RELATIONSHIP OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY (ACDA) WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000900040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 8, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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USIB-D-26. 2/1
8 May 1963
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Relationship of U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) with the
Intelligence Community
REFERENCE USIB-M-262, 20 March 1963, Item 5
1. The attached copy of a letter on the subject to the Director,
ACDA, from the Director of Central Intelligence, which was summarized
orally by the Acting Chairman at the USIB meeting this date, is circulated
herewith to Board members for information and reference.
2. Attention is invited to the fact that the attached letter supersedes
the action in the reference, requesting representatives of CIA and DIA to
prepare a position paper related to this subject.
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USIB-D-26. 2/1
8 May 1963
The Honorable William C. Foster
Director, U. S. Arms Control 'and Disarmament Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
In this letter I will attempt to summarize my understanding of the
results of our discussion on April 17th, and in doing so, answer your letter
to me of February 8th and April 8th, and Adrian Fisher's letter of February 18th.
The topics and ideas covered by these letters have, as indicated by you.
been the subject of several discussions between representatives of our
respective organizations.
First, I would like to repeat that the intelligence community, and most
particularly CIA and DIA (as they are most directly concerned with your
problems), desire to afford the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
all possible cooperation. We appreciate that our intelligence findings and
analysis have an important bearing on your activities.
We feel it is not practical to place a permanent representative on your
staff as no one man has knowledge of all the phases of the intelligence
community's activities and, therefore, would be unable to properly serve
your requirements. Likewise, it is not practical to set up a special unit
in CIA to deal with ACDA's requirements as your requirements reach into
most of CIA's divisions and, therefore, such a unit would have to include
at least one representative from a great number of our departments or
divisions.
In addition, it is my belief and this has been concurred in by Secretary
Gilpatric, that there should be one focal point in the intelligence community
as a liaison between the community and ACDA and that this point can best be
set up in the Central Intelligence Agency.
With this in mind, I am appointing a liaison officer with appropriate
staff assistance in CIA. I will so inform the United States Intelligence Board.
He will be authorized to call upon all members of the community as well as
all divisions and departments of CIA as appropriate to the extent necessary
to meet your requirements.
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The liaison officer will be charged with the responsibility of serving
your needs promptly so that delays which you have experienced in the past
can be avoided. I think this arrangement should meet your requirements.
The establishment of a USIB committee on ACDA matters as proposed in
your letter presents difficulties because of your manifold needs. Your
requirements do not present a parallel situation to JAEIC or GMAIC for they
are involved in a very specific area of intelligence activity whereas your
requirements range over a very broad field of intelligence reporting and
analysis.
With respect to the ACDA representation on USIB committees such as
JAEIC or GMAIC, or on USIB itself, it is my feeling that this would involve
an extravagant waste of talent on your part for these committees are involved
in a vast number of problems which are of no particular interest to ACDA.
A better procedure is for ACDA to appear before the committees or the
Board itself when matters of special interest to ACDA are up for consideration.
This can be arranged by Mr. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research
in the Department of State, who sits on USIB and has representatives on all
of the committees and, therefore, can decide the circumstances under which
ACDA representation should be called in. This, incidentally, is a procedure
we follow in a great many departments of the Government that have a
particular knowledge and special interest in a problem that may be brought
before the Board or one of its committees.
With. respect to the suggestions made in Mr. Fisher's letter that USIB
make judgments on the range of probable error in estimates of Soviet
capability, order of battle, quantity of military items, etc. , I am at a loss to
understand just what USIB could do along this line which would be constructive.
What is asked by Mr. Fisher is that "... in addition to commenting on the
range of probable error, the intelligence community might also... indicate
their degree of confidence that the estimates are not grossly in error....
ACDA will, in addition, require an estimate of range of error or total
inventories as well. "
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USIB regularly produces estimates of Soviet capabilities, order of
battle, military inventories, etc. , and these are under constant review and
are revised from time to time as new dependable intelligence develops. In
many instances, members of the community differ in these evaluations and
it is my practice to set out the dissenting views in footnotes to the estimates.
Some estimates are based on very hard intelligence. Others are arrived at
by a synthesis of all available intelligence, a great deal of which cannot be
evaluated as being "hard. " The information on which the final conclusions
are based is carefully studied by the intelligence community and the estimates
reflect the degree of certainty which we have in our conclusions. Certainly
no estimates are produced which are "grossly in error" nor is it practical
to develop what is referred to as an "estimate of the probable error. " When
there is doubt, the estimate contains a range, or is otherwise qualified.
When new information indicates that"the range is not correct, a revised
estimate is produced. I frankly do not see how we can go further.
One point I must add is to emphasize the very great difficulty of
developing the rate of production of military items., and in the case of some
items, the total inventory. As an example, we feel we know with reasonable
assurances the MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM launchers in the Soviet Union.
Also, we know something of their military doctrine concerning the "reloading
of the pads. " However, we do not know the number of missiles in existence,
nor the rate of production. The same is true of a great many other military
items. Hence, it is not practical to proceed on any basis of destroying end
items and then reaching a conclusion of what is left by the process of subtrac-
tion. What is necessary and appears to me indispensable if we are to pursue
a safe course is an arrangement which would provide for the inspection of
both the destroyed items and the remaining inventory.
With respect to the final question raised by Mr. Fisher, which is the
extent to which intelligence can contribute to the inspection provisions of a
treaty, I feel that this is a matter which should be very intensively studied
by your staff and appropriate representatives of the intelligence community.
Intelligence can make a real contribution in this area. Advantage should be
taken of the potential of the intelligence community, not only with respect
to gathering information but more particularly with regard to the intelligence
processes used in arriving at a reasonable and dependable quantitive analysis.
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In studying this we must always look to the permanence of intelligence
sources. Many of them are subject to compromise, and once compromised,
as in the case of press leaks, they disappear. It seems to me that proven
intelligence processes of analysis and estimates and the community's
customary practice of drawing a reasonable conclusion from a synthesis of
a wide spectrum of information is the most useful contribution the community
can make to your problem.
I will be pleased to discuss this matter further with you after you have
considered the points in this letter.
Sincerely,
/S/ John A. McCone
Director
25 April 1.963
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