PHUNG HOANG

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01720R001100080034-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 14, 2004
Sequence Number: 
34
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01720R001100080034-1.pdf64.4 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 :'CIA-RDP80R01 720R001 100080034-1 SUBJECT : Phung Hoang 1. We believe USAID's redraft of the original SAVA draft is essentially sound and, considering USAID's horror of being publicly identified with "Phoenix" or "counter-subversion", it seems quite forthcoming and unbiased. USAID has managed to submerge its own preferences to some extent in favor of encouraging a continued, well- defined counter-subversion advisory effort even if they get tarred by the semantics brush. In effect, of course, USAID has been involved in counter-subversion to some extent all along - they advise the National Police Field Force which is a Phung Hoang action arm - but have enjoyed the buffer provided by the stated responsibility of the U.S. military to advise Phung Hoang. 2. We have recently been informed, through a Progress Report, that the National Police, under Public Safety Division kUSAID) advisors, will take over the Phung Hoang Management Information Service which handles Automatic Data Processing (ADP) of VCI. This suggests, at least to some extent, a cooperative and realistic attitude by USAID in the field. 3. We have noted several places in the attached draft where minor changes should be made for clarity and consistency. The insertion of "if anyone" in paragraph 4C is significant, however, since it may well be that no U.S. agency will either want or need to advise the PRU. Such lack of direct advice to the PRU would not seem to leave a worrisome gap, to any greater extent than the with- drawal of U.S. military advisors from ARVN units will leave gaps. USAID would be expected to provide administrative and logistics sup- port to the PRU as they do for all police elements including the Special Police. 4. We believe that paragraph 3 of the USAID draft may require some reworking by DOD. It is our impression that the problem is not V s + _ G ~ PIT A Z _ (1 7-2"0111 01100080034-1 ft-NY n TApproved For Release 2004/10/28 :1 lA-RDP80R01720R001100080034-1 in the numbers of Phung Hoang advisors to be retained but in their qualifications. Too many trained Phung Hoang advisors might be rotated out and replaced by untrained persons, and what is needed is to assure that properly qualified persons fill the residual advisor slots until the U.S. military advisory effort is terminated. 25X1 Attachment: USAID Draft (H/W) Approved For Release 2004/10/2$,; ,P80R01720R001100080034-1