SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050042-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 42
• Content Type: MEMO

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M E M O R A N D U M
SUBJECT: Scientific Intelligence
There are certain peculiarities which affect the field of
Scientific intelligence and the position which it occupies in relation
to other forms of intelligence. In the first place, there is the
ahsence of an agreed understanding of what is involved in "scientific
intelligence", including the question of whether it is concerned
primarily with "pure science" or "applied science". There is also
the fact that scientific intelligence is of general interest to the
entire scientific world and does not affect only the national security.
This is unlike the field of military intelligence, for example, which
is almost exclusively of interest to professional military people.
One aspect of this situation is that in science many of the most
competent personnel are outside of Government service and certainly
outside of service in the national security agencies. The problem of
putting them to effective use for scientific intelligence purposes
affecting the national security creates, in consequence, difficulties
over the proper security precautions which need be observed and the
relations between the scientists and the military. There are also
certain questions as to whether the primary interests and loyalties
of the scientists rest with their profession and with the desire
thereof to increase the general fund of scientific knowledge or with
scientific intelligence, its special needs and its security require-
ments.
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Because science contributes to almost all phases of the
mobilization and war capabilities of a nation and to its offensive
and defensive power, interest in scientific intelligence is scattered
in many places. The various Armed Services, holding it to be their
proper responsibility to attack and defend with their respective
arms, feel that they do not have an identical interest in scientific
intelligence, but that each has an interest corresponding to the
offensive or defensive missions of the particular Service. As a
result of this and of the fact that interest in scientific matters
is so widely scattered throughout the Government and outside, there
has been little progress in developing a central organization for
scientific intelligence or in defining the respective spheres of the
different Services or the interests which they have in common,
Finally, there is a peculiar situation today in which, for
practical purposes, an artificial distinction exists between "nuclear"
and "non-nuclear" science. A variety of legislative and historical
considerations have contributed to this distinction, which obviously
has no validity but, as a practical fact, it cannot be ignored in
organizing and developing scientific intelligence.
Scientific intelligence, as it affects the national security,
is handled in a number of different places. There is no clear-cut
delineation of functions or responsibilities, and there is no effective
machinery for ooordinationf except in limited respects. The agencies
concerned as producers and consumers include the State Department,
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Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, Research and
Development Board, Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. This list, of
course, does not include the non-military agencies, such as the
Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Standards, Weather Bureau,
and National Security Resources Board, all of which have a real
interest in this problem as well as a contribution to make. For
present purposes, we can limit ourselves to the agencies which are
primarily concerned with scientific intelligence as it affects the
national security, although we must assure ourselves that these
agencies are drawing assistance from other sources.
The collection of scientific intelligence is carried on by
a number of agencies operating in the United States and abroad. The
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2, dealing with
collection, does not assign the dominant interest for scientific
intelligence to any department, but prescribes that each agency will
collect scientific (as well as economic and technological) intelligence
in accordance with its respective needs". As a result, the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and State Department are all, to the extent that they
individually choose, collectors of scientific intelligence. In
addition
I One step toward some centralization of collec-
tion is the proposed establidion%, under the State Department, of a
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system of Scientific Attaches, whose purpose, as now proposed, would
be "to collect intelligence information on scientific matters, fundamental
research, and applied research and development, whioh transcends the
competence and/or responsibility of the other attaches". Some central-
ized collection in this field is also being done through communications
intelligence.
The collection procedures, the assignment of requirements,
and the determination of priorities are not made in accordance with
any over-all plan centrally controlled and coordinated. Each collecting
agency gives the assignments it wishes to its own collectors, although
it may receive and handle requests from other agencies. In cases where
a collection request is sent to CIA, the office of Collection and
Dissemination attempts to canvass the collection possibilities through-
out the Government and to see to it that the collection request is
sent to all collection agencies inside and outside CIA which might be
in a position to make a contribution. However, the Office of Collection
and Dissemination is able to act only with respect to those collection
requests that come into CIA from the outside or which are passed from
one part of CIA to another. There is no coordinated procedure with
respect to the whole field or individual parts thereof (except for
atomic energy) whereby the experts in and consumers of scientific
intelligence develop their collection requirements in close consultation
with each other and with the collectors.
In the case of atomic energy intelligence there is the same
multiplicity of collecting agencies (S0, 00, Army, Navy, Air, State,
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and the AEC), but the problem has been somewhat differently handled.
Because of the concentration of responsibility for atomic energy
intelligence in the Nuclear Energy Group of CIA, which has worked
closely with the nuclear energy specialists of Army, Navy and Air,
there has been a greater measure of coordination in this field of
scientific collection than in the others. The chief collection diffi-
culty has arisen between the Nuclear Energy Group and AEC, whose facil-
ities have been used informally for collection, without all of these
facilities having been placed at the disposal of the Nuclear Energy
Group. It is to be hoped, however, that this situation will be
remedied if other difficulties can be worked out and as a result of
the association of Dr. Colby with the Atomic Energy Commission and his
working together with the Nuclear Energy Group.
With certain exceptions governing the case of particularly
sensitive materials such as atomic energy intelligence or communications
intelligence, there seems to be fairly broad dissemination of all
scientific intelligence received in Washington. The principal diffi-
culties seem to arise out of the dissatisfaction of the expert consumers
when they are not allowed to have access to information concerning the
source of the intelligence they are called upon to use. Scientists
who are called upon to evaluate highly specialized information claim
that they cannot do their job properly unless they have full access to
raw information and complete knowledge of sources. This problem has
been particularly acute in the case of atomic energy and the present
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arrangement whereby Dr. Colby of the Atomic Energy Commission is to
have full access to all source material is a recognition that the
resolution of this dilemma hinges upon an agreement that the expert
consumer needs to be satisfied as to the validity of the information
handed to him. If this problem has not arisen so acutely for other
fields of scientifio intelligence, the only reason may be that there
has been less activity in those fields. It may be that the same
difficulties exist there and would become evident if the persons working
in these fields had concerted and coordinated their efforts to an
extent that caused them to become more conscious of the difficulties
handicapping their work.
One further difficulty lies in the fact that not all available
printed material can be put to effective use because of the language
difficulty. The systematic study of foreign literature is hampered
by a shortage of security-cleared personnel possessing the necessary
language and other qualifications,
Except in the field of atomic energy intelligence where
there is still room for improvement, there is no means for producing
what might be considered national scientific intelligence estimates.
In other words, although scientific intelligence is an object of concern
to a number of individuals in different agencies, there is no recognized
way of producing an agreed and authoritative estimate of a problem.
Under National Security Council Directive No. 3, each agency is respon-
sible for the production of scientific intelligence "in accordance
with its respective needs". One would expect to find that the Scientific
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 Branch in CZA-ORE performed the function of drawing together and
coordinating the production of scientific intelligence estimates.
This has not happened. The reason may be the slowness of the Scientific
Branch in forming its organization or it may rest in the conception
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has of its mission, being, as he is, more
interested in science for science's sake than in scientific intelli-
gence. Also, the Scientific Branch may be suffering from some of the
same uncertainty that affects the entire ORE organization so that it
is not clear whether ORE is just another producer of intelligence or
has the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of other agencies.
The fact remains that there is no recognized method by which coordinated
estimates, generally recognized as valid, are produced. The Research
and Development Board, which obviously has a major interest in scientific
intelligence, frequently complains, and with reason, of this deficiency.
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The principal problem in the scientific intelligence field
seems to be how to develop a coordinated effort which will make it
possible--
(a) To plan collection requirements and methods in
coordination with the collectors.
(b) To establish priorities.
(c) To produce authoritative estimates which result
from their concerted efforts.
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This concerting of efforts should also result in bringing
to light cases where there is a dangerous gap between the collectors
and the consumers and where the analysts require information to which
they are not now given access.
Assuming that CIA continues to have the responsibility for
the coordination of intelligence, it seems necessary that in the
scientific field steps should be taken so that CIA understands and
more effectively discharges that responsibility. In strengthening
the scientific work of CIA it may be desirable to consider consolidating
it in one place rather than leave it scattered, as at present.
It seems unnecessary at this time to press forward with any
further inquiry of the atomic energy intelligence picture, although we
should follow closely the way in which the new arrangements work out
between the Atomic Energy Commission and CIA.
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