SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040009-5
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• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 15, 1950
• Content Type: NIE

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TOP SECRET
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
The present estimate is an editorial adaptation of JIC
531/10 with certain modifications and additions to bring it
up to date. The intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force
participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur
in it. This paper is based on information available on
11 November 1950.
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
THE PROBLEM
1. To estimate Soviet capabilities and inten- which the USSR might be prepared to engage
tions with particular reference to the date at in a general war.
CONCLUSIONS
2. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously moti-
vated by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine
and by considerations related to the position
of the Soviet Union as a world power. Their
ultimate objective is to establish a Commu-
nist world controlled by themselves or their
successors. However, their immediate con-
cerns, all consistent with that objective, are:
a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin
over the peoples of the Soviet Union.
b. To strengthen the economic and mili-
tary position and defend the territory of the
Soviet Union.
c. To consolidate control over the Euro-
pean and Asian satellites (including Commu-
nist China).
d. To make secure the strategic approaches
to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the estab-
lishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces ca-
pable of threatening the Soviet position.
e. To eliminate US influence in Europe
and Asia.
f. To establish Soviet domination over
Europe and Asia.
g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-
Soviet world generally, especially to under-
mine the power and influence of the US.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these
immediate objectives simultaneously. In case
of conflict between one and another of these
objectives, however, it may be expected that
the Soviet rulers will attach greater impor-
tance to the first four listed, and in that order.
3. Inasmuch as the Soviet ultimate objective
is immutable and dynamic, the Soviet Union
will continue relentlessly its aggressive pres-
sures on the non-Soviet world, particularly on
the power position of the Western nations.
Consequently there is, and will continue to
be, grave danger of war between the USSR
and its satellites, on the one hand, and the
US and its allies on the other.
4. The Soviet rulers could achieve and are
achieving the first three of their immediate ob-
jectives (para. 2 a, b, and c) without risk of in-
volvement in armed conflict with the United
States.
5. Their remaining immediate objectives
(para. 2 d, e, f, and g) are improbable of
achievement without resort to armed force,
although there are still` factors in the situa-
tion which might well lead the Soviet rulers
to suppose that, in favorable circumstances,
they might eventually achieve these objec-
tives without the use of Soviet forces.
6. In pressing to achieve these latter objec-
tives the Soviet rulers will inevitably impinge
upon vital interests of the Western Powers
and thus incur the risk of involvement in a
general war through Western reaction.
7. In the belief that their object cannot be
fully attained without a general war with the
Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may de-
liberately provoke such a war at the time
when, in their opinion, the relative strength
of the USSR is at its maximum. It is esti-
mated that such a period will exist from now
through 1954,1 with the peak of Soviet
' 1954 is assumed to be the date by which North
Atlantic Treaty forces in Europe will have been
built up to such strength that they could withstand
the initial shock of Soviet attack and by which the
gap between the military strength of the Western
Powers and that of the USSR will have begun to
close.
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strength relative to the Western Powers be-
ing reached about 1952.1
8. From the point of view of military forces
and economic potential, the Soviet Union is in
a position to conduct a general war now (i.e.,
at least to conduct the campaigns listed in
paragraphs 66-68, p. 10), if the Soviet rulers
should consider it desirable or expedient to
do so.
9. Intelligence is lacking to permit a valid
prediction as to whether or when the USSR
would actually resort deliberately to a general
war. It must be recognized, however, that a
grave danger of general war exists now, and
will exist hereafter whenever the Soviet rulers
may elect to take action which threatens the
vital interests of the Western Powers.
10. Specifically with respect to the Korean
situation, to date there is insufficient evidence
to indicate that the USSR intends to commit
Soviet forces overtly in Korea. However, the
' After the USSR has made good certain im-
portant deficiencies in atomic bomb stockpile and in
certain types of aircraft and before the Western
economy has been fully geared for a war effort.
commitment of Chinese Communist forces,
with Soviet material aid, indicates that the
USSR considers the Korean situation of suffi-
cient importance to warrant the risk of gen-
eral war. The probability is that the Soviet
Union considers that the US will not launch
a general war over Chinese Communist inter-
vention in North Korea and the reaction
thereto. The principal risk of general war is
through the exercise of Soviet initiative which
the Kremlin continues to hold. The proba-
bility is that the Soviet Government has not
yet made a decision directly to launch a gen-
eral war over the Korean-Chinese situation.
There is a good chance that they will not in
the immediate future take such a decision.
At what point they will take a decision to
launch a general war is not now determin-
able by Intelligence.
Note: The foregoing paragraphs (7-10) represent
the best conclusions that can be reached on the
basis of the information available at this time. The
problem of whether and when the USSR may resort
deliberately to general war is under continuing
consideration and will be the subject of future re-
ports as pertinent information is developed..
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DISCUSSION
1. SOVIET
1. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously moti-
vated by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine
and by considerations related to the position
of the Soviet Union as a world power. Their
ultimate objective is to establish a Commu-
nist world controlled by themselves or their
successors. However, their immediate con-
cerns, all consistent with that objective, are:
a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin
over the peoples of the Soviet Union.
b. To strengthen the economic and mili-
tary position and defend the territory of the
Soviet Union.
c. To consolidate control over the Euro-
pean and Asian satellites (including Commu-
nist China).
II. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
Political.'
2. There is nothing in Soviet ideology, or in the
internal situation of the Soviet Union, which
requires or precludes either deliberate resort
to 'war or the achievement of any particular
objective by any given date.
3. The Soviet rulers appear to believe that,
provided the security of the Soviet Union can
be assured, time will be on their side in the
achievement of their long-term objective of
world communization under Kremlin domina-
tion.
4. The Soviet rulers have shown, however,
that they are more immediately concerned
with the power position of the Soviet Union
than with their long-term objective. In addi-
tion, they have made it clear that they will
not rely solely on the operation of historical
processes, but will actively and aggressively
press for the realization of their aims, using
' See also Appendix A for a discussion of political
alignments and morale factors in the event of war,
Appendix B for a discussion of Soviet objectives and
prospects in particular countries.
OBJECTIVES
d. To make secure the strategic approaches
to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the estab-
lishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces ca-
pable of threatening the Soviet position.
e. To eliminate US influence in Europe and
Asia.
f. To establish Soviet domination over
Europe and Asia.
g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-
Soviet world generally, especially to under-
mine the power and influence of the US.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these
immediate objectives simultaneously. In case
of conflict between one and another of these
objectives, however, it may be expected that
the Soviet rulers will attach greater impor-
tance to the first four listed, and in that. order.
armed force, if necessary, even though serious
risks may be involved.
5. A Soviet decision to risk general war by
the use of armed force in any particular situ-
ation, and, even more, a deliberate resort to
general war, would depend on:_
a. The Soviet rulers' estimate of the im-
portance of the particular situation in rela-
tion to their over-all security.
b. The prospects of accomplishing the ob-
jectives involved by other means.
c. Their estimate of their chances of im-
proving their over-all power position in a
general war.
Economic?
6. The Soviet Union has already largely mo-
bilized its industry for war. It now has,
through manufacturing and stockpiling of
war materiel and equipment, a great prepon-
derance of military stocks, which enables, it
not only to maintain superior military
' Excludes consideration of Soviet capabilities in
nuclear energy production capacities.
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strength in being but also to have at its dis-
posal a readily realizable additional strength.
The West, on the other hand, except for a few
specialized arms, is only beginning to mobilize
its industry for war.
7. The over-all economic war potential of the
Western Powers is now, and for an indetermi-
nate number of years will continue to be,
superior to that of the Soviet Union and its
satellites. However, the Western Powers can-
not immediately assert their greatly superior
economic war potential, since it will require
several years to mobilize their strength.
8. Under these circumstances, the present
move among the North Atlantic Treaty coun-
tries for gearing part of their industries : to
production of armaments is a most important
consideration, because from 1951 onward, the
great preponderance of Soviet military
strength, derived from its large holdings of
war equipment, will begin to decline, and after
1953 may have ceased to be a significant
factor.
9. There are, however, other considerations
which might well induce the Soviet rulers
to interpret their own economic preparedness
for war in a different light. In undertaking a
war against the Western Powers at an early
date the Soviet rulers could look forward
to sweeping initial successes. They must,
nevertheless, take into account that such a
war would probably be prolonged and become
one of attrition, and that the industrial and
economic structure of the Soviet Union would
be exposed to severe losses, although some of
these could be at least partially offset by
Soviet control over the resources of Western
Europe and other areas obtained as a result
of Soviet conquests in the early stage of the
war.
10. There are, moreover, indications that in
the next and succeeding Five-Year Plans spe-
cial attention will be given to the strategic
problems of bringing the manufacturing in-
dustries into better balance with the basic in-
dustries, improving the transportation sys-
tem, and obtaining better results in the
planned dispersal of industry.
11. The Soviet rulers may hesitate to risk a
global war if they consider that the future
economic military strength of the West out-
weighs the immediate military advantage
they hold over the Western Powers. How-
ever, the date at which the Soviet rulers
might be prepared to take the risks of a major
war against the Western Powers is unknown
since there is no intelligence available con-
cerning what evaluation the Soviet rulers are
making of this factor. Consideration of the
known factors indicates that from the point
of view of output and stockpiles of war mate-
riel, the period when the Soviet Union could
assert its military strength most advantage-
ously against the Western Powers is between
now and the end of 1953.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Scientific
Development.
12. The atomic bomb is the only weapon of
mass destruction which would be a major
factor in a Soviet decision to assume the risk
of a major war.
13. The current estimate
atomic bomb stockpile is
Mid-1950 22
regarding the Soviet
as follows:
Mid-1952 95
Mid-1953 165
Mid-1954 235
14. The Soviet Union has and will have suf-
ficient aircraft, trained crews, and bases of
operation to warrant an attempt to deliver in
the United States and in the United Kingdom
the full stockpile of atomic bombs that are now
and will become available. Should local con-
ditions require the dropping of bombs by other
than visual means, the efficiency of Soviet
bomb placement may be adversely affected.
In addition, the Soviet Union has the capabil-
ity for clandestine atomic explosions in ports
and in selected inland areas, and may be able
to launch guided missiles with atomic war-
heads from submarines within the period un-
der consideration.
15. In view of present and future Soviet atomic
capability, it is apparent that the total power
of the Soviet Union has been and is being in-
creased rapidly.
16. The United States now enjoys a wide mar-
gin of superiority in numbers of bombs in
stockpile over the Soviet Union. However, it
would be illusory to conclude that the United
States and Western Europe will remain safe
from atomic attack so long as the United
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States maintains this numerical superiority.
When the Soviet rulers believe that they have
produced a sufficient quantity of atomic
bombs to be seriously crippling or decisive
against the Western Powers, the danger of So-
viet attack will be greatly increased. When
the Soviets have attained this atomic capabil-
ity, the US superiority in total numbers of
atomic bombs will no longer be a deterrent
to the Soviet decision for war, in the same rela-
tive degree as before. The extent of Soviet
vulnerability to a retaliatory US attack will,
however, affect Soviet calculation.
17. It is impossible to state when the Soviets
may estimate they have reached this capabil-
ity. This may occur at any time and the sit-
uation may become critical at any time within
the next two years.
18. As regards other items of scientific de-
velopment, it is considered that the Soviet
rulers would probably be willing to assume the
risk of a major war at any time after the end
of 1950.
Ground Forces.
19. The military effectiveness of the Soviet
Union is being steadily increased. At present
the Soviet Army comprises about 175 line divi-
sions and could rapidly mobilize about 145
more, and subsequently increase this number
if required. By about 1954 indicated reor-
ganization, training, and equipment programs
will have been completed. By that date the
Soviet rulers should be able to place reliance
on the,satellites to the extent that an increas-
ing proportion can be expected to fight well
against hereditary enemies. The Soviet Union
possesses the advantage of a concentration of
force on interior lines and potentially of exer-
cising the initiative.
20. The state of readiness in the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization countries is far below
that of the Soviet Union. Reaction to the
Korean conflict caused many of these nations
to plan increases in national armed forces.
Even by 1954, however, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization countries cannot achieve parity
with the Soviet Union in numbers of men un-
der arms or in quantities of certain items of
equipment.
21. Under the impetus of expected increased
aid from the United States, coupled with an
increase in appropriations at home, the forces
which should be available to North Atlantic
Treaty Organization countries for the mid-
years commencing 1951 to 1954 are estimated
to be 63, 72, 83, and 93 divisions respectively.
22. At present the Soviet Union possesses the
capability of initiating hostilities in Western
Europe without any additional warning and
invading Western Europe with an initial force
of about 25 divisions at present located in East
Germany and Poland, and of rapidly building
this force to about 75 to 90 divisions. In such
event the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
countries are not at present capable of prevent-
ing the overrunning of Western Europe, ex-
cluding the United Kingdom.
23. It is accepted that it will be found pos-
sible progressively to build up the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe
so that, by 1954, they will be capable of with-
standing the initial shock of such a surprise
attack.
24. In the Near and Middle East area, the
planned improvements in the armies of Tur-
key, Greece and Iran are largely a matter of
modernization rather than expansion. There
is, therefore, little military advantage from
the viewpoint of the Soviet Union in opening
hostilities in this area in any particular year
between now and 1954.
25. From purely an army viewpoint, if the So-
viet rulers are willing to initiate, to provoke,
or to accept the risk of a general war, it would
be in their best interests to do so at some time
between now and 1954, with the optimum date
probably being about the middle of the period.
Air Forces.
26. The authorized military aircraft strength
in operational units of the Soviet Air Forces
is estimated to be 20,000 aircraft at the pres-
ent time. While definite information is lack-
ing, it is believed that the actual aircraft
strength of the operational units may be ten
to fifteen percent below the authorized
strength. In addition to the aircraft in oper-
ational units it is estimated that there are
some 20,000 combat aircraft in stored reserve.
Besides the stored reserve, the combat units
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would be supported by the semi-military Civil
Air Fleet with an operating strength of 1,500
major transports, and an unknown number of
concealed aircraft, for example those of the
MVD, plus combat aircraft in the training es-
tablishment, command support aircraft, and
those assigned for test, research, and develop-
ment. No significant change is expected in
the organization of the Soviet Air Forces over
the next few years nor is there evidence to
suggest that the front line strength will
change materially over the same period.
However, it is estimated that the proportion
of high performance aircraft will increase con-
siderably and advances in bomber interception
and strategic bombing capabilities can be
expected.
27. The Soviet Military Air Force is numeri-
cally superior to Western tactical air forces
and is adequate to support all land campaigns
which the Soviet Union might be expected to
undertake in event of war in the next few
years. Its combat value is being increased
steadily by re-equipment of fighter and
bomber units with high performance jet air-
craft.
28. The Soviet Naval Air Force is an effective
coastal adjunct to the Soviet Air Force and
could be used in direct support of the Soviet
Army. It is anticipated that as in the case of
the Military Air Force, the combat value of
the Naval Air Force will increase as the re-
.-,Alt of re-equipment in the next year or two
and as the result of further training.
29. The Soviet Union possesses in quantity ex-
cellent day interceptors for fighter defense,
but at present is handicapped in the bomber
interception field by the lack of efficient all-
weather interceptors and effective ground con-
trol interceptor radars. It is anticipated that
a good all-weather interceptor will probably
be introduced in 1952, and that difficulties
with ground control interception radars will
have been largely overcome by the time this
interceptor appears in service. In 1952, the
Soviet Union should have reached a state of
training and re-equipment sufficient to pro-
vide a relatively effective fighter defense sys-
tem.
30. The Soviet Union has and will have the
capability in aircraft and trained crews to en-
able it to attempt to deliver in the United
Kingdom and North America the full stock-
pile of atomic bombs that are and will become
available. In the next few years the strategic
bombing capability of the Soviet Air Forces
will increase substantially, particularly in
view of the increasing atomic bomb stockpile.
The introduction of jet medium bombers in
1952 and heavy bombers in 1953 in the strate-
gic bombing force will increase the effective-
ness of this force, although the problems con-
nected with high-speed bombing and naviga-
tion may not be fully solved by that time.
31. Based on the above considerations, the So-
viet Union may assess its present air capabili-
ties as. adequate for the conduct of a major
war. It is expected that Soviet air capabili-
ties will be improved steadily and probably
reach optimum relative to the Western Powers
in 1952. Therefore, a state of readiness which
the Soviet Union considers favorable for the
conduct of major operations may 'be reached
at any time from the present to 1952.
Naval Forces.
32. The surface naval forces of the- Western
Powers,are so much stronger than those of the
Soviet Union that the latter will not be able
for many years at least to dispute by surface
forces the control of the major ocean commu-
nications. The Soviet Submarine Fleet, how-
ever, is strong in comparison with the anti-
submarine forces of the Western Powers, and
Soviet minelaying potential is high in compar-
ison with the minesweeping resources avail-
able to the Western Powers.
33. The Submarine Fleet is able now to exert
a serious threat to Allied sea communications.
This threat will become progressively more
serious with the estimated increase in strength
and improvement in performance of the Sub-
marine Fleet during the next few years.
34. The Surface Fleets pose no serious threat
to Allied control of the sea, but are probably
ready now to accept the following roles:
a. Defense of sea frontiers of the Soviet
Union.
b. Support of the seaward flanks of the
Soviet Army.
35. The Naval Air Forces are capable now of
supporting the surface fleets in the above roles.
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36. The Soviet Merchant Fleet is capable of
providing the lift for short range amphibious
operations, and of sustaining the wartime
economy of the Soviet Union, except, possibly,
in the Far East.
Civil Defense.
37. The knowledge available indicates that
neither the Soviet nor NATO blocs have yet
taken effective measures of civil defense on a
scale sufficient to cope with atomic attack.
III. COURSES OPEN TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
General Review.
38. The basic problem here considered is to
estimate the courses of action that may be
followed by the Soviet rulers in pursuit of
their objectives as stated in paragraph 1.
39. It must be recognized that a general war
might occur as a result of some Soviet action
undertaken without deliberate intention to
precipitate a general war and even before the
Soviet rulers considered themselves fully ready
for it.
40. The Soviet rulers, while so far eschewing
the direct use of their own military forces,
have shown themselves willing to employ every
available means short of this. Further ag-
gression in the face of Western counter-meas-
ures will carry with it an increasing danger
of general war. Short of abandonment by
the West of its policy of resisting Communist
aggression, the only circumstance that could
remove that danger would be the abandon-
ment by the Soviet Union of its policy of ag-
gression.
41. On the basis of Soviet conduct and declar-
ations of policy since 1945, there is no indica-
tion that the Soviet rulers will modify their
policy of aggression. In fact, during the last
year their actions have shown an apparently
increasing disregard of possible Western reac-
tions. In particular, the North Korean at-
tack appears to mark a significant step for-
ward in the Kremlin's strategy, since, even
though the Soviet rulers may have originally
discounted the risk of US reaction to the North
Korean move, they have persisted in their
course despite actual US reactions.
42. The Soviet rulers can be expected to con-
tinue their aggressive pressures on the power
position of the Western countries. In their
choice of time, place, and method they will
continue to follow a policy of expediency.
They can be expected to continue to attempt
to exploit every apparent soft spot, employing
such weapons and tactics as seem best adapted
to particular situations.
43. The Soviet rulers have shown that, while
applying the rule of expediency in choosing
among the possible courses of action, they will
not necessarily reject such courses as carry the
risk of armed conflict. Logically, they would
prefer not to take action of this nature so long
as they believed that they were attaining their
immediate objectives without it. If, however,
they came to the conclusion that they were
failing to obtain these objectives by other
means they would be willing to assume the
risk of involving their own forces, dependent
on their estimate of their chances of success
both in attaining their immediate objectives
and in coping with any resultant reaction by
the Western Powers. Generally, the more
closely they considered their objectives related
to the security of the Soviet Union the more
readily would they risk involving their own
military forces.
44. In view of the above, an estimate of the
danger and imminence of war can be based
only on a review of the critical situations exist-
ing and impending, together with a calcula-
tion of Soviet aims and prospects in each case,
the relative strength and state of over-all prep-
aration of the powers involved, and the impact
of likely Western counter-moves on Soviet
planning.
45. In dealing with various critical situations
existing and pending, Soviet rulers may at-
tempt to achieve their objectives by either:
Course One-means short of deliberate re-
sort to general war, or,
Course Two-deliberate resort to general
war.
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46. Course One would in turn cover several
possible lines of action which might be fol-
lowed separately or concurrently. These are :
a. To use means other than armed aggres-
sion across a frontier.
b. To instigate local military aggression
by satellite armed force.
c. To undertake local aggression by Soviet
armed force.
47. Course Two could follow either of two al-
ternative lines of action :
a. A direct attack on the United States
and its allies; or,
b. A deliberate provocation involving the
virtual certainty of general war, and intended
to precipitate it.
48. Choice of Course One b, or Course One c,
would seem to depend, at least in large part,
upon the urgency of Soviet preoccupation with
the area in which such limited aggression
were instigated or undertaken. Choice of
Course Two, on the other hand, would amount
to an attempt to destroy the power position of
the Western countries either once and for all,
or at least in Europe and Asia, and would de-
pend. upon global considerations. From the
political standpoint, Course Two a is less
likely than Course Two b.
Course One (Means Short of Deliberate Resort to
General War).
49. On the basis of the discussion in Appendix
B, and apart from possible long-term consider-
ations such as economic crisis in the West
which the Soviet rulers may think will work in
their favor, they probably estimate their pros-
pects somewhat as below:
Course One a (Means other than armed ag-
gression across a frontier).
50. Tibet and Indochina appear to be the only
countries in which the odds presently favor
the establishment of Communist control. In
Indochina, Chinese aid for indigenous Com-
munist elements is essential and is being fur-
nished. If Indochina were to come under
Communist control, then Siam and Burma
would probably quickly follow.
51. The state of public opinion In Western
Europe, particularly in France, and in Western
Germany may give the Soviet rulers reason to
hope that their immediate aim of prevent-
ing the development of continental military
strength can still be accomplished through
agitation and internal pressures. Generally,
however, the West European governments do
not reflect this state of popular opinion, and
public opinion is changing and will continue
to change as Western defense measures be-
come effective. From now on, apart from the
possible effect of the above-mentioned long-
term considerations, any hopes which the
Kremlin may now retain for success in West-
ern Europe and Western Germany will prob-
ably diminish.
52. The development of the situation in Iran
is less predictable, but here again it can be
expected that as Western support increases,
the prospects for the achievement of Soviet
domination of Iran without the use of external
force will decline.
53. In Scandinavia, Turkey, the Arab States,
Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Indo-
nesia, and Japan, the national authorities are
apparently capable of coping with any out-
breaks of violence designed to lead to Krem-
lin control of the country. On the other hand,
the Kremlin could, by propaganda and other
means, hope to influence, in some cases ma-
terially, the political attitude of the Arab
States, India, Pakistan, Israel, and Indonesia.
54. In Yugoslavia the government is at pres-
ent capable of coping with outbreaks of vio-
lence designed to lead to Soviet control. How-
ever, the economic situation might deteriorate
substantially in the next year of two, in which
case the authority of the government might
be threatened.
55. In Malaya and the Philippines, current
Communist guerrilla operations can probably
be sustained indefinitely; and in Greece, the
Soviet Union may attempt to revive large-
scale guerrilla activities at any time. How-
ever, the authorities of these countries, sup-
ported by the United States or the United
Kingdom, should be able to control the sit-
uation.
Course One b (Local military aggression by
satellite armed forces).
56. General. The Soviet Union has already
resorted to indirect aggression by means of
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satellite forces in the case of Korea. Similar
employment of non-Soviet forces could be at-
tempted in the following areas, although the
Kremlin would have to recognize that indi-
rect aggression in any of them (except Tibet)
would in varying degree carry risk of general
war :
In Europe: Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia,
Western Germany, and Berlin.
In Asia: Tibet, Formosa, Hong Kong,
Macao, Indochina, and Burma.
57. Europe. Military success would be un-
likely in the cases of Turkey and Greece, and
questionable in the case of Yugoslavia. In
Western Germany it would also be unlikely in
the present state of development of the Polizei
Bereitschaften. The incorporation of Berlin
is an essential step towards the Soviet aim to
secure a unified Germany subservient to the
Kremlin. An attack by the Polizei Bereit-
schaften at Soviet instigation upon the West-
ern occupying forces in Berlin might well ap-
pear to Soviet rulers to have prospects of local
success, although the Soviet rulers would have
difficulty in disavowing responsibility for such
an attack unless Soviet occupation troops had
been previously withdrawn from the Berlin
area.
58. Asia. Tibet can be occupied at any time
without any risk of extension of hostilities.
Military success in Formosa is problematical
but success could be assured against Burma,
Indochina and Hong Kong, and Macao. Dom-
ination of Burma and Indochina would out-
flank Siam and control the major sources of
rice to Asiatic countries at present outside thF
Soviet orbit. Siam could not then avoid com-
ing under Communist domination, and Ma-
laya would thus be directly threatened. Hong
Kong would be a lesser strategic prize and
the difficulty of localizing the war would be
greater than in the case of Burma and Indo-
china.
Course One c (Local aggression by Soviet
armed forces).
59. The Soviet rulers may well consider that
only against Finland and Yugoslavia could
Soviet forces be used directly without grave
danger of immediately precipitating general
war, and would recognize that even in those
cases their use would bring general war ap-
preciably nearer.
On Balance.
60. The Soviet rulers may have reason to esti-
mate that they can achieve some of their ob-
jectives, particularly in South and Southeast
Asia, through measures short of armed aggres-
sion across a frontier. However, the existing
situation, apart from the possible effects of
long-term considerations, gives them little rea-
son to hope for achievement, through these
means alone, of their major objectives, partic-
ularly those related to the rearmament of the
West including utilization of West German
and Japanese military potential. Neverthe-
less, it can be assumed that they will continue
to exploit every opportunity for the employ-
ment of such means in order to retard Western
defensive preparations and to weaken and
divide the non-Soviet world.
61. A decision to employ indirect or direct mil-
itary aggression on a local scale will probably
depend on developing circumstances, partic-
ularly on the progress of Western defensive
measures. The Soviet rulers might accept
serious risk of general war in order to prevent
the actual development of hostile military
power on the strategic approaches to the
Soviet Union. They would be particularly
concerned at the recreation of West German
or Japanese military power. It must be em-
phasized that Soviet rulers may well regard
the progressive development of the situation
in Korea in the same light and may take local
action accordingly.
Course Two (Deliberate Resort to General War).
62. The Soviet rulers might, under certain
circumstances, consider that it was to their
advantage deliberately to engage in war with
the Western Powers. However, it is estimated
that they would be unlikely to take this step
deliberately unless they were convinced that
their most important objectives were plainly
jeopardized. In addition, they would have to
be confident, either:
(a) of speedy neutralization of US offen-
sive power; or,
(b) of their ability to establish a degree
of control over the Eurasian land mass, in-
cluding the neutralization of the United King-
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dom by occupation or otherwise, that would
give them the benefit of a considerable pro-
portion of European industrial potential and
would present the United States with a mili-
tary task of such proportions that the United
States would be unwilling or unable to make
the effort necessary to carry it through.
63. A decision by the Soviet rulers to resort
to war under assumption (a) above would
presuppose their estimate that they had
atomic or other capabilities to deal the United
States a blow sufficiently crippling to enable
the Soviet Union to attain their war objec-
tives.
64. A decision by the Soviet rulers on the basis
of assumption (b) above would presuppose
their estimate that, either with or without
a limited attack on the United States, the
Soviet economy, strengthened by the acquisi-
tion of Western European industrial resources,
would be capable of supporting a prolonged
war, and also their estimate that Soviet de-
fenses could prevent crippling attacks on the
resultant Soviet economy.
IV. SOVIET STRATEGIC INTENTIONS AND CAMPAIGNS
IN THE EVENT OF GLOBAL WAR
65. In the event of global war between the
Soviet Union and the Western Allies, it is con-
sidered that Soviet action would follow gener-
ally along the lines set forth below.
66. The Soviet plan would be to undertake
the following operations:
a. Simultaneously
(1) A campaign against Western Eu-
rope including Italy.
(2) An aerial bombardment against
the British Isles.
(3) Campaigns against the Near and
Middle East including Greece and Turkey.
(4) Campaigns in the Far East.
(5) Attacks against Canada and the
United States, including Alaska and the Aleu-
tians.
(6) A sea and air offensive against
Anglo-American sea communications.
(7) Subversive activities and sabotage
against Anglo-American interests in all parts
of the world.
(8) Defense of the Soviet Union against
hostile attack.
b. As soon as possible, after the occupa-
tion of the Channel Port areas, a full-scale
sea and air offensive against the British Isles
including an attempted invasion.
c. As soon as feasible, campaigns against
Scandinavia and the Iberian Peninsula.
d. As necessary, air attacks against Pak-
istan.
67. It is believed that the Soviet Union would
have sufficient armed forces to undertake all
the campaigns listed above and sti l have suffi-
cient armed forces to form an adequate re-
serve.
68. Opportunist campaigns by Chinese Com-
munist forces, which may or may not be di-
rected by the Soviet Union, against neighbor-
ing territories in Asia might be undertaken at
any time.
69. If war occurs during the period under con-
sideration, little or no warning will be re-
ceived and, therefore, M-Day and D-Day
should, for planning purposes, be considered
the same. The Soviet armed forces are in an
advanced enough state of preparation to
achieve the objectives outlined in this esti-
mate without requiring any appreciable period
of notice.
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APPENDIX A
POLITICAL ALIGNMENT
Soviet Bloc.
1. The following countries are likely to re-
main in alignment with the Soviet Union:
a. In Europe : Poland, Eastern Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria,
and probably Albania. (There is a possibility
that Albania may cease to be a Soviet satellite
in the course of the next few years, provided
Yugoslavia remains outside the Soviet bloc.)
b. In Asia : Communist China and Outer
Mongolia.
2. In the event of a major war in Europe the
European satellites may be expected to be
belligerents.
3. In the event of a war between the Soviet
Union and the Western Powers, Communist
China is not likely to deny to the Soviet Union
any facilities or resources, and is likely to pur-
sue an opportunist policy of expansion. The
Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 requires each party
to render assistance to the other in the event
of attack by Japan "nor any other state which
should unite with Japan directly or indirectly
in acts of aggression." Communist China is
unlikely to forfeit the advantages of this alli-
ance in present circumstances.
4. The political alignment of Korea will de-
pend on the outcome of the present United
Nations action there.
Anti-Soviet Bloc.
5. In the event of any war between the Soviet
Union on the one hand and the United King-
dom and the United States on the other, it is
considered that the following countries (to-
gether with their overseas possessions) will be
in alignment against the Soviet Union from
the outbreak of the war:
United States, United Kingdom, Can-
ada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
and Ceylon.
6. The following countries (with their over-
seas possessions) would probably also be
aligned against the Soviet Union, but not nec-
essarily unless the provisions of the North At-
lantic Treaty were involved :
France, the Benelux countries, Italy,
Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal.
Those countries not participating as bellig-
erents would be at least benevolently neutral.
7. India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan
may well decide to maintain non-belligerent
status unless directly attacked, though their
attitude would be sympathetic to the Western
Powers.
8. Treaty commitments (all subject to the
provisions of the United Nations Charter) also
exist between the United Kingdom and
Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.
a. Turkey. Under the Treaty of Mutual
Assistance of 1939 (which expires in October
1954) the United Kingdom and France are
obliged to go to the assistance of Turkey, if
Turkey is attacked, but Turkey is not obliged
to assist her allies in a war against the Soviet
Union. Though the Turks are likely to fight
rather than submit to any major Soviet de-
mands, they would not otherwise necessarily
join the Western Powers. in war.
b. Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of
1936 (which expires in 1956) permits the Unit-
ed Kingdom to station limited land and air
forces in the Suez Canal Zone. On present
indications, the Egyptian Government, in the
event of a war with the Soviet Union, although
probably favoring the Allied cause, would not
consent to the use of Egyptian armed forces
except possibly in defense of Egyptian terri-
tory. This would not, however, affect West-
ern use of bases in Egypt.
c. Iraq and Jordan. Under the United
Kingdom treaties with Jordan and Iraq, the
parties agree to offer one another mutual
assistance. In the case of Iraq, assistance to
the United Kingdom is limited to the provision
of facilities in Iraq territory.
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9. Apart from treaty obligations, all the Arab
Governments will probably be disposed to
favor the Western Powers and to make avail-
able to them their economic resources and
territories; although they may be reluctant to
assist in any active cooperation, particularly
if this involves the dispatch of forces outside
their own territories.
10. Philippines. The present Philippine Gov-
ernment is committed to alignment with the
United States and to make Philippine bases
available to the United States.
11. Latin America. The Latin American re-
publics will support the United States in vary-
ing degrees of effective cooperation under the
Rio Treaty. Active military assistance may be
available in some cases (e.g. Brazil).
12: Japan. It is expected that, even after the
conclusion of a Japanese Peace Treaty, at least
base facilities in that country will continue to
be available to the Western Powers.
13. Western Germany and Austria. The
position of the governments of Western Ger-
many and Austria will depend on the develop-
ment of plans under the North Atlantic
Treaty.
14. Greece. In the case of Greece the Gov-
ernment will be entirely sympathetic and .may
be expected to fall in with Western plans as
far as it is able to do so.
Neutral States.
15. The following countries will attempt, in-
itially at least, to remain neutral, though some
of them may cooperate in action undertaken
by the United Nations :
Iran, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, the
Irish Republic, Finland, Yugoslavia, Israel,
Afghanistan, Burma, Siam, and Indonesia.
Most of these countries would probably resist
if attacked, particularly if given support.
16. Yugoslavia. So long as the present
regime remains in power the Soviet Union will
have to use force if it wants to make use of
Yugoslav territory. There is at present no
indication of the existence of an alternative
Communist organization of sufficient strength
to carry out a pro-Cominform rising, but a
severe deterioration in the economic situation
within the next year or two, which remains a
definite possibility, could materially affect the
situation.
17. Israel. In the event of a major war in the
Middle East, Israel may be disposed to favor
the Western Powers and, as a result of politi-
cal or economic pressure, may assist them.
MORALE
Soviet Union.
18. Soviet citizens in responsible positions
from the age of 50 downwards have been
brought up on Marxist-Leninist doctrines to
the rigid exclusion of all others. The great
majority, therefore, will always be ready to
support strong central leadership by Commu-
nist leaders in defense of Soviet national in-
terest.
19. The Soviet people do not want war, but
any war in which the Soviet Union became
involved would be presented to them as essen-
tial to their national survival, and few would
be able to question the official version of
events. The vast majority would acquiesce in
the decision of the Kremlin.
20. In war, the control exercised over every
form of human activity by the police and
propaganda systems of the Soviet Union
would be a source of unity and strength, so
long as the Soviet campaigns met with suc-
cess. If, however, the assertions of Soviet
propaganda were disproved by events, there is
little doubt that evidence of Soviet inability
to resist Allied strength would come as a shock
to the people generally. So long as police con-
trol remained intact, this would not have any
widespread result. Even if Allied counter-
measures, including the use of atomic bombs,
resulted in police control being severely
strained or broken, the process of disintegra-
tion would probably be a slow one. The Rus-
sian people have in the past rallied magnifi-
cently to expel foreign invaders, and even in
the event of large-scale Allied air attack, the
majority of the population would fight on as
best they could.
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21. Although the Soviet rulers have to reckon
with a degree of disloyalty (which might be
increased in war) among the minorities in the
Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and
Central Asia, rebellion on the part of these
ethnic groups could not be expected unless
Soviet police control had collapsed or Western
support and protection were at hand.
The European Satellites.
22. The majority of the populations in the
satellite countries are intensely nationalistic,
and large proportions resent the domination
of the Kremlin and the present Communist
Governments with which they are burdened.
Although this attitude is a source of potential
weakness to the Soviet bloc, there is no present
evidence to indicate that it would give rise
to further successful nationalist deviations on
Titoist lines, nor would it produce effective
resistance to the Soviet war effort unless the
war were going badly for the Soviet Union and
the disaffected elements were given guidance
and support from the West.
China.
23. In. the event of major hostilities the Chi-
nese Peoples' Government could maintain ef-
fective control over the general population in.
Manchuria, in North, Central, and East China,
and in most of the large cities, through the
existing political and police apparatus. In
South and Southwest China, where the Com-
munist apparatus is not yet fully developed
and where some 400,000 guerrillas still remain
in active opposition, the effective authority of
the Chinese Peoples' Government would prob-
ably be limited to the principal cities and lines
of communications and to the frontiers with
Indochina and Burma, leaving millions of
Chinese beyond its control. This situation,
however, would not endanger the regime un-
less an organized, politically coherent opposi-
tion movement, with outside support, were to
develop within the country. There is no
present indication of such a development.
The Western World.
24. The chief elements of weakness in Western
European morale are a general feeling of the
inability to resist armed attack by the Soviet
Union (combined with an unwillingness to be-
come involved in another war) and the lack of
unity of purpose on the part of the Western
Allies. These weaknesses are enhanced by
the intellectual and emotional appeals of the-
oretical Communism; the social and indus-
trial unrest which Communism exploits; and
by a general failure on the part of the rank
and file of the Western Nations to appreciate
the real conditions of life under a Communist
dictatorship.
25. In Western Europe, the internal Commu-
nist threat is not serious except in France and
Italy where the Communist parties have a con-
siderable hold on the labor organizations, and,
in Italy, also among the poorer peasants. The
position of other Western European countries
will be materially affected by that of France.
In France, although the majority of French-
men are anti-Communist, there is a wide-
spread feeling of defeatism. There is, under
present circumstances, a considerable unwill-
ingness to resist if war breaks out, or to risk
being compromised in the eyes of the Com-
munists under a Soviet occupation which is be-
coming accepted as inevitable. If French-
men, however, can be given real confidence in
their ability, with the support of their allies,
to withstand a Soviet invasion, this defeatism
is likely to be. dispelled. Defeatism has not
gone so far as to affect the attitude of the
French Government toward her allies. The
Soviet Union is aware of a general situation
and appears in its propaganda to the West to
devote more attention to exploiting the desire
for peace and attracting those elements of the
population most susceptible to peace appeals
than directly to expanding the Communist
parties in these countries.
26. In Western Germany there is general op-
position to Communism and the Communist
Party is unlikely to constitute a serious in-
ternal threat. Nevertheless, German morale
is at present low and will deteriorate still fur-
ther unless Western Germans can be given
confidence that either they themselves, or the
Western Powers, will be enabled to defend
Western Germany from attack.
27. In the Middle East, although Communism
is generally feared and disliked, the social
structure is such that there is fertile ground
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for propaganda. The Arab Governments
would, however, prefer to remain neutral in
any conflict between the Soviet Union and the
Western Powers. If they were directly at-
tacked, token resistance might be expected,
the strength and duration of which would
depend on how the war went for the Allies.
If it went badly, the early emergence of a pro-
Soviet body of feeling might be expected. The
Arab peoples themselves are largely indif-
ferent but, though Communist ideas have
maae little progress, they are generally anti-
Western, and no popular resistance to the
Soviet Union can be expected. In the non-
official intelligentsia there is considerable
anti-Western feeling, chiefly on account of the
present policy of the Western Powers toward
Israel. In the event of a general conflict in
which Israel were involved in support of the
West, there might be a risk that anti-Israel
feeling would induce the Arabs to come out on
the other side.
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APPENDIX B
COURSES OPEN TO SOVIET UNION
1. In the following discussion, possible Soviet
actions under Course One (Means Short of
Deliberate Resort to General War) are
examined.
Northern Europe (Finland, Sweden, Norway,
and Denmark).
2. The immediate Soviet aim in Northern
Europe is to prevent the occupation and use
of that area as a base of operations against the
Soviet Union. If the Soviet rulers considered
that a serious threat were developing they
would accept a risk of global war if necessary
to prevent such a development. The ulti-
mate desideratum would be control of the
entire area, thus acquiring not only its facili-
ties and resources, but also complete control
of the Baltic and free access to the North
Atlantic.
3. With the exception of Finland, Soviet sub-
versive capabilities in Northern Europe are
extremely limited. Even in Finland the gov-
ernment appears capable of keeping internal
pressure under control. The only effective
means available for accomplishing either of
the aims indicated above is the overwhelming
local preponderance of Soviet military power.
4. The coercive threat inherent in the prox-
imity of overwhelming Soviet power appears
sufficient, in large part, to accomplish the
immediate Soviet aim. It imposes on Finland
a necessity to cooperate with the Soviet Union
(so long as Soviet demands do not require
national suicide) and is a main consideration
causing Sweden to adhere to a fixed policy
of neutrality. Although Norway and Den-
mark have adhered to the North Atlantic
Treaty, they would be disinclined to permit
developments in their territories which the
Soviet Union could regard as an offensive
threat.
5. Conversely, the local employment of Soviet
armed force for the subjugation of Northern
Europe is inhibited by regard for the broader
consequences. Outright Soviet invasion of
Finland would be resisted by the Finns to
the best of their ability. This action, also,
might well frustrate the immediate Soviet
purpose in Northern Europe by driving Swe-
den into adherence to the North Atlantic
Treaty and by stimulating offensive-defensive
preparations in Norway, Denmark, and Swe-
den. An attack on Sweden would be resisted
and would also stimulate the preparations in
Norway and Denmark and would involve risk
of a general war. An attack on Norway or
Denmark would directly involve war with all
the North Atlantic Treaty States.
6. The Soviet rulers will continue to maneuver
toward the subversion of Finland by local
Communists supported by the immanent
power of the Soviet Union, but are unlikely to
resort to local military action in Northern
Europe unless convinced that such action is
necessary to prevent the occupation and the
use of the-area as a base for operations against
the Soviet Union or that global war is im-
minent.
Western Europe (France, Benelux, Italy, Portu-
gal).
7. Immediate Soviet aims in Western Europe
are:
a. To prevent the countries of Western
Europe from becoming organized into a force
capable of presenting effective military op-
position to the Soviet Union, either as a bul-
wark or threat.
b. To destroy or impair Western European
confidence in, and association with the United
States and United Kingdom.
c. To foster conditions favorable to the
growth of communist strength.
8. Short of deliberate resort to general war,
the only means at the disposal of the Soviet
Union for the pursuit of its aims in Western
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Europe consist of such communist-inspired
activities as mass propaganda and agitation;
parliamentary pressure; subversive infiltra-
tion of armed forces and government offices;
industrial strikes and sabotage; and attempts
to stir up internal violence and civil commo-
tion. Since 1946 there has been a generally
declining trend in the effectiveness of such
measures, corresponding with a general in-
crease in the stability of the governments and
in their ability to maintain internal security,
due in large part to external economic aid.
Nevertheless, despite the substantial effect
of the Economic Recovery Program, Western
Europe has not yet achieved economic via-
bility; and, despite the provisions made under
the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual
Defense Assistance Program, the defenses of
Western Europe have not yet been translated
from paper plans into actuality. Morale in
certain cases is currently at a low level, the
feeling of inability, under present circum-
stances, to resist Soviet military attack being
particularly marked. The Soviet-inspired
"peace campaign" has both appealed to and
stimulated latent defeatism. Morale is un-
likely to be rehabilitated without the estab-
lishment of real confidence that a Soviet in-
vasion could be repulsed.
9. Under these circumstances, it would be
premature to conclude that the Soviet rulers
have given up hope of achieving their aims in
Western Europe by continuing their present
tactics. As the actual implementation of
Western European defense plans proceeds, in-
tensified efforts to obstruct it both psychologi-
cally, through further propaganda pressure
upon morale, and physically, through strikes,
sabotage, and civil commotion, may be ex-
pected. It is, nevertheless, estimated that the
governments of Western Europe will be able
to cope with such efforts and to carry out their
defense commitments.
Germany
10. The long-term objective of the Soviet
Union in Germany is clearly to secure a uni-
fied Germany completely subservient to the
Kremlin. Pending achievement of this ob-
jective, the Soviet Union will seek to main-
tain absolute control over its own zone of
Germany and to prevent the integration of
Western Germany into the North Atlantic
Community. It will especially seek to pre-
vent the establishment of a West German
armed force that could bolster effectively the
Western military position.
11. The Soviet Union will continue to employ
every, indirect method available to undermine
the Allied position in Western Germany and
to interfere with the stability and efficient
functioning of the West German Govern-
ment. To this end, Soviet rulers will rely
upon the West German Communist Party, the
entire. East German state and Party appa-
ratus, certain extreme rightest groups in
Western Germany, and the potential of all
Eastern Europe for economic pressure on
Western Germany. Their tactics will be in-
filtration of the West German Government
and police, strikes, agitation, and probably in-
creasing use of violence against both local and
Allied authorities. They will, immediately,
direct their attention toward creating eco-
nomic chaos,. building up popular pressure
for Western troop withdrawal, crystalizing
and extending current opposition toward re-
armament, encouraging development of neu-
trality sentiment, and intensifying the al-
most universal desire for German unity. To
strengthen their propaganda position, the
Soviet rulers will make further paper conces-
sions to the East Germans, including prob-
ably a separate peace treaty and a token with-
drawal of Soviet troops. They will not, how-
ever, diminish in any way their actual control
over the Eastern zone.
12. It is regarded as unlikely that the Soviet
rulers will achieve their objectives in Ger-
many through the above approach. There
are no indications that the West Germans'
dislike of communism in general and Soviet
domination in particular is in any way dimin-
ishing or likely to diminish. Effective re-
armament of Western Germany would com-
pel the Soviet rulers either to take a new ap-
proach in the struggle for Western Germany
or risk increasing Western utilization of West
German military potential. The importance
that Soviet rulers clearly attach to prevent-
ing the latter, as well as certain trends in
Soviet policies and activities in East Germany,
suggests that the Kremlin is considering the
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use of East German military forces to estab-
lish control over Western Germany. While
the Polizei Bereitshaf ten is at present consid-
ered inadequate to undertake a conquest as-
signment, there is evidence that it is being
steadily strengthened. In the near future
the Kremlin may consider this force suffi-
ciently strong to be used to attack the West-
ern zones, and the possibility of such an at-
tack cannot therefore be excluded. The So-
viet rulers would have to recognize, however,
that this would involve great risk of general
war.
Berlin
13. Apart from the aim of securing control of
all Germany, an immediate Soviet objective is
to secure the withdrawal of Western forces
from Berlin. The importance of this to the
Kremlin lies not only in the impetus that
full possession of Berlin would be expected to
give to efforts of the East German government
to extend its rule over all Germany, but also
in the exaggerated sensitiveness of the Soviet.
rulers to the presence of hostile forces in the
heart of a Soviet province.
14. Without the use of forceful measures,
however, there appears little possibility that
the Western position in Berlin can be made
untenable. Restitution of a full-scale block-
ade would under present circumstances be
very embarrassing to Western authorities, but
it appears doubtful that a second blockade
would be risked unless the Kremlin were pre-
pared to maintain it by force if necessary.
The use of East German forces for this pur-
pose or for direct attack on the Western Sec-
tors of Berlin is a distinct possibility, The
same great. risk of general war would be
involved here as in the case of West Germany.
15. For both Berlin and Western Germany,
the Soviet rulers must realize that the em-
ployment of their own forces in any sort of
attack on the Western Forces of Occupation
would not be possible without precipitating a
general conflict.
Austria
16. The Kremlin's policy with respect to
Austria appears to be to continue the status
quo until such time as the German problem
is settled. It now appears highly unlikely
that the Kremlin will agree to a peace treaty
and a withdrawal of occupying forces. On
the other hand, there are no indications that
increased efforts are to be made to extend
Soviet control over the whole of Austria im-
mediately, or independently of German de-
velopments. If the German situation should
develop favorably for the Soviet rulers, in-
creasing external and internal pressures on
Austria could be expected.
Yugoslavia
17. The defection of Yugoslavia from the
Cominform, besides isolating Albania, de-
prived the Soviet Union of an important stra-
tegic position in Southeast Europe, giving
direct access to the Mediterranean, and of
an important base for exerting pressure on
Italy, Greece, Trieste and Western Austria.
Moreover, the Soviet rulers must realize that
the continued existence of the Tito heresy
makes it easier for dissident elements in the
communist parties of other countries to ques-
tion the Kremlin's leadership.
18. The Soviet aim must therefore be to
bring about as soon as possible the fall of
Tito. The Cominform will continue to try to
promote economic collapse and to create a
powerful pro-Cominform communist move-
ment within the country.
19. Soviet policy in Yugoslavia might meet
with greater success if the economic situa-
tion deteriorated far enough to lead to gen-
eral discontent, but at present there is no
sign that any alternative communist organi-
zation can be built up in sufficient strength
to evict Tito and install a pro-Cominform
government. The only means open to the
Kremlin under present circumstances is the
use of external force. If the Kremlin consid-
ers that satellite forces, with such Soviet ma-
terial assistance as might be required, could
overrun Yugoslavia, this possibility must be
reckoned with, particularly as such an attack
would not necessarily involve a direct clash
with the Western Powers. However, the So-
viet rulers are unlikely to consider that the sat-
ellite forces are powerful enough at present to
overrun Yugoslavia without direct Soviet in-
tervention. Consideration of the military
factors shows that the military strength of
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the satellites is likely to increase relative to
that of Yugoslavia, but it will remain ques-
tionable for some time whether this increase
will be sufficient to ensure a successful in-
vasion without direct Soviet intervention. A
direct Soviet attack, except in the event of
general war, is unlikely unless the Soviet
rulers should see in Yugoslavia a considerably
greater threat to the Soviet position than
exists at present.
Greece.
20. The establishment of Soviet influence in
Greece would be a valuable step towards the
isolation of Turkey, and the control of Crete
and of the Greek islands in the Aegean which
would be necessary for the effective control of
the Straits. It would also enable the Soviet
Union to mount air and limited naval opera-
tions against Allied sea communications in the
Eastern Mediterranean from the outbreak of
a general war.
21. For the present, it appears that the Soviet
Union is content to support the Greek Com-
munists chiefly with propaganda and money.
The communists' objective is to gain control
of the Trade Unions, exploit popular dissatis-
faction with the present system of govern-
ment, and ultimately to have the Communist
Party legalized and able to participate in the
government. They are concentrating, with
some success, on the reorganization of their
political activities.
22. The Soviet Union may attempt at any time
to resuscitate large-scale guerrilla activity in
Greece by using the former Greek guerrillas
dispersed among the satellites, mainly in Bul-
garia. The Greek Government, however,
could cope with such an attempt. While the
Soviet Union might instigate Bulgarian and
Albanian aggression against Greece, probably
accompanied by renewal of large-scale guer-
rilla activity, this is less likely since it would
involve considerable risk of United Nations
action. Furthermore, the chances are ques-
tionable whether the Bulgarian and Albanian
armed forces without direct Soviet aid could
defeat the Greeks now or in the future. The
immediate objectives of the Soviet rulers in
Greece are hardly of sufficient priority to jus-
tify the risk involved.
23. Should the Soviet Union succeed in re-
gaining control of Yugoslavia, the potential
threat to Greece would be greatly increased.
It would then be far easier to support guer-
rilla operations against Greece and stir up
trouble inside the country. In this event if
the Western Powers did not greatly increase
their support to the Greek Government, a
Communist domination of Greece would
probably ensue.
Turkey.
24. Russia has traditionally regarded the con-
trol of the Straits as one of its more important
strategic objectives, and Soviet policy towards
Turkey will continue to be directed towards it.
Turkey would be of great strategic importance
in a general war.
25. Communism has little appeal to the Turks,
who are traditionally fearful of Russian in-
tervention. The Soviet Union could achieve
limited results in Turkey through continuing
the war of nerves which imposes on Turkey the
economic burden of continued maintenance
of large military forces. The Soviet Unioi,
could also exert pressure on the Turkish Gov-
ernment by raising the question of the "his-
toric Georgian and Armenian lands" in East-
ern Turkey, or fostering the movement for
Kurdish autonomy.
26. There is, however, no chance of a Commu-
nist government being established in Turkey
without foreign invasion, nbr of a Turkish sub-
mission to any major Soviet demands. A
satellite invasion would be unsuccessful with-
out the intervention of Soviet forces. The So-
viet rulers must realize that a Soviet invasion
of Turkey would probably mean general war.
It is, therefore, likely that short of decision to
resort to a general war, they will limit them-
selves to an intensification of propaganda and
attempts at sabotage despite their apprecia-
tion of the limitations of this approach.
Arab States and Israel
27. In the Arab States the primary aim of the
Soviet rulers is to eliminate Western influ-
ence; and to undermine the strategic posi-
tion of the Western Allies in the Middle East.
To this end, they will attempt to foster eco-
nomic and social discontent against the Arab
ruling classes; strengthen illegal Communist
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parties; nurture a Communist sabotage po-
tential, particularly in oil field and pipeline
areas; instill fear of Soviet armed strength;
exploit anti-Israel feeling; extend the influ-
ence of the Soviet Union through the Orthodox
Church; and exploit dissident minorities such
as Armenians and Kurds.
28. Soviet policy toward Israel has appeared to
be more directed toward embarrassing the
United States and the United Kingdom in the
Middle East and promoting political chaos
than toward any immediate aggressive inten-
tion in Israel proper. The Soviet rulers un-
doubtedly will attempt to orient Israel away
from the Western Powers, in particular the
United States. However, for the present they
will limit their efforts to propaganda and the
strengthening of Communist influence in
Israel.
29. In neither Israel nor the Arab States can
the Soviet rulers expect the above tactics to
establish Communist control, although they
may succeed in influencing political attitudes.
At present they probably do not consider the
time is yet propitious to bring to bear any
other type of pressures.
Iran
30. The primary concern of the Soviet Union
with respect to Iran is to prevent the develop-
ment in that country of a potential base of
operations against the Soviet Union, with par-
ticular reference to the vulnerability of the
vital Baku oil region. The Soviet Union's sen-
sitivity on that point is reflected in its contin-
ued emphasis on the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of
1921, which contemplates the entry of Soviet
forces in Iran if necessary to forestall a threat
to Soviet security by a third power from
Iranian territory. An additional interest
would be the advantage to be derived from
Soviet control of Iranian oil resources with
particular reference to their denial to Western
use. The bulk of this oil would not be imme-
diately available for use within the Soviet Un-
ion unless its transportation by sea were feasi-
ble. Soviet domination of Iran would also
permit direct access to the Indian Ocean and
the Arab States, with a consequent increase in
the ability of the Soviet Union to undermine
Western interests in those areas.
31. Iran's proximity to the Soviet Union, its
remoteness from potential support, and the
political and economic conditions prevailing
within the country all facilitate Soviet intimi-
dation and subversion. The principal factor
is the immediate presence of overwhelming
Soviet military power. Subversive potentiali-
ties exist, locally, in Azerbaijan and Kurdish
disaffection, and, nationally, in the Soviet-
dominated Tudeh Party. Soviet employment
of these means has met with successive
checks : Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran
under United Nations pressure, with the im-
plication of United Nations support against
any future Soviet incursion; the Azerbaijan
debacle; the outlawing of the Tudeh Party;
and the emergence of the strong Razmara Gov-
ernment, which if given prompt economic and
military aid, may succeed in stabilizing the
internal situation. Nevertheless, dangerous
subversive potentialities will remain, particu-
larly if there should be a further deterioration
of the economic situation.
32. A Soviet decision to solve the problem by
direct military intervention is not prevented
by any local power of resistance; furthermore,
a plausible political justification for direct in-
terference in Iran could probably be engi-
neered without much difficulty but the Soviets
would have to reckon with longstanding UK
and recently expressed US interest in Iran,
the previous UN action, and the Korean prece-
dent. , It could be conceived as a local opera-
tion only on the calculation that it could be
accomplished before any reaction could occur
and that the United States, the United King-
dom and the United Nations would shrink
from any dangerous counteraction after the
fait accompli.
33. The threat of Soviet intervention under
the 1921 Treaty is probably sufficient to pre-
vent Iranian consent to the development of
any real threat to Soviet security in Iran; fur-
thermore, it might induce Iranian opposition
to a defensive build-up of Western forces in
Iran. That being the case, the Soviet Union,
for the time being, will probably subject the
Iranian Government to alternate intimidation
and blandishment, while simultaneously ex-
ploiting every subversive opportunity with the
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minimum purpose of keeping the country
weak and distracted and the maximum object
of bringing a "friendly" government to power
in Tehran. The Soviet Union would probably
not invade Iran unless it were willing to risk a
general war.
Afghanistan
34. The immediate Soviet interest in Afghan-
istan is to prevent the establishment of any
potentially hostile influence in that country,
which borders on Soviet Central Asia, a par-
ticularly sensitive region. A secondary So-
viet interest is in the potential utility of Af-
ghanistan as a position from which to
threaten Pakistan and India.
35. There is no apparent Communist activity
in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, however,
has a means of meddling in Afghan affairs
through professed solicitude for the inhabit-
ants of the area north of the Hindu Kush, who
are akin to the peoples of Soviet Central Asia.
The southern (Pathan) tribesmen, moreover,
are easily stirred up against the government
in Kabul, even without this pretext.
36. The Soviet Union has shown no consider-
able interest in Afghanistan. To do so might
well alarm and antagonize Pakistan and In-
dia. The immediate Soviet objective is suffi-
ciently served by the existing isolation and
backwardness of the country. In this con-
nection, Soviet purposes are well served by
Afghanistan's quarrel with Pakistan over
"Pathanistan," which antagonizes the neigh-
bor controlling Afghanistan's communications
with the non-Soviet world, creates disappoint-
ment in the lack of Western sympathy with
Afghanistan's position, and encourages a
tendency to turn to the Soviet Union for sup-
port.
37. The Soviet Union has no reason to be dis-
satisfied with the present situation in Afghan-
istan and is unlikely to develop a more active
policy in that country under present circum-
stances.
Pakistan
38. The primary Soviet concern with respect
to Pakistan must be to prevent the use of
West Pakistan as a base for Allied aerial oper-
ations.
39. West Pakistan affords a comparatively
poor field for Communist agitation because of
its Moslem character, the relative absence of
industrialization, and sheer difficulty of es-
tablishing suitable contacts. Since the estab-
lishment of a Soviet embassy at Karachi, how-
ever, some agitation has begun. The situa-
tion in East Pakistan in this respect resembles
that in India and Communist activity there is
controlled from India.
40. Meanwhile Pakistan's embroilments with
India, e.g., the Kashmir question, and with
Afghanistan tend to serve Soviet interests by
keeping the country tense and distracted.
The Soviet Union will endeavor to keep these
issues alive, but is not likely to intervene
openly unless Western military air bases,
which may be considered a threat to the So-
viet Union, are established there.
India
41. The immediate Soviet concern with re-
spect to India must be to exploit Indian an-
tipathy toward residual European colonialism
in Asia and sympathy for any movement pre-
senting itself as Asian nationalism, in order
to prevent India's alignment with the West
and to enlist its unwitting aid in bringing the
rest of Asia under Soviet domination. The
ultimate Soviet purpose is to effect Commu-
nist control over India.
42. India, and East Pakistan as well, afford
fertile ground for both industrial and agrarian
agitation. Aside from being peculiarly sus-
ceptible to pacifist and nonresistant move-
ments, Indian intellectuals are receptive to
the Communist interpretation of develop-
ments in Asia. There are present many of
the elements out of which the Communist
revolution in China was produced. Most im-
portant exceptions are lack of direct contact
with the Soviet Union and the absence of a
People's Liberation Army. Should Chinese
Communism advance to the frontiers of India,
effective substitutes for these missing ele-
ments might eventually be supplied.
43. Recent developments with respect to Ko-
rea have been somewhat prejudicial to Soviet
exploitation of India's attitude, but Indian
policy retains considerable ambivalence.
With respect to the internal situation, the
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Indian Government has, reacted strongly to
Communist violence, but is disposed to toelrate
nonviolent agitation and propaganda. Its ef-
forts to control Communist activity have met
with some success in industrial centers, but
less in rural areas. Parts of Hyderabad, for
example, are to all practical purposes under
exclusive Communist control. In general,
however, the previous Communist program
has fallen short of expectations and the Party
has been weakened by arrests, purges, and in-
ternal dissension. The Party is now follow-
ing a new policy modeled on that of the Chi-
nese Communist Party.
44. The Soviet Union will presumably con-
tinue to exploit Indian susceptibilities as best
it may in the international field, while seek-
ing to guide and promote Communist control
in India as a long-term project.
Tibet
45. It is the announced intention of the Chi-
nese Communist regime to "liberate" Tibet,
and military operations to this end are already
reportedly under way. The issue may, how-
ever, be decided by direct negotiations, with
only token use of military force. Any hostili-
ties that might be undertaken would certainly
be localized.
Burma
46. In Burma the general Soviet object is the
spread of internal violence to prevent the es-
tablishment of a viable non-Communist Gov-
ernment, with a view eventually to securing
Communist domination of the country.
47. The principal instruments of Communism
are the threat of direct or indirect Chinese
Communist intervention in support of the
present activities of the Burma Communist
Party.
48. In general, while Burma is one of the most
disturbed of the Southeast Asian countries, it
is not so favorable a field for Communist ac-
tivity as some of its neighbors. There is no
nationalist problem; nor is there a large Chi-
nese minority. On the other hand, there is a
certain amount of agrarian discontent, and
this will leave the situation precarious unless
the Government's plans for agrarian reform
are successful.
49. Recently, the Burma Communist Party
suffered a severe military and political set-
back, and as a result, it is unlikely that with-
out substantial aid from China, it could en-
danger the stability of the legitimate Govern-
ment, even though the latter is faced with
many other resistance groups throughout the
country.
50. With Chinese Communist assistance in
the form of materiel and leadership (a likely
eventuality), the strength of the Burmese
Communist Party would be greatly increased,
but against this must be placed the innate an-
tagonism between Chinese and Burmese.
This antagonism might result in the loss to
the Communists of left-wing Socialist sup-
port, including the support of the trade union
movement, which has been cooperating with
the World Federation of. Trade Unions. The
stakes in Burma are probably not great
enough to justify direct Chinese invasion.
On balance, the prospects of Communist suc-
cess in Burma probably seem sufficiently good
to lead the Kremlin and Chinese People's
Government not to go beyond their present
policy there. Communist prospects in Burma
would be materially improved by the estab-
lishment of Communist control over all of In-
dochina.
Siam
51. In Siam there is no agrarian discontent
and little popular sympathy for Communism.
The overseas Chinese community is the only
considerable element subject to Communist
exploitation. The situation in Siam, however,
will be decisively influenced by developments
in Indochina and Burma. If either of those
countries were brought under Communist con-
trol, Siam would probably seek to accommo-
date itself to the new situation.
Malaya
52. Both the Chinese People's Government
and the Kremlin will wish to see the removal
of UK influence and the substitution of Com-
munist Party control in Malaya. The Ma-
layan Communist Party is a small minority
group which nevertheless enjoys sufficient
support from the local Chinese to prolong mil-
itary operations. Although the Soviets and
Chinese Communists will aim at securing
widespread popular support, it is difficult to
see how this policy can succeed in view of the
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administrative and military measures now be-
ing taken by the UK authorities. Neverthe-
less, the Communists can be expected to con-
tinue their insurrection as long as possible for
its nuisance value and in the hope that a
change in the world situation may occur. No
other means of pressure is open to the Com-
munists so long as Communist power is not
established in a contiguous country.
Indonesia
53. The immediate Soviet aim in Indonesia is
the reestablishment of the influential position
the Communist Party held prior to the abor-
tive 1948 rebellion. At the same time the
Kremlin appears to wish to maintain a facade
of good relations with a view to inducing the
Indonesian Government to follow a policy of
neutrality.
54. At present the World Federation of Trade
Unions is attempting to gain control of the In-
donesian Trade Union and the Communists
are seeking to establish themselves as protec-
tors of the Indonesian workers. There has
as yet been no sign of pressure by the Chinese
People's Government through the small Chi-
nese minority.
55. The process of reestablishment of Commu-
nist influence is still in its early stages. The
effect of the degree of success achieved else-
where in Southeast Asia will doubtless be con-
siderable, but the desire to avoid a second
abortivc attempt at seizing power will prob-
ably induce Soviet caution.
Indochina
56. In Indochina the Soviet Union clearly aims
at the exclusion of French influence and estab-
lishment of a puppet regime over the whole
country under Ho Chi Minh. The present
situation is politically and militarily favorable
to Ho. Furthermore the Chinese Communists
are providing Ho Chi Minh with equipment
and training facilities. French forces are al-
ready experiencing serious military reverses at
the hands of revitalized Viet Minh forces. The
Communists can reasonably argue that their
present chances are good, unless military sup-
plies from external sources and increased ef-
forts on the part of the French Government
enable the French to establish a military as-
cendancy. In view of the importance of Ho
Chi Minh to the Communist plan for South-
east Asia generally, and the fact that he has
been recognized by both the Kremlin and the
Chinese Peoples' Government, his defeat
would be a major setback. If, therefore,
there were signs of the tide turning in French
favor, the Chinese Peoples' Government,
backed by the Soviet Union, might well decide
to undertake invasion by Chinese Communist
forces. But so long as Ho Chi Minh main-
tains his position, the Soviet rulers and the
Chinese Communists are likely to conclude
that the present trend, which ties down large
French forces indefinitely, is more desirable
than incurring the political, logistical, racial,
and other difficulties that a Chinese Commu-
nist invasion would involve.
Hong Kong
57. Recovery of Hong Kong is in accordance
with both Soviet designs to expel UK influ-
ence from Asia and Chinese Communist policy
to "liberate" all former Chinese territory. As
the Communists have not so far tried to re-
cover the colony they must have decided that
it is not in their interests to incur the risk of
UK retaliation at present. The possibility of
an attempt, however, exists at any time, but,
in the first instance, the Communists would
probably rely on subversion.
The Philippines
58. In the Philippines, as in other newly in-
dependent countries of Southeast Asia, the
Soviet aim is to prevent the development of
internal stability with a view to eventual Com-
munist domination of the country.
59. The principal instrument for achieving
this aim is the insurgent Hukbalahap, which
draws its strength from agrarian unrest and
from a preference for guerrilla life acquired
by some elements during the Japanese occu-
pation, but which is definitely led by disci-
plined Communists. Other elements suscep-
tible to Communist use are found among the
overseas Chinese community, the radical la-
bor movement, certain disgruntled veterans,
and opportunistic politicians out of office.
The Communist program is facilitated by a
general lack of popular confidence in the com-
petence or the. integrity of the government.
60. By the means indicated the Communists
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can maintain a disturbed internal situation in
the Philippines, but are not capable of seizing
control of that country in present circum-
stances. Chinese Communist or Soviet
armed intervention on their behalf will not be
feasible, short of conditions of global warfare.
Formosa
61. The Chinese Communists for their own
purposes wish to recover Formosa and the de-
nial of the island as a Western base must be
the Soviet aim. Although the Chinese Com-
munists have sufficient shipping to lift the
troops, the invasion is bound to be hazardous
owing to US air and sea patrols, and, at pres-
ent, without Soviet naval and air assistance,
the operation would be unlikely to succeed.
Nevertheless, the intention to take Formosa
eventually cannot be considered to have been
abandoned.
Korea
62. The Soviet aim is to dominate Korea.
The Soviet rulers probably consider control of
the peninsula necessary to safeguard their
Pacific provinces and their interests in Man-
churia. At the same time they probably esti-
mate that it is necessary if they are to succeed
in their plan to neutralize and ultimately to
gain control of Japan.
63. To date there is insufficient evidence to
indicate that the USSR intends to commit So-
viet forces overtly in Korea. However, the
commitment of Chinese Communist forces,
with Soviet material aid, indicates that the
USSR considers the Korean situation of suffi-
cient importance to warrant the risk of gen-
eral war. The probability is that the Soviet
Union considers that the US will not launch
a general war over Chinese Communist in-
tervention in North Korea and the reaction
thereto. The principal risk of general war is
through the exercise of Soviet initiative which
the Kremlin continues to hold. The probabil-
ity is that the Soviet leaders have not yet
made a decision directly to launch a general
war over the Korean-Chinese situation. There
is a good chance that they will not in the im=mediate future take such a decision. At what
point they will take a decision to launch a gen-
eral war is not now determinable by Intelli-
gence.
Japan
64. The immediate objective of the Soviet rul-
ers in Japan will be to weaken the position of
the US authorities there with a view to pre-
venting its use as a base or as an area for the
development of an effective indigenous mili-
tary force. On a longer view, and more posi-
tively, the Soviet rulers must see that the is-
lands would, under Soviet control, contribute
materially to strategic, economic and political
domination of the Far East.
65. The instruments at present available to
the Soviet rulers are the Japanese Communist
Party, elements of the Japanese Trade Unions,
the peace campaign, and subversive tactics
(including the possible formation of a govern-
ment in exile). There appears no possibility
that the Kremlin can hope to achieve its aims
even by any combination of these factors.
Without taking into account occupation
forces, the Japanese Government, which is
staunchly anti-Communist, is sufficiently
strong to cope with any internal disorders
that the Communists appear capable of
mounting. Moreover, the Japanese popula-
tion is generally both anti-Communist and an-
ti-Soviet and subversive movements would re-
ceive little popular support.
66. There are accordingly no other methods
open to the Soviet rulers save invasion of
Japan.
67. If at any time the Soviet rulers decided
that it was necessary to go beyond their pres-
ent tactics, it is unlikely that they could do
much in the way of securing a foothold in Ja-
pan save by direct attack by their own forces
(with or without Chinese Communist assist-
ance). They would presumably recognize
that this would entail inevitable consequence
of a general conflict.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/06/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040009-5
 Approved For Release 2003/06/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040009-5
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/06/20 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040009-5