly
outside of service in the national security agencies. The problem of
putting them to effective use for scientific intelligence purposes
affecting the national security creates, in consequence, difficulties
over the proper security precautions which need be observed and the
relations between the soientiOts and the military. There are also
Certain questions as to Whether the primary interests and loyalties
of the scientists rest with their profession and with the desire
thereof th increase the general fund of scientific knowledge or with
scientific intelligence, its special needs and its security require?
ments.
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Because science contributes to almost all phases of the
mobilisation and war capabilities of a nation and to its offensive
and defensive power, interest in scientific intelligence is scattered
1
in easy places. The various Armed Services. holding it to betheir
proper responsibility to attack and defend with their restive
arms, feel that they do not have an identical interest in scientifio
intelligence, but that each has an interest corresponding to the
offensive or defensive MilligOAS of the particular Service. Al a
result of this and of the fact that interest in scientific matters
is so widely scattered throughout the Government and outside, there
his been little progress in developing a central organisation for
scientific intelligence or in defining the respective spheres of the
different Services or the interests Willa they have in common.
Finally, there is a peculair situation today in whiCh, for
practical purposes, an artificial distinction exists between Neuclearo
and ?nos-nuclear" science. A variety of legislative aid historical
considerations have contributed to this distinction, Which obviously
has no validity but, as a practical fact, it cannot be ignored in
organising and developing scientific intelligences
eel's*
Scientific intelligence, as it affects the national security,
is aid in a number of different places. There is no clear-out
delineation of fon-otiose or responsibilities, and there is no effective
aachinery for coordination, except in limited respects. The agencies
concerned as producers and consumers. include the State Department,
SECRFT
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Army, avy, Air Pores, Atomic Energy Commission, Research and
Development Board, Central Intelligence Agency. joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. This list, of
course, does not include the non-military agencies, ouch as the
Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Standards, Weather- Bureau,
and National Security Resources Board, all of Which have a reel
interest in this problem as well ae a contribution to make. Nor
present purposes, we can limit ourselves to the agencies which are
primarily noncerniklith scientific intelligence's* it affects the
national 'maturity, although we must assure ourselves that these
agencies are drawing assistance from other, sources.
The Collection of scientific intelligence is carried on by-
e number of agencies operating is the Dated States and abroad. The
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2, dealing with
collection, does not "malign the dominant interest for scientific
intelligence to amy department, bit prescribes that each agency will
collect scientific as well as economic and technological) intelligence
'in accordance with its respective needs'. As a result, the Army.
Isvy. Air Force, and State Department ars all, to the extent that they
individually Choose, collectors of scientific intelligence. In
addition, CIA collects scientific intelligence on behalf of all of the
agencies through the Office of Special Operations
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The collection procedures. the assignment of requirements.
sad the deteraination of priorities are not made in accordance with
any sr-all plan centrally controlled and corrdinated. lath collecting
agency gives the assignments it washes to its mon collectors although
it mey receive and handle requests from other *gentles. In eases Where
collection request is sent to CIA, the Office of Collection and
Dissemination attempts to canvass the collection possibilities through-
out the Government and to see to it that the _collection request is
sent to all collection agencies inside and outside CIA Whith might be
in a position to mike a contribution. However, the Office of Collection
and Dissemination is able to act only with respect to those collection
requests that come into CIA from the outside or Whit& are. posed from
one part of CIA to another. There is no coordinated procedure with
respeot to the Whole field or individual parts thereof (except for
atomio energy) wereby the'emperts in and coneys:ere of WA:stifle
intelligence develop their collection reqpirements in close consultation
with each other and with the oollectilies.
In the case of atomic energy intelligence there is the same
aultipltatt7 of colleotimg agencies ($O, 00,. Army lan. Air, State,
SECRET
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and the ABC). but the problem has been somewhat differently handled.
Because: of the concentration of responsibility for atomic energy
intelligence in the Nuclear Inergy Group of Otk, which has worked
*lately with the nuclear energy specialists of Army. Navy and Airs
there has been a greater measure of coordination In this field of
scientific collection than in the *there. The chief collection diffi-
culty has arisen between the Nuclear !mem Group and ANC, Whose facil-
ities have been used infoasflj for colleotiou. without All of those
facilities having been placed at the disposal of the Nuclearinergr
Group. It is to be hoped. however. that this situation will be
remedied if other difficulties can be worked out and as a result of
the association of br. Colby with the Atomic Nnergy Commission add hisw
working together with the Nuclear Znergy Groups
etespe
With. certain exceptions governing the case of particularly
senstttye materials such as atomic energy intelligence Or communication*
intelligence, there seems to be fairly broad dissemination of all
scientific Intelligence received In Washington. The principal din -
'tuition sees to arise out of ihe dissetisfaction of the expert consumers
when they are not allowed to have access to informs ion concerning the
source, of the intelligence they are called upon to use. Scientists
who are called upon to evaluate highly epecialised information claim
that they cannot do their job properly unless they have full access to
raw infCreation ad complete- knowledge of souroes. This problem has
'been particularly acute in the case of atomic energy and the present
SECRET
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SECRET,
(alignment sreby Dr. Colby of the Atomic Energy Commission is to
have full access to all source material ista recognition that the
resolution of this dilemma hinges on an agreement that the expert
consumer needs to be satisfied. as to the validity of the information
handed to him. If this problem has not arisen so acutely for other
fields of scientific intelligence, the only reason nay be that there
has been less activity in those fields. It way be that the same
difficulties exist there mad would become evident if the persons working
La these fields had concerted and coordinated their efforts to an
extent that caused them to become more conscious of the difficulties_
handicapping their work.
One further difficulty lies in the fact that not all available
printed material can be put to effective use because of the language
difficulty. The systematic stpdy of foreign literature is hampered
by a shortage of security-cleared personnel possessing the necessary
language mad other qualification*.
Except in the field of atomic, energy intelligence where
there is still room for improvement. afore is no means for producing
hat might be considered national scientific intelligence estimates.
la other words, although scientific' intelligence is an Object of concern
to a number of individuals in different agencies, there is no recognised
were produning an agreed and authoritative estimate,of a problem.
Under National Security Council Directive No. 3, each agency is tampon-
bl.s for the production of scientific intelligence "in accordance
with its respective needs". One would expect to find that Scientific
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Branch in CIA*0101 performed the functionof drawing together and
coordinating the production Of scientific intelligenoe estimates.
This has not happened. The reason may be the slowness of the Scientific
Breath in forming its organisation or it any rest in the conception that
25X1 its Chief,
25X1
has of its mission, being, as he is, more
Interested in science for science's sake than in scientific intelli-
gence, ,Also, the Scientific Breath may be suffering from some of the
sane= uncertainty that affects the entire ORR organisation so that it
is not clear Whether OR* is just another producer of intelligenoe or
has the responsibility for coordination, the- efforts of other agencies.
The fact remains that'thers is no recognised method by which coordinated
estimates, generally recognized as valid, are produced. The Research
ad Development Board, Which obviously has. major interest in scientific
intelligence, freqpently complains, and with reason, of this deficiency.
In the Central Intelligence Agency, there are a number of different
places attire scientific= intelligence is handled. On: the collection
side, the Offieo of Operations has a Scientific Specialist
panels of qualified and security-cleared consultants in ,various cities,
so that the members of these panels can be celled upon fen assistants?
in tapping specialised sources drssientific intelligence and will
at the sane time keep thier eyes open for this kind of intaligencs .
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The foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations has several
translators who spend most of their tine abstracting and translating
foreign scientific documents on a routine basis mad also in response
to wino vignette. In the Office of Special Operations, there Is
Technical and Scientifio Section
with the task of
assisting the Nelegraphiv desks in the produrenent *ad handling of
scientific intelligence obtdned through covert means. Also in the
Office of Special. Operations 14 tkii Nuclear Ittera Group (Colonel
which, in addition to perforning this same funCtion with
respect to the special field of atoaic energy intelligence. Is also
the principal central evaluating unit in the Government for atonic
energy Intelligence; thus, it advises atiguides the collection of
atomic energy intelligence and at the sane time evaluates the product.
Its proper place in OIL is really the ORS Scientific Branch and only
peculiar and personal consideratione have caused it to be pat on OSO.
Is the Ono, of Reports and Bstimatet, the Scientific Branch
has been very slow in getting *tilted. The Branch does mot yet
ye a recognised position either in CIA or in relation to the other
1, interested In scientific intelligence-. As originally conceived,
least in the minds of the Research and Development Board, Which
minatmil to his present position, the Scientific Branch was
th have been the central coordination point for scientific intelligence.
This developaent has not yet occurred and in fact the Scientific Bram*
has dons little toward itself producing or coordination the production
of scientific estimates. It has been working on individual questions
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that have been brought to its attiption and it is not certain that
it has a clear understanding of What is involved in.selentific intel?
ligence as aomparsd to a general interest in scientific developments.
It Should also be noted that the work of the Scientific Branch in ORZ
seems to be quite unrelated to the week of the various regional
brandhes,'Which comprise the in portion of ORZ. Since the reorgan-
isation of the office of Collection and Dissemination. there is now
in the Office of Reports and Istimates an individual Whose tank it is
to coordinate the collection requirements of the On Brandhes (including
the Scientific Branch) and those of outside agencies so that appropriate
collection directives my be issued to 00 and OSO. OOD is still
responsible for coordinating collection requirements Which are referred
to outside agencies. I
11110.1011
The principal problem in the ecientific intelligence field
seems to be how to develop & coordinated effort which will make it
possible--
(a)
To plea collection reqpirements and asthods in
coordination with the coilkmatcre.
To establish priorities.
To produoeauthoritative estimates Which result
from their concerted efforts.
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This concerting of efforts shoat also result in bring
to light oases where there is a dangerous gap between the collectors
mad the consumers and where 'the analysts require information to which
they are not Oven access.
Assusdng that CIA continues to have the rssponstbiltty for
the coordination of intelligence. it seems necessary that in the
scientific field steps should be taken so that CIA understands and
acre effectively discharges that responsibility. In strengthening
the scientific work of CIA it may be desirable to consider consolidating
it in one place rather than leave it scattered, as at present.
It seems unnecessary at this time to press foward with any
further inquiry of the atomic energy intelligence picture, although we
should follow closely the 'my in which the new arrangements work out
between the Atomic inergy Commission and 0144
UGRET
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OFFICE 07 REPORTS AND FalIMAII
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ET
I. General Description*
The Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) of the Central Intelligence Agency
is one of three major branches which deabwith the procurement, analysis, evaluation
and dissemination of intelligence information.
25X1
The Office of Reports and
Estimates has the spe4a1 function of receiving information from these two agencies
of CIA (although not necessarily all of it in the case of 080); of receiving in
addition a far larger and weightier flow of information from the intelligence services
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) agencies, including the State Department,
War Department, Navy Department, and Department of Air Force; and of gathering still
other information from outside sources such as non-ILC agencies, the Library of
Congress, and elsewhere; of reviewing and considering this mass of raw or nearly raw
material; and of preparing from it a series of intelligence reports in different
forms, the character of which is supposed to be ',national intelligence required for
national planning policy and operational decisions.
No other branch of CIA shares this reporting responsibility to any bread extent,
25X1 although disseminate information to the Director of CIA, and in ram form
to departmental agencies. The senior personnel of ORE are generally agreed that
insofar as CIA has the function of providing the top echelons of the federal
government with considered intelligence reports and estimates, the unit within CIA
which will perform this function is their own.
The Chief of ORE at the present time is Mt. Theodore Babbit, aged 51, a former
instructor in Romantic language. at Tale University, an assistant dean of freshmen
there, and during the recent war, a colonel in the Army with duties of a liaison and
attach e nature in the Mediterranean area. Personally agreeable, he is not generally
considered to have much force; and his appointment in CIA evidently 'toms from
previoia positions hold in the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) of the Department
of State. His title is Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates.
Mr. Babbitt's deputy until May 1 was Capt. Arthur R. McCollum, USN, a naval
intelligence officer of considerable esperience, who remained in close touch with
25X1 he Office of Naval Intelligence during his tenure in ORE. His successor is a
a recent graduate of the Navy War College who will begin his
assignment in ORB soon after June 1.
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Under the Assistant Director and his Deputy are an Administrative Officer and
25X1
a Plans and Policies Officer. Only one of them, the Plans and Policies Officer,
has responsibilities in fields which basically affect OREls work
with substantive intelligence.
The operating units of ORE, those which actually receive, study, and write
estimates based on intelligence reports, are six regional branches and five
consultant's panels. In addition, two branches, devoted respectively to map research
end intelligence, and to scientific intelligence, operate as independent functional
units within the ORE structure. These intelligence?producing branches and panels
issue their completed reports through two channel's the Current Intelligence Group,
which control' the form and manner in which intelligence is reported on a daily and
weakly basis; and the Estimates Group, which operates the mechanism for publishing--
although not for writing-- staff intelligence, i.e., special reports on rather broad
subjects detailed in some length. A third intelligence?producing channel is the Basic
Intelligence Group, the chief responsibility of which is to produce a series of National
Intelligence Surveys according to Joint Intelligence Committee priorities with the
asnistance of departmental intelligence agencies. The work of the Basic Intelligence
Group is essentially that of coordinating departmental activities; and in this sense
25X1
it differs substantially from Current and Estimates Group, which publish intelligence
?
prepared within ORE itself.
Since the units of OR/ just summarised comprise the "working" subdivisions of
the Office, it is worthwhile to review their activities and relations in some detail
before going on to consider their product. We shall consider the Regional Branches,
the Consultant's Panels, and the Current and lstimates.Groups in that order.
The six Regional Branches, in addition to being the4ost controversial entities
in ORE, are probably its backbone. Each branch has responsibility for intelligence
estimates effecting a designated geographical regions Western Europe, including
Austria and Osedhoslovakia; Eastern Europe/USSR; Near East and Africa; Par Last;
covering all countries south of the Rio Grande. In those branches work the bulk of
the ORB personnel; to them go most of the reports which ORE receives in the first
instance, and almost all reports before being sent to file. They are the producers
of the overwhelming quantity of intelligence issued by ORE; and on them in theory
falls the basic responsibility for preparing the estimates "required for national
planning policy and operational decisions." Since their responsibilities are great,
since they have most of the personnel in ORE, and since they are jealous of their
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central functions, they figure largely in the internal controversies which distinguish
a number of the working relationships in ORB. Individually, they may be described
as follows:
a. Western European Branch: This is the target of a great quantity of internal
criticism within ORZ. It is held up by numerous people as the exemplification of most
of what is wrong with ORB in terms of competent personnel, useful product, convenient
working relations. Conversely, however, when one interviews the Branch Chief,
and talks with his deputy,
one receives an equally warm indictment of other branches and individuals
in ORB. The Western European Branch appears to carry on a running battle with Current
Group for reasons which will be described later; and is regularly out of step with
Estimates Group. /t is listed by several judges as the next to the poorest if not
the poorest regional branch in ORB. Tot in conversation with
much stress is 25X1
placed on the Branch's responsibility for estimates, and much criticism is expressed
of other parts of ORB for preventing the publication of estimates, and for throttling
attempts to make comments on intelligence items in current intelligence reports.
25X1
25X1
b. !astern European/USSR Branch: Until recently the chief of this branch was
Re was criticised for
ocarrying all his intelligence in his head", and for measuring all events in the
Soviet Union in terms of prefOrmed judgements. His successor
an old and experienced Army intelligence officer with mach experience in
the Tar last and some first-hand acquaintance with Russia during the recent war. lits
branch personnel are said to be very weak, or at best spotty; and to be committed to
25X1
apriori interpretations of Soviet intentions and capabilities. is a member 25X1
25X1
of a JIC committee on the Soviet Union, and so has contact with the higher levels of
policy; he also is chairman of an informal committee on departmental intelligence
officers responsible for "astern Zurope. Most recent estimates characterise this
has not yet had
Branch as the poorest in ORB, although it is agreed that
time to improve it.
c. Wear Eastern-Africa Branch: This is generally onsidered to be the best
of the ORB regional branches. Its chief, is a former navel
intelligence officer who saw duty in the Near and Middle last after having visited
and worked there as an archeologist. Re has the respect of his ORI-colleagmes, and
works very closely with the Near Zastern political desk of the State Department.
) while maintaining close relations at the same time with his opposite number in ora,
State. Re considers his branch personnel to be oiaigh quality, and is satisfied with
his working relationships with Current Group and Estimates Group, although not wholly
so with the Consultant's Panels or the Basic Intelligence Group.
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d. Per Eastern Branch; Its chief is
naval officer with some ON! experience. The branch has been
25X1
in its personnel and output; I was not much iSpressed by
a regular 25X1
characterised as "fair"
but rather more so by 25X1
his deputy. The brandh appears to have established normal liaison
relationships which are effective, And to follow in other respects the general pattern
of OR/ working relationships. I have not heard particular criticism of the branch
from Current or Estimates Group or elsewhere, but have gained the impression that its
contribution is somewhat colorless and uninspired.
25X1 e. Northern Branch: Chief is a former university professor
(public administration) end civil servant, during the recent war an Army officer
assigned to London as assistant military attache. He is methodical but rather
unimaginative, and the outside estimate of his branch is along the same lines. His
relations with Current Group are generally good, but Northern Branch has been criticised
25X1 ?
for low productivity and for poor quality of staff intelligence. It is presumed that
recognises the inadequate quality but feels unable to do anything about it.
a former school- 25X1
f. Latin American Branch: Chief is
master who served during the war as a colonel and, secretary-general of the Inter-
American Defense Board. His branch is held in generally good repute, although one
2,5X/ears references to
as "academic" and "pedestrian". He is a member
of a JIG committee on anti-sabotage, etc., defense of the Western Hemisphere, and
thus has some insight into high-level policy planning. Latin American Branch appears
to be fairly well staffed. It failed, of course, to give warning of the Bogata incident.
Despite their individual differences in staff, quality of intelligence output,
etc., the regional branches have numerous points of similarity in regard to operating
practices. For all of them, the main source of information is the State Department,
both cables and reports. This ranges from an estimated 60% of all material received
(Fier Eastern Branch) to nearly 90%. Next most important source is military attach
reports, which amount to from 10% to 15% of reports received. SO generally contributes
more than ON!, Navy, but quality is irregular and quantity limited. 00, for most
branches; is only starting to contribute, and some of them have received next to
nothing from it, but indicate that they expect it to become an important source in
the future. Air Intelligence, being still nascent, contributes virtually nothing to an.
All regional branches profess to have well-established liaison c)ntacts with
departmental, intelligence agencies, both for consultation and for providing concurrence
with finished papers. Intimacy of contact varies to some degree with agencies; OIR,
State, appears to be rather temperamental in dealkhg with an branches (and it is known
generally that OIR considers that ORE duplicates its own function in large measure).
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With some branches OIR has good relations (Eastern Europe, for example), and with
others, rather more distant (Northern Branch). Army contacts are generally good, but
25X1
not much used. Navy seems cordial, but has very little to offer. Air is eager but
next to informationless. ORE Branches take a somewhat acid view of OSO security,
which prevents them from entering the is housed; but all indicate
that they have good and cordial telephone relations with SO, and several (Near East,
Western Europe) indicate that the SO men working on problems shared by ORE will visit
25X1 the
on request for consultation. ORE personnel are inclined to resent
25X1 their exclusion from
25X1
however.
Few of the branches see finished'
and those that are seen
are described as very valuable, however.
The Branches spend varying amounts of time in preparing items from cable traffic
for the Daily Summary of the Current Intelligence Group. Some estimate this as low
as two to three hours' daily; from other sources it seems clear that some branches
spent an inordinate amount of time each day on this work,-..all morning for several
analysts, for example. Articles for the former Top Secret Weekly Report took an
estimated six to twelve hours per week to prepare; no estimate has been received on
time spent on the present Secret Weekly, but it is probably as much. The pervading
difficulty of dealing with the Daily and Weekly Summaries so far as branches are
concerned will be treated in connection with the Current Intelligence Group.
Staff Intelligence, i.e., the production of lengthy, rather thoughtful estimates
and reports on given situations affecting regional Branches, is at present on an
informal basis in ORE. This will be treated in detail in connection with the work of
the Estimates Group, but it should be noted here that mast projects for staff
intelligence, unless requested by an outside agency such as ESC, are initiated by
branch personnel, usually by the analyst assigned to a particular country. Papers
thus prepared are reviewed and edited by the "branch editor" in those instances where
such an officer exists (Near East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe have such editors),
and forwarded to Estimates Group for further review, publication, and clearance.
The Plans and Policies Group has not yet ecteblished P system of priorities on the
subject-matter of such reports, a fact which has resulted in the production of staff
intelligence which is out of date and occasionally irrelevant, and the failure to
produce needed and relevant estimates.
The question of outside, top-level guidance in the production of intelligence
estimates on important subjects is dealt with differently by the Branches. The best
of them. notably Near Eastern, believe most strongly that ORE should have such
guidance. The question seems less important to the Northern Branch and Latin American
Branch; but leAPPEgadtcfifgReelleagabY2Ptatkaget166269006g6aga681A" Branch,
reports on their areas,
litre out of date when received. They
25X1
25X1
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much criticized by its peers, insists that top-level guidance is imperative.
Actually, at the present time, little such guidance is received: some branches have
completed papers at BSC request (the question of liaison with ISO and JIC is a very
vexed point with ORE), but for the most part intelligence production by the branches
and panels proceeds in ignorance of the questions in the minds of the very national
policy planners and the maker of "operational decisions" whom ORB is intended to serve.
All branches share personnel problems common to ORE: all are short of CAT
personnel, all suffer from the extreme delays in security clearance which obstruct
recruitment of new personnel.
/n general, the branches tolerate the consultant's panels which exist alongside
them in the ORE structure rather than uphold their special function. They are inclined
to be critical of the editorial privileges taken by panles on their completed intelli-
gence, and one of the basic questions of responsibility in ORE refers to the obligations
of regional branches to accept the advice of consultent's panels and vice versa.
The branches take little or no responsibility for Vae coordination of intelligence
/activity among departmental agencies. They refer to the 'concurrences" extracted from
these agencies for OBE's staff intelligence reports, endpoint out that as now constitmied
they are not in a position to coordinate departmental intelligence production-in their
particular spheres except by means of mutual agreement. In some instances Branch
personnel lament the inability of CIA to "compel' departmental action on common
objectives, but others simply refuse the question. Similarly, ORE branches do not
attempt to coordinate departmental intelligence collection requests, which are handled
by OCD.
The branches do, however, at least appear to take seriously their ultimate respon-
sibility for top-grade estimates of situations affecting LS. security. Although one
may sense a certain air of unreality considering the fact that ORE does not yet have
all source materiel of the highest grade, and considering that ORE is divorced fro*
close contact with policy planners, the responsible Branch officers unhesitating4
assert that the responsibility would be theirs within CIA in the eyes of the country
and Congress in the event of, for example, a surprise attack in unexpected force.
The two special branches of ORE without regional cognisance are the Map Branch,
which vas taken over in toto from the State Department in 1947 in order to avoid its
dissolution for lack of funds; and the Scientific Branch, which was started in ORE as
.a basic intelligence reporting unit assembling and evaluating information on foreign
scientific developments. The Map Branch, headed byl conducts map 25X1
intelligence activities, receiving and collating all new information received in ORE
on cartographic subjects; intelligence cartography, i.e., the drawing and printing of
maps to show intelligence situations, such as boundary line questions, ethnic or industrial
distirubtion in Arpgjel FsgeRjleilid MOStnet082gROIAMDOW7 resources of
25X1
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which are available to other map agencies in Washington, and which to a degree
coordinates the map intelligence requirements of the government.
The Scientific Branch, the chief of which i
was intended to
prepare estimates and reports on scientific matters. Actually, it has had a scant
staff (which is now growing, however), and has suffered from a basic inability on
25X1 the part of to fit himself into the intelligence field. He considers
himself an RTB representative with an, and has resented what he considers diminution
of his authority in enumber of respects involving B. He has lost control of the
Nuclear Energy Group formerly in ORE and now in OSO, and has resented this. In
addition, he has a basic concept of Scientific Intelligence which centers in serving
the scientific profession rather than the information and security requirements of
the government. This likewise has made his position difficult. So far as his
outward relations are concerned, his branch functions much as does the consultant's
panels of ORE, but to date has produced very little intelligence, and that of mediocre
quality.
Next' to the regional branches, the most numerous members of ORB are assigned to
the consultant's panels.
These units review intelligence reports from a functional
point of view depending upon their particular interest. 'hey vary in size and method
of procedure. As indicated above, their particular relation to the regional branches
16 not precisely clear, a fact which gives rise to.frequent difficulties. .The Panels
are as follows:
25X1, that
a. Global Survey: Strictly speaking, this is not a panel in the same sense
the others are. It comprises two individuals, Ludwell L. Montague and
both former colonels in the intelligence branch of the Army, and both with
e background is teachers of history on. the college level. They serve a dual function:
as the authors and editors of thiAmonthly "Review of the World Situation as it Relates
to the Security of the United States"; and as mental prods and censors for the regional 25X1
branches., other panels, and Current and Estimates Groups of ORE. Montague and
. although regarded with high suspicion by the Western European Branch for an alleged
opposition to the production of forecasts and estimates, are elsewhere regarded as the
most capable of the senior men in ORE, and their monthly product as the most thoughtful
and worthwhile of all ORB publications. Contributions for the latter they receive
from regional branches and other panels; editing they do themselves by compromise and
agreement with the initiating branches and panels,. The final product is timed to
appear for meetings of the National Security Council. Montague and
appear to
take a rather broad responsibility in reviewing the staff and current intelligence
tvar-1
25X1
prepared elsewhere in OM, and their influence seems to be rather pervasive and generally
nod. They have very strong opinions upon the ultimate from which ORE should take:
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a small, highly selective group of senior, experienced men, whose main fuction
shell be the preparetion of estimates for the use of policy planners. Despite
their intervention, they consider the present output of ORE to be markedly inferior.
25X1 b. Economics Panel:
a former colonel in the Army and
economics adviser to certain European commands, who prior to the war served in various
civil service capacities as an economic analyst. The panel undertakes to review
information for its economics implications, and to prepare estimates on the economic
capabilities, etc., of potential enemies. In addition, it reviews the staff intelli-
gence of other branches and panels in terms of its economics content. It has been
criticised recently as having become obstructionist, and for having produced little
on its own despite a large personnel roll. The latter Charge is not wholly accurate,
since it has prepared studies at the request of the Munitions Board, and has initiated
some other staff intelligence, but not a very impressive total, is convinced 25X1
that his staff is excellent, and is pleased that it includes experts in petroleum,
mines, metallurgy and otter fields. Be considers the economic output of the regional
branches generally very poor, and believes it highly important to check it carefully.
c. Transportation Panel: This also operates as a true panel of experts who
review the transportation implications of staff intelligence papers, and who also
produce intelligence reports of their own. Some of the latter have been on inter-
national civil aeronautical subjects, and have been prepared at the request of
federal aeronautical agenices. Circulated as CIA studies, however, they have appeared
to lack the essential elements of national intelligence. The panel is generally well
thought of, / am not able to comment on the capabilities of the chief, 25X1
but the panel has more respect than the other in ORB.
25X1
Ii. International Organizations Panel: This unit, the head of which is
a former naval intelligence officer and for many years a lawyer
practicing in New York, studies developments in the United Nationa, its many sub-
sidiary committees and organizations, the international trade union movement, the
World Trade Organization, international youth movements, and even the ICA.
is energetic, aid is proud of the quantity of intelligence which his small unit (two
assistants) has turned out. Elsewhere one hears that the panel has perhaps taken too
broad a field, and has become wrapped up in petty organizational matters of little
admits that his unit does little "consulting' with branches
25X1 general concern.
or other panels.
e. Military Panel: This is staffed by three senior officers of the Army,
Navy (Marine Corps), and Air Force. The two whom I met,
were by no means impressive. I gather that their contribution to ORB intelligence
i
et
al
papers is very limited and. that they produce littldintelligen their own.
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25X1
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The intelligence product of the several regional branches and panels is edited
and published, as indicsted earlier, through the Current Intelligence Group and the
Estimates Group. These will now be considered.
The Current Group, the chief of which is Re was assigned 25X1
to C/A by the State Department and is a former member of R&A Branch. OSS, as a member
of which he assisted with the preparation of current intelligence reports. Re is
generally well regarded in ORB, except by the Western BUropean Branch. The work of
his Group falls into three categories; the preparation and publication of the Daily
Summary, the Weekly Summary, and of Special Evaluation Reports.
The Daily Summary, issued daily except Sunday to the President, the Secretaries,
the Chiefs of Staffs and the Departmental intelligence chiefs, contains briefs of the
most significant reports received during the preceding 24 hours. It is prepared
basically from the daily increment of State Department cables. This material is
received in the'morning in ORB; one copy of each cable is kept for Current Group, and
another is sent immediately to the appropriate regional branch. In, each place the
cables are reviewed and decision made on *doh should be considered for inclusion in
41.
the Daily. The branch then undertakes to draft briefs of cables which it wishes to
nominate for the Daily, together with such comment as it wishes to make. This material
is then brought to Current Group, and submitted to editors there. These individuals may
accept the brief and comment as written, reject both out of hand, or recommend changes.
In either of the latter circumstances there is likely to ensue a period of. negotiation
with branch prsonnel, who must be convinced as to changes or reconciled to dropping
of the item. One of the constant sources of internal irritation in ORB is the ladk of
clear-cut responsibility between the Branches and the Current Group on the editing
of Current Intelligence.
25X1 it should be noted, is aware of criticisms directed against the Daily
Summary; i.e., that it is not a summary, that it gives a necessarily fragmentary and
spotty view of the totality of events of the preceding day. He says, however, that the
White Rouse in particular seems pleased with the Daily; there is general consent
thst such a publication must be prepared by some Washington agency; and that State
Department, which supplies P% of the material appearing in the Daily, is generally
willing and even anxious to have CIA assume the responsibility for the publication.
It may be noted that working-level views of CIR. State, differ substantially with this
view in regard to the Daily.
1.
The Weekly Summary, formerly Top Secret and now Secret, is now in effect a Imola
situation report, withitess contributed by each regional branch on significant events
in its area during the preceding eight days. Haddock agrees that the contents of at leAssi
least the first such Weekly as contributed by the branches were neither very illuminat -C".2
tug nor very thoughtful?about on the level of informed newspaper comment. Re says
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that this is a reflection of the generally low level of competence which exists among
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regional branch personnel. Preceding the branch con ritutions is a two-page over-all
summary of the week's developments prepared in Current Group; has hopes that this
section may come to perform a task of synthesis which will improve the general
character of the Weekly.
. The Specie-1 Evaluation reports are prepared infrequently and only when ORE wishes
to report on a situation of urgency and gravity. Originally, conceived as a
"Memorandum for the President" from CIA, the Special Evaluation now receives distribution
identical with that of the Daily Summary, and is regarded by ORE ae a Channel for
reporting quick evaluations, based, however, on more than one source, to the upper
25X1 reaches of the Government.
25X1
feels that in the event of sudden national
emergency the facts as available to ORE would probably be reported via this channel.
It is not used so rarely as to be disregarded by Current Group or regional branches
in the event: such an emergency did occur: At the same time, no speciallevaluations
were prepared during the Russian crisis of March, nor during the Czechoslovakian or
other sudden alert. It should be noted that Special Evaluations, like the Daily
Summary but unlike the Weekly Summary, need not be concurred in in advance by
departmental agencies are consultedon them.
The handling of staff intelligence reports written in some detail on relatively
broad subjeCts is the responsibility of the Estimates Group, Originally conceived,
along with Cdrrent Group, as a single Intelligence Group for ORE, the Estimates Group
is now not much more than an editing unit in the sense of adding literary polish, not
in. the sense of altering interpretation or meaning which also sees to the details of
printing and to the mechanical aspects of obtaining departmental concurrences prior to
publication. Its acting chief is
a former naval intelligence officer
whose civilian experience was in the fields of engineering and financial and management
analysis. Re is regarded as somewhat lacking inforce.
As originally conceived, and as carried out by
the function of Estimates Group was to indicate priorities for the production of staff
intelligence: to suggest areas that should be concentrated upon, and to assign
particular subjects if necessary in the light of over-all intelligence needs. A part
of this function is to be taken over by the Programs section of the Plans and Policies
Office in the near future; but for the present there is no effective guidance of the
production of staff intelligence outside of the regional branches and panels themselves.
Thus, the branch chief may asiign an analyst to prepare a paper on a subject that
seems important; or, as more frequently happens, the analyst may decide that from
his own point of view a subject is interesting and perhaps important, and so he
prepares an extensive paper. More or less by the inertia of the organi7ation, this
paper climbs up through the ranks of the regional branch, past its chief and under
the scrutiny of its own editor, into Estimates Group where it is polished and in parCro-
./
perhaps z4w rialThrcIiMeinWl?94i rti.MPPARANPARPEPP519.51 concurrence,
25X1
25X1
11,
?
3 MU, I
and eventually tHilaactroRdieea%igialeM2SeSntingeigeg9RW5???5??59i
no point does it
now pass a rigid and responsible inspection for its relevancy, national intelligence
significance, or its timeliness, and it has generally been so tardy as no longer to
be timely if it was planned to be so at the outset.
The Estimates Group has the same problem as the Current Group in reaching
agreement with the branches and panels on the wording of papers, but probably not to
the same degree. Its special grievance is the unwieldiness of the present method of
obtaining departmental concurrences on ORE intelligence reports. The mechanical
aspects of this procedure?messengers, deadlines, consultations with departmental
authorities, etc?--are handled by Estimates Group. When departmental agencies raise
objections to the contents of papers, however, the Estimates Group then arranges
conferences at which the originating branch and the dissenting agency may review
together the causes of the latterts dissent.
and the branch personnel find 25X1
this system tedious and often little more than a discussion of semantics. More
seriously, they state that there is a fundamental lack of understanding among the
departmental agencies as to the precise nature of "concurrence" and "substantial dissent,"
i.e? whether concurrence means absolute agreement on the particulars of analysis,
interpretation, estimation, etc., or whether it may mean general belief that the main
considerations have been set forth fairly. Equally. does "dissent" mean opposition
to the whole concept of the paper, or may it be entered if a departmental agency
.disagrees in one of several conclusions? These matters have been drawn to the
attention of NAPS with the hope of getting a clarifying directive issued by MSC:
these efforts are now at a stalemate. Beceuse of its difficulties with the departmental
concurrence system and its difficult relations with the regional branohei and panels,
the personnel of Estimates Group have elaborated rather strong but probably inaccurate.
views on exactly how a Central Intelligence Agency should operate, and how it should
coordinate departmental intelligence agencies. The departmental agencies,for their
part, are not seriously troubled by the concurrence problem. Although they find it
occasionally troublesome.
Existing apart from the branches and panels, and also from the Current end
Estimates Group, is the Basic Intelligence Group mentioned briefly in an earlier portion
of this report: Its single mission at the present time, and in the foreseeable future,
is to promote the compilation and publication of a series of National Intelligence
Surveys. These will include a summary of all the basic data available on national
areae t location, geography, topography, hydrography, people, cities, politics,
sociological structure, etc., and will constitute a permanent replacement for the
war-time JAN/8 series and the subsequent War Department 'SID series. On the basis of
experience as chairman of an ad hoc committee of CIA and departmental authorities,
chief of S t? Gttp, has drawn up an elaborate
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suinary of the contents of each future NIB, and has arranged for allocation Of each
chapter, section alid sub-section to one or more departmental agency. .The latter will
have responsibility for the collection and review of the material required for sections
assigned and will furnish Basic Group, ORB, with finished text. Basic Group will
review this text with its own staff of editors, submit it to the appropriate regional
branch or panel of ORB, and include it in the finished loose-leaf study. In deco-
ordinating departmental production af this material, has had partmental . 25X1
agencies state their personnel and financial needs in advance, so that these may be
considered and approved in advance by IAC. linal approval of the irogran has yet to
be given by ISO, but is expected before 1 July 1948.
The staff groups of ORE, as indicated earlier, are the Administrative Office and
the Plans and Policies Office. Administration undertakes three major responsibilities;
control of intelligence reports; procurement of personnel; and working facilities
and arrangements. The extensive control system for documents appears to be not only
adequate' but good, without being too ponderous for its purpose. The personnel procure-
ment task is very difficult because of the length of tine--four to six months--now
required to obtain security clearances on all clerical and professional help, and
because of the difficulty of attracting genuinely high-caliber individuals into ORB
positions because of salary, anonymity, and delay in appointment. These considerations
have contributed to a number of personnel problems which seen now to hamper the efficiency
of the entire organization. The allocation of working facilities, space, etc., is on 25X1
a leSel with other federal agenciee. Its chief is
and civil servant.
The Plans and. Policies Officer is a former air force intelligence 25)(1
officer with an architectural and building background. His staff is responsible for
'ORE liaisoh with such outside groups as ICAP8 and departmental intelligence planning
groups. It also reviews allocation of responsibility, etc., within ORB, and acts as
the Assistant Director's advisory group on intelligence planning. When fully established.
the Programs section of Plans and Policies will provide firm guidance for the production
of staff intelligence papers. Its iequirements section already reviews requirement
requests of ORB divisions and passes them to OCD; it has also taken over some general
field collection requirements responsibilities from the original OCD before its recent
reorganization. Plans and Policies, interestingly enough, now has a unit reviewing
materiel from special sources, and it is understood that this activity will expand
in the future, rather than be surrendered to regional branches, panels, etc.. Where 25X1
other substantive reports are reviewed.
is acutely aware of the 'coordination'
responsibilities of CIA and ORB, and conscious that they have not been discharged as
was originally anticipated. Be credits this failure to an unwillingness of the
departmental agencies to submit to coordination by CIA, with the result that in some
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degree the latter produces intelligence by supplication, not of right. He is also
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aware of the divorcement of ORE from planning agencies on the highest level, with
the result tha.t ORE lacks contact with the realities of national policy. These
criticisms and. others of ORE will be reviewed in some detail in later portions of
this review.
UWE.
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Coordination 'unction,
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This discussion will be based upon the four aspects of intelligence coordination
described in Mt. Jackson's letter to Secretary Torrestal of 14 November 1945. Although
the Categories of coordination set forth there were meant to apply to a central
intelligence agency as a whole, they are applicable to a degree to the Office of Reports
and Estimates as now established, and will be considered here in that limited sense.
1. Coordination in the collection of information* ORE'. contribution to this
aspect of Centralized intelligence activity is confined to one fu ction, and that one
lately acquired. This is the responsibility for coordinating and evaluating priorities
of field collection requirements of it. own and of departmental agencies.- Until
approximately 15 May 194S this function was discharged by the Office of Collection and
Dissemination of CIA, but following OCD's reorganisation the requirements task Was
handed to ORE, and has been assumed as indicated earlier by it. Plans and. Policies
Officer.
In theory, OR3's function in this field is to receive intelligence requirements
specified by departmental agencies, review them in the light of the overall needs of
U.S. intelligence, decide which requirements are most pressing, and forward those
given priority to OCD for assignment to the proper division or divisions within CIA
or to the departmental agencies (or both) for action in Washington or in the field
or both.
The mechanism for issuing requirements has not been fully elaborated. At present,
however, and in the foreseeable future, there will be no coordination through the IAC,
the closest corollary now in existence to the Directorate of Intelligence mentioned
in Mr. Jackson's letter. Since ORE is almost wholly deprived of access to the current
plans of the chiefs of staff and the intimate objectives of American foreign policy,
there is little question of coordination in this respect, except as ORE personnel may
make shrewd assumptions as to national objectives and plans. The specific collection
assignments end the procedures to be followed by agencies receiving the assignment
are beyond the purview of ORE. Similarly, the responsibility for seeing that
intelligence furnished as a result of issued requirements is sent to the proper
place belongs to OCD rather than to ORE.
Neither ORE nor other divisions of CIA have attempted to become a centralised
collection agency. Instead, full use is made of departmental collection facilities,
as well es the common services of 00 and OSO esteblishedin
Materiel from special sources is not now centralized in CIA.
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2. Coordination in the evaluation and collation of intelligence material. In
theory. as explained in Mr. Jackson's letter, this would involve assignment of primary
responsibility in certain intelligence spheres to departmental agencies (such as has
been done to a degree in ISC-j). with CIA (OR!) performing the function with regard
to fields of common usefulness.
Actually, there is no doubt that ORZ serves as a "fifth" departmental intelli-
gence agency, overlapping to a greater or lesser degree the collating and evaluator,'
functions performed in departmental agencies. ORZ does not, it is true, attempt to
'duplicate ID, Army's order of battle function; Navy's strictly naval intelligence,
or Air Toree's intelligence with regard to foreign air capabilities. It does, however,
broadly overlap ont. State's work in economic and political intelligence; it does
duplicate military-Political and military-economic analyses which (properly or
improperly), are now being written in ID, Army; and it does undertake extensive projects
of reporting current and staff intelligence which incorporates the same basic rem
materiel used by the departmental agencies in their otip work.
The theoretical justification of this extra-departmental intelligence production
on ORZ's part is the assertion that ORE is producing "national intelligende" rather than
departmental intelligence. Insofar as this term is defined, it means that OPZ is
concerned with a "broader field" than departmental agencies; that it considers national
security as a whole rather than segments or fragments of it.; that it interprets reports
independent of a "departmental bias." A. more practical justification which recurs
. repeatedly as the explanation for Ibm production of, in particular, items of staff
intelligence, is that "no one else is doing it." By such negative reasoning. ORE
appears rather frequently to explain the production of intelligence studies which
are circulated into the highest levels of the government.
The true significance of ORZ's status as a "fifth" intelligence producing agency
lies in the fact that it has rejected any intelligence concept whereby 'the departmental
agencies would provide it with finished studies which it would then review and perhaps
incorporate in national estimates; or any further concept of defining departmental
'responsibilities in the fields of evaluation and collation, with consequent assignment
of function and exercise of control over the product. More precisely, OR1 has
largely and consciously abdicuted any responsibility or right to define departmental
evaluatory and collating functions, to require that they be performed, and to demand
that they be Made to conform to an over-all pattern of national intelligence activity.
It is true that ORZ is now involved in a project under consideration by ICAPS for
establishient of a standard operating procedure in the interdepartmental production
of staff intelligence papers, Which will define the terms upon which such papers may
be proposed, written, and issued by CIA with the cooperation of departmental agencies.
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This measure has not yet got near the stage of approval, and. it seems probable that if
approved it will incorporate ample provision for departmental agencies to plead prior
commitments in declining ORE requests for collaboration.
Interdepartmental coordination, indeed, has never meant much more to ORE than
interdepartmental entreaty to assist in
present Director has never taken a firm
agencies in insisting upon coordination
attempt, the departmental agencies have
Ahead of their own commitments to their
general agreement in.ORE that until NBC
responsibility to coordinate evaluation
the production of intelligence studies. The
line with his own people or with departmental
Of this forth; and in the absence of any such
consistently. refused to place CIA requirements
chelfs of staff, secretaries. etc. There is
or other agency can enforce CIA's right and
and collation, there can be nothing left to
ORE except to fu ction as it now does, as an independent intelligence producing agency
with no more rights or influence than the departmental agencies.
With respect to the "fields of common usefulness" now incorporated in ORE, vie"
the Scientific Branch and the Map Branch, there is no question of their primary
function in collation and evaluation. The Map Branch is nowhere duplicated in the
government; and the Scientific Branch is established on somewhat different terms
from the technical and scientific branches of the departmental agencies. Its main
quarrel, indeed, is over the distribution of responsibility, for scientific intelligence
within CIA,' not outside. Economic intelligence is assigned by NSC-3 to each ?
departmental agency insofar as it is interested; the economics panel of ORE serves as
a consulting body and as a colleting and evaluatory agency to accept special requests
for economic studies addressed to CIA. It attempts no general coordination Of '
economic intelligence in the government.
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3. Coordinstion through centralization of intelligence facilities or services
of common usefulness: In a broad sense the "services of common usefulness" of CIA
are those performed by 00 and OSO, ORE iteself, however, does provide certain such
services. As indicated above, the Map Branch and Scientific Branch perform functions
not specifically duplicated elsewhre. In some degree the economic panel, transportation
panel, international organizations panel and the global survey panel afford facilities
not specifically provided elsewhere. In a somewhat limited sense, the Current
Intelligence Croup, in producing its Daily Summary and its Weekly Summary, performs
a service to the higher levels of the government not available at present through
departmental agencies, but possibly capable of being performed by them.
The unique service of common usefulness" involving a high degree of departmental
coordination now performed by ORE is the work of the Basic Intelligence Group in
planning and executing the National Intelligence Survey series. As indicated in
Part I of this summary, the Group's role is purely that of allocating intelligens
responsibility to departmental arencies, receiving a finished product from them,
editing and checking it, and issuing completed studies which represent the combined
and coordinated work of the departmental intelligence agencies.
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aEbnL
coordtgann6,qclinfigege3gani4IniVnigeinfraY111/5Mied strattfic
nature: As conceived in Mr. Jackson's letter, and as originally conceived in C/G under
Adm. Souers, the function of coordination in the production of strategic estimates
involved contributions of finished estimates within their own spheres from departmental .
agencies, similar contributions from the "special service" departments of CIA, and the
discussion and reworking of the whole into a completed national estimate by CIA, specifi-
cally by ORE. Actually, in its role of a "fifth" departmental agency, (FE, is not
now performing this function, and probably cannot perform it under existing conditions.
Instead of combining the considered opinions of departmental agencies into
integrated and balanced national estimates, ORE now undertakes to prepare its own
intelligence studies (which may or may not be estimates in any broad sense) from the
materials available to it. Having completed and edited its draft, ORS through its
Estimates Group sends the text to the departmental agencies for their review and
formal concurrence or subetantial dissent. In this way, again by indirection, ORE
considers that it expresses coordinated departmental opipion through its own. reports.
Should departments enter objections, ORE representatives discuss the questions with
them, make alterations if necessary to obtain concurtence, and then publish the paper
as it appears after this scrutiny and compromise. The final product, instead of being
a basic dismission and reworking of departmental contributions, no one of which covers
the entire scope of the finished estimate, is a sort of Gallup Poll of departmental
agencies on the literary efforts. of ORE employes.
There are numerous reasons why ORE, as it is now conOituted, is not and probe*
cannot undertake a broad estimate-producing function of weight and meaning. At the
outset it has no adequate access to policy-making circles, either in JIC or C. /t
lacks almost entirely any information on day-to-day formulation of American foreign
policy and military policy. It assumes that it can only solicit, hat in hand,
departmental studies on given subjects, which are then supplied within the limits
of departmental convenience or not at all. It has relatively few personnel equipped by
background and intellectual competence to prepare national estimates on the highest
level. It does not have sufficient guidance within itself or within CIA which would
give it the moral and intellectual strength necessary to perform such a task.
The curious contradiction of ORE at present is that some--but not all--of its
personnel believe it to be performing a national intelligence function of great
value to the government. They recognize in large pert that responsibility would be
theirs in the event of another Pearl Harbor; yet fail to comprehend that they are
not producing the sort of national estimates which would most probably preclude
Pearl Harbor from recurring.
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Ever.; Mr. Babbitt, the head of ORE, recognizes that the present activities of ORE
are much different from those envisaged by Adm. Souers or contemplated in Mr. Jackaon's
letter; He professes confidence that ORE as now constituted could discharge such a
function provided it had the right to compel support and assistance from the departmental
agencies. He obviously feels that there is no danger of the departmental agencies
approving any such outside demands upon themselves, and appears to be content. to allow
ORE to continue as at present. It is not readily possible to obtain from him a precise
definition of just what ORE is now doing, and for whom.
In this connectiqn it aboUld be noted that the considered staff intelligence
reports which ORE now issues in the "ORE Series" are generally initiated on a low or
medium branch level, are approved by branch heads without reference to or knowledge
of broad intelligence needs except as these appear evident on the working level, and
,are finally completed and issued again without much concern for timeliness or
relevancy. The programs section of the Plans and Policies Staff is expected to
remedy this situation in some part; but until ORE had access to policy planning it
can never be related precisely to the real intelligence needs of the country at any
- given moment.
In fine, the coordinative function of ORE is negative if not nonTexistent except
in certain specified and rather closely limited areas. Underlying ORE's failure.to
contribute in this field is a conviction, held in varying strength by the responsible
people in ORE, that it should be doing more coordinating, that it was intended
originally to coordinate rather than to produce, that it could coordinate if it had
stronger leadership, a more precise charter, more authority over the departmental
agencies.. There is in some quarters considerable dissatisfaction with ORE's present
output, and an anxiety to change it back to the earlier concept of high-grade co-
ordinator of. departmental intelligence the mission of which was to produce national
estimates. The practical difficulties of achieving true coordination at the present
time, the inertia of events since CIO days, lack of real leadership in CIA, and the
ponderous characrer of the present ORE structure, however, all militate against
(E's assumption of a firm commitment in the field of interdepartmental coordination.
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? We have now reviewed the present organization and operation of ORE, and have
considered the manner in which it discharges - or fails to discharge - its function as
a coordinating agency in the production of national intelligence. It now remains to
specify in what manner ORE has earned praise or censure from its own people and from
qualified observers outside; and to evaluate what appear to be its strengths and its
weaknesses. It is important to point out that this attempt to arrive at a balanced
view of ORE's good and bad 'qualities is shaped by the assumption that its mission is
properly the one which ORE itself professes, viz., that it shall produce "national
intelligence required for national planning policy and operational decisions." It
shall be assumed that such policy and decisions are on. the top level of the government,
and potentially may affect the fundamentals of national security.
The praise which one hears for ORE is more or less desultory, given frequently in
reference to a particular report or series of reports, and with greater or less
mindfulness of the broad mission of CIA and ORE. Thus there is some attempt to justify
ORE by saying that it "does what nobody else is doing," that its Papers and reports
cover gaps in the Washington intelligence picture which need to be filled, and which would
remain gap were it not for ORE's intervention. It is hardly necessary to point out that
any such statement begs the question of whether the gap which ORE happens to fill genuinely
needs filling from the point of view of national security; and alp whether it is, truly
ORE's function to act as intelligence backstop and gap-filler in any event.
ORE is also described, generally by its own people, as "the only agency that gets
everything" in the way of intelligence raw materials. Actually, they do not "Get everything
particularly special source material and operational information. When it is pointed out
that there is wide interchange of raw intelligence among departmental agencies, ORE people
reply that they get the fullest dissemination first, and therefore can perform an "
evaluating function more rapidly than other agencies. In rebuttal it may be pointed out
that speed of distribution is rarely of the essence when it comes to preparing a lengthy
and weighty staff intelligence estimate. In the field of Current Intelligence it has .
some application, but is not an intrinsic superiority of CIA or ORE. At best, it implies -
a broad field of duplication between ORE and departmental agencies which presumably
receive as much raw material as ORE and which read it with equal care a few hours later.
"ORE contains many good men, and given a chance could do a lot." This rather
uncritical observation is related to another point of view, to the effect that ORE is
after all a very young agency, and must go through the customary tribulations of growing
up. It is a recognition of present short comings rather than a definite promise of
better things to come.
Some observers give ORE's output of finished intelligence fairly full marks. The
most frequently praised item is probably the monthly "Revire of the World Situation as
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it Relates to U. S. Security". Other, rather general, approval is given to the Daily
Summary and to the ORE series; the Weekly Summary appears to make relatively little
impression. On the other hand, one experienced observer, whose view is not unique,
remarked that ORE's output is "spotty, ranging from less than fair to excellent.*
Some critics find the Monthly Summary itself wordy, irrelevant and not very penetrating.
In general, one can confidently say that the ORE output is variable in quality and
usefulness.
The criticisms of? ORE are more numerous and specific than the plaudits, perhaps be?
cause it is easier to Solicit unfavorable comment than it is the opposite. In broad terms,
these criticisms are as follows:
It is frequently said, both inside and outside of ORE, that ORE (and CIA) fails to
coordinate intelligence in Washington and the field. This has been considered in Part II
of this summary, and so will not be reviewed here.
It is also said that the ORE product is frequently not *national intelligence,* and
that ORE, apart from its Current and Basic Intelligence which are not meant to be considered
commentaries on national security problems, produces much that baa little specific
connection with U. S. security, even when broadly considered, and is often not timely so far
as the subjects considered are concerned. In this connection maybe cited the reports on
civil aeronautical subjects mentioned earlier; and other reviews of subjects unrelated to
operational needs. Some branch chiefs of ORE go so far as to say that all of ORE's output
is by its nature "national intelligence" others, more cautious, consider only that *national
intelligence" occurs in many ORE studies, but is not necessarily the sole content of these
studies, and not necessarily as rigorously defined as should be the case.
It is also objected that all CIA reports, although they may and often are unrelated
to operational requirements or to national planning go directly to the President. This
results in his receiving a flow of intelligence information which may not be relevant or
timely, but which conveys the impression that it represents the best efforts of the combined
intelligence services of the government. Aside from questions of departmental resentment,
there is a serious question of whether the White House may not be misled by the intelligence
products which is not privy to national security policy, lacks full source material, and is
staffed overwhelmingly by junior analysts.
With regard ti Current Intelligence, there is a rather vocal body of opinion which
questions the necessity either for the Daily and Weekly Summaries to be produced at all, or,
if they must be produced, whether ORE should be responsible for the function rather than
the State Department. It is pointed out that the Daily, in particular, is fragmentary,
disconnected, and in no sense a summary except as it happens to brief the cable messages
of State and other agencies which are most vital on the day they are received. It provides
no daily running comment on the world security situation of the nation, and such comments
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as CIA adds to departmental field reports are often no more than truisms, and sometimes
judgments which in their nature can only be made effectively in the field and not by any
headquarters agency. In rebuttal, the Current Group of ORE asserts (correctly) that Mr.
Truman "likes" the Daily Summary in its present form; and that State is not anxious to take
over the editorial responsibility of producing it. The Group also asserts broadly that
"some such" report of the cream of daily cable traffic is required in the government, and
that their product fulfills the requirement.
Finally, there is some criticism to the effect that ORE duplicates departmental .
agencies. This comes in particular from OIR, State, which considers that the political
intelligence produced by ORE is parallel to their own output, and could be supplied by them
on request of ORE. Such criticism draws a distinction between the "special services" which
a central agency can perform for all intelligence and the broad duplication of services or
functions which occurs in fact. When this is discussed with ORE personnel they are inclined
to say that they have not found it possible to obtain the coverage in fields allegedly
duplicated from the departmental agencies, and thus have had to enter these fields themselves.
This is an attitude also reflected in ORE's stand toward departmental coordination: that is
an attitude also reflected in ORE's stand toward departrental coordination: that in the
absence of coordination, ORE must supply the services it needs and which departmental agencies
will not supply.
There are a number of other criticisms of a more specific nature which are directed
against ORE. Each of them, however, has bearing on the general problems just cited. They
will be considered individually in the analysis of ORE's weaknesses to follow later.
On balance, the criticism of ORE function seems to outweigh the praise accoided it.
Yet there are certain assets in ORE as it is now composed which cannot be overlooked and
which gives some promise of a more effective and healthier organization. One such asset is
the generally serious and sincere purpose of the people holding responsible positions in ORE.
Some of them, it is true, are more than mildly critical of the present organization and its
output; others are less inclined to find fault, but still hopeful that better things can
come. Broadly speaking, however, there is interest in ORE and CIA, an anxiety to perform
well, and .a certain pride in ORE and its products. The personnel situation appears to have
a number of defects which will be mentioned later, but along with the defects is a certain
amount 6f 'esprit which may in itself overcome some present shortcomings. More specifically,
there are a number of able men in ORE; among then are Montague andl of the Globa125X1
Survey panel, although these are warmly criticized by Western European Branch;
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Current Intelligence; the Plans Officer;
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chief of Near Eastern Branch; and
some others. There is much question as to the contribution of
European Branch, but he has a forceful personality and vigorous ideas. ORE appears to have
moved rather slowly - perhaps too slowly - in its relations with departmental agencies, but
as a consequence has established generally good if not unique working relations with them.
chief of Western 25X1
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ORE's men are givereeitgOelinegRa244144Pg6WWCMC145.
.12Aliantal agencies;
and while it may be argued that a central agency should command greater respect than this
among its peers, the existing situation could be much worse. ORE's Daily Summary appears
to be well thought of at the White House. In the production of its staff intelligence ORE
appears to stress the overriding question of national security, and to make some attempts
at estimating capabilities and intentions. Thus is does not lay itself open to the criticism
of OIR, State, viz., that reports are often academic and EEL facto. Some ORE products have
been out of date, but have made some effort to cope with an existing security situation,
and not merely to recite what has gone before.
With due regard to the merits which ORE may now claim to have, its defects and
weaknesses are more telling than it. points of strength. Especially is this true in
measuring the present ORE against the yardstick of national intelligence production for
policy planning and operational direction. The following appear to be the outstanding
weaknesses of the present organization
(a) It has insufficient access to the counsels of the policy planners and the
directors of diplomatic and potential military operations. As. explained in Part I, ORE's
contact with the National Security Council is, in the first instance, through Mt. Childs
ICAPS, who is not a substantive intelligence officer, and is personally rather limited
in outlook. In the second instance, Mr. Montague of ORE attends some meetings of the
NSC staff in an effort to ascertain the problems of national security upon which the
Council and its staff are working and which may be presumed tokte important. He
attempts to keep ORE informed of the intelligence requirements, and to guide ORE's
operations in the light of the NBC's own needs and priorities. Neither effort is
I
particularly successful, but not beca e of Montague. Although he has obtained some
specific requests for estimates from CI and although he has provided substantive
counsel in discussions by the NSC staff, he has not been able to obtain constant access
to NSC deliberations in such a way that ORE potentialities can be exploited fully, or
that ORE may have the advantage of NSC guidance and direction. The Director, who attends
NSC meetings, provides no assistance at all.
A similar situation exists with regard to JIC and JIG. The liaison again is through a
member of ICAPS, whose net contribution since his appointment as CIA member of JIG in
January, 1948, has been to present two JIG papers to ORE for comment. He has in no way
kept ORE informed of JIG or JIC thinking or problems, and has not conveyed any requests
for original estimates from the Joint Chiefs to ORE. Thus with respect to both of
these senior agencies which guide and develop American policy, ORE's status is that of
isolated agency more ignored than consulted and given only limited responsibility for
the preparation of national intelligence estimates pertaining to actual security
problems. The fault lies perhaps as much with NSC and JIC as with CIA, but the failure
of the latter to exploit its special status with respect to NSC in particular cannot
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(b) ORE has little or no access to current U.S. operational information. This is
another aspect of the agency's separation from the policy planners. Not only is it
ignorant in most instances of the immediate problems confronting these planners ( the
Russian crisis of March - April, and the recent Tsingtao problems are examples) and not
only does it not provide intelligence estimates tailored to fit these problems, but it
is not informed of steps taken by State Department and service departments throughout
the world which may and regularly do deeply affect the capabilities and the probable
moves of foreign states. It is true that the Current Branch of ORE does receive a
limited flow of State Department operational information, but not to a degree or in
sufficient volume to keep all branches and panels of ORE informed of U.S. diplomatic
moves as they are anticipated and as they occur. Equally important, there is no flaw
of any kind of army, navy or air movements in occupied areas or foreign parts which may
result in corresponding measures or movements on the part of foreign states under
scrutiny by ORE. In the absence of such operational information, except as it appears
in the press or is transmitted by government grapevine, ORE cannot fully evaluate the
national intelligence it produces. Again, the Director does not insist that his agency
has access to such information.
(c) ORE personnel are not capable of preparing genuinely high-grade national
intelligence. This weakness is traced to the recruitment policy of ORE after it under-
took rapid expansion in 1946 and 1947. At that time numerous junior analysts were
employed before senior positions were filled. As recruitment for the senior positions
lagged, juniors were too frequently promoted to take these vacant places for lack of
incumbents. The result was the placing of heavy substantive responsibility in the
hands of youngish individuals whose academic experience and travel were strictly limited,
and who lacked almost completely any first-hand appreciation of the problems of forming
national security policy. An equally dangerous situation has arisen as a result of thfs
policy of rapid promotion: the subsequent applications of more qualified individuals
for senior positions in ORE have sometimes been ignored purposely in order to protect
the positions of individuals already on the rolls.
Not all branches in ORE have suffered from this administrative failure; notable
exceptions are the Near Eastern and the Latin American branches. Some of the younger
men, moreover, have risen to their jobs and have shown genuine promise. The opinion
persists in ORE, however, reinforced by the almost daily experience of the Current Group,
that a large body of not fully competent but somewhat stubborn individuals is still
employed in ORE, with the result that intelligence production is not on the intellectual
plane which might be supposed.
A farther criticism of the personnel situation is based on the prevalency of active
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or former service officers in the higher administrative positions of ORE who tend to
hang together. There is evidence in ORE that a so-called "Navy clique" exists among
naval officers, active and reserve, assigned there, and that this clique has been able
to influence internal ORE policy through the outside intervention of ONI with the
Director of CIA. This is denied by Mr. Babbitt, but almost certainly exists.
The personnel situation in ORE is particularly serious when considered in the
light of the Office's mission to produce national intelligence estimates for policy
planning, etc. If the estimates to be used by planners are to be written by men of
limited experience, and background, who may or may not be conscious of their limitations,
but who cannot fail to be aware and perhaps jealous of their important roles, some
misjudgment may be expected to occur. Even review by highly competent senior officials
cannot prevent mistakes from being slide; and certainly cannot prevent the issuance of
wordy and rather poorly written reports. Precisely in proportion as it fulfills in
fact a function of value and importance to policy planners; ORE will need to be staffed
by the most competent intelligence analysts available.
As a further commentary of the personnel situation in some regional branches in
ORE, it should be noted that the tendency is or thS branch chief to assume an
administrative rather than a substantive intelligence role; with the result that the
intelligence product is often that contributed by the least experienced individuals in
the branch, and merely reviewed by the branch chief.
(d) There is little control over the production of staff intelligence in terms of
subjects or priorities. As matters stand, it is the theoretical 'function of the .
Estimates Group to guide the production of staff intelligence. Actually, the Programs
section of the Planning Staff is expected to assume' this function shortly. Hitherto
there has been little or no control over the preparation of staff estimates in terms of
their relevancy to the national intelligence needs, or the need for them.. As one ORE
observer described the situation, "the P-26 decide what intelligence will be produced,"
i.e., the most junior analysts are perfectly free to suggest proposals for intelligence
studies, their proposals are usually reviewed only at the branch level, and the study or
estimate is then produced with only working-level checks with departmental agencies to
compare notes and to avoid duplication. There is little or no programming from the top:
a definition of the fields in which effort should be directed, and a priority liating.of
the particular subjects which Should be considered first. The problem is related, of
course, to OREle separation from policy planning; but also reflects a lack of direction
within the organisation itself. As indicated, the Programs section of the Planning Staff
is expected to give firmer guidance in this field in the future.
(e) ORE regards the system of clearances and concurrences as a sufficient substitute
for coordination of departmental intelligence activities. This has been more fully
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SteEr
discussed in Part II, but cannot- be overlooked here. The net effect of ORE's
willingness to become a *fifth* agency, and to abdicate responsibility for depending
upon departmental contributions as the basis of national intelligence estimates has
been to leave departmental agencies in their nativeetate of independent unite serving
chiefs of staff, etc., and not necessarily the broader needs of national security.
The agencies themselves profess to see a need for CIA and for coordination in
production through ORE, and consider that OREla failure to give guidance in this field
haa been in some degree a failure of the bright promise of central intelligence.
(f) ORE lacks a firm and uniform understanding of precisely what *national
intelligence" is. This again clearly related to the agency's separation from the
consumers of national intelligence. Since intelligence production as it now exists
is chiefly a one way street for ORE, down which its completed studies go, never to
return and to send back no word of the joy or sorrow in which they were received, the
organization cannot perhaps be blamed for not having clearer comprehension of its
mission. Still, an outside observer cannot fail to observe that neither the Director
nor other CIA or ORE individuals have been able to provide any effectual link with
the high level consumers of the ORE product. NO praise, criticism, nor comment is
thus returned on most ORE publications and studies, with the result that production
tends to be along the same lines as in the past, with *no comment* interpreted as
meaning *good* or *enough.* It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that'tkie Director
of CIA should be more anxious than he apparently is to make sure that the completed
product of hie reports section should. be indispensible to policy planners. He should
regard anything less than indispensibility - mere nuaefulnese or *interesting - as in
some senile failure.
(g) The ponderous and departmentalised organisation of ORE makes for inefficient
production, This fact, coupled with the apparent tendency of Mr. Babbitt to go along
,with rather slack administration, leaves two areas ripe for contention in the daily .
working relations of ORE. One of these ie the ever-sensitive relationship of the
regional branches and the panels to the Current Intelligence Group. This has been
mentioned, in Part I. The other is the equally undefined responsibility of regional
branches with respect to consultant's panels. Granted that intelligence production,
or the production of any opinion for that matter, is not a subject for the absolute
delimitation of. authority, it appears that ORE is now so organized as rather to favor
argument and discussion rather than to provide a means for resolving controversy.
Granted also that the.analysts- of ORE now enjoy full intellectual freedom, and should
have full.freedom.to arrive at their own expert conclusions, means sight wellexist for
the reconciliation of divergent views without the friction and controversy that now
exist.
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IV. Tentative Conclusions
In the light of the foregoing critique, it is possible to suggest
certain major headings to which the Committee may give consideration
in arriving at its ultimate recommendations. For the most part, these
may be traced directly to the criticisms and weaknesses detailed in
the preceding section. The following are perhaps the most significant!
1. The task of CRE to produce a distinctive national intelligence
product, i.e., reports and estimates involving the national security,
should be designated as its overriding function.
National intelligence should be defined as intelligence
affecting_ U.S. security on the highest level, both currently and
potentially. It should be prepared from the distinctive contributions
of the military, naval and air intelligence agencieswand from the
political, economic and social contributions of 0/R, State, as well
as by CRE itself. It should be intelligence of he highest quality
and broadest scope, and representing a synthesis of departmental
contributions in its final form. It should stress quality instead of
quantity, genuine significance instead of mere interest or convenience.
It should be prepared in anticipation of all international developments
which are crises or which might reach the stage of crisis involving
the national security. It should also comprehend world strategic
developments which may affect American national interests in years to
Interpreting national intelligence in this light, ORE should
cleave Strictly to it, and should not undertake intelligence reporting
of a lesser or ancilliary sort. If undertaken at all, this should be
done by the departmental agency moat concerned, and in any event should
not be regarded as national intelligence.
2. ORE must gain access to policy thinking as conducted in the
National Security Council, the Joint Intelligence Bommittee, the President's
Cabinet, or other agency of national planning on the highest level.
It must serve this agency or agencies with its intelligence
estimates, prepared in the terms in which problems present themselves
to the planners. ORE, for its part, should integrate its productbn program
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to the precise needs of the policy planners, with due regard to its function of
giving warning to policy planners of future problems implicit in the intelligence
picture. Thus, ORE must be able to rely upon its consumer for guidance in the
production of intelligence; and the consumer must depend primarily upon ORE forte
intelligence studies it needs. As a further corollary, ORE must receive the
operational reports of the departmental agencies which will keep it informed of
the day-to-day development of American foreign policy in the diplomatic, economic
and military spheres. It should assume or allocate responsibility for reporting
operational measures to the President and other recipients of its Daily Summary.
ORE should also develop a more perfect system for the use of special source
information within its own organization than has yet been the case.
With the assumption of the broad privileges and responsibilities of
producing national intelligence, ORE must train its personnel much more rigorously
than in the past to consider intelligence in its broad and essentially national
aspects. I?tmust have a carefully guided system of intelligence priorities, and
a continuing criticism of its intelligence collection requirements to make sure
that its substantive efforts are most fruitfully expended. It should try to
develop a high sense of discrimination as to what is national intelligence and .
what is not; and to relegate what is not to departmental agencies.
3. ORE should undertake a broad.and responsible function of departmental
coordination in the production of intelligence estimates and in the guidance of
intelligence generally.
As indicated above, ORE should tend to rely more than in the past on
departmental contributions to intelligence estimates; it should encourage CIA
to establish ORE'S right to control the departmental agencies in this field, and
shou3d enforce any responsibilities given to it. By the same token, it, shNad
avoid research duplication in specifically departmental fields, including that of
political intelligence.
. In coordinating depathental contributions to nations] intelligence
estimates, ORE may well continue to afford some "common services" on the order of
Hasid -Intelligence and perhaps Current Intelligence. It may also include a
Scientific Branch for its awn estimating purposes and also as a common service
available to departmental agencies. Its Map Branch, howe,,er, insofar as it is a
service function and not an intelligence estimating unit, might be turned back to
the State Department, with provision for its financial support there.
4. (RE's administration must be strengthened in order to perform the role
outlined here.
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Some consideration should be given to Mr. Babbitt's present capacity as
Assistant Director. More particularly, administrative measures should be encouraged
which will resolve as much as possible the time-consuming and relatively futile
discussions and arguments between the substantive intelligence producers and the
editors of the durrent and staff intelligence publications of ORE. If it is
assumed that the Daily Summary shall continue, its editing should be scrutinised
and perhaps given to one group as its sole responsibility, giving the substantive
groups and branches the right only to comment upon briefs which the responsible
unit shall write.
5. The personnel policy of ORE should be rigorously reviewed and revised.
The qualifications of the intelligence analysts, etc., now employed in
ORE should be reviewed in th- light of the strict definition of ORE's national
intelligence function, and those whoie responalbilities outweiertheir background
and achievement should be dropped or placed under closer supervision. The
personnel situation in each branch should be carefully analyzed, and employment of
new personnel planned to strengthen each unit in terms of its function as a producer
of national intelligence. Consideration may be given to reducing the overall
personnel of ORE, with a view to tightening administrative and working relationship4
and to providing for more convenient exchange of views within th.k. organization,:
It is assumed that the CIA administrative lag in security clearances will be
overcome not only with respect to ORE but with regard to the entire organization.
Emphasis in procuring new personnel should be put on mature persona of broad
experience not only academically and regionally, but in the planning and implementation
of national policy. Stricter administration should eliminate any tendency for
the formation of "cliques" by service or other groups of individuals.
6. ORE should keep in close touch with the Director of Central Intelligence,
who should lend his assistance in guiding its function. The Director should consider
ORE his most valuable unit with respect to his duties in connection with the National
Security Council. He should keep it informed of his own NSC contacts, and should
take an active interest in the manner in which its estimates are received, comments
upon their timeliness, relevancy, etc., and should communicate this at once to the
Assistant Director, ORE.
While the Director himself is in close touch with ORE, the branch chiefs of
ORE should seek to divest themselves as much as possible of mere administrative
duties in favor of assuming greater substantive burdens. They should take active
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charge of the production of intelligence reports, and should produce some
themselves on the assumption that their position is justified more by their broader
substantive experience than by their competence as administrators.
7. The organization of ORE may perhaps be simplified. It is possible that
the consultant's panels might be unified, and given a more precise definition of
their work than now exists. Similarly, the conflict between them and the regional
branches should be resolved.- Their requests for additional personnel should be
reviewed carefully in terms of the definite contribution which they can make. The
question of economics intelligence as assembled in the government should be
considered by itself, with a view to establishment of 0/R or ORE as the responsible
unit in this field.
8. The production of Current Intelligence, particular * of the Daily Summary,
should be reviewed as to its real value to the government. If nothing else, con-
sideration should be given to altering its form, to provide more comprehensive
coverage. Allocation of the function to the State Department should also be
considered. As indicated earlier, the production of staff intelligence should be
rigorously-regulated in terms Of the strict needs of policy planners and operational
authorities. Consideration should be given to dropping the. weekly summary entirely.
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