RELEASE OF THE DULLES-JACKSON-CORREA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 203
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM FOR

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L WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
June 8, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR
SUBJECT:
I 25X1
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Release of the Dulles-
Jackson-Correa Report
In response to the FOIA request ofi the NSC
Staff has released a sanitized version of the 1949 Report to the
NSC by Messrs Dulles, Jackson and Correa on "The Central
Intelligence Agency and National Organization of Intelligence. "
For your information, I am enclosing a sanitized version of th
e
Report as it was released and a copy of my letter t
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
Attachments
Done per Mori Review
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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
and
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE
Done per Mori Review
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
William H. Jackson
approved for release through
Historical Review Program on
.'1,'91 HP P 9/ ...MOPl
1 January 1949
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31
AND 32 AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION
OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS
IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
PERSON 19 PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
January 15, 1949
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Mr. Sidney W. Souers
Executive Secretary
Gentlemen:
In accordance with the terms of the memorandum to the under-
signed from Mr. Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council, dated February 13, 1948, as supplemented by his
memorandum of March 17, 1948,* we submit herewith our report on "The
Central-Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence."
On January 13, 1948, the National Security Council recommended to
the President that a group comprising. individuals not in Government
service should make a "comprehensive, impartial, and objective survey of
the organization, activities, and personnel of the Central Intelligence
Agency." The group was asked to report to the Council its findings and
recommendations on the following matters:
"(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the present organi-
zational structure of CIA.
"(b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.
"(c) The relationship of these activities to those of other
Departments and Agencies.
"(d) The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel."
As a result of this action, the present Survey Group was created and
the undersigned appointed by the National Security Council with the approval
* See Annexes No. 1 and 2 for the texts of these two memoranda which
constitute the terms of reference for this survey.
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of the President. The terms of the resolution approved by the National
Security Council were communicated to the Group on February 13, 1948.
Following discussions with the undersigned regarding the scope of
the survey, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council,
with the approval of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and.
Air Force, sent to the Survey Group on March 17, 1948, a second memo-
randum which constituted an extension of the scope of the survey as
originally set forth by the National. Security Council. In particular,
this memorandum included the following provisions:
"The survey will comprise primarily a thorough and compre-
hensive examination of the structure, administration, activities
and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency
as outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council.
It will also include an examination of such intelligence activi-
ties of other Government Departments and Agencies as relate to
the national security, in order to make recommendations for their
effective operation and over-all coordination, subject to the
understanding that the Group will not engage in an actual physical
examination of departmental intelligence operations (a) outside
of Washington or (b) in the collection of communications intelli-
gence. On behalf of the National Security Council, I will under-
take to seek the cooperation in this survey of those Government
Departments and Agencies not represented on the Council which have
an interest in intelligence as relates to national security.
"It should be understood that the Survey of the Central
Intelligence Agency and its relationship to other Departments and
Agencies will be done for and with the authority of the National
Security Council. The survey of the intelligence activities of
the Departments of State, Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
however, will be for and with the authority of the :respective
heads of those Departments."
It was also provided that the Survey Group should submit from time
to time recommendations on individuals problems, and that problems con-
cerning the Central Intelligence Agency should be given priority over
those Involving other agencies.
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The Survey Group has submitted two special reports to the National
Security Council, each one in connection with particular problems being
considered by the Council and its members.
The. second interim report, dated May 13, 1948, dealt
with the "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."
The present report is based on an examination and appraisal of our
national intelligence structure and operations as created by the National
Security Act of 1947 and developed in the Central Intelligence Agency and
the individual departments and agencies concerned with national security.
In accordance with the directive from the National Security Council,
emphasis has been placed upon the Central Intelligence Agency, but there
has also been an examination of the principal departmental intelligence
agencies in order to determine their scope in the field of intelligence,
and their relations to each other and to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Our examination has been confined almost entirely to the over-all intelli-
gence organization and activities in the Washington headquarters of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State, Army, Navy and
Air Force.
We have met with members of the directorate and personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency and with representatives of other agencies.
With the assistance of our staff, we have consulted approximately 300
persons who by virtue of their present position or past experience are
familiar with intelligence problems. In addition, a series of confer-
ences were held at which officials,of all of the intelligence agencies
were invited to submit their recommendations and suggestions and discuss
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them with the Group. These conferences were attended by representatives
from the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Staff,
Research and Development toard and Atomic Energy Commission.
In conclusion, we desire to record our appreciation for the effective
work of the staff members of the Survey Group,
in assembling data with regard
to our national intelligence organization and in assisting the members of
the Survey Group in carrying out the examination of our intelligence
structure on which this report is based.
Faithfully yours,
Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Mathias F. Correa
William H. Jackson
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Letter of Transmittal
Suzmnar y . .
Chapter I
Chapter II
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction: The Intelligence Problem in the
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Intelligence and the National Security
Act of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Duties of the Central Intelligence
Agency under the National Security Act . . . .
1
15
21
21
Control over the Central Intelligence Agency .
The General Mission of the Central Intelligence
Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
Conclusions and Recormaendations. . . . . . . .
27
Chapter III
The Organization and Administration of the
Central Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . .
29
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
29
Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
32
Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
33
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
34
Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
36
Conclusions and Recommendations. . . . . . .
.
38
Chapter IV
The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for the Coordination of Intelligence
Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
41
The Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . .
.
41
The Organization and Operation of the Machinery
for Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
4+3
Intelligence Advisory Cormnittee. . . . . . .
.
1+3
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Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Office of Collection and Dissemination . . . .
National Security Council Intelligence
Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
The Degree of Coordination Achieved. . . . . . .
Scientific Intelligence. .
Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
Affecting the National Security. . . . . . . . .
Communications Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . .
Proposals for Improved Coordination. . . . . .
5E)
58
Conclusions and Recommmendations. . . . . . . . 63
Chapter V The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for National Intelligence Estimates., . .
65
The Mandate under the National Security
Act and the Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
The Concept of National Intelligence Estimates . 68
The Organization and Activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency for the Production of Na-
tional. Intelligence? . . . . . . . . . . . .
Proposals for Improving the Production of Na-
tional, Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Conclusions and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . 81
Chapter VI Services of Common Concern: Intelligence Research
and Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Proposed Research and Reports Division . . .
83
83
84
Miscellaneous Reports and Memoranda. . . . . . . 86
The National Intelligence Survey . . . . . . . . 87
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Economic, Scientific and Technological
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . .
91
Chapter VII
Services of Common Concern: The Collection of
Overt Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
Contact Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
Foreign Broadcast Information Branch . . . . . .
101
Foreign Documents Branch . . . . . . . . . . . .
103
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . .
104
Chapter VIII
Services of Common Concern: The Collection of
Secret Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
107
The Charter of the Central Intelligence Agency
to Conduct Secret Intelligence Activities . . .
108
Organization of the Office of Special
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
110
Field Activities of Covert Intelligence . . . .
117
Security of Secret Intelligence Activities . . .
122
Counter-Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1211
Communications Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . .
126
The Need for Policy Direction of Secret
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
127
General Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
128
Conclusions and Recommendations. . . . . . . . .
129
Chapter IX
Services of Common Concern: The Conduct of
Secret Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
131
Relations between Secret Intelligence and
Secret Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
131
The Office of Policy Coordination . . . . . . .
132
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . .
134
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Page
Chapter X
The Direction of the Central Intelligence Agency
135
General Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . .
.
135
The Question of Civilian Direction . . . . .
.
136
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . .
.
138
Chapter XI
The Service Intelligence Agencies . . . . . . .
.
139
Mission and Responsibilities . . . . . . . .
.
139
Coordination of Service Intelligence Agencies
11+1
The Status of Intelligence in the Services
11+6
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . .
11+9
Chapter XII
The Intelligence Functions of the Department
of State- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
151
The Research and Intelligence Staff . . . . . .
152
Intelligence Relations between the State
Department and Outside Agencies . . . . . . . .
Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . .
161
Chapter XIII
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
163
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ANNEXES
1. Survey Group Terms of Reference (I): Memorandum dated
February 13, 1948, from Sidney W. Souers, Executive
Secretary, National Security Council. . . . . . . . . . . 165
2. Survey Group Tarms of Reference (II): Memorandum dated
March 17, 1948, from Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secre-
tary, National Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3. Presidential letter dated January 22, 1946, creating the
Central Intelligence Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947. . . . . 171
5. Chart: Central Intelligence Agency Organization as of
January 1, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6. Table: Personnel Strength of Central Intelligence Agency,
as of December 24, 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1:
"Duties and Responsibilities" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
8. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2:
"Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad". . . . . . 178
9. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3:
"Coordination of Intelligence Production.. . . . . . . . . 180
10. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4:
"National Intelligence Objectives". . . . . . . . . . . . 184
11. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5:
"Espionage and Counter-Espionage Operations". . . . . . . 185
12. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6:
"Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring" . . . . . . . . . 186
13. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7:
"Domestic Exploitation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
14. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 8:
"Biographical Data on Foreign Scientific and Technol-
ogical Personalities" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
15. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9:
"Communications Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
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The primary object of this survey has been the Central Intelligence Agency,
its organization and activities, and the relationship of these activities to
the intelligence work of other Government agencies. Examination has been made
of these other intelligence agencies only to the extent that their activities
bear upon the carrying out by the Central Intelligence Agency of its assigned
functions.
Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 19+7 creates the Central
Intelligence Agency as an independent agency under the direction of the National
Security Council. It gives to the Council broad powers in the assignment of
functions to the Central Intelligence Agency and creates a framework upon which
a sound intelligence system can be built. The Central Intelligence Agency has
been properly placed under the National Security Council for the effective
carrying out of its assigned function. It should, however, be empowered and
encouraged to establish, through its Director, closer liaison with the two
members of the National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends and who
should be the main recipients of its product--the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense.
The National Security Act, as implemented by directives of the National
Security Council, imposes upon the Central Intelligence Agency responsibility
for carrying out three essential functions:
(1) The coordination of intelligence activities;
(2) The correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the na-
tional security, which has been interpreted by directive as meaning the produc-
tion of national intelligence;
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At",
(3) The performance centrally of certain intelligence services of caaanon
concern. These include services of a static nature,such as research in fields
of common usefulness, and operational services such as the collection through
the central agency of secret intelligence.
These three functions constitute the basis of an integrated system of In-
telligence and they have been used as the frame of reference for the examina-
tion of the Central Intelligence Agency and the related activities of other :In-
telligence agencies of the Government represented on the National Security
Council, particularly the Department of State and the Departments in the Na-
tional Military Establislm ent.
No amendment to the provision of the Act relating to intelligence Is re-
quiredat this time. What is needed is action to give effect to its true intent.
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TEE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR COORDINATING fl rEL-
LIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Under the statute, the Central Intelligence Agency has broad responsibility
to coordinate intelligence activities relating to the national security. In
the discharge of this responsibility, the Central Intelligence Agency should
review the intelligence field and ascertain where there are gaps or overlaps.
The agency best equipped to do a ;particular job should fill any gaps. Where
two or more- agencies are doing similar work, the one best equipped ought to
carry on the fob and the others drop out or their efforts be coordinated.
This vitally important responsibility for coordination is to be exercised
by recommending directives for approval by the National Security Council. The
Central Intelligence Agency has the duty of planning for coordination and, in
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consultation with the other intelligence agencies, of taking the initiative in
seeking directives to effect it. Today this coordinating function of the
Central Intelligence Agency is not being adequately exercised.
To assist it in carrying out this task the Central Intelligence Agency
has available the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This group includes the
Director of Central Intelligence as chairman, the the heads of the intelligence
staffs of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.
A number of formal directives for the coordination of intelligence activi-
ties have been issued by the National Security Council upon the recommendation
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
These directives, except those specifically assigning to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency the carrying out of certain common services described below, have
not gone far enough in defining the scope and limits of departmental intelli-
gence activities. These activities continue to present many of the same juris-
dictional conflicts and duplication which the National Security Act was in-
tended to eliminate. Consequently, the absence of coordinated intelligence
planning, as between the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service agencies and
the State Department, remains serious. What is needed is continuing and effec-
tive coordinating action under existing directives and also directives estab-
lishing more precisely the responsibility of the various intelligence agencies.
The field of scientific and technological intelligence is an example of
lack of coordination. Responsibilities are scattered, collection efforts
are uncoordinated, atomic energy intelligence is divorced from scientific
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intelligence generally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving at
authoritative intelligence estimates in the scientific field,with the possible
exception of atomic energy matters,
Another important example of lack of coordination is in the field of do-
mestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating to the national security.
Jurisdiction over counter-intelligence and counter-espionage activities is as-
signed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency abroad. However,fifth column activities and espionage
do :riot begin or end at our geographical frontiers, and our intelligence to coun-
ter them cannot be sharply divided on any such geographical basis. In order
to meet the specific problem presented by the need for coordination of activ-
ities in the field of domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence relating
to the national security, it is recommended that the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation be made a permanent member of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee so far has had little impact on the
solution of the problem of coordination, except in formally approving proposed
directives. It should be re-activated and called upon to play an important
role.
To assist the Director of Central intelligence in carrying out his duties
to p:Lan for the coordination of intelligence, the staff in the Central. Intell-
ligence Agency.known as the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
should be reconstituted and strengthened.. It should be composed of personnel
definitely assigned to, and responsible to, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and charged, on a full-time basis, with carrying on continuous planning
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for the coordination of specific intelligence activities. This staff, which
might be called the "Coordination Division," should support the Director in
fulfilling one of his most important and difficult duties under the National
Security Act.
In concluding the consideration of this most vital problem of coordination
of intelligence activities, it should be emphasized that coordination can most
effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various agencies. With
the right measure of leadership on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency,
a major degree of coordination can be accomplished in that manner.
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
A long-felt need for the coordination, on the highest level, of intelli-
gence opinion relating to broad aspects of national policy and national security
was probably the principal moving factor in bringing about the creation of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The lack of any provision for the prompt produc-
tion of coordinated national intelligence of this kind was one of the most
significant causes of the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure.
This type of national intelligence, expressed in the form of coordinated
national estimates, transcends in scope and breadth the interest and compe-
tenceof any single intelligence agency. Hence, such estimates should be fully
participated in by all of the principal intelligence agencies. All jointly
should share in the responsibility for them.
With one or two significant exceptions, whose occurrence was largely for-
tuitous, the Central Intelligence Agency has not as yet effectively carried
out this most important function.
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The Office of Reports and Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency
was given responsibility for production of national intelligence. It has,
however, been concerned with a wide variety of activities and with the produc-
tion of miscellaneous reports and summaries which by no stretch of the ima.,gi-
nation could be considered national estimates.
Where the Office of Reports and Estimates produces estimates, it usually
does so on the basis of its own research and analysis and offers its product
as competitive with the similar product of other agencies, rather than as the
coordinated result of the best intelligence product which each of the interested
agencies is able to contribute.
The failure of this type of intelligence product to meet the requirements
of a coordinated national estimate is not substantially mitigated by the exist-
:ink; procedure whereby the Office of Reports and Estimates circulates its esti-
mates to the intelligence agencies of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and ob-
tains a formal notation of dissent or concurrence. Under this procedure, none
of the agencies regards itself as a full participant contributing to a truly
national estimate and accepting a share in the responsibility for it.
It is believed that this situation can be remedied if the Central Intel-
ligence Agency recognizes the responsibility which it has under the statute and
assumes the leadership in organizing its own work and in drawing upon that of the
other intelligence agencies of Government for the production of coordinated intel-
ligence. Thus, within its own organization, the Central Intelligence Agency
should have, in lieu of the present Office of Reports and Estimates, a small
group of specialists, which might appropriately be called "Estimates Division."
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It would be the task of this group to review the intelligence products of other
intelligence agencies and of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to prepare
drafts of national intelligence estimates for consideration by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee.
The final process of coordination should take place in the Intelligence
Advisory Committee which would review and discuss the proposed estimates. The
finished estimate should be clearly established as the product of all of the
contributing agencies in which all share and for which all take responsibility.
It should be recognized as the most authoritative estimate available to the
policy-makers.
Where particular scientific or technical intelligence matters are involved,
the Intelligence Advisory Committee should secure the views of the best quali-
fied technical experts available to them, including experts from the Research
and Development Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.
There should also be provision for the prompt handling of major emergency
situations so that, as a matter of course, when quick estimates are required,
there is immediate consultation and collective appraisal by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee on the basis of all available information.
The inclusion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a permanent member
should assure that intelligence estimates will be made in the light of domestic
as well as foreign intelligence. Provision should be made for the representa-
tion on the Intelligence Advisory Committee of other agencies of the'Government
when matters within their competence are under discussion.
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PERFORMANCE CENTRALLY OF SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN
Under the National Security-Act, the Central Intelligence Agency should
perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such services
of common concern as may be assigned to it by the National Security Council.
These services, as now being performed by the Central 'Intelligence Agency,
can be broken down into (1) static services, consisting of intelligence research
and production on certain assigned subjects which do not fall exclusively within
the function of any one existing intelligence agency, and (2) operating serv-
ices, consisting of certain types of intelligence collection and related secret
ope:rat ions .
STATIC SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN
At the present time the static services of intelligence research and re-
porting are carried out in the Office of Reports and Estimates. If the duties
of this Office in relation to the production of national intelligence are as-
signed to a newly constituted Estimates Division, the miscellaneous reporting
functions presently carried out by the Office of Reports and Estimates and a
part. at least of the personnel engaged in them could be reconstituted as the
nucleus of a separate division of the Central Intelligence Agency to be known
as the "Research and Reports Division." This Division would also include the
Foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations and the various reference
and library functions now carried on in the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
The economic, scientific and technological fields are ones in which all of
our intelligence agencies have varying degrees of interest. At the present
time there is serious duplication in these fields of common concern. Central
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production and coordination by the proposed Research and Reports Division,
would result in great economy of effort and improvement of the product. For
example, the organization within this division of a scientific branch, staffed
by highly qualified personnel and empowered to draw upon the scientific per-
sonnel of such organizations of Government as the Research and Development
Board and the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of dealing with spe-
cialized scientific problems, is a project which should have the highest
priority.
This division of the Central Intelligence Agency should be staffed in part
by representatives of the departmental intelligence services so that the reports
produced would represent authoritative and coordinated opinion and be accepted
as such by the various consumer agencies.
The Director's plamiing staff for coordination of activities, the proposed
Coordination Division, should review the question as to what subjects might
appropriately be assigned to the new Research and Reports Division for central
research and report and what services now centrally performed in the Central
Intelligence Agency might be eliminated. The Intelligence Advisory Committee
would be the agency to determine the allocation of work, and in case of any
failure to agree the matter would be referred to the National Security Council.
OPERATING SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN
The operating services of common concern presently performed by the Central
Intelligence Agency consist of the collection, through the Office of Operations,
of certain types of intelligence in the United States - i.e., intelligence from
private individuals, firms, educational and scientific institutions, etc.; the
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collection of secret intelligence abroad through the Office of Special Opera-
tions; and the conduct of secret operations abroad through the Office of Policy
Coordination.
All of these services are appropriately allocated to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. These operating functions are so inter-related and, inter-
dependent that they should have common direction at some point below the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence.
In its secret intelligence work, the Office of Special Operations requires
a closer liaison with the Qther intelligence agencies, especially those of the
military services and of the State Department which are its chief consumers
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and which should be able to guide its collection efforts more effectively than
they do at present. The counter-intelligence function of the Office of Special
Operations requires more emphasis and there is need for better coordination of
all its activities with the military, particularly in the occupied areas.
THE ORGANIZATION AND DIRECTION OF THE CTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The principal defect of the Central Intelligence Agency is that its direc-
tion, administrative organization and performance do not show sufficient ap-
preciation of the ,Agency's assigned functions, particularly in the fields of
intelligence coordination and the production of intelligence estimates. The
result has been that the Central Intelligence Agency has tended to become just
one more intelligence agency producing intelligence in competition with older
established agencies of the Government departments.
Since it is the task of the Director to see that the Agency carries out
its assigned functions, the failure to do so is necessarily a reflection of
inadequacies of direction.
There is one over-all point to be made with respect to the administration
of the Central Intelligence Agency. The organization is over-administered in
the sense that administrative considerations have been allowed to guide and,
on occasion, even control intelligence policy to the detriment of the latter.
Under the arrangements proposed in this report, the heads of the newly consti-
tuted Coordination, Estimates, Research and Reports, and Operations Divisions
would be included in the immediate staff of the Director. In this way the
Director, who at present relies chiefly on his administrative staff, would
be brought into intimate contact with the day-to-day operations of his agency
and be able to give policy guidance to them.
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In commenting on administration, the question of security should also be
stressed. The Director is charged under the law with protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. One of the best methods of
achieving this is to correct the present situation where the Agency is viewed
and generally publicized as the collector of secret intelligence and to bury
its secret functions within a Central Intelligence Agency whose chief recog-
nized activities are the coordination of intelligence and the production of
intelligence estimates.
In reviewing the work of the directorate, consideration has been given to
the question whether or not the Director should be a civilian. The work of
the Agency, from its very nature, requires continuity in that office which. is
not likely to be achieved if a military man holds the post on a "tour of duty"
basis. For this reason, as well as because freedom from Service ties is de-
sirable, the Director should be a civilian. This recommendation does not ex-
clude the possibility that the post might be held by a military man who has
severed his connection with the Service by retirement.
TEE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF TEE STATE
DEPARTMENT
The Service intelligence agencies and the intelligence organization of
the State Department have been reviewed from the point of view of the over-all
coordination of intelligence and of the contribution which These agencies
should make to the assembly and production of national intelligence.
As regards the Service intelligence agencies, the active exercise by the
Central Intelligence Agency of its coordinating functions should result in a
more efficient allocation of effort than is presently the case. The Service
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agencies should concern themselves principally with military intelligence
questions, leaving the Central Intelligence Agency to perform agreed central
services of common interest. In addition, continuing responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency for coordination should be exercised with respect
to certain Service activities, for example, espionage and counter-espionage in
occupied areas. The Joint Intelligence Committee would continue to operate
with its membership unchanged and would concern itself exclusively with mili-
tary and strategic questions as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Services would participate in the formulation of national intelligence esti-
mates through their membership in the Intelligence Advisory Committee and would
share in the collective responsibility for these estimates.
In the case of the Research and Intelligence staff of the State Department,
the conclusion has been reached that this staff, as at present constituted, is
not sufficiently close to operation and policy matters in the Department to
furiish the necessary liaison or the political intelligence estimates required
by the Central Intelligence Agency for the preparation of national estimates.
Accordingly, it is desirable that a high official of the State Department be
designated as its Intelligence Officer to coordinate these activities, to act
as the Department's representative on the Intelligence Advisory Committee and,,
in general, to act as liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency with respect
to the intelligence and related activities of the two agencies and to develop
close working relations between them.
While organization charts can never replace individual initiative and
ability, the Central Intelligence Agency, reorganized along the functional
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Lanes indicated in this report... should be able more effectively to carry out
the duties assigned it by law and thus bring our over-all intelligence system
closer to that point of efficiency which the national security demands.
The foregoing summary is only a brief outline of the main points of the
report and does not take the place of the detailed discussion in the report
and the various conclusions and recommendations at the close of the respective
chapters.
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CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
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Before considering the adequacy and effectiveness of the work of the
Central Intelligence Agency and its relations to our other intelligence agen-
cies, a brief word of background may be helpful.
Although the Central Intelligence Agency is largely an outgrowth of our
experience in World War II, it would be wrong to proceed from the premise that
prior to the war our Government had operated without intelligence as to the
capabilities and intentions of possible enemies or prospective allies. The
Department of State had long maintained a widespread information -gathering
service. The Army, the Navy and certain other departments of the Government
had maintained their own systems of collecting information and producing
intelligence.
Prior to World War II, however, we had no integrated secret intelligence
service. We had not adequately exploited the available sources of overt in-
telligence. We had no central agency to coordinate intelligence collection
and production, and to assemble the best available intelligence for expression
in national estimates to guide in the formulation of foreign policy and the
preparation of our defense plans.
In World Wars I and II our European Allies, Great Britain in particular,
had placed the product of their intelligence services largely at our disposal.
While we can expect in the future assistance from the intelligence services of
friends and allies, we have rightly concluded that we should not depend on
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them for our intelligence to the extent we were forced to do in World. War I
and during the early days of World War II.
It was World War I~ which showed both our deficiencies in intelligence
and also what we could accomplish under pressure. Through the expansion of
the facilities of the State Department and the military services, through the
Office of Strategic Services -- our first move towards a central intelligence
agency -- through enlisting the best personnel that could be found, in and out
of Government service, we were turning out a very creditable performance in
many phases of intelligence work well before the end of thy; war.
We now recognize that if we are to have adequate intelligence in times of
crisis, we must prepare in time of peace, and we have seriously turned to the
task of building ups, central intelligence organization. The country has now
accepted the verdict, even if somewhat reluctantly, that peace-time intelli-
gence is essential to security and, as many of our military leaders have said,
our first line of defense. It took us a long time to reach this conclusion,
and. we are only now gradually getting over our suspicions of intelligence and
our tendency to confuse it with mere intrigue and the more lurid side of es-
pionage. We are beginning to accept it as serious and honorable work and essen-
tial to our defense.
It is well to recogn.ize,however, that an efficient intelligence organ:Lza-
tion cannot be built overnight.
It will require years of patient work to provide skilled personnel to do
the job. Blueprints and organization charts, even legislation and ample appro-
priations will not take the place of competent and highly trained men and
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women. Without them we shall have neither effective intelligence operations
nor sound intelligence estimates. Unfortunately, in the difficult organiza-
tional period since the war, the future of intelligence as a career has seemed
so uncertain that many war-trained and competent men have left the sex-Tice,
and it has been particularly difficult to find recruits to take their place.
Finally, security for our intelligence activities is not always easy to
achieve here in the United States. It is not only the penetration of fifth
columnists which we have to guard against. We have the general problem rising
out of our tradition that all of the affairs of the Government shall be con-
ducted in the open. Sometimes we tend to carry this over even as regards the
.publication of the intimate details of intelligence operations. In peacetime,
particularly, it is not always easy to reconcile our vital interest in pro-
tecting the freedom of the press with the need for silence on certain phases
of intelligence.
As against these debit items, we could cite a long list of highly favorable
factors. America has the potential resources, human and material, for the
best intelligence service in the world.' Within our borders we have every race
and nationality, loyal sons speaking every language, travelling and resident
in every foreign country. We have a wide geographical base for the development
of intelligence work. We have the greatest reservoir of scientific and tech-
nical skills. We have important allies abroad who are ready to join their
knowledge to ours and to give us the benefit of their years of experience in
intelligence. And last, and possibly most important of all, in the field of
intelligence work,we can develop the individual in_itiative,skill and ingenuity
of a free people, and, in dealing with our main intelligence antagonists, even
though they operate with the iron discipline imposed by the Kremlin, we can
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show that free men can be vastly more efficient than those working for a
slave system.
These are some of our great assets; our problem is to mobilize -them.
There are real elements of urgency in seeing that this task is accomplished.
(1) America today, as never before in time of peace, is? vul'herable to
sudden and possibly devastating attack. To meet an initial attack, there are
no sure military weapons of defense and it may well be that our best protec-
tion lies in adequate advance knowledge of the character and timing of the
danger .
(2) A vast area of the world stretching from the Elbe River in Germany
to the Yangtse in China is largely behind an iron curtain where the normal
sources of information are partially or wholly lacking. The techniques of an
intelligence service ought to be one of the important means of penetrating
this barrier.
(3) A whole new area of knowledge in the field of science has become
vital for our defense. This field cuts across the functions of various Govern-
ment departments and presents new problems from the viewpoint of intelligence
collection and coordination.
(4) The far-flung activities of the fifth column, both here and abroad,
present a new type of threat to our security, and we require a concerted in-
telligence program to counter this danger.
These are only a few of the developments which give to intelligence an
importance in our defense system which it has never had in the past in time of
peace. Fortunately, these facts are now becoming well understood, and the
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Administration, the Congress and the people share with deadly seriousness the
determination that the United States here and now shall build the best intelli-
gence service that our national genius and our great resources can provide.
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CHAPTER II
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Beginning as early as 1944 preparations were under way for the transition
from war-time intelligence to a permanent intelligence organization suited to
our post-war needs.
In a series of discussions among the interested Government agencies as to
how the country could most effectively organize its permanent, long-range,
peace-time intelligence there was general agreement on some form of a central
agency. There was, however, a sharp divergence of views as. to the scope of the
activities of such an agency, the authority it should enjoy, the manner in
which it should be administered and controlled and where in the Government it
should be located. These issues were resolved at that time. through the crea-
tion by Presidential letter (See Annex No. 3) of the Central Intelligence Group,.
and then more definitely determined through the establishment of the Central
Intelligence Agency by Congress in Section 102 of the National Security Act of
1947. (See Annex No. 4).
THE DUTIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
Section 102 (d) of this Act defines the duties of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency as follows: -
"(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national secu-
rity, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National
Security Council --
"(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning
such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies
as relate to national security;
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11(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for
the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelli-
gence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and
facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena,
law-enforoement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further
That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue
to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelli-
gence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible or'pr ecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure;
"(1+) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agen-
cies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
"(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct."
In these provisions the authors of the National Security Act showed a
sound understandingcf our basic intelligence needs by assigning to the Central
Intelligence Agency three broad duties which had never before been adequately
covered in our national intelligence structure. These duties are: (1) to
advise the National Security Council regarding the intelligence activities of
the government and make recommendations for their coordination; (2) to pro-
vide for the central correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence
relating to the national security; and (3) to assure the performance, cen-
trally, subject to National Security Council direction, of certain intelligence
and related functions of common concern to various departments of the
Government?
The powers given to the National security council and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency under Section 102 of the Act establish, in our opinion, the
framework for a sound intelligence service for this country. Accordingly, we
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do not suggest any amendments to the Act and believe it would b3 unwise to
tamper with this legislation until we have had further experience in oper-
ating under it. Throughout our report we stress the vital importance of
giving effect to the real legislative intent through the effective exercise
by the Central Intelligence Agency of those functions assigned to it by
the Act. We refer particularly to the responsibility of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency for the coordination of intelligence activities and the co-
ordination of intelligence opinion in the form of national intelligence
estimates.
In providing for a semi-autonomous highly centralized agency with a broad
variety of intelligence responsibilities affecting various Government agencies,
we have departed from the general pattern followed by other countries. There
the tendency in most phases of intelligence has been to avoid such a degree of
centralization. Under the conditions existing in the United States we believe
that the degree of centralization proposed under the National Security Act can
be justified., provided that the distinctive functions of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency are handled according to their special requirements.
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51~P sEC~r~
CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
We do not agree with the argument, often advanced, that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, or at least its operating services, should be placed under the
direct control of one of the executive departments of the Government, such as
the Department of State or the National Military Establishm,3nt. The activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency do not concern either of these departments
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exclusively. Moreover, the administrative arrangements of these departments
are not well suited to the conduct of extensive secret foreign intelligence
operations. The fact that in time of war secret activities are primarily of
concern to the military is not, in our opinion, sufficient justification for
placing them under military control in time of peace. The National Security
Act is flexible enough and the authority of the National Security Council
sufficiently broad to permit any necessary adjustments within the Central In-
telligence Agency so that these operations will be responsive to the needs of
the policy-making and operating departments of the Government, without sub-
ordinating them directly to these departments.
We have also considered the question whether the Central Intelligence
Agency as a whole is properly placed in our governmental structure under the
National Security Council. When the National Security Act was being drafted-
doubts were expressed whether a committee such asthe National Security Council
would be able to give effective direction to the Central Intelligence Agency.
It was argued that the National Security Council was too large a body, would
be preoccupied with high policy matters, and would meet too infrequently to be
able to give sufficient attention to the proper functioning of the Central In-
telligence Agency.
There is force to the criticism that a committee, no matter how august,
is rarely an effective body for the direction of the current operations of
another agency. It is true that the National Security Council cannot effec-
tively assume the task of directing such current operations, and should not
attempt to do so, except to the extent of assuring itself of compliance with
its directives. However, the Council, whose chairman is the President and
whose membership comprises the highest authority in the interested departments
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of the Government, can render effective service in determining the nature and
scope of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency within the frame-
work of the National Security Act.
We recommend, however, that provision should be made for closer liaison
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the two members of the National
Security Council on whom It chiefly depends: namely, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense. We suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence
be encouraged to seek current advice and continuing guidance from these two
members of the National Security Council on matters which may not properly be
the subject of its formal directives, or which have not reached the point of
requiring such directives. Such close association would help counteract what
we feel is a growing tendency for the Central Intelligence Agency to become a
separate and independent agency of Government working to some extent in com-
petition with, rather than for the benef it of, those departments of Government
which are the primary users of what the Central Intelligence Agency should
produce.
THE GENERAL MISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Unless the Central Intelligence Agency performs an essential service for
each of these departments and coordinates their intelligence activities it
will fail in its mission. The Central Intelligence Agency should not be mere-
ly another intelligence agency duplicating and rivalling the existing agencies
of State, Army, Navy and .Air Force. It should not be a competitor of these
agencies, but a contributor to them and should help to coordinate their
intelligence activities. It must make maximum use of the resources of exist-
ing egencies; it must not duplicate their work but help to put an end to
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existing duplication by seeing to it that the best qualified agency in each
phase of the intelligence field should assume and carry out its particular
responsibility.
In the succeeding chapters of this report we will suggest concrete steps
for giving effect to these general principles. In doing so we will start from
the premise which we have stated above that the existing legislation affords a
good basis on which to build a central intelligence service. Furthermore, as
the most practical method of approach, we will examine what has been accom-
plished through the Central Intelligence Agency under this legislation and
suggest as we go along the specific and, in some cases, fundamental changes
which we consider desirable. In this way we will build upon what we now have
rather than attempt to start anew and build from the ground up.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 establishes a
framework for a sound intelligence system and no amendments to this Section of
the Act are deemed necessary at this time.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed in our govern-
mental structure under the National Security Council.
(3) The Central Intelligence Agency should be empowered and encouraged
to establish through its Director closer liaison with the two members of the
National Security Council on whom it chiefly depends. namely, the Secretaries
of State and Defense.
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CHAPTER III
THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ORGANIZATION
The National Security Act of 191+7 does not make detailed provision for
the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency. It provides that the
Agency shall be headed by a Director of Central Intelligence and that he "shall
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, from among the commissioned officers of the Armed Services or from among
individuals in civilian life".
. With one exception, noted below, the Director is free to organize the
Central Intelligence Agency as he chooses and to appoint to positions within
the organization persons of his own. selection, as well as to terminate their
employment without regard for normal Civil Service procedures.
In this chapter we discuss the administrative organization of the Central
Intelligence Agency, leaving for Chapter X, when we have completed our exami-
nation of the various activities of the Agency, an appraisal of the over-all
direction of the organization in relation to its assigned mission.
In carrying out his task of organizing the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Director has designated as his immediate subordinates a Deputy Director
and an Executive Director*. Assisting this directing group in a staff capacity
are the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS); the General
* General Order No. 11 of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated September 11+,
191+8, which is to become effective shortly, abolishes the post of Executive
Director.
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Counsel who handles all legal and legislative work;
the Executive for Administration and Management, in charge of
financial and budgetary matters, administrative services, supply and general
housekeeping, personnel and management advice and surveys; and the Executive
for Inspection and Security, responsible for internal security policies and
invV3stigations, physical security arrangements, inspections and audits. (For
Organization Chart as of January 1, 191+9, see Annex No. 5).
The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS), comprising
persons nominated by the Departments of State, Army,. Navy and Air Force, has
the primary responsibility for assisting the Director and the Intelligence
Advisory Committee with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities.
(See Chapter IV).
The other functions of the Central Intelligence Agency are performed in
five Offices*, each headed by an Assistant Director. These are the Office of
Reports and Estimates (01RE), Office of Special Operations (OSO), Office of
Policy Coordination (OPC), Office of Operations (00), and Office of Collection
and Disseminatibn (OCD). A chart showing the personnel strength of the various
parts of the Agency as of December 24, 1948 is given in Annex No. 6.
The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to "correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" is assigned to the
Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). However, as we will point out later,
(See Chapters V and VI), a clear distinction has never been made within the
* We understand that since this report was written steps are being taken to
create a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence.
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Office of Reports and Estimates between the duty of correlating national in-
telligence and performing other miscellaneous reporting activities which are
more in the nature of "static" common service functions.
The "operating" services of common concern which have been assigned to
the Central Intelligence Agency are carried out by three Offices. The Office
of Special Operations is responsible for foreign espionage and counter-espionage
(See Chapter VIII). The Office of Operations is charged with the exploitation
of domestic contacts for foreign intelligence, the monitoring of foreign broad-
casts and the exploitation of intelligence information found in foreign docu-
ments, press and other publications (See Chapter VII). The Office of Policy
Coordination is charged with conducting secret operations abroad under a spe-
cial mandate from the National Security Council which stipulated that the As-
sistant Director, Office of Policy Coordination, must be nominated by the
Secretary of State, and that his appointment by the Director is subject to
approval by the National Security Council. This is the only case, as mentioned
above, in which the National Security Council has prescribed internal arrange-
ments within the Central Intelligence Agency or limited the appointive author-
ity of the Director. (See Chapter IX).
The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines a variety of functions,
each somewhat differently related to the over-all mission of the Central In-
telligence Agency. It performs static services of common concern in that it
compiles and maintains certain biographical, library and other reference mate-
rials. It also performs a coordinating function in handling intelligence col-
lection requests of the Central Intelligence Agency and the other departments.
Finally, it performs administrative functions such as the reception and dis-
semination of documents and reports.- (See Chapter IV).
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BUDGET
The Central Intelligence Agency appears to have no serious budgetary
problem and is favored by adequate Congressional support. The budget proposals,
as approved by the Director, are submitted each year with the authorization of
the National Security Council to the Bureau of the Budget where they are
handled by one official who has full security clearance. Then the budget is
supported before special sub-committees of the Appropriations Committee of the
two Houses of Congress. After approval, arrangements are made with the Bureau
of the Budget so that various parts of the budget are appropriated to other
departments. Thus, there is no official appropriation to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, but there are a number of separate blanket and unidentified ap-
propriations to other departments, which act as the vehicles for transmitting
the funds to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget have refrained from examining
in detail the internal workings of the Central Intelligence Agency in order to
determine the justification for the budget. It is important that such dis-
cretion and security be continued and that special treatment be accorded.
However, in order to justify this, it is necessary that the National Security
Council continuously assure itself as. to the proper maiagement and operations
of the Central Intelligence Agency, serving as the informed sponsor of the
Agency and as the protector of its security.
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In summary, we believe that the present arrangements for handling the
difficult question of the budget for the Central Intelligence Agency are sound.
and that the Agency has not been hampered in carrying out its present respon.-
sibi:lities by lack of ftuzd.s.
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Lest further incidents of this character occur, every effort should be
made to prevent the public disclosure of secret information relating to the
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the National Security
Act (Section 102 (d) (3)), the Director of Central Intelligence is made re-
sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. This mandate appears to give the Director authority to resist
pressure for disclosure of secret information.
If, however, in his relations with Congress or with other Government de-
partments, the disclosure of secret information is sought from the Director,
and if he has any doubt as to whether he should comply, it should be established
practice for him to refer the question to the National Security Council in
order that it may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public interest.
We believe that other steps can also be taken toward an improvement of
security. There should be greater flexibility in the Central Intelligence
Agency's organization by distinguishing between those functions which are
written into the statute and hence are public and those whose existence, and
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certainly whose operations, should remain secret. The two should be adminis-
tratively and functionally separated, and appropriate concealment should be
given to the secret activities as discussed below. (See page 116).
At the same time, a serious endeavor should be made to reverse the pres-
ent unfortunate trend wherein the Central Intelligence Agency finds itself
advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organization. It should. be
presented instead to the ;public as the centralized coordinator of intelligence.
This would help to cover :rather than uncover its secret operations. Even with
these specific steps, in the long run only organizational discipline and per-
sonal discretion will insure security.
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(See Chapter X).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The centralization of all administration in one office is undesirable
since secret operations require their own separate administration.
(2) The present arrangements for handling the difficult budgetary ques-?
tions of the Central Intelligence Agency are soundly conceived, and the Agency
has not been hampered in carrying out its present responsibilities by lack of
funds.
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(3) To assist the Director in carrying out his statutory duty of protect-
ing intelligence sources and methods he should, in cases where the disclosure
of secret information is sought from him and he has doubt as to whether he
should comply, refer the. question to the National Security Council in order
that it may determine' whether or not disclosure is in the public interest.
(4+) In the interest. of security, the Central Intelligence Agency should
increasingly emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence rather
than its secret intelligence activities in order to reverse the present un-
fortunate trend where it finds itself advertised almost exclusively as a secret
service organization. In this way it can help to cover up rather than to un-
cover the secret operations entrusted to it.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The coordination of the intelligence activities of the several departments
and agencies concerned'with national security was a primary reason for estab-
lishing the Central Intelligence Agency. This is clear from the early discus-
sions concerning the creation of a central agency and from the language of
Section 102 of the National Security Act.
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
To achieve this purpose, the Central Intelligence Agency was assigned the
duty of advising the National Security Council in matters concerning such in-
telligence activities as relate to the national security and of making recom-
mendations to the National Security Council for their coordination. The Act
does not give the Central Intelligence Agency independent authority to coordi-
nate intelligence activities. Final responsibility to establish policies is
vested in the National Security Council.
This duty of advising the National Security Council, together with the
two other principal duties of correlating national intelligence and performing
common services as determined by the National Security Council, all serve the
general purpose of coordination. In fact, these three basic duties of the
Central Intelligence Agency, although distinct in themselves, are necessarily
inter-related and the performance of one function may involve another.
For example, in performing its duty of advising on the coordination of
intelligence activities, the Central Intelligence Agency may recommend to the
National Security Council the means to be employed in the assembly of reports
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and estimates requisite for the performance by the Agency of its second duty,
the correlation of national intelligence. As another example, the Central In-
telligence Agency may recommend, in accordance with its duty to make recommen-
dations for the coordination of intelligence activities, that a particular in-
telligence function be :performed henceforth by the Agency itself under its
thi^d duty of providing services of common concern more efficiently accom-
plished centrally.
The statutory limitations upon the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of the Na-
tional Security Council were obviously designed to protect the autonomy and
internal arrangements of the various departments and agencies performing in-
telligence functions. The Secretaries of departments who are members of the
National Security Council are in a position to review recommendations of the
Central Intelligence Agency concerning their on departments, and provision is
made that other departmental heads may be invited to attend meetings of the
National Security Council when matters pertaining to their activities are under
consideration. In spite of these calculated limitations on the authority of
the Central Intelligence Agency, it is clear that the Agency was expected to
provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated intelligence
system. In practice, the National Security Council has, almost without excep-
tion, approved the recommendations submitted to it by the Central Intelligence
Agency for the coordination of intelligence activities.
The National Security Act does not define the "intelligence activities"
which are to be coordinated under the direction of the National Security Council,
or specify the departments whose activities are covered. Presumably all
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intelligence activities relating to the national security are included, from
collecting information in the first instance to the preparation and dissemina-
tion of finished intelligence reports and estimates. The criterion, a very
broad one, is "such intelligence activities ...... as relate to the national
security" and not the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or
locale of the intelligence activity. Thus, practically no limitations are set
upon the scope of the intelligence activities with which the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is to concern itself.
THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE MACHINl+F2Y FOR COORDINATION
Three organizations assist the Director of Central Intelligence in dis-
charging his responsibilities respecting the coordination of intelligence ac-
tivities: the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), with its Standing Com-
mittee; the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of Collection and Dissemination
(OCD), also in the Central Intelligence Agency.
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COME'=
The membership of this Committee, created by National Security Council
Intelligence Directive No. 1 of December 12, 19+7 (See Annex No. 7), includes
the Director of Central Intelligence, as chairman, the heads of the intelligence
staffs of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, the head of the
Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff and the Director of Intelligence
of the Atomic Energy Commission. It is the direct successor to the Intelligence
Advisory Board which was created by President Truman in his letter of January 22,
19+6 setting up the Central Intelligence Group (See Annex No. 3).
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Beginning with the discussions that preceded the creation of the Committee
there have been two different concepts as to its proper mission. On the one
hand was the view, held in the various departments., that the Committee should,
in a sense, be a "governing board" for the Central Intelligence Agency. On
the other hand, it was argued that Congress had set up the Agency autonomously
and that any interdepartmental committee should serve merely in an advisory
capacity at the discretion of the Director. The solution established in Intel-
ligence Directive No. 1 lies between these views.
In practice, the role of the Committee has not been significant, and in
our opinion, this has been one of the reasons for the weakness of the present
arrangements for the coordination of intelligence. In this chapter and the
next we will submit our recommendations for increasing the responsibility of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee, both with respect to the coordination of
intelligence activities and the preparation of intelligence estimates.
The members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee are authorized to pass
upon recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence to the National
Security Council and upon directives proposed by the Director in implementation
of National. Security Council Intelligence Directives. Although it is incumbent
upon the Director to transmit to the National Security Council dissents of
members of the Committee to his recommendations, the Committee may not prevent
the: Director from making his recommendations to the National Security Council
regardless of dissents. Where unanimity is not obtained on a proposed direc-
tive among the military department members of the Committee, the Director is
required to refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it
to the National Security Council.
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The activities of the Intelligence Advisory Committee have been largely
confined to taking formal action, usually by voting slips, upon directives
proposed by the Director of Central Intelligence to be submitted to the National
Security Council or upon implementing directives. These actions are prepared
for the Committee by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and
the Committee's own Standing Committee of departmental representatives. The
Committee has met/only infrequently and has had little to do with the continu-
ing coordination of intelligence activities or with the preparation of coordi-
nated intelligence estimates.* This situation is probably due to a combination
of circumstances, including the failure of the Director to appreciate the
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for bringing about coordina-
tion, lack of mutual confidence among the departments and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency anda general failure to understand how a coordinated intelligence
system can be brought about.
The conception of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is sound. It is
sound because interdepartmental coordination in such a complicated field as
intelligence cannot be achieved solely by directives and without the fullest
cooperation of the interested departments. It requires frequent consultation
and continuing collaboration on all important questions. The Intelligence
Advisory Committee should be the medium for accomplishing this, but it will
not succeed if it continues to meet only infrequently, and avoids serious
grappling with intelligence problems and continuous conqultation ultation on questions
of common interest.
*On this subject, see Chapter v and particularly page 75 where there is a dis
cussion of the ad hoc committee set up in March, 1948.
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ID17 EPARTMENTAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING STAFF (ICAPS)
This was set up as a staff unit of the Director of Central Intelligence
to assist him in his responsibilities for the coordination of intelligence ac-
tivities. Its members are representatives nominated by the intelligence or-
ganization.s of the State, Army, Navy and Air Force Departments; the senior
State Department representative is the Chairman of the group.
The assigned task of ICAPS is to review the intelligence activities. of
the Government, and assist the Director in initiating measures of coordination
for recommendation to the National Security Council. In order to accomplish
this mission effectively, it should have intimate knowledge of the organiza-
tions, responsibilities, activities and priorities of the various intelligence
agencies. Actually, its achievements reflect inadequate knowledge of these
subjects and failure to appreciate the breadth of the responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency for coordination of intelligence activities.
ICAPS has been largely concerned with the coordination of intelligence
activities by assisting in the preparation of the nine National Security Council
Intelligence Directives and the four implementing. directives of the Director
of Central Intelligence.
It was originally expected that ICAPS would act as the secretariat
or working staff for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, but owing in part to
the infrequent meetings of the Comm2ittee, this has not happened. Moreover,
there has been confusion between the functions of ICAPS and those of the
Standing Committee comprising representatives from the staffs of the members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the result that responsibilities
are divided and unclear. Moreover, the status of the members of ICAPS has been
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ambiguous because it has never been entirely clear whether the group was pri-
marily a staff of the Director of Central Intelligence or a committee repre-
senting the member agencies. This has left the group with divided loyalties
and uncertainty as to its mandate.
The position of ICAPS has been rendered more difficult because its members
have been given operating responsibilities which are not only unrelated to
their primary task of assisting to formulate plans for the coordinating of in-
telligence, but are responsibilities which seem to belong more properly to the
operating branches of the Central Intelligence Agency. Thus, one member of
the staff serves as the full-time liaison officer with the Joint Intelligence
Group of the Joint Staff. This is purely an intelligence research and report-
ing function in which the Office of Reports and Estimates has almost exclusive
interest. Moreover, the official liaison officer from the Central Intelligence
Agency to the National Security Council staff is the Chairman of ICAPS. This
function also concerns matters affecting primarily the Office of Reports and
Estimates and, in fact
a representative from that Office now also works with
the National Security Council staff.
In these and other ways ICAPS has acquired operating rather than planning
functions and has become, to some extent, a buffer between the operating parts
of the Central Intelligence Agenoy.and outside agencies. In carrying out both
its planning and operating functions, it is not in close touch with the intel-
ligence branches of the Central Intelligence Agency. There are numerous com-
plaints that it is not only failing to carry out its own mission properly, but is
actually impeding the other parts of the Central Intelligence Agency in carry-
ing out theirs.
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In general, we have found that ICAPS, staffed by individuals whose e3:per-
ience with problems of intelligence organization is not extensive., and lacking
a clear and firm mandate, has failed to undertake a broad and effective pro-
gram of coordination of intelligence activities. It has been allowed to dis-
sipate its energies in activities for which it is not suited and to neglect its
primary mission. It has not given the impression within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency or outside that it grasps the nature of the responsibility for
coordination of intelligence activities which is imposed upon the Central
Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act.
OFFICE OF COISLECTION AND :DISSEM NATION
The Office of Collection and Dissemination combines three functions, only
one of which is directly related to the task of coordinating intelligence
activities.
In the first place, it acts as a service organization for the other Of-
fices of the Central Intelligence Agency by procuring intelligence data from
other agencies and by disseminating to those agencies the intelligence collected
or produced by these Offices. Its second task is the provision of certain
services of common concern for the benefit of the Central Intelligence Agency
and other agencies. These include the maintenance of an intelligence library
and of certain central registers and indices.
Finally, the Office of Collection and Dissemination performs certain co-
ordinating functions with respect to the collection of intelligence. It proc-
esses all intelligence requests received by the Central IntelligenceAgency,
whether these call merely for documentary material cr require field collection.
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It canvasses the collection capabilities of the Agency and all other appropriate
agencies in order to determine how best to meet these requests. Thus, if the
Office of Naval intelligence should request of the Central Intelligence Agency
information on the petroleum producing capabilities of various foreign coun-
tries, the Office of Collection and Dissemination would determine the intelli-
gence resources which should be tapped in order to satisfy the request. If the
request cannot be satisfied within the Central Intelligence Agency, it will de-
termine what outside agency is capable of procuring necessary information and
will be responsible for forwarding the request to such agency. In the course of
this action, the Office of Collection and Dissemination will attempt to discover
whether any other agency has a similar requirement for information which might
be combined with the original request. In this manner the Office assists in
coordinating the requirements and collection requests received from within the
Central Intelligence Agency and from outside agencies.
It is obvious that this function of coordination is designed to meet cur-
rent requests and does not involve a broad responsibility continuously to mon-
itor and coordinate the collection procedures and requirements of the various
intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Such a re-
sponsibility would force the Office of Collection and Dissemination into the
position of a central clearing house for all collection requirements and re-
quests of all agencies. It would be impractical to have Bauch an arrangement
due to the mass of administrative detail involved and the resulting delay in
the satisfaction of the requests. In practice, direct inter-agency requests,
not requiring coordination, may by-pass the Central Intelligence Agency
completely.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIG.MCEi DIRECTIVES
The formal accomplishment of over-all coordination is represented mainly
by nine Intelligence Directives approved by the National Security council upon
recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with
the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and four implementing directives which
need not be discussed here.
The National Security Council. Intelligence Directives* provide for the
coordination of intelligence activities in various ways. The basic Directives,
Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 seek to achieve coordination of intelligence activities by
allocation of general areas of responsibility to the several departments and
to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Directive No. 1, as we have pointed out, establishes the general arrange-
ments for such coordination. It sets up the Intelligence Advisory Committee,
discussed above, to advise the Director of Central Intelligence, specifies the
procedures for the issuance of Intelligence Directives and defines the duty of
the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to the production of "national
intelligence." Insofar as practicable, the Central Intelligence Agency "shall
not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various Depart-
ments and Agencies, but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities."
The ]Directive provides for exchange of information between the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and the departmental agencies, and authorizes the assignment of
officers to the Central Intelligence Agency by the departmental organizations.
It also includes provision for the Central Intelligence Agency to request au-
thorlity to inspect intelligence material in agencies of the Government.
*See Annexes No. 7-15 for the texts of the Directives.
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Directive No. 2 allocates responsibility for the collection abroad of
overt intelligence among the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force by
establisnrng "certain broad categories of agency responsibility." Political,
cultural and sociological intelligence are assigned to the State Department.
Military, naval and air intelligence are assigned to the respective Services.
The collection of economic, scientific and technological intelligence is allo-
cated to each agency "in accordance with its respective needs." The Directive
provides for coordination of these collection activities in the field by the
senior United States representative.
Directive No. 3 is an elaborate definition of categories of intelligence
production, i.e., basic, current, staff, departmental and national intelligence,
and it assigns the responsibilities of the departmental agencies and the Central
Intelligence Agency in intelligence production. The same areas of "dominant
interest" are specified as for intelligence collection, and the production of
"national intelligence" is reserved to the Central Intelligence Agency. How-
ever, the terms of the various definitions are broadly drawn, the exceptions
are numerous, and confusion of intelligence functions has continued despite
the effort to eliminate it by definition.
Directive No. 4 provides that the Central Intelligence Agency shall take
the lead in preparing a comprehensive outline of national intelligence objec-
tives, and from time to time shall indicate the priorities attaching to these
objectives.
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Four of the Directives'. Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, assign certain "services of
common concern" to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority granted
in the National Security Act (Section 102 (d)). These are coordinating actions
in the sense that, by common agreement,, they assign to the Central Intelligence
Agency primary or exclusive responsibility for conducting certain intelligence
activities of common concern. Directive No. 5 provides that the Central In-
telligence Agency will conduct all espionage and counter-espionage operations
abroad except for certain agreed activities and it also provides that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency will coordinate covert and overt collection activities.
(See Chapter VIII).
Directive No. 6 gives the Central Intelligence Agency authority to conduct
all federal monitoring of foreign press and propaganda broadcasts, and directs
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the Agency to disseminate the information thus received to interested depart-
mental agencies. (See Chapter VII).
Directive No. 7 gives the Central Intelligence Agency authority for the
exploitation of domestic sources of foreign intelligence, and provides for the
participation of departmental agencies in this activity. (See Chapter VII).
These Intelligence Directives allocate responsibilities to the Central
Intelligence Agency in fields which have been conceded to be those of common
concern where work can best be done centrally. This is also true of the allo-
cation to the Central Intelligence Agency of responsibility for the conduct of
secret operations (other than intelligence) abroad by the Office of Policy
Coordination which was accomplished by direct National Security Council action
(NBC 10/2) and not by Intelligence Directive submitted through the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. (See Chapter Ix). In all of these cases where particular
functions of common concern have been assigned, the allocation of functions
has been generally accepted as sound.
THE DEGRFIE OF COORDINATION ACHIEVID
In spite of these formal directives for the coordination of intelligence
activities, it is probably correct to say that departmental intelligence ac-
tivities are substantially unaffected by this program of coordination except
where the Central Intelligence Agency has been given exclusive responsibility
for certain activities.
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In general, there 1s an absence of effective coordination under the lead-
ership of the Central Intelligence Agency and there is virtually no supervision
of the ways in which the various directives are carried out, except that the
Central Intelligence Agency controls those common service activities assigned
to it. Conflicts of Jurisdiction and duplication of activities remain. In
many cases they have not only been unr:;solved, which is hardly surprising after
such a short time, but they remain unrecognized and unacknowledged.
Despite the provisions of Directives Nos. 2 and 3 in regard to the allo-
cation of dominant interest, each department collects and produces the intel-
ligence it chooses according to priorities it establishes. The very large
loopholes in these directives and the absence of any continuously effective
monitoring of their implementation makes this possible. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency itself has become a competitive producer of intelligence on sub-
jects of its on choosing which can by no stretch of the imagination be called
national intelligence. (See Chapters V and VI). The amount of undesirable
duplication among intelligence agencies is considerable and the absence of co-
ordinated intelligence collection and production is serious.
In our opinion, certain essentials for the improvement of this situation
would include: continuous examination on the initiative of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency of instances of duplication and failure of coordination; direc-
tives which establish more precisely the responsibilities of the various de-
partments; and the effective carrying out of plans through close interdepart-
mental consultation at all levels. To a greater or lesser degree, all of these
essentials are lacking at the present time.
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Clearly, as pointed out above, the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to coordinate intelligence activities is subject to directives of the
National Security Council. However, the responsibility to advise the National
Security Council and to make recommendations for coordination is squarely placed
on the Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore, lack of authority in a specific
situation should not deter the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising its
responsibility to submit recommendations so that proper coordination will re-
sult. If there are doubts as to how the coordination should be affected, it is
the duty of the Agency to ask the National Security Council to resolve them.
The coordination of intelligence activities today is particularly important
in three fields illustrative of the general problem, namely -- scientific in-
telligence, domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence affecting the na-
tional security, and comannications intelligence.
SCIENTIFIC INT'E JLIGENCE*
The field of scientific and technological intelligence is obviously one
which may overshadow all others in importance. At the present time there is
no proper coordination of effort in this field, which is one in which there is
a broad area of common interest. In fact, this diffusion of responsibility is
confirmed in National Security Council Intelligence Directives Nos. 2 and 3
which allocate collection and production responsibilities for scientific and
technological intelligence to "each agency in accordance with its respective
needs."
*Since this report was written, steps are being taken to create in the Central
Intelligence Agency a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence and to trans-
fer to it the Nuclear Energy Group now in the Office of Special operations.
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Each of the military Services collects scientific and technological in-
telligence in accordance with its own program and produces such reports as it
chooses. The Central Intelligence Agency performs certain central collecting
services through its Office of Operations and Office of Special Operations.
The Office of Special Operations also houses the Nuclear Energy Group which is
the central governmental unit for interpreting atomic energy intelligence.
Separate from it is a Scientific Branch in the Office of Reports and Estimates
which was expected tobecome the central group for stimulating and coordinating
scientific intelligence. It has not yet filled this role. The Research and
Development Board does not itself actively engage in scientific intelligence
but has an important interest in the field. Its needs should therefore be
given major consideration in plans and arrangements far coordination.
In summery, responsibilities are scattered, collection efforts are unco-
ordinated, atomic energy intelligence is divorced from scientific intelligence
generally, and there is no recognized procedure for arriving. at authoritative
intelligence estimates in the scientific field, with the possible exception of
atomic energy. Here is a situation which must have priority in coordination of
intelligence activities. In Chapter VI we propose certain steps which come
within the scope of this survey.
DOMESTIC fl LLIGENCE A D COUNTER- TLIGENCF, AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY
Another broad field requiring coordination is that of foreign intelligence
derived from domestic sources and the allied field of domestic counter-intelli-
gence. This includes the exploitation of intelligence from United States busi-
ness firms, travellers, etc., exploitation of the intelligence possibilities
of groups and individuals of foreign nationality in the United States,, the
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relating of domestic counter-intelligence to foreign intelligence and the
coordination of domestic counter-espionage with counter-espionage abroad. Ex-
cept for the exploitation of private sources of foreign intelligence in the
United States which is centralized in the Office of Operations of the Central
Intelligence Agency (see Chapter VII), responsibility for the other activities
is scattered among the State Department, the Armed Services, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. There is little effec-
tive coordination among them, except. on a case basis.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has primarily security and law
enforcement responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important area of
intelligence. This includes domestic counter-espionage and counter-sabotage,
control of communist and other subversive activities and surveillance of alien
individuals and groups. All of these functions are closely related to the con-7
parable activities abroad of the Central Intelligence Agency. They all have
an important intelligence aspect, particularly today when intelligence from
domestic and foreign sources is so closely related. The fact that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is primarily concerned with security and law enforce-
ment may result in a failure to exploit the intelligence possibilities of a
situation and may create difficulties in reconciling the intelligence with the
security interests.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is not part of the existing ma
chinery for coordination of intelligence through the Intelligence Advisory
Committee or otherwise. There is no continuing manner whereby domestic intel-
ligence and counter-intelligence are related to over-all national intelligence
in order to serve the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act
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"of' coordinating the intelligence activities of the bevera:L Government depart-
ments and agencies in the interest of national security.,,
In our opinion, the Central Intelligence Agency has the duty under the Act
to concern itself with the problem of coordinating those phases of domestic
intelligence and counter-intelligence which relate to the national security
and should submit recommendations on this subject to the National Security
Council. This is not inconsistent with the stipulation of the National Security
Act that the Central Intelligence Agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law-
enforcement powers, or internal security functions." It would in fact serve to
carry out the program of coordination set forth in the Act in a broad field
which has hitherto been largely neglected.
A step toward bringing about the coordination we recommend would be to
provide for closer association of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the
intelligence agencies by making it a member of the Intelligence Advisory
ConmAittee.
COMMUNICATIONS fl LLIGENC]P
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*We understand that, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, a committee
orthe three ganization for Services
communications
the production of f ca os
question of representatives
mint of
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PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED COORDINATION
In order to remedy the existing situation in respect of coordination of
activities, several steps are necessary. The Director of Central Intelligence
must show a much greater concern than hitherto with the general problem of co-
ordination of intelligence activities which is one of his essential statutory
duties. His is a responsibility to all of the departments concerned with na-
tional security; it can be properly discharged by leadership, imagination,
initiative and a realization that only a Joining of efforts can achieve the
desired results.
The other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee must also share
in the general responsibility for carrying out the intent of the National ,So-
curity Act by quickening their interest and exhibiting a spirit of active co-
operation. No amendment to the Committee ts charter as set forth in Intelligence
Directive No. 1 appears necessary to bring about this improvement.
In the next chapter where we deal with the question of national intelli-
gence estimates we propose that the Intelligence Advisory Committee assume a
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more active role in producing these estimates. In our opinion, this would not
only improve the relevance and quality of the estimates but would give
the Committee the impetus and the background it needs to deal effectively with
the coordination of intelligence activities. More than any other stage in the
intelligence process, the consideration of estimates should reveal the defi-
ciencies and overlaps as well as the accomplishments in intelligence.
We believe, as stated above,. that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
should be added to the permanent membership of the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee. We also believe that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Staff
might be dropped from the regular membership. The role of the Atomic Energy
Commission in intelligence is a limited one and confined to a highly specialized
field. The representation of the Joint Staff upon. the Intelligence Advisory
Committee appears to be largely duplicative in view of the predominantly Serv-
ice membership of the Committee. However, they, together with other interested
agencies such as the Departments of Treasury and Commerce, the Research and De-
velopment Board and the National Security Resources Board, should attend meet-
ings whenever matters of direct concern to them are being considered.
Within the internal organization of the Central Intelligence Agency the
Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) should be set up
clearly as art integral part of the Agency, charged with the task of seeking
out, studying and developing, in consultation with the other parts of the
Central Intelligence Agency and outside agencies, plans for the coordination
of intelligence activities. It should have no responsibility for current oper-
ations, except that certain current tasks of coordination (such as some of
those now performed by the Office of Collection and Dissemination) might be
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carried. out under its direction. The reconstituted ICAPS which might appro-
priately be called "Coordination Division" should be small. Its members should
be persons interested in, and qualified to deal with, problems of intelligence
organization. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the Director, must
look upon this reorganized and strengthened group as hire major support in ful-
filling one of his most difficult assignments under the National Security Act,
that of advising the National Security Council on the intelligence activities
of 16
,he Government and making reconmtiendations for their coordination.
It is our belief that the relationship between certain of the functions
presently performed by ICAPS and the Office of Collection and Dissemination
should be considerably closer. ICAPS is responsible for the promulgation of
plans and policy in relation to the coordination of collection activities. As
one of its tasks, the Office of Collection and Dissemination coordinates actual
collection and dissemination and in some respects is ma position to implement
the general plans and policies for coordination. Constantly dealing with the
day-to-ds.y "working level" problems of collection, the Office of Collection and
Dissemination is in a good position to make recommendations in regard to the
improvement of collection procedures and the coordination of collection'
activities.
We, therefore, recommend that the collection and dissemination functions
of this Office be placed under the new Coordination Divisior;,subject to future
determination of the extent to which individual Offices may conduct their own
dissemination. (See Conclusions to Chapters vii and VIII). We further recom-
mend that all of the library, index and register functions be separated from
the Office of Collection and Dissemination and be placed in a centralized Re-
search and Reports Division as described in Chapter VI.
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CONCLUSIONS AND REC3 M DATIONS
(1) The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Na-
tional Security Act with respect to the coordination of intelligence activities,
which is one of the most important ones assigned to the Central Intelligence
Agency, has not been fully discharged.
(2) One of the important areas where moreactive efforts at coordination
are needed is the field of scientific intelligence. (See Chapter VI).
(3) Another important area is that of domestic intelligence and counter-
intelligence insofar as they relate to the national security. To improve co-
ordination in this area and between it and the entire intelligence field, we
recommend that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be made a member of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
(5) The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly conceived, but it
should participate more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in
the continuing coordination of intelligence activities.
(6) The Intelligence Advisory Committee should consist of the Director of
Central Intelligence and representatives of the Departments of State, Army,
Navy and Air Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other departments
and agencies would sit as ad hoc members when appropriate.
(7) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff should be recon-
stituted as a staff* responsible only to the Director of Central Intelligence,
*In this chapter we have called this new staff "Coordination Division." It
should be noted that this name and other names we have given to proposed
branches of the Central Intelligence Agency are only for purposes of illustra-
tion and simplification and not given as a formal recommendation.
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with the task of developing plans for the coordination of intelligence
activities.
(8) The responsibilities of the Office of Collection and Dissemination
with respect to the coordination of collection requirements and requests and
the dissemination of intelligence should be carried out under the new Coordi-
nation Division. This is subject to future determination of the extent to
which individual Offices may conduct their own dissemination.
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CHAPTER V
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
THE MANDATE UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND THE DIRECTIVES
One of the principal duties assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency
"for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security" is
"to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and
provide for Ot] appropriate dissemination." The Central Intelligence Agency
is thus given the responsibility of seeing to it that the United States has
adequate central machinery for the examination and interpretation of intelli-
gence so that the national security will not be jeopardize& by failure to co-
ordinate the best intelligence opinion in the country, based on all available
information.
In our opinion, this responsibility has not been adequately discharged,
and remedial measures are necessary. There is confusion as to the proper role
of the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of intelligence reports
and estimates. This confusion has resulted from incorrect interpretation and
lack of proper inplementation of the statute and the directives. The reasons
for this go to the heart of the national intelligence problem and need to be
examined in some detail in order to discover how the necessary improvement can
be made.
Although the Act provides that "the departments and other agencies of the
Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate de-
partmental intelligence," the statute does not limit the duties of the Central
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Intelligence Agency to correlate and. evaluate intelligence, except by the
standard. of "national security." Interpretation of these statutory provisions
was made by the National Security Council in Intelligence Directives No. .1 anti
No. 3.
Intelligence Directive No. 1 (See Annex No. 7) provides that the Director
of Central Intelligence shall produce* intelligence relating to the national
security, called national intelligence, and that "in so far as practicable, he
shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various
Departments and Agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities
and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes."
The directive also stipulates that national intelligence disseminated by the
Central Intelligence Agency "shall be officially concurred in by the Inte11-.-
gence Agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial dissent."
These provisions are to some extent clarified in Intelligence Directive
No. 3 (See Annex No. 9) which defines national intelligence as "integrated de-
part:nentil intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and
national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and
transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the
Military Establishment."
Directive No. 3 then places on the Central Intelligence Agency the re-
sponssibil.ity for the production and dissemination of national intelligence.
Such intelligence is to be developed and assembled in coordination with other
departments and agencies in order to obtain intelligence developed within the
-* The term "produce," as used here, means the preparation and issuance of as.-
sembl.ed and interpreted intelligence reports and estimates.
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scope of their respective missions which will assist in the production or com-
plement the assembly of national intelligence. The directive also instructs
all agencies to maintain sufficient researoh facilities to meet their individ-
ual needs and to assist in satisfying the requirements of other agencies.
Areas of "dominant interest," a term which is not specifically defined,
are allocated by the directive to the various departments as follows: political,
cultural and sociological intelligence to the Department of State; military
intelligence to the Army, naval intelligence to the Navy, air intelligence to
the Air Force; and economic, scientific and technological intelligence to "each
agency in accordance with its respective needs." Upon this framework is built
the formal program of intelligence production by the departmental agencies and
the Central Intelligence Agency.
The significant provision of Directive No. 3 for the Central Intelligence
Agency is the definition of national intelligence, for which the Agency is
given exclusive responsibility, although it is recognized as having rights and
responsibilities with respect to other forms of intelligence as well. In ef-
fect the directive interprets the vague provision of the National Security Act
on "intelligence relating to the national security" to cover a particular type
of intelligence teasonably distinct from departmental intelligence and con-
forming to admittedly broad but generally comprehensible specifications.
The purport of the National Security Act as supplemented by the directive
in regard to the production of national intelligence can be understood and
justified in the light of the history and general objectives of the Act. Be-
hind the concept of a Central Intelligence Agency lay the necessity not only
for the coordination of diversified intelligence activities (See Chapter IV),
and for the performance by the central agency itself of certain services of
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common usefulness (See Chapters VI-IX), but also for the coordination of in.
telligence opinion in the form, of reports or estimates affecting generally the
national security as a whole.
Although the Act and the Intelligence Directives give the Central Intel.?
ligence Agency the independent right of producing national intelligence, Di:rec?-
tive No. 1 stipulates that such intelligence shall be officially concurred in
by the intelligence agencies or shall carry statement of substantial dissent?
As a practical matter, such estimates can be written only with the collabora--
tion of experts in many fields of intelligence and with the cooperation of
several departments and agencies of Government. A national intelligence
report or estimate as assembled and produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence opinion,,
based on all available information. It should deal with topics of wide
scope relevant to the determination of basic policy, such as the assessment
of a country's war potential, its preparedness for war, its strategic capabil-,
ities and intentions, its vulnerability to various forms of direct attack or
indirect pressures. An intelligence estimate of such scope inevitably "tran-
scends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Mili-
tary Establishment." A major objective, then, in establishing the Central In-
telligence Agency was to provide the administrative machinery for the coordi-'
nation of intelligence opinion, for its assembly and review, objectively and.
impartially, and for its expression in the form of estimates of national scope
and importance.
TEE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
The concept of national intelligence estimates underlying the statute and
the direct ivee is that of an authoritative interpretation and appraisal that
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will serve as a firm guide to policy-makers and planners. A national-intel-
ligence estimate should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence,
opinion. It should be based on all available information and be prepared with
full knowledge of our own plane and in the light of our own policy requirements.
The estimate should be compiled and.assembled centrally by an agency whose
objectivity and disinterestedness are not open to question. Its ultimate
approval should rest upon the collective responsibility of the highest officials
in the various intelligence agencies. Finally, it should command recognition
and respect throughout the Government as the best available and presumably the
most authoritative intelligence estimate.
The production of national intelligence estimates by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency falls far short of such a.concept, in part for reasons which the
Central Intelligence Agency does not control. The principle of the authori-
tative national intelligence estimate does not yet have established acceptance
in the Government. Each department still depends more or less on its own intel-
ligence estimates and establishes its plans and policies-accordingly. In the
Military Establishment there is some coordination through the Joint Chiefs of
Staff who rely upon the advice of the Joint Intelligence Committee which, in
turn, rests primarily upon the contribution of the three Service departments.
Neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor the State Department participates
directly in these procedures in the Military Establishment, and the estimates
of the Joint Intelligence Committee are in most cases more restricted in scope
than a national intelligence estimate. Within the State Department the policy-
makers are, for the most part their own intelligence. advisors. Finally, there
is no systematic way of tapping that domestic intelligence information, which
should be chiefly in the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, having
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a bearing on broader intelligence issues. At the National Security Council
level the intelligence estimate which is applied to policy papers is brought
to bear through the individual departmental representatives and the independ-
ently produced contributions of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Although the task is made more difficult by a lack of general acceptance
of the concept of'national intelligence estimates in the Government, it is,
nevertheless, the clear duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under the
statute and the directives to assemble and produce such coordinated and authori-
tative estimates.
THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE C]NTRAL fl ELIGENOE AGENCY FOR THE
PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Unfortunately, the attention of the Central Intelligence. Agency has been
largely diverted from the objective of producing national intelligence.
find in examining its organization and activities, that major emphasis is not
placed on the unique national intelligence function of the Central Intelligence
Agency but that this function is largely diffused and dispersed in an organiza-
tion which concerns itself' with a variety of intelligence-producing activities.
These include suanneries of current developments, political reports, background
studies on countries and areas, economic reports, etc. (See Chapter VI).
In the original Central Intelligence Group it was conceived that there
would be a small organization of highly qualified individuals which would limit
itself strictly to national intelligence problems and base its work primarily
on the specialized reports and estimates produced by the departments rather
than employ a large research and analysis organization of its own. However,
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the character of the organization changed, and the Office of Reports and Esti-
mates, which now carries out the responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for intelligence reporting, discharges a large number of intelligence--
producing functions, These include, to a limited extent, the production and
coordination of national intelligence but. also other functions, to be describ-
ed in Chapter VI. Some of the latter functions duplicate those carried on in
other departments, and some are more in the nature of common services on be-
half of the other agencies, although they are not always recognized as sucks.
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The intelligence output of this organization which can be properly termed
"nat:iona intelligence" is not impressive. The subjects are normally selected
on the initiative of the staff itself or as the result of discussions in the
National Security Council staff, where a member of the staff of the Office of
Reports and Estimates generally participates. In producing these reports the
Office usually employs the research of its on staff instead of drawing to-
gether and coordinating contributions from departmental agencies. Such depart-
mental contributions are available to the Office of Reports and Estimates under
the terms of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 as inter-
preted in No. 3/1 ("Standard Operating Procedure for the Production of Staff
Intelligence") but in fact only a small number of the reports are actually
derived from departmental contributions. The customary procedure has been for
the Office of Reports and Estimates to prepare a basic draft which is then
circulated to the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force for their
comments and concurrence or dissent. This procedure has proved to be ineffec-
tive as a means of producing coordinated national intelligence. The depart-
ments participate more as outsiders reviewing the material of another agency
than as collaborators sharing responsibility in an enterprise of equal concern
to all.
In spite.of the use of the system of concurrences for certain types of
reports, the position today of the Central Intelligence Agency is that of an
independent producer of national intelligence, the quality of whose product is
variable and the influence of which is questionable. The tendency within the
Central Intelligence Agency has been to emphasize the independent production
of intelligence and this emphasis has led to two results.
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In the first place, the intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency has not always been relevant to policy requirements and has lacked efi' ec-
tiveness. In the second place, there has been a failure to develop coordinated'
national intelligence which would supersede independent departmental efforts
to produce over-all intelligence.
It is perhaps true that the efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency
have been criticized partly because the opinions expressed by the Agency were
occasionally at variance with the opinions held in the departments; but there
have been other reasons. The independent intelligence estimate is felt to be
useful but never decisive inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency cannot
and does not by itself have all the specialized qualifications needed to pro-
duce national intelligence, and is not, as an independent agency, in constant
and intimate association with the policy-makers and planners, a knowledge of
whose work and intentions is indispensible to sound intelligence.
There is also criticism that the product of the Central Intelligence Agency,
regardless of its quality or importance, gets formal circulation at the highest
levels in the Government even though its content may not coincide with the
views of departmental officials whose on information may be more reliable and
complete. There is in fact a serious danger that the product of the Central
Intelligence Agency may be looked upon as coordinated national intelligence,
which it usually is not.
What has happened is that the creation in the Central Intelligence Agency
of a large office of Reports and Estimates performing, as will be emphasized
in the next chapter, a variety of functions that are not truly related to the
coordination of national intelligence estimates, necessarily means that concern
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with national intelligence problems is diminished, that the area of competition
with the departmental agencies is enlarged and that the Central Intelligence
Agency concentrates more on the independent production of intelligence than on
its coordination.
Adm'nistrative arrangements within the Central Intelligence Agency and
between the Agency and the other departments and agencies have contributed to
this situation. Personnel in the Office of Reports and Estimates who are
responsible for national intelligence (and this includes almost everybody in
part;, inasmuch as national intelligence functions are scattered throughout all
parts of the Office) receive little guidance as to what they should report on.
To a large extent they select their on subjects and establish their on priori-
ties, and. this practice only increases the criticism from which much of the
product suffers. Finally, the liaison relationships with outside agencies are
unsatisfactory although this situation is largely the-result of the lack of EL
clear conception of the proper mission of the Central Intelligence Agency in
the coordination of intelligence opinion in the form of national estimates.
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In fact, one of the most important recommendations of this report is that
a reconr3tituted Intelligence Advisory Committee should perform this function.
In at least one other situation requiring immediate intelligence inter-
pretation there was once again only fortuitous coordination. This case was the
result of intelligence received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
distributed by it. The Central Intelligence Agency performed only a secondary
role and there was no formal intelligence estimate. This further illustrated
the fact that, under present arrangements, recognized and prompt procedures
.are lacking for the authoritative coordination of intelligence views in an
emergency situation. In addition, it was seen that there is no regular and
agreed arrangement for participation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and for the use of intelligence from domestic sources in a national estimate.
PROPOSALS FOR IUROVING THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
In order to remedy the present unsatisfactory arrangements for the.pro-
duction of national intelligence estimates and provide for the coordination of
intelligence opinion at times of crisis and for long term planning, as contem-
plated in the National Security Act, there needs-to be a revision of the pres-
ent arrangements. Insofar as the Central Intelligence Agency is concerned it
is necessary, in the first place, to make a clear distinction between the
function. of correlating national intelligence opinion to assist plans and
policy forilation on the highest level and those intelligence reporting
activities Which may be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency as a cen-
tral. service of common concern.
The mission with respect to the production of national intelligence cannot
be fulfilled solely through a large staff such as the present Office of Reports
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and Estimates whose work is directed more to the production of miscellaneous
reports than to the coordination of national intelligence opinion. In our
opinion the present Office of Reports and Estimates should be replaced and for
it substituted two offices one of which, to be described in the next chapter,
will not be involved with the production of national intelligence but will
perform intelligence research and reporting services of common concern. The
other office, an "Estimates Division," would comprise a small group of highly
selected individuals whose task it would be to draw upon and review the
specialized intelligence product of the departmental agencies in order to pre-
pare, for final discussion and approval by the Intelligence Advisory Committee,
a finished national intelligence estimate. This small group would rely pri-
marily upon the intelligence reports of the individual agencies but it would
have access to such source material as it requires in order to review depart-
mental contributions and prepare consolidated estimates for final action by
the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
National intelligence estimates, in order to be authoritative, must be
fully participated in by all of the principal intelligence agencies in order
that the best advice may be tapped and responsibility shared for those major
estimates on which high policy decisions depend. Therefore, the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, under. the leadership of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, should actively assist in establishing and supervising the national
intelligence production program as well as discuss and review the proposed
estimates submitted to it for approval. The Committee would, at the same
time, concern itself more actively than at present with the coordination
of the other intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies,
as discussed in Chapter IV. In fact, by assuming an active responsibility for
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the reconciliation of intelligence estimates the Committee would almost auto-
matically be able to assist the Director more effectively -in coordinating in-
telligence requirements and developing sound arrangements for the coordination
of intelligence generally.
The membership of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, as we have pointed
out in Chapter IV, would include the Director of Central Intelligence as chair-
man, and representatives from the Departments of State,* Army, Navy and Air
Force ani the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Ad hoc membership should be
given to other Agencies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, Joint Staff and
Research and Development Board, whenever appropriate.
These revised arrangements should make adequate provision for the handling
of major emergency situations so that there is automatic consultation and
collective responsibility when quick estimates are required. We have seen that
in the past such consultation has been largely fortuitous and could not be
relied upon to operate promptly.
This proposal would not affect-the responsibility of the Joint Intelligence
Committee to prepare strictly military estimates for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and perform such other military duties as the Joint Chiefs of Staff might
assign. Through the membership of the Service intelligence chiefs on the In-
telligence Advisory Committee and through close liaison between the Joint
Inte:Lligence Group and the new Estimates Division in the Central Intelligence
Agency, every effort should be made to insure the consistency of the Joint
* See below, page 159, for a discussion of the status of the State Department
representative.
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Intelligence Committee's military appraisals and the broader national estimates
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
Whatever arrangement is decided upon, there are certain general condi-
tions which must be observe, if intelligence estimates are to be sound and
timely. All information, whether it originates from intelligence sources or
whether it comes from other sources including operations, must be available
to the intelligence people who by putting together and studying all of the
bits of information must provide the overall interpretation. There is always
a dangerous tendency, particularly in time of crisis, when it can be most
serious, for vital information to be withheld on the grounds that the intel-
ligence personnel should not see it because it concerns operations or for
alleged security reasons. In other instances the disseminatign of vital but
sensitive material is restricted to a very few people at the top levels with
the result that those individuals who are most competent to analyze a particu-
lar situation are left out of the picture entirely. It is therefore neces-
sary that intelligence estimates be made in full light of our own policies and
operations. The preparation of such estimates should not be impeded by any
barriers arising from security considerations or otherwise, which may jeo'p-
ardize the soundness of the intelligence product.
Finally, any discussion of the preparation of national estimates would be in-
adequate without two caveats., The first applies to those who prepare the estimates;
the second to those who may use them. Prejudice in the form of stubborn adher-
ence to preconceived ideas is likely to be the gravest danger to sound intelli-
gence. Estimates are subject to the risk of being colored and twisted to ref lect
the prejudices of those who prepare them. This can best be countered by providing
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reasonable checks and balances as we have endeavored to do in the composition
and responsibilities of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. If, for example,
the State Department, which may be wedded to a particular policy, presents the
facts distorted by faulty preconceptions, the final product, as reflected in
an intelligence estimate, will be defective. It is hoped that in such a case
the new :Estimates Group of the Central Intelligence Agency will supply an ini-
tial corrective and that the non-State Department members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee will have sufficient breadth of knowledge to challenge the
State De?artment estimate. Likewise, military estimates should be submitted
to scrutiny so that they are compatible with each other and avoid the error,
however unconscious, of magnifying the needs of their on branch of the Service.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee, if it functions properly, and is as-
sisted by the disinterested work of the Central Intelligence Agency is the body
where such distortions should be caught and corrected and the prejudices of
one mind challenged by the thinking of a mind which at least does not suffer
from the same prejudices.
In turn, prejudice on the part of the policy-makers may render them blind
even to brilliant achievements of an intelligence service. They may just re-
fuse to listen to what they do not like. Hence, nothing would be more dan.-
gerous than to believe that if we once had an effective intelligence service
and an efficient intelligence estimating body, we would be immune to a disaster
like Pearl Harbor.
This does not lead to the conclusion that intelligence is futile. It
merely shows its limitations. If the intelligence appraiser can keep from
twisting and coloring the data he receives and if the policy-maker can keep a
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relatively open mind and be prepared for continual re-evaluation of the assump-
tions on which he is relying, then sound intelligence estimates can be a
pillar of strength for our national security.
(1) In the Central Intelligence Agency there has been confusion between
the responsibility of producing coordinated national intelligence estimates
and responsibility for miscellaneous research and reporting activities.
(2) The provisions of the National Security Act for the production of
national intelligence estimates, as interpreted by the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives, are sound but have not been effectively
carried out.
(3) There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency a small
Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelli-
gence product of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated
national intelligence estimates.
(4) Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, these
estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted
Intelligence Advisory Committee whose members should assume collective respon-
sibility for them.
(5) Provision should be made in these arrangements for the handling of
crisis situations when coordinated estimates are required without delay.
(6) Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this way must, in
order to be effective, be recognized as the most authoritative estimates avail-
able to the policy makers.
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CHAPTER VI
SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND REPORTS
PROPOSED RESEARCH AND REPORTS DIVISION
We have recommended in the preceding chapter that there be created a
small, high-level Estimates Division to concern itself primarily with the cor-
relation of national intelligence, subject to final approval by the Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee. If the responsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency for the production of national intelligence is assumed by this Esti-
mates Division, there will remain certain research and intelligence reporting
functions now being performed by the Office of Reports and Estimates which
might properly be carried out as a service of common concern by a newly con-
stituted "Research and Reports Division". Other activities of the Office of
Reports and Estimates should be discarded as being superfluous or competitive
with the proper activities of departmental intelligence.
There is presently within the Office of Reports and Estimates a nucleus
for the proposed Research and Reports Division in fields of common concern.
To these
there should be added the Foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations
(See below,page 103) and the library, biographical and other registers and in-
dices presently maintained by the Office of Collection and Dissemination.
Generally speaking, this Division will be responsible for authoritative
research and reports in economic, scientific and technological intelligence,
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the: maintenance of central. reference facilities, and such other matters as are
deemed of common concern. To the extent necessary, it will also coordinate the
activities of the other agencies in these fields. Its staff should include in
appropriate cases adequate representation from the State Department and Serv-
ices so that, subject to policy guidance from the principal. consumers, its
products will represent the coordinated. opinion of the best available talent
and should be fully responsive to the requirements of the consumer agencies.
In this chapter we suggest the type of activity which should be discon-
tinued as unessential or duplicative, the type of activity which should be
;retained as a common service and some activities, not presently carried out in
the Office of Reports and Estimates, which should be performed by the proposed
Research and Reports Division as services of common concern. It would be the
responsibility of the National Security Council, acting on the advice of the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, to
determine which of these central services might properly be performed, and we
believe twat the Coordination Division (reconstituted Interdepartmental Co
ordinatint3 and Planning Staff) should examine this problem and prepare the
necessary plans.
PERIODICAL SUMMARIES
The Office of Reports and Estimates presently produces current intelligence
in two principal forms: a top secret Dail.y Summary and a secret Weekly Summary.
The former comprises abstracts of a small number of incoming and outgoing
cables received during the preceding twenty-four hours. Approximately ninety
per cent of the contents of the Daily Summary is derived from State Department
Sources, including both operational as well as intelligence material. There
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are occasional comments by the Central Intelligence Agency on portions of the
Summary, but these,for the most part, appear gratuitous and lend little weight
to the material itself. The result is a fragmentary publication which deals
with operations as well as intelligence, without necessarily being based on the
most significant materials in either category. In a summary of this type, cir-
culated to the President and the highest officials of the Government, there is
an inherent danger that it will be, misleading to its consumers. Thisis because
it is based largely on abstracts of State Department materials, not in histor-
ical perspective, lacking a full knowledge of the background or policy involved
and with little previous consultation between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the State Department. Moreover, it is incomplete because it is not based on
all the most important materials.
The Weekly Summary is more widely circulated than the Daily Summary, but
also represents primarily political reporting and competes for attention with
several departmental weekly summaries., particularly those of the State Depart-
ment and the Department of the Army.
Still another periodical publication is the monthly "Review of the World
These summaries, particularly the Daily, are the subject of considerable
controversy and are received with expressions ranging from moderate interest
to strong criticism. The Weekly and the Daily are, to a certain extent, duplica-
tive in that the State Department, to which political intelligence has been
assigned as an area of dominant interest,also disseminates its own operational
and intelligence summaries on the highest levels. As both Summaries consume
an inordinate amount of time and effort and appear to be outside of the domain
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of the Central Intelligence Agency, we believe that the Daily, and possibly
the Weekly, Summary should be discontinued in their present form. We do, how-
ever, appreciate the fact that, to some extent, there may be a need for such
summaries, and we suggest that the newly constituted Coordination Division ex-
amine the situation to determine whether there is such a need and how it can
beet be met.
MISOELLMEOUS REPORTS AND MEMORANDA
The Office of Reports and Estimates also produces a variety of other re-
ports, studies and summaries. Some of these are strategic and basic studies
on foreign countries or areas, presenting the political, economic and military
situation. Others are intended to be estimates of current international prob-
lems. These are formal reports,dealing with a variety of subjects ranging from
"Possible Developments in China" to "Opposition to the ECA". These estimate-
type reports are circulated throughout the various agencies for the purpose of
obtaining concurrence or dissent. But the fact that they are so circulated in
no way means that they are properly coordinated estimates which represent the
best thinking on the subject under review. They often deal with topics which
are not particularly relevant to departmental problems or national issues,
with the result that the various agencies often feel that it is an imposition
to be burdened with the responsibility for reviewing these documents, making
appropriate comments and noting concurrence or dissent.
The Office of Reports and. Estimates also initiates more informal reports
by means of intelligence memoranda produced spontaneously or in answer to spe--
cific requests. These are not coordinated by circulation through the other
agencies. Subjects again differ widely and include such topics as "Soviet
Financing; of the French Coal Strike" and. "Tungsten in South Korea".
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.Much of this production is academic, tends to duplicate work in other de-
partments, has little relation to national intelligence, and is not produced
as a recognized service of common concern. On the other hand, some of this
production might, subject to general agreement, be performed as a central com-
mon service. In our opinion, the newly constituted Research and Reports Divi-
sion should refrain from the production of essentially political studies and
miscellaneous reports and should concentrate its effort upon the production of
reports in those fields clearly assigned to it as recognized services of com-
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
Under National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, the Central
Intelligence Agency is charged with preparing an outline for the National In-
telligence Survey -- an extensive series of basic studies on all countries and
areas of the world -- and with coordinating the necessary departmental contribu-
tions. This study has been assigned to the Office of Reports and Estimates,not
as the producer, but rather as coordinator of the program,under specifications
and priorities approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This coordination
is achieved through the allocation of topics for research and production for
the particular purpose of the Survey series,but there is no provision for cen-
tralization or coordination of current production in these fields.
Under this series, various chapters and sections have been farmed out to
the State Department,the Services, and other qualified agencies. For instance,
the Army has been assigned the responsibility for the sections on transportation
and. conmaunications. The assigmaent of these sections does not mean that Army
is recognized as having either primary interest in, or continuing responsibility
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for, intelligence with respect to transportation and communications.. For the
purpose only of the handbooks,the National Intelligence. Survey eliminates dup-
licationof production in certain fields and provides temporary editorial
coordination of basic intelligence through the allocation of topics. It does
not solve the problem of centralizing or coordinating continuing research and
production in the fields.of common interest.
ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLCGICAL INTELLIGENCE
The. Office of Reports and Estimates appears to have made no serious attempt
to produce coordinated estimates or authoritative intelligence in the fields
of economic, technological and scientific intelligence, in which no department
is recognized as having a dominant interest. The six Geographic Branches,, the
Scieatif':c Branch and a number of the Consultant Panels are variously interested
in these fields but have seldom produced authoritative intelligence contribu-
tions therein. We have found in our examination of the Central Intelligence
Agency, State Department and the three Service intelligence agencies that there
is much duplication and little coordination of. production on these subjects.
Although often along parallel lines, studies are independently produced by the
various agencies and do not, therefore, represent the beat available coordinated
opinion.
There has been an attempt inNational Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tive No. 3 to guide the effort of the various agencies into coordinated chan-
nels by the allocation of certain fields of dominant interest, but in the
fields of economic, scientific and technological intelligence, each agency is
authorized to produce in accordance with its needs. Thus, it is in these
;fields, :Left. open to all agencies and for which responsibility is no-or
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divided and diffused, that the proposed Research and Reports Division could
perform a valuable service of common interest by centralizing or coordinating
research and intelligence production.
It is doubtful whether such a high degree of centralization in these fie lds,
including some essentially military intelligence,is desirable in this country.
Our Service intelligence agencies have been assigned fields of dominant interest,
and they will continue to produce military intelligence within these areas.
However, even if each intelligence agency confines itself almost entirely to
the production of intelligence within its field of dominant interest, there
remains a vast area of common interest in such necessary supporting fields as
economic, scientific and technological intelligence.
The economic field could include, for example,induetrial production, eco-
nomic resources, metallurgy, fuels, power,,couanunications and telecommusLications.
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These are some of the subjects where there is present duplication among our
agencies and in which a great economy of effort and, improvement of product
would result if intelligence were produced centrally. To provide an effective
contribution, the centrally produced reports on economic and industrial matters
must represent the most authoritative coordinated opinion on the subject and
must be accepted as such by the consumer agencies. A principal new consumer
would be the Estimates Division, recommended in the preceding chapter. We
also recognize that the requirements of the various agencies in these matters.
of common concern will differ, and that each agency will need to adapt to its
own particular problems the intelligence produced in these fields.
Few subjects of intelligence are more important than science and tech-
nology,and yet little success .has been achieved in this country toward coor-
dinating intelligence collection and production in these fields. Among, the
agencies which are interested and in a position to contribute are not only the
Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the three Services, but
also the Atomic Energy Commission and the Research and Development Board.*
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To fulfill its responsibilities as the chief analytical and evaluating
unit for scientific intelligence, and consequently as the principal guide for
collection, the Branch would have to be staffed by scientists of the highest
qualifications. We appreciate that in such a Branch it would be impossible to
obtain a leading scientist for each of the many segments of scientific and tech-
nological intelligence, but we believe that a staff of moderate size and of
high quality can cope with the normal research and evaluation,co-opting, where
necessary, personnel from such organizations as the Research and Development
Board and the Atomic Energy Commission.
(1)
;Chapter, there should be created out of the present Office of Reports and Es-
timates a Research and Reports Division to accomplish centrtil research in, and co-
ordinated production of, intelligence in fields of common interest. The staff
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of this Division should include sufficient representation from the State De-
partment and the Services to insure that their needs are adequately met.
(2) The. Coordination Division (reconstituted Interdepartmental Coor-
dinatinE: and Planning Staff) should be given the responsibility for studying
the actual scope of the Research and :Reports Division and for recommending
those services of common concern which should be performed centrally.
(3) The propriety of the preparation by the Central Intelligence Agency
of essentially political mumsies should be reviewed, taking into considera-
tion the need for such summaries, the existence of a number of duplicating
summaries and the particular capabilities of the individual departments to
prepare them.
(4) The various reports, studies and summaries which are not national
intelligence or recognized services of cammon concern should be discontinuedL.
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SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
THE COLLECTION OF OVERT INTELLIGENCE
The Office of Operations, under an Assistant Director, performs a central
common service through the collection of overt intelligence by three essentially
distinct means: the Contact Branch is responsible for the exploitation of
business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in
the United States as sources of foreign intelligence information; the Foreign
Broadcast Information Branch is responsible for all federal monitoring of
foreign propaganda and press broadcasts; and the Foreign Documents Branch ex-
ploits foreign language documents and foreign periodicals and press for intel-
ligence purposes.
CONTACT BRANCH
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7 (See Annex No. 13)
provides that "The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the
exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of business
concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of
foreign intelligence information". The directive also establishes the general
rules under which these activities are to be conducted and provides for the
ways in which the needs of the other intelligence agencies are to be met. This
represents an important step forward toward tapping a valuable source of in-
telligence and overcoming the difficulties encountered during World War II,
when procedures for this purpose had to be improvised and the overlapping in-
terests of a number of agencies reconciled.
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION BRANCH
Under National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6 (See Annex
No. 12), the Central Intelligence Agency is assigned the mission of monitoring
all foreign propaganda and press broadcasts and disseminating the resulting
intelligence. These duties are carried out by the Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Branch (FBIB)of the Office of Operations which conducts actual monitoring
operations through two stations located in this country (on the East and West
coasts respectively), one station in Cairo (being moved to Cyprus); one in
Tokyo and one in Hawaii (being moved to Okinawa). I
Approximately 2,000,000 words are monitored daily by these stations, of
which 150,000 are cabled to this country after local editing. Upon receipt
here, this material is re-edited and published as a daily summary of approxi-
mately 90,000 words. In addition, weekly summaries and special digests on
particular topics are prepared. A considerable amount of data is produced for
the "Voice of America" activity of the State Department. Most of this moni-
toring work is routine, but the Branch also receives from various agencies
statements of their continuing requirements as well as specific requests.
In general, it can be said that the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch
performs a non-controversial common service which is well received by the con-
sumer agencies. If there is any reservation as to the usefulness of its work,
it is that the material is not analyzed or evaluated prior to dissemination;
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it is merely compiled and presented factually. However, this seems to be a
proper arrangement although there should. be appropriate machinery outside the
Branch for taking the monitoring reports and interpreting them in light of
other related intelligence. This would. seem to be a proper function of the
appraisers and producers of intelligence, although the Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Branch, possessing as it does the full coverage, could continue to
make summaries of the traffic it monitors. If, as was suggested in Chapter VI,
a Research and Reports Division is created for research on questions of common
interest,, this might be the proper place where this material could be further
analyzed and appropriate studies prepared. The political analysis, however,
shou:Ld.be done in the State Department.
We have experienced some difficulty in arriving at a recommendation as to
where the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch should be placed in view of our
recommenclations for the dispersal of the other functions of the Office of
Operations. While the work of the Branch is essentially an operating function,
it is also a purely overt one, and this militates somewhat against placing it
in the proposed Operations Division which would be concerned almost exclusively
with covert operations. On the other hand, the fact that the Branch is
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operational argues against placing it in the proposed Research and Reports Di-
vision which would be engaged in performance of purely static functions. On
balance, we incline to the view that, as between the two, the Operations Divi-
sion, with its greater facilities for handling communication operations in
general, is the preferable place within the Central Intelligence Agency. Fur-
ther, it is conceivable that the facilities of the Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Branch may, at some future time, prove useful to the proposed Operations
Division in its covert activities. Of course, the product of the Branch should
be immediately available to the new Research and Reports Division for analysis.
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS BRANCH
The third Branch of the Office of Operations is the Foreign Documents
Branch which has the responsibility for exploiting foreign language documents
and foreign periodicals and press for intelligence purposes. Unlike the Foreign
Broadcast Information Branch and the Contact Branch, which operate by virtue
of charters accorded the Central Intelligence Agency by National Security
Council Intelligence Directive Nos. 6 and 7, respectively, the Foreign Docu-
ments Branch has no such charter and is, therefore, not recognized officially
as a unique common service. The other departments and agencies do some of
their own translations of foreign language documents, etc., but also rely on
the Foreign Documents Branch.
The Foreign Documents Branch is engaged in completing its exploitation of
large quantities of materials captured during the recent war. In addition, it
monitors current press and periodical publications and besides these routine
translations it occasionally translates specific documents upon request. It
also maintains for the various consumer agencies a continuing program of
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abstracting from periodical publications specific materials in such fields as
electronics, transportation, etc.
There is a constant and large flow of production from the Foreign Docu-
ments Branch in the_ form of extracts from the foreign press; current periodical
abstracts, both general and technical, dealing with items of intelligence value
contained in Soviet and other foreign periodicals; an industrial card file rec-
ord for inclusion in the Foreign Industrial Register of the Office of Collec-
tion and Dissemination; biographical intelligence reports; a bibliography of
Russian periodicals, special accession lists and various translations of cur-
rent material to meet continuing requirements.
Inasmuch as it is virtually impossible to have a large pool of expert
translators who are at the same time specialists in various fields, it is most
important that the work of an agency such as the Foreign Documents Branch The
performed in close relationship to and under the constant guidance of the con-
sumer agencies. It would, therefore, seem that instead of being associated an
the Office of Operations with the Contact Branch and the Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Branch, with which it has little in common, it would be preferable
for the:Foreign Documents Branch to be a part of the proposed Research and
Reports :Division suggested in Chapter VI.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMMATIONS
(1) The Office of Operations.cons:tsts of three distinctive activities,
which represent useful and recognized functions in their own field but have no
particular relation to each other.
(2) The Contact Branch should be integrated with the Office of Special
Operations and Office of Policy Coordination under single over-all direction
(Operrations Division) within the Central. Intelligence Agency.
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(3) More active efforts should be made to exploit intelligence from
foreign nationality groups and foreign individuals in the United States, and
steps should be taken by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee to coordinate the activities of the various agencies
in this field.
(4) The Foreign Documents Branch should be made part of the proposed
Research and Reports Division if one is created.
(5) If the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch remains a part of the
Central Intelligence Agency, it should probably be administered by the new
Operations Division, but its product should be currently available for analysis
in the new Research and Reports Division.
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CHAPTER VIII
SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
THE COLLECTION OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE
a government bases
through the press,
nels of trade and
the collection of
tively secondary
peacetime conditions, the bulk of the information on which
its action in the international field is obtainable by overt
to say, through 3iplomatic and military establishments,
scientific and technical publications and the normal chan-
international intercourse. With these facilities available,
intelligence in peacetime through secret means assumes rela-
importance. In fact, as mentioned above, insofar as our own
Government is concerned, covert collection of intelligence was a negligible
factor prior to World War II.
Today it is an understatement to describe conditions as merely abnormal.
They are uniquely difficult from the viewpoint of intelligence. Where Com-
munist regimes are in control the ordinary means of securing information
are generally lacking. In these areas, it is true, we have a few diplo-
matic missions and here and there some consular establishments. Their staffs,
however, are so restricted and spied upon that they cannot perform their usual
information gathering functions. Even the type of information that is
available for the asking here in the United States is unobtainable there.
In this whole great area of communist domination it is not only military
information which is kept secret, but it is hard to get even aim-pie and
seemingly innocuous details relating to the economic, financial and polit-
ical developments which may furnish vital clues to political and military
trends.
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Also, the methods of fifth column penetration practiced by the Communists
follow a unique pattern in various foreign countries and in the United States
which calls for the best that we have in the field of counter-intelligence.
As a result of this,there is an urgent call upon our skill and ingenuity
to find methods of informing ourselves about Iron Curtain countries. As we
cannot do it adequately by orthodox methods, an increasingly heavy burden is
placed on our secret intelligence and counter-intelligence and hence they have
today a higher priority in our over-all intelligence picture than in the past.
THE CM M OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO CONDUCT SECRET INTELLIGENCE
ACTI'PITL
The responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency for the collection
of covert intelligence abroad are performed as a "service of common concern"
in accordance with the terms of National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tive No. 5 of December 12, 1947. (See Annex No. 11). Unlike the collection
of overt intelligence, where the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency is
a limited. one, the collection of practically all covert foreign intelligence
is assigned to the Agency.
Intelligence Directive No. 5 gives to the Central Intelligence Agency the
following: duties:
a. To conduct all organized federal espionage operations abroad,
except for agreed activities by other departments and agencies.
b. To conduct all organized federal counter-espionage abroad, in-
clud.ing occupied areas.
c. To coordinate covert and overt intelligence collection, and to
coordinate the activities of casual agent.a employed on covert missions by
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other departments and agencies, members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee.
d. To disseminate the intelligence thus obtained to the various
departments and agencies having an authorized interest in it.
Covert collection thus includes espionage and counter-espionage abroad,
i. e., the clandestine collection of information and counter-action against
foreign secret intelligence activities. It does not include intelligence col-
lection by secret but essentially technical means, such as communications
intelligence.
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2 sets forth the
respective responsibilities of the departmental agencies for collection of
certain categories of foreign intelligence information. The Army was thus
given primary responsibility for collecting foreign military information, the
Navy naval information, the State Department political, cultural, and socio-
logical information, etc. The effect of Directive No. 5, however, is to limit
these responsibilities to overt collection, and set aside the entire field of
covert intelligence operations (with a few exceptions) as the domain of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Further, the Agency is "responsible for coordi-
nating covert and overt intelligence collection activities," and is also
charged with coordinating the activities of casual covert agents employed by
other agencies with its own "organized covert activities."
It is important to note, in this connection, that the National Security
Council has rejected, and we believe rightly, the concept that espionage might
be conducted by several agencies, each independent of the other, and each
authorized to operate in the same areas with roughly the same objectives.
Multiple espionage of this kind has occasionally been advocated as a means of
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protectd.ng security. It is argued that the penetration of a centralized
espionage agency might destroy its entire roster of agents, leaving the nation
without an effective secret intelligence service in time of crisis, whereas
penetration of one of several espionage units might destroy its networks, but
would leave those of the others untouched.
We consider this view to be largely theoretical, provided espionage is
properly conducted to keep the identity of chains entirely separate and if
proper security is maintained in the central office. In any event, we feel
that this danger is less serious than the confusion and overlapping in the
field of espionage which would result if several services were engaged in it.
Adoption of a centralized espionage structure has meant that, except for oer_
taro operations in occupied areas, the foreign covert operations of other
agencies of the Government have been dissolved or turned over to the Centra..
Intelligence Agency.
ORGAVIZAr2ION OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
The Central Intelligence Agency does not enter the intricate field, of
foreign espionage and counter-espionage without some background of experience.
The ;,overt operations unit, known as the Office of Special Operations (OSO),
is in effect the legatee of the operating experience, the records, and many
of the personnel of the secret intelligence (SI) and counter-espionage (X-2)
branches of the former Office of Strategic Services and Strategic Services
Unit;, War Department. It also inherits the valuable relationships built up
by these organizations with certain foreign intelligence services, I
/ In numerous instances the Office of Special Operations has maintained
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field stations originally opened by the Office of Strategic Services and
maintained by the Strategic Services Unit. In its headquarters structure it
has drawn heavily upon the previous experience of these organizations in
conducting war and post-war operations.
Administratively, the Office of Special Operations is on the same level
as the four other Offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. Contact with
the Director is maintained almost exclusively by its chief, the Assistant
Director for Special Operations, and his deputy. The Assistant Director's
personal staff also includes an Executive Secretary, whose duties are ap-
proximately that of an executive officer, and several consultants and advisers
who deal with particular aspects of agent operations, archives, budget and
the like.
Under the Assistant Director, the organization is divided into three major
operating groups.
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Before concluding our survey of the headquarters organization of the
Office of Special Operations, we wish to add a re.comendation to which we
attach particular importance and which affects the relationship of this Office
to other covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
See above, Chapter VI. Since this report was drafted, we understand that
steps have been taken to transfer the Nuclear Energy Group to a new Office
of Scientific Intelligence.
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In Chapters VII and IX we briefly consider the similarity of the opera-
tions and administrative problems faced by the Office of Special Operations,
the Office of Policy Coordination and the Contract Branch of the Office of
Operations. All three offices carry on activities of a highly confidential
nature. These activities are inter-related and require close coordination.
In addition they are able mutually to service each other. This is particularly
true of the overseas operations of the Office of Special Operations and the
Office of Polioy Coordination. We recommend that the three activities be
placed under the common control of a single directing head who would be one
of the chief assistants of the Director. The three Offices might be set up as
separate branches of a common service of secret activities which should enjoy
large autonomy within the Central Intelligence Agency and might appropriately
be called Operations Division. Whether eventually a closer-merger of the
three activities should be effected can best be determined in the light of
experience.
As a part of such a central organization devoted to covert operations,
centralized administrative services should be established under the single
chief of covert activities, and should not be identified with or combined with
the administrative arrangements made for the balance of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The covert organization thus established should, in particular, under-
take its own personnel recruitment, using the facilities of the personnel
section of the Central Intelligence Agency only insofar as they appear to serve
t:he purpose of the covert organization.
In making this recommendation, we appreciate that the Office of Policy
Coordination under NSC 10/2 has a special relationship to the Secretary of
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State and the Secretary of Defense. We believe that substantial benefits
would accrue in having this same relationship established, through the head of
the Operations Division, with both of the secret overseas activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency, assuming that they and the Contact Branch are
brought together in the manner we recommend above.
In this recommendation we have also had in mind the desirability of quickly
establishing a partioularly close relationship between the secret activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Military Establishment and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in case of war. If the measure of autonomy we suggest for
these services is achieved, they could be attached, without delay, to the
Secretary of Defense or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the National Security
Council should consider this advisable.
Subject to the foregoing recommendation, we believe that the headquarters
organization of the Office of Special Operations is soundly conceived and has
made a satisfactory start toward setting up our secret intelligence work.
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In some countries, contact has been established with local police, in-
telligence, or counter-intelligence services. These relations are often most
useful, and. their potentialities for the future are great. The moat successful
example is the continuing liaison with the
In certain friendly but threatened countries, the Office of Special-
Operations has begun arranging with these services for the installation of
stay-behind agents to be used in the event of a military emergency. In most
instances independent networks are also being built up.
The agent operations of the Office of Special Operations abroad have been
criticized as being too frequently directed against fairly obvious, short-term
objectives, and as having overlooked or failed to exploit strategic targets..
The Office is also sometimes criticized in the departmental agencies and in the
Office of Reports and Estimates for producing quantity rather than quality. It
can in part answer such criticism by showing that it has not received adequate
directives from the policy-makers. This serious failure should be remedied.
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The encouragement of defection of strategically placed personnel in
Soviet and satellite government services should be another major objective of
the field operations of the Office of Special Operations and to some extent of
the Office of Policy Coordination. A few successes have been achieved in such
activities, but thus far most Soviet defections have been largely fortuitous.
In our opinion, neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor the Army has fully
exploited the intelligence possibilities of numerous individuals who have
filtered into the American zones of Germany and Austria. Often interrogations
have been so delayed or so conducted as to be virtually fruitless.
There is also a domestic phase of this problem both in the case of d.efec-
tors in the United States and inthe handling of those who may be brought here.
The entire question, both at home and abroad, clearly involves the coordination
of intelligence activities and is an important one with which the Central In-
telligence Agency should deal. Here it should assume its responsibilities to
work out amore effective procedure to coordinate the activities of the various
agencies involved. (See Chapter IV).
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Before turning from the question of operational security, it may be ob-
served that the- headquarters security of the Office of Special Operations is
not impeccable. (See above, page 34). It occupies a separate building readily
identifiable as belonging to the Central Intelligence Agency. Secret opera-
tions of this nature should preferably be located in a building having so many
services and visitors that the identification of a secret staff and their
visitors would be rendered difficult. Further, the staff could more easily
cover the explanation of its work by giving a well-known and relatively in-
nocuous address,
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The Central Intelligence Agency should then endeavor to reverse the
present unfortunate trend where it finds itself advertised almost exclusively
as a secret service organization and become to the public the centralizer and.
coordinator of intelligence, not the secret gatherer. If the changes we are
recon3nd.ing are effected, they would furnish a good point of departure for
the Central Intelligence Agency to do this.
COUNTEE-ESPIONAGE
Espionage and counter-espionage have been unified in the Operations Group
of the Office of Special Operations. This arrangement represents a departure
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from the wartime structure of the Office of Strategic Serviced in which these
activities were conducted in separate branches. It is also different from
most foreign services, which have separate espionage and counter-espionage
branches, integrated only through their chiefs. Possibly because of this
organizational unification counter-espionage has not yet been adequately ex-
ploited as a source of positive intelligence information, as a channel for
deception, as a means of protecting espionage operations and as a basis for
penetrating fifth column operations abroad, which may be tied in with fifth
column operations here.
The techniques of espionage seem somewhat simpler than those of counter-
espionage, and the former generally is assumed topromise more decisive results.
Factors such asthese have influenced the concentration of the Office of Special
Operations on espionage problems. It seems apparent that the present counter-
espionage staff of the Office of Special Operations should be materially
strengthened and more intensive counter-espionage work promoted.
Owing to the subordination of counter-espionage to espionage, the ex-
ploitation by the Office of Special Operations of counter-intelligence oppor-
tunities and its general approach to the problems of counter-intelligence have
not been markedly successful. Its liaison arrangements with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, which is charged with all counter-espionage responsibilities
in the United States, except those affecting personnel of the Armed Services,
have been, limited for the most part to exchange of information on suspect
individuals.
Full collaboration on counter-espionage plans and operations has not yet
been achieved, and neither organization is fully acquainted with the over-all
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program.of the other. Since the danger of foreign espionage and the menace of
fifth column activities does not stop or start at our national boundaries, it
is desirable that the two agencies most concerned with counter-espionage should
maintain closer relations with each oher. We have already pointed out in
Chapter IV the extent of the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency
to insure coordination of certain counter-intelligence activities of the
Government. We can only observe here that a major aspect of such coordination
is a close working relationship between the Office of Special Operations and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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TEE NEED FOR POLICY DIRECTION OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE
To be genuinely effective, secret intelligence operations must be directed
toward the intelligence objectives of greatest importance to the Government.
Today, as we mentioned above, the Office of Special Operations lacks the
direction which it needs to insure the maximum relevancy of its operations to
the problems of foreign and military policy. It is, indeed, a fundamental
failing of the American intelligence services that, in general, they are not
advised of the current needs of policy-makers. Unfortunately, continuing ef-
fort is rarely made by intelligence consumers to guide intelligence activities
toward the most meaningful targets.
The formal requirement lists of the military services are received by the
Office of Special Operations; generally speaking, these are of a "spot", short-
term nature. They are often transmitted with the implied expectation that the
desired answers can be secured almost immediately. Adequate guidance from
the State Department is lacking, except in the cases of a few officers of the
Office of Special Operations who maintain personal contact with policy officers
in the State Department. No regular evaluatory or other comments are received
on the intelligence reports put out by the Office except from the Office of
Reports and Estimates which is not necessarily the best source for such judg-
ments. It is thus deprived of the guidance in specific cases which Service
agencies and the State Department could supply.
We believe that these deficiencies would be remedied, at least in part,
by the attachment to the Office of Special Operations, as suggested earlier in
this chapter, of representatives from the Department of State and the Services
and by the creation of a more direct relationship to the Secretaries of State
and Defense.
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GEI AL APPRAISAL
In appraising the general results of the operations of the Office of
Special Operations, it is too early to arrive at definite conclusions. Certain
operations now being conducted, hitherto lacking in results, may prove to be
of the first importance at some time in the future. It can be said, however,
that the Office has. been successful in securing certain categories of valuable
intelligence. It has also established or maintained relations with the in-
telligence services of several friendly countries, not only for the exchange
of information but, in some cases, for the conduct of operations.
Many priority targets of secret intelligence remain untouched. Few sig-
nificant operations have been conducted within the Soviet Union, and operational
planning for others remains at a fairly early stage. We recognize the vast
difficulties of this type of undertaking and the need for extreme caution.
Throughout the departmental intelligence services, as we have remarked
earlier, there exists a general feeling that the results of secret intelligence
operations have not yet attained the level which the current concentration of
personnel and funds should warrant. This, we believe, is in part due to the
lack of sufficiently intimate liaison between the Office of Special Operations,,
the Services and the State Department.
in thus assessing achievements, it cannot be forgotten that the agency is
still very young. This is the reason for some of the defects which have been.
pointed out in the foregoing discussion. The organization does have the serv-
ices of some highly talented and experienced persons, both in headquarters and
in the field. Their presence gives promise of systematic improvement for their
work as a whole.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The covert operations of the Office of Special Operations and Office
of Policy Coordination and the activities of the Contact Branch of the Office
of Operations should be integrated, and the three operations- should be brought
together under single over-all direction (Operations Division) within the
Central Intelligence Agency.*
(2) Covert intelligence activities conducted by the Central Intelligence
Agency and other agencies in occupied areas should be reviewed in order to ef-
fect close coordination.
(3) Measures should be initiated within the Central Intelligence Agency
looking toward better coordination of the handling of defectors, which concerns
American intelligence agencies abroad as well as in the continental United States.
(4) The Office of Special operations (or the new operations Division)
must give primary attention to the building up of a corps of trained personnel
for operations abroad.
(5) The cover policies of the Office of Special Operations in the field
should be generally reviewed and tightened. Continuous and careful considera-
tion should be given to increasing the use of non-official cover at the same
time that demands for diplomatic or military cover are reduced to a minimum.
(6) The counter-espionage activities of the Office of Special Operations
should be increased in scope and emphasis, and closer liaison in this field
should be established with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(7) 'Relations with departmental agencies should be brought closer, and
the guidance which the Office of Special Operations receives from intelligence
For our recommendations regarding the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch
of the Office of Operations, see Chapter VII.
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consumers should be strengthened. This might be achieved by including repre-
sentatives of the Service agencies and the State Department in the Information
Control Section of the Office of Special Operations.
(8) The Director should assure himself that the Office of Special Opera-
tions is receiving adequate information on the current and strategic intelli-
gence needs of the Government. This might be achieved by establishing closer
relations with the Secretaries of State and Defense.
(9) The Office of Special Operations should exercise a greater measure
of control over the dissemination of its own material.
(10) The Nuclear Energy Group should be moved from the Office of Special
Operations to the proposed. Research and Reports Division where it should be a
part of the general scientific work.
(11) The Office of Special Operations should have access to communications
intelligence to the full extent required for guidance in directing its opera-
tions and for more effective conduct of counter-espionage.
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CHAPTER IX
SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN:
THE CONDUCT OF SECRET OPERATIONS
RELATIONS BETWEEN SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET OPERATIONS
The collection of secret intelligence is closely related to the conduct
of secret operations in support of national policy. These operations, includ-
ing covert psychological warfare, clandestine political activity, sabotage and
guerrilla activity, have always been the companions of secret intelligence.
The two activities support each other and can be disassociated only to the
detriment of both. Effective secret intelligence is a prerequisite to sound
secret operations and, where security, considerations permit, channels for
secret intelligence may also serve secret operations. On the other hand., al-
though the acquisition of intelligence is not the immediate objective of secret
operations,. the latter may prove to be a most productive source. of intelligence.
It was because of our views on the intimate relationship between these
two activities that we submitted our Interim Report No. 2, dated May 13, 1948,
"Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence," which was a
comment on proposals, then before the National Security Council, for the ini-
tiation of a program of secret operations. In that report we made the follow-
ing observations:
"In carrying out these special operations, the Director ff Secret
Operations) and his staff should have intimate knowledge of what is being
done in the field of secret intelligence and access to all the facilities
which may be built up through a properly constituted secret intelligence
network. Secret operations, particularly through support of resistance
groups, provide one of the most important sources of secret intelligence,
and the information gained from secret intelligence must immediately be
put to use in guiding and directing secret operations. In many cases it
is necessary to determine whether a particular agent or chain should
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primarily be used for secret intelligence or for secret operations, be-
cause the attempt to press both uses may endanger the security of each.
"The Allied experience in the carrying out of secret operations and
secret intelligence during the last war has pointed up the close relation-
ship of the two activities. The 'British, for example, who had separate
systems during the war, have now come around to the view that secret in-
telligence and secret operations should be carried out under a single
operational head and have reorganized their services accordingly."
THE OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
The National Security Council in creating within the Central Intelligence
Agency, in-accordance with Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act,
the Office of Special Projects (now known as the Office of Policy Coordination)
recognized these'views to the extent that both secret intelligence and secret
operations were included within the same organization. However, this action
did not go as far as we had recommended, with the result that the. Office of
Policy Coordination (secret operations) and the Office of Special Operations
(secret intelligence) are not bound together by any special relationship and
operate as entirely separate Offices.
Although it is too early to appraise the accomplishments of the Office of
Policy Coordination which has been in existence only a few months, experience
has, in our opinion, already shown that the organizational. relationship be-
tween it and the Office of Special Operations should be closer. Although the
problems with which the two Offices are concerned are so intimately related,
there is no arrangement for coordinating their operations under common direc-
tion except insofar as they are both under the Director of Central Intelligence.
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Even this relationship is weakened by the fact that NSC 10/2 which created the
Office of Policy Coordination provides that "for purposes of security and of
flexibility of operations and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency,
the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components
of Central Intelligence Agency." Thus,complete separation was made mandatory.
The Office of Policy Coordination, which is the only Office in the Central
Intelligence Agency created by direct order of the National Security Council,
is also given a special position in that its charter provides that the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "insuring, through desig-
nated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense,
that covert operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with
United States foreign and military policies and with overt activities" and
that disagreements between the Director and these representatives shall be re-
ferred to the National Security Council for decision. Furthermore, the Chief
of the Office of Policy Coordination can be appointed only upon nomination by
the Secretary of State and approval by the National Security Council.
In practice, the Office of Policy Coordination enjoys a position which
gives it direct ties to the Department of State and the National Military
Establishment and support from them not enjoyed by the. Office of Special Opera-
tions. Consequently, the two activities which should be closely integrated
are in fact operating with different outside guidance and support, with dis-
similar charters, and they occupy a different status within the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
In our opinion, this situation is unsound. The close relationship between
these two activities, as pointed out above, needs to be recognized along'with
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the fact that secret intelligence requires the same degree of control and sup-
port from the State Department and the Military Establishment as secret opera-
tions. As recommended in Chapters VII and VIII, we propose therefore that
these two activities be closely integrated (along with parts of the Office of
Operations) in a single Operations Division which would enjoy considerable au-
tonomy, in accordance with our over-all recommendations for changes in the
organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.
As we have stated above, the operations of the Office of Policy Coordina-
tion have been so recently initiated that it is premature to comment upon them
in any detail. We believe, however, that the Assistant Director in charge of
the Office of Policy Coordination is proceeding wisely in building slowly in
this most difficult field.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The close relationship between covert intelligence and covert opera-
tion.s and the fact that the latter is related to intelligence affecting the
national security justifies the placing of the Office of Policy Coordination
within the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Office of Policy Coordination should be integrated with the other
covert Office of the Central Intelligence Agency, namely,the Office of Special
Operations, and with the Contact Branch of the Office of Operations, and these
three operations should be under single over-all direction (Operations Divi-
sion) within the Central Intelligence Agency.*
* For our recommendations regarding the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch
of the Office of Operations, see Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER X
THE DIRECTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
GENERAL APPRAISAL
We have reserved for this final chapter an the Central Intelligence Agency
the discussion of the post of Director. An appraisal of the qualifications
and achievements of the directing, personnel is only possible in light of an
examination of the entire organization. Within the scope of his mandate under
the National Security Act, it is the Director who must guide the organization
to the attainment of its objectives, establish its operating policies and win
the confidence of other branches of the Government.
This is not an easy task. The Central Intelligence Agency has a diversi-
fied and difficult mission to perform. Its success depends, to a large extent,
on the support it receives from other agencies which may be ignorant of its
problems and suspicious of its prerogatives. It has peculiar administrative,,
personnel and security problems and has to handle complicated operating situa-
tions. Moreover, the pressure to build rapidly has been strong and there has
been little time in which to demonstrate substantial accomplishments.
We believe that these difficulties cannot alone explain the principal de-
ficiencies which we have discussed in previous chapters. The directing staff
of the Central Intelligence Agency has not demonstrated an adequate under-
standing of the mandate of the organization or the ability to discharge that
mandate effectively.
The duties of the Central Intelligence Agency in regard to the coordina-
tion of intelligence activities ?have not been fulfilled. The responsibility
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for the correlation of national intelligence has not been carried out in. such
a manner as to provide the policy-makers with coordinated national intelligence
estimates. Some activities are being carried out by the Central Intelligence
Agency which largely duplicate the work of other departments and agencies, and
there has been no adequate attempt to coordinate or centralize others. Gen-
erally speaking, satisfactory working relations have not been established with
other departments and agencies. Within the Central Intelligence Agency in-
adequate guidance as to the intelligence requirements of the Government is
received from the Director. These deficiencies exist in spite of a broad stat-
utory mandate, reasonable appropriations and support from the National Security
Council.
Administrative policies within the Agency contribute to this situation.
The internal organization does not reflect an appreciation of the Agency's sev-
eral distinctive yet inter-related. missions under the National Security Act:
In fact, the scheme of organization tends to blur and impede the performance
of the organization's essential intelligence functions under the Act. The
Directorate has given positions of pre-eminence to officials who are prima ily
administrators yet exert policy control over the intelligence Offices without
being qualified to do so. There is little close consultation on intelligence
and policy matters between the various stratified levels. Although the heads
of the Eeveral Offices are allowed. considerable latitude in conducting their
respective operations, they do not share substantially in the determination of
over-all policy.
THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN DIRECTION
We have also considered the question whether the Director ought to be a
civilian. While we recognize that the statute provides that he may be either
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civilian or military we have reached the conclusion that he should be a civil-
ian. We do not mean to exclude the possibility that a Service man may be Se-
lected for the post, but if this is done he should resign from active military
duty and thereafter work as a civilian. In such a case appropriate provision
should be made so that he does not lose his retirement benefits.
We have reached the conclusion that the Director should be civilian be-
cause we are convinced that continuity of tenure is essential and complete in-
dependence of service ties desirable for carrying out the duties of the Direc-
tor. The post cannot properly be filled as a mere tour of duty between mili-
tary assignments. Unless there is such continuity of service and complete in-
dependence of action, the Director will not be able to build up the esprit de
corps, the technical efficiency, the loyalty of home staff and field workers,
which are essential to the success of the enterprise. We agree with the intent
of the provision of the National Security Act that the Director "shall be sub-
ject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or oth-
erwise)" by the Service departments, but do not feel that this provision can
alone offset the disadvantages to which we have pointed.
It is inevitable that there should be rotation in the Service intelligence
agencies, though in recent years that rotation has 1?een far too rapid in the
top ranks. However, in the Central Intelligence Agency there should be sta-
bility and continuity of leadership.
Finally, we recommend a civilian Director because we believe that in work-
ing out a well balanced top echelon oommittee (the reconstituted Intelligence
Advisory Committee) for appraising and coordinating Government intelligence,
the strong, and properly strong, representation of the military intelligence
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Services on such a body should he balanced with an equally strong civilian
re;presf3ntation.
We have considered the argument that the Director of Central Intelligence,
because of the high security requirmugnts of the post, should be a man perma-
nently devoted to Government service., amenable to the disciplines of the Serv-
ices and. free of political ambitious or entanglements. We believe that the
qualifications of the Director of Central Intelligenoe, whether his past ex-
perience has been in civilian life or, in military or other Government service,
should be on so high a level that there would be no more doubt as to the loyalty
and. responsibility of the Director, than of the Secretary of State or the Sec-
retary of Defense. In appointing the Director of Central Intelligence with the
responsibilities he must carry today, we must select a man to whom we wotLld
willingly entrust any position of responsibility whatsoever in our GovexzUmenT.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMATIONS
(1) The directing staff of the Central Intelligence Agency has not dem-
onstrated-an adequate understanding. of the mandate of the organization or the
ability to`discharge that mandate effectively.
(2,) Administrative organization and policies tend to impede the carrying
out of the essential intelligence functions of the Central Intelligence Agency
under the Act.
(3) Continuity of service is essential for the successful carrying out
of the duties of Director of Central Intelligence.
(J As the best hope for continuity of service and the greatest assur-
ance of independence of action a civilian should be Director of Central In.-
telligence. If a Service man is selected for the post he should resign from
active military duty.
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THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
The Survey Group has been primarily concerned with examining the struc-
ture, administration, activities and inter-agency relationships of the Central
Intelligence Agency. In the examination of the Service intelligence agencies,
emphasis has been placed on their contribution to national intelligence and
their relation to the Central Intelligence Agency. On the basis of this study,
the Survey Group does not consider itself qualified to submit recommendations
regarding either the details of the internal administration of the Services or
of their methods of collecting information and producing intelligence.
MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The National Security Act, in providing for the systematic coordination
of intelligence, also safeguarded the role of the Services in intelligence by
providing in Section 102 (d) (3) that "the departments and other agencies of
the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate
departmental intelligence." Subsequently, the National Security Council in
Intelligence Directive No. 3 (See Annex No. 9) defined departmental intelli-
gence as "that intelligence needed by a Department or independent Agency of
the Federal Government, and the subordinate units thereof, to execute its mis-
sion and to discharge its lawful responsibilities."
The mission of the military services involves the enormous responsibility
of maintaining the security of the United States. It is incumbent upon them
to produce or obtain from other agencies the intelligence necessary to assist
them in fulfilling this mission. In the past this need for intelligence has
been met to a large extent by the Services acting independently and without
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the benefit of systematic coordination. Although it is now generally :recog-
nized that such coordination is urgently needed, there is still a tendency on
the part of the Services to strive to create their own self-contained systems
of intelligence.
This tendency stems in part from the military doctrine that "intelligence
is a function of command," a doctrine which has been interpreted to require
the control of the collection and production of all necessary intelligence by
the staff of the commander requiring it. The doctrine so construed can only
reEIult In an obviously unsatisfactory and impractical attempt at self-sufficiency.
As a matter of fact, at all staff levels intelligence must be supplemented by
contributions of both raw, information and finished intelligence from other de-
partments and agencies.
The general definition of departmental intelligence must therefore be
qualified by practical limitations and subject to the overriding necessity for
coordination of the intelligence activities of all Government agencies, pur-
suant to the National Security Act. The need for limiting the tendency toward
self-sufficiency, while acknowledging the broad interests of the departments,
is formally recognized in National Security Council Intelligence Directives
Nos. 2 and 3. These directives assign to the Departments of the Army, Navy
and Air Force, respectively, dominant interest in the collection and produc-
tion of military, naval and air intelligence. The directives also recognize
that the concern of the Services in intelligence is broader than their specific
areas of dominant interest. Directive No. 2, concerning intelligence collec-
tion, provides:
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"No interpretation of these established over-all policies and objec-
tives shall negate the basic principle that all Departmental repre-
sentatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection
and for the appropriate transmission to their Departments of all
intelligence information pertinent to their Departmental missions."
Similar safeguards are included in Directive No. 3 concerning intelligence
production which provides that:
"Each intelligence agency has the ultimate responsibility for the
preparation of such staff intelligence as its own Department shall
require. It is recognized that the staff intelligence of each of
the Departments must be broader in scope than any allocation of
collection responsibility or recognition of dominant interest might
indicate. In fact, the full foreign intelligence picture is of
interest in varying degrees at different times to each, of the
Departments."
In practice, the Service departments, while concentrating on their respec-
tive areas of dominant interest, collect and produce substantial quantities of
information in fields with which they are not primarily concerned. As a result,
there is considerable duplication in the material collected and produced by
them and by other agencies.
COORDINATION OF SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Intelligence collection by the Services is an important part of our intel-
ligence system. There are,for example, the intelligence components of overseas
commands in Europe and the Far East, and attaches stationed with United States
diplomatic posts throughout the world who are in a position through observa-
tions and official liaison to collect valuable information.
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All of these channels are used to meet the collection
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requirements of the Services as broadly interpreted by them,,. as well as some
of the collection requirements of other departments and agencies which mass
use of Service collection facilities.
Some duplication and overlap is inherent in the existence of several in-
dependent Service collection agencies operating in all parts of the world. As
pointed out in Chapter IV, there has been no continuing coordination of their
efforts. The only formal limitations which have been imposed by directives
generally prohibit certain methods of intelligence collection, such as espio-
nag- and. the monitoring of foreign broadcasts, which have been assigned to the
Central Intelligence Agency as services of common concern. More effective co-
ordination of collection is a recognized necessity and should be performed in
accordance. with the recommendations outlined in Chapter IV. In addition, co-
ordination can be improved within the Services either upon their own initiative
or upon that of the Secretary of Defense.
The production of intelligence by the Service agencies generally falls
into the three categories of current, basic and staff intelligence (including
estimates).
Current intelligence is prepared by each of the Services in the form of
daily, weekly or monthly summaries, briefings and digests derived from varied
sources. Much of this product, particularly that dealing with general military
and :political developments, is duplicative and of such common interest that
some consolidation of effort is desirable and should be possible. We recommend
that this situation be reviewed in order to determine what effort may be prop-
erly dispensed with, what consolidation is possible, and what common services
the Central Intelligence Agency might render in this regard. (See Chapter VI).
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In addition to basic studies in their respective fields of dominant in-
terest, including such tasks as determining the armament potential and order
of battle of various countries, each Service accomplishes a large amount of
research, compilation of data and reporting in the fields of economic, scien-
tific and political intelligence with which they all have some concern. In
our examination of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence agencies
of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force, we have found that there
is overlapping of interest and duplication of effort in intelligence research
and production in such fields as petroleum resources, communications, industrial
production, guided missiles and biological warfare. Established procedures
for coordination in these and related subjects are lacking.
It'is in order to improve this situation that we have recommended in
Chapter VI the creation, within the Central Intelligence Agency, of a Research
and Reports Division which would perform research and production of intelli-
gence in fields of common concern on behalf of all of the interested agencies,
and would coordinate their efforts in these fields when centralization was un-
desirable. This office,, which should operate in close relationship with the
Services and be staffed in part with Service personnel, should perform much of
the work now being done in the fields of economic, scientific and technological
intelligence. There will, of course, be specialized matters for which the in-
dividual Services must continue to be ultimately responsible, but there is a
vast area of common interest from which they can all draw.
Estimates, prepared to meet the requirements of the departments and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, are the most important type of staff intelligence pro-
duced by the Services. The present position with respect to their production
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is not satisfactory. Each Service produces its estimates in accordance with
assumptons, standards and methods of its own selection, and gives to them the
scope it desires, not necessarily limiting them to its own field of interest.
Departmental plans and policies may be based on such independently produced
estimates, regardless of the divergent and even contradictory estimates of
other departments.
As pointed out in Chapter V, the Central Intelligence Agency has not as
yet adequately exercised its function to coordinate these and other estimates,
for example those of the State Department, for the purpose of preparing nE,-
t:ional estimates. The Joint Intelligence Committee performs this task to some
extent in the military sphere, but. arrangements are lacking for regularly in-
sur:Lng that assumptions are comparable, analytical methods valid, and the final
estimates as sound as possible. In our opinion, an important step toward un-
proving this situation would be taken. if,the recommendations submitted in
Chapter V regarding the production of national estimates were adopted.
These steps, together with the creation of the Research and Reports Divi-
sion in areas of common interest, would have the effect of bolstering the Joint
Intelligence Committee in its special role and promoting the coordination of
Service estimates in both broad and limited fields. It is important that the
strictly military estimates of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the national
estimates produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, partly on basis of the same material, should be in harmony.
In the general field of counter-intelligence, the Services have usually
placed primary emphasis on protective security activities which do not neces-
sarily have intelligence as their primary aim ant. have often been performed by
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non-intelligence personnel.* The more specialized counter-espionage function,
which has as its precise objective the identification and thwarting of the
personnel, methods and aims of unfriendly foreign intelligence services, is a
true secret intelligence activity. Exclusive responsibility for its conduct
abroad has been properly assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, except
for the counter-intelligence activities of the Services necessary for their
own security. (See Chapter VIII). In the areas of United States military oc-
cupation, this exception has been broadly interpreted and, in particular, the
Counter Intelligence Corps, both in Germany and Japan, has devoted considerable
effort to counter-espionage, including the use of intelligence networks extend-
ing beyond the actual areas of occupation.
There has not been adequate recognition of the need for coordination of
these activities with the broader responsibilities of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The dissipation of trained personnel, failure to centralize informa-
tion concerning counter-intelligence targets, the risks inherent in the unco-
ordinated conduct of agent operations, all tend to weaken our prospects of suc-
cess in counter-espionage.
This need for coordination of the counter-intelligence effort also exists
in the United States where the responsibilities of the Services are limited in
relation to those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.**
* The Air Force has recognized this emphasis by transferring practically all
counter-intelligence functions from the Director of Air Intelligence to the
Inspector General.
*-Coordination in this field is carried out in accordance with the Presidential
memorandum of June 26, 1939, which stipulated that the War Department, Navy
Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation would be the only agencies of
the Government to conduct investigations into matters involving espionage,
counter-espionage, or sabotage. The principal function of the Interdepart-
mental Intelligence Conference set up as a result of this memorandum has been
to delimit the respective investigative responsibilities of the three agen-
cies in the United States.
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We have seen that within the Military Establishment there is no general
machinery for intelligence coordination. The Secretary of Defense at present
has no staff for this. purpose or to do more than exercise very general super-
vision and control. He is able to initiate particular projects for coordina-
tion and has, in fact, done so with respect to the production of communications
intelligence and the attache systems. He can also resolve particular co~ntro-
versies which cannot be settled at a lower level in the Military Establishment.
Other examples within the Military Establishment of coordination in limited
fields are the Joint Intelligence Committee's responsibility for estimates re-
quired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrangements for the production of comm;u-
nications intelligence, and the existence of the Air Intelligence Division for
the production of air intelligence by the Air Force and Navy.
Although coordination has been attempted or accomplished by the Services,
either on their own initiative or at the instigation of the Secretary of De-
fense, In limited areas such as those mentioned above, effective coordination
of the Service intelligence agencies requires the over-all coordination of the
activities of all intelligence agencies in the Government. This is a duty as-
signed to the Central Intelligence Agency in consultation with the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. In Chapter IV we have'recommended that the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, on which the Services are represented, should participate
more actively with the Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing co-
ordination of intelligence activities. To a very considerable extent, responsi-
bility for the successful operation of this machinery rests with the Services.
THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE SERVICES
Recognition of the important role of intelligence in the determination of
national policy and of the major responsibility which the Services have in
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intelligence requires that the Service agencies enjoy in their departments a
position comparable to the size of the task assigned to them. In order to be
able to carry out their responsibilities to their departments and to make an
effective contribution toward a coordinated national intelligence system, the
Service agencies must work closely with the planning and operational staffs and
be fully informed regarding departmental plans and policies.
To meet adequately their vital responsibilities and to maintain their
proper position in the departmental structure, the Service intelligence agen-
cies must be staffed with qualified personnel. This was too little recognized
prior to the last war, and upon the outbreak of hostilities we found that we
were seriously deficient in numbers and quality. of intelligence officers. We
did attempt to take steps to correct this situation in the various intelligence
schools and by acquiring personnel from civilian life to be trained as intel-
ligence officers. Recently, the importance of intelligence training has been
more fully realized, and the Services have taken steps to provide adequate
schools. In consequence, the quality of both the intelligence officers and the
attaches has improved in recent years.
The theory of rotation in the Services has been a handicap to sound intel-
ligence work in that it militates against experience and continuity. An
assignment to intelligence will probably last not more than four years, and
usually a shorter time.. This not only means that the individual officer has
difficulty in becoming proficient in intelligence, but that the Service intel-
ligence agency is in danger of suffering from a lack of continuity of leader-
ship trained in intelligence. For example, the Army Intelligence Division has
had seven chiefs in seven years, and the recently formed Directorate of
Intelligence, Air Force, has already had two directors.
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It is not our purpose to suggest once more the often discussed possibility
of an intelligence corps, but we do believe that, if the corps theory is un-
acceptable, some alternative method should be developed whereby officers, al-
though taking an occasional tour of duty in command, operations or other staff
positions, will feel that intelligence is their permanent interest and concen-
trate in it over the major portion of their careers.
In the past, capable officers have not been attracted to intelligence work
due to their belief that intelligence was a backwater, might delay promotion,
and in any event would not further their careers. This tendency must be over-
come and officers made to feel that their opportunities for advancement will
not be impaired by an assignment to intelligence duty. Intelligence must The
given prestige, and it must be made sufficiently attractive so that an officer
will seek an intelligence assignment as he would one to command or operations.
In addition to making a career in intelligence more attractive in the
Services,, It is important to provide for the training and availability of re-
serve officers. There are thousands of such officers today who, during the
last war,, were in various intelligence agencies or at overseas commands, and
many proved of inestimable value. Their talents and their willingness to serve
must not be lost.
In conclusion, we wish to note that a measure of progress has been made
in that the Service intelligence agencies have manifested an increased interest
in intelligence and an attitude conducive to accomplishing its effective co-
ordination. The Services are conscious of their grave responsibility for help-
ing to avert the danger of a national military catastrophe, created by modern
methods of warfare. They have come to recognize the need for effective
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coordination to the end that the intelligence upon which the national policy-
makers must act shall be the very best obtainable from every available source.
This tendency on their part is in marked and encouraging contrast to the situ-
ation which prevailed not only immediately prior to our entry into World War II,
but even in the early days of that conflict itself. We believe that, given
effective leadership, the full cooperation of the Service agencies in the
achievement of genuine coordination can be obtained.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECONMMATIONS
(1) The Service intelligence agencies have manifested an increased in-
terest in intelligence and an attitude conducive to accomplishing its effective
coordination.
(2) In order to meet adequately their vital responsibilities and main-
tain their proper position in the departmental structure, the Service intelli-
gence agencies should be staffed with qualified personnel who concentrate in
intelligence over the major portion of their careers.
(3) In accordance with a program of coordination initiated and guided by
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Service intelligence agencies should con-
fine themselves principally to those fields of intelligence in which they have
the primary interest.
(4+) A more active program of coordination by the Central Intelligence
Agency would result in a higher degree of centralization and coordination of
intelligence production in fields where the Services have a common interest.
(5) There should be effective coordination between the work of the Joint
Intelligence Committee in the field of military estimates and that of the
Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Advisory Committee in the field
of national estimates.
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CHAPTER XII
THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The- State Department is assigned.d.cmi.nant interest in the collection and
production of political, cultural, and sociological intelligence by the National
Security Council. It necessarily follows from this allocation that it is the
agency to which the Central Intelligence Agency and the military services
should turn to secure the reports and estimates they may require in these
fields of intelligence.
Possibly we can best explain our ideas of the State Department's role by
a concrete but hypothetical illustration. We shall assume, for example, that
the Secretary of the Navy, to prepare himself to meet his responsibilities in
connection with a visit of naval units to the western Mediterranean, desires a
report on political conditions in Spain. To secure it, he would turn to his
Chief of Naval Intelligence. The latter in turn should seek the desired in-
formation from the State Department, either directly or through the Central
9
Intelligence Agency. He should not try to get it from his own intelligence
analysts, any more than he would expect the State Department to furnish from
its own resources an estimate of the strength of the Spanish Navy. The reason
is obvious. The State Department is the main repository of political informa-
tion about Spain. It is also the final arbiter of our attitude with respect
to Spain. For the Navy, our policy in this situation is a fact, and a vital
fact, to be taken into account.
If, to take another hypothetical case, the National Security Council felt
the need for an over-all estimate of the-Spanish situation -- an estimate that
would include not only political information from the State Department but
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Military and strategic elements as well -- then, as indicated more fully in
Chapter V, a national estimate should be prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency for review and approval by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Here
would be brought together the intelligence resources of State, of the military
services, of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of any other agency equipped
to make a real contribution on the subject. The State Department representa-
tive on the Intelligence Advisory Committee would, of course, share in the
responsibility for the final estimate.
Because cf the intelligence contribution which the State Department should
be prepared to make io the National Security Council and to other Government
agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department is called
upon to assume an important role in the field of intelligence, even apart from
its task of supplying the information required by its own policy officers. We
have examined the intelligence functions of the State Department, and particu-
larly the intelligence organization of the Department, known as the Research
Intelligence staff, solely to determine how effectively the State Department
is organized to meet these outside intelligence requirements;, particularly those
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
THE RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE STAFF
The Research and Intelligence staff is unique among the departmental in-
telligence agencies for at least two reasons. In the first place, it is an
intelligence agency within an intelligence agency, since the collection and
interpretation of all information bearing on our foreign relations is a primary
objective of the Department as a whole and of its officers in the field. In
the second place, the Research and Intelligence staff was not established by
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the Department in response to keenly felt internal needs. It was the result
of the transfer to the Department in 1945, of the Research and Analysis and
the Presentations Branches of the Office of Strategic Services.
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At the head of the Research and Intelligence staff is a Special Assistant
to the Secretary. The staff is divided into three units: the Office of the
Special Assistant, comprising several personal assistants and a rather sub-
stantial unit conducting research in special source material; an Office of
Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition, and an Office of Intelligence Research
which is the intelligence producing branch of the organization.
The research analysts in the Office of Intelligence Research are for the
most part persons cf academic background, and many of them are of high quality.
In general, however, the recruitment of first-rate intelligence analysts and
other specialists has become increasingly difficult as the future of the Re-
search and Intelligence staff became more and more uncertain.
The functions of the Research and Intelligence staff, as officially de-
fined, are to develop and implement a "comprehensive and coordinated intelli-
gence program for the United States;" and to develop and implement a similar
coordinated program for "positive foreign intelligence" for the Department,
including procurement of information and the production of intelligence studies
and spot intelligence. In addition, Research and Intelligence is authorized
to initiate instructions to Department officers abroad and to determine what
information flowing into the Department is required for the production of
"timely intelligence."
This definition of functions and responsibilities does not indicate the
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particular kind of "program for positive foreign intelligence" which Research
and Intelligence will develop. In particular, it does not clearly distinguish
between factual studies and. intelligence estimates, and it does not give the
staff any special authority or responsibility in producing intelligence, such
as the intelligence agencies of the military services enjoy in their respec-
tive departments. The charter is broad and vague, and invites a variety of
interpretations.
The intelligence reports which Research and Intelligence prepares and
circulates within the Department are of several different kinds. They include
intelligence memoranda, which comprise a brief analysis of information on
current subjects; information notes, which are factual reports involving little
interpretation or estimating; Office of Intelligence Research studies, which
are exhaustive summaries of available information on subjects of particular
signLficance; periodical :reports, which are confined to factual reporting on
subjects of continuing interest; and situation reports, which comprise reviews
of the political, economic and social situations in foreign countries.
With the exception of situation and periodical reports, the studies of
the Office of Intelligence Research are prepared, at least in theory, at the
request of policy or other officers of the department. Actually, many of them
are written on the initiative of the Office itself. A majority are in princi-
ple requested by other offices in the Department, but generally result :from.
proposals which the Office of Intelligence Research has made and which have
elicited an indication of interest which can serve as a "request." The situ--
atior. reports have ordinarily not been prepared in response to requests, but
are, now integrated with the National Intelligence Survey program (see Chapter
VI) in which Research'and Intelligence is extensively participating.
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The quality of these different reports varies greatly. The main criti-
oisms of them are that they tend to be academic, are unrelated to immediate
policy problems, and are often too lengthy and detailed to influence busy
policy officers. It has been observed that Research and Intelligence produces
"Ph.D. intelligence," scholastically admirable, but of somewhat limited use in
the day-to-day formulation of policy.
The Policy Planning Staff and the political (geographical) desks and eco-
nomic affairs offices of the Department are the principal recipients and users
of such reports. As indicated earlier, these offices request a relatively
limited number of reports on their own initiative, and for the most part do not
consider them essential to their work.
It. is open to question whether Research and Intelligence occupies a posi-
tion in the State Department which permits it to play an effective and neces-
sary role in the over-all intelligence picture of the Government. As we have
stated, Research and Intelligence was, in effect, grafted upon the existing
organization of the Department. There was no large body of opinion within the
Department or the Foreign Service which keenly supported the contributions
which an intelligence staff could make to policy decisions. In fact there was
substantial feeling that the functions called "intelligence" were at least
parallel to, if not inclusive of, many of those already performed by the policy
offices. For these reasons many members of the Department were originally
reluctant to make use of the physically separate intelligence staff.
This aloofness is confirmed by the failure to bring the intelligence or-
ganization into important policy councils. In view of the special nature of
the Department's work, throughout which intelligence and policy are closely
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Joined,, this is understandable. In any event, the effect is to establish the
intelligence staff not as the sole source of intelligence analysis, but merely
as one possible source which could be employed if the policy authorities so
desired. The intelligence staff, in the opinion of many policy officers, has
not seemed to offer the Department any uniquely significant contributions which
would justify its regular and intensive employment.
The precise function of Research and Intelligence in producing intelligence
reports has never been adequately defined. It has not been made clear whether
Research and Intelligence should limit its activities to preparing exclusively
factual studies at the request of policy officers, or should produce intelli-
gence estimates.
Whatever the designed scope of its functions, Research and Intelligence
has moved increasingly during the past year in the direction of intelligence
estimating. In this respect it has sought to assume a responsibility long
accepted by the other departmental intelligence agencies. But its movement in
this direction has brought it into conflict with the policy officers of its
own Department who consider it their awn function to be the analysts of current
problems as well as the formulators of our policies.
Accordingly, Research and Intelligence enters the field of the policy
officers when it presents estimates of its own, which appear to analyze the
policy implications of a given problem. The conflict over this aspect of the
Research and Intelligence role is most evident in regard to intelligence
memo:randa prepared by the organization on more or less current developments.
Although such reports may :rgpresent a high degree of analytic skill, they are
likely to be regarded by the policy officer as a useless repetition of
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information with which he is already familiar, or an unwarranted attempt to
tell him what he should think about a problem under his consideration.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the Department's attitude toward the
Research and Intelligence reports is the line which appears in the printed
heading of each: "The conclusions expressed herein are based upon research
and analysis by the Intelligence Organization, and do not necessarily represent
the views of other offices of the Department of State."
If, in fact, Research and Intelligence does prepare estimates, there is
the possibility that on certain matters two or more separate studies or esti-
mates covering the same subject may exist simultaneously in the Department.
The Policy Planning Staff or the geographical desks, for example, are accus-
tomed to draft their own estimates quite independently of Research and Intel-
ligence. Yet Research and Intelligence, knowing that a particular matter is
one of general concern to policy officials, may prepare an estimate of its own.
So long as these remain in the State Department no direct harm may result,
although the duplication of effort and the existence of unreconciled points of
view on the same subject may be undesirable. If,'however, as may well occur,
the separate estimates are used outside the Department in satisfying the needs
of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the
Services, the possibility of confusion is obvious.
INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND OUTSIDE AGENCIES
In the future -- particularly if action is taken on our recommendations
for the elimination of much of the miscellaneous political intelligence work
now done outside of the State Department -- the latter will be called upon
more and more to make intelligence contributions to the Services, to the
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Central Intelligence Agency and to national intelligence estimates. Then it
will be doubly important that the responsibility for the State Department's
contribution be more clearly fixed within the Department.
One possible solution might be to limit the Research and Intelligence
staff to factual reporting and to place on the policy officers of the Depart-
ment the responsibility for passing upon any political intelligence estimates
used outside of the Department. Alternatively these estimates might be prepared
by Research and Intelligence and then passed upon by the appropriate policy
officers of the Department before they go to the Central Intelligence Agency
or to other Government departments. A third solution might be to allocate the
personnel of Research and. Intelligence among the policy offices (geographical
desks) of the Department or attach them to the Policy Planning Staff and. then
place on the policy officers or Planning Staff the responsibility for State
Department estimates for the Central Intelligence Agency or for other outside
Government agencies.
The State Department should, of course, be protected from burdensome and
unreasonable demands for political estimates from other agencies. If such call
should create a problem, the Intelligence Advisory Committee, on which the
Department will be represented, should exercise its coordinating function to
reduce the demands to manageable proportions.
Furthermore, the Department has a primary responsibility to exercise its
intelligence functions for the purpose of formulating its own policies. It
must adopt the methods and techniques which will best meet this primary respon-
sibility. How this is done is not within our competence. However, in working
out 'its own internal procedure, it is important to the over-all intelligence
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set-up and particularly to the proper functioning of the Central Intelligence
Agency, with which this report is immediately concerned, that the State Depart-
ment should equip itself to meet the legitimate request for political intelli-
gence submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency or other Government intel-
ligence agencies and to effect the closer liaison with the Central Intelligence
Agency which we have recommended in this report.
To meet these requirements we recommend that the State Department give
consideration to assigning to some senior officer of the Department the func-
tions of Intelligence Officer.* Such officer should have the prestige, the
authority, and the access to operational and policy matters which would equip
him to guide the production and control the dissemination of State Department
intelligence estimates. The Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence
and his staff do not today have such powers or position. Whether, in a given
case, the intelligence estimates would emanate from the Policy Planning Staff,
the political offices (geographical desks), or from a combination of the two,
plus the Research and Intelligence staff, is a matter for internal State De-
partment determination.
The appointment of an Intelligence Officer, with the powers and functions
we have indicated, and with a all but highly trained staff, in our opinion,
would result in a more efficient system whereby the Department could meet any
legitimate needs of the Central Intelligence Agency and of other Government
agencies for political intelligence. In this way the Department could also
effect closer liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service
We have used the term. "Intelligence Officer" here for reasons of clarity
only. As a practical matter and for security reasons some other and more
innocuous title would be desirable.
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agencies. This Intelligence Officer would serve as the Department's repre-
sentative on the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee, described In
Chapter IV. He would also act as the Department's principal liaison officer
for other matters concerning the Central Intelligence Agency, including liaison
with the Office of Policy Coordination as provided by the National Security
Council and with other covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency as
suggested in this report. This Intelligence Officer would combine the func-
tions now being handled by several departmental officers or not being 1=idled
at all. He should not, however, stand between other department officers and
the appropriate officials of the Central Intelligence Agency,, but he should
coordinate these relationships. For example, the various desks in the oper-
ating and estimating units of the Central Intelligence Agency should develop
close working relationships with the corresponding geographical. desks or other
policy officers of the Department.
We recognize that in recommending that the political intelligence reports
and estimates be passed upon by the policy officers of the Department, there
is the risk, which we discussed above in the chapter on national estimates,
that these reports will be colored, possibly even distorted, by the policy
prejudices of those who prepare them. As between this danger and that of having
the reports prepared by a group which is not thoroughly acquainted with the
operational and policy decisions of the Department, we choose the former. We
do so in the hope that if the Central Intelligence Agency, and particularly its
Estimates Division, and the Intelligence Advisory Committee function as we be-
Bove they should, an opportunity will be afforded to challenge departmental
estimates and to appraise. them in the light of reports available to members of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee from, other sources. (See Chapter V). Here
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it may be possible to correct estimates of any single department that have
gone "overboard" for a particular policy line which from a broader view of
available facts may be shown to be unsound.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMMATIONS
(1)
The State Department, to which the National Security Council has
assigned dominant interest in the collection and production of political,
cultural and sociological intelligence, should equip itself more adequately to
meet the legitimate requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency and of
other Government intelligence agencies for such intelligence.
(2) The specialized intelligence staff in the State Department, the
Research and Intelligence staff, does not now have sufficient current 1mowledge
of departmental operations and policies to furnish, on behalf of the Depart-
ment, the basic estimates which may be required by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Service intelligence agencies.
(3) The liaison between the State Department and the Central Intelligence
Agency should be closer and put on a continuing, effective basis.
(4+) To meet the foregoing requirements, consideration should be given by
the Department to designating a high officer of the Department, who has full
access to operational and policy matters, to act as intelligence officer. This
officer, with a small staff,. should process requests for departmental intelli-
gence received from the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies and see
that legitimate requests are met through the preparation of the requisite in-
telligence reports or estimates by the appropriate departmental officers. He
should also act as continuing Intelligence liaison officer with the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Service intelligence agencies.
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CHAPTER XIII
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this report we gave a brief summary of our survey and
findings, and at the various chapter endings we have added those conclusions
and recommendations which were applicable to the subject mattercf the chapter.
We have been critical of the direction and administration of the Central
Intelligence Agency where we felt that there had been failures to carry out
its basic charter. We have also pointed out what we have judged to be in-
adequacies in administration and lack of over-all policy guidance within the
organization. At no time, however, have we overlooked the great difficulties
facing a relatively new and untried organization which has been viewed with
some suspicion and distrust even by those whom it should serve. We believe
that some measure of this suspicion and distrust is being dissipated and that
what is needed today is for the Central Intelligence Agency to prove that it
can and will carry out its assigned duties. We have proposed specific steps
which can be taken toward this objective.
The progress of the Central Intelligence Agency should be continuously
tested by the National Security Council against the accomplishment of the pur-
poses of Sec. 102 of the National Security Act. That is to say, the Central
Intelligence Agency should be prepared to show what is being accomplished:
(1)
To coordinate the intelligence activities of the Government;
(2) To provide, in close collaboration with other governmental intelli-
gence agencies, for the central correlation of intelligence relating to the
national security; and
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(3) To perform the intelligence and related services of common concern
assigned to it by the National Security Council.
In these fields the Central Intelligence Agency has the duty to act. It
has been given, both by law and by National Security Council directive, wide
authority, and it has the open invitation to seek from the National Security
Council any additional authority which may be essential. It must not wait to
have authority thrust upon it. Its basic mandate is clear? We recognize that
it will require initiative and vision to carry it out. If this is done, we
will have made a satisfactory start toward achieving one of our most essential
defense requirements, an adequate intelligence service.
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ANNEXES
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CQNFlDENTIAL
ANNEX 1
SURVEY GROUP TERMS OF REFERENCE I
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
February 13, 1948
MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Mr. William H. Jackson
SUBJECT: Survey of the Central Intelligence Agency
This is to confirm our understanding that you will
serve as the group to make a survey of the Central Intelligence
Agency, in accordance with the enclosed resolution approved by the
National Security Council.
This memorandum is your authorization to proceed
with this survey and, upon presentation by you, will constitute a
directive to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelli-
gence Chiefs of the Departments represented on the Council, to fur-
nish you necessary information and facilities as indicated in the
second paragraph of the enclosed resolution.
Your willingness to participate in this vitally
important survey is sincerely appreciated by all members of the
National Security Council.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Executive Secretary
Incl
National Security Council Resolution
CONEIDENT%
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
January 13, 191+8
The National Security Council has agreed that a group of
two or three specially qualified individuals not in the Government
service should make a comprehensive, impartial, and objective sur-
vey of the organization, activities, and personnel of the Central
Intelligence Agency. As a result of this survey, this group should
report to the Council its findings and recommendations on. the fol-
lowing matters:
a. The adequacy and effectiveness of the present or-
ganizational structure of CIA.
b. The value and efficiency of existing CIA activi-
ties.
c. The relationship of these activities to those of
other Departments and Agencies.
d. The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel.
The National Security Council also authorized and directed
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Chiefs of
the Departments represented on the Council to give the above group
access to all information and facilities required for their survey,
except details concerning intelligence sources and methods.
166
coNFIDENTIAL
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ANNEX 2
SURVEY GROUP TERMS OF REFERENCE II
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
March 17, 1948
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Mr. William H. Jackson
SUBJECT: Survey of the Central Intelligence Agency
1. I have already sent you a memorandum with the terms
of the resolution of the National Security Council providing that a
survey should be made of the activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency and its relationship to other Departments and Agencies.
2. As a result of our further discussions on this sub-
ject, it may be helpful if I set forth my understanding regarding the
scope of the survey and the procedures to be followed.
3. The survey will comprise primarily a thorough and
comprehensive examination of the structure, administration, activities
and inter-agency relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency as
outlined in the resolution of the National Security Council. It will
also include an examination of such intelligence activities of other
Government Departments and Agencies as relate to the national secur-
ity, in order to make recommendations for their effective operation
and over-all coordination, subject to the understanding that the group
will not engage in an actual physical examination of departmental in-
telligence operations (a) outside of Washington or (b) in the collec-
tion of communications intelligence. On behalf of the National Secur-
ity Council I will undertake to seek the cooperation in this survey of
those Government Departments and Agencies not represented on the Coun-
cil which have an interest in intelligence as relates to national
security.
44. It should be understood that the survey of the Central
Intelligence Agency and its relationship to other Departments and Agen-
cies will be done for and with the authority of the National Security
Council. The survey of the intelligence activities of the Departments
of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, however, will be for
and with the authority of the respective heads of those Departments.
CONFIDENTIAL
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EdNRDENJ
5. This survey group will submit from time to time recom-
mendations on individual problems which need to be brought to the at-
tention of the Council or the heads of the respective Departments and
Agencies concerned.. Problems concerning CIA will be given priority
over those involving other Agencies. It is contemplated that the sur-
vey will be completed and final report submitted on or before January 1,
1949.
6. It is my understanding that at your request Mr. For-
restal has agreed to lend to the investigating group the services of
Mr. Robert Blum to head the staff work. I would appreciate the
group's advice as to additional staff members it may require in order
that I may clear them for this work. The members of the staff, when
cleared by the heads of the Agencies concerned, will be given access
to information and facilities required for the survey in the same
manner as provided for your group in the Council's resolution.
7. Compensation and expenses for the members of the in-
vestigating group and its staff will be paid for out of funds avail-
able to the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence
Agency.
8. I will be pleased to render so far as practicable
any further assistance which you may require in conducting your
survey.
SIDI EY W. SOUERS
Executive Secretary
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ANNEX 3
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER CREATING THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 22, 19+6
To The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War, and
The Secretary of the Navy
1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelli-
gence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the
most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the
national security. I hereby designate you, together with another person to
be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence
Authority to accomplish this purpose.
2.' Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time
to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which
persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under
the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National In-
telligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be desig-
nated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and
shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.
3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the
National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:
a. Accomplish the correlation and. evaluation of intelligence relating
to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the
Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.
In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the
intelligence agencies of your Departments.
b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intel-
ligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security
and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment
of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most ef-
fective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit.of said intelligence agencies, such services
of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be
more efficiently accomplished centrally.
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d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence af-
fecting the national security as the President and the National Intelli-
gence Authority may from time to time direct.
4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be ex-?
eroised under this directive.
5? Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your Depart-
ments as may be designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall be
freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation,
evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the National Intel-
ligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open
to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with
planning functions.
6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue
to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.
7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence
Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the
p:ri:acipa:= military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having
functions related to national security, as determined by the National
Intelligence Authority.
. 8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other de.-
partments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government
shall furnish such intelligence information relating to the national security
as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence ma;
.7
from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence
Authority.
5. Nothing herein shall. be construed to authorize the making of investiga-
tions inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions,
except as provided by law and Presidential directives.
10. In the conduct of their activities the national Intelligence Authority
and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully
protecting intelligence sources and methods.
Sincerely yours
/s/ Harry Truman
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ANNEX 4
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
(PUBLIC LAW 253 - 80th CONGRESS)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security
Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence,
who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the com-
missioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian
life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of $1+,000 a year.
(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as
Director then--
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject
to no supervision, control, restriction, orprohibition (military or other-
wise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a ci-
vilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Depart-
ment of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services
or any component thereof; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers,
or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or direct-
ed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any
component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or divi-
sion thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civil-
ian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office
of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance
of and service in such office, shall in noway affect any status, office, rank,
or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, per-
quisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such
status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while
serving in the. office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances
(active or retired, as the case may be) payable toa commissioned officer of
his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to
defray the expenses of the Agency; annual compensation at a rate equal to the
amount by which $1+,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and
allowances.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24,
1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of
Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any
officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination
necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such
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termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or
accept employment in arty- other department or agency of the Government if
declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Com-
mission.
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national secu-
rity, it shall be'the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National.
Security Council--
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning
such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies
as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for
the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and
agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intel-
ligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies
and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena.,
law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further,
That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue
to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelli-
gence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence ,agen.-
ciee:, such additional services of common concern as the National Security
Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties :related to-intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and ap-
proved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies
of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national
security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central .Intelli-
gence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed
by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as herein-
after provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence
for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided, however, That upon
the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of
Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dis-
semination as may be essential to the national security.
(f) Effective when -she Director first appointed under subsection (a) has
taken office--
(1) the Natiowtl Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339,
February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and
(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence
Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group
shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, alloca-
tions, or other funds available or authorized to be made available. far
such Group shall be available and shall be authorized tobe made available
in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.
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~`,z ~_a_.. ? gym. I.- rev . .,.....
k 3~ '
> Oak
~~ I
DEPT. OF
STATE
SEPT. OF
ARMY
OFFICE OF
COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION
GE NE NAL
COUNSEL
SEPT. OF
AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF
SCIENTIFIC
INTELLIGENCE
ADO I DORY
COUNCIL
BUDGET NANAGEMERT PERSONNEL SERVICES (EMPLOYEE
OFFICER OFFICER OFFICER OFFICER INVEST. fA.
OFFICE OF
REPORTS AND
ESTIMATES
6lOBAL
wlrEr Fr.
FIINCTIgUL
SULTNITS GPS.
j r
- L1 IPR00. (BOARD J
OFFICE OF
SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF
POLICY
COORDINATION
INSPECTION AND
SECURITY
INSPECTION
BR. I
AUDIT
OR.
SECURITY
BR.
OFFICE
OF
OPERATIONS
21501
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ANNEX 6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PERSONNEL STRENGTH AS OF 24 DECEMBER, 1948
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ANNEX 7
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
December 12, 1947
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of
1947, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the
National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:
1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordination between
the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations, an
Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the respective intelligence
chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from
the Joint Staff (JCS), and the Atomic Energy Commission, or their repre-
sentatives, bball be established to advise the Director of Central Intel-
ligence. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the chief, or
his representative, of any other intelligence Agency having functions re-
lated to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee whenever matters within the purview of his Agency are to be
discussed.
2. To the extent authorized by Section 102 (e) of the National
Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, or represen-
tatives designated by him, by arrangement with the head of the department
or agency concerned, shall make such surveys and inspections of depart-
mental intelligence material of the various Federal Departments and Agen-
cies relating to the national security as he may deem necessary in con-
nection with his duty to advise the NSC and to make recommendations for
the coordination of intelligence activities.
3. Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed pri-
marily to strengthen the over-all governmental intelligence structure.
Primary departmental requirements shall be recognized and shall receive
the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency.
a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making rec-
ommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council per-
taining to the intelligence activities of the various Departments
and Agencies, transmit therewith a statement indicating the concur-
rence or non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the
Department heads of the National Military Establishment,the Director
of Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the Secretary of
Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council.
b. Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence
shall, when approved by the National Security Council, issue as
Council Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. The
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respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring
that such orders or directives, when applicable, are implemented
within their intelligence organizations.
c. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the
National Security Council to insure full and proper implementation
of Council directives by issuing such supplementary DCI directives
as may be required. Such implementing directives in which the In-
telligence Advisory Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by
the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall be implemented with-
in the Departments and Agencies as provided in paragraph b. Where
disagreement arises between the Director of Central Intelligence and
one or more members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee over such
directives, the proposed directive, together with statements of non-
concurrence, shall be forwarded to the NSC for decision as provided
in paragraph a.
4. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence
relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national in-
telligence. In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intel-
ligence activities and research of the various Departments and Agencies
but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize
departmental intelligence for such production purposes. For definitions
see NSCID No. 3.
5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate National
Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Security Coun.-
oil, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies, and to such Govern-
mental Departments and Agencies as the National Security Council from
time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated shall be offi-
cially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry an agreed.
statement of substantial dissent.
6. When Security Regulations of the originating Agency permit, the
Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and other Departments or Agencies intelligence or Intel-.
ligence information which he may possess when he deems such dissemination
appropriate to their functions relating to the national security.
7. The Director, of Central Intelligence shall perform for the bene-
fit of the existing intelligence Agencies such services of common concern
to these Agencies as the National Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally.
8. The intelligence organizations in each of the Departments and
Agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency and with
eac4 other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a con-
tinuing interchange of intelligence information and intelligence available
to them.
9. The intelligence files in. each intelligence organization, in-
cluding the CIA, shall be made available under security regulations of
the Department or Agency concerned to the others for consultation.
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10. The intelligence organizations within the limits of their capa-
bilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may be requested
by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one of the other Depart-
ments or Agencies.
11. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrangements
with the respective Departments and Agencies to assign to the Central In-
telligence Agency such experienced and qualified officers and members as
may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes, in ad-
dition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligence may di-
rectly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will be subject
to the necessary personnel procedures of each Department.
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ANNEX 8
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 2
COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ABROAD
January 13, 1948
The following over-all policies and objectives are established by the
National Security Council for the interdepartmental coordination of foreign
intelligence collection activities, so that measures may be taken promptly to
effect sound and efficient utilization of the various departmental collecting
and reporting facilities abroad:
1. There shall be an allocation within certain broad categories of
agency responsibility for collection abroad, as follows:
Political. ,. . . . . Department of State
Cultural . . . . Department of State
Sociologica]. . . . . Department of State
Military . . . . . Department of the Army
Naval. . . . . . . . Department of the Navy
Air. . . . . . . . . Department of the Air Force
Economic )
Scientific ). . . Each agency in accordance
Technological ) with its respective needs
2. All available intelligence information, no matter by whom col-
lected, shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the field
representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may
also send copies to or otherwise inform his own agency.
3. The senior US representative in each foreign area where the
United States maintains a foreign post shall, within the spirit of the
pinricples enunciated herein, be responsible for the coordination of all
normal collection activities in his area.
4. The collecting and reporting facilities of each of the agencies
shall be utilized so as to avoid unproductive duplication and uncoordi-
nated overlap and to insure within budgetary limitations that full flow
of intelligence information which is the major need of all departments and
agencies for the accomplishment of their respective missions.
5. Full utilization shall be made of the individual initiative and
favorable contacts of agency representatives.
6. No interpretation of these established over-all policies and
objectives shall negate the basic principle that all departmental repre-
sentatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for
the appropriate transmission to their departments of all intelligence in-
formation pertinent to their departmental missions.
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7. There shall be free and unrestricted interdepartmental exchange
of intelligence information to meet the recognized secondary needs of
each department and agency for intelligence usually obtained or prepared
by other departments or agencies.
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ANNEX 9
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ]INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 3
COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
January 1.3, 1948
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of
191+'7, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the
National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following
over-all policies and objectives are established for the coordination of the
production of intelligence:
1. In order that all facilities cf the Government may be utilized to
their capacity and the responsibilities of each agency may be clearly de-
fined in accordance with its mission, dominant interest, and capabilities,
the whole field of intelligence production is divided into the following
categories, and responsibilities are allocated as indicated:
a- Basic Intelligence
(1) Basic Intelligence is that factual intelligence which
results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more
or less permanent or static nature and general interest which,as
a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be
the best available.
(2) An outline of all basic intelligence required by the
Government shall be prepared by the CIA in collaboration with the
appropriate agencies. This outline shall be broken down into
chapters, sections, and sub-sections which shall be allocated as
production and maintenance responsibilities to CIA and those
agencies of the Government which are best qualified by reason of
their intelligence requirements, production capabilities, and
dominant interest to assume the production and maintenance
responsibility.
(3) When completed, this outline and tentative allocations
of production and maintenance responsibilities shall be sub-
mitted for NSC approval and issued as an implementation of this
Directive. It is expected that as the result of constant con-
sultation with the agencies by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, both the outline and the allocations will be revised from
time to time to insure the production of the basic intelligence
required by the agencies and the fullest possible use of current
agency capabilities. Changes in the outline or allocations shall
be effected by agreement between the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the agencies concerned.
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(4) This basic intelligence shall be compiled and continuous-
ly maintained in National Intelligence Surveys to cover foreign
countries, areas, or broad special subjects as appropriate. The
National Intelligence Surveys will be disseminated in such form
as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence
and the agencies concerned.
(5) The Director of Central Intelligence shall be respon-
sible for coordinating production and maintenance and for accom-
plishing the editing, publication, and dissemination of these
National Intelligence Surveys and shall make such requests on the
agencies as are necessary for their proper development and
maintenance.
(6) Departments or agencies to be called on for contribu-
tions to this undertaking may include agencies other than those
represented permanently in the IAC.
b. Current Intelligence
(1) Current intelligence is that spot information or intel-
ligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value
to operating or.policy staffs, which is used by them usually
without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpre-
tation.
(2) The CIA and the several agencies shall produce and
disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet
their own internal requirements or external responsibilities.
(3) Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall
be based on interagency agreement including NSC Intelligence
Directive No. 1 and the principle of informing all who need to
know.
c. Staff Intelligence
(1) Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any
department or agency through the correlation and interpretation
of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet
its specific requirements and responsibilities.
(2) Each intelligence agency has the ultimate responsibility
for the preparation of such staff intelligence as its. own depart-
ment shall require. It is recognized that the staff intelligence
of each of the departments must be broader in scope than any
allocation,of collecti-____ responsibility or recognition of domi-
nant interest might inaicate. In fact, the full foreign intel-
ligence picture is of interest in varying degrees at different
times to each of the departments.
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(3) Any intelligence agency, either through the Director of
Central Intelligence or direotly,may call upon other appropriate
agencies for intelligence which does not fall within its own
field of dominant interest. Such requests shall be made upon
the agencies in accordance with their production capabilities and.
dominant interest.
(4) As a part of the coordination program, the Director of
Central Intelligence will seek: the assistance of the IAC intel-
ligence agencies in minimizing the necessity for any agency to
develop intelligence in fields outside its dominant interests.
(5) The CIA and the agencies shall, for purposes of coordi-
nation, exchange information on projects and plans for the pro-
duction of staff intelligence.
(6) It shall be normal practice that staff intelligence of
one agency is available to the other intelligence agencies perma-
nently represented on the IAC.
d. Departmental Intelligence
(1) Departmental intelligence is that intelligence including
basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department or
independent Agency of the Federal Government, and the subordinate
units thereof,to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful
responsibilities.
e. National Intelligence
(1) National intelligence is integrated departmental intel-
ligence that covers the broad aspects 'of national policy and
national security, is of concern to more than one Department or
Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single
Department or Agency or the Military Establishment.
(2) The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce and
disseminate national intelligence.
(3) The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and
develop the production of national intelligence in coordination
with the IAC Agencies in order that he may obtain from them
within the limits of their capabilities the departmental intel-
ligence which will assist him in the production of national
intelligence.
(4) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, by agreement
with the pertinent Agency or Agencies, request and receive such
special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries
prepared by the individual Departments or Agencies in their fields
of dominant 'interest or in accordance with their production
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capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelli-
gence reports or estimates undertaken mutually.
2. The research facilities required by any agency to process its
own current and staff intelligence shall be adequate to satisfy its indi-
vidual needs after taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other
agencies. Each agency shall endeavorto maintain adequate research facili-
ties, not only to accomplish the intelligence production task's allocated
to it directly under the foregoing provisions but also to provide such
additional intelligence reports or estimates within its field ofidominant
interest as may be necessary to satisfy the requirements of the other
agencies under such allocations.
3. For the purposes of intelligence production, the following divi-
sion of interests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of
coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall serve as a
general delineation of dominant interests:
Political, Cultural,
Sociological Intelligence..Department of State
Military Intelligence ........ Department of the Army
Naval Intelligence ............ Department of the Navy
Air Intelligence .............Department of the Air Force
Economic, Scientific, and Each agency in accord-
Technological ance with its respective
Intelligence ...............needs
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CONFIDENTIAL.
ANNEX 10
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
December 12, 19+7
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security
Act of 194.7 and for the purpose of providing intelligence support for the
preparation of studies required by the National Security Council in the ful-
fillment of its duties, it is directed that:
1. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the
other agencies concerned, shall prepare a comprehensive outline of national
intelligence objectives applicable to foreign countries and areas to serve
as a guide for the coordinated collection and production of National
Intelligence.
2. The Director of Central :Intelligence, in collaboration with the
other agencies concerned, and under the guidance of the NSC Staff* shall
select from time to time and on a current basis sections and items of such
outline which have Ea priority interest. These selections will be Issued
by the Director of Central Intelligence to supply the desired priority
guidance for the production of National Intelligence by the Central In-
telligence Agency and for the contributions to such production by other
agencies concerned.
* For this purpose, the NSC Staff shall consist of the Executive Secretary and
the Departmental representatives designated by Council members to advise and
assist the Executive Secretary. Any cases of disagreement within this group
will be referred to the National Security Council for decision.
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ANNEX 11
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5
ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS
December 12, 19+7
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) of the National Security
Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:
1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized
Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions
for the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet
the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with
the national security, except for certain agreed activities by other
Departments and Agencies.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized
Federal counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its
possessions and in occupied areas, provided that this authority shall not
be construed to preclude the counter-intelligence activities of any army,
navy or air command or installation and certain agreed activities by De-
partments and Agencies necessary for the security of such organizations.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible.for
coordinating covert and overt intelligence collection activities.
11. When casual agents are employed or otherwise utilized by an IAC
Department or Agency in other than an overt capacity, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall coordinate their activities with the organized
covert activities.
5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such in-
telligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have
an authorized interest therein.
6. All other National Security Council Intelligence Directives or
implementing supplements shall be construed to apply solely to overt in-
telligence activities unless otherwise specified.
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ANNEX 12
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 6
FOREIGN WIRELESS AND RADIO MONITORING
December 12, 1947
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of
19+7, and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof', the
National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:
1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all Federal
monitoring of foreign propaganda and press broadcasts required for the
collection of intelligence information to meet the needs of all Depart-
ments and agencies in connection with the National Security.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such in-
telligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have
an authorized interest therein.
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ANNEX 13
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7
DOMESTIC EXPLOITATION
February 12, 19+8
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of
1947, and for the purpose enunciated in paragraphs (d) and (e) thereof, the
National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:
1. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the
exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United States of
business concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals
as sources of foreign intelligence information.
2. To implement this undertaking, the Central Intelligence Agency
shall:
a. Determine the foreign intelligence potential of sources so
that the best available may be selected expeditiously for exploita-
tion upon the receipt of collection requests from the intelligence
agencies. For this purpose, CIA will maintain a central index of
non-governmental sources in the United States.
b. Establish uniform procedures and standards for security
clearance of all contacts in this field, and arrange such clearances.
C. Establish uniform procedures to insure that the interests
of organizations and individuals contacted will not be jeopardized.
d. Collect through the establishment of field offices within
the United States, foreign intelligence information required in the
interests of the national security or by the individual intelligence
agencies.
e. Arrange for direct contact between intelligence agency
representatives and non-governmental sources within the United States
whenever conditions require such action or upon the request of a
member agency to secure technical or other foreign intelligence
information.
f. Obtain the agreement of responsible policy-making officials
of American organizations having a foreign intelligence potential be-
fore establishing and maintaining contacts within that organization.
S. Inform the intelligence agencies of the prospective depar-
ture from or return to the United States of selected American citi-
zens having a high foreign intelligence potential, so that the agen-
cies may furnish requirements or provide specialists for briefing or
interrogation.
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h. Disseminate to the appropriate agencies all foreign in-
telligence information obtained through this program. Reports p,:?o-
duced by the agencies shall be identified as such, unless the origi-
nating agency stipulates to the contrary
3. Further to implement this undertaking, the intelligence agen-
cies shall:
a. Assign to duty in the Central Intelligence Agency field
offices, if they so desire and within their capabilities, represent-
atives to serve their interests under the direction of the CIA man-
agers. Member agencies may, at their discretion, establish active
working liaison between their Regional Offices and. CIA Field Offices.
b. Send directly to the Central Intelligence Agency for col-
lection all their requests for foreign intelligence information to
be obtained from non-governmental sources within the United States.
C. Transmit to the Central Intelligence Agency for appropriate
dissemination full information and reports resulting from approved
direct contacts by agency representatives with non-governmental
sources, identifying such sources by CIA code number.
d. Obtain, to the maximum extent possible, from their depart-
ments and agencies the foreign intelligence information which the
departments and agencies have received as a by-product of the normal
relationship with business concerns and other non-governmental or-
ganizations and individuals in the United States in connection with
non-intelligence activities, and transmit to the maximum extent pos-
sible, the information to the Central Intelligence Agency for editing
for source security and for appropriate dissemination.
e. Obtain, in so far as is practicable and within existing
security regulations, from their departments and agencies information
concerning business concerns and other non-governmental organiza-
tions and individuals in the United States having foreign intelli-
gence potential, which the department or agency possesses or sub-
sequently acquires, and make the information available to the Central
Intelligence Agency.
f. Nominate representatives to serve on a, committee, under
the chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, to meet periodi-
cally to consider mutual problems and interests in connection with
this program.
4. Further to implement this undertaking, the National Security
Resources Board and the components of the Military Establishment, other
than the components represented on the IAC, shall furnish. directly to the
CIA,. to the maximum extent possible, all foreign intelligence information
which is received as a by-product of their normal relationship with busi-
ness concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals in
the United States, in connection with non-intelligence activities.
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5. Nothing in this program shall be interpreted to affect the
established relationship of the Departments and Agencies with business
concerns, other non-governmental organizations, and individuals in the
United States for purposes other than the procurement of foreign intelli-
gence information. Nor shall it affect the nornal,intercha.nge of docu-
ments between libraries of the departments and other libraries, or the
development of research projects with individuals or non-governmental
institutions.
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ANNEX 14
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 8
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON FOREIGN
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERSONALITIES
May 25, 1948
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act
of 1947 and for the purpose enunciated in paragraph d(4) thereof, the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of Biographical Data on Foreign Scientific
and Technological Personalities is assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
1. To implement this undertaking, the following procedures are
established:
a. Departmental intelligence agencies shall continue to collect,
analyze, and abstract biographical data on foreign scientific and
technological personalities. in accordance with their needs.
L. Departmental intelligence agencies shall forward to the
Central Intelligence Agency, in the manner most satisfactory to the
Department concerned, all biographical data originating within their
respective Departments, or complete documentary references thereto,
on foreign scientific and technological personalities.
c. The Central Intelligence Agency shall codify and index. all
such data received, including such data as may be received from. all
sources, and shall incorporate the actual material received in its
files.
d. All biographical data on foreign scientific and technological
personalities maintained by the-Central Intelligence Agency shall be
readily available to the participating Departments and Agencies.
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLI Executive Registry
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TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
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Chief, ER
t
7 E 12
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SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Eunice,
Attached is a sanitized copy
of the Dulles, Jackson, Correa Report,
as received from the NSC Staff.
For your retention.
~wr
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
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re M K0. 237 Use previous editions GP,) Io7l 0 -, c+s-
t-67
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