A REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000400070017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 10, 1971
• Content Type: PAPER

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MEMORANDUM FOR: John Huizenga
Attached are:
OMB's report, "A Review of the Intelligence
Community"; and
The Agency's comments on the Review, the
original of which the Director gave to Jim
Schlesinger on 20 April.
E-Kw
30 April 71
(DATE)
I A FORM
54 101 WHICH RELACES FORM
BE US10-101
ED.
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A REVIEW OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COi-fUNIT
March 10,
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VI.
Page
INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF INTELLIGENCE ..............................
1
COST TRENDS ...................................
3
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRODUCT ..................
100/
ORGANIZATIONAL DILEMMAS ......................
13
SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES ................
20
LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY ...................
25
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSt, L.EA1 RSHIP .............
34
CHANGING FUNCTIONAL BOUNDARIES AND COSTS .....
39
TOWARD IMPROVEMENTS. IN THE PRODUCT' ...........
44
APPENDICES
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF INTELLIGENCE
The operations of the intelligence community have pro-
duced two disturbing phenomena. The first is an impressive
rise in their size and cost. The second is an apparent.-in-
ability to achieve a commensurate improvement in Ithe scope
and overall quality of, intelligence products.
During the past decade alone, the cost of the intelli-
gence community has almost doubled.. At the same time, spec-
tacular increases in collection activities have occurred.
Where satellite photography is concerned.. the increases have
led to greatly unproved knowledge 'about the military capa-
bilities of potential enemies..' But exparded collection by
means other.than photography has not brought about a similar
reduction in our uncertainty about the intentions, doctrines,
and political processes of foreign powers. Instead, the
growth in raw intelligence -- and here satellite photography
must be included -- has come to serve as a proxy for improved
analysis, inference, and estimation.
The following report seeks to identify the causes of
these two phenomena and the areas in which constructive change
can take place. Its principal conclusion is that while a
number of specific measures may help to bring about a closer
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~ relationship between cost and effectiveness, the main hope
for doing so lies in a fundamental reform of the intelligence
community's decisionmaking bodies and procedures.
This conclusion is advanced in full recognition that
reorganization will, at best; only create the conditions in
which wise and imaginative- leadership can flourish. In the
absence of reorganization, however, the habits of intelligence
community will remain as difficult to control as was the per-
formance of the Department of Defense prior to the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958.
 sonably well into the mid-1950s.
To understand the phenomenon of increasing costs, it
is necessary to consider briefly the organizational history
of the intelligence community. The National Security Act of
1947 and the National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tives (NSCIDs) of the late 1940s and early 1950s established
the basic division of responsibilities among agencies and
departments. This division had its origins in traditional
distinctions between military and non-military intelligence,
between tactical and national intelligence, and between
communications (COMINT) and non-communications (or agent)
intelligence.- Thus, CIA was,directed to employ clandestine
agents to collet "non-military" intelligence and produce
"national" intelligence. The Department of State was made
responsible for the.overt collection of "non-military" in-
telligence. The National Security Agency (NSA) was estab-
lished to manage COMINT collection. The Military Services
were instructed to collect "military" intelligence as well
as maintain tactical intelligence capabilities for use in
wartime. All were permitted to produce "departmental" in-
telligence to meet their separate needs. While not ideal,
this division of functions and responsibilities worked rea-
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Since that time, these traditional distinctions and
the organizational arrangements which accompanied them have
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become increasingly obsolescent. The line between "military"
and "non-military" has faded; scientific and technical in-
telligence with both civilian and military applications has
become a principal area of endeavor. for almost all intelli-
gence organizations Similarly, under the old distinctions,
the national leadership -- namely the President and the NSC -
concerned itself with "national" intelligence, while pre-
sumably only battlefield commanders cared about tactical in-
telligence. But a rapidly advancing technology which has
revolutionized the collection, processing, and communication
of intelligence data casts doubt on the validity of the dis-
tinction's.
Simultaneously, technoi'ogical,~a.dyanc:es have created new
collection posi'..bilities which do not fii conveniently within
a structure based on traditional distinctions and were not
covered in the original directives. Satellite photography,
25x
have become some of the most important ar~axl
vital methods of intelligence collection not currently covered
by any uniform national policy.
The breakdown of the old distinctions and the appearance
of new collection methods has been a simultaneous process
raising a host of questions about intelligence organization.
Is ELINT related to COMINT, is it technical or military in
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nature, is it of primary interest to tactical or national
consumers? Where should the
who should analyze it?' Who should be responsible for
__j
satellite photography? On the more mundane, but nonetheless
critical level, questions arise about the organizational re-
sponsibilities for such topics as Sihanoukville supply in-
filtration, VC/NVA order of battle, and missile deployments
in the Suez Canal area. Are these military or non-military
issues? Is the intelligence about then tactical or national?
Who should be responsible for collectio:i and what collection
resources should be tasked?'
In the absence of an authoritative governing body to
resolve these issues, the community has resorted to a series
of compromise solutions that adversely -1ffect its performance
and cost. In general, these compromises have favored multiple
and diffuse collection programs. and the neglect of difficult
and searching analytical approaches. The most serious of the
resulting problems are outlined below in brief form, and dis-
cussed in more detail in the appendices.
1. The distribution of. intelligence functions has become
.increasing7y fragmented and disorganized.
? The old distinctions among national, departmental,
and tactical intelligence are out of date. Today,
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CIA is as likely to produce intelligence relevant
to, say, NVA/VC order of battle as DIA or MACV,
just as MACV produces many reports that are of
interest to the national leadership.
? Similarly, the relatively neat ordering of collec-
Lion functions that existed after World War II has
broken down. CIA now engages in a wide range of
collection activities
NSA has added
capabi1..ties. The Services now have a full panoply
of sensc:_s to perform a variety of functions.--
tactical intelligence, surveillance, early warning,
and so oz.
Table I illustrates how almost all major com-
ponents of the intelligence community are in-
volved in each of its various collection and
production functions.
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2. The community's activities are dominated l_,y collection
cQmnpcti.t1on and have become unr_~,?oduct~vely duplicative .
0 Z bou - f the
telligence in 1972 will be spent on collection
(Table I above). Despite past massive increases in
the collection of photography, COMINT, ELINT,
and other sensor data, sizeable additional collec-
tion capabilities are planned to become operational
The blurring of traditional boundaries has encouraged
community members to engage in a competitive struggle
for survival and dominance, primarily through new
technology, which has resulted in the redundant
acquisition of data at virtually all levels --
tactical, theater command, and national.
0 Gross redundancies in collection capabilities have
become commonplace as exemplified by aircraft in
both CIA and Defense which collect photography,
budgeted for in-
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the collection of ELINT.
? Collection capabilities remain in operation beyond
their useful lives. As older systems lose their
attractiveness at the national level, they are
taken over at the command or tactical level where
they duplicate higher level activities or collect
data of little value.
? Simultaneously, compartmentalization within various
security systems has served to hide or obscure com-
petitiv: capabilities from evaluation, comparison,
and tradeoff analysis..
251
3. The conununity' s growth is largely unplanned and un-
guided.
? Serious forward planning is often lacking as decisions
are made about the allocation of resources.
? The consumer frequently fails to specify his product
needs for the producer; the producer, uncertain about
eventual demands, encourages the collector to pro-
vide data without selectivity or priority; and the
collector emphasizes quantity rather than quality.
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Tht community's activities have become exceedingly ex-
E n:sive.
0 The fragmentation of intelligence functions and the
competitive drive for improved collection technology
are important reasons why the cost of intelligence
hasi uring the past decade.
0 A significant part of this cost growth is attributable
to the acquisition. of expensive new systems without
simultaneous reductions in obsolescent collection
programs.
0 In the absence of planning and cruidance, internally
i
generatE:d values predomiriafe?.-in the community's in-
stituticons. These values favor increasingly sophisti-
cated and expensive collection technologies at the
expense of analytical capabilities.
0 Few interagency comparisons are contemplated. Po-
tential tradeoffs between PIIOTINT and SIGINT, between
PHOTINT and I-iUMINT, and between data collection and
analysis are neglected.
.0 While the budgetary process might be used to curb
some of the more obvious excesses, it cannot sub-
stitute for centralized management of the community.
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III. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRODUCT
In a world of perfect information, there would be no
uncertainties about the present and future intentions, capa-
bilities, and activities of foreign powers. Information,
however, is bound to be imperfect for the most part. Con-
sequently, the intelligence community can at best reduce the
uncertainties and construct plausible hypotheses about these
factors on the basis of what continues to be partial and
often conflicting evidence.
Despite the richness of the data made available by modern
methods of collection, and the rising coats of their acquisi-
tion, it is not at all clear 'that our hypotheses about foreign
intentions, capabilities, and activities have improved corn-
mensurately in scope and quality. Nor can it be asserted with
confidence that the intelligence community has shown much in-
itiative in developing the full range of possible explanations
in light of available data. Among the more recent results of
this failure to acknowledge uncertainty and entertain new
ideas in the face of it, has been a propensity to overlook
such unpleasant possibilities as a large-scale exploitation:
of Sihanoukville by the NVA to transship supplies, a continu-
ation of the SS-9 buildup and its possible MIRVing, or Soviet
willingness to invade Czechoslovakia and put forces into the
Middle East.
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are all the more disturbing because the need to explore and
test a number of hypotheses will, if anything, expand as the
Soviets project their military power and come to play a more
direct global role. Yet there is no evidence that the in-
telligence community, given its present structure, will come
to grips with this class of problems.
The community's heavy emphasis on collection is itself
detrimental to correcting product probler,,s. Because each
organization sees the maintenance and expansion of its col-
lection capabilities as the principal route to survival and
strength with th:.~ community, there is a :.-trong presumption
in today's intelligence set-up' t.ha't?_auddi :ional data collec-
tion rather than improved analysis, will provide the answer
to particular intelligence problems. It has become common-
place to translate product criticism into. demands for en-
larged collection efforts. Seldom does anyone ask if a
further reduction in uncertainty, however small, is worth
its cost.
The inevitable result is that production remains the
stepchild of the community. It is a profession that lacks
strong military and civilian career incentives, even within
CIA. The analysts, with a heavy burden of responsibility,
find themselves swamped with data. The consumers, at the
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\\ same time, treat their product as a free good, so that demand
exceeds supply, priorities are not established, the system
becomes overloaded and the quality of the output suffers.
As if this were not enough, production, instead of guiding
collection, is itself guided by collectors and the impetus
of technology. Since the military are the principal collec-
tors, they are more likely to focus on the needs and interests
of their own Services than on the issues of concern to the
national leadership, and they continue the wasteful practice
of counterpart targeting. Under such difficult conditions,
it is not surpri3ing that hypotheses tend to harden into
dogma, that their sensitivity to changed conditions is not
articulated, and that new data are- noE"sought to test them.
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL D.11,MIMAS
Questions about cost and product might exist ever, if the
intelligence community possessed strong leadership. It is
noteworthy, however, that they have arisen under conditions
the most marked of which is a lack of institutions governing
the community with the authority and responsibility to re-
solve issues without excessive compromise, allocate resources
according to criteria of effectiveness, and consider the re-
lationship between cost and substantive output from a national
perspective.
This lack of governing institutions stems fundamentally
from the 'failure of the National Security Act of 1947 to
anticipate the "constitutional." needs 'of a modern and techno-
logically complex intelligence community. The primary intent
of the Act, understandably, was to prevent a recurrence of the
intelligence confusions and delays that occurred prior to
Pearl Harbor. These problems were seen as having resulted
from defects in the central processing, production, and dis-
semination of intelligence. The critical need, accordingly,
was to create an organization which would have access to all
intelligence and report its estimates to the national leader-
ship.
In 1947, the size and cost of individual programs were
relatively small, and the scope and nature of the management
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problems associated with today's corcum-inity were not antici-
pated. Consequently the issue of how to plan and rationalize
the.collection of intelligence did not seem of great moment,
and the Act did not explicitly provide for. a mechanism to per-
form these functions or evaluate the scope and quality,of its
product.
There is another reason why the 1947. Act did so little
to provide strong leadership for the coi;ununity: powerful in-
terests in the Ailitary Services and elsewhere opposed (and
continue to oppose).more centralized management of intelli--
gence activities. Partly, this opposition arises from the
belief of the Services that direct control over intelligence
programs is essential if they' are to"&-onduct successful mili-
tary operations; partly, it results from bureaucratic concerns.
The Services are reluctant to accept assurance that informa-
tion from systems not controlled by them will be available as
and when they require it.
Despite such opposition, the National Security Act of
1947 did stipulate that the CIA would coordinate the "in-
telligence activities" of the Government under the direction
of the National Security Council. However, the Act also made
clear provision for the continuation of "departmental in-
telligence". Since then, three Presidents have exhorted the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to play the role of
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community loader and coordinator, but his authority over the
community has romance '?-:in11naal. While the DCI has been the
catalyst in coordinating substzintive, intelligence production,
he has maclc little use of such authority as he possesses to
manage the resources of the community.
Realistically, it is clear that the DCI, as his office
is now constituted, cannot be expected to perform effectively
the community-wide leadership role becau:- e:
? As an agency head he bears a number of weighty op-
erational and advisory responsibilities which limit
the effort he can devote to community-wide management.
? ;le bear_ s a particularly heavy bui den for the planning
and conduct of covert actions.
? His multiple roles as community leader, agency head,
and intelligence adviser to the President, and to
a number of sensitive executive committees, are
mutually conflicting.
? He is a competitor for resources within the community
owing to his responsibilities as Director of CIA,
which has large collection programs of its own; thus
he cannot be wholly objective in providing guidance
for community-wide collection.
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IIe controls only
of the communi t:y ` s re-
sources and must therefore rely on persuasion to
influence his collca ues regarding the allocation
and management of the other
appropriated to the Department of Defense. Since
Defense is legally responsible for these very large
resources, it feels that it cannot be bound by out-
side advice on how they should be used.
o The DCI is outranked by other departmental heads who
report directly to the President and are his immr