PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

SECRET Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120002-3
Psychological
Aspects of
United States
Strategy
Panel Report
NSC review(s) completed.
 Psychological
Aspects of
United States
Strategy
Panel Report
 November 29, 1955
Washington, D. C.
On August 16 you invited the twelve persons listed below to participate
in a group study and review of the psychological aspects of future U.S.
strategy. You asked that a report be developed to recommend the means
and methods best, calculated to achieve U.S. objectives, taking into con-
sideration the necessity for an integrated national program within which
long-term military, economic, technological, and ideological programs
could be developed.
As your designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I trans-
mit herewith the report of our panel. Although the focus of this report
is psychological, it has not been possible to avoid a good deal of considera-
tion of economic, political and military policies and programs that have
a strong bearing on attitudes and outlooks both within the Free World
and the. Soviet orbit. This is because the net impact of all policies and
programs is, at least in part,' psychological. The report represents the
agreed views of all the panel members, There are also available to you,
for such use as they may serve, certain papers prepared by individual
members as preliminary contributions to the final report. These papers
are not to be considered as part of our report, but we commend them
for their individual ideas.
I should emphasize a major premise of our report. We believe that
the Free World is presently engaged in a vital struggle against the forces
of Communism, a struggle which requires a sustained U.S. effort to avoid
jeopardizing the future of the nation and of the Free World.
The four principal, actions we deem urgent and vital are:
1. Explaining to the people of the United States the gravity of the
world situation and spelling out what is required to overcome it,
2. Increasing the military budget to provide for the improvement of
the air defense of North America, for the establishment of an acceptable
air defense of Western Europe, and for development of a greater capa-
bility to deter limited war and to deal with it if it occurs.
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 3. Providing the leadership, on a continuing basis, for Free World
political, economic, and cultural common action to achieve dynamic
growth, thus eliminating vulnerabilities to Communism.
4. Continually applying pressure on the Soviet bloc to expose the
insincerity of their intentions and tactics.
I wish to express our appreciation for the contributions made by gov-
ernmental officials from various departments and agencies. Without
their briefings at our meetings at Washington in August and without
their participation at our discussions at Quantico in September, we would
have lacked the intimate, timely knowledge of current problems neces-
sary to completion of this task.
At this point I wish to make clear that none of the panel members be-
lieves that this report is altogether original with the panel. We know
that many of the points covered have been at some time discussed or
advanced by members of the various departments of the U.S. Govern-
ment. We also realize that most of the programs recommended in the
report are being considered or are being implemented in various ways.
We do believe, however, that proper emphasis and full governmental co-
ordination are lacking in many areas.
Finally, I also wish to express the appreciation of all the panel mem-
bers for the wonderful cooperation of your entire staff, who have worked
night and day to make this report possible. Without their help the re-
port could not have been produced on the schedule requested.
Frederick L. Anderson
Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Panel Chairman
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
 NEFF.
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Mr. C. D. Jackson
Time, Incorporated
Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
Director, Operations Research Office
The Johns Hopkins University
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Colonel George A. Lincoln
Professor of Social Sciences
United States Military Academy
Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger
School of Advanced International
Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
Mr. Stacy May
Consulting Economist
Dr. Max F. Millikan
Director, The Center for International
Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Philip E. Mosely
Director of Studies
Council on Foreign Relations
Dr. George Pettee
Assistant Director, Operations Research
Office
The Johns Hopkins University
Dr. Stefan T. Possony
Air Intelligence Specialist
Department of the Air Force
Mr. William Webster
Executive Vice President
New England Electric System
 Page
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ai
I. ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Present International Situation . . . . . . . . . . 5
Dangers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
II. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. ACTION . . . . . . 11
General Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Achieving and Maintaining Free World Military Security . . . 13
Political Relations with the Free World and the Soviet Orbit. . 19
Promoting Free World Stability and Growth . . . . . . . 23
III. CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR SUCCESS . . . . . . . . 33
Integration of Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Obtaining the Support of the American People . . . . . . . 33
The Threshold of U.S. Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
ANNEX B: Letter Inviting Panel Participation and Statement of
the Objectives of the Panel . . . . . . . . . . 38
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 Mr-
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This is an examination of psychological aspects of U.S. strategy, Our
panel's concept of psychological strategy is not that of a separate course
of action, but of an integral component of all our policies and programs,
economic, military, and political, designed to further U.S. security while
working for a just peace. The things we say and the things we do in-
evitably affect the choices made by leaders and peoples throughout the
world - those of our enemies, our allies, the uncommitted, and ourselves.
Consequently, we have found it important to consider those political,
economic, and military programs which influence attitudes and outlooks,
both within the Free World and the Soviet orbit.
 POPULATION
OF THE WORLD
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 Highlights of the Report
The world is in a period of revolutionary
change manifested by the pressing political,
social, and economic expectations of many
peoples; of great and accelerating techno-
logical progress; and of grave struggle be-
tween the free nations and a dedicated Com-
munist enemy.
In the short-term, the Free World mili-
tary situation is only partially satisfactory;
the overall Western economic situation is
spotty; though potentially strong, the po-
litical and economic situation in many
areas, particularly in the underdeveloped
regions, is precarious; and Free World mili-
tary security and psychological unity are
generally deteriorating.
Although the focus of this report is psy-
chological, it has not been possible to avoid
a good deal of consideration of economic,
political, and military policies, and pro-
grams that have a strong bearing on atti-
tudes and outlooks within both the Free
World and the Soviet orbit. This is because
the net impact of all policies and programs
is, at least in part, psychological.
In the course of our examination of the
problems facing the United States, which
are covered at length in our report, there
emerges a necessity for:
1. Explaining to the people of the United
States the gravity of the world situation,
and spelling out what is required to over-
come its dangers.
2. Increasing the military budget to pro-
vide for the improvement of the air defense
of North America, for the establishment of
a satisfactory air defense of Western Eu-
rope, and for the development of a greater
capability to deter limited war and to deal
with it if it occurs.
3. Providing the leadership, on a continu-
ing basis, for Free World political, economic,
and cultural common action to achieve
dynamic growth, thus eliminating vulnera-
bilities to Communism.
4, Continually applying pressure on the
Soviet bloc to expose the true nature of
their intentions and tactics.
Of the dangers confronting the United
States in the next decade, two have con-
cerned us particularly:
1. The United States, the only non-Com-
munist power strong enough economically
and militarily to provide sustaining leader-
ship for the Free World, may in fact fail
to fulfill that responsibility. In that event,
Communist expansion by successive local
actions may finally force the United States
to abandon many of its traditions and ideals
in order to survive as a nation.
2. Exploitation by the Soviets of their
technological or military superiority, real
or apparent, would shatter the cohesion of
the Free World and so encircle and isolate
the United States that it could probably
survive only at the cost of its way of life.
These dangers must be explained clearly,
frankly, and forcefully to the American pub-
lic.
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 FURTHERING THE MMITARY EFFORT
Military security must be assured in order
to provide time and opportunity for taking
all other necessary action. Hence, the
United States must build its military se-
curity to a level that provides a consider-
able margin of safety.
We do not believe that the general order
of magnitude of our security programs, now
being undertaken, will be adequate to pro-
vide the necessary margin of safety. We
are convinced that a greater effort must
be made to improve the defense of the
North American continent against air
attack, not only to protect U.S. retaliatory
capability but to deter such attack and to
give the American people confidence in their
chances for survival.
We are also convinced that a satisfactory
air defense of Western Europe must be es-
tablished without delay. The psychological
aspect of such defense is as important as
its military aspect for, if the United States
is to have the full support of its allies, these
allies must have confidence in their own
survival as well as that of the U.S. We
believe that such a defense system can be
installed at an acceptable cost.
We strongly urge the development of a
capability to deter limited war or to deal
with It promptly should it occur. What we
recommend is a strong, mobile ready force
of appropriate composition, with arrange-
ments for its employment in all likely areas,
and designed to apply only the degree of
force required to deal with a particular
situation.
EXPANDING THE FREE WORLD
To win out in the end over the forces of
Communism, the United States must seize
the initiative and promote an expanding
Free World. We conclude that this is a
very long-term measure and should be a
permanent part of United States foreign
policy.
We do not conceive of this measure as an
economic aid or a technological develop-
ment program alone. It is a program of
meeting the aspirations of the peoples of
the world by helping them to plan and im-
plement measures for self-development.
Along with know-how and capital must go
expressions of Free World principles - by
deed and by written and spoken word.
Implementing measures include joint de-
velopment programs, regional integration
of effort, development of young leadership,
emphasis on programs of interest to native
populations, and supporting information
programs.
We hesitate to put a cost estimate on
such an effort, but to define its dimensions
we agree that the figure of an additional $2
billion per year for a number of years ex-
presses the approximate magnitude. Any-
thing substantially less would be below the
threshold of effort likely to produce results.
The Soviets have only recently become very
active in this area of effort. From the view-
point of the overall struggle with Commu-
nism, U.S. failure to act decisively in this
area might well be considered a withdrawal
of troops from a battlefield on which the
enemy is deploying new and fresh battal-
ions.
EXPOSING THE SOVIETS
The United States must also step up
pressure to expose the true nature of Soviet
intentions and the falsity of their doctrine.
The Free World must not let itself be de-
flected by changing Soviet tactics from pur-
suing its objectives. To do so is to lose by
default.
The accomplishment of this program will
demand an attitude of faith in the future
and of confidence in our nation's strength.
I
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I
 It will also be tedious and exacting and will
require personal dedication and sacrifice,
but it will not be too demanding of the
great resources of the United States. The
reward will be the establishment of a strong
Free World with the United States the re-
pected first among equals. The alternative
is an encircled and isolated position in
which the United States might survive only
at the cost of its way of life. It is up to this
nation to determine the course of world
policy, and live up to the measure of its
greatness. Only thus can a just and last-
ing peace be achieved.
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 Assessment of the Situation
We have studied official appraisals of the
world situation, probable developments, and
various external problems facing the U.S.
These appraisals lead us to the following
conclusions:
The world is undergoing a revolutionary
transformation. Some of its manifesta-
tions are the pressing political, social and
economic expectations and the attendant
alteration of many socio-political institu-
tions; the rapid rate of economic growth,
and the efficacy and speed with which
ideas are disseminated. The drastic rate
of technological change, the difficulty of
making new ideas properly understood, and
Chapter I
the pressures of ideological conflict inevita-
bly lead to psychological disturbances that,
unless channeled through rational processes
of evolutionary change, generate violence
within and between communities.
During the first two phases of the cold
war, which ended with the Geneva Confer-
ence, Communist provocation and aggres-
siveness supplied much of the impetus for
necessary security measures, Since the So-
viet government has now adopted more flex-
ible tactics, the U.S. and the Free World
may be lulled into a false sense of security.
A systematic effort is therefore required to
keep the Free World on its guard and to
stiffen its morale for long-term efforts.
Soviet Bloc
ACTIONS
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 The Soviet Union is likely to continue its
current tactics for some time. These can
be expected to include:
A systematic effort by the Soviets to
portray their purposes to the Free World
and to their own people as peaceful.
A sustained effort to present Soviet so-
ciety as "progressive."
A reduction in the element of overt
threat in Soviet dealings with the exter-
nal world.
A major increase in the Soviet effort
to establish closer relations with foreign
nations by diplomacy and economic and
cultural projects, particularly in the un-
derdeveloped regions.
A continuing effort to portray the se-
curity ties between the United States and
other nations of the Free World as un-
necessary, contrary to their own interest,
and ultimately dangerous.
Soviet relaxation in one area may have
the purpose of removing the base for U.S.
action in another. In any event the relaxa-
tion of military pressure will enable the
U.S.S.R. to step up its diplomatic, economic,
and psychological pressures. The following
developments can therefore be expected:
Increasing support will be given by the
Soviet Union to various "national inde-
pendence movements."
Aggressive moves by Soviet "proxies"
may be encouraged.
The technological and military growth
of Soviet power will be continued and,
perhaps, accelerated, and major efforts,
including demonstration of power, will be
made to keep the world aware of the So-
viet capability for destruction.
In areas such as Western Europe, where
the Soviets have small hope of winning
outright control, Communist and crypto-
Communist parties will make major ef-
forts to interfere with legislative work
in order to undermine security and pre-
vent reform, and will concentrate on
"anti-American" propaganda, especially
in countries with U.S. bases.
As overt Soviet pressure recedes, the
traditional frictions of international re-
lations - such as French distrust of Ger-
many and the Arab-Israeli problem -
will come to the forefront. Communism,
operating either openly from Moscow and
Peking or covertly through local Commu-
nist parties, will exploit these strains and
schisms. This exploitation can be en-
tirely ruthless and divorced from ideolog-
ical considerations, for whichever side
Communism chooses to support (and fre-
quently it will support both) the Free
World can only lose.
The Soviet Union is very unlikely to
choose general war as a policy course at
this time unless Free World military power
is outpaced technologically or dwindles to
a level where the Soviet Union has a high
possibility of achieving quick success with-
out major damage to itself.
There is evidence, moreover, that the
U.S.S,R. and its satellites are experiencing
tensions and strains in certain areas. It
is undoubtedly becoming increasingly diffi-
cult to maintain the centralization of au-
thority and direction of the Soviet system
in the face of an expanding population, ur-
banization, the growing economy, and in-
creased though unbalanced industrializa-
tion. There are also the continuing prob-
lems of production and control in the
agricultural sector of the Soviet economy,
and above all, of raising the standard of
living of the Soviet peoples, whose expecta-
tion have been growing.
The variations in the complex relation-
ships around Russia's periphery are mani-
fold, as are the relationships and problems
connected with national Communist par-
ties. Furthermore, many of these contacts
 are complicated by the problems which sur-
round ethnic minority and nationality
groups within the Soviet Union and in the
satellites.
The composition of leadership groups of
the U.S.S.R. and its satellites is undergoing
transformation. New leaders are emerging
who require a new rationale suitable for
solving conflicts between internal and ex-
ternal policies.
We have been shown no evidence, how-
ever, that the Soviet system is likely to ex-
perience critical difficulties from any arms
competition in which it feels it must en-
gage. The highest peacetime level of U.S.
defensive effort that can be expected at
present is not high enough to bring about
an economic crisis within the U.S.S.R.
Soviet policies seem to be formulated by
a group in which presumably several points
of view are represented. It appears that
present Soviet strategy is more or less open-
ended and therefore liable to sudden
change, either in the direction of increasing
aggressiveness, possibly to the point of all-
out war, or of a growing readiness to pre-
tend to, or even genuinely to participate in,
the stabilization of peace.
DANGERS
Among the dangers that will confront
the U.S. in the next decade, two have con-
cerned us particularly:
Failure by the U.S. to fulfill its respon-
sibilities as the Free World's leader will
open the way to further Communist expan-
sion by successive local actions, especially
in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Our
national interest requires a sustained U.S.
stewardship over the Free World's cohesion.
The U.S. is the only non-Communist power
strong enough economically and militarily
to assume such a world-wide responsibility.
Failure to exercise this leadership would
lead to the gradual disintegration of the
Free World's security structure and to the
ultimate "encirclement" of the United
States, an avowed objective of world Com-
munism. Forced back on its own resources
and confronted with an almost unmanage-
able military situation, an encircled United
States might not survive or would be driven
for the sake of survival to adopt policies and
expedients inconsistent with its traditions
and ideals.
Actual military or technological supe-
riority, or the skillful conveying of an im-
pression of such superiority, could be ex-
ploited by the Soviets in order to disinte-
grate the cohesion of the Free World or,
for that matter, to weaken the resolution
of the United States itself.
This danger could be aggravated by:
1. The loss of positions in the Free
World (e.g., in the Middle East).
2. The falling behind in armaments of
our major allies, and the growing obsoles-
cence of their military forces.
3. The loss, or restrictions on the use,
of U.S. forward bases.
4. Inadequate defense budgets, espe-
cially in the U.S., coupled with a continu-
ing failure to coordinate the defense econ-
omies of all NATO nations in the most
productive manner.
5. Rates and levels of research and de-
velopment inferior to those of the Soviet
Union, coupled with a continuing Soviet
capability to exploit Free World scientific
resources.
The U.S. policy of alliances has been
based on the assumption that peace requires
deterrent strength and that such strength
includes the willingness to fight if neces-
sary. Deterrent strength is being achieved
(a) by the development of nuclear and
other military power and (b) by alliances.
While nuclear deterrents are an essential
and irreplaceable element of U.S. security,
 the hazards of nuclear warfare are extreme-
ly great, especially for densely populated
countries close to the Soviet bloc. The So-
viets have been very skillful in stimulating
"nuclear anxieties," and there is a great
danger that some of our allies, as well as
the uncommitted powers, will seek to adopt
a neutral position. This trend toward neu=
tralism or, conversely, against "nuclear se-
curity," will tend to increase unless we are
able to explain to our allies:
The military significance of their de-
fense effort.
The peaceful objective of our security
strategy.
The fact that the U,S, shares with them
the risks of atomic war.
The bad faith of Soviet "ban-the-bomb"
agitation.
While our intentions may be dangerously
misinterpreted by the Free World, an equal-
ly grave danger arises from the misinter-
pretation of our needs and intentions by the
U.S. public. An over-emphasis on peace as
the chief goal of policy, particularly if the
emphasis involves an incapacity to muster
any effective force except nuclear weapons,
makes it increasingly difficult to use force
or the threat of force to safeguard our in-
terests. This is especially true if the So-
viet military challenge takes the form of
peripheral, "brush-fire" wars.
The U.S. system of alliances may be fur-
ther eroded if some of our present partners
become convinced that the only way to
achieve their primary objectives, or to avoid
difficulties, is by making deals with the
U.S.S.R. Specifically, the following prob-
lems may arise:
1. As time goes on, Western Germany
may become increasingly vulnerable to the
Soviet diplomatic offensive, not only for
reasons that affect all Western Europe but
also because Soviet acquiescence is pre-
requisite to German unity, Repeated Soviet
emphasis on the proposition that German
unity can be achieved through abandon-
ment of NATO and through direct negotia-
tions with the East German regime - and
by no other means - may have a powerful
cumulative effect on German thought and
policy.
2. A prolonged reduction in the overt So-
viet threat is likely to make Japan less will-
ing to accept full membership in the Free
World alliance: first, because the Japanese
desire to avoid a serious and sustained arm-
ament effort; second, because they look to
East-West trade as a possible solution of
their chronic trade crisis; and third, because
the Free World has not yet found a political
role of stature for Japan of at least the
magnitude of Western Germany's role in
Europe.
3. There are powerful non-Communist
elements in many countries that are not
immune to the suggestion that their na-
tional interest will best be served by a pro-
Russian and anti-American orientation.
Moreover, colonial as well as balance-of-
power interests may temporarily disrupt
Free World unity at critical junctures.
Such a danger would be increased any time
the Soviet Union granted some concession.
Countries of South and Southeast Asia,
intent on their domestic problems of eco-
nomic growth and the modernization of
their societies, and obsessed with the mem-
ory of their colonial past, have been sus-
ceptible to wishful thinking concerning the
intention of the Communist bloc. The So-
viet diplomatic offensive is likely to intensi-
fy the tendency of these countries toward
neutralism.
Arab countries in the Middle East, are
also likely to become more susceptible to
the Soviet diplomatic offensive in order to
increase their bargaining power over the
West and to gain aid and advantage in the
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conflict with Israel. Many local "nation-
alist" parties are inclined to cooperate with
the Soviets. Except in a few countries, the
psychological posture of the U.S. in the
Middle East is particularly weak, while the
Soviet Union is steadily gaining ground.
In Africa, the problem of colonialism is
likely to make a number of areas increas-
ingly vulnerable to Soviet overtures and
subversion. Throughout the continent of
Africa, this central problem takes a variety
of forms that may work to Communist ad-
vantage. Relaxation of the cold war will
permit the U.S.S.R. to stimulate the develop-
ment of critical situations on this front,
especially in connection with possible com-
plications in South Africa. Acute strains
can then be expected in the relations be-
tween some of the major countries of the
Free World.
In all underdeveloped areas we can expect
a systematic Soviet effort to assist with eco-
nomic problems. In areas where the So-
viets succeed in establishing a foothold,
their influence will be strengthened by their
ability to integrate political and economic
considerations and the flexibility of their
decision-making machinery.
In summary, by failing to put forward a
greater level of effort now, the U.S. will
continue to be confronted by a mounting
series of crises. These crises will, at the
minimum, require increasing levels of cost
and effort and, at the maximum, will cost
us our very way of life.
The opportunities that confront us, if we
pursue vigorously the recommended courses
of action, are:
We will preserve the American way of
life and give leadership, hope, and confi-
dence to the Free World,
The Soviet Union may ultimately be
brought to recognize that it has no possi-
bility of achieving a position of strategic
superiority over the West, It may then de-
cide that Soviet national interest requires
modification of the Communist doctrine
of world revolution leading to a transfor-
mation of the U.S.S.R. into a normal mem-
ber of the world community.
Stable, effective democratic societies can
be developed in the underdeveloped areas
of the world (and in underdeveloped parts
of some advanced areas) that will be resist-
ant to subversion and to the appeals of ex-
tremist movements.
The NATO community of nations can
develop an antidote for neutralism and de-
featism through an increased sense of com-
mon purpose and of confidence in its own
capacity to work toward constructive goals.
Given the proper psychological climate,
there exist sufficient resources in the Free
World to achieve and maintain arms su-
premacy in all significant weapons systems
and geographical areas.
We have the capacity to raise the odds
against Soviet surprise attack by the con-
tinuous strengthening of our offensive capa-
bilities and of our defense and warning sys-
tems, and thus to reduce Soviet chances
for successful attack and hopes to forestall
retaliation.
The U.S., especially if aided by the indus-
trial nations in the Free World, has the
capacity to stay ahead in the technological
race, provided that it makes the required
efforts.
The Communist parties in many Euro-
pean countries may become so discredited
and demoralized that it should be possible
to reduce them gradually as politically sig-
nificant factors,
 In the long run, by the dedicated exertion
of essential extra effort, money, and energy
for the next decade, we will be buying in-
surance against what would otherwise be
successively more threatening crises, which
we will then be able to meet only by dis-
proportionately larger expenditures and
possibly sacrifices of our greatest treasure
- American lives.
MAJOR DIMENSION IN TODAY'S NEGOTIATIONS
 Chapter II
Strategic Framework for U. S. Action
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
We are suggesting no new broad compo-
nents of national security policy in this re-
port; our major recommendation is the need
of a longer-range view and a better integra-
tion of our policy instruments. The prob-
lem of the continually changing situation
is not only what to do, but also how and
how much to do; not only a problem of
initiation and review, but also a problem of
management, leadership, and long-term
continuity. It is a problem of program
balance, timing, coordination, adjustment
and emphasis, adapted to a very dynamic
situation.
We are faced with the necessity of main-
taining three initiatives in the eyes of the
world:
1. The initiative in maintaining military
power adequate to deter any aggression.
2. The initiative for peace in negotiation.
3. The initiative in furthering the aspira-
tions, material and spiritual, of the people
of the world.
The Soviet Union strives to turn our suc-
cesses in the first of these initiatives into
a propaganda liability for. us in our struggle
to maintain the second and third, The need
for taking all three initiatives poses prob-
lems unprecedented in our national. experi-
ence. We must preserve the substance and
effect of our deterrent power while prov-
ing to the world that we stand for peaceful
solutions, cultural progress, and idealism.
It is imperative that our intentions and
actions in all three fields reinforce one
another.
Unifying Concepts
The transformation of NSC decisions into
action programs represents the foreign pol-
icy area in which greater effectiveness must
be achieved. In many ways, it is more dif-
ficult to devise adequate programs accom-
modated to the conflicting limitations of
funds, trained manpower, and materiel than
to make the policy decisions from which
these programs derive. The problem is
further complicated by the necessity of en-
suring that the programs actually adopted
support one another.
The total impact and effectiveness of U.S.
psychological strategy depends in consider-
able part on the adoption of unifying con-
cepts. Certain of these concepts are dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs.
The Struggle to Capture the Symbols
In this phase of the cold war, the most
crucial contest may well be over the alle-
giance of the uncommitted part of the
world, encompassing approximately a bil-
lion people, as well as over the continued
cohesion of our allies. Success or failure
in this struggle may turn in considerable
part on which side captures the symbols
that express man's aspirations and thereby
influence political behavior. These include
peace, self-government, economic advance-
ment, security, freedom and cultural prog-
ress. All policy must therefore be exam-
ined not only for its substantive but also
for its symbolic impact.
 The Thresholds of Effort and Realization
Committed as our country is to continu-
ing efforts on a global basis, we must give
close attention to the resources and actions
required to surmount thresholds that mark
the minimum levels necessary to effectively
implement our polices and programs. A
policy without adequate resources to sup-
port it may be little better than no policy
at all, and the resources expended, instead
of leading to partial success, may give little
or no return.
Timing
As Communist strategy develops greater
maneuverability, we can depend less and
less on crash programs to rescue us from
crises caused by our failure to develop far-
sighted policies and programs. Because
the time-tolerance for decision-making has
been drastically reduced, we continually
pass phase lines warning of the approach
of possible hazards which, if not dealt with
immediately by forehand action, may later
reach a crisis with no alternative open to
us but a costly salvage operation, or worse.
The contest for Indochina for example, may
have been decided before the U.S. took an
active interest in the struggle.
Coordination
We realize that this word and concept is
worn thin by discussion. We believe, how-
ever, that the change in Soviet tactics places
a special and very exacting demand on the
coordination of the policies and programs
of our government. Unless there is a high-
ly effective coordination of our programs
and of information about them, our initia-
tives almost certainly will appear contradic-
tory and incompatible.
We have the possibility of demonstrating
our principles by actions and thereby creat-
ing a sense of Free World community
through cooperative efforts. The fact of
being engaged in a common effort with
Americans may prove psychologically as sig-
nificant as what is actually being achieved.
We must remember, however, that to
arouse local enthusiasm action must be of a
character that can appeal to the imagina-
tion of the people and must give the im-
pression that a better future is being built.
We should avoid embarking on fantastic
programs for psychological reasons, but
should rather plan our development pro-
grams after assessments both of their tech-
nical utility and the sense of direction and
useful evolution they can impart.
The effectiveness of our policy depends
on the psychological and moral framework
created for it. It is to the Soviet interest
to project the contest between us and the
Soviet bloc as a pure power struggle, from
which the rest of the world should stand
apart. This is one of the psychological
bases of neutralism. Conversely, it is in our
interest to convey the true situation, which
the Soviet leaders themselves never forget,
that the struggle is essentially ideological.
We must show that we are not prepared to
jeopardize the principles of freedom as the
price of peace. Our problem is to inject in-
to our actions the values that oppose the
Communist image of matter as the master
of the universe. To meet Communism sole-
ly as a competing economic or.military sys-
tem is to miss the dimensions of the Com-
munist challenge and to pave the way for
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 SHIFT IN MOTIVATION
IN FREE WORLD ALLIANCES
li i II rl, ii I I C~ iI~ ~~?~ ~~II~p
JIT1OMORROW
COMMA ACTION
CONFJOENCE
its expansion under the guise of the values
of freedom, human dignity, and peace:
"The central fact of today's life is the
existence in the world of two great phil-
osophies of man and of government.
They are in contest for the friendship,
loyalty, and support of the world's peo-
ples.
"On the one side, our nation is ranged
with those who seek attainment of hu-
man goals through a government of laws
administered by men. Those laws are
rooted in moral law reflecting a religious
faith that man is created in the image
of God and that the energy of the free
individual is the most dynamic force in
human affairs."
(Address by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower at the Annual Convention of
the American Bar Association in Phil-
adelphia, Wednesday, August 24, 1955).
It is therefore important that the U.S.
express its policies so that the following
basic principles are recognizable as their
foundation:
1. Well-being and military security are
complementary and indivisible.
2. The problems confronting the coun-
tries of the Free World are soluble by peace-
ful evolutionary means.
3. Communism is obsolete.
4. Because of its traditions and ideals,
the U.S., not the U.S.S.R., is the natural
leader in the current period of revolution
and in the struggle for a lasting peace.
The initiative the U.S. must maintain in
the field of military security supplies the
basis for initiative in negotiation and in the
promotion of Free World stability. Subtlety
of diplomacy will not be able to hold the
Free World together if our allies lose con-
fidence in our ability to deter aggression or
to protect them in case of war. A develop-
ment program to increase Free World sta-
bility will be futile if the uncommitted
nations become convinced that communism
has the capacity to submerge them. Thus
our military posture has a psychological
component that we can ignore only at our
peril.
Moreover, nuclear power, the rapid rate
of technological advance, and the cost of
production and manufacture of modern
 arms have changed the pattern of interna-
tional affairs. The consciousness of the
existence of the nuclear threat may con-
tribute to restraint in certain situations
but it may also encourage an adventurous
policy through the belief that only the de-
fense of a very vital interest will cause a
power to unleash a nuclear war. The in-
ternational situation is further complicated
by the likelihood that small nations may
come to possess some nuclear weapons capa-
bility.
The rate of technological advance has
brought with it a rapid rate of obsolescence
of weapons systems together with greatly
increased complexities of manufacture.
Some weapons systems are now obsolescent
before they are operational. One conse-
quence is that most nations lack the in-
dustrial capacity to keep up with changes
in the armament technology. Put another
way, responsibility for the progress of mili-
tary development and for the supply of,
modern arms now rests with only a few
powers.
The U.S. military security program is de-
signed to (1) deter aggression of all types,
(2) win in case of limited war and survive
to win in case of general nuclear war, and
(3) support the psychological and political
arms of policy.
United States Military Strength
Armed force is what peoples and states-
men think it is until it is actually tested
in operation. Hence choices and actions
result from the strategic impression created
by the force in being, In order to reduce
Soviet options, the United States and its
allies should build and maintain sufficient
military strength to convey the strategic
impressions that (1) we have highly effec-
tive power, both for defense and retaliation,
against massive nuclear power either
threatened or used, and that (2) we com-
mand alternatives to the use of massive
atomic weapons if the situation warrants.
We need, in addition to a strong offensive
capability: (1) a greater capability for the
air defense of Western Europe, (2) a more
effective deterrent to limited and peripheral
war, and (3) more resources for and greater
public emphasis on the defense of our coun-
try against massive nuclear attack.
These actions are feasible technically and
financially; they can be put forward as non-
threatening, non-aggressive measures that
will further the President's Geneva pro-
gram, erase reputation for "warmongering",
and gain acceptance as essential prerequi-
sites to initiation of an effective arms in-
spection program. Moreover, adequate de-
fense should be stressed for psychological
reasons. It gives the assurance of confi-
dence in case of crisis, which would not be
forthcoming under current programs. Cou-
pled with a quiet and strong nuclear of-
fensive readiness, it seems likely to be more
rewarding than reliance primarily on mas-
sive nuclear offense.
Limited War Capabilities and Deterrents
Massive nuclear power alone seems un-
likely to provide an effective deterrent to
limited peripheral or "brush-fire" wars.
Attempts to use such power as the sole de-
terrent would tend more likely to be a psy-
chological and political liability, which
might threaten the unity of our alliances
and of our efforts to achieve acceptance of
our policies by neutrals. Today our allies
feel we have only two alternatives: (1)
primary dependence on massive nuclear
power and (2) doing nothing effective.
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 SECRET
Hence our coalition policy finds itself in
difficulties. The price of keeping our allies
includes, in addition to our present capa-
bilities, the creation of a mobile force of
adequate size capable of acting quickly with
or without the use of tactical atomic weap-
ons in situations short of general war. We
should, therefore, depend for a deterrent to
limited war on (1) a ready. mobile force, (2)
political arrangements facilitating quick
employment - preferably in collaboration
with indigenous forces, and (3) obscurity
concerning our atomic intentions. In this
manner we would achieve a dual deterrent
to limited war; first, the ready mobile force
and, second, the possibility that, if neces-
sary, our full atomic power will be brought
to bear.
We recognize the psychological and po-
litical value of collective action in case the
need for the use of force arises, It is, how-
ever, the course of wisdom to maintain. a
considerable degree of "free hand" through
arrangements that will, in case of need, per-
mit the U.S. to take the needed initiative in
time for the action to be effective. The
rapid action in Korea can serve as a prec-
edent. The hazards of the future are ex-
emplified by a possible crisis situation in the
Middle East, where any action to be effec-
tive might need to be taken rapidly. The
number and magnitude of lesser tensions
of the Middle East type may well increase
and the fear that action to deal with a
local issue might lead to general nuclear
war may make it increasingly difficult for
us to meet such crises.
NATO and the Air Defense of Western
Europe
The position of NATO, and our role in
it has been vitally important. This po-
sition has been achieved in great part
through the psychological effect of the con-
fidence and the feeling of unity engendered
by the cooperative building of military
force. Even though the extent of that force
in being at any time has been of question-
able adequacy, or of obvious inadequacy, the
needed security effect has been achieved.
Like the weapons system on which it was
based, this program has now become some-
what obsolescent and has to develop a new
integrating component. That needed com-
ponent is the psychological impact of an
air defense program for NATO, a program
obtainable at an acceptable price. There
will, of course, come a day when the means
provided will be, at least in part, obsoles-
cent, although many will lend themselves
to conversion to the more advanced re-
quirements, They will, however, in the
meantime provide a large measure of mili-
tary security while giving badly needed con-
fidence, impetus, and cohesion to NATO.
The price of inaction on this program may
be very high - considerably higher than
the cost of action. An air defense program
for NATO, moreover, would give an incen-
tive to neutral nations, like Sweden, to inte-
grate their military planning with that of
NATO. Finally, air defense represents the
military sector which can be strengthened
without impairing the U.S. peace initiative,
Allies
Our arms assistance programs need an
incisive review with particular emphasis on
their psychological, political and economic
aspects. It appears that (1) we are over-
extended on promises compared to our
current Congressional and Bureau of the
Budget policy intentions, and (2) we have
not given adequate weight to the impact
on weak economies of some programmed
military establishments, Adverse results
seem certain from the inevitable disillusion-
ment of some governments over the failure
of plans worked out with local U.S. military
missions.
In Turkey we are already reaping some of
the harmful effects of inadequate long-
 range planning. Our group has the view
that we should aim for adequate internal
security forces plus only those additional
forces which can be supported by the in-
digenous economy, bolstered by the U.S.
assistance we are willing to provide over
a long-term period.
The mutuality of U.S. and allied (par-
ticularly European) security interests needs
increased emphasis. This emphasis can be
successful only if the U.S. program and ac-
tions prove persuasive in joint allied mili-
tary planning and in political and public
discussion. It can be persuasive only to
the degree that it demonstrates to our allies
the military significance of their contribu-
tion.
The American people and our leadership,
moreover, need to consider our internal
policies and actions, particularly in defense
matters, with an eye to the need for setting
a persuasive example for other peoples and
their statesmen.
Our policies and administration need to
be geared to move quickly and flexibly as we
identify weaknesses in our programs and
opportunities for useful action.
Regulation of Armaments
The critical difficulties in this area in-
clude the impossiblity of accounting com-
pletely for nuclear production, and the
necessity for a very high degree of technical
effectiveness in an inspection program, if
dependence is to be placed on inspection.
But progress may be possible without prior
design and acceptance of a completely effec-
tive system. In fact, an effective system
can probably not be devised without some
trial and experimentation. Any inspection
system adds to the deterrent effect since it
should decrease the inspected country's esti-
mate of its chances of effecting surprise.
We should therefore explain to our public
and the world that regulation of arma-
ments and "inspection' is proposed not ex-
clusively for the purpose of reducing arms
cost, but for the much more important
purpose of reducing probabilities of atomic
destruction. Reduction of armaments fol-
lows inspection and is likely to be depend-
ent on the developments of the inspection
system.
in order to keep the initiative, the U.S.
needs to maintain a flow of specific pro-
posals and actions. We hold "war maneu-
vers" with our own forces and with allies.
There seem certain to be psychological
assets in a program of "peace maneuvers"
by which we actually test out strategies
and tactics of inspection - perhaps in col-
laboration with an ally.
Dynamics of Our Military Problem
Since the opening of the Korean war, the
Soviet Union has materially assisted us by
frightening us and our allies into the need-
ed security effort. The Soviet Union may
now do so to a lesser degree and we must
depend not on fear, but on positive motiva-
tion and leadership. This problem has
three closely related aspects:
1. Our constituted governmental and
military organizations, with roles and mis-
sions derived from the past, are not neces-
sarily administratively in phase with the
modern requirements for security.
2. Protracted leadtimes, the length of
time between conception and capability to
act, are in considerable part due to legisla-
tive, budgetary, and administrative consid-
erations endemic to our political and ad-
ministrative system. There are reports in-
dicating that the Soviet Union may be more
successful than we in devising ways to
shorten or eliminate these elements of lead-
time. It is questionable that we can afford,
in the future, the luxuries of time-consum-
ing administrative action.
3. The problem of balance among forces
is a very knotty and controversial one.
 Nevertheless, it requires a continuous effort.
There should be an increased use of de-
tached scientific analysis of balance, types
and scopes of requirements, and of expendi-
tures. We believe that such analysis would
show that the priorities for expenditures
have shifted more rapidly than the pro-
grams. There also appear to be likely re-
turns from a scientific analysis of the of-
fensive-defensive mix of the Soviet Union
and the optimum offensive-defensive mix
we should oppose to it. The panel tends
to believe that the U.S. may well be more
secure by balancing the arms equation with
the Soviet Union at a comparatively high
level of effort rather than at a low level.
Thresholds of Eff ort and Levels of
Preparedness
The leadtimes in the military field are
such that the decisions made today deter-
mine vital availabilities 3 to 10 years from
now. This point is particularly applicable
to research and development, Since mili-
tary needs can only be estimated approxi-
mately and because the Soviet Union shows
a capability to surprise us by the rapidity
of its advance, we should be sure to provide
sufficient military power. In the military
field a shortage tends to be comparable to
a shortage in length of a bridge span; a
small extension may spell the difference
between security and disaster. The funda-
mental decisions on security (political and
economic as well as military) must now be
made years in advance, Since we cannot
estimate with hairline precision, we should
provide enough. Security, in short, requires
a considerable margin of safety.
Initiative, efficiency, and long-run econo-
my will be furthered by:
1. Elimination of fluctuations in provi-
sion of resources, and long-term (3-5 years)
assurances of availabilities.
2. Relating adjustments in resources to
the military requirements rather than to
internal political considerations such as re-
ducing taxes by means of reduced defense
expenditures.
The Price of Safety
The Soviet Union is putting a materially
greater proportion of its production into
military power than are we, and the ruble
buys more in the military field than the
equivalent dollars. We are probably allo-
cating on a comparative basis too little to
maintain a lead or even parity. It is not
always realized that a security policy pred-
icated on the humanly admirable but mili-
tarily luxurious concept that the opponent
must be allowed to strike the first blow
has a price tag attached to it. So far, the
U.S. has been unwilling to pay.
There is no question about the existence
of a very difficult problem in balancing se-
curity on the one hand and economic and
internal political considerations on the
other. In the absence of firm U.S. leader-
ship, security decisions tend to be made
more and more on grounds of short-run
economic and political considerations. Our
group urges increased efforts to coordinate,
on a rational and scientific basis, the U.S.
security requirement with U.S. economic
and political aspirations.
A constant security effort will involve
an increase in our military expenditures.
Viewed, however, as a proportion of the
rising gross national product of our coun-
try, it seems that the cost of security might
over the long run remain constant,
The U.S. is by far the wealthiest country
in the world, measured both in terms of
total production and on a per-capita basis.
Its leadership in the fiscal and budget area
is certain to be persuasive to many countries
looking for guidance as to the extent of
their security effort and the degree of dan-
ger presented to them by the Soviet Union.
 \~`~eNeE\M+Yiu\ J`\`~\~
INIMMOMMEMNIMEMINS;
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I
The suggestions in the preceding sections
may result in some readjustment in cur-
rently programmed expenditures; they in-
volve certain additive programs which prob-
ably mean an increase of 10 to 20% in
the U.S. security budget. With a produc-
tion currently surging upward, and with
the leadership existent in our country, there
should be no problem of capability to insure
our way of life. We can and must afford
to survive.
The Problem
The U.S.S.R. has been most skillful in
utilizing the aspirations of humanity for
peace, economic advancement, and human
dignity in two ways: (1) by generalized talk
about peace, it has given the impression
that the outstanding disputes are minor
and that the achievement of peace depends
largely on a change of tone; (2) by focusing
on security problems, such as German re-
armament, the U.S.S.R, has fostered illu-
sions that it is threatened and has put the
onus for reassuring it on the West.
Both tactics are eminently to the Soviet
advantage. As long as the concept of peace
is identified with a change of tone alone
it will be simple for the U.S.S.R. to use
negotiations as part of its peace offensive.
The more the Soviet bloc is permitted to
capitalize on peaceful gestures which cost
it nothing, such as visits of Soviet farm
delegations, the more difficult it will prove
to get popular support for the level of Free
World security expenditure (political and
economic, as well as military) without
which the Soviet bloc may soon achieve
strategic superiority. The more prolonged
the discussions about threats to Soviet se-
curity, the more difficult will it prove to re-
turn to real security problems: the growth
of the Soviet orbit, the subversive activities
of Communist movements, the aggressive
tactics of communism in Asia, the prepon-
derance of Soviet military strength in Eu-
rope, and the danger of a surprise nuclear
attack.
When Soviet pressure is relaxed, more-
over, the traditional frictions of internation-
al affairs tend to come to the forefront. Ex-
amples are the French distrust of Germany,
the Arab-Israeli problem, frictions among
certain states of Latin America. The
U.S.S.R.- is thereby offered an opportunity
to increase our embarrassments at little cost
and less risk. This situation is aggravated
by the fact that in major areas of the world,
where no conception of our power exists,
irresponsible governments seem convinced
that they can act with impunity toward
the U.S. but not toward the U.S.S.R.
In negotiations with the Soviet bloc, the
U.S. should base its measures on the follow-
ing principles:
1. Since in a revolutionary period the
contest is over the minds of men, all gov-
ernmental actions have not only a substan-
tive but also a symbolic significance.
2. Initiative is of cardinal importance,
It provides the opportunity for defining the
psychological and moral framework of the
negotiations; it absorbs the energies of the
other side in defensive measures; and it
maximizes the possibilities of conflicts with-
in the Soviet leadership group.
3. One means of achieving the initiative
is to come to a conference with more than
one set of proposals so that the Soviets will
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 be kept off balance and the U.S. can project
an impression of imagination and purpose-
fulness to the rest of the world.
4. Negotiations leading to the settlement
of issues which leave the Soviet orbit un-
impaired play into the hands of the Soviets
because (a) they gain time until their stra-
tegic situation improves, and (b) each such
settlement, however trivial, tends to under-
mine the resolution of the Free World.
5. In certain situations, such as when
negotiations in one area are used to mask
aggressive moves in other areas, the threat
to break off negotiations or the refusal to
continue to negotiate is itself a negotiating
weapon.
In summary, the U.S. must devise a
policy which (a) maintains sufficient pres-
sure to discourage Soviet adventures, but
(b) through tactics which do not under-
mine the possibilities of an evolution of the
Soviet system. Of these lines of action,
the need for maintaining pressure is the
more fundamental. Whenever policies to
promote the evolution of the Soviet system
are inconsistent with maintaining pressure
they will have to be sacrificed.
The over-all U.S. political problem re-
solves itself into the following tasks: (1) to
maintain within the U.S. domestic sup-
port for a continuation of a firm policy;
(2) to announce a program which captures
the universal desire for peace but still leaves
no doubt that peace can only be achieved
through a series of concrete adjustments;
(3) to conduct negotiations with the
U.S.S.R. on a plane where the presence of
Soviet troops in the center of the continent,
the Soviet satellite orbit, and aggressive So-
viet tactics in Asia are stressed as the causes
of the present tension; (4) to devise a policy
for dealing with Soviet efforts to use the
relaxation of tensions to foment rivalries
within the Free World.
Exploitation of the Position Established by
the President at Geneva
The effectiveness of these measures will
depend on the psychological framework
created for them. No one is in a better
position to achieve the maximum psycho-
logical impact than the President, building
on the position he established at Geneva.
No one could better rally the American
people and make clear to them that con-
ciliation stands at the end, not at the be-
ginning of negotiations.
As soon as his health permits, the Presi-
dent might consider a speech to the nation
explaining that a real relaxation of tensions
is impossible without Soviet concessions on
issues which caused the tension in the first
place, such as the division of Germany, the
enslavement of the satellites, etc.; that
while the U.S. is willing to negotiate as long
as there exists a hope for concrete results,
it will not be a party to misleading the
people of the world if the negotiations
should merely mask continued Soviet in-
transigeance.
In order to put the Soviets on the defen-
sive, the President might also deem it ap-
propriate to reiterate and expand the phi-
losophy which prompted him to present his
"open sky" proposal at Geneva. Oppor-
tunity for such a statement may be pro-
vided by a full-length reply to Bulganin's
disarmament letter. In his answer, the
President might press the Soviets toward
more rapid progress in accepting an inspec-
tion scheme and he might propose that, in
the interim, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
should pledge themselves to see to it that
the U.N. Charter henceforth will be com-
plied with more faithfully.
Negotiations with the U.S.S.R.
Within the psychological framework thus
created by the President, we can counteract
the Soviet strategy of pressing issues where
 we are at a maximum disadvantage while
using the relaxation of tensions to maintain
the status quo in other areas by the follow-
ing measures:
1. Developing specific proposals aimed at
forcing the Soviets to make concrete re-
adjustments in our strategic favor.
2. Making clear at every stage of the
negotiations the outstanding issues still to
be settled and pressing for them. An ex-
ample might be a conference of the signa-
tories of the Korean Armistice to discuss
violations of the armistice agreement and to
implement its provisions for free elections.
3. Better utilizing our influence in inter-
national organizations to prevent the So-
viet bloc from exploiting them for their
own ends and to put the Soviets on the de-
fensive. In particular, we should: (1) pre-
vent a repetition of the Algerian vote in the
UN through fuller consultation with our
friends, such as the Latin American bloc;
(2) keep the Soviet bloc on the defensive
by exploiting its vulnerabilities, such as the
slave labor system.
We can prevent the U.S.S.R. from eroding
the unity of the Free World by the following
kinds of measures:
1. Relation of single issues, such as elec-
tions for Vietnam, to similar problems in
other areas where our position is stronger.
There may be wisdom in insisting, in ad-
vance of any crisis, that the problem of free
elections in one divided country should not
be separated from the problem of free elec-
tions in all countries presently divided.
With this approach, we could demand that
free elections, under suitable guarantees go
forward in Korea and Germany, and when
appropriate, in Vietnam.
2. In Europe, Germany is the issue where
Western moral, military, and legal positions
are most in harmony. Now that the West's
proposal for full political unification has
been rejected, the U.S, confronts the prob-
lem of shifting the onus for the continued
partition of Germany on the U.S.S.R. and of
demonstrating that the alternative plan
proposed by Molotov and the East German
regime is a sham. We can do this by con-
centrating our fire on the weakest Soviet
point - their refusal to accept free elec-
tion. We should propose a series of limited
steps toward unification, such as an Eco-
nomic Parliament or an Advisory Parlia-
ment based on free elections, which will
demonstrate that it is the Russian refusal
to accept free elections and not German
participation in NATO which is the obstacle
to German unification.
We should also attempt to associate
major segments of West German opinion
with our policy to assure continuation of
pro-Western orientation of the Federal Re-
public. One means to achieve this would
be frequent invitations to German parlia-
mentary and public opinion leaders from all
democratic parties to conferences and con-
sultations with their American counter-
parts both in Germany and in the U.S.
We should deal with Soviet efforts to use
the relaxation of tensions in order to foment
difficulties in critical areas by the following
kinds of measures:
1. A warning to the U.S.S.R - perhaps
contained in the Presidential address rec-
ommended above - that peaceful coexist-
ence is seriously prejudiced by Soviet ac-
tions which can only lead to increased ten-
sions and the danger of violence.
2, A program, also discussed later in this
chapter, to reverse the trend of events in the
Middle East and Southeast Asia. Such a
program should have as its guiding princi-
ple that anticipatory, farsighted action may
prevent a crisis from occuring at all. The
U.S. should keep in mind, however, the
harmful psychological impact of making
concessions whenever a nation flirts with
the Soviet bloc.
 3. A demonstration that the U.S. under-
stands its strategic interests and intends
to defend them. The U.S. should find a
concept for the twentieth-century equiva-
lent of "showing the flag" by a combination
of military, political and economic power.
4. Coordination of our policies with those
of other nations which have major interests
in the area in question. In the Middle East
a systematic effort should be made to de-
velop the closest coordination between the
U.S. and U.K. positions. Such a policy pre-
supposes submerging commerical and other
rivalries in our overriding objective of pre-
venting communism from turning our
flank in the Middle East. A joint U.S.-U.K.-
Egyptian development program of the Nile
might have given us the political leverage
to forestall the Soviet arms deal.
5. Contacts with the West are bound to
affect the Soviet Union and its satellites.
These contacts might influence the Soviets
slowly along a road on which it is difficult
but (and we emphasize) not impossible, to
turn back. With the understanding that
there is no certainty of improvement but
only a possibility, we recommend: (1) that
we should press all contacts with the Soviet
Union that do not hazard important values;
(2) that racial and family relationships
across the Iron Curtain might well be a very
fruitful area for greater development. While
the peoples of the U,S.S.R. have been under
Communist domination nearly 40 years and
in virtual cultural isolation for most of their
history, the peoples of the European satel-
lites have been under Soviet domination
only 10 years. Hence, there is much more
probability for a maximum impact on the
satellites than on the Soviet Union; (3)
that American participants in exchange
programs and American visitors to Russia
be carefully briefed about Soviet methods
of influencing foreigners and exploiting
them for propaganda purposes.
Colonialism
Many of the difficulties confronting the
U.S. with regard to the colonialism issue
are psychological in origin. The American
position is made difficult by the American
national conviction that "colonialism" is
bad under all circumstances and that "na-
tional independence," whatever that may
mean in a concrete case, is admirable. This
conviction overlooks the fact that many
peoples are incapable of self-government,
that the nationality principle is not ap-
plicable in areas where many religions, cul-
tures, and races mingle and where a "na-
tion" may emerge only in the future. It
also forgets the millions of white people
who have settled in the colonial areas for
more than 100 years and whose rights de-
serve respect and protection.
The image the U.S. projects regarding its
attitudes toward colonialism will influence
our effectiveness in dealing with this issue.
Bearing this in mind, the U.S. should adopt
a policy inspired by the following general
considerations:
1. The U.S. utilizing developmental and
information programs and assisted by the
community of free nations will make every
effort to satisfy the aspirations of the colo-
nial peoples.
2. The political solutions to the many
outstanding colonial situations will be re-
sponsive to local requirements.
3. In case of unrest, the U.S. will exert
its influence so that repressive actions by
colonial powers will be as indirect as possi-
ble.
4. Trusteeship by more advanced civiliza-
tions is an essential moral obligation where-
ever the populations are incapable of organ-
izing themselves into a state and assuming
their place in the community of nations;
where divisions in the population would
allow some other advanced community, in
eluding a Communist force, to exploit a
 Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120002-3
native population; and where the survival
interests of large numbers of peoples are at
stake,
5. Soviet spokesmen will not be allowed
to attack Western "colonialism" (for ex-
ample, in the UN) without being reminded
forcefully not only about their own colonial
possessions, but also about the fact that
these possessions are hidden away behind
an impenetrable Iron Curtain.
The Relations Between Diplomacy and
Psychological Strategy
The things we say, which are "policy,"
and the things we do, which are "programs"
need to be consistent and mutually sup-
porting. The psychological and political
aims of national policy depend on the
support of economic or military programs
of action. Conversely, the effectiveness of
these programs depends greatly on the
timing, choice, and other characteristics of
the manner in which we explain thenm. In
particular, we must strive to get the great-
est psychological benefit from our actions
and weigh substantive advantages against
possible psychological disadvantages. For
example: we should not take unilateral
actions without attempting to sell them
for political and psychological benefits
Just as the Soviets used their relinquishing
of a Finnish base as a move in the cold war,
so we should seek to derive political benefits
from such gestures as the withdrawal of
U.S. divisions form Korea.
Emerging Prospects
Soviet tactics for the emerging phase of
the struggle will continue to work toward
the long-term objective of capturing the
Eurasian-African land-mass piecemeal and
by means short of a general war. There is
growing evidence that the U.S.S.R, has
realized that its most effective means of
expansion is by identifying itself with the
concern of a large part of the world for
internal political, economic, and social
growth. We can anticipate that Soviet
expansion through economic development
will become a permanent phase of the
struggle.
We need, therefore, to counter this pro-
gram on a broad basis and in a way that
does not involve us continually in the costs
and losses incident to open crises. Under-
standably, over the last decade, we have
concentrated our efforts to a considerable
extent on political and military programs
and have created some belief that our eco-
nomic, social, and cultural programs are
sporadic and temporary. There is, more-
over, a tendency within the U.S. to brand
such programs as "do-goodism," and the
trend appears to be toward the reduction
of these programs at the earliest possible
date.
Our group believes that we should initiate
a long-range program to assist Free World
development aimed at assisting societies
toward peaceful change and growth and to-
ward meeting the aspirations of peoples.
Whenever effective and appropriate, this
should be done through the UN. A so-
ciety that is economically viable and demo-
cratic in the sense that power, initiative,
responsibility, and opportunity for advance-
ment are widely distributed will give Com-
munism fewer opportunities to seize power
except by overt external aggression. The
latter is the easiest form of aggression to
combat, In development programs we
should consider not only their technical
utility but the sense of direction and useful
23 SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/21 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120002-3
evolution they can impart. It is therefore
important:
1. That the U.S. undertake a systematic
study, by area, of the kind of program
which will be most suitable for enlisting the
interest of the population,
2. To devise means for dramatizing the
impact of these programs.
Leadership and Confidence in Progress
Any long-term program to promote Free
World stability must have as one of its
major targets the small group of intellec-
tuals, administrators, and technicians who
provide the leadership in all areas and
whose influence is particularly strong in
the former colonial areas of Asia and the
Middle East. Communism owes much of
its success because of inroads among this
group. A program of leadership training
- particularly for young leaders - may not
yield startling results in the short run.
Nevertheless, we should aim to strengthen
the leadership resource base, to keep
younger leaders constructively employed
or in training. We should seek, with the
cooperation of government and business au-
thorities, expansion of opportunities for em-
ploying young leaders so that they may
gain a personal stake in their society.
An important method in selecting and
rewarding leadership lies in defining stand-
ards of excellence. One of the difficulties
of the Free World is its problem in match-
ing the dedication of the Communist orbit
with a similar dedication of its own. This
reflects a crisis of values brought about in
part by a destructive Communist critique,
in part by their superior ability to symbolize
their values. We should, therefore, create
a system of awards which define and reward
excellence in interpreting and furthering
the basic values of the Free World similar
to what the Nobel Prize does for the ad-
vancement of peace and the Stalin prize
for achievements in the Communist realm,
Any society must in the long run acquire
the resources, particularly the economic
ones, to move forward in pace with its de-
sire for progress. This requirement is part
BASIC ELEMENTS for a program of Free World dynamic growth
FREE WORLD
ASSISTANCE
 of an equally compelling requirement that
individuals, communities, and states must
develop confidence in their ability to make
progress. Uncertainty, lack of confidence,
and frustration make for instability. We
should not bind ourselves to the effective-
ness of the Communist campaign aganist
sorely-pressed, moderate leadership in some
newly-independent countries. Lacking the
means to fulfill the promisese of "independ-
ence", these leaders are vulnerable to the
Communist charge that they are bankrupt.
They are thus unable to counter effectively
the Communist formula for achieving pop-
ular aspirations.
In order that the democratic way may
survive, the aspirations of all classes and
regions in each nation's society have to re-
ceive consideration. This is a particular
problem in countries with substantial urban
populations. The economic gap between
rural and city people can become critical
with rising industrialization.
In many areas we are widely regarded,
with some justice, as having been too ex-
clusively preoccupied with high-level dip-
lomatic negotiation, with pacts, treaties,
and conferences about global issues that
have little relevance or appeal to the people
or their local leadership. Foreign grass-
root support for U.S. policies can be ob-
tained only if people at the grass roots un-
derstand our endeavors and benefit from
them.
The Threshold of Economic Effort Required
We believe that a minimum level of effort
is required and that we have not achieved
it. We are spending substantial amounts
on economic aid, but the bulk is for short-
term relief and rehabilitation in crisis
areas like Korea and Vietnam. We believe
between one and two billion dollars per
year, in addition to current aid and capital
investment, needs to be made available for
underdeveloped areas capable of using addi-
tional resources productively under realistic
criteria of eligibility. We believe, moreover,
that this rate of investment must be main-
tained over a number of years if sustained
results are to be achieved. The hope in
such a program is that by reinforcing the
promise of success in countries such as Tur-
key, India, Burma, and the Latin American
states and by stimulating new efforts in
countries not yet in motion we can prevent
the development of economic and political
crises that would be many times more cost-
ly to meet.
We should keep in mind that the Soviet
Union can match us if we set our activity
at a low level and encumber our programs
with lengthy administrative leadtimes. We
can outstrip communism and give leader-
ship to the world only by setting our effort
at an effective level and by projecting the
initiative, imagination, vision, and willing-
ness to take risks that have traditionally
characterized U.S. private enterprise. We
must accept the fact that the struggle with
communism is almost certain to go on over
a long period. We see economic develop-
ment as inseparable from political and so-
cial development within a country. And so
long as a considerable component of mili-
tary force is required within a country, it
must be developed and handled in close re-
lationship with other forms of development.
Expanding the Non-Military Function of
NATO
In devising a dynamic program to in-
crease the cohesiveness of the Free World,
particular attention should be given to the
NATO bloc. Such a program must have
two components:
1. A level of military strength that
affords a reasonable deterrent against
Soviet attack and reasonable protection
should it occur.
2. A program of common action to
develop a greater sense of community.
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The program of common action should
include an effort to strengthen the non-
military functions of NATO. Four ways are
suggested in which this might be done:
1. Development of joint studies,
through the establishment of research
institutes,
2. Joint ventures including, among
others, a NATO-wide "ownership" pro-
gram, a NATO cultural program, and
NATO youth programs,
3. A series of NATO-wide activities
designed to encourage mutual adapta-
tion, such as rotating visits of all parlia-
mentarians among the NATO countries
including the U.S.
4. Establishment of NATO reporting
organs, such as a NATO Parliamentary
Gazette,
The question of which of these activities,
many of them now carried on by other Euro-
pean bodies to some degree, are appropriate
for NATO needs further examination. But
the principle of cooperative effort in non-
military matters in an organization in
which there is U.S. participation seems to
us one which follows from the general con-
siderations outlined earlier.
Japan
In Asia, Japan presents us with perhaps
our most complicated problem, which illus-
trates very well the difficulty of the selec-
tion and integration of programs. Atten-
tion tends to be focused on Japan's econom-
ic problem. Our country has to give serious
consideration to relaxation of the controls
on Japanese trade with the Soviet bloc, if
only to provide a convincing demonstration
that the solution of Japanese economic
problems is not to be found in that direc-
tion. An acceleration of growth in the un-
derdeveloped areas, coupled with assistance
on our part in directing Japanese trade with
these areas, should produce expanding mar-
 kets and sourdes of raw materials. Contin-
uing favorable adjustment of our tariffs will
assist Japan in her difficult economic situa-
tion; nor is there any doubt that we must
continue to give Japan material assistance
for some time if it is to take over responsi-
bility for its own local security.
But Japan will not become an effective
partner unless Japanese spiritual and politi-
cal factors develop in a way that keeps Ja-
pan firmly attached as a member of our
community of states. This requires that
Japan be given a position of honor and re-
spect among nations and that we help Ja-
pan become strong and stable. Unless we
are successful in this effort there is danger
that Japanese opposition to continued alli-
ance with the Free World will increase to
a degree damaging to our interests,
The Colonial Question
One of the great threats to the cohesion
of the Free World centers in the relation
between the industrialized nations and the
recently independent countries and colonial
areas of Asia and Africa. The image which
the U.S. projects toward this relationship
will greatly affect the success of the pro-
grams we might pursue toward the colonial
areas.
As stated earlier in this report U.S. pro-
grams toward the colonial areas should rest
on two cardinal principles:
1. The community of free nations
will make every effort to assist the
orderly effort of colonial peoples to
satisfy their aspirations.
2. The solutions to the many out-
standing colonial problems will be re-
sponsive to local requirements.
Our main endeavor should be to promote
the peaceful evolution of colonial areas so
as to reduce the chances of violent out-
breaks. In addition to selected economic
assistance programs, the following long-
range steps should be taken:
1. The establishment of joint study
groups to elaborate various reform
plans.
2. The establishment of school sys-
tems with improved curricula including
adult education.
3. The development, by the inter-
ested Western powers, of an effective
intelligence system to isolate trouble-
makers at an early time.
4. Various efforts to manipulate or
split independence movements coupled
with the full-fledged cooperation of
their moderate wings.
5. In the colonial areas, nations
other than the "motherlands" should
be allowed to invest, to trade, to advise,
and to educate. Personnel exchanges
should be multi-lateral, with the native
elite going not only to Paris and Lon-
don, but also to Washington. In order
to profit from Western civilization in
its broader aspects, the native nationals
should be encouraged to maintain all
kinds of relationships with various
Western nations.
If, in spite of our efforts to prevent it,
violence should break out in colonial areas,
the U.S. should take a strong stand against
atrocities, and a stand for any constructive
effort to re-establish peace.
Neutralism
Many countries throughout the world
prefer to stand apart from the conflict be-
tween the Communist orbit and the West.
Some of these countries are new to self-
government; most of them are more con-
cerned with anti-colonialism or economic
development than with communism.
Our group suggests that the currently
developing world situation may make un-
 wise some policies and programs that re-
quire countries to stand up and be counted
in the East-West conflict. There are many
problems of mutual interest between our-
selves and the neutral nations that do not
involve the East-West conflict. A neutral-
ism of the Swiss type, based on strength,
should be respected and even perhaps en-
couraged in certain areas in the Middle
East and along the rimland of Asia.
The countries inclined to neutralism
must have a reason if they are to choose
sides at all, In fact, since they are bound
to come under Communist pressure, they
will need to have adequate reasons to pre-
vent them from being "neutral" against the
U.S. It is suggested that one of the long-
run counters to this tendency is that the
U.S., without direct reference to commu-
nism, identify itself on a selective basis with
efforts to improve the internal security and
the internal economic growth of these neu-
tralist countries.
Military Assistance Programs
Although seemingly designed for a pure-
ly military purpose, military assistance pro-
grams are also economic assistance pro-
grams of a specialized type. They are
political and psychological instruments of
the greatest delicacy and importance. In
the marginally committed and uncommit-
ted nations, they offer a useful instrument
for simultaneously establishing internal se-
curity and for furthering the aspirations of
people for a better life. By using military
assistance programs in support of day-to-
day policy, we increase the value of military
force as a political instrument.
Our military training and assistance
country missions have been among our
most effective political and psychological
instruments in some countries, particularly
Latin America. The importance of the
military and of military men in the gov-
ernments of new and/or unstable countries
is one of the important facts of internation-
al life. We can often best maintain con-
tacts and exercise influence through mili-
tary channels. Military programs, more-
over, reach village-level people and their
problems.
Atomic Competition
The U.S. now faces two related develop-
ments of such a high probability that it
needs to prepare a policy against them as
if they were certainties. The Soviet Union
is now both ready and willing for political
purposes to: (a) supply arms to many dis-
contented nations in the Free World, and;
(b) compete strongly in international trade
and in development programs requiring the
provision of capital and technological assist-
ance of many kinds, including atomic en-
ergy.
Our country can expect that the Soviet
Union will move in every time we offer an
opportunity through a mistake, through
procrastination, or a half-hearted policy.
We can, for example, expect the stiffest
kind of competition for the future title to
the Atoms-for-Peace program.
Properly exploited, U.S. leadership in ex-
tending the peaceful uses of atomic energy
has great political and propaganda value,
but the U.S. will have to move swifty to re-
tain the leadership.
It became clear at the 1955 Geneva
Atomic Conference that we have few re-
maining advantages to gain from rigid se-
curity and that others, including the Rus-
sians, the British, and the French, will soon
be in a position to move vigorously into the
field. The psychological effects of a more
open U.S. atomic information policy can be
considerable, especially if we avoid appear-
ing a grudging contributor to foreign pro-
grams. It is important to speed declassifi-
cation of all information in this area except
 data with direct and important military
significance.
Three fields of information should be em-
phasized:
Power-While making data available,
we should avoid overselling atomic power
for its own sake. Nuclear power plants
should be integrated into over-all power
programs. While atomic power may soon
be competitive in some presently high-cost
areas (Japan, Brazil), conventional fuels
will pay their own way in many areas for
decades to come.
Research - This is an important area
for increased cooperation with other na-
tions. It has great symbolic value even
before practical results emerge. The pres-
ent research reactor program is valuable in
this light, and could profitably be expanded,
Isotopes - Although applications of iso-
topes in medicine, agriculture, and industry
are of more immediate value to the U.S.
than to most areas abroad, the U.S. can
benefit psychologically by exporting some
of these techniques.
The expansion of knowledge concerning
atomic energy may increase the interest
of many countries in an inspection and
regulation system for nuclear power. Our
group has not explored this avenue at
length, but suggests that such an explora-
tion might prove rewarding from the politi-
cal and psychological standpoints.
Western Europe and Japan, They would
also have a salutary or good psychological
effect by setting an example for countries
tempted to choose autarky.
East-West Trade
Our East-West trade policies were neces-
sary when instituted, and contributed initi-
ally to furtherance of our objectives. Most
of our allies believe they no longer serve
any significant security purpose. In their
present form, they may give us more liabili-
ties in the form of strain on Free World
unity than they give us assets in the securi-
ty area,
There are reasons to believe: (1) that the
exchange of goods that would actually de-
velop in the absence of any controls would
be very much less than our allies believe;
(on this score the experience of Sweden is
illuminating) and (2) that the strategic
value to the bloc of this slight expansion of
trade would not be such as to increase sig-
nificantly their economic war potential.
Recent steps to modify East-West trade re-
strictions help meet pressure from our allies
to relax controls. As long as we are aware
of the political uses the Soviets might make
of trade, the symbolic advantages to be
gained from a bold move to call the Soviet
bluff by encouraging trade in all but nar-
rowly military significant items, may out-
weigh the limited strategic advantages of
continued restriction.
Removing Trade Restrictions
While we believe the major new emphasis
called for in a program for Free World
growth and stability is a concentration on
the internal problems of countries and re-
gions, we would emphasize that this must
be accompanied by redoubled efforts to pro-
mote international trade and liberate it
from restrictions:
Lower U.S. tariffs would give assistance
to the balance of payments position of
Furthering Our Interests Through
Information
Our information program can be effective
only to the degree it is related to our politi-
cal, economic, and military programs, on
which it is completely dependent. Our in-
formation effort should be based on the
maximum coordination of timing and scope
of actions of other programs with the infor-
mation program. The problem is to have
actions that speak both loudly and well in
 our interest, and then to have an informa-
tion program which distills the last iota of
possible returns from them.
The best information program concern-
ing America abroad would be one expressed
on a basis of spontaneity by members of our
various missions and by Americans travel-
ling abroad, avoiding the taint often asso-
ciated with the word propaganda. It is im-
portant that this program appeal to intel-
lectuals who supply so much of the leader-
ship, particularly in backward countries.
Individual Americans serving our country
abroad need to be capable of dealing face-
to-face with local leadership groups both
on a technical and ideological plane, Amer-
ican personnel abroad should be encouraged
to develop the widest possible contacts in
the countries in which they are resident..
Current practices inhibit some Americans
from seeking or even accepting contacts
with persons in foreign countries who are
not already reliably known to be our firm
friends. This practice, where it exists,
should be changed. In fact, it is to our
advantage to seek out leadership which is
skeptical or even unfriendly, bring it to the
U.S., or expose it to information about
America and Americans in other ways.
With education and literacy growing at
an astounding pace everywhere, books,
papers, and magazines provide the most
effective way of reaching large numbers of
people. Our foreign library program is ad-
mirable and should be expanded, but the
great need is for really cheap books and
magazines of the right types that would be
available in local commercial establish-
ments. Unfortunately the Communists
have realized this and have flooded areas
in which they are interested with masses
of literature at heavily subsidized prices.
Western writings are too highly priced and
available only to the wealthier urban
classes. The communicable products of
Western culture which have achieved a real-
ly wide audience are comic books and the
more sensational films - perhaps it would
be possible to institute a program of such
items of a helpful type. We recommend a
program, substantially financed if neces-
sary, for the subsidization of inexpensive
editions in local languages of a wide variety
of books, many of which, in order to achieve
real impact, will have to be written by
authors knowledgeable in the approach
here suggested. In addition we should
capitalize on the fact that English is a
lingua franca in many formerly colonial
areas by making available cheap books in
English.
Information and Political Warfare
The struggle for men's minds is a total
effort in which all aspects of U.S. programs
must be coordinated if we are to compete
successfully with the highly organized Com-
munist agitation-propaganda "machine."
A specific problem we face is that the
Communist movement will endeavor in-
creasingly to win power in underdeveloped
areas by exploiting the democratic elec-
toral process. They are already achieving
success with unsophisticated electorates
through superior organization and large
expenditures of men and money. This
growing and very acute danger necessitates
an intense effort on our part to become
more knowledgeable in the field of political
warfare and more capable of successfully
conducting such activities. A mutual pro-
gram of fact-finding and training in dem-
ocratic election procedures would help to
insulate newly independent areas against
this Communist strategy.
In its preoccupation with "public rela-
tions" programs, the United States in the
past has been able to overcome many short-
range propaganda threats with a remark-
 STRUGGLE FOR MEN'S MINDS -
FREE WORLD EFFORT MUST OVERCOME A VAST AGITPROP MACHINE
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AGITATION
( STRIKES, PR DIE
able measure of success. In so doing, how-
ever, it has neglected the long-range dan-
gers and opportunities, Advance knowledge
of the processes of attitude formation and
of opinion trends abroad has become essen-
tial and henceforth must supplement efforts
dealing with the more transitory aspects of
opinions. U.S. information programs should
continue to concern themselves with laying
the foundations of political thinking in
addition to reporting and commenting on
political developments.
 The Tone and Scope of a U.S. Information
Program
We believe that the "Eisenhower Ap-
proach" can positively advance U.S. objec-
tives if we can project its true nature cor-
rectly. It is therefore imperative that a
very sharp distinction be made between So-
viet and U.S. objectives.
The essence of the "Eisenhower ap-
proach" is that, while international prob-
lems remain unsolved, the United States
and other countries should make efforts to
solve them in a positive and peaceful fash-
ion, without relaxing our guard and with a
clear concept of our strategic goals.
"The spirit of Geneva, if it is to provide
a healthy atmosphere for the pursuit of
peace, if it is to be genuine and not spu-
rious, must inspire all to a correction of
Injustices, an observance of human rights
and an end to subversion on a world-wide
scale. Whether or not such a spirit as
this will thrive through the combined in-
telligence and understanding of men, or
will shrivel in the greed and ruthlessness
of some, is for the future to tell."
(President Eisenhower's Bar Association
Speech)
"The spirit of Geneva" could therefore
provide us with a great psychological op-
portunity:
a. It may give us an opportunity to
rally the Free World for a long-term
effort by means of a galvanizing new
approach.
b. It may, whatever the Soviet's in-
tention, transform deceptive smile of-
fensives into a genuine change.
The effectiveness of these information ef-
forts depends to a large extent on the tone
with which we present them. Our tone
should be sober, friendly, optimistic, posi-
tive, factual, simple, and expository, with
emphasis on the need for open-mindedness
and for inter-cultural understanding.
Propaganda-to-propaganda responses to
Soviet psychological campaigns will not be
as effective as "the propaganda of the deed."
The political, diplomatic, military, and
economic actions of the U.S. can counteract
Soviet propaganda better than can infor-
mation programs.
U.S. information programs should none-
theless force the Soviets into explicit prop-
aganda lines in order to pin them down
tactically and to make sure that Soviet
propaganda advantages won by inconsist-
ent behavior in a particular national situa-
tion are offset by corresponding Soviet losses
in other areas to which the inconsistency
would be repelling.
Thus, in colonial areas, the native peoples
never should be allowed to ignore the fact
that the Soviet Union itself is a colonial
power, and that, so far, it has not shown
the slightest inclination of giving up its
colonial possessions. The state of the So-
viet colonies should be made known. More-
over, native peoples should not be left in
ignorance about their fate should the So-
viets continue to expand. Under no cir-
cumstances should Soviet or Communist
spokesmen be allowed to attack Western
"colonialism" without being reminded
about their own colonial possessions.
As in other areas, there is a threshold of
effective action in the information field.
The whole level of this activity has been too
low. The total U.S. effort in the informa-
tion area should be at least double the pres-
ent level. Only this would insure that
everything possible is being done to make
available everywhere the ideas that would
inspire progress toward a more peaceful
world. Only this threshold will permit an
increased flow abroad of peoples, ideas,
books, magazines, newspapers, films, broad-
casts, television, exhibits, cultural presen-
tations, trade-fair exhibitions, sports teams,
technical groups, and delegations of all
kinds - soldiers in the battle of ideas,
 Chapter III
Conditions Required for Success
INTEGRATION OF PROGRAMS
It is a truism that political, military, eco-
nomic and information factors all need co-
ordination in an effective foreign program.
The degree of coordination now in effect can
be stepped up with a "value-per-dollar"
probably higher in effective results than is
afforded by any other administrative device
at our disposal. The world diplomatic
front is a screen on which appears the ap-
parent struggle between the Free World and
the Communist camp. Behind it the real
struggle goes on in the sphere of weapons
research, countermeasure capabilities, and
the supreme problem of a technological
breakthrough. On this confusing battle-
field, coordination of scientific, military
and diplomatic developments is urgently
needed.
Basic to effective program coordination
is the problem of assuring properly trained
personnel. Coordination bogs down unless
officials assigned to carry out policies un-
derstand the cross-relationships of their ac-
tions. The scope, variety, and complexity
of our programs in support of policy require
the assignment of individual specialists to
the areas of economics, technology, military
science, diplomacy, and information. These
individuals need to know more about activi-
ties outside their particular spheres - they
should also be capable generalists. When
such individuals are on the cutting edge of
programs in foreign areas they must be
capable generalists in the nature of the so-
cieties with which they are dealing, and in
the direction of movement we are trying to
promote in those societies. Much more of
a career service approach and career train-
ing is needed for the complicated repre-
sentation and program direction that is re-
quired.
Even when we do achieve a measure of
integration, we tend often to stop at inte-
gration by country. Only in Europe and
to some extent in Latin America do we have
a formula and method of operation for in-
tegration by region. The national bound-
ary lines usually do not satisfactorily define
the divisions between our interests, There
needs to be regional integration and co-
ordination at a level below Washington.
This need has been recognized by the mili-
tary as a result of its experience in World
War II but has not been recognized or ac-
cepted generally in other types of programs.
The Middle East and Southeast Asia deserve
the most serious consideration for this type
of integration.
OBTAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE
In our democratic system, the ultimate
boundary lines defining the dimensions of
the possible are set by the American people.
Necessary programs, and the reasons for
instituting them, are now more complicated
than ever before. Hence, those men whose
knowledge and judgment are widely re-
spected bear the very sobering respon-
sibility - more serious than at any time
since the opening of World War II - of in-
fluencing the American people in what they
should accept and support.
The American people yearn to get the
threats and costs over with and to return
to a condition that the more short-sighted
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 would describe as normalcy. But we live
in a period which our President has
described as an era of perpetual crisis. Our
people can understand and accept a long-
range strategy for the achievement of our
objectives by the maintenance of a consist-
ent, high level of effort and confidence.
We believe that there now is a dangerous
gap between what governments know to be
true about the present international situa-
tion and what people believe on the basis
of the limited information available to
them. In particular, until the shape and
meaning of the technological arms race
is explained with clarity and precision, it
will be difficult, if not impossible, for the
Free World's governments to have that de-
gree of popular understanding required for
the support of the policies and actions that
must be undertaken. The same is true of
the Soviet threat. Soviet peace offensives
owe their effectiveness at least in part to the
fact that few Free World statesmen in au-
thority dare tell people the real hazards fac-
ing them. First among these is the danger
that a peace which is not reflected in a cer-
tain strategic balance must prove short-
lived and a disastrous failure.
Within the U.S., it is important to make
clear to the people the real nature of the
Soviet threat and the extent of the sacri-
fices required. This will involve not only
reiterated pronouncements by high Admin-
istration officials, particularly the Presi-
dent, but also a systematic effort to ac-
quaint influential citizen groups with the
rationale of our policy. Our effectiveness
abroad will depend on the support of an
enlightened public opinion at home.
We recognize that no set of policies and
programs is going to receive unanimous ap-
proval from the many segments of the
American community. Our country, its
government, its people, its press, its tem-
perament all combine to prevent any unan-
imous, monolithic acceptance of solutions
to the problem of survival facing us over
the next decade, perhaps over the next
generation. In fact, this lack of unanimity
is an element of strength since it calls
to the attention of the responsible operating
agencies the deficiencies that are bound to
exist in any series of programs as compli-
cated as those which must be undertaken.
There must, however, be no mistake in
the minds of the world, both the Free World
and the communist world, as to the method
and direction of our country's policy and as
to the sustained resolution of the American
people and its leadership.
Looking back over the past decade the
American people have been extraordinarily
cooperative in a very confusing foreign poli-
cy situation. We now face a situation prob-
ably more difficult than any in the last
decade. Communism under the guise of
peace, good will, progress, arms reduction,
anti-colonialism-all the appealing con-
cepts symbolic of peace and progress-
reaches for an initiative which, if grasped,
might be decisive. In order to meet and
reverse this challenge both the American
people and the American leadership must
rise to realize it,
There are two basic negative points to be
accepted and explained to our people:
1, We have now to undertake costly
long-term efforts without the stimulus
of enemy provocation.
2. We have now to develop policies
and programs which go beyond meet-
ing the Communist initiative on an
item-by-item basis if we are to assure
success in our struggle for the world.
Turning to the positive side, we need and
have in great part provided to the Free
World a leadership and a basis for confi-
dence. Stable long-term motivation has to
be a motivation to do something, not mere-
ly to prevent something. Only a positive
 basis of motivation can be independent of
specific actions by the enemy, and as a
corollary, only a positive motivation can
provide any basis for the initiative on our
part, and for the consequent advantages.
In the past the American people always
have supported policies once they under-
stood their meaning. They want to see
their government adopt a long-range strat-
egy which will lead to the gradual solution
of the world crisis. The three pillars of
such a positive strategy are: (1) avoiding
war through a position of strength, (2) si-
multaneously inducing modification in the
Soviet system, and (3) combining the secu-
rity effort with the promotion of greater
well-being at home and abroad. This is pos-
sible if American military strength assures
peace for a long time, perhaps two genera-
tions.
THE THRESHOLD OF U.S. EFFORT
Our country faces a tedious and exacting
task which calls for patience, understand-
ing, and perseverance. The demands that
it places on our great resources, which loom
large in absolute terms, are relatively small.
Adequate support of this task does not in-
volve privation for the American people -
the effort required is nothing to compare
with that expended in World War II.
It is of the utmost importance that the
American people be brought to realize that
there is something that needs to be done,
that the task is not difficult, but that it re-
quires a long-term effort.
Our national tendency is toward piece-
meal programs in response to specific crisis
situations. We tend, moreover, to press
for the reduction of our foreign commit-
ments and to change the scope and char-
acter from year to year. Such tendencies
are now dangerous in the extreme. The fu-
ture is bound to be so risky that the mini-
mum required cannot be estimated with
close accuracy, The course of wisdom is to
provide a level of effort which includes a
built-in margin of safety.
The outcome of the struggle for the world
which will go forward over at least the next
ten years, is highly dependent on a U.S.
effort which is both sustained and at an
adequate level in each of the great areas of
international contact and interaction (mili-
tary, political, economic, and psychological)
in which we are engaged. In all of these
areas an inadequate program may give the
illusion that we are coping with a problem
successfully when in fact we may merely
be applying a palliative. We cannot stress
too much that the withholding of a com-
paratively small increment of what a total
effort should be may bring liabilities and
losses measured by many times the amount
withheld. On the other hand, the contri-
bution of the extra increment may make
the difference between a success and a criti-
cal loss. The analogies in every-day life
are simple and well known; the extra tenth
of a second of speed wins the race, the extra
foot on the flood wall means the difference
between safety and disaster.
The U.S. is continually passing time
markers which indicate points at which
programs must be started to meet long-
range needs, either probable or certain. As
an example, we are already long past that
time when we should have undertaken a
definitive and energetic program to increase
the yearly flow of scientists and engineers.
This example illustrates the point that,
in the situation of revolutionary change in
the world, we are continually passing mile-
stones indicating hazards in the future -
hazards for which these markers flag the
last opportunity to anticipate and prepare.
The level of effort and sustained applica-
tion of the American people is primarily
 dependent not on our economic resources
(for those seem altogether adequate to the
effort required), but on the level of com-
prehension of the American people. It is
the primary task of American leadership
to lift this level of comprehension above
that minimum threshold which marks the
assured adequacy of effort and assured ver-
satility and freedom of action in interna-
tional affairs.
If the United States confines itself to its
present level of national effort, the somber
prospect is that the Soviet Union may
achieve military and technological superi-
ority. The Soviet Union could exploit this
superiority to shatter the cohesion of the
Free World and reduce the United States
to an encircled and isolated position. In
such a position the U.S. might then be able
to survive only at the cost of its way of life.
Further, the unchecked instability of many
societies in the Free World, particularly in
the underdeveloped areas, will bring in-
creasing opportunities for Communist ex-
pansion through economic and political
penetration. This expansion could take
place even before the Communist obtain a
military preponderance .
Only by dedicating itself now to the long,
untiring effort required over the next dec-
ade can the U.S. avoid disproportionately
,large expenditures and sacrifices of Ameri-
can lives later when confronted by succes-
sively more threatening crises.
 In the initial stages of the preparation of
this report, individual panel members pre-
pared twenty papers on various aspects of
the problem. Many of the suggestions
made in these papers appear in the panel
report; many do not. The papers will not
be distributed with the report, but a source
book containing them will be available upon
request in Mr. Rockefeller's office. Each of
these papers is the work of an individual,
and the substance is not necessarily agreed
to by the panel as a whole.
1. A Post-Geneva Estimate of Soviet Intentions, (C) . ............................ byPhilip S. Mosely
2. Thresholds of U.S. Effort, (U) ................................................by Max F. Millikan
3. Economic Policy as an Instrument of Political and Psychological Policy, (C) ....by Max F. Millikan
4. General Guide Lines for An American Long-Range Psychological Plan, (C) ... by Stefan T. Possony
5. A Positive Position for the Third Phase of the Cold War, (S) . .................... by George Pettee
6. The U.S. Public: A Matter of Orchestration, (C) ..............................by C. D. Jackson
7. The Discrete Problems of the Far East, (C) ..............................by Paul M. A. Linebarger
8. Policy and Opinion in South and Southeast Asia, (C) ..................by Paul M. A. Linebarger
9. The Middle East and Africa-A Working Paper, (C) .......................by George A. Lincoln
10. Latin America-As A Demonstration Area of U.S. Foreign Policy in Action, (C) ......by Stacy May
11. The National Costs and Policies Required to Maintain a Modern Weapons System,
(S) .........................................................................by Ellis A. Johnson
12. Arms Equation, (S) ................by George A. Lincoln in collaboration with William Webster
13. Crucial Problems of Control of Armaments and Mutual Inspection, (S) ........by Ellis A. Johnson
14. Thresholds of Armament Effort-U.S. and U.S.S.R., (S) ............................by Stacy May
15. Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations With the U.S.S.R., (S) ....by Henry A. Kissinger
16. The German Problem, (S) ........................................ ....... by Henry A. Kissinger
17. Soviet Evolution, (C) ...........................................................by George Pettee
18. Investigation of NATO, (C) ................................................by Stefan T. Possony
19. The Atoms for Peace Program, (C) ..........................................by Stefan T. Possony
20. The Purpose, Requirements and Structure of an American Ideological Program,
by Stefan T. Possony
Classification: C=Confidential, S=Secret, U=Unclassifled
 The recent conference of head of government of the Big Four at Geneva
opened up new possibilities and requirements for U.S. action for both
the immediate future and for the longer pull.
In carrying out my responsibilities to furnish advice on the psycholog-
ical aspects of policies followed by the Unitd States, I am particularly
anxious to enlist the help of out-side-of-government experts like yourself.
The contribution made by such people has proven extremely valuable in
the recent past. I desire to continue it in the future.
I would therefore like to invite your participation in a group study and
review of the psychological aspects of future U.S. strategy. This study
should develop the means and methods best calculated to achieve U.S.
objectives, taking into consideration the necessity for an integrated na-
tional program within which long-term military, economic, technologi-
cal, and ideological programs can be developed and financed.
Enclosed you will find information relating to the administrative plans
for these discussions. I hope you will be able to join in this effort. I
look forward with pleasure to seeing you.
Sincerely,
/s/ NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President
Enclosure
Objectives of the Panel
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OBJECTIVES OF THE PANEL
Study of the Psychological Aspects of Future U.S.
A
1. Problem
1..To study the psychological aspects of
possible U.S. strategy in the light of devel-
opments at Geneva in order to discover an
optimum, integrated national program
within which specific long-term military,
economic, technological, and ideological
programs can be developed and financed.
U. Discussion
2. A central problem of psychological sig-
nificance facing the U.S. is what means and
methods it should utilize to maintain the
unity and strength of the Free World in the
face of a Soviet peace offensive designed to
dissipate the fear and moral superiority
which have thus far kept it together. The
U.S. must not permit the new international
atmosphere to eliminate the moral issue of
freedom vs. the spiritual oppression of com-
munism; otherwise, Free World strength
and purpose may be eroded away. In addi-
tion the U.S. must find some other motiva-
tion than fear with which to inspire the
efforts of free men for the long pull.
3. It is now a long-range objective of the
U.S. to assist the orderly democratic devel-
opment of those nations outside the Com-
munist bloc. It would seem that perhaps
this objective affords the most promising
basis for free world unity, particularly if it
is built through a common effort to achieve
the hopes and aspirations of the peoples.
To achieve this objective requires careful
long-term planning, financing, and integra-
tion of economic programs with other pro-
grams. Exclusive reliance on economic aid
is not enough. The social, political, mili-
tary and ideological factors must be inte-
grated with the economic. The U.S. could
concurrently exert far more dynamic, evo-
lutionary "idea" leadership which would
give the uncommitted peoples of the world
Strategy
the understanding that democratic solu-
tions to their economic and social, as well
as political, problems can be found and that
these solutions will be effective.
4. The U.S. has the capability, through
technological development, to block the So-
viet military threat in every field. The real
strength of the United States lies in the
dynamic social structure from which its in-
dustrial and technological superiority flows.
If this strength is effectively mobilized, the
United States can overcome the Free
World's markedly increased indifference
which results from the new Soviet diploma-
cy and approaching parity in thermonu-
clear capabilities.
5. To take these steps, national strategic
coordination of all pertinent U.S. actions
is required. As the President has stated:
11... we must bring the dozen of agencies
and bureaus to concentrated action under
an over-all scheme of strategy." (San
Francisco speech, 1952.) Such an "over-all
scheme of strategy" should:
a. Establish a basis for Free World co-
operation which does not depend on the
fear of naked Communist aggression but
which rests on the moral ascendancy of
human freedom.
b. Achieve actual U.S. and allied mili-
tary superiority.
c. Assure a rate of economic growth
in the Free World superior to that at-
tained in the Communist bloc.
d. Assist free societies to be more ef-
fective and more responsive to basic hu-
man aspirations than Communist-dom-
inated societies.
e. Create the long-term political, eco-
nomic and military unity of the U.S.-led
alliances, with due understanding of the
 realities of a nuclear military posture as
a basis for achieving a practical arma-
ment.
III, Conclusions
6. Current National Security Policy calls
for "a flexible combination of military,
political, economic, propaganda and other
actions , .. so coordinated as to reinforce
one another." As a result of the new
developments in international affairs a
greater need exists for psychological strat-
egy with will provide more specific guid-
ance for departmental and agency pro-
grams and which will enable the U.S. to
gain maximum psychological advantage
from all its actions. To help fulfill this
need, it has been agreed to augment regular
governmental procedures by forming a
study panel. The study panel will be com-
posed of outstanding experts in significant
areas. In addition, selected governmental
officials should participate as appropriate.
7. A fresh outside look at many of the
complex problems confronting the Govern-
ment can make a major contribution to the
development of our evolving national strat-
egy. This contribution can be enhanced
if made by outsiders who have had some
association with the Government and who
are also generally familiar with current
procedures and capabilities. Certain offi-
cial background papers and other necessary
information will therefore be given to the
study panel,
IV. Terms of Reference
8. The terms of reference of the study
panel are implicit in the world situation.
An initial survey of the psychological as-
pects of the political, economic, social, and
military factors affecting U.S. security will
doubtless result in the panel focusing at-
tention on certain crucial areas of govern-
ment activity as well as on the major region-
al problems.
9. Background areas of investigation
a. Major political trends
(1) Assess the likely emerging for-
eign policies of the USSR and other
major nations or groups of nations for
the foreseeable future.
(2) Assess the cohesiveness of the
Soviet bloc vs. the Free World alliance
system, the impact and evolution of
neutralism and the forces influencing
the uncommitted nations and peoples.
b. The military balance
(1) Assess the scale and character
of the likely Soviet effort in the arms
race over the next five to ten years.
(2) Consider the possible uses, mili-
tary, political, and psychological to
which Moscow might put arms parity
or superiority, if they achieved it.
c. Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America
(1) Assess the scale and character
of the likely Communist challenge over
the next five to ten years.
(2) Consider the possible. uses, mili-
political, and psychological which Mos-
cow (and/or Peking) might make of a
position of relative strength.
10. Psychological Aspects of Implementing
Programs
a. Consider the kind of U.S. and Free
World policy, from the present forward,
which would take advantage of the new
developments and frustrate Communist
purposes and lead to an internal modifi-
cation of policy within the bloc and result
in an accommodation with the Free
World on terms acceptable to the U.S.
b. Consider the scale and character of
the U.S. and Free World effort required
to counter the Communist effort in Eu-
rope, Asia, Africa, Near East and Latin
America. Estimate the cost to the U.S.
and Free World of making the requisite
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 economic, social and ideological effort,
and the psychological basis for demon-
strating the all important long-term self-
interest of such a program.
c. Consider the scale and character of
the U.S. and Free World effort required
to counter the Soviet military effort and
intentions. Estimate the cost of the eco-
nomic outlay to the U.S. and Free World
of making the requisite effort and its psy-
chological and political implications.
d. Consider the size and nature of the
information program required to maxi-
mize sustained public support for the U.S.
and allied effort.
e. Consider the creation of new meth-
ods whereby U.S. private and govern-
mental actions might better promote re-
gional cooperation.
I. Develop more effective programs for
training U.S. officials in the discharge of
the U.S. role of cooperative world leader-
ship.
11. Integration
After the foregoing separate elements are
explored, the study panel should consider
how best to integrate its findings in order
to provide governmental departments with
useful, definitive psychological guidance.
To this end, it should consider:
a. What potential resources, political
actions, and strategic possibilities are
suggested as offering the greatest prom-
ise for attaining a greater degree of peace-
ful initiative by the U.S.
b. In what respect is it possible to do
more effective planning and use re-
sources more efficiently in the light of the
new developments.
c. What worldwide, mutually beneficial
objectives should be adopted by the U.S.
in relation to the Free World and what
time phasing is recommended for attain-
ing these objectives?
12. Qualifying Factors
The study group should not merely arrive
at a "most likely" projection to achieve psy-
chological strategy objectives, but indicate
frankly and explicitly its believed margins
of error and its doubts. In suggesting U.S.
and Free World countermoves, the study
group should indicate the margins of risk
and safety which it attaches to the proposed
levels of effort and the intelligence assump-
tions which underlie them. (National In-
telligence Estimates will be made avail-
able.)
While, in the end, the study group should
emerge with a cost estimate, it should define
the political and psychological conditions
on which the success or failure of such an
effort may depend.
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