REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ENTITLED 'THE CONTROL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE' DATED 1 JANUARY 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500030012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 4, 1949
• Content Type: MF

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In rerl.y r 'e .
to =nitis.ls and OFFICE OF, TilE C?IIEF OF t la OPERATIONS
No. Serial 00036 -I31
VEOIINOTOI, 25, D. C.
Yy9~5X1
COPY No. -7-/
IZLFORAINDUM FOR TJE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
I ATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
Vial Director, Cax:tral Into11if.ence Agency.
Subjoct: Report to the National Security Council entitled
"The Central I ntelli t-onco A,;ency and the National
Organization for Intollirenoe" dated. 1 January
lO 19.
Enclosures : (A) Corinonts of the Dopart ment of the Navy
pertaining to subject report.
(B) Proposed draft of anendod NSCID No. 1
1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are for arded herewith in
cccipliance with the mezzorand n ror tho National Security Council
dated 24 January 1949.
(Sited) Thos. B. Inglis
THUS . 3. I N I S
Rear Ad1niral, U.S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence
1st Indorsemont 7 larch 1949
$'o2 Executive Secretary, National Security Council
1.. Forwarded.
Navy. review(s) completed. (.`Signed) R. H. Hillenkoetter
It, H,> HILLFNKOETTER
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ENCLOSURE (A)
Comments of the Doparinent of the Navy on the
RRoport to the Notional Security Council entitled
"'Elie Central Intelligence Agency and National
Organizatioft for Intelligence" dated l January 1949.
1. The following comments and reoonendations regarding the
subject report are submitted by the Office of Naval Intelligence.
The roport contained herein is confined to those "Conclusions and
Rocannendations" contained in the subject report v4dah are of
concern to the Department of the Navy.
2. The majority of the "conclusions and Roo= mnondations"
contained in the subject report may be catalogued under the
following headings of which the first covers practically the
entire reports
A. Coordination
B. The Intelli41enco Advisory Cormnittee
C. The Interdepartmental Coordinating; and Planning Staff
D. The Central Intelligence Agency
E. z.;iscollaneous, Which includes such matters as.peraonnal,
crisis estimates, and intelligence agencies other than
the CIA.
The following oonrients and rocc*m ondations will be placed in the
foregoing categories.
ENCLOSURE (A)
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A. Coordination
The report states that the coordination function
of the CIA is not being adoquately exorcised and that
(page 3) "vhat is needed in continuing and effective
coordinating action under existing directives and also
directives establishing more precisely the responsibility
of the various intelligence ag rides." The report also
states that (page 5) "coordination can most effectively
be achieved by mutual agreement smong the various
agencies." The National Security Act of 1947 charges
the Director of the CIA with recommending to the
National Security Council measures for coordination of
the intelligence ag-oncios but confers upon the Director
no authority over those agencies. As each of those
agencies is under its on Departmental Head, such
authority would be inconsistent with normal eamnand
relations. Consequently, the best organization for
effectively establishing the desired degree of coordina-
tion appears to be the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
The IAC will be dealt witEZ in more detail in the next
section of this report, but it is believed that the
authority and rospozcibilities of the IAC could be
broadened without conflict with ta.o National Security
Act of 1947 and thus enable this Committee to accomplish
more effective coordination in the field of intolligenco
requirements. Among the essentials necessary to achieve
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proper coordination the subject report lists (page 54)
"continuous a i.nation on the initiative of the CIA of
instances of duplication and failure of coordination;
directives which establish more precisely the responsi-
bilities of the various departments and the efrootivo
carrying out of plane through close interdepartmental
consultation at all levels." Althouta tho IAC has w
authority at present to issue coordinating, directives,
it can be authorized to recanmend such directives to
the U SC. The other essentials listed above appear to
be functions which the IAC could most effectively perform.
D. The Intelligence Advisory Ca sdtteo
The subject report states that (page 63) "the Intelli-
Geneo Advisory Committee is soundly conceived, but it
should -participate more actively with the Director of
Central I ntelli ence in the continuing coordination of
intelligence activities." It is also further stated in
the discussion of National Intelligence Estimates that
(page 81) "theao estimates should be submitted for discus-
sion and approval by the reconstituted In olligence
Advisory Carni.ttee vf-ioso members should assume collective
responsibility for them." The Chief of Naval Intelligence
questions the statement that "the IAC is soundly conceived".
The present NSCID No. 1 establishes to IAC "to advise the
Director of Central I ntclli eneo" . This statement and the
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3iarne of the Ccrnmittoe are indicative i.aat its function
are purely advisory and that it is without authority.
In the natter of moking recommendations to and
advisin ; the ITSC these recc endations and this advice
on ginato with the Director of the CIA who indioated
the concurrence or nonconourrenoo of the IAC members.
Yhere is no roquirenent that recam, enctations or advice
which originate with members of the IAC be forwarded
to the Council unless the Director of CIA sees fit to
do so. It is beli?v+ed that reoanmendation, or advice
Yhioh originates wait - a member of the IAC should be
forwarded to the Council whether the Director of CIA
agrees or not.
Directives issued in Implementation of Bational
Security Council Directives are now issued by the
Director of the CIA after unanimous concurrence by
the IAC. This procedure could be atrenggthensd as
will be indicated later in this paragraph.
The sooond quotation above states that the IAC
nernbors "should assume collective responsibility" for
national Intollirenoe Estimates. It is submitted that
if tho IAC mombors are to assume "colloctive responsi..
bill. ty" they should be assiC.ned collective authority,
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rather than a collective advisory capacity, in the
production of these estimates.
In order to effect the improvements indicated in
the subject report and to overcome the defects in the
charter of the IAC, it is reconuaendod that the present
174SCID No. 1 be reissued along tho lines indicated in
the proposed.redrs.ft attached and labelled Enclosure
(I3). This proposal would chan,,e the name of the
Cor.nii.ttoe to "I ntelli Conce Coordinating Ca: nittoe" .
I1ono of the changes Indicated usurp any of the authority
delegated to t e Director of the CIA by the National
Security Act of 1947. All changes are intended to
strengthen the oocrdinatinG machinery of the govern-
mental intolligence aE onoios.
C. The I nterdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
The subject report makes a number of comments
regarding; ICAPS, many of which. are or anizatioal in
character vrlthin CIA. The report states that it Should
be reconstituted and suggests Vie name of "Coordination
Division". The report fur- "or states that- its assigned
nission, rthich It has failed to execute, (pace 46) is
"to review the intelll{;onoo activities of tho govern-
meat, and assist the Director in initiating : oasures
of coordination for recommendation to the :rational
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Security Council". The report roe=mends that (page
63) "ICAPS should be reconstituted as a staff responsible
only to the Director of CIA." This is not understood
since ICAPS is now oonsiderod responsible only'to the
Director of CIA. The original concept of ICAPS was
that it should act as a staff for the TAG but this has
not been carried out in practice. The original concept
is considered preforrable to the present arrangement
which should be changed as indicated belay.
The following roeanzaondations regarding TCAPS are
suhaitted:
1. Redesignate ICAPS as the "Coordinating Staff"
under the TAG (I CC) .
2. Prepare a procedure for this staff containing
the following provisions:
(a) The ICAPS (CS) shall be composed of members
appointed by the member agoneioe of the IAC
(I CC) . A ropresentative appointed by the
Director of the CIA shall be the Chairman.
(b) ICAPS (CS) shall: (1) keep under continuous
review the status of coordination among the
various intelligence agencies and make recom-
mondati ons to the TAG (ICC) for impro? wont
therein; (2) maintain close liaison ?.IIth
member agendas of the lAC (ICC) and other
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agencies of the govorrriont concerned with
the National Security with a view to oatab
lishing most effective ooll?ction of
essential inforrlation, determining their
intolligonce needs and insuring an effective
interdepar1nontal dissemination of intelli-
genco; (3) perform such staff functions as
the IAC (ICC) may assign, including initial
drafts of proposals for the consideration of
the IAC (ICC) and poriodic checks to insure
proper implementation of intelligence direc-
tives under the cognisance of the IAC (ICC);
(4) determination of "Com. on Services" which
can be best performed by the CIA.
In other words, the ICAPS (CS) relationship to the IAC
(ICC) should approximate that of the Joint Intelligence
Group to the Joint I ntolli,;ence Committee, with respect
to matters of policy and procedures. Approval of the
above rocomaendati ons should be followed by a written
charter for I CAPS (CS).
The Central Intellig enoe Agency
The subject report contains a considerable number of
conclusions and roocamendations pertinent to the CIA. In
general they fall into two categories, namely "organisation"
ENCLOSURE A
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and f?Coorcrination" vri.th a Low isolatel utters which in
certain cases will receive ca ment.
1. Organization
Marq of the co tints in the report are made
with a vier: to placing all covert functions under
a single administrative division. This concept
is considered sound as it in belioved that the
eocuritr of this kind of operation would be
improved t oroby.
Anothor recommendation (page 81) would
establish a small Bstinate Division t rich would
review the specialized product of the depart-
mental agoncios in order to prepare coordinated
national intelligence estimates. This rocom-
mondation would sot up a "Review of reviews"
board for which qualified porsonnel would be
hard to obtain and such a board would duplicate
the functions which the Committee states should
be perforraod by the IAC.
2. Coordination
This has boon covered in the preceding
sections and no further comments appear warranted.
3. The Question of Civilian Direction
The report status (page 136) that "while we
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recognize that he (ti-Lo Director) may be either
civilian or military, wo hwo rouchod the con-
clusion that he should be a civilian" unless
(pa go 137) "he should rosin from active military
duty and thereafter woric as a civilian". The
report implies that a Director dravm from the
military would be either (a) loss competent or
(b) less permanent than a civilian. As to (a),
the most competent individual, civilian or mili-
tary, ttho is willing to make the assignment a
career should be appointed. !ore are many
experienced anil competent officers in the Tiili-
tary Establishment and no legal bar to their
appoinLnont is roc, iaeuded. The loyalty,
patriotism, and maturity of jud iienb of military
officers in the upp ob ranks has been thorou&hly
tested, .'With one possible exception, all suCoess-
ful foreign secret services are presently headed
by military officers and have been for many years.
AS to (b), it is probable that on grantor diffi-
culty would be encountered in obtaining perraonanoy
of tenure with a civilian than with a military
orgicer. Very few really outstanding civilians
in this field have been persuaded to remain in
, ovorrmnt service i ndefixil.tely. It is believed
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that the intorh of the report is. that a Service
man assigned as the Director of Central Im;elli-
gerce should "retire" rather than "rosi gn" as
resignation would result in the loss of retire-
ment benefits. An officerts equity in future
retired pay should ho protected by suitable
wording in any logislation making retirement
mandatory. It is suggested that an officer
from the sorvices assigned this duty in the
future undergo a trial period of approximately
six months. Ilia acsigmnent should then be made
per ianont to, say, ago 60, provided (1) the
National Security Council is con'-inood of his
competence, (2) the officer desires the assign-
ment, and (3) he -agrees to retire
4 Wartime Status of CIA
The r1ubjoot report states that "the Central
Intelligence Agency is properly placed in our
govermontal structure under the National Security
Council". This corm.iont is considered correct
during peacetime but is open to some question
during war or national emergency. As this
subject is under consideration by the JIC, a,
present, it is desired to refrain from eanment
until the JIC rooomendations have boon acted
upon by the JCS.
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E. Lii. soollaneous
1. Crisis Situations
In the discussion of National Intolli ,pence
Estimates, the subject roport states that (page 81)
"Provision should be made in these arranComsnts
nor the handling of crisis situations when coordin-
ated estimates are required without delay". This
comment noots with complete concurrence and
presents no procedural problem within the IAC,
provided one or more of the nambor agonoios is
aviare of the situations To insure timely action
.in crisis situations, echelons above the IAC must
be made fully aware that the IAC is prepared to
handle the intelligence aspects of these situations
rapidly and that infon a.tion of this nature roceivod
thrown "EYES ONLY" messages and other similar
sources must be relayed expeditiously to the IAC
zaombor under that echelons An IISCID to this effeot
is recommended.
2. The Unitod States Communications Intelli I;onoo Board
Tae report recommends (page 63) that "The
Director of Central Intolli ;enoe should be made
permanent chairmn of the United States Canmunica-
tiona Intolligenoe Board." The Chief of Naval
Intelligence does not concur in this reoam ondation.
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At prevent the chairrianehip of this Committee
is assigned upon an annual rotational basis
and it is believed that the Committee has been
functioning effoctivuly. Unless fature devvelop-
rments appear to warrant a change in procedure,
it is reeomended that the present i thod of
essi'gn,lent remain unchanged.
3. The Service I ntel li gorse Agencies
These agencies rre covered briofly and
principally as roL;arC-.s the matter of coordination.
The report indicates a closer coordination under
tho Guidance of t e CIA* It is believed that in
matters of sole concern to the 1!atiiozal L`silitary
Establishment this coordination should be accom-
plished Idzrou ,tw Joint Intolligonoo Committee.
If the m atbor is one concerning national into
Bence it should be coordinated by the IAC. It
is also stated that the 3orvice Agencies should
confine themselves principally to their oval fields
of interest. This it agreed to, in general, but
they should not be pa'ooluded from oor,enting,
vthonover they have a sound basis, on matters
outside their normal area of interest. Unless
such a'provision is made the IAC cannot be expected
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to assumes responsibility for a mtiox r.l intolli--
genee estimate upon vshioh the members are permitted
to comment only partially.
4. The State Dept i"nt
'The ,reca nondations of the Comibtee are
brief on this subject. It rocamnends that the
State Department designate a high officer of the
Depart font as 1ntelliGonoo officer. Given
sufficient authority such an officer could con-
tribute much to the production of objective
political intelligence and to, liaison and
coordination with other agencies.
The report chits all reference to the fact
That as a principal producer of political intolli.
gonce the State Department has an important
function to porforn for other departments. It
is bolieved much could be aooc plished to
improve the matter o.^ dissemination if net the
quality of such intolli;enoe.
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F
NATIONAL SFgnl^-Y COUNCIL INTELL (: IC& DIRECTIVE NO, 1
COMINATION A ADPISORY +,SF'; IAILITIFS AI :FUNCTIONS
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security
Act of 1947, and for the purroses enunciated in paragraphs (d) and fe)
thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:
1. To maintain the relationship essential to c6ordination
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence
organizations, an Intelligence Coordinating Committee consisting
of the respective intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State,
Army, Navy, and Air Force and from the Joint Staff (JCS), and the
Atomic Energy Commission, or their representatives, shall be
established to make recommendations to the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of
the departments and agencies of the government as relate to the
National Security. The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall be the Chairman thereof and he shall invite the
chief, or his representative, of any other intelligence agency having
functions related to the national securit3t to sit with the Intelli-
gence Coordinating Committee whenever matters within the purview
of his agency are to be discua ed. The Intelligence Coordinating
Committee shall establish its own procedures, including Frocedure8
for the coordination and preparation of national intelligence
estimates in both routine and in crisis situations.
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2. Coordination of intelligence: activities should be
designed primarily to strengthen the overall governmental
intelligence structure. Primary departmental requirements shall
be recognized and shall receive the cooperation and support of
all other intelligence agencies.
Recommendations of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence and of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee
shall be forwarded to the National Security Council by the
chairman of that Committee. These recommendations shall
indicate the concurrence or nonconcurrence of the members
of the ICC and shall contain the views of the dissenting
members set forth In full, When unanimity is not obtained
among the Department Heads of the Natitonal Military Establish-
ment, the Chairman shall refer the problem to the Secretary
of Defense before presenting it to the National Security
Council, The foregoing procedure shall also be followed by
the Director of Central Intelligence in forwarding recommenda-
tions or in giving advice to the National Security Council.
h. Recommendations of the Pirecter of Central Intelligence,
or of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, shall, when
ae~rroved by the National Security Councils issue as Council
Directives to the originator. The respective intelligence
chiefs shall be resronsible for insuring that such orders and
directives, when applicable, are implemented within their intelli-
gence organizations.
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c. The Intelligence Coordinating Committee shall act
for the National Security Council. to insure full and proper
implementation of Council Intelligence Directives by issuing
such supplementary ICC directive: as may be required. Such
implementing directives in which the Intelligence Coordinating
Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the Chairman
thereof, and shall be implemented within the departments as
provided in paragraph b. Where disagreement arises between
members of the Intelligence Coordinating Committee over such
directives, the proposed directive shall be forwarded to the
National. Security Council for decision as provided in paragraph A.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce
intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred
to as national intelligence. In so far as practicable, he shall not
duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various
departments and agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence
facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such
production purposes. For definitions see NSCID No,, 3.
4 The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate
National Intelligence to the President, to members of the National
Security Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC agencies,
and to such governmental departments and agencies as the National
Security Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so
disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the intelligence
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agencies or shall carry an agreed statement of substantial
5. When Security Regulations of the originating agency
permit, the Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other departments or
agencies intelligence or intelligence Information which he may
possess when he deems such dissemination appropriate to their
functions relating to the national security.
6. The Director of Central Intelligence shall perform
for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such
services of common concern to these agencies as the National
Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally.
7. The intelligence organizations in each of the depart-
ments and agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence
Agency and with each other, as appropriate to their respective
responsibilities, a continuing interchange of intelligence
Information and intelligence available to them.
8. The intelligence files in each intelligence organization,
including the CIA, shall be made available under security regulations
of the department or agency concerned to the others for consultation.
The intelligence organisations within the limits of their
capabilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may
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be requested by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one
of the other departments or agencies.
10. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrange-
ments with the respective departments and agencies to assign to
the Central Intelligence Agency such experienced and qualified
officers and members as may be of adv? ;ntage for advisory, operational,
or other purposes, in addition to such personnel as the Director of
Central Intelligence may directly employ. In each case, such
departmental personnel will be subject to the necessary personnel
procedures of each department.
il. The,provisions of this directive shall not be construed
as an abrogation of any right or responsibility conferred upon
any individual or organization by duly constituted authority,
NOTE: If this directive is approved DOI Directive 1/1 will
require revision to conform.
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