MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS ON THE SCHLESINGER REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000400070008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 16, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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16 April 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
Programs Evaluation
In line with our discussion with the Director
this morning, I think we need to reorganize our paper to coincide as
closely as possible with his oral remarks, which he obviously has
pretty firmly fixed in his mind. I would summarize them as follows:
a. The thrust of the OMB paper is okay.
It is not our purpose to argue with it but rather to make some
suggestions along the lines the OMB paper suggests and directed
to this paper.
b. The letters of exhortation which the
DCI has received from the President give him no role in com-
munity resource management, and the big problem is How can
he get a handle on it? The OMB paper and the Director recog-
nize that most of the resources (85 percent) are in the Defense
Department. Any effort toward better resource management
must first focus on DOD. The Director believes that a good
beginning has been made through the Froehlke arrangement.
The Laird posture statement provides for an additional Deputy
Secretary of Defense and an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
(or some comparable position). This is already on the record,
and the Director believes that it would be most inadvisable to
attempt any more legislation than this at this time. If we could
get DOD resource management under one man who would cooper-
ate with the DCI, it should be possible to effect some savings.
Recognizing that 85 percent of the assets and resources are in
DOD, it is simply not realistic for the DCI or any other outsider
to "command" the entire community.
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 c. Addressing himself to production, the
Director thinks it is not new people we need but a better relation-
ship with Dr. Kissinger and our other principal consumers. He
would welcome a council of consumers, possibly chaired by Dr.
Kissinger. He feels a real need for some super-evaluative body
of consumers to critique the product. The Director feels quite
strongly that the interplay between production and collection is
very important, and he wants no part of the scheme to set up the
DCI and the production components as a separated entity.
d. The Director feels that the report quite
properly recognizes that the DCI is a very busy man. He thinks
it entirely feasible, however, that a good bit could be delegated
to subordinate officials such as the DDCI or, in the case of the
Clandestine Service, to the DD/P, which would give him more
time to help with resource management.
e. With regard to readjustment of the
organizational structure, the Director feels it would be a great
mistake to make the DCI responsible for NSA. He feels that,
when you start to replace all of the military with a civilian
manpower pool, the military services would no longer support it,
and in any case, we do not want this responsibility. He recognizes
that Gayler is going to be out for greater budgets but that Froehlke
or Packard is simply going to have to tell him there isn't any
more money and there will probably be less. He feels that the
OMB role in allowing the community budget to grow to its present
size has been a pusillanimous approach. Why have they allowed
this? The DCI has always been available for consultation but
has not been invited in, so to speak.
While the Director was not specific about this,
I think we have to recognize that PFIAB and Mr. Laird, at least, have
been asked for their comments. The Director's written response should
therefore be couched in rather diplomatic terms. All of the several
comments are going to have to be brought together at one point, and the
leaky ship on which we ride also causes me to assume that in due course
DOD and others will have a copy of the Director's comments. They
should therefore be plain but not appear to be a power grab by the DCI.
I think we should also assume it is entirely possible that these comments
will be communicated as submitted to the President, which again means
that they must be very carefully written.
L. K. White
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SECRET
41 t'kpril 1971
SUBJECT: Meeting with
0~ai&utivc Fteg:~ ;y
of the Visa: President's 25X1
Office, 40 April 1971
25X1
25X1
25X1
1. Ocarne in to see ine for an hour Tuesday morning,
by appointment. We had known each other previously when I had
the Africa Division and
had been posted in
besides worrying at headquarters,
in. pcFlitics since leaving the Agency,
After reviewing his career
got down to-business. 25X1
i i acknowledged the current malaise at policy levels with the intelli-
geaces connk-,aunityr, citing rising costs, lack of commensurate i miprove-
rnent in product and a general feeling the community suffered frog x
lac< of coordination and inordinate duplication. I told him this Was
indeed a familiar theme nowadays, although it was seldo~an as specific
as -tight be helpful. I also said that whereas no one in our profession
had illusions about perfection, it was nonetheless apparent to us that
the work of the community was more effective and the product better
than in days gone by. We discussed the lack of feedback from the
senior consumers, even though we agreed that the 0 series of the 25X1
National Estimates had been improved as the result of specific sug-
gestions. Here I also pointed out that these were changes to ii-feet
the needs of the new Ad:Iuinistration rather than improvements as the
result of substantive criticism.
25X1 Z. At Oa instance, we soon began to discuss the role
of the L C1 and quickly got onto the familiar ground of substantive
coordination as contrasted with authority over resources.
25X1
who seemed quite well prepared on these matters, was familiar with
these aspects and asked what Bight be done if the DCI should be given
specific authority over resources, budgets and program reviews.
He acknowledged that the Depart'nent of Defense progratnsa were a
massive factor in any DCI's authority- and I told Mtn I felt good
centralized coordination from the DCI would only be accomplished
With a cooperative working relationship with the Secretary of Defense
and/or his subordinates to whom he .ig.it delegate authority for
intelligence programming. In reply to Iia question, I gave it as
25X
G:..u, :;:1
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25X1
my view that increased DCI authority need not be accompanied by
any ::major upheaval in the organization of the community and that at
all costs legislation (beyond what Secretary Laird has been discuss-
ing with the Congress in regard to a new Deputy Secretary and
possibly two new Assistant Secretaries) should be avoided. I 25X1
appeared to understand this fully and concurred. 0 asked what 25X1
type of evaluative work the NIPS: Staff had been able to accomplish
and w iat I felt could further be done in the event DCi authority
should be bolstered. In reply, I talked about systems analysis, the
work done for the NIRB, some examples of specific studies I 25X1
was already familiar with most of those I .mentioned), winding up
with a generic description of the CLINT study as pointing the way to
what might be done on a broader community basis. We agreed that
this technique had considerable pro dse for certain types of collection
programs, although probably less for others. II was particularly 25X1
interested in wondering whether such studies would also emphasize
the managerial aspects of individual programs and reflect findings
on the degree of coordination or lack of it reflected in the intelligence
co,n:nunity. I told him that whereas present work concentrated on
substantive evaluations, these other conclusions could be drawn without
too much difficulty from the studies. As Opointed out, it was 25X1
these latter aspects which most exercised critics at the policy level.
3. Pursuing the subject of what exercised policy-level critics
of the intelligence community, Obrought up the crises which 25X1
resulted from such incidents as the "Pueblo" and the shoot-down of
the EC-l21. was aware that much reconnaissance activity is
now cleared with the 40 Committee and the DCI has no handle on
tactical intelligence activities springing from local commands. He
nerely emphasized this was a fact of life and that no argument that
the DCI didn't have authority in such and such a field would be of much
use the next time there was a public flap. I put it to I that whereas 25X1
the JJCI probably never -would have much leverage in tactical matters,
for perfectly obvious reasons, any increase in his authority over
national intelligence matters would tend to draw a crisper line between
these and the tactical sector.
4. At one point, while discussing the quality of the product,
25X1 Dimplied that whereas technical collection had made great
strides in measuring hardware and related matters, other aspects
such as intent, policy, philosophy, etc. seemed to be less well
covered. As a result, we discussed for several minutes the relative
invulnerability of the Soviet bureaucracy these days and some of the
reasons I thought lay behind it. This discussion was, naturally
25X1 enough, inconclusive but Odid not seem greatly to disagree with
what I had to say.
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5. asked about the status of relations with Bob
k roehlke's office, particularly the systems analysis side, and I told
biz: this was generally cordial and that it was my experience syster-is
analysts knew each other and had little difficulty keeping in touch
no -utter what their parent organizations might do. I told him I
thought, this was all to the good and rtiaerely -neant that if the work of
the NIPS Staff should change as the result of any increase of authority
on the part of the .DCI, the Staff was in a position to move forward
with soinewhat greater facility as a result of it. When he left, he
promised that he would not be quoting NIP : as his authority but was
hopeful that he could return to the subject at some later date, possibly
after some new arrangements for ,ntelligenee co:rmnunity coordination
had had a chance to prove theaselves.
(Signed) Bronson Tweedy
Bronson Tweedy
D/ DCl/ NlPi~"
cc: CI
DDCI
ecutive Director
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 Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400070008-2
Miscellaneous papers regarding reorganization
of the intelligence community
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