COMMENTS BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON 'CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS' OF A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500030002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 28, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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0231.60
COMMENTS
by -
THE CENTRAL; INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
on
"CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
of
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Mr. William H. Jackson
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Entitled
"THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE"
February 28, 1949.
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,... q I
c.:.
f COMM7NTS / 7 c-
1)Irvel-
vv.- f'ait
by
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
on
"CONCLUSTONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
of
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Mr. William H. Jackson
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Entitled
"THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR. INTELLIGENCE"
February 21, 1949
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The Committee's report is an admirable effort to direA tht
Central Intelligence Agency to fundamentals and is a genulnely
constructive effort to improve the production of intelligelce on
which the policy of the United States should be based. rie observa?
tions of the Committee are in general, accurate, and it: objectives
are sound; its conclusions, however, are, in many respeeA faulty,
and the recommendations for their attainment are, in.mar7 cases,
impracticable
The larger part of the Report is concerned with te amount of
coordination exercised by the Central Intelligence Agerey in regard
to the other intelligence activities of the Government. It is
realized that an optimum coordination has not yet been reached;
however, not only a start, but considerable progress along the path
of complete coordination has been attained. No gaps :amain even
though all duplication has not yet been abolished. On this subject
of coordination, I am sure the members of the Nationti Security Council
realize the difficulties encountered; particularly, those members
having to do with the unification of the Armed Servces. A comparable
problem has confronted the Central Intelligence Acency with the added
obstacle that one additional department is involeed.
The Committee states (page 5): "?coordination can most
effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various apencies."
There is no question as to the validity of that statement. However, to
achieve coordination in such a manner, compromises of wording,
emphasis, etc., have to be accepted.. For example, three months were
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required to secure agreement on most of the present NSCID's, while it
required one year to resolve the differences between the Air Force
and the Navy on one NSCID.
The Committee begins its discussions on coordination with the
above-mentioned declaration, but, in numerous cases thereafter,
throughout the Report, the element of "direction" in coordination is
intimated and even stressed. This element of "direction" has usually
been entirely unacceptable to the interested agencies. Further, the
Director of Central Intelligence, per se, has no authority to enforce
coordination, and, indeed, the Committee (rage 41) recognizes this
when it says, "The Act does not give the Central Intelligence Agency
independent authority to coordinate intelligence activities." Yet
many of the Committee's recommendations hinge upon having such
authority, and many of the alleged shortcomings are due to this lack
of authority. The phrase, "such procedure would violate the chain
of command," was repeated over and over again in the discussions during
the drawing-up of the present NSCID's.
In view of this lack of explicit authority, in view of the
progress made in the relatively short time this activity has been in
operation, and in view of the progress already made in coordination
by mutual agreement, it is considered that in not too long a period
the continued augmentation of such a program will more than justify
any delays incurred.
A second alleged shortcoming is'that the Central Intelligence
Agency is "overedministered in the sense that administrative
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conditions have been allowed to guide and, on occasion, even control
intelligence policy, to the detriment of the latter." The adminis-
tration of the Central Intelligence Agency has been developed on
the following nattern:
(1) Budget, personnels-and other support services are
essential to any operation, and are centralized to serve all
components of the Agency.
(2) Control procedure's are restricted to keeping within
the budget requirements, insuring that illegal transactions
are nut permitted, avoiding waste and duplication in expendi-
tures, and maintaining certain standards required by security,
the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and the
General Accounting Office. No agency, regardless of its nature,
and most emphatically one that handles confidential government
funds, can possibly avoid such controls
Administration has advised on policy matters and should continue
to do so, particularly,in the determination of the ability to support
operational proposals and in the achievement of greater efficiency with
the means available for operations. Administration has no voice in
determining the substance of operational direction, guidance and
production, nor should it ever have.
There is a never-ending argument on the merits of administration
versus operations. The operating. people would like to be given a
lump sum for their operations and complete latitude with regard to
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numbers and grades of personnel, travel authorities, new projects,
etc? The results of such action, without controls, is obvious--
chaos--and? again, it simply cannot be done where government funds
are involved?
?
The Committee further declares: "Administrative arrangements
which do not at first appear to be efficient or economical may be
necessary in the Central Intelligence Agency. Personnel requirements
for certain types of work cannot conform to normal civil service
standards, and the demands of security often impose special and
unusual procedures. This situation must be understood not only br
those responsible for the internal organization_of the Central
InteIlie.ence Agency but also by Congress and the Bureau of the
Budget." --- "The centralization of all administration in one pffice
is undesirable since secret operations require their own separate
administration."
The Committee's report seams to indicate undue emphasis and
alarm in connection with complete autonomy for covert components of
the Central Intelligence Agency. There has to be an umpire some place,
and no one, directly responsible for operationso should be his own
final authority and judge in the utilization of funds and personnel.
Security is adequately served through the physical segregation
of covert administrative branches and the establishment of direct
channels, both to the covert operational officials and to the
responsible administrator who is the third senior official in the
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Agency. Covert and overt support activities are not intermingled,
but a single administrative chief over each phase insures adequate
mutual support and minimizes duplication. The Central Intelligence
Agency saved over sixty positions by the new organizational approach
and so far has had few complaints. From a strictly security point
of view, there will be better security than before because of not
pointing up autonomous separate support functions in a single agency.
It is all very well for a group with no responsibilities or
authority to state that both. Congress and the Bureau of the Budget
must understand that the Central Intelligence Agency must be givens,
in effect, a blank check and a free hand. In practice, the Central
Intelligence Agency must justify its demands with some reason and logic
and must reassure both of those bodies that the Central Intelligence
Agency is, at least, somewhat careful with government funds and does
its best to guard against waste and fraud.
Another Committee comment is: "Many able persons have left the
organization and few qualified ones have been attracted to it. On
the higher levels, quality is uneven, and there are few persons who
are outstanding in intelligence work."
The above statement seems to be totally unwarranted, as well
as to have no actual 'basis in fact. Out of 267 employees in the
three top grades (P-6 to P-8 and CAF-13 to CAF -15, both inclusive),
20 employees have left, not all of them voluntarily. The following
table shows this turnover.
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Losses of CIA Personnel in Top Three Grades in Calendar Year 194g
1. Resigned due to extended illness and 1 (P-8)
physical inability to return to work.
2. Death. 1 (GAF-13)
3. Requested by CIA to resign (not competent
to perform duties adequately--would not
conform to CIA policies--not competent
to handle the job).
3 (1, P-8)
(1, P-7)
(1, CAF-13)
4, Resigned due to NSC action requiring a 1 (P-8)
State Department nominee to replace
him (OPC).
50 Resigned due to difficulties in securing
essential special security clearances and
dissatisfaction over lack of opportunity for
personal publicity. (Replacement has been
obtained who is much better qualified.) (OSI)
1 tP-8)
6. Resigned to accept other positions and since 8 (2, P-7)
replaced by better qualified personnel. (6, P-6)
(This group comprised of emrloyees whose
work was adequate but not exceptional. In
each case CIA was pleased to accept the
resignation.)
7. Resigned to accept Opportunities in either 3 (P-7)
government or private business not immedi-
ately available in CIA.
8. Resigned to accept appointment as Foreign 1 (P-6)
Service Officer.
9, Resigned to accept military commission. 1 (P-6)
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For the calendar year 1948, the turnover in the Central
Intelligence Agency for all personnel, for all causes--death,
sickness, maternity leave, and all other voluntary or involuntary
separations--has averaged 1.6% per month. This is a considerably
lower rate than for most other government agencies.
The charge that there are few persona outstanding in intelli?
gence work is another general one and is difficult to sustain, It
is admittedly difficult to establish an absolute criterion as to
ability, but, if scholarship and experience do have some bearing,
the following tables will demonstrate that the Central Intelligence
Agency is not totally devoid of capable people.
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CIA allficati ns of ofes ion on
As of September 1948)
g2.11.2.e e
95%
15%
80%
30%
11%
93%
No Derree
1 0
II Degrees
III "
f_imiaLkajamet,
II
68%
III or more
30%
Military Service
60%
Intel1tence Fxpie ce
I year
?
91%
II years
76%
III " or more
61%
Related Experience
I year
95%
II years
88%
III " or more
79%
ResidFoei
I year
44%
II years
37%
III " or more
27%
Foreign Trav11.
55%
Sex
Male
70%
Female
30%
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ORE - Qualifications of Professional Personnel
(As of September 1948)
College
99%
No Degree
11%
In
88%
II Degrees
27%
III w
14%
Foreign Language
95%
II
71%
III or more
23%
Milttgry Service
58%
Inte1lieen9e Exterience
I year
98%
II years
84%
III " or more
70%
Felated Uperience
I year
98%
II years
93%
III ft or more
86%
Evitsleineign
I year
46%
II years
39%
IIT w or more
29%
Foreign Travel
55%
Sex
Male
Female
67%
33%
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Another error, states the Report, is "The placing in key
positions of a large percentage of military personnel, many of them
on relatively short 'tour of duty' assignment, tends to discourage
conpetent civilian personnel from looking to employment in the
Central Intelligence Agency as a career.*
Omitting the post of Director, which is considered in another
part of the Report, there is only one--out of six--Assistant Directors
who is a military man. Four--out of six--Deputy Assistant Directors
are from the military services, but, considering the fact that the
military services are both the greatest suppliers and the greatest
customers, this does not appear unreasonable. The overall figure
is 58 military personnel, or leas than 2% of the total number of
employees in the Central Intelligence Agency.
, The above Committee statement seems somewhat inconsistent with
recommendations in other parts of the Report which urge the assign-
ment of military personnel to various branches of the organization.
Budget
On page 33 of the Report is the statement: "Both Congress and
the Bureau of the Budget have refrained from examining in detail the
internal workings of the Central Intelligence Agency in order to
determine the justification for the budget." This statement is only
partially correct as, while Congress, so far, has not inquired into
detail, the details have been gone over in the Bureau of the Budget
by an official who has full security, clearance. It was at the
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insistence of the Bureau of the Budget that a centralized
administrative staff was set up.
Security
The Committee recognizes the need for security, '--in the
Central Intelligence Agency which has unfortunately become
publicized as a secret intelligence organization." The Central
Intelligence Agency concurs completely in this, and the publicity
received has neither been sought nor encouraged, but has been
actively discouraged. i
Under the existing conditions of press and radio, it would be practi-
cally impossible to conceal completely, desirable as it undoubtedly
would be, activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The more
practicable manner, which has been adopted, is to conceal the covert
sections by allowing the avert sections to serve as a "lightning rod"
and draw off attention from the clandestine activities.
Concise comments on the individua
of the Committee follow:
Charter II. rage 27.
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conclusions and recommendations
"(1) Section 102 or the National Security Act of 1947
establishes a framework for a sound intelligence system and
no amendments to this Section of the Act are deemed necessary
at this time."
Concur.
11
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insistence of the Bureau of the Budget that a centralized
administrative staff was set up.
Sect_min
The Committee recognizes the need for security, "?in the
Central Intelligence Agency which has unfortunately become
publicized as a secret intelligence organization." The Central
Intelligence Agency concurs completely in this, and the publicity
received has neither been sought nor encouraged, but has been
actively discouraged.
Under the existing conditions of press and radio, it would be practi-
cally impossible to conceal completely, desirable as it undoubtedly
would be, activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The more
practicable manner, which has been adopted, is to conceal the covert
sections by allowing the overt sections to serve as a *lightning rod"
and draw off attention from the clandestine activities.,
Concise comments on the individual conclusions and recommendations
of the Committee follow:
Charter II. rape 27.
"(1) Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947
establishes a framework for a sound intelligence system and
no amendments to this Section of the Act are deemed necessary
at this time."
Concur.
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"(2) The Central Intelligence Agency is properly placed
in our governmental structure under the National Security
Council."
Concur.
"(3) The Central Intelligence Agency should be empowered
and encouraged to establish through its Director closer
liaison with the two members of the National Security Council
on whom it chiefly depends, namely, the Secretaries of State
and Defense."
Concur. Although an effective liaison already exists,
closer relations will be established.
"(1) The centralization of all administration in one
office is undesirable since secret operations require their
own separate administration."
The Central Intelligence Agency is on the horns of a
dilemma in this problem. Until a few months ago, separate
administrations were provided for secret operations. Then,
the Tberstadt Report recommended a decrease in the administra-
tive overhead, and the Bureau of the Budget required that
administrative duplication be eliminated. So, a centralized
administration was instituted. Either type of organization,
it has been demonstrated, will work.
"(2) The present arrangements for handling the difficUlt
budgetary questions of the Central Intelligence.Agency are
soundly conceived, and the Agency has not been hampered in
carrying out its present responsibilities by lack of funds."
Concur.
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"(3) To assist the Director in carrying out his statutory
duty of protecting intelligence sources and methods he should
in cases where the disclosure of secret information is sought
from him and he has doubt as to whether he should comply, refer
the question to the National Security Council in order that
It may determine whether or not disclosure is in the public
interest."
Concur.
"(4) In the interest of'security, the Central Intelligence
Agency should increasingly emphasize its duties as the coordinator
of intelligence rather than its secret intelligence activities
in order to reverse the present unfortunate trend where it finds
Itself advertised almost exclusively as a secret service organi?
zation. In this way it can help to cover up rather than to
uncover the secret op,rations entrusted to it."
Concur.
"(5) The placing in key positions of a large percentage of
military personnel, many of them on relatively short 'tour of
duty' 'assignment, tends to discourage competent civilian
personnel from looking to employment in the Central Intelligence
Agency as a career."
Do not concur. .Omitting the post of Director, which is
considered in another part of the Report, there is only one--
out of six--Assistant rirector who is a military man. Four--
out of six--Deputy Assistant Directors are frOm the military
services, but, considering the fact that the military services
are both the greatest suppliers and the greatest customers,
this does not appear unreasonable. The overall figure is 58
military personnel; or less than 2% of the total number of
employees in the Central Intelligence Agency
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The above Committee statement seems somewhat inconsistent
with recommendations in other parts of the Report which urge
the assignment of military personnel to various branches of
the organization.
"(1) The responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency
under the National Security Act with respect to the coortM:aation
of intelligence activities, which is one of the most important
ones assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, has not been
fully discharged."
Concur in the importance of coordination. Such coordination,
as the Committee points out, must be achieved by mutual agreement,
and, although a complete answer has not yet been made, progress
has been continuing along the desired course. Lacking explicit
authority, coordination cannot be imposed, and, even where such
authority might exist its exercise might be undesirable because
of the tensions and resentments that would be set up, Coordination
by agreement should be continued and should be accelerated by
placing into effect the practicable recommendations in the Report.
11(2) One of the important areas where more active efforts
at coordination are needed is the field of scientific intelligence."
Concur. This has been provided for with the establishment
of the Office of Scientific Intelligence.
"(3) Another important area is that of domestic intelligence
and counterintelligence insofar as they relate to the national
security. To improve coordination in this area and between it
and the entire intelligence field, we recommend that the
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Federal Bureau of Investigation should be made a member of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee."
Retationships in this field between the Central Intelli-.
gence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have
grown steadily in scope and in closeness during the past year.
There is no objection whatsoever to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation becoming a part of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee, but it should be pointed out that the present
charter of the Intelligence Advisory Committee permits invi-
tation to Intelligence Advisory Committee meetings of agencies
in addition to the permanent members, when the subject matter
to be discussed is of interest to additional agencies.. This
seems to be adequate. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
was invited to meetings of the Intelligence Advisory Board,
but in 1946 discontinued attending these meetings. It is
thought that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would not now
care to join the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a permanent
member, but I shall be glad to invite the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to participate on a permanent basis if the
National Security Council approves this recommendation in the
Report.
"(4) The Director of Central Intelligence should be made
permanent chairman of the United States Communicatiras Intelligence
Board."
Do not concur. Having membership on the United States
Communicatdons Intelligence Board, where procedures must be
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adopted unanimously, seems to be sufficient.
"(5) The Intelligence Advisory Committee is soundly
conceived, but it should participate more actively with the
Director of Central Intelligence in the continuing coordination
of intelligence activities?,"
Concur. The Intelligence Advisory Committee is now meeting
a
regularlhat more frequent intervals, both for the purposes of
coordination and for the joint preparation of estimates, for
briefings and presentations to the Secretary of Defense, Committesi
of Congress (including the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy), and
the National Security Council. Increased use of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee for the continuing coordination of intelligence
activities will be carried out
"(6) The Intelligence Advisory Committee should consist of
the Director of Central Intelligence and representatives of
the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other departmentsand agencies
would sit as ad hoc members when appropriateQ"
Do not concur. There is no objection to the participation
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a member of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee, but it is believed that much
benefit is obtained by the presence of representatives of the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Intelligence Group as
permanent memberS. There seems to be no valid reason for
dropping these latter two members. The' Atomic Energy Commission
is particularly desirous of maintaining this relationship.
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"(7) The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff
should be reconstituted as a staff responsible only to the
Director of Central Intelligence, with the task of developing
plans for the coordination of intelligence activities."
task.
Concur. This is its present organi7ation and its present
-
"(P) The responsibilities of the Office of Collection and
Dissemination with respect to the coordination of collection
requirements and requests and the dissemination of intelligence
should be carried out under the new Coordination Division. This
is subject to future determination of the extent to which
individual Offices may conduct their own dissemination."
Do not concur. See recommended organization at the end
of these comments'
Chapter V, paga.211.
"(1) In the Central Intelligence Agency there has been
confusion between the responsibility of producing coordinated
national intelligence estimates and responsibility for
miscellaneous research and reporting activities,"
This is abroad statement that needs qualification. Both
types of activities may have been performed, but there has been
no confusion between them, and both were found to be necessary.,
It is believed that what the Committee describes as "confusion"
has resulted from the Central Intelligence Agency's recognition
of its threefold 'responsibilities as- the producer of national
Intelligence estimates, as the intelligence facility of the
National Security Council, and as the agency responsible for
performing services of common concern. The Committee has failed
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to recognize the gap that exists between the Central Intelligence
Agency's eilmlicit responsibilities, as set forth in NSCID #3,
and the Central Intelligence Agency's implicit responsibilities
as the intelligence facility of the National Security Council.
Moreover, NSCID #3 is so rigid with respect to the Central ,
Intelligence Agency's production responsibilities and so flexible
with respect to those of the departmental. Intelligence agencies
that its usefulness as a working document is seriously impeired.
.The Committees conclusion is made on the basis of a dangerously
limited view of the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibilities
for intelligence production. Such responsibilities should be
considered not solely in terms of the production of "poerdinated
nationaeintallAganca aatj-Mat9e .and "1-14-9_4-111.71SS-1-3L2-19140--or
pommRn interest,' but also in terms of the Central Intelligence
Agency's role as the intelligence facility of the President,
the National Security Council, and such agencies as may he
designateci. by them.
The Central Intelligence Agency's intelligence production
responsibilities should include the following, and NSCID #1
and NSCID #3 should be modified accordingly to include a revised
and more appropriateedefinitif national intelligence:
__-
eee
(i)----717,5aii6e intelligence required to reduce
to a minimum the element of surprise in foreign situations
and developments which affect United States national
security,
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? 94., 6
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(2) To produce coordinated intelligence estimates
required for national planning, policy, and operational
decisions,
(3) To produce intelligence required to support
those agencies designated by the National Security
Council to receive it.
(4) To produce intelligence in fields of common
interest to the Central Intelligence Agency and the
departmental intelligence agencies, including economic
and scientific intelligence,
(5) To produce intelligence required for Central
Intelligence Agency estimates not normal to an
departmental responsibilities.
(It should be noted that paragraph (2) above is the only category
of intelligence which conforms to the definition of national
intelligence in NSCID #3.)
1(2) The provisions of the National Security Act for
the production of national intelligence estimates, as inter-
preted by the National Security Council Intelligence Directives,
are sound but have not been effectively carried out."
Concur in the assertion that the provisions of the National
Security Act for the production of national intelligence estimates
are sound, but, after almost a year's experience, believe that
NSCID #1 and NSCID #3 should be revised for the reasons cited
immediately above and for the following reasons:
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(1) The directives do not provide for adequate
treatment of the matter of priority within the departmental
intelligence agencies with respect to their support of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Consequently, the Central
Intelligence Agency is unable to make optimum use of
departmental intelligence and cannot depend upon timely
departmental action in meeting Central Intelligence Agency
commitments and deadlines.
(2) The directives do not adequately allocate
eroduction responsibilities and do not defina intelligence
fields of common concern,
4(3) There 'should be created in the Central Intelligence
Agency a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and
review the specialized intelligence product of the departmental
agenciee in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence
estimates'
The Report is vague concerning the details of the proposed
reorganieation, and, therefore, opinion is divided on the
necessity or desirability of a drastic internal reorganization
now. However, if the Committee's recommendation means that the
Estimates Division is to be large enough to provide its own
relatively high level research support, the recommendation is
workable and mieht result in simplification of the process of
producing estimates. The problem of a greater duplication of
effort, than now exists, immediately arises. It is believed,
therefore, that this recommendation is premature and should be
considered only after a revision of NSCID #1 and NSCID #30
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"(4) Under the leadership of the Director of Central
Intelligence, these estimates should be submitted for discussion
and approval by the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee
whose members should assume collective responsibility for them."
"(5) Provision should be made in these arrangements for the
handling of crisis situations when coordinated estimates are
required without delay?"
"(6) Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this
way must, in order to be effective, be recognized as the met
authoritative estimates available to the policy makers."
These three recommendations have been considered together
as parts of the same problem, The Central Intel1igen6 Agency
cannot agree with the view that members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee should assume collective responsibility )'or
Central Intellioence Agency estimates. It is considered that the
main question is what sort of estimates should emerge from the
national intelligence structure. Those who developed the original
concept of a central intelligence group had clearly in mind the
ever-rresent factor of departmental bias as well as the short-
comings of joint intelligence, which often produces estimates
so watered down in the process of reaching agreement as to be
valueless. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates can be free
from such faults only if they are rroduced with full cognizance
of departmental views but without subservience to departmental
prejudices. Intelligence Advisory Committee review of the
Central Intelligence Agency drafts should undertake to eliminate
minor or apparent differences but not to gloss over divergences
of informed opinion. The resultant estimate must be essentially
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that of the Central Intelligence Agency and not that of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee collectively. Any statements
(7
of(!'issent should be limited)bo substantial and well-defined
-
issues, as the directives now provide. Moreover, these
directives should be further modified to restrict dissent to
the field of responsibility of the dissenting agency. (For
example, the Office of Naval Intelligence has an interest in
political matters but is not responsible for estimates in tnat
field, and the Central Intelligence Agency should not be required
to publish a dissent by the Office of Naval Intelligence on purely
political matters if the State Department concurs in the Central
Intelligence Agency position.) The logic of this contention is
simply that, lust as a dissenting member of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee cannot be expected to share in the responsibility
for a Central Intelligence Agency estimate in which he dissents,
so, by extension, the Central Intelligence Agency has sole
responsibility for its estimates, even when Intelligence
Advisory Committee concurrence is complete, and does not share
this responsibility collectively with the members of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee. Concurrence should forttfy the
estimate; it should not create an artificial responsibility.
The Report does not reflect a clear understanding of this vital
aspect of the coordination theory. To the Committee, /national"
intelligence is merely "coordinated" intelligence, and coordinated
intelligence is joint intelligence, at the mercy of departmental
bias.
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Although the Report favors the method of preparing drafts
in an ad hoc comattee, experience shows that this procedure
is time-consuminp and inefficient. The Central Intelligence Agency
believes that- coordination procedures will be effective only if
its stimates personnel produce the initial draft as a basis
for discussion with a permanent, full-time, substantively
competent Intelligence Advisory Committee sub-committee, prior
to the submittal of the estimates to the Director for Intelligence
Advisory Committee action.
There must be effective means for handling&isis situations. )
In the past, an informal procedure, which worked, was in effect.
This procedure is now in process of being formali7ed by agreed,
written understanding.
The Central Intelligence Agency's estimatemust earn their
distinction as the most authoritative intelligence available
to the policy makers. It is, however, recommended that the
National Security Council enjoin the policy makers to give
the Central Intelligence Agency such guidance in matters
pertaining to national policy that Central Intelligence Agency
support will be more directly responsive to their needs
2,11pAttygget_9l.
"(1) In addition to the Estimates Division recommended in
the previous Chapter, there should be created out of the present
Office of Reports and Estimates a Research and Reports Division
to accomplish central research in, and coordinated production of,
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intelligence in fields of common interest. The staff of this
Division should include sufficient representation from the
State Department and the Services to insure that their needs
are adequately met,"
The Report is vague concerning the details of the proposed
reorganisation, and, therefore, opinion is divided on the
necessity or desirability of a drastic internal reorganization
now. However, if the Committee's recommendation means that the
Estimates Division is to be large enough to provide its own
relatively high level research support, the recommendation is
workable and might result in simplification of the process of
producing estimates. The problem of a greater duplication of
effort, than now exists, immmediately arises. It is believed,
therefore, that this recommendation is premature and should be
considered only after a revision of NSCID #1 and NSCID
Similarly, the proposed Research and Reports Division,
includini a basic economic research unit as well as the present
Map Branch and such other facilities as might be determined to
belong there, could profitably operate apart from the
Estimates Division. It must be pointed out, however, that
these recommendations are made within the framework of the
entire Report, It would be highly inadvisable to separate the
present Office af Reports and Estimates functions without
making sure that corresponding changes will be brought about
in the functions and facilities of the departmental intelligence
agencies, particularly in their relationships to the Central
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intelligenc13 Agency. It should be recognized that decentra-
lization of intelligence production responsibilities, as
recommended in the Report, necessarily involves substantial
problems of coordination, flow, routing, and priorities of
access to source materials, and raises the potential danger
of an even greater duplication of effort than now exists
This proposal will be further discussed in the recommended
organization at the end of these caaments.
"(2) The Coordination Division (reconatuted Interdepart-
mental Coordinating and Planning Staff) Should be given the
responsibility for studying the actual scope of the Research
and Reports Division and for recommending those services of
common concern which should be performed centrally.,"
Concur. It is believed that the reconstituted Interdepar
mental Coordinating and Planning Staff should determine what
revision of NSCID #3 is needed, in collaboration with the
Intelligence Advisory Committee Standing Committee and repre-
sentatives'of the Office of Reports and Estimates,
"(3) The propriety 91 the preparation by the Central
Intelligence Agency of essentially rolitical summaries should
be reviewed, taking Into consideration the need for such
summaries, the existence of a number of duplicating summaries
and the particular capabilities of the individual departments
to prepare them,"
The Central Intelligence Agency does not concur in this
recommendation or its implications. In referring to the Central
Intelligence Agency current intelligence publications as
"essentially political summaries," the Report properly indicates
?I
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that those publications are based to a considerable degree on
State Department materials. However, a major cause for this
preponderance of State Department materials is that Army, Navy,
and Air Force did not until recently, as State does, make all
their highest level intelligence and operational materials
available to the Central Intelligence Agency. A strong National .
Security Council directive is required to remedy this situation.
. ?-?
Concerning the problem of duplication, the Central Intelligence
Agency believes that such duplication is more apparent that/
real. Each of the departmental agencies prod/ces periodic
summaries which are designed for a specific audience, and no
one of those publications could meet the needs of the other
audiences. (Even the State Department summaries are specialized;
they are diplomatic summaries for readers with an intimate knowl?
edge of diplomatic operations.) The Central Intelligence Agency
current intelligence publications are the, only ones designed
primarily for the President and the National Security Council.
It is believed that only the Central Intelligence Agency has the
perspective and the freedom from bias necessary for proper
performance of this delicate and significant function.
The President and the members of the National Security
Council have repeatedly expressed their aprroval of the Central
Intelligence Agency Daily and Weekly Summaries. Although the
Report makes no specific recommendation concerning the Central
Intelligence Agency monthly "Review of the World Situation,"
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the publication has been well received insofar as the Central
Intelligence Agency has been able to ascertain.
"(4) The various reports, studies and summaries which are
not national intelligence or recognized services of common
concern should be discontinued."
Concur.
glaaaftnaLL:_man_1(14-
"(l) The Office of Operations consists of three distinctive
activities, which represent useful and recognized functions in
their own field but have no particular relation to each other."
Do not concur. These activities are closely bound by the
link that they are the only Central Intelligence Agency activities
engaged in the overt, collection of intelligence information. They
are alike in that each maintains "open" field offices, each
collects "raw" information from "open" sources, and each
provides services of common concern. These activities do not
perform research, analysis, or evaluation. All, by their tasks,
must admit openly to being part of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The three branches are further related, as follows:
STAT
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Concur. An agreement on procedures regarding this task
is now practically completed between the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
"(4) The Foreign Documents Branch should be made part of
the proposed Research and Reports Division if one is created."
Do not concur. The Foreign Documents Branch at present
operates under various inter-agency agreements, providing a
central exploitation service for captured documents and current
foreign publications, including books, periodicals, and the
daily press. The translation service of the Foreign Documents
Branch, although established rrimarily for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, is extensively used by all the Intelligence
Advisory Committee agencies, which have limited translation
facilities, especially for the Oriental and?Near Eastern languages
That the Foreign DocumentsBranch's work must "be performed in
close relationship to and under the constant guidance of the
consumer agencies" is concurred in. Since the Foreign Documents
Branch's main work is done 0 the request'of, and according to
the specific requirements of, the departmental intelligence
agencies as well as those of the Central Intelligence Agency
(Office of Reports and Estimates, Office of Special Operations,
ete.), the 'guidance of the interested sections or desks is
always available. The Branch at present operates centrally,
producing raw intelligence Information in English from foreign
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language sources for wide dissemination. Closer integration
of the Branch with research and evaluation sections of the
Central Intelligence Agency would benefit the latter, but would
tend to cut the operation off from the Intelligence Advisory
Committee consumers. It may be noted that this Brandi was once
a part of the current Office of Reports and Estimates, and this
subordination was found impractical. Under such direction, the
operation tends to became an adjunct to Central Intelligence
Agency research projects, rather than a collection service
which provides large quantities of foreign information in a
useable form, not only to all the intelligence agencies, but to
other parts of the military establishment, such as the Research
and Development Board, the technical services, etc.
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Chapter VH1.1_021112.
In this connection, the Office of Special Operations and
the Office of Policy Coordination were formerly integrated and
combined into one office during the period when NSC 4-A was in
effect. NSC 10/2 states explicitly that the Office of Policy
Coordination shall be autonomous in the Central Intelligence
Agency.
"(2) Covert intelligence activities conducted by the
Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies in occupied areas
should be reviewed in order to effect close coordination."
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Concur. This is being carried out at the present time. 25X1
Concur. This, too, is being done on a continuing basis.
"(4) The Office of Special Operations (or the new Operations
Division) must give primary attention to the building up of a
corps of trained personnel for operations abroad."
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Concur. This is being done. It is not unprofitable to
think of'the Office of Special Operations career in terms of -
other professions such as the law. In law, three years of
formal study constitutes merely a mental conditioning and the
acquiring of a rationale preparatory to its practice. The
career itself has developed into innumerable fields of speciali?
zation However, it is within the power of legal experts to
judge the competence of members of the profession since it has
established standards. An examination of the plaintiff's and
defendant's briefs against the judge's opinion and legal
precedence pPrmits an evaluation, of professional ability which
will at least find a substantial body of concurrence within
the profession. The Office of Special Operations is only
beginning to establish standards or a relative sense of values
in its own profession which enables competence to be recognized
universally within the intelligence profession. The Office of
Special Operation's training is developing in a sound manner since
it is formalizing a program of instruction based on case histories
and field experience. This course of study is being continually
refined by the criticisms of incoming field personnel who have
gained new techniques and encountered special -conditions which
require revisions in the training program.
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and closer liaison in this field should be established with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
Concur. This is being done. This continued implementation
will naturally result in a higher quality of counterespionage
activity which will in turn directly influence the Central
Intelligence Agency relationship with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
"(7) Relations with departmental apendies should be brought
closer, and the guidance which the Office of Special Operations
receives from intelligence consumers should be strengthened.
This might be achieved by including representatives of the
Service agencies and the State Department in the Information
Control Section of the Office of Special Operations."
Concur. It must be noted that this will increase the
number of military personnel employed in the Central Intelligence
Agency.
"(8) The Director should assure himself that the Office
of Special Operations is receiving adequate information on the
current and strategic intelligence needs of the Government.
This might be achieved by establishing closer relations with
the Secretaries of State and Defense."
Concur.
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"(9) The Office of Special Operations should exercise
a greater measure of control over the dissemination of its own
material."
Do not concur. This would again produce duplication which
has already been so sharply criticized. Save for operational
matters, normal dissemination, subject to security safe-guards,
should be employed.
"(10) The Nuclear Energy Group should be moved from the
Office of Special Operations to the proposed Research and
Reports Division where it should be a part of the general
scientific work,"
Concur. The Nuclear Energy Group has already been moved
to the Office of Scientific Intelligence.
"(11) The Office of Special Operations should have access
to communications intelligence to the full extent required for
guidance in directing its operations and for more effective
conduct of counter-espionage."
Concur. This is being done. In this connection, the
Committee's comment on page 126 appears a trifle gratuitous:
"Although, as pointed out elsewhere in this report (See Chapter
IV), we have not gone into this field, there appears to be some
question whether the Office of Special Operations now has
adequate and prompt access to this material." The Office of
Special Operations is receiving all information that is available
in this field.
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Cha ter IXJ_Roze......241
"(1) The close relationship between covert intelligence
and covert operations and the fact that the latter is related
to intelligence affecting the national security justifies the
placing of the Office of Policy Coordination within the
Central Intelligence Agency."
"(2) The Office of Policy Coordination should be integrated
with the other covert Office of the Central Intelligence Af,ency,
namely the Office of Special Operations, and with the
25X1 f the Office of Operations, and these three operations
should be under single over-all direction (Operations Division)
within the Central Intelligence Agency."
Concur,'
In this connection, the Office of Policy Coordination and
the Office of Special Operations were formerly integrated and
combined into one office during the period when NSC 44 was in
effect. NSC 10/2 states explicitly that the Office of Policy
Coordination shall be autonomous in the Central Intelligence
Agency. To carry out the second recommendation above, NSG 10/2
will have to be revised?
ghlatla-L_pul.11?.
"EL) The directing staff of the Central Intelligence Agency
has not demonstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate
of the organization or the ability to discharge that mandate
effectively."
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Do not concur. Had the Central Intelligence Agency been
constituted in a vasuum, where relations with other established
agencies need not have been taken into account, progress in
coordination* organization, and production might have been much
more rapid. However, the relationships and impaets between not
only the ether intelligence agencies, but also the administrative
agencies of the Government?the Bureau of the Budget, the General
Accounting Office, the Civil Service Commission, etc,--had to be
adjusted and had to be lived with. Diamissing the theoretical
conditions whioh one might have liked to enjoy, and considering
the realiatie conditions whieh have confronted the Central Intel.
ligenoe Agency, It ip believed that much pregresa along sound
lines has been made. Andoihat is more gratifying, this tendency
is increasing in both scope and in the right direetieno
1/(2) Administrative organization and policies tend be
impede the carrying out of the essential intelligence functions
' of the Central Intelligence Agency under the Act,"
Do not concur, The development of our organization and
funotions,has been based on a policy of centralization of specifie
responsibilities in single offices and the coordinated work of
the officee as a team* each concentrating in its own field and
looking to the others for support from other fields. Only in this
manner can we avoid the confusion, duplication of effort,
ineffieiency, and major frictions which always attend a situation
wherein every component tries to be self-sufficient and attempts,
to do the same things, at the same time, in the same sphere,
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and in oonstant eompetition. Our organizational paler hats
resulted in the centralized groupings shown below:
(1) Redeareh, evaluation, and production, and
Coordination in these fields;
Office of Reports and Estimates (except science)
Office of Selentifio Intelligence
(2) Collection and liaison control1 disseminations
liaison services and information service, and coordination
in these fields:
Office of Collection and Dissemination
(3) Overt field collection:
Office of Operations
(4) Covert field collettiOn and counterespionage*
?Moe of Special Operations
(5) Covert field operations:
Office ittf Penny Coordination.
(The last two funetiOns whieh had been integrated into one
covert office were separated as a result of a directive issued
by' the National Security Council*)
1,(3) Continuity 'of service,is essential for the successfdl
tarrying out Of the duties ofDirector of Central Intelligence."
Concur. This principle is obvious, and a lack of the
assurance of continuity works a hardship on both the pereonnel
Of the Central Utelligence Agency and the quality of work
performed. Changes of Directors with the following changes of
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organization tend to make the Central Intelligence Agency
employee feel uncertain and insecure in his job with con's
sequent harm to the quality and quantity of his output. This
was pertieurlariy noticeable last Fail just before election when
literelly(dozens of rutiT;ri)Were extant in Washington that one Of
the Committee members was to became Director of Central Intelliw
gence as soon as the eleotion was over,
"(4) AS the best hope for continuity of service and the
greatest assurance of independence of action a civilian should
be Director of Central Intelligence. If a Servitle man is
selsoted for the pest he shoed resign from active military
duty,"
This is a question that has arisen time and time again,
Perhaps the best disoussion of this problem is that stated in
the report of the Eberatadt Committee which is quoted, as
follows:
"A moot question is whether the Director Should be a
Civilian or a professional military ma*. The argument
in favor of a service man is that he will command more
confidence from the armed services who talk his language
and will respect his position and Security. With a mili.
tan' man, the present pay scale will not prove a deterrent,
The jeb could be developed into one of the top staff
assignments available to members of the three services.
"Against this, it is said that the position requires
a broader background and greater versatility and diplomatic
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experience than is usually found in service personnel;
that the. best qualified and most competent officers
would not accept the position if to 65 so meant permanent
retirement and an end of the road to important command or
operational responsibility. If a military man is assigned
to the position as a tour of duty, he will, it is said,
inevitably be influenced to some degree, in the execution
of hig duties, by his rank and status as compared with that
of other offioars.with whom he deali, He may also be
influenced by concern or his next billet.
"The principal argument against a civilian is the
diffioulty of getting a good one. It Will be difficult
to attract a man of force, reputation, integrity, and
proven administrative ability who has an adequate knowledge
of foreign history and politics and is familiar with intelli-
gence technique and the working machinery or the Government '
and the military establishment. Not only is the pay low in
oomparision to industry and the professions, but the reward.
of success is anonymity. The wisdom of putting an individual
who lacks_intelligence experience in charge simply beoause
he is a competent administrator is dubious A civilian
would have the advantage of being freefrom taint of service
ambitions or rivalriee. On the other hand a civilian zany
be more subject to political pressure than a military mane
In certain foreign countries this has occurred. In any
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event a civilian would have to be a man tf oommanding
reputation and personality in order to salute the
respect and cooperation of the sertices. CIA's
relatione With'the'StatelDepartment woOld'undoubtedly
benefit from the presence of a eivilian director, known
and respected by the Secretary of State and his
assistants
"The intrinsic interest of the work0 its potentia
influence on policy, and recognition of public service
to be performed might combine to persuade a competent
civilian to accept the position.. If so, his appointment
.
would seem desirable. A change in the statute that would
disqualify a military man is not, however, recommended.
"Moreover it would not be wise, at this time at least,
to amend the statute to include a mandatory requitement that
a military man, appointed as Director, must retire from
the service. 4 competent officer could be persuaded to
retire from his service and abandon his career to become
Director of CIA only if he felt some assurance of a
reasonable tenure of office, That no such assurance exists
today appears from the fact that three different Directors
have been appointed since January of 1946. A provision
requiring the retirement from service of any commissioned
officer appointed Director might appropriately be included
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In the ?statute.-if coupled with the provision for
adequate retirement pay in case he is removed as
Directoro"
9.111A9ISTAingt.14,2?
0(2) The Service intelligence agencies have manifested
an increased Interest in intelligence and an attitude conducive
to accomplishing its effective coordination."
Concur.
?
"(2) In order to meat adequately their vital responsibilities
and maintain their proper position in the departmental structure.
the Service intelligence agencies should be staffed with qualified
personnel who concentrate in intelligence over the major portion
of their careers."
Concur.
N(1) In accordance with et program of 000rdinationinitiated
and guided by the Central Intelligence Agency. the Service -
intelligence agencies should confine themselves principally to
those fields of intelligence in which they have the primary - '
interest."
COnour,
"(4) A more active program of coordination by the Central
Intelligence Agency would result in a higher degree of centra-
lisation and coordination of Intelligence production in fields
where the Services have a common interest."
Concur.
N(5) There should be effective coordination between the
work of the Joint Intelligence Committee in tie field of mill.
tary estimates and that of the Central Intelligence Agency and
Intelligence Advisory Committee in the field of national
estimates.?
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Concur,
r LIX. nae .
w(I) The State Department: to Which the Nationd Security
Council has Assigned doMlnant Interest in the collection and
produetion epoliticalp'oultural and sociologleal intelligenee:
should equip itself mere adequately to meet the legitimate
requirements of the Central intelligence Agency and of other
Government intelligence agencies for suoh Intelligence."
Concur.
"(2) The specialised intelligence staff in the State
Department, the Reteareh and Intelligence Staff: deep not now
have sufficient current knowledge of departmental operations
and policies to furnish: on behalf of the Departaent, the
basic estimates which may be required by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the Service intelligence agencies&"
No comment?
"(3) The liaison between the State Department and. the
Central Intelligence Agendy should be closer and put on a
continuing, street/vs bees*"
Concur. Authorisation should be granted the Office of
Reports and Estimates of the Central intelligence Agency to
maintain effective liaison with political and operational levels i"
in. the State Department in addition to the liaison presently
authorised with the Office or Intelligence Research. It is
particularly impOrtant that the Office of Reports and Estimates
have effective working relations with the State Department's tt-t3'r
etat??wwv,`"t
Policy Planning Staff in order to coordinate intelligence
production requirements, The Office of .Reports and Estimatest,tcooto, -
_rt f44,,'
rtv
Cat
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intelligence production plans should be in phase with the
poliey planning of the State Department.
7(4) To meet the fbregoing requirements, consideration
should be given by the Department to designating a high officer
of the Department, who has Ada access to operational and
policy matters, to act as intelligence officer. This officer,
with a mall staff', should Process requests for departmental
intelligence received rrom the Central Intelligence Agency and
Other agencies and see that legitimate requests are met through
the preparation of the requisite intelligence reports or
,estimates by the appropriate departmental officers. He should
also act an continuing intelligence liaison officer with the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Service intelligence agencies.".
Concur, depending upon the position of the person selected.
Unless the individual is situated at a high policy level within
the State Department, his designation would be meaningless, if
not detrimental.
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gottalatgazwisiumealuttpn
Attached hereto are charts showing: (Enclosure A) the present
organization and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(Enclosure B) an organization recommended by the Committee; and
(Enclosure C) an organization recommended by the Central Intelligence
Agency. This latter recommended organization incorporates tbose
recommendations of the Committee which are believed to be practicable.
The changes in the functions of the various bodies are discussed
-below in connection with the organization (Enclosure C) recommended
by the Central Intelligende Agency;
Intelligence Advisory Committee - The Intelligence Advisory Committee
is increased by the addition of a
representative of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation as a member.
Interdepartmental Coordinating . The Interdepartmental Coordinating
and Planning Staff
and Planning Staff is not placed in
a Coordination Division because that:
seems merely to place unrelated
elements into one body.
Office of Collection and
Dissemination
The Office of Collection and
Dissemination is retained as a
co/looting, disseminating, liaison,
and reference branch as at present
constituted.,
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P
? -
The Committee proposes, in essenee, that the reference fUnotiona
of the Office of Collection and Dissemination be divorced from the
liaison functioni, that the referenee-fitnotions be transferred te
the Office of Reports and Estimates, and that the liaison functions
be administered by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff. The stated reason for this proposal is that the reference
and liaison funotiona have little interrelation, that the former
are closely related to the research function of the Office of Remits
and Estimates, and that the latter are closely related to the coordin-
ating function ot the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff. The best reply to this seemingly logical proposal is that
the Agency has already tried it out in Practice and found it unsatis-
faitory. It had taken the Agency many months of hard work, trial, and
error to /earn that the seemingly different functions or reference
and liaison are, in feet, so closely related that they are better
performed by a single administrative unit than by- separate ones.
It would be exact to state that the techniques of the Office -of
Collection and Dissemination are many and various, invelving the use
Of much unique machine equipment, but it la only on paper that the
runOlone appear unrelated. In truth, they all Serve a.single and
oommon end: to get and stere intelligence information and make it
available to those who need it.
In 1947 the Agency was organised with the Reference Center,
embracing library and registers, in the Office of Reports and
Estimates; and with liaison assigned to the separate Office of
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Collection and Dissemination. Thie was similar, in principle*
with what the Committee now proposes. The only difference is that
the Reference Center (under the CommitteWS proposal) would now be
installed in one of the two Divisions into which the Office of
_ .
Reports and Eitimates would be 'split* and the liaison funmtion would
be aesigned to a renamed Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff,
The separation of liaison and reference fhnetiens did not work
out well in practice, The administrative void between the two worked
to the detriment of both. If an anatyst in ,the Office of Reports and
Estimates caned fox' a document knowato be in the State Department's
library, it was clearly the job of the inter-library loan people in
the Central Intelligence Ageneyss library to get it for him; but, if
it turned out that the document was subject to stringent security
,restrictions* then it became the job of a liaison officer to mike
arrangements, with appropriate officials of the State Department*
for the document to be released, The two- jobswere one and the same,
but they required different aPproachos and different techniques,
As the library and liaison people were under different administral.
tions, they failed to develop intimate knowledge of ea& ether's
daily problems and of the techniques and channels being developed to
deal with them. Delays were many, and tempers were exaperbated.
The Reference Center, under the Office of Reports and Estimates, ?
found itself without adequate administrative understanding and support.
The main business of the Office of Reports and Estimates was to deal
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with critical problefte of a substantive native, and the specialists
preparing an important estimate against a tight deadline naturally
took preeedenoe over library and register people whose problems could
be put Off until the morreli.. The ,needs of the analysts had priority5
and there was a tendency to postpone action on the more humdrum needs
of the Reference Center. It seems inescapable that the same situation
would develop again if the library and registers were to be reassigned
to the Office of Reports and Estimatea, or to a Researth and Reports
Division created out of the Office of Reports and Estimates. In
addition, there is now an Offiee of Scientific/ Intelligence which
requires library and register serviees no less than the Office of
Reports and Estimates, and it would tie unwite to make it dependent
on it siiifer Office for these services. I believe that the Central
Intelligence Agency Library and the registers Should serve all of
the Central Intelligence Agency, and that they can best do so if
administered eentrally, separately and apart from any One of the
consumer offices or divisions.
Office or Roporto and Estimates . An ?Estimates" Group, as recommended
by the Committee is formed at the
highest level 42 the Office of
Reports and Estimates,. By placing
this group so, instead of making it
a separate office, duplication is
avoided by not requiring a specie/
staff and research group to support,
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Office of Operations
Office of Special Projects
a new Office. It is believed the
resUit desired by the Committees
i.e., an ultimate(nontrA and
`
coordination of estimates can be
obtained in this may without
requiring additional, separate
supporting personnel,
- This ante is left intaot as in
the present organization because
its task is the
of
-
of information, as distinguished.
from the Covert methods used by
the riffles of Special Operations and
the Office of Policy Coordination.
- This is a new office comprising the
present Office of Special Operations
and the Of flee of Polley Coordination
and combines all covert operations
inteone ?Moe as recommended by the
Committee. It differs from the
Conmittee Organisation in that the
administrative services are performed
centrally, which conforms to the
Bureau of' the Budget's ideas regarding
the avoidance of duplication. This
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?organisation le similar to that
which runetioned before the
adoption of NW 10/2, and for it
to be placed in effect now will
reqare the eimendment of NSC 10/2.
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PRESENT ORGANIZATION
NATIONAL SECURITf COUNCIL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Subject to existing law and to the direction and con-
trol of the National Security Council, the Director
of Central Intelligence:
1. Directs all activities of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
2. Advises the National Security Council in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the
Government departnents and agencies as relate to
national security.
3. Makes recommendations to the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence
activities of the departments and agencies of the
Government as relate to the national security.
4. Correlates and evaluates intelligence relating
to the national security and provides for the
appropriate dissemination of such intelligence
within the Government using Mere appropriate.
existing agencies and facilities.
5. Protects intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorised disclosure.
6. Performs for the benefit of the misting intelli-
gence agencies such additional services of com-
mon concern as "the National Security Council
determines can be rore efficiently accomplished
centrally.
7. Directs such analysis as nay be necessary to
determine which functions in the fields of
national intelligence are not being presently
performed or are not being adequately performed.
S. Acts for the NEC in coordinating all federal
foreign intelligence activities related to the
,
national security to insure that the overall
policies and objective establiehed
are properly
implemented and executed.
9. Performs such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security
as the National Security Council may from time
to time direct.
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORS COMMITTEE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
As a purely advisory body, without directive powers,
advises the Director of Central Intelligence cm
policy and procedural natters as they affect the
various departs:Patel intelligence functions and the
central responsibilities of CIA. The Comaittee is
composed of:
1. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for
Research and Intelligence.
2. Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S.
Army.
3. Chief of Naval Intelligence.
4. Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S.
Air Force.
5. Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic
InannrCcemission.
6. Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group,
Joint Staff.
INTER-OSUTVENTAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING STAFF
As the mordinatimg and planning staff of the Direc-
tor for inter-departmental intelligence activities:
1. Coordinates inter-departmental intelligence
planning for accomplishment of the national
intelligence mission.
2. Prepares for the Director, with the assistance
of interested CIA offices, the overall plans
and policies for inter-agency intelligence
coordination.
3. Provides the Director's representation on
all IAC ad hoc Committees.
4. Provides such secretariat as may be required
for the Director's intelligence advisory
committees.
5. Maintains constant liaison with IAC agencies
for the purpose of ad...ising the Director of
their reactions to CIA and inter-agency
coordination.
6. Coordinates with the Executive in connection
with overall program planning and development
to determine the availability of administrative
support.
7. Represents the Director on and controls CIA
liaison with the MSC staff.
DEFT. OF '
STATE
DEFT. CF
ARMY
REP.
DEPT. OF
NAVY
REP.
DEPT. OF
AIR FORCE
:LEP. .
GEIERAL COUNSEL
Advises the Director and other members of CIA
on legal matters pertaining to the administra-
tion and operations of CIA and provides essen-
tial legislative liaison service.
1
ADVISORY COUNCIL
- Performs special coordinating functions as directed
by the Director of Central Intelligence.
EXECUTIVE
As principal staff officer of the Director for
the administration of all CIA activities:
I. Coordinates administrative support with
operational requirements.
2. Is the channel of communication with the
Deputy Director end the Director on matters
which involve administrative action or sup-
port requirements.
3. Provides and controls CIA liaison contacts'
with all other agencies on CIA administra-
tive matters.
4. Supervises the organisatimal and functional
development of the Agency.
5. Serves as Deputy Director in the absence of
that official.
BUDGET
OFFICER '
PERSONNEL
OFFICES.
SERVICES 1-
OFFICER
liANAGESERT
OFFICER
INSPECTION AND SECURITY
As a staff officer of the Director is responsible
for the security of all CIA activities, except
communication': security, sad develops in coopera-
tion with other security agencies of the govern-
ment uniform security control policies and practices
on matters of mutual concern:
1. Performs special inspections and investigations
directed by the Director; provides for inspection
of CIA offices for security enforcement, and
inspection of the utilisation, maintenance,
accountability for and disposition of CIA property,
equipment and supplies; evaluates the property
procurement program; secures reports of all viola-
tions of security policies and regulations commit-
ted by CIA personnel and initiates appropriate
action in each case.
2. Undertakes such planning for security projects as
may be directed by the Director.
3. Formulates and supervises the implementation of
security policies relative to the safeguarding
of classified information, the security of opera-
tions, personnel and installations of CIA and the
eligibility of other agencies to secure CIA
classified information; determines the adequacy
of security controls in such agencies.
4. Provides for the examination and audit of all
CIA fiscal transactions, including property
procurement and transportation actions.
5. Investigates or provides for investigation, and
determines security clearance of all personnel
employed by or assigned to CIA, and individuals
or organisations who are to be contacted by CIA
an intelligence matters; maintains a central
record of security reports on individuals and
organisations investigated, and controls access
to such records.
6. Maintains liaison with the FBI end other agencies
on all personnel and physical security matters
pertaining to CIA.
EMPLOYEE
INVEST. BR.
INSPECTION'
BR.
AUDIT
BR.
ollickpr COLLECTION AND DISZAWNATION
The Office of Collection and Dissemination, under the
direction of the As:istant Director for Collection
and Dissemination, is responsible for CIA policy
guidance in tore collection and dissemination of
intelligence material and provides central reference
facilities available to all intelligence agencies.
In carrying out this responsibility and in accordance
with aSC and CA directives, OCD:
1. Provides centralized services in the final coordi-
nation of intel;igence requirements; ascertains
which government facilities are best able to
satisfy specific requirements; and as.signs collec-
tion missions to the several governmental intelli-
gence collecting agencies and to the CIA operating
offices.
2. In conjunction with other intelligence acencies,
develops and ITplements coordinated dissemination
policies and practices, and worms out improved
methods for rapid correlation and dissemination of
intelligence data.
3. Provides and arzanges direct liaison with other
goverment agencies in order to locate and procure
intelligence materials, and coordinates operational
liaison contacts between analysts of CIA and ?the"
agencies to ensure an adequate exchange of Informa-
tion.
4. Maintains library and archival repositories of
all CIA intelligence and administrative materia-s1
provides bibliographic, reference and loan ser-
vices on these materials; develops agency-wide
systems of record management for adequate docu-
ment control within CIA.
.5. Provides support by business machines and other
special equipment for those operations of CIA
and other government agencies which can benefit
by their use; maintains files and machine indexes
of bibliographic, biographic, industrial and
graphic intelligence data and services special-
ised inter-departmental requests from these
facilities.
6. "insists ICAPS in preparation of plans, policies,
and proceoures for inter-agency intelligence
coordination.
7. Initiates and coordinates action tau:en by CIA
In orcer to effect necessary changes in the
security clasnification imposed upon specific
documentary intelligence materials.
S. Provides agency-wide meseenger, courier and
top secret control services.
LIAISON
Bk.
Cia ATIORS
STAFF
OFFICE OF POLICY 000RD1RAIlbh
Serves as an inter-agency coordination and opera-
tional activity for specialised projects.
I L _I_ _1_ I
LIEIRARY
BR.
MACH Ihe.
? METHODS BR.'
BIOG.A:tIC
KEGISILh
INDUS1nIAL
REGr.TRP.
G. A:NIG:3
F-P
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
As the exclusive intelligence evaluation, analy-
sis, and production components of CIA, (except
for science) the Office of Reports and Estimates,
under the direction of the Assistant Director for
Reports and Estimates, is responsible for the
production and presentation of national intelli-
gence required for the formulation and administra-
tion of policy and operational decisions affecting
national security. In carrying out this responsi-
bility, and in accordance with MSC and CIA direc-
tives, ORE:
1. Prepares current and staff intelligence reports
and estimates on a regional, functional, and
global basis. Such reports and estimates pre-
sent and interpret the significance of foreign
conditions and developments which affect U. S.
national 'security. Foreign intelligence trends
are analyzed and future developments together
with probable consequences are forecast and
interpreted.
2. Coordinates and administers an inter-depart-
mental program for the production, publication
end maintenance of basic intelligence designed
to meet the common requirements of CIA and the
UC agencies.
3. Formulates the National Intelligence Objectives
in collaboration with the IAC agencies and under
guidance of the SSC.
4. Evaluates available intelligence information
and intelligence; assesses its adequacy, accuracy,
and timeliness, and prepares reports of such
assessments for the guidance of collection and
producing agencies to assure that all fields of
intelligence bearing on the national security
are adequately covered.
5. Formulates requirements for the collection and
exploitation of intelligence data to insure
receipt of Notarial necessary for fulfillment
of production requirements.
6. Advises the Director of Central Intelligence on
programs, plans, policies and' procedures for
the production of national intelligence.
7. Assists ICAPS in preparation of plans, policies,
and procedures for inter-agency intelligence
coordination.
GLOBAL
SURVEY GP.
BASIC
1A7ELL. GP.
CUR. ENT
INTEL/. GP.
PLANS & POLICY
STAFF
STAFF
DULL. GP.
REGIONAL
B/uL?CHES
NAP
MANCE'
FUNCTIONAL
CONSUL-ANTS
GROUPS
1 INTELLIGENCE
--I PROD. BOARD
-J
1
INTEGhATION 1
PANEL
OFFICE OF SCIFITIFIC INTELLIGENCE
As the CIA component with primary responsibility
for scientific intelligence analysis, evaluation,
production and presentation, the Office of Scienti-
fic Intelligence under the direction of the Assist-
ant Director for Scientific Intelligences
1. Prepares scientific intelligence reports and
estimates designed to present and interpret
the status, progress and significance of
foreign scientific research and developments
which affect the capabilities and potentials,
of all foreign nations.
2. Makes substantive review of basic scientific
intelligence produced by other agencies and
advises ORE On its adequacy for inclusion in
the National Intelligence Surveys.
3. Formulates the national scientific intelli-
gence objective, in collaboration with the
IAC agencies and under the guidance of the
BSC.
4. Evaluates available scientific intelligence
information and intelligence; assesses its
adequacy, accuracy and timeliness and prepares
reports of aseessments for the guidance of
collection, source exploitation and producing
agencies to assure that all significant fields
of scientific intelligence bearing on the
National security are adequately covered.
5. Formulates requirements for the collection
and exploitation of scientific intelligence
data in order to insure receipt of materials
necessary for fulfillment of production require-
ments.
6. In collaboration with appropriate CIA components
and the IAC agencies, advises and aids in the
development coordination and execution of the
overall plans and policies for inter-agency
scientific intelligence production.
7. Advises the Director of Central Intelligence
on programs, plans, policies and procedures for
the production of national scientific intelli-
gence.
8. Assists 'CAPS in preparation of plans, policies
and procedures for inter-agency scientific
intelligence coordination.
COORDINATION
STAFF
SCIENTIFIC
SERVICES
STAFF
OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
1. Receives oftice missions, functions and
organisational requirements direct from the
Director of Central Intelligence or the Deputy
Director.
2. Provides world-vide communication security
and support for all of CIA except domestic
telephone, central mail and registry and
Murier service.
BIOLOGY
BRANCH
PHYSICS &
ELECIRObICS
BRANCH
ChENISTRY
B.ANCH
EATHLIU,TICS
& STATISTICS
BRANCH
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PRODUCTION
STAFF
AERONAUTICS
BRANCH
ORDINANCE
BRANCH
NAVIGATION
BRANCH
SECUnITY
BR.
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS
,
As a centralised collection service for CIA and the
IAC agencies, the Office of Operations under the
direction of the Assistant Director for Operations:
1. Provides centralized facilities for the exploita-
tion of primary sources and the collection of
foreign intelligence information directly from
individuals and non-government organisations
within the U. S., from foreign language documents,
and from foreign broadcasts to satisfy intelli-
gence requirements.
2. Directs and coordinates its collection services
in accordance with requirements for information
necessary for the production of departmental
end national intelligence.
3. Assigns collection missions to its Branches to
meet requirements received from OCD.
4. Maintains close liaison with OCD to insure
prompt transmittal of information collected to
all interested recipients.
5. Assists ICAPS in preparation of plans, policies,
intelligence
:::r11::ti:ed:e.s for interagency
CONTACT
BR.
_L_
FOREIGN DOC.
BR.
PLANNING &
? COORDINATING
STAFF
ENCLOSURE "A"
LEGAL
STAT
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ORGANIZATION RECOMMENDED BY DULLES COMMITTEE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OPERATIONS DIVISION
1.
As a completely automomous unit in CIA subject only
to direct control of the Director, under the super-
vision of the St4te Dept. and Military establishment,
is responsible for
a. Clandestine collection abroad.
b. Counter-espionage abroad.
c. Clandestine operations abroad.
d. Collection of foreign intelligence
information from sources in the
United States.
2. ReceivaL requirements ror collection direct from con-
sumer agencies and makes direct dissemination of intell-
igence information in its own discretion.
3. Maintains complete administrative support services for
its operations, including responsibility for such external
contacts as personnel procurement, budget and fiscal
matters, etc.
4. Coordinates with the Advisory Council within its field.
( 1. Supervisory and control responsibilities granted to
other agencies put this Division in the position of serving
two or three masters.
2. Autonomy is economically unsound from every point of view
3. Combining overt and covert operations in one unit is
security-wise unsound.
4. Direct collection and dissemination authority would ?
create duplication and confusion.
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
immumma ADVISORS CONNITYEE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
1. Reviews and has collective approval responsibility for
CIA intelligence estimates.
2. Determines allocation of central services to CIA.
3. Provides guidance for clandestine collection efforts.
4. Assists DCI in establishing and supervising the national
intelligence production program.
5. Establishes principles and rules for coordination in
intelligence field.
( Now includes JCS and 'AEC but not FBI. INC now is strictly
advisory to DCI. Report contains other suggestions directly
contrary to functions recommended, partioulary in connection
with reeponsibility if DCI to go to MSC for more positive
authority over IAC individual activities.)
r+.".SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR RESEARCH & INTELLIGENCE
?*,,,DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, GENERAL STAFF,U.S.A.
CHIEF, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HDP.S. U.S. AIR FORCE
REPRESENTATIVE OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ADVISORY COUNCIL
????=????????411
No functional changes recommended. Activities not surveyed.
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTION &
SECURITY
EXECUTIVE
PERSONNEL
BUDGET
SERVICES
HANAGEMENT
PLANS & COORDINATION
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
iiRANCH
POLICY CuORDIMIT ION
BRANCH
CONTACT
BRANCH
COORDINATION DIVISION
1. Develops, in coordination with other activities of CIA
and outside agencies, plans for coordination of
intelligence activities.
2. Furnishes to the Director the basis for advice and
recommendations to the MSG relative to coordination of
intelligence eetiviti?o.-
3. Receives intelligence information requirements from all
sources, determines best means of satisfying them, and
prepares and issues collection directives to collection
agencies when necessary to meet requirements.
4. Receives and disseminates intelligence and intelligence
information.
5. Conducts research on collection capabilities and
recommends remedial action where appropriate.
( All of the above functions are now Charged to either MAPS
( 1 & 2 ) or OCD ( 3,4 & 5 ). They are not related functions
and would be awkward in actual implementation. )
COLLECTION &
DISSEMINATION
BRANCH
PLANNING &
COORDINATING
BRANCH
GENERAL COMMENT ON OVERALL CHART
NO ACTUAL CHANGE IN CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED
BY THIS ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH. HOWEVER, CONSIDERABLE DUPLICATION
OF EFIORT AND COIOUSION IN DAILY OPERATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY
RESULT FROM ITS IMPLEWENTATION.
GENERAL COUNSEL
Not commented on by report. Anguse that no changes in
functions were intended.
EXECUTIVE
No specific comments made in de report relative to organ-
isation or support activities. Report is very critical of
mover administration" and indicates possibility of over-
staffing. There is nothing, however, on which a change in
functional statements can be based, other than a complete
restriction to en4pport of overt activities.
PERSONNEL
BUDGET
SERVICES
MANAGEMENT
Tr",' r,r,:(77
ESTIMATES DIVISION
Receives and reviews the intelligence produced by the
*Research and Reports Division and by other intelligence
agencies, and produces national intelligence estimates
for approval by the IAC.
( ORE now receives the product of other intelligence
agencies and now produces national intelligence
estimates. It has at its disposal the constant daily
flow of the mass of collected information essential as
backgrowid for accurate and objective prognostication.
This flow would either be shut off from the Estimates
Division or it would require a duplicate group of
researchers to handle it. If shut off, the Estimates
Division would soon be working in a vacuum with no
sound basis for judging the adequacy of the intell-
igence products available to it. A duplication of
qualified scientists would also be necessary to procure
effective results.)
LIBRARY
MACHINE
METHODS
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INSPECTION AND SECURITY
Not comnented on by report. Assume that no changes in ?
in :Unctions were intended.
RESEARCH & REFORM DIVISION
1. Responsible for centralised research in, and coordinated
production of, intelligence in fields of common interest
to all intelligence agencies, receiving policy guidance
from consumer agencies.
2. Maintains central library and reference services.
( Centralised research and coordination of production are
now charged to ORE.)
REFERENCE
?
BRANCH
BIOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION
SCIENTIFIC
BRANCH
INDUSTRIAL
INFORMATION
MAP
BRANCH
GRAPHICS
INFORMATION
ECONOMICS
BRANCH
FCREIGN
DOOPENTS
GEOGRAPHIC AREA
BRANCHES
ENCLOSURE "8"
LEGAL
Approved For Release 2001a/MEIA-RDP861300269R000500030002-1
ORGANIZATION RECOMMENDED BY CIA
NATIONAL SECIBITT COUNCIL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
'Subject to existing law and to the direction and con-
trol of the National Security Council, the Director
of Central Intelligence:
1. Directs all activities of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
2. Advises the National Security Council in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the
Government departments and agencies as relate to
national security.
3. Makes recommendations to the National Security
Council for the coordination of such intelligence
activities of the departments and agencies of the
Government as relate to the national security.
4. Correlates and evaluates intelligence relating
to the national security and provides for the
appropriate dissemination of such intelligence
within the Government using where appropriate
misting agencies and facilities.
5. Protects intelligence sources end methods from
unauthorised disclosure.
6. Performs for the benefit of the existing intelli-
gence agencies such additional services of com-
mon concern as the National Security. Council
determines can be more efficiently acoomplished
centrally.
7. Directs such analysis as my be necessary to
determine Minh functions in the fields; of
national intelligence are not being presently
performed or are not being adequately performed.
S. lots for the BSC in mordinating all federal
foreign intelligence activities related to the
national seaurity to insure that the overall
policies and objectives established are properly
lapleminted end emoted.
9. Performs such other fenstiams and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security
as IMilatigiallieeerity CONmeti-smc-frum timer--
te tins direst.
"MI
Aff11110111 ammana
11111091 DIiics
-DEPAIMENTAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING STAFF
As the coordinating and planning staff of the Direc-
tor for inter-Mpartmental intelligence activities&
1. Coordinates inter-departmental intelligence
planning for accomplishment of the national
intelligence mission.
2. Prepares for the Director, with the assistance
of interested CIA offices and the IAC mammies,
the overall plans and policies for inter-money
intelligence coordination.
3. Provides the Director's representation on
all LC ad hoc Committees.
4. Provides such secretariat as may be required
for the Director's intelligence advisory
committees.
5. Maintains constant liaison with IAC agencies
for the purpose of advising the Director of
their reactions to CIA and inter-agency
coordination.
6. Coordinates with the Executive in connection
alto overall program planning and development
to deteraine the availability of administrative
=Inert.
7. Represents the Director on and controls CIL
liaison with the NEC staff.
DEPT. BF '
STATE
SEPT. OF
Merl
hEP.
.1
IT. OF
NAV!
REF.
an. Cr
AIR TOME
hi:P.
GENERAL COINISEL
Melees the Director end other members of CIA
on legal matters pertaining to the administra-
tion and operations of CIA and provides essen-
tial legislative liaison service.
ADVISORY pawn.
Performs special coordinating functions as directed
by the Director of Central Intelligence.
A. As as adviser, body, advises the Direst?, of Central
Intelligence cm polls:, and procedural matters as
they sired the various deportmental InteLligenes
fonstices emd ihe ventral remponsibillties of CIA.
26 Astively pirtiapates with MCI in emordinatles et
Intelligens. activities.
9:1121..V.-10/Wakili
1. Special Assistant to the Seoretary or State
for lossareh end Ietelligsmee.
2. Director of Intelligemee, Gamma Stet!,
O.11. Army
3. Chien! isval Intelligense.
de DireMer of Intalligemes, Needgeserters,
U.S. Air Peres.
5. Disease or a:eerily sal latelligenso,
Atede Isere" Commissiom.
6. Begagliesetsr, Joist latesnigens. Orally
MIA Neff.
7. Director, Federal Doreen eflavestigatiem
or his designated representative.
1
1211001711
As principal staff ernes, of the Direst's for
the administration of all CIA astivitims
1. Coordinates administrative support with
operational requirements.
2. Is the olmanal of ossmenicaties with the
Deputy Director and the Director on matters
cal& involve adninistrative antima or ear
pert requirements.
3. Provide.' and controls CIA liaison molests
with all other wades on CIA administra-
tive matters.
4. Supervises the ergs:a:ratio:al sad functional
development of the Agency.
5. Serves as Deputy Director in the abeam@ of
that official.
ISSPECTB011 AND SECOILITI
DIMGFS
Orlelcrit
PERSOISIL
OFFIGTR--
SERVICES '
OFFICER
MAMAGISEll'
OFFICER
As a staff offices of the Director is responsible
for the security of all CIA activities, except
oomsamications enmity, end develops in coopers-
ties with other security agencies of the govern-
ment uniform security :astral policies and practices
on matters of 'Meal ?Oscar=
1. Performs special inspections and investigations
directed by the Director; provides for inspection
of CIA offices for security snforeement, and
Inspection of the utilisation, maintenance,
accountability for and disposition of CIA property;
equipment and supplies; evaluates the property
procurement program; secures reports of all viola-
tions of security policies and regulations commit-
ted by CIA personnel and initiates appropriate
action, In each case.
2. Undertakes such planning for security projects as.
may be directed by the Director.
3. Formulates and supervises the implementation of
security policies relative to the safeguarding
of classified information, the security of opera-
tions, personnel and installations of CIA and. the
eligibility of other agencies to secure CIA
classified information; determines the adequacy
of security controls in such agencies.
4. Provides for the examination and audit of all
CIA fiscal transactions, including property
procurement and transportation actions.
5. Investigates or provides for Investigation, and
determines security clearance of all personnel
employed by or assigned to CIA, and individuals
or organisations who are to be contacted by CIA
on intelligence matters; maintains& central.
record of security reports on individuals and
organisations investigated, and controls access
to such records.
6. Maintains liaison with the FBI and other agencies
on all personnel and physical security matters
pertaining to CIA.
EXPLOTES
INVENT. BE.I
.11M???MIL
INSPECTION'
a.
AUDIT
SR.
OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION
The office of Collection and Dissemination, under the
direction of the Assistant Director for Collection
and Dissemination, is responsible for CIA polity
guidance in the collection and dissemination of
intelligence material and provides central reference
facilities available to all intelligence agencies.
In carrying out this responsibility end in accordance
with MSC and CIA directives, OCD:
1. Provides centralised services in the final coordi-
nation of intelligence requirements; ascertains
which government facilities are best able to
satisfy specific requirements; and assigns collec-
tion missions to the several gcmemmental intelli-
gismo collecting agencies and to the CIA operating
offices.
2. In conjunction with other intelligence agencies,
develops and implesents coordinated dissesdnation
policies and practices, and works out improved
methods for rapid correlation and dissemination of
intelligence data.
3. Provides and arranges direct liaison with other
goverment agencies in order to locate and procure
intelligence materials, and coordinates operational
liaises, contacts between analysts of CIA and other
agencies to ensure an adequate exchange of informa-
l. Maintains library and archival repositories of
all CIA intelligence and administrative materials;
provides bibliographic, reference and loan ser-
vices on these materials; develops agency-wide
systems of record management for adequate dom.
ment control within CIA.
5. Provides oupport by business machines and other
special equipment for those operations of CIA
and other government agencies Mich can benefit
by their use; maintains files and machine indexes
of bibliographic, biographic, industrial and
graphic intelligence data and services special-
ised inter-departmental requests from these
facilities.
6. Assists ICAPS in preparation of plans, policies,
and procedures for inter-agency intelligence
coordination.
7. Initiates and coordinates action taken by CIA
in order to effect necessary changes in the
security classification imposed upon specific
documentary intelligence materials.
8. Provides agency-wide messenger, courier and
top secret control services.
OF&J.TIONS'
STAFF
LIAISON
HR.
LIBRARY
BR.
MACHINE
METHODS BR:
BIOGLAPHIC
REGISTER
INDUSThIAL
REGISTER
CAMHIGS
REGISTER
WIGS OF REPORTS AND ESTIMTLS
As the exclusive intelligence evaluation, analy-
sis, and production components of CIA, (except
for science) the Office of Reports and Estimates,
under the direction of the Assistant Director for
Reports and Estimates, is responsible for the -
production and presentation of national intelli-
gence required for the formulation and administra-
tion of policy and operational decisions affecting
national security. In carrying out this respoasi-
bility, and in accordance with SSC and CIA direc-
tives, ONEt
1. Prepares current and staff intelligence reports
and estimates on ? regional, functional, and
global basis. Such reports and estimates pre-
sent and interpret the significance of foreign
conditions and developments which affect U. S.
national security. Foreign intelligence trends
are analysed and future developments together
with probable consequences are forecast and
interpreted.
2. Coordinates and administers an inter-depart-
mental program for the production, publication
and maintenance of basic intelligence designed
to meet the common requirements of CIA and the
IAC agencies.
3. Formulates the National Intelligence Objectives
In collaboration with the IAC agencies and under
guidance of the NSC.
4. Evaluates available intelligence information
end intelligence; assesses it. adequacy, accuracy,
and timeliness, and prepares reports of such
assessments for the guidance of collection and
producing agencies to assure that all fields of
intelligence bearing on the national security
are adequately covered.
5. Formulates requirements for the collection and
exploitation of intelligence data to insure
receipt of material necessary for fulfillment
of production requirements.
6. Advises the Director of Central Intelligence on
programs, plans, policies and procedures for
the production of national intelligence.
7. Asaiets 1CAPS in preparation of plans, policies,
and procedures for inter-agency intelligence
coordination.
Om
ESTIMATES
comp
GLOBAL
SURVEY GP. '
BASIC
DULL. GP:
CIAL,ENT
INTELL. GP.
PLANS & POLICY
STAFF
STAY!
'MILL. GP.'
FLEGIONAL ,
BriAoCEES
NAP
MANCH
FUNCTIONAL
CONSULTANTS
CROUPS
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
INTEChATION I .....
PANEL
As the CIA component with primary responsibility
for scientific intelligence analysis, maluatica,
production and presentation, the Office of Scienti-
fic Intelligence under the direction of the Assist-
ant Director for Scientific Intelligences
1. Prepares scientific intelligence report. and
estimates designed to present and interpret
the status, progress and significance of
foreign scientific research and developments
which affect the capabilities and potentials
of all foreign nations.
2. Makes substantive review of basic scientific
Intelligence produced by other agencies and
advises ORE on its adequacy for inclusion in
the National Intelligence Surveys.
3. Formulates the national scientific intelli-
gence objectives in collaboration with the
IAC agencies and under the guidance of the
NSC.
4. Evaluates available moientific intelligence
information and intelligence; assesses its
adequacy, accuracy and timeliness and prepares
reports of assessments for the guidance of
collection, source exploitation and producing
agencies to assure that all significant fields
of scientific intelligence bearing OA the
National security are adequately covered.
5. Formulates requirements for the collection
and exploitation of scientific intelligence
data in order to insure receipt of materials
necessary for fulfillment of production require-
ments.
6. In collaboration with appropriate CIA components
and the IAC agencies, advises and aids in the
development coordination and execution of the
overall plans and policies for inter-agency
scientific intelligence production.
7. Advises the Director of Central Intelligence
on progress, plans, policies and procedures for
the production of national scientific intelli-
gence.
8. Assists IGAPS in preparation of plans, policies
and procedures for inter-agency scientific
intelligence coordination.
COORDINATION
STAFF
SCIENTIFIC
SERVICES
STAFF
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
1. Receives Wise missieme direct tram the Director
of Central Intelligens, or the Deputy Director.
2. Provides world-wide Isomminstioa seemIty and
egret for all of CIA except domestic telephone,
! central mail sad registry end 'eerier serviee.
13. Serra as es interapney coordination sod
.
operatic:al activity for specialised projects.
4. Charged with exclusive reepomsibility for
- espionage aid emotes' engem. abroad.
BIOLOGY
BhANCH
TOP SECT' rr
PHYSICS &
ELEGIRONICS
BhANCH
CHM.ISTRY
BANCH
NATSENATIGS
& STATISTICS
Biu'ASCH
Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP86600269R000500030002-1
PRODUCTION
STAFF]
AERONAUTICS
&UCH
ORDIRANCE
DUNCE
NAVIGATION
BRAMCH
SPECIAL
I:MATIONS
FRANCS
SECUhITY I
111!_.
OFFICE OF OPSRATIOSS
As a centralised collection service for CIA end the '
IAC agencies, the Office of Operations under the
direction of the Assistant Director for Oimmationes
1. Provides centralised facilities for the exploita-
tion of primary sources and the collection of
foreign intelligence information
2. Directs and coordinates its eollection services
in accordanee with requirements for information
neoeseere for the produstIon of departmental
and national Intelligence.
3. Amigos collection missions to its Breaches to
meet requirements received fres OCD.
4. Maintains close liaison with BCD to lasers
prompt transmittal of informatioa collected to
all interested resipleate.
5. Maisie ICAPS in preparatim of planes poliales,
and pr000dures for later-ageney intelligence
coordination.
PLANNING &
COORDINATING.
STAFF
CONTACT
BR.
FOREIGN DOC.
Ilh.
INC.LOSUR.E "C"
25X1
25X1
STAT
Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP86600269R000500030002-1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/08 : CIA-RDP86600269R000500030002-1
'?Applr ved For ReleM ?
lov,;.7. wvv.iuvuouuUL- I
UNCLASSIFIED when blank - TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document - When clotcl*Ege-d from document regrade
cover sheet as appropriate. Attach to each CIA and Non-CIA collateral Top Secret document maintained by CIA.
I
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