POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY TRENDS IN THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300110001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1951
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 2004/07/09 :CIA-RDP86B00269R000300110001-5
SECRET
SECtJR1TY INFORMATION
GEhiERAii i-iEADQU,ARTERS
~fViTEC7 vaTIONS AND FAR EAST COMMAND
ia~liL}TARY }NTELL}GENCE SECT{ON, GENERAL ~7AF~
P~L1TlCAL, ECONC~~v'!!C
A !~! D
M1LiTAf~Y TREl~IDS
i N THE FAR. EAST
DIA review(s) completed.
OSD review(s) completed.
GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH
 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS AND FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION. GENERAL STAFF
POLITICAL, .ECONOMIC
AND
MILITARY TRENDS
I N THE FAR EAST
- ~ -_ ~+-'~ ~ 7
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION
FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
18 December, 1951
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY TRENDS
IN THE FAR EAST
].. The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to portray the trends of
enemy activities during the past six months as they effect the Far East Com-
mand; second, to deduce from an analysis of these trends the various possibili-
ties and probabilities of enemy action in the Far East in the near future.
2. The section dealing with Air Trends was contributed by the Deputy
for Intelligence, Far East Air Forces.
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:
DOYLE O. HICKEY
Lieutenant General, General Staff with Troops
Chief of Staff
OFFICIAL:
R. F. ENNIS
Major General, General Staff with Troops
Asst Chief of Staff, G-2
OSD REVIEW COMPLETED. Referred to (C)JCS.
 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 :CIA-RDP86B00269R000300110001-5
SECRET Security Information
Political, Economic and Military Trends
in the Far East, 18 December 1951
This estimate consists of an analysis of trends throughout the Far East
during the past six months in the military, political and economic fields. Its
purpose is to determine the answer to three basic questions: First, do Commu-
nist trends provide any indication of the prospects of a military armistice in
Korea? Second, in the event of a failure to reach an armistice agreement, do
these same trends provide clues to the next Communist move in the Far East?
And third, in the event that a military armistice is successfully concluded, do
these trends reveal the Communist intentions thereafter?
In order to provide an appropriate background for this analysis of
trends, Communist capabilities in the Far East are established as follows:
1. To conclude a military armistice in Korea, and thereafter - as
a result of lessened UN pressure -resort to an invasion of Formosa or the
commitment of military forces in Southeast Asia.
2. In the event of a failure to reach a successful armistice agree-
ment in Korea, to increase the commitment of Chinese Communist forces in
Korea and to commit Soviet forces in Korea.
3. In the event that the commitment of Soviet forces in Korea is
accepted as the prelude to World War III, to invade Hokkaido and northern
Honshu with Soviet forces.
With these capabilities in mind, the trends v.~ill be analyzed in the fol-
lowing sequence: First, the trends in Korea in the political and military fields
(exclusive of air activity); second, air trends throughout the Far East -not
only in Korea and Manchuria, but in China and the USSR as well; and there-
after, the trends in the military, political and economic fields in China, the
USSR and in Southeast Asia.
The first requirement is to estimate the probabilities of a military arm-
istice in Korea.
It is now believed that the enemy probably conceived the idea of an
armistice as a result of his abortive Fifth Phase Offensive (April -May 1951)
It was then that the enemy leaders realized that any further large-scale
attacks under the then-existing conditions were not only futile but terribly
wasteful.
The enemy leaders were thus confronted with three broad courses of
future action. These courses of action were:
1. Continue the stalemate.
2. Terminate the conflict.
3. Import enough military power (particularly airpo~~er, armor
and artillery} to resume offensive operations for the purpose of ejecting UN
units from Korea.
The first course of action (continue the stalemate) possessed one ad-
vantage in that it tied down substantial US forces in Korea, and acted as a
drain on the US economy and worldwide military effort, but it had several
disadvantages. First, the UN military strength in Korea vas increasing at a
greater rate than that of the Communists'; second, a continuous stalemate
would eventually exhaust the Chinese; and third, the temper of the American
leaders was rising and it was not certain that the US might not spurn the
stalemate and drive for a complete victory with its probable expansion of the
war.
To the enemy leaders, the second course (end the war) would probably
involve some loss of prestige, but had other points to recommend it. It would
terminate a costly venture for China. It might cause the US to slacken its
rearmament program. It would eventually get UN forces out of Korea and
SECRET Security Information
 Approved For Release 2004/07/09 :CIA-RDP86B00269R000300110001-5
pave the way for future moves against tine ROK gcvernment. And finally, it
was attractive to MAO Tse tung personally and in consonance with the tenets
of Chinese Communism which he has preached and practiced through the years.
1VIA0, talking once to Anna Strong, the pro-Communist author, expounded as
his basic strategic theory, the following -- "r fight only when victory is certain
. .Run away when it is impossible."~~ Never was victory less certain for the
Chinese Communists than it was in June 1951.
But to the Chinese the termination cf the war must not entail great and
ostensible loss of prestige for them. The losses and the drain of the war have
been too great for China to humble herself in seeking an end to the conflict;
and the Chinese people might rebel against a government which had launched
them into such an obviously wasteful venture. Moreover, all Asia is in pre-
carious balance, and the stakes for Asiatic Communism are high. Thus, if the
Communist leaders adopted this line of action they would be required to steer
a hazardous course between what they want (an armistice) and what they can
afford to pay (no great. loss of prestige).
The last course (expand the war) must have appeared to the Commu-
nists as the most hazardous of all. Its rewards, if successful, were great; but its
dangers were even greater. The most terrifying of these was the possibility of
an expansion of a local war into World War III, involving the Soviet Union
before that nation is ready. If not World War III, then at the very least the
Communist leaders foresaw in this course of action the bombing of Manchuria,
as well as full-scale ground fighting against an ever-expanding UN force.
However, the Communists must have calculated that such a course, regardless
of hazards, might have to be adopted. Perhaps a satisfactory armistice could
not be arranged; if not, then the forces of Communism must be ready for what
was to come.
Looking back over the recent past, it now appears that in June or July
of 1951 the Communist leaders made a prudent decision. It was this: To seek
to terminate the war by an armistice, if this could be arranged, without sur-
rendering all of their recently-gained prestige. In the meantime, to prepare
militarily for any eventuality in Korea. That this vas their decision has been
borne out by their political actions at the armistice conference and by their
military operations since July.
The primary political trend has been the generally conciliatory attitude
of the Communist armistice negotiators. Starting on 10 July they have
compromised with, or acceded to, UN demands on such items as the admittance
of newsmen; deletion from the agenda of specific reference to the 38th parallel
as the demarcation line; withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea; acceptance
of the present battle-line as a temporary line of demarcation; and an inferred
willingness to campromise on Item No. 3 of the agenda (inspection and super-
vision of the armistice) .
Their overall attitude and action have continued to suggest that they
want an armistice.
In contrast to the enemy's political activities in an effort to obtain an
armistice, his military activities have been characterized by intensive efforts
to prepare himself for future large-scale military operations.
1. General Attitude
During the past six months, the enemy has conducted an active
defense with his infantry deployed on commanding terrain and supported by
increasing amounts of mortar, rocket and artillery fire. In the conduct of
defensive operations, the counterattack has played an integral part.
In addition to the counterattacks mentioned above, attacks -
limited both as to size and objectives -have been launched during this period.
In size, these assaults varied from a company to a division reinforced by
armored elements. These attacks strove to accomplish one or more of three
general missions: (1) To destroy and wear down small UN units; (2) To seize
critical terrain features; and (3) To eject UN forces and influence from the
islands off the coasts of North Korea.
* Strong, Anna L., "The Chinese Conquer China". pg 207, New York,
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1949.
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In general, the enemy has apparently been awaiting the out-come
of armistice negotiations while attempting to minimize his losses, increase UN
casualties, and above all, augment his military potential in Korea.
2. Logistical Build-Up
There has never been any doubt that the enemy has been exer-
cising his maximum logistical capabilities during the period. In spite of the UN
interdiction program against his railroads, evidence at hand suggests that he
has been successful in supplying his front line forces. Prisoners of War report
that they are eating better than ever before, and complaints deal chiefly with
quality and preparation of food rather than with quantity. Weapons and am-
munition, both small arms and heavier weapons, are in greater supply. Winter
clothing is adequate, in contrast to the inadequacies of last year. Increased
truck movements and PW reports indicate a substantial improvement in the
POL supply.
The vehicle and rail sightings confirm the improvement of the
enemy's logistical status.
The following vehicle sighting statistics are significant:
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Sightings
42751
50244
71256
76586
57181
Sorties
2169
2091
2719
2828
2506
Ave Sightings per Scrtie
19.6
24
26.5
27
22.8
VEHICLE SIGHTINGS
The significant figure is that of sightings per sortie, which indi-
cates an increasing number of vehicles in Korea until November when sight-
ings dropped off slightly; however, incomplete returns indicate that the number
will probably increase again in December.
Train sightings are as follo~a~s:
Jul
Aug
Sightings
46
41
Sorties
2169
2091
Ave Sightings
per Hundred Sorties
2.12
1.96
TRAIN SIGHTINGS
JULY
AUG
SEP
OCT
Sep
Oct
Nov
129
119
168
2719
2828
2506
4.75
4.20
6.71
These statistics show~t an increasing number of train sightings
over the period.
ployed for relatively long hauls; whereas the high figures far the next three
concerned, the figures for July and August represent trains which Mere em-
increased train and vehicle sightings
certain other factors should be borne in mind. Insofar as train sightings are
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months represent trains engaged in short shuttle moves ~~hich were required
as a result of the many rail cuts inflicted by the UN air interdiction .program.
The significant feature is the fact that the enemy has been able to muster
sufficient locomotives to satisfy his icgistical requirements in spite of ~ihe
interdiction program.
The increased number cf motor vehicles can also be attributed
to the inverse effects of the air interdiction program, since a large number cf
vehicles were required to offset the lass of a portion of the enemy's rail
capacity. Here again, the significant feature is the fact that the enemy has been
able to acquire enough vehicles for the job -and still replace the hirh l: sses
assessed against him by UN air attacks.
In Summary--all available in*_eliigence leads to the conclusic.n
that the enemy's supply status has improved during the period.
3. Increase of Armor in Forward Areas
Another significant trend during the period has been the ii1-
crease in enemy armor in and near the K