MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS ON A REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000400070005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 9, 1971
• Content Type: MF

I'm afraid that I have not been able to come up
with any brilliant ideas - productive ideas on the
UNiB paper. None of the alternatives is really
satisfactory for the Director or Agency, as far as
I can see. The Coordinator would paobably be easiest
for the Director and the Agency to live with but
the Director might be shut out of White H ouse
councils and from the taxpayer point of view the
desired control over resources would not result.
Any of them would seemingly involve more management
or overhead or headquarters-type staff and that also
means space and many other related problems.
There are various other points or questions
which the options raise but I'm sure others are much
more qualified than I to talk about them - competing
centers, splitting CA from other present CS
collection activities.
I'm sorry to be so mushy and unhelpful.
Ctf
NSA, NRO, OSD revibws completed
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STAT
NOTE: Attached are the initial comments by
senior Agency officers on the OMB Study,
"A Review of the Intelligence Community. "
Those submitting comments are: Jack Coffey,
Larry Houston, Tom Karamessines, Carl
Duckett, and Jack Smith and
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9 April 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: A Review of the Intelligence Community
1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. It appears to me that the attached is a very thoughtful
and forceful paper. You do not have to accept or argue with all
the specifics but should, I believe, take it as an accurate analysis
of the major problems facing the Intelligence Community.
3. The question of the authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence has plagued us from the start. Theoretically, the
DCI could exercise adequate authority by making proposals which
if not acceptable to other members of the Community he could
then appeal to the National Security Council for specific directive.
This course of action would be cumbersome in the extreme and
would lead to one internecine war after another and, therefore,
has not been adopted. On the other hand, I believe any proposal
involving substantial changes to existing legislation could well
lead to the emasculating of the intelli e~ nce effort. I agree with
A* --soaa y ~~
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the authors that Option #1 as stated would require such legislation.
However, the concept of Option #1 would be the most effective form
of achieving control.
4. I believe that very nearly the same result could be
achieved by a modification combining Options #1 and #2 and
adopting a concept which actually was adopted in the Central Intel-
ligence Group days when General Vandenberg obtained a directive
from the National Security Authority to act as its Executive Agent
in all rrnters relating to intelligence. One of the problems involved
is made clear by the storm of opposition to the NSA directive which
arose, particularly in the military area, and which led to its
abandonment without being put into effect. If, however, the President
were determined that this would be the proper way to obtain the
necessary control, he could within the existing legal framework
have the DCI constituted as the Executive Agent of the NSC in all
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matters relating to intelligence. DCIDs would then have the force
and effect of law, and USIB would become only an advisory staff
to the DCI. NIPE and NIRV could be combined or continue to
operate separately with support from anecpanded Comptroller
function. NSCID[:Ivould have to be amended as the Director would
become Executive Agent of the Government for COMINT, ELINT,
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and SIGINT, with operational control over the National Security
Agency instead of the Secretary of Defense.
5. If, as proposed in Option #1, there should be a single
major intelligence appropriation, it could be made to CIA and
transferred as appropriate to other agencies under section 5 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.
6. Such additional responsibilities on the DCI would almost
certainly necessitate greatly increased delegations of authority,
particularly in the Support area and the Clandestine Service. On
the other hand, CIA could be given an exclusive charter in clan-
destine intelligence as well as in covert operations, eliminating
the military in those fields.
7. As proposed in Option #1, the Director's office would
control all major collection assets and research and development
activities, while Defense and State would retain their production
groups. Again, as stated in Option #1, the Department of Defense
would maintain budgetary and operational control over only the
most "tactical" collection and processing assets necessary for
direct support of military forces, although these assets should be
subject to the DCI's review. This is the extreme proposal of
what could be accomplished under existing law, and to my mind
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the primary disadvantage is that it would meet with the most
formidable resistance from the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs.
8. Option #2 as stated would need legislation or at least
a Presidential reorganization plan submitted to the Congress in
that it proposes the current CIA collection organization be put
in a new agency under a separate director. I believe here again
the requirement could be fulfilled without legislation by giving
the DCI a mandate just short of the Executive Agent concept so
that operational control of NSA, NRO, and DIA would remain the
same as it is now. To carry out a broader role, the Director
would again have to delegate far more authority, particularly in
the Support and Clandestine Service fields, but I do not believe
a new agency is required or that the establishment of a new agency
under a separate director would achieve any savings or advantages.
Rather than a central budget and appropriation, the Director would
present a coordinated intelligence budget for review by OMB.
9. Option #3 would not require legislation but in my mind
would not be effective in achieving the ends sought.
10. If my extreme proposal were to be put into effect, I
believe there should be neither a Director of Defense Intelligence
nor an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, as these
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positions would constantly be in direct opposition to the DCI.
My concept would be an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence whose responsibilities would be to coordinate
Defense intelligence activities and carry out the DCI's policies
and directives in the field of intelligence. Obviously, again this
would be an anathema to any Secretary of Defense. If the DCI
is not given directive power throughout the Community, then a
Director of Defense Intelligence might make sense. If Option #2
or my proposed modifications to Option #2 were adopted, it would
still be necessary to alter the function of USIB to something in
the nature of an advisory staff and to expand the function of the
Comptroller. A coordinated budget presentation or a single
major appropriation for intelligence would probably require open
handling of the whole appropriation process and expose at least
the over-all amount that goes to the Agency, but as things have
been going, maybe we are faced with this anyway.
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
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12 April 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT: Comments on OMB-White House
Intelligence Community Study
1. This document's importance to us and to the Community
derives mainly from the rank and position of its sponsor, --
certainly not from any merit as a sound, perceptive exposition of
what is wrong and how it can best be corrected. We must respond
positively, and at the same time not lean so far forward that our
feet come away from basic foundations which fairly well determine
the Community's structure. To do that would be neither wise nor
helpful.
2. The central objective of the paper is "to bring about a
closer relationship between cost and effectiveness". This should
be one of the main touchstones in commenting on the paper's
recommendations.
3. There are five specific criticisms of the Community. If
they are curable without basic reorganization, the political and
departmental disruptions and dislocations which basic reorgani-
zation among the Community would entail may be avoided. The
five main criticisms are:
"1. Satellite photography, telemetry intercept, ELINT,
acoustical detection and radar have become some of the
most important and vital methods of intelligence collection
not currently covered by any uniform national policy. " (And,
it might be added, these have become clearly the most
expensive activities in the Community by far. )
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"2. Distribution of intelligence functions has become
increasingly fragmented and disorganized. "
"3. The Community's activities are dominated by
collection competition and have become unproductively
duplicative. "
"4. The Community's growth is largely unplanned
and unguided. "
"5. The Community's activities have become exceedingly
expensive. "
4. I believe each of the above "defects" is curable without
basic reorganization, but I also endorse the suggestion that some
changes need to be made. This leads to a comment on the suggested
options in the study.
5. The advantages of Option 1 are in my opinion clearly out-
weighed by its disadvantages. It would without question require
new legislation, and it would vest one man with too much authority
in the exercise of which he would be crossing too many other
departmental interests of a critical kind.
6. I dismiss Option 3 as being too pallid a remedy.
Security Act of 1947 charges th_e "Agency" with certain responsibilities
which Option 2 would vest in a DCI who had been_d~vorced from the
"Agency". This would have to be examined. Furthermore, and more
importantly, the Agency's strength and therefore its contribution and
effectiveness in the Intelligence Community comes in considerable
measure from its relatively integrated method of operation across
the board. I think there would be a great loss to the Community if
what we know as the "Agency" were to be reduced to clandestine
collection and covert action, much as some of my colleagues might
think this a great idea. We profit daily from having access to the
analysts and estimators, the scientists an atlagrgpecialists; I dare
say some of them profit occasionally from the same dialogue. Our
collection activities and our covert actions benefit from this kind
of continuing guidance. We achieve within the Agency, at least,
the general avoidance of "unproductive duplication" and "fragmented
and disorganized distribution of intelligence functions. "
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7. Option 2 deserves our-most careful consideration but not
our unreserved endorsement. First of all, I do not believe that
Option 2 is possible as stated without new le islation. The National
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8. We do need greater explicit authority, directed by the
President, to the DCI over the budgets of the other intelligence
agenicies. To exercise this authority intelligently, we need a
larger and more effective staff to monitor the Community's plans,
budgets, and effectiveness in behalf of the DCI in much the same
general way in which the OPPB performs this function for the DCI
within the Agency. There should be included in such a staff at least
one relatively senior representative of the OMB.
9. The study ignores, in its preoccupation withwhat the
authors understand to constitute "national" intelligence, the fact
that we cannot safely separate survival intelligence from the conduct
of clandestine collection. Implicit in the study seems to be the thought
that satellite photography, telemetry intercept, ELINT and the rest of
the technical collection array should be the principal preoccupation of
a DNI or a DCI, while a subordinate officer is adequate for the much
less important clandestine collection and covert action; and yet we
should note that, to a President and the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the domestic and international day-to-day political and
other problems turn most often on what may be happening in a given
country or area with a non-existent or indirect impact, on our national
survival. This is true without even taking into account the work done
in counter-intelligence and covert action.
10. Finally, two very specific recommendations affecting the
Clandestine Service are touched on in the paper, without elaboration.
First of these suggests the transfer of CIA SIGINT to NSA. This is
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11. The other specific suggestion involves Defense clandestine
collection and recommends that we take it over. This is also a feasi-
ble step but we should have to be most selective in what we accepted
and ruthless in what we discarded and wrapped up. We would probably
need a modest increase in numbers and budget, and additional viable
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12. To sum up, a reinforced DCI under the general terms of
Option 2 but without the breakup of CIA, and with a larger and more
effective "Intelligence Community" monitoring staff would have the
tools he needs to accomplish, over a period of several years, the
correction of some of the shortcomings of the Community as set
forth in the study paper and repeated in paragraph 3 above. His
leadership of the Community would be clear and authoritative; he
would be in a position to influence heavily if not actually dictate
the division of functions among the major intelligence agencies;-he
could exercise the same constructive influence and direction on the
structuring, staffing, and funding processes, of analysis and inter-
pretation, which the study suggests; and he could play a larger role
in decisions to be taken by the Secretary of Defense on the direction
and control of Defense Department's intelligence activities.
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
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12 April 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT White House Study Titled "A Review of the
Intelligence Community"
1. After a brief review of the subject document
I would like to offer the following observations and recom-
mendations.
2. A number of conclusions and assertions regarding
the performance of the Intelligence Community are incorrect
and misleading, but I believe it would be unwise to attack the
paper. I do believe it essential, however, that at least the
following two points are made.
a. The statement on page 18 that "The Director
of the National Reconnaissance Office is similarly
unable to control a large part of his program which
is run by the Deputy Director for Science and Technology
in CIA" is a bit overdrawn. Since the D/NRO and the
EXCOM allocate all funds for NRO programs, it is
impossible for the DD-S&T to do any freewheeling.
CIA funds are not used for reconnaissance programs
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and I contend that the guy who controls the purse
strings is in fact controlling the programs.
b. The relatively small Office of ELINT in
CIA has been a major contributor to the national
collection program, yet the study suggests that all
responsibilities in this area should be turned over
to NSA. This is proposed despite a clear recognition
in the report that there are serious management
problems in various DOD intelligence programs,
particularly NSA.
3. I admit that both points raised above may be
parochial from a DD-S&T point of review, but I believe they
are points that should not go unchallenged. Rather than any
attempt at nitpicking the report itself, I have tried to
concentrate on a constructive proposal for changes in the
Intelligence Community which I believe might effect significant
improvement. My proposal is based on the following assumptions
which I believe to'be true.
a. The intelligence organizations in government
are somewhat outdated and need revision.
b. The "big spenders" are in the Department of
Defense, thus any attempt at increasing efficiency
must come to grips with the Defense components of the
Community.
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c. Granting there have been exceptions, the
collection systems developed and operated by CIA
have been effective and well managed.
d. The NRO approach to management of national
collection systems has been quite effective, particularly
during the last five years.
e. The DCI can never-play a strong management
role in the collection arena when 85% of the assets
belong to the Department of Defense.
f. Establishment of a separate independent agency
to manage intelligence collection is preferable to
trying to restructure the Defense Department.
g. The DCI could exercise considerable control over
a separate collection agency through budgetary review
without being saddled with the day-by-day management
problems of the organization.
4. The attached charts show two organizations which
I recommend for consideration. One called the CIA would
function as a staff to the DCI and would perform exploitation,
analytical, and estimative functions. The study recommends that
if collection responsibilities are removed from the DCI he
should retain NPIC, and I agree. I consider it is just as important
that the DCI take over responsibility for SIGINT exploitation
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which to a first approximation would mean transferring the
production components of NSA to the new CIA. I have also
suggested that there might be some realignment as to the
analytical functions currently assigned to the DDI and DD-S&T.
The Requirements Evaluation Staff would be an expanded NIPE
type of organization which would interface with the proposed
new collection agency.
5. The second organization chart is titled National
Collection Agency and I think it is reasonably self-explanatory.
It assumes responsibility for all national intelligence
collection, with a proviso that tactical collection responsibility
be returned to the military services. I realize it is a
debatable point, but believe such a split is feasible and
can be defined. An outside committee which has been reviewing
the whole ELINT picture for DOD is probably going to recommend
this step in ELINT collection and I understand they have
concluded that this could be done without major problems.
6. The organization chart indicates the way the present
organizational components would be assigned to the new
organization. It does not attempt to cope with the question of
how DDS functions would be handled. If there is interest in
pursuing the basic idea, I would propose that this question be
addressed by those who are more familiar with that part of
the organization.
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7. I also suggest that an EXCOM be established to
oversee the entire collection apparatus much as it now does
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programs. The DCI's dominant role in
the community would make him the logical chairman of the
EXCOM and I further believe that the new agency's budget
should be submitted through the DCI. I suggest a Requirements
Evaluation Staff in the Collection Agency which would work
hand in glove with the similar staff in the DCI's organization.
This staff component would also provide a full time secretariat
for the EXCOM which I believe would need to meet at least
once a month to assure that the collectors did not tend to
take on a life of their own.
8. The titles I have used for the Directorates of
the new agency would probably not be those actually adopted, but
were selected to be descriptive of the jobs to be performed.
I have made no specific proposal as to how covert action programs
would be carried out, but believe it is probably best that
this function stay with the other components of the DDP
who would continue to have the overseas staffing and apparatus
necessary for these activities.
9. I recognize that this proposal has at least one
serious drawback. Almost certainly it would require legislative
action. I believe, however, that this should not be a basis
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for totally ruling out consideration of this approach since
all of the functions which would be assigned to the new
organizations are already approved by legislation and much
of what I suggest might even be possible under existing
statutes. I leave that question to the legal experts.
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Carl E. Duckett
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
Attachments:
1 - Central Intelligence Agency
2 - National Intelligence Collection Agency
-17
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Deputy Director
for
Political/Economic
DD/I - less
OSR
NPIC
Board of
National
Estimates
Deputy Director
for
Military and
Scientific
DCI
Deputy DCI
Ex-Dir Compt
Deputy Director
for
Imagery Exploitation
OSR
OSI
FMSAC
R&D (analysis only)
Computer Center
Requirements
Evaluation
Staff
Primary
Relationship
with NICA
Deputy Director
for
SIGINT Exploitation
Production portion
of
NSA
OEL (CIA)
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Supervision by an
EXCOM
Possible members:
DCI - Chairman
Deputy Sec Def
Science Advisor
Deputy OMB
DIC
Deputy Director
for
COMINT
National Collec-
tion portion of
NSA
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCY
Deputy Director
for
ELINT (includes
Telemetry)
Director (DIC)
Deputy Director
Comptroller
Deputy Director
for
Imagery
National Collec- Imagery portion
tion portion of of NRO
NSA
OEL (CIA)
ELINT Satellites
from NRO
Requirements
Evaluation
Staff
Deputy Director
for
Other Technical
Primary relation-
ship with DCI Staff
Deputy Director
for
Human Collection
DD/P 25X1
Radars DOD Human Collection
Ships for missile programs
monitoring II(CIA)
Black Boxes
NOTE: Tactical Collection would be the responsibility of the Military Services
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12 April 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel White
FROM
SUBJECT
Comments on "A Review of the Intelligence
Community, " March 10, 1971
1. Scope of These Comments. This memorandum does not discuss
directly the larger administrative issues raised in the Report such as
Community management and the DCI's authority, the organization of
intelligence in DOD, cost control and duplication in collection programs,
etc. These matters obviously have a bearing on estimative work and some
implications for NIE's of the Report's proposals are discussed. But D/NE
has had no direct involvement in Community management problems and
the DD's are evidently better qualified to comment on these subjects.
2. This paper therefore limits itself to the following topics: (1) the
Report's observations on the quality of the Community's estimative/
analytical effort; (2) implications of the Report's organizational proposals
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for NIE production; and (3) features of the Report which, from the point
of view of estimates production, could and probably should be welcomed
by the DCI in registering his reactions.
I. The Report's View of the Community's Estimative/Analytical Performance
Note: (a) These comments could be taken as defensive or as
"fighting the problem. " For this reason, they are not all intended
for actual use in the DCI's response. But certain misconceptions
on the part of the Report's drafters could be useful to have in mind
as the dialogue proceeds. (b) The points made here apply not only
to NIE's as such but also to analytical work done in CIA and in
the Community on which NIE's are based.
3. Broadly, the Report's authors assert that analysis and production
("stepchild of the Community") have failed to improve in pace with gains
in technical collection. (a) Why should this be expected? The assertion
mixes apples and oranges. The gain made in acquiring a photograph
unobtainable before is simple and obvious. Improvement in analysis and
production is a much more complicated process and much more difficult
to demonstrate. (b) Anyone who wants to take the trouble to compare the
analytical product of today with that of earlier years will have no difficulty
in recognizing great gains in skill, methodology, sophistication and
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relevance. (c) These gains were made in part because of the advances
in technical collection; it is false to juxtapose elements which form a
single process. If we have "greatly improved knowledge of military
capabilities, " as the report acknowledges, it is owing to advances in
both collection and analysis.
4. "Expanded collection by means other than photography has not
brought about a similar reduction in our uncertainty about the intentions,
doctrine, and political processes of foreign powers, " (as compared, that
is, with our greater certainty about military capabilities - p.1) - - What
is surprising about this? (a) Intentions, etc., are immensely more
difficult to discern; (b) "Means other than photography" are inherently
much more chancy in their returns and much more difficult to interpret.
(c) Technical collection contributes on these matters also and should not
be thought of as contributing exclusively to appraisals of capabilities.
5. The Report repeats a standard oversimplification often heard
in the complaints of users to producers about failures in estimating
intentions. The Intelligence Community, because of experience, cumulative
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insight, and the greater sophistication of our analytical effort, is
greatly more knowledgeable about "intentions, doctrines and political
processes of foreign powers" than it was twenty or even ten years ago.
We speak with considerable confidence about the main directions of
Soviet and Chinese policies and about the parameters of risk within
which these policies will operate. But if by estimating intentions one
means reliable prediction of a particular course of action among the many
possible within such limits, one lives in a dream world. As the Report
itself acknowledges in one passage (p. 10a), no intelligence organization,
however competent, can ever relieve a government of all uncertainty.
Intelligence can only reduce it somewhat; many policy decisions will
inevitably have to be reached in the face of uncertainty about particular
actions of other states. The argument of the Report is that not enough
has been done to reduce such uncertainty. The Intelligence Community
can honestly claim that much has been done, though naturally it should
acknowledge its obligation to try to do more. To a large de ee the
Report is a manifestation of the chronic and normal tension between
producers and users of estimative intelligence.
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6. A classic form of this tension is seen in the Report's criticism
that there has been insufficient "initiative in developing the full range
of possible explanations of available data, " (p. 10a) and, at the same
time, its insistence on the need to "refine" evaluation of capabilities,
intentions, etc. (p. 44). This is an imprecise variation on an old
contradiction in user complaints: "I want to know all the conceivable
possibilities in the situation. " But: "You give me so many possible
explanations that I don't know what to expect. " One source of our present
difficulties is that customer emphasis has changed in recent years.
Whereas there was formerly more often a demand that the range of
possibilities be narrowed and probable developments estimated, now there
is more often a demand that a fuller range of possibilities be described.
This shift in emphasis could mean that intelligence judgment in general
commands less credibility among high-level users than used to be the case.
7. The Report says that improvement, in both collection and
production, must come from setting priorities. If this means anything,
it means that some subject areas now covered should be eliminated. On a
strict view of intelligence needed to support decisions in national security
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policy, this is no doubt possible and even desirable. But expectations
of intelligence users are not geared to this strict criterion. Intelligence
is expected to supplement, confirm or negate news media reports on all
manner of events on which the USG will not act or even express an
attitude. Servicing mere curiosity is an inevitable demand so long as
the US thinks of itself as a world power potentially involved everywhere.
If rigid priorities are set for intelligence effort, will the DCI be excused
when he replies to queries: "Sorry, we don't cover that"?
8. Certain specific errors of judgment are charged: "Among the
more recent results of this failure to acknowledge uncertainty and entertain
new ideas in the face of it, has been a propensity to overlook such unpleasant
possibilities as a large-scale exploitation of
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The intelligence performance on some but not all
of these developments might fairly be criticized, especially for failure
explicitly to acknowledge uncertainty (though for this consumers seldom
show gratitude). But none of these developments was "overlooked" as a
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9. The Report makes certain observations on personnel working
in production. Theirs is said to be "a profession that lacks strong .. .
career incentives, even within CIA. " (p. ll) "More effective use"
should be made of them and they should have "better career opportunities
to hold them as analysts instead of forcing them to become supervisors
in order to achieve promotion. " (p. 46) - - (a) What can the authors
have available as evidence to support their statement about the incentive
of CIA analysts? Anyone who has worked with them intimately knows that,
as compared with standards of individual performance usual in other large
bureaucracies public or private, theirs manifest a very high degree of
professional commitment. (b) In the intelligence business supervisors
are almost inevitably promoted analysts because effective supervision is
extremely unlikely to be achieved except by those who have demonstrated
some substantive competence. (c) In any kind of large organization, high
talent and commitment are hard to come by. In intelligence organizations,
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more than in others, shortages of these commodities are less easily
compensated for by the "science" of management.
II. Implications for National Estimates of the Report's Proposals for
Reorganization
Note: The report assumes throughout and under all three
organizational options that the Community should convey its
collective information and judgment in the form of National
Estimates. While USIB is heavily criticized as an ineffective
organ for managing Community collection resources, nothing
is said about its performance as a substantive body deliberating
on national estimative issuances. The authors evidently have
in mind some connection between NIE's and NSSM's but they
do not explain it.
10. The organizational options range from maximum centralization
(# 1) through partial centralization (# 2) to preservation of the present
confederal system (# 3). These alternatives apply, however, entirely
to resource management and budget control. Under all options "competing
centers" for analysis and participation in the national estimative process
would exist in State and Defense and perhaps elsewhere. -- The question
which arises is how "competitive" such components would be under greater
centralization. Is centralized management really compatible with the
Report's aim of "increasing competition in the interpretation of evidence
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and the development of hypotheses"? In the real bureaucratic world
centralized control can hardly be expected to increase the autonomy of
substantive production elements or to enhance the diversity of their
output. -- Further, under present arrangements the authority of national
estimative products derives precisely from the fact that they issue from
a confederal system whose procedures encourage all parties to be heard
at length and to dissent if they wish. There would be real danger in a
more centralized system that departmental elements would not participate
as vigorously and that end runs, which could only compound the
dissatisfaction of users, would be attempted.
11. More centralized direction for intelligence components in
Defense (discussed in Ch. VII) would in principle raise similar problems
of compatibility between the objectives of better resource control and the
autonomy of production elements. From the point of view of national
estimative procedure, the latter has proved its value. Important
analytical problems in the military field are likely to find better solutions
when all services participate independently with qualified analysts from
civilian components in a forum like that provided by the Board of
National Estimates. The service intelligence units have diverse
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interests in and approaches to major military intelligence problems
which help to generate a wider range of hypotheses. This latter objective
of the Report would be impeded rather than promoted by greater
centralization in Defense, given the inhibitions against independent and
objective intelligence production normally found in military organizations.
12. The Report betrays considerable misunderstanding about the
relationship between collection and production, evidently because it is
primarily focussed on controlling the costs of the former. It fails to
appreciate the close functional relationship between the two. In Option # 2
collection organizations are in fact to be removed to a new agency under a
separate director. Good intelligence results from a vital and intimate
inter-action between collectors and producers. Organizational separation,
with the DCI's higher managerial role presumably as the only remaining
link, would at a minimum seriously prejudice the chances of good
performance in both functions.
13. These paragraphs are not intended to imply that the Report's
attempt to examine organizational problems is entirely misguided.
Obviously, organizational arrangements and functional divisions laid
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down 20 or more years ago may well need revision. But the Report
says that organizational change is afire-condition for improvement in
estimative/analytical performance. This can be doubted. At least it
can be said that some of the particular organizational changes proposed
would hinder achievement of this goal. Generally, in. its pursuit of
managerial efficiency and cost control, worthy aims in themselves, the
Report reveals little understanding of how production processes actually
work, and is particularly insensitive to the vital need for autonomy of
producer elements. In intelligence, organizational rigor can be the
enemy of performance and some untidiness can be worth the price.
III. Features of the Report Suggested for Positive Reaction
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Note: Within the limits of this memorandum, the suggestions
for favorable comment made below concern only ways of improving
the national estimative product mentioned in the Report. These
are not central to the Report, however, since it states that, "It is
probably premature to recommend detailed measures to improve
the quality and scope of the intelligence product . . . this issue
should be considered at greater length by the leadership of a
reorganized community. " (p. 46)
14. The need to "strengthen" analytical effort "to increase the
competition of ideas" could be supported. It might be acknowledged that
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there has been a tendency to assume "that additional data collection rather
than improved analysis will provide the answer to particular intelligence
problems. " (p. 11) It would be possible to welcome "a DIA with improved
organization and staffing as a major competitor to CIA in the area of
military intelligence. " (p. 45) (This is, of course, not quite the problem.
It is DIA that needs a major competitor in CIA. State should be stronger
in this field also since DIA's natural weakness is failure to appreciate the
political dimensions of military issues.)
15. Reference is made to the possible need for "new estimating
centers" to participate in preparation of National Estimates, again to
increase "competition". No indication is given as to where these would be
lodged or what their organizational rationale would be. The "centers"
already existing in the military services and in NSA are not mentioned
and the inference is that they are not thought of as necessary participants.
Nevertheless, the idea of additional "centers" could be welcomed in
principle.
16. The Report inquires "whether a new review board should be
created, especially to evaluate the analytical and estimating activities
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of the Community. " (p. 24) This would surely be waste motion and
evaluate nothing effectively. Indeed, the Report itself elsewhere suggests
"product evaluation within the organizations themselves" (p. 45). As an
alternative to a new review board the Report suggests "strengthening" PFIAB
along with other existing review mechanisms. Perhaps this could be
supported as a lesser evil.
17. The Report suggests "institutionalized ways of communicating
consumer needs, priorities, and evaluations to intelligence producers. "
(p. 45) It can be doubted that "institutionalized ways" would do much good,
the real need being for direct and informal communication with users,
but the desirability of much more user feedback could be warmly endorsed.
Lack of this has in fact been a chronic complaint by those involved in estimates,
and an intensified one in recent years.
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12 April 1971
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MEMORANDUM
1. Although one could find fault with a fact here and
an interpretation there, the over-all thrust of the paper would
still remain valid. The expenditures for intelligence,
principally collection, have increased greatly in the past decade
and the results have not increased commensurately. One could
of course select a few very expensive projects which provided
great breakthroughs in our understanding of Soviet and Chinese
military posture. Examples are the KH-4 project earl in
the 1960s
F ==I But, these are exceptions and the major thesis of
the paper is justified by all the other increases in. expenditures
which have produced little of note.
2. The principal assumption that improvements can
come only from reorganization of the intelligence community,
especially with respect to the "leader" of the community is not
so well supported. Nevertheless, some reorganization will
take place if only because the authors who are in a better
position to have a sense of the President's predilections have
pushed reorganization as the primary means for remedying
the situation.
3. With these two considerations in hand, we believe
there is little to be gained in further discussion of the first
five sections of the paper. The primary section of the paper
for the DCI is VI which presents options on the leadership of
the community. Like many of the NSC option papers it presents
a high and a low option both of which are unlikely outcomes.
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4. Option #1, the appointment of a Director of National
Intelligence would require so much change that it would be
infeasible politically with little less than a year before the
presidential election activities go into full swing. The argu-
mentation in the paper itself against the third option, a
Coordinator of National Intelligence, is sufficient to put this
out of the running.
5. This leaves the second option, a Director of Central
Intelligence or some variant of it. The way it is stated in the
paper the DCI would lose direct responsibility for DDP much
of DDS and DDS&T and perhaps some of the DDI like
However, he would have added responsibilities for
recommending to the President appropriate plans, programs
and budgets for the major elements of the intelligence community
and for presenting a consolidated intelligence budget for OMB
review. Obviously, other variants which do not involve losses
could be constructed.
6. The authors present two reasons for separating off
the collection and covert action programs. The first implies
that the DCI is now too busy with the day-to-day management
of these CIA activities to take on the new responsibilities as
well. In our view the major reason for the DCI not spending
more time on community management matters is not the time
factor, rather it is due more to the fact that the. necessary
Presidential backing and authority have not been provided.
With these new responsibilities assigned and these thoroughly
understood by all concerned, especially in the Department of
Defense, the DCI could delegate the day-to-day management
of the collection and covert action programs to a strong DDP
with little diminution in their effectiveness.
7. The second reason given is that the Director serves
as both advocate for CIA programs and judge in community-
wide matters. This is supposed to diminish the community's
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willingness to accept his guidance as impartial. Of course,
the DCI is conscious of this pitfall and seeks to avoid it.
If collection and covert action were removed from the direct
control of the DCI, it would do little more than eliminate an
excuse for an unfavorable judgment. The other two advantages
of Option #2--improved efficiency and enhanced stature--are
not affected by a decision to remove the collection and covert
action programs from under the direct control of the DCI.
Rather, these benefits would be forthcoming only if the
President made very clear to all concerned that the DCI had
the authority to make decisions on his behalf.
8. Chief among the disadvantages listed by the authors
are those dealing with further weakening of the DCI's manage-
ment of the separated parts and his lack of ability to mobilize
deploy and target collection assets in time of crisis. In
addition, the authors obviously are not aware of the amount
of interplay between throduction offices and those involved
in the collection and covert action activities. Some of our
most productive collection projects are the results of this
interplay, the KH-4 projects being good examples
of this.
9. Furthermore, with the possible exception of clandestine
collection, most of the Agency's collection programs like
and DCS (which are services of common concern to the entire
community) are very efficiently performed,
especially when compared with t ose carried out by the Depart-
ment of Defense.
10. The whole discussion of what is wrong with the present
system misses one important consideration of success. This
concerns a sense of common purpose which those in charge
of other intelligence components must have in order to make
it work. Leadership in the intelligence community depends upon
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the degree of support the DCI gets from the highest authority,
how clearly and effectively the President instills this sense
of common purpose in these people, and reinforces decisions
made by the DCI. If the people in charge of the intelligence
resources in the Defense Department feel that they can ignore
or circumvent the authority of the DCI by going to the JCS,
to the Secretary of Defense, to The President, or to Congress,
it makes little practical difference whether the DCI is given
more responsibility and written authority. The President must
tell the others that the DCI has his full and virtually unquestioned
support in order that the DCI be effective. Further, the
people who are appointed to run the other intelligence organiza-
tions must be in tune with what The President wants as reflected
in the actions of the DCI and must be personally compatible
with him. Without these attributes, reorganization can be
expected to produce little more than confusion in the short
run and more of what we have experienced in the past decade
in the long run.
11. Given this kind of Presidential support and the sense
of common purpose among those who run the other intelligence
organizations, the present scope of activity of the DCI with some
modifications can work. The true options fall under this
heading. What we must do right away is to get to work generating
these true options as variants of Option #2.
12. We have no comment to make about the discussion
in Section VII on the Department of Defense except to say
that an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence would also have
to have the support of the DCI, and all managers of intelligence
in the Department would have to have the same sense of common
purpose described above. It is easy for an outsider to say
that if the mess in the Pentagon were cleared up, most of the
problems of the control of expenditures would be solved. Yet,
we believe it is true.
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13. It is worth noting here that the discussion of the
vast growth in expenditures for intelligence is tacitly attributed
to the needs of national intelligence. The authors should
realize that most of the expenditures for intelligence including
much of the increases of the past decade, especially for SIGINT,
are for tactical use of military forces. Although national inteltl
ligence derives some benefits from these expenditures, national
needs alone would not require anywhere near the volume and
frequency currently collected for military contingency use.
14. With respect to the discussion in Section IX on
improvements in product, it would accomplish little to argue
against the proposition that the product is not responsive and
useful. The fact that the authors (who are close enough to
HAK and The President to understand their feelings) say
improvements are needed is sufficient reason to accept the
proposition and to see what can be done to meet their needs.
15. Of the seven areas for improvement two seem
worthy of special comment. First, the intelligence community
must be in closer touch with the high-level consumers to know
what they need to formulate and implement national security
policy. The suggestion that a consumer council be established
has much merit. With regard to a net assessments group,
the discussion suggests that such a group be on the DCI's
staff to prepare "net assessments of U. S. , allied and opposing
capabilities and doctrines. " If the purpose of this is to provide
the intelligence community and thus the consumer with some
insights into better estimating of foreign capabilities, intentions,
limitations and doctrine, there is some merit in the proposition.
If however, the DCI's staff would be tasked with testing various
U. S. force options, this option is completely inappropriate. on
a number of grounds.
16. In their discussion of the USIB (page 21), the
authors describe it as both a parliament and a confederation
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and suggest that it be reconstituted "so as to formalize these
relationships on an advisory basis. " Any of us who have watched
the Chairman run USIB would object to the idea that USIB was
not now an advisory body to the DCI. But before doing so, we
should realize that all the USIB Committees are run like
parliaments and the desire not to bring controversy to the Board,
unless absolutely necessary, frequently leads to USIB and the
DCI being presented with highly compromised solutions which
USIB usually affirms.
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Remarks :
Red: I have approached this with a
broad brush, looking primarily at the legal
concepts. I trust this is responsive, and if
you would like more detail, please let me
know.
STAT
LR Houston
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)IFOrl I
FORM No. 2)3)7 Use previous editions
1-67 LJI
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