MANAGEMENT ISSUE DIRECTORATE: NFAC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-01146R000200070008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 July 1980
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ISSUE STATEMENT:
The Agency has inadequate space in the headquarters building to
satisfy the minimum requirements for most analysts to conduct thought-
ful research.
TIME FRAME:
The foreseeable future.
'EXPLANATION:
The shortage will not be significantly eased by the construction
of the given the space demands for the SAFE system,
projecte growt over the next five years, the need to bring the Office
of Geographic and Cartographic Research into the headquarters building,
and the proliferation of sophisticated equipment (ADP, television,
cartographic plotters, etc.)
Space constraints have become severe enough to impact on the
quality and efficiency of our work. We are losing good analysts who
refuse to work in crowded or noisy conditions. The ability to experi-
ment with innovative ADP applications will be forestalled by lack of
space to put the equipment. Productive organizational alignments
cannot take place because of space restrictions. Finally, NFAC may
have to curtail its plans to expand the number of analysts with new
skills because of lack of space to accommodate them.
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MANAGEMENT ISSUE
DIRECTORATE: NFAC
ISSUE STATEMENT
Possible impact on NFAC of the requirement for increased intelligence
support to tactical field commanders.
TIME FRAME:
5-10 Years.
EXPLANATION
Providing
and continuing
increased intelligence support for tactical commanders
current national level efforts will tax to the maximum
the capabilities of current collection, processing and analytical re-
sources.
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS:
More resources will be needed if increased support is to be pro-
vided for tactical commanders, and we are expected to continue our
current national level intelligence support activities.
If more resources are not available, then management will have to
decide how current or available resources will be apportioned in order
to meet the requirements of policymakers and field commanders.
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Conversely, increased tasking of the technical collection sys-
tems with tactical requirements of the field commanders may lead to short-
falls in collection against "national" requirements, thus diminishing
the information available to the producers of national intelligence.
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1. Soviet Strategic Capabilities:
a. The Soviet strategic posture will undoubtedly remain the area
of greatest overall attention within the Center for the foreseeable future.
The challenge of analyzing existing weapons systems and the strategy and
policies of the Soviet leadership relative to their deployment and use
must also be augmented by a constant effort to anticipate and examine new
developments.
b. J
Because of the long lead time required to develop such systems,
our present and continuing efforts are likely to serve us well into the
1980s. What we must concentrate on is the development of the next generation
of weapons systems and possible technical innovations that could significantly
alter and enhance the capabilities of present and projected systems. In the
former case, we are talking about concentrated efforts that will intensify as
the decade passes its midpoint. With regard to the latter, we need more
searching and imaginative and supportive intelligence collection now.
Specifically we want to focus on:
i. The systems that are now on the drawing boards or will
be there in the next few years. What are the areas of
concentration? On what political basis have the
judgments to develop such programs been made--i.e.
the context of SALT, MBFR, TNF? The role of directed
energy weapons; concentration on CW/BW. Use of satellite
platforms and outer space generally.
ii. Significant scientific breakthrough that will alter and
enhance the capability of some system or alter the
relative balance of forces in some area with that of
the US.
iii. Enhanced Soviet capabilities to conceal and protect the
development of new weapons systems through technical means.
c. The importance of this effort to US security is self evident.
d. Clearer concentration of selected analytic and collection efforts
will be required to meet the more sophisticated demands in this area.
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2. Soviet Conventional Weapons development and use as an instrument of
foreign policy.
a. While NFAC has concentrated heavily on Soviet strategic weaponry,
we have allocated few resources to the growth and development of Soviet
and surrogate conventional forces. Moscow has demonstrated the ability
to project force abroad through conventional means, and to develop weapons
systems of considerable durability and sophistication. This change in
posture requires a greater concentration of effort by NFAC on conventional
weapons development, as well as on the political aspects of their transfer
and use as a means of expanding Soviet influence or that of surrogates in
key third world states.
b. We must begin now- to develop
a sophisticated data base on ovie production capabilities and technical
applications in all forms devoted to conventional weapons. This effort
must be augmented over the next decade in keeping with the likely growth
of Moscow's role both as an arms merchant and also because of its ability
to use military weapons sales to buttress its foreign policy objectives.
c. Our ability to provide solid analysis on the scope, dimension,
direction and technical sophistication of Soviet conventional forces
development will have a significant influence on the direction of US and
allied efforts in the same area and on our ability to affect behavior of
states threatened either directly or indirectly by Soviet politico-military
aggression.
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3. East-West Tension: Expansion of Soviet goals.
a. NFAC's coverage of the scope and dimension of the more aggressive
manifestations of Soviet foreign policy has not been conducted systematically
nor, in general, has that of the Community. Now, in view of the likely
continued tension in the East-West relationship, greater concentration in
this area will be necessary.
b. The effort in this direction has already begun, and will have to
grow in scope and sophistication so long as we can anticipate enhanced
Soviet pressures and competition--i.e. in South Asia, the Middle East,
Latin America, and Indochina, and so long as stresses continue to develop
in the Western Alliance.
c. Our ability to warn of the capabilities and intentions of the
Soviets to intervene in key areas around the world must be strengthened
to support US policy objectives and those of the allies, and to counter
Soviet efforts.
d. This is largely a requirement for much more integrated and
sophisticated analysis within NFAC. We will also need to define collection
targets that will shed light on specific Soviet foreign policy objectives.
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4. The Soviet Internal Situation--the economy and the implicit political
and security implications.
a. NFAC devotes a considerable effort to studying all aspects of
the Soviet economy and the development of economic policy with particular
emphasis on energy development and constraints. We will continue to
conduct specific studies on important aspects of the economic situation.
It will be increasingly important, however, to develop the capability to
discuss in greater depth the political and security implications of anti-
cipated economic constraints on overall Soviet policy, on relations with
Eastern Europe, Cuba, and Vietnam, and on the sorting out of Soviet
internal leadership over the next five years or so.
b. We see mid-1985 as a watershed in Soviet energy availability.
Soviet policies and adjustments up to that point and their efforts to
adapt once a true economic crunch has been experienced will be factors
for analysis throughout this decade.
c. The impact of the Soviet leadership transition and of Soviet
economic constraints have important implications for US national and
strategic. interests.
d. Our ability to undertake more long-term sophisticated analysis
of the Soviet economy rests in part on the availability of more and
different information, both human and technical, and an increasing
ability to perform multidisciplinary analysis integrating a variety of
intelligence sources. Considerable progress has been made in this regard
in analyzing Soviet grain and oil developments, but more will be necessary,
particularly as in any attempt to understand the policy aspects of
economic constraints. Collection impact will center on how Soviet
decisions are made, and on who are the key technical and policy officials.
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5. Changed Intelligence Requirements on China
a. China is likely to remain the second area of concentration
within NFAC, given the role the Chinese play in Asia, their adversary
relationship with the USSR, their economic potential--including oil
development--and their interest in the Third World. Our data problems
have changed. Because of the rapid opening of China to the West,
increasing demands have fallen on NFAC to digest a great amount of
new data which was heretofore simply unavailable. Much of this infor-
mation is now freely given, lowering the dependence on intelligence
materials in some areas and therefore requiring a sharp tailoring of
the overall intelligence collection effort--particularly in the economic
and scientific and technical fields. Insofar as China's growing importance
to the US enhances its importance as an intelligence target, we must begin
to sort out what is important to analyze and to collect.
b. China is certain to grow in importance in the coming decade--in
its own right and in terms of its relationship with the major powers,
particularly the US.
c. There will be great US interest in the implications of all areas
of Chinese development, but our efforts will have to consider first the
elements that will have direct impact on US national security interests.
Chinese military developments--particularly the policy aspects--will
have considerable importance.
d. We have the resources to analyze developments in China, but they
must be restructured and the collection effort streamlined to provide a
more tailored and more sophisticated flow of information.
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7. Intelligence on Eastern Europe.
a. NFAC has tended to view and analyze Eastern Europe as an extention
of the policies of the USSR and, as a consequence, analysis has been to
a considerable extent been limited by the heavy concentration on all
aspects of Soviet development and policy. In the coming decade, economic
and energy constraints in the USSR will have a significant impact on the
economic well being of the East European States. Transitions of leadership
in both the East European states and in Moscow will add a new element of
pressure and uncertainty and the attraction of the West as the source of
economic assistance will have increasing political overtones. In an over-
all European context it will become increasingly important to understand
policy developments, directions and pressures within the East European
States--their relationship with Moscow, with each other and with the West.
Not enough quality collection and analytic resources are devoted to this
area now. Much more will be required in the 80s.
b. The mid-80s are likely to see substantial strains growing in
Moscow's relations with its Eastern European allies. We must be in a
position to anticipate the problems as they grow and to provide guidance
to the policy maker on where the strains are likely to lead.
c. Understanding and dealing effectively with Eastern Europe in a
bilateral context, or working through our European allies will be ai
ever increasing aspect of our overall relationship with Moscow in a
period-of heightened competition and continued East-West tension. Policy
initiatives and plans will require very sophisticated analysis of nature
of the European situation.
d. More integrated analysis of the political/economic and social
elements within Eastern European society will be a necessity if proper
policy support is to be provided.
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a. The crisis in energy has dramatically demonstrated how inter-
dependent the world has become and how vulnerable the United States and
its allies are to instability or unrest in states which are either important
sources of valuable resources or have considerable strategic significance.
The expanding and more aggressive Soviet role in Southwest and Southeast
Asia and other regions either directly or through surrogates underscores
those vulnerabilities. Our capacity to understand the forces for change
within societies that are of importance to the US and the West is now
apparent but our ability to perform the detailed type of analysis to
give us that understanding or to collect the information that will support
such analysis is not well developed. Crises in Saudi Arabia, Nigeria or
Indonesia--key oil producers for the West are certainly possible within
the next decade and could easily have a dramatic and devastating impact
on the economies of the West. The viability of other resource rich
African states, the ability of the small Middle East oil producing states
to maintain traditional political systems in the midst of external pressures
for change, the capacity of strategically important states in Southeast
Asia and Central America to move toward a more democratic policy in the
face of blandishments of the USSR or its surrogates all need indepth study
in the coming years. This will require a more integrated approach involving
intelligence collection, utilization of available academic or traditional
research materials and sophisticated multidisciplinary analysis.
b. The next decade will see an increasing demand from policy makers
for analysis concerning emerging forces that may undermine the stability
of key states and eventually adversely impact on US policy interests.
c. Limited the expansion of Soviet power or that of Moscow's
surrogates into areas of strategic importance to the US will be a major
foreign policy concern.
d. We will need a substantial enhancement of new skills and techniques
both in analysis and collection as well as extensive cooperation between
the two areas to meet this new challenge.
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9. Technology Transfer, Nuclear Proliferation
a. In the 80s we will need to know about and monitor advanced
communications as they impact on patterns of international trade, the
flow of information, the transfer of sensitive commercial and military
technology. We will need to study civil technologies that have signi-
ficant economic and military applications. This will be particularly
true in the developed West, but also in the more advanced Communist
states and increasingly in the more sophisticated upper tier LDCs.
These have been areas where a relatively low level of attention has
been given, and the data base for analysis has either been highly
technical or sharply limited. More and better analysis will be required,
and the demand for better raw information will grow.
The proliferation of sophisticated technology, particularly of
the type related to nuclear weapons, has been monitored by NFAC as
part of its responsibility for nuclear proliferation. But the rapid
spread of this and other technology, particularly to the more volatile
upper tier LDCs, will require a level of collection and analytical effort
that has not been committed to date.
b. The decade of the 80s is likely to be characterized in part for
the demands relating to technological analysis in broadest terms--to
support US policy interest in an extremely wide range of areas.
c. The US has a wide range of economic, strategic, and international
political equitities to protect in the highly competitive and increasingly
complex and dangerous fields of both civil and military technology.
d. An expansion of both analytical and collection resources of a
relatively new order may be required to provide the sort of support
US policy makers will need in this area.
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10. Natural Resources--Competition
a. We are entering a period in the 80s in which the competition
for other than energy resources will be a major element in the foreign
policy of many states. Food, water, forest and ocean products will all
come to be regarded as increasingly important, and in some cases scarce
resources with significant policy implications for the US. NFAC has
begun to study these problems and to integrate the analysis of them
with the overarching political and economic issues that have traditionally
been the center of our analytical effort. But much more work will be
required to keep pace with the anticipated policy requirements.
b. As we get into the 80s these scarcities and their policy
implications will mount. We must begin now to anticipate such problems,
and to lay the groundwork for having proper advice to provide the policy
level.
c. US interest in this area is bound to grow and will take on more
complex aspects as the demands for US support and leadership in world
resource problems mounts.
d. A new range of disciplines must be added to the NFAC analytic
base to augment the efforts already begun in this area.
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1 July 1980
MANAGEMENT ISSUE
ISSUE STATEMENT:
Improve the overall quality of intelligence by adhering to the
NFAC-derived Five-Year Plan.
TIME FRAME:
1982-87.
EXPLANATION:
NFAC has been charged by OMB and Congress to develop a long-term
plan to improve the quality of intelligence.
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
It is possible that this plan should be broadened to include
adjusting human and technical collection capabilities to complement
changes in the character of information required by analysts. There
are also elements of the plan that involve increased overseas experi-
ence for analysts. Cross-directorate planning for this program is
necessary.
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1 July 1980
MANAGEMENT ISSUE
ISSUE STATEMENT:
There is a need to strengthen the Directorate of Administration's
ability to provide general support in the headquarters area.
A plan developed today would begin to show demonstrable improvement
in FY 1983 at the earliest.
A resource-constrained environment has played havoc with the
Directorate of Administration's ability to satisfy critical services of
common concern, such as providing an adequate secure voice system
within the Intelligence Community, or a timely shuttle service to the
State Department. It has been further manifested by shortages of paper
in the print shop, a reduction in the guard force and an inadequate
number of officers devoted to industrial security investigation. The
cable dissemination system is inadequate. It often takes longer to
disseminate a cable electrically within the headquarters building than
it does to send it from a station to headquarters.
MANAGIT IMPLICATIONS:
We must reverse this trend or face the prospect of becoming exces-
sively bureaucratic--too few resources require more justification from
those requiring services--and more importantly, cost us the flexibility
we have prided ourselves on in meeting the varied requirements placed on
this Agency by the policymaker.
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1 July 1980
MANAGEMENT ISSUE
ISSUE STATEMENT:
The Agency must have a long-range plan to meet the significant
growth in ADP requirements.
TIME FRAME:
Next five to ten years.
EXPLANATION:
The types of substantive problems facing the Agency in this decade,
to include arms verification, Soviet activities in outer space, measures
of force effectiveness, energy demand, shortages of natural resources,
and new Soviet and Chinese weapons systems, require extraordinary
computer capacity.
Current or new systems, such as SAFE, will meet specific needs but
will not satisfy the entire range of required ADP applications, espe-
cially in NFAC. ADP has proven to be a highly effective investment in
terms of increasing the productivity of analysts.
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