ORE COMMENTS ON THE DULLES REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500030016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 14, 1949
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT : ORE Comments on the Dulles Report
REFERENCE: Memorandum, 26 January 1949, from Deputy
Director
1. Attached hereto, in accordance with the request
contained in reference memorandum, are the ORE comments
on the Dulles Report.
2. ORE's comments are organized in two sections as
follows:
a. Section I, General Statement, contains
three parts, treating ORE objectives
in reviewing the report, the ORE reaction
to the report as a whole, and a summary
of ORE recommendations made in Section II.
be Section II contains comments on those
specific conclusions and recommendations
in the report which affect ORE.
Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates
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OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
_QOMMENTS
on the
DULLES COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE
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1. GENERAL STATEMENT
The Objectives of ORE in Reviewing the Dulles Reports
Yn reviewing the Dulles Report, the Office of Reports and Estimates
has as its basic objective, not self-justification or the denial of admitted
shortcomings, but a genuinely constructive effort to shed the light of
practical working experience upon the problem of improving the produc-
tion of the intelligence upon which United States policy should be based.
ORE has, therefore, proceeded to examine the recommendations con-
tained in the Dulles Report,, has pointed out certain impractical aspects,
and has indicated how the recommendations might be most effectively
implemented. ORE considers that its ultimate acquaintance with the
actual problems involved in the production of national intelligence enable
it, with the help of the detached perspective of the Dulles Report, to sug-
gestt concrete means for carrying out the principles underlying the Report.
ORE Reaction to the Report as a Whole.
The Dulles Report is an admirable effort to re-direct CIA to fundamen-
tals and first principles in the production of national intelligence; it pro-
poses in effect a return to the coiacepts developed at the close of the war
during two years of earnest and intense discussion among the most exper_
fenced intelligence personnel in Washington. The observations of the
Committee appear accurate, and its objectives are sound; but its conclu-
sions are in many respects faulty, and the recommendations for their
attainment are in many cases impracticable. Although the proposals
bearing on this Office lack, perhaps by intent, both precision and detail,
ORE believes that sound administration of the suggested organization,
combined with strong NSC direction to the 1AC agencies to make their
facilities available to Ceti., could bring about improved intelligence
production,.
Mice Report g s greatest weakness stems from the Co mitteel's restricted
concept of the extent to which the departmental intelligence activities needed
to be investigated in order to appraise their relationship to the operations of
CI . Although the Committee claimed to appreciate the danger of consider-
t.ng CIA activities alone and frankly stated that some correctives were needed
outside CM, specific recommendations were addressed only to C. and an
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indefensible share of responsibility for Ch.'s admitted. shortcomings
was attributed to the Director. The resulting Report contains many
acute observations but it also embodies recommendations Which could
not by themselves bring about the desired results.
3. Summary of ORE Recommendations.
On the basis of the datailed comments (to be found in Section II) on
the conclusions and recommendations of the. ulies Report, ORE makes
the following summary recommendations.
(1) NSCID #1 and NSCID #3 should be revised to:
(a) redefine CIA's intelligence production responsibilities as
-et forth In Section II, paragraph 1 b;
(b) define those intelligence categories, in fields of common
interest, which should be produced centrally by CIA:
(c)
(d)
clarify and define departmental intelligence responsibilities
to CI ;
require departmental intelligence agencies to grant priority
to the production of intelligence required by CIA; and
clarify IAC coordination procedures on CIA estimates as
recommended in Section Il, paragraph 4
Reorganization of ORE may be required to provide for the pro-
duction of national intelligence estimates, as distinguished from central
research in intelligence fields of common concern. Such reorganization
should not be attempted. however, until the action in paragraph (1) above
has been completed. ORE should not be divided into t vo separate C
Offices for the purpose of separating the two types of intelligence pro-
duction unless the need for such action is proved and demonstrated.
(3) ORE agrees that ICAPS should be responsible solely to CIA and
not to the department agencies its members are supposed to represent.
It strongly recommends, however., that ICAPS should not be reconstituted
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along the lines suggested in the Report, but shoe' be replaced by a
working staff acting for a Council, composed of the DCI and his
Assistant Directors, and established to deal with intelligence problems
of concern to two or more, offices of CIA. The Assistant Directors
concerned should attend all meetings of the IAC standing committee,
(4) ORE has no desire to operate the CIA library nor to assume
the functions of the Foreign Documents Branch, as long as such ser-
vices continue to be conducted in support of ORE. It is recommended,
therefore, that these two functions remain where they are or be merged
as a library service within OCD.
(5) ORE regards as one of its major responsibilities the furnishing
of specific and long-range guidance to 00 and OSO collection facilities,
through the development of coordinated interdepartmental requirements
for information. It recommends that this function should not be decen-
tralized to 00 and OSO.
(6) ORE direct working-level relations with NSC9 JCS, and the State
Department Policy Planning Staff should be authorized in order () to
enable ORE to receive the guidance necessary for its production effort,
and (b) to give more direct and effective intelligence support to policy
and operational levels.
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ORE COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC DULLES REPORT CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter V (1).
In the C c aural Intelligence Agency there has been confusion between
a Espons o rp o cing coordinated national intellig ce
estimates and responsibilitLfor miscellaneous research and retort-
ing activities.
The various reports studies and summaries which are not national
intelligence or recognized services of com rnon concern slshoulc be
disconinued. .~ .~
a. These two points have been considered together as they are part
of t:n~ same problem.
b. ORE believes that what the Dulles Committee describes as "con-
fusion" has resulted from CIA's recognition of Its threefold responsibilities
as the producer of national estimates, as the intelligence facility of the NSC,
and as the agency responsible for performing services of common concern.
The Committee has failed to recognize the gap that exists between CIA's
explicit responsibilities, as set forth in NSCID #3, and CIA's implicit respon-
llltts as the Intelligence facility of the NSC. Moreover, NSCID #3 is so
rigid with respect to CIA s production responsibilities and so flexible with
respect to those of the departmental intelligence agencies that its usefulness
as a working document is seriously impaired. The Committee's conclusion
is made on the basis of a dangerously limited view of CIA's responsibilities
for intelligence production. Such responsibilities should be considered not
colely in terms of the production. of "coordinated national inte ence esiihates and "intelli ence in fields of common interest"" but also in terms'-
of CIA s role as the intelligence facility of the President, the National
Security Corm cil and such agencies as may be designated by them.
c. CIA intelligence production responsibilities should include the following,
and NSCID #l and NSCID #3 should be modified accordingly to include a revised
:od more appropriate definition of national intelligence:
fl
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Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter VI (4).
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(1) To produce intelligence required to reduce to a minimum
the element of surprise in foreign situations and developments which
affect U national security.
(2) To produce coordinated intelligence estimates required for
national planning, policy and operational decisions.
(3) To produce intelligence required to support those agencies
designated by the NSC to receive it.
(4) To produce intelligence in fields of common interest to CIA
and the departmental intelligence agencies, including economic and
scientific intelligence.
(5) To produce intelligence required for CIA estimates not normal
to any departmental responsibilities.
d. It should be noted that paragraph c (2) above is the only category
of intelligence which conforms to the definition of national intelligence
in NSCID #3.
2.
Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter V (2).
The provisions of the National Securit Act for the production of
national intelligence estimates, as inter reted by the National Security
Council Intelligence-Directives are sound but have not been effectively
carried out.
a. ORE concurs in the assertion that the provisions of the National
Security Act for the production of national intelligence estimates are
sound, but does not concur in the statement that these provisions are
adequately interpreted by the NSCID's, particularly in NSCID #1 and
NSCID #3.
b. ORE has taken this position for reasons cited in paragraph 1 b
and -c above, and for the following additional reasons:
(1) - The directives do not provide for adequate treatment of the
matter of priority within the departmental intelligence agencies with
respect to their support of CIA. Consequently, CIA is unable to make
optimum use of departmental intelligence and cannot depend upon timely
departmental action in meeting CIA commitments and deadlines.
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(2) The directives do not adequately allocate production
responsibilities and do not define intelligence fields of common
concern.
3. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter V (3)
There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency
_ _
a sma Estimates Division w is won
w u and review
the specialized intelligence pr Mt R 19 e r e a e ivies
in order to Aregw
e coordinated national Intelligence st mates.
Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter VI (1)
In addition to the Estimates Division recommended in the
previous Chapter, there should be created out of the present
Office of ReportsEstimates a'Itesearc_an Re orts Divi-
sion to accomplish central research in and coordinated r ac-
tion of Intelligence in fields of common interests. The staff
this Division should include sufficient re resentation from the
state Department and Services to Insure that their needs are
adequately met.
a. These two recommendations have been considered to-
gether inasmuch as they are part of the same problem.
,, Partially because the Report is vague concerning the details
of the proposed reorganization, opinion is divided in ORE on the
necessity or desirability of a drastic internal reorganization now.
However, if the Committee's recommendation means that the
Estimates Division is to be large enough to provide its own
relatively high level research support, the recommendation is
workable and might result In simplification of the process of
producing estimates. Similarly, the proposed Research and
Reports Division, including a basic economic research
unit as well as the present Tap Branch and such other facilities
as might be determined to belong there, could profitably operate
aart from the Estimates Division. It must be pointed out, how-
ever, that these recommendations are made within the framework
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of the entire Report. It would be highly inadvisable to separate
the present ORE functions without making sure that correspond-
ing changes will be brought about in the functions and facilities
of thP devartmental intelligence agencies, particularly in their
relationships to CIA. It should also be recognised that decentrali-
tiem of intelligence production responsibilities, as recommended
In the Report, necessarily Involves substantial problems of co-
ordination, flow, routing, and priorities of access to source
materials and raises the potential danger of an even greater
duplication of effort than now exists.
A. ORE therefore believes that these recommendations are
premature. Their implementation should be seriously con-
sidered only after NSCU) #1 and NSCII) #3 have been revised and
the subsequent effect reviewed.
4. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter V (4)
Under the leadership of
these estimates s
approeal
by the reconstituted bnce Advisory Committee whose snem-
rs 1 oulcfiassnme co ec vie es
Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter V (5)
___,_ML, a d be made in these arra ements for the
handl of crisis situations ho;7co___o_r'dtnat&d a es a re-
_uired without delay.
Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter V (6)
Coordinated Intelligence estimates produced in
in or-Mr- ec ive, be recogn ed as
estimates available to the policy makers.
a. These three recommendations have been considered to-
get&,r as parts of the same problem.
b. ORE cinnot agree with the view that members of the IAC
should assume collective responsibility for CIA estimates. it
is considered that the main question is what sort of estimate
should emerge from the national intelligence structure. Those
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who developed the original concept of a central intelligence group had
clearly In mind the ever-present factor of departmental bias as well
as the shortcomings of joint intelligence, which often produces esti-
mates so watered down in the process of reaching agreement as to be
valueless. CIA estimates can be free from such faults only if they
are produced with full cognizance of departmental views but without
subservience to departmental prejudices. IAC review of CIA drafts
should undertake to eliminate minor or apparent differences but not
to gloss over divergences of unformed opinion. The resultant esti-
mate must be essentially that of CIA and not that of the IAC collectively.
Any statements of dissent should be limited to substantial and well-
defined issues, as the directt ves now provide. Moreover, these
directives should be further modified to restrict dissent to the field
of responsibility of the dissenting agency. (For example, ONI has an
terest In political matters but is not responsible for estimates in
that field, and CIA should not be required to publish a dissent by ONI
on purely political matters if OIR concurs In the CIA position.) The
logic of OR.E's contention is simply that, just as a dissenting mem-
ber of the TAC cannot be expected to share in the responsibility for
a CIA estimate in which he dissents, so, by extension, CIA has sole
responsibility for its estimates, even when IAC concurrence is
complete, and does not share this responsibility collectively with
the members of the IAC. Concurrence should fortify the estimate;
it should not create an artificial responsibility. The Dulles Report
does not reflect a clear understanding of this vital aspect of the
coordination theory. To the Committee, "national" intelligence
is merely "coordinated" intelligence, and coordinated intelligence
is joint intelligence, at the mercy of departmental bias.
p, Although the Report favors the method of preparing drafts in
an ad hoc committee, the experience of ORE (including the example
of "Project 50", cited by the Committee), shows that this procedure is
time-consuming and inef#icieit. ORE believes that coordination pro-
cedures will be effective only if its own estimates personnel produce
the initial draft as a basis for discussion with a permanent, full-time,
substantively competent IAC committee, prior to the submittal of the
to the estimates to the Director for IAC action.
d. ORE agrees that there must be effective means for handling
crisis situations. In the light of past experience, some modification
of the present DCI 3/1 procedures may now be necessary.
p. ORE believes that its estimates must earn their distinction as
the most authoritative intelligence available to the policy-makers. It
is, however, recommended that the NSC enjoin the policy makers to
give CIA such guidance in matters pertaining to national policy that
CIA intelligence support will be more directly responsive to their needs.
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5. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter VI (2).
The C o o r d i n a t i o n Division ( r e c o n s t i t u t e d I n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l Coor-
stud the acf s the Researc an i on
and for nS2mmg those services of common concern which
should be performed centrally
y.
A. ORE believes that a revised draft of NSCID #3 should determine
the actual scope of Intelligence production in fields of common concern
and that this should be done whether or not the proposed reorganization
of ORE is adopted. ORE recommends that this Office be given the respon-
sibility, in collaboration with the IAC Standing Committee, for re-drafting
NSCID #3 for these purposes.
J Further comments on the ORE concept of the reconstituted ICAPS
function are included in 7 below.
6. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter VI (3).
T
me r r
of es
consider
att
her
du
eparatic n the Central Intelligence Agency
the need for such summaries
of the
licat
of
indivi
summaries and
deoartmar
o prepare
existence a
r cap- abuff-190
a. ORE does not concur in this recommendation or Its implications.
In referring to CIA current intelligence publications as "essentially
political summaries," the Report properly indicates that those publica-
tions are based to a considerable degree on State DepartnnEnt materials.
However, a major cause for this preponderance of State Department
materials is that Army and Navy do not, as State does, make their highest
level intelligence and operational materials available to CIA . A strong
NSC directive is required to remedy this situation. Concerning the problem
of duplication, ORE believes that such duplication is more apparent than
real. Each of the departmental agencies produces periodic summaries
which are designed for a specific audience, and no one of those publications
could meet the needs of the other audiences. (Even the State Department
summaries are specialized; they are diplomatic summaries for readers
with an intimate knowledge of diplomatic o`peraffans.) CIA current intel-
ligence publications are the only ones designed primarily for the President
and the NSC. ORE believes that only CIA has the perspective and the
freedom from bias necessary for proper performance of this delicate
and significant function.
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b. The President and the members of the NSC have repeatedly ex-
pressed their approval of the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries. Although
the Report makes no specific recommendation concerning the CIA monthly
"Review of the World Situation", the publication has been well received,
insofar as ORE has been able to ascertain.
7. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter IV (7).
The ICAPS should be reconstituted as a staff re s sibIe onl to the
Director of Central Intelligence with the task of deve pping~alans _for
the coordination of Intel ence activities.
_., ORE does not concur in the recommendation that in its reconstituted
form ICAPS or the proposed "Coordination Division" should function as
recommended in the report.
b. ORE recommends that ICAPS be replaced by a council of Assistant
Directors which will advise the Director on matters of intelligence policy and
and interdepartmental coordination, and which will prepare drafts of NSCID's
and 1)CI's to implement such proposals.
c. The council of Assistant Directors wider the ORE proposal would
require a Secretariat to formulate agenda,circulate drafts of papers,
arrange and schedule meetings, record conclusions reached,and cause
approved plans, policies and directives to be promulgated.
4., Under this proposal, the DCI would be represented on the IAC
Standing Committee by the AD or AD's concerned with the problems
under discussion.
8. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter IV (8).
The esgonsibilities of the OCD with respect to the coordination
of collect Qn re uirements a ue `aa'c~`t ie d ems' of
intelligence should be carried out under the new Coordination
Dives onijs subiect to future determination of the extent
to which individual offices m conduct their own dissemination.
a. ORE does not agree that the OCD function is appropriate in any
sense to its concept of the working staff function recommended for the
reconstituted ICAPS in paragraph 9 above.
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9. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter VII (4).
The Foreign Documents Branch should be made part of the proposed
Research and Reports' __ 6ne s .crea_e'
a. Because the FDB function is basically a "source exploitation
facility',"involving a substantial library and reference function, ORE
considers that FDB should remain in 00 or be attached to the CIA
library. The library should 3n turn remain in OCD as a central ser-
vice to all CIA components.
10. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter XI (5).
There 'should be effective coordination between the work of the IC
.0~.1..11.I.Mf1.0 rRIAMO-MR.[R..RW+'Y.1 .r.ll~rr~i--
in the field of militar estimates and that of the CIA and LAC in the
field of national estimates.
a. ORE believes that intelligence production can be effectively
coordinated only at the working level and that ORE representation to
the NSC as well as the JIC is necessary.
b. It is strongly recommended., therefore, that the ORE have the
responsibility for conducting working-level liaison on substantive
intelligence matters with NSC and JIC.
11. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter XII (1).
The State Department, to which the NSC has assigned dominant
interest in the collection, and r e io_ n o o i Ica cdlfilr ai-
and sociological intelligence s iii itself ade ely
to meet the eai ima e r eu ements o e an o er
igenceencles for suc _ ence.
Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter XII (2).
The s, i e 0 d- c _e s t ent
search and Yntelli ence ;Sttt#t d!,es not now have sufficient
rsalo.alym a.xresa- M.un~
.current knowledge of depa,ri:ment erat ons an po icies o
furnish, on behalf o the Deoar nth asicc estimates which
be rectuired by thud the Servicee jntgYliM ea cies
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at. These two conclusions and recommendations have been con-
sidered together as being separate parts of the same problem.
b. ORE concurs in each statement. (1) As long as the intelli-
gence facilities of the Department of State are inadequate to meet
CIA deadlines and CIA specifications for intelligence production,
CIA has no alternative but to produce its own political, cultural and
sociological intelligence. (2) As long as OIR is denied access to
needed information which is available in the Department, ORE can-
not risk the assumption that OIR intelligence production is complete
and accurate.
12. Conclusion and Recommendation - Chapter XII (3).
The liaison between the State Department and the Central Intelli-
ence Agengy should Ve c oser an t on a continuing s e- ive
basis.
a. ORE concurs. Authorization should be granted ORE to main-
tain effective liaison with political and operational levels in the Depart-
ment of State in addition to the liaison presently authorized with OIR.
It is particularly important that ORE have effective working relations
with the Department I's Policy Planning Staff in order to coordinate
intelligence production requirements. ORE intelligence production
plans should be in phase with the policy planning of the Department.
The present arrangement, authorizing ORE to deal only with the Office
of Special Assistant for Intelligence, prevents CIA from receiving
guidance from the State Department policy level.
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