CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 12, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY : N0.
FAR THE' E~E'CUTiVE SECRETARY.,
PAI.LiTAIiY L.IAISOiV COBdidITTEE
TO THE A'I'0~9IC ENERGY COB~MISSZaN
CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN
THE FAR EAST
Published 12 October 1950
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
DISTRIBUTION:
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CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
This set of estimates regarding critical sit-
uations in the Far East was prepared in
response to a request from the President.
The intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the
Air Force participated in the preparation of
these estimates and concur in them.
The estimates follow in this order:
A. Threat of Full Chinese Communist
Intervention in Korea
B. Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea
C. Threat of Chinese Communist Inva-
sion of Formosa
D. Threat of Chinese Communist Inva-
sion of Indochina
E. Communist Capabilities and Threat
in the Philippines
F. General Soviet and Chinese Commu-
nist Intentions and Capabilities in
the Far East
Inasmuch as the conclusions reached with
respect to these particular situations in the
Far East depend in part on the passibility of
a Soviet decision to resort to global war, the
latest agreed estimate concerning that de-
cision is included as Section G.
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CRITICAL SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST
A. Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea
I. Statement of the Problem.
1. To estimate the threat of full-scale Chi-
nese Communist intervention in Korea.
II. Capabilities.
2. The Chinese Communist ground forces,
currently lacking requisite air and naval sup-
port, are capable of intervening effectively, but
not necessarily decisively, in the Korean
conflict.
III. Factors Bearing on Intent.
3. Indications of Intentions. Despite state-
ments. by Chou En-lai, troop movements to
Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atroci-
ties and border violations, there are no con-
vincing indications of an actual Chinese Com-
munist intention to resort to full-scale inter-
vention in Korea.
4. Factors Favoring Chinese Communist In-
tervention.
a. Intervention, if resulting in defeat of UN
forces, would: (1) constitute a major gain in
prestige for Communist China, confirming it
as the premier Asiatic power; (2) constitute a
major gain for World Communism with con-
comitant increase in. Communist China's stat-
ure in the Sino-Soviet axis; (3) result in the
elimination of the possibility of a common
frontier with aWestern-type democracy; and
(4) permit the retention of sources of Man-
churian electric power along the Yalu River.
b. Intervention, even if not resulting in a
decisive defeat of UN forces, would: (1) en-
able the Chinese Communists to utilize for-
eign war as an explanation for failure to carry
out previously announced economic reforms;
(2) be consistent with and furnish strong im-
petus to anti-Western. trends in Asia; and (3)
justify a claim for maximum Soviet military
and/or economic aid to China.
c. Intervention, with or without assurance
of final victory, might serve the cause of World
Communism, particularly the cause of the So-
viet Union, in that it would involve the West-
ern bloc in a costly and possibly inconclusive
war in the Far East.
d. The Communist cause generally and the
Sino-Soviet bloc particularly face the pros-
pect of a major setback in the struggle with
the non-Communist world if UN forces are
permitted to achieve complete victory in
Korea.
5. Factors Opposing Chinese Communist
Intervention.
a. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly
fear the consequences of war with the US.
Their domestic problems are of such magni-
tude that the regime's entire domestic pro-
gram and economy would be jeopardized by
the strains and the material damage which
would be sustained in war with the US. Anti-
communist forces would be encouraged and
the regime's very existence would be en-
dangered.
b. Intervention would minimize the possi-
bility of Chinese membership in the UN and of
a seat on the Security Council.
c. Open intervention would be extremely
costly unless protected by power-ful Soviet air
cover and naval support. Such Soviet aid
might not be forthcoming because it would
constitute Soviet intervention.
d. Acceptance of major Soviet aid would
make Peiping more dependent on Soviet help
and increase Soviet control in Manchuria to a
point probably unwelcome to the Chinese
Communists.
e. If unsuccessful, Chinese intervention
would lay Peiping open to Chinese resentment
on the grounds that China would be acting as
a Soviet catspaw.
f. From a military standpoint the most fa-
vorable time for intervention in Korea has
passed.
g. Continued covert aid would offer most of
the advantages of overt intervention, while
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avoiding its risks and disadvantages. Covert
aid would enable the Chinese Communists to
(1) Avoid further antagonizing of the UN
and reduce risk of war with the US;
(2) Promote the China-led Asiatic peo-
ples' "revolutionary struggle," while
ostensibly supporting peace;
(3) Maintain freedom of action for later
choice between abandonment of aid
or continuing such covert aid as
might be appropriate to Chinese Com-
munist needs in Korea;
(4) Satisfy the "aid Korea" demand in
Communist circles in China and Asia
generally, without risking war with
the US.
IV. Probability of Chinese Communist Action.
6. While full-scale Chinese Communist in-
tervention in Korea must be regarded as a con-
tinuing possibility, a consideration of all
known factors leads to the conclusion that
barring a Soviet decision for global war, such
action is not probable in 1950. During this
period, intervention will probably be confined
to continued covert assistance to the North
Koreans.
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B. Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea
I. Statement of the Problem.
1. To estimate the threat of direct Soviet
military intervention in Korea during 1950.
II. Capabilities.
2. Soviet armed forces now in the Far East
are capable of intervening overwhelmingly in
Korea virtually without warning.
III. Factors Bearing on Intent.
3. Indications of Intentions. The Soviet
Union to date has given no indication that
it intends to intervene directly in Korea.
Since the beginning of hostilities the Soviet
Union has sought in its official statements
and in its propaganda to give the impression
that it is not involved in the Korean situa-
tion. Moreover, the USSR has taken no po-
litical or military actions that constitute
direct armed intervention in Korea. How-
ever, the Soviet Government for some months
has been increasingly improving its military
capabilities in the Far East as well as in other
strategic areas.
4. Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention.
The defeat of North Korea would constitute
a major setback for the USSR. It would
involve
a. The loss of a Satellite, and the establish-
ment of aWestern-oriented state on the fron-
tiers of Communist China and the USSR.
b. Giving the Western Powers a potential
strategic bridgehead which the Kremlin would
always regard as a threat to the industrial,
communication, and military centers of Man-
churia and the Soviet Far East.
c. Weakening the Soviet military and politi-
cal position vis-~,-vis Japan.
d. A loss to Soviet political prestige in that
it would demonstrate that the Kremlin is not
willing to support its followers effectively in
aSoviet-instigated action.
e. A loss to Soviet military prestige in that
it would lead to a tendency, whether or not
justified, to re-evaluate the effectiveness of
Soviet military equipment and tactics.
f. A reduction in the prospects of the
Soviet Union for expanding its political con-
trol by means short of war in that it would
demonstrate the determination and capability
of the non-Soviet world to resist effectively
Soviet-inspired aggression.
5. Factors Opposing Soviet Intervention.
a. In weighing potential gains and risks of
intervention, the Soviet leaders must calcu-
late, as an overwhelming consideration, that
their open intervention would lead to direct
hostilities with US and other UN forces over
an issue on which the Western world has
achieved a new degree of unity. Soviet
leaders would have no assurance that combat
between Soviet and US forces would be lim-
ited by the US to Korea or to the Far Eastern
theater. Consequently, a decision to inter-
vene openly in Korea, in the ultimate analysis,
involves a decision to risk immediate and
probably global war with the US.
b. The Soviet leaders may estimate that
it will be possible, without assuming this all-
critical risk, to salvage some of the losses suf-
fered from the Korean situation. US mili-
tary activities could be obstructed by exten-
sive guerrilla action, which might involve the
US in an extended and costly occupation and
which could contribute to Soviet efforts to
develop in Asia a racial enmity toward the
US and the Western Powers.
IV. Probabilities of Soviet Action.
6. It is believed that the Soviet leaders will
not consider that their prospective losses in
Korea warrant direct military intervention
and a consequent grave risk. of war. They
will intervene in the Korean hostilities only
if they have decided, not on the basis of the
Korean situation alone, but on the basis of
over-all considerations, that it is to their inter-
est to precipitate a global war at this time.
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C. Threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Formosa
I. Statement of the Problem.
1. To estimate the threat of Chinese Com-
munist invasion of Formosa during 1950.
II. Capabilities.
2. Despite certain definite Chinese Com-
munist deficiencies in naval and air forces
and probably in amphibious training and doc-
trine, the Communists are now capable of
launching an invasion against Formosa with
about 200,000 troops and moderate air cover.
The USSR could at a minimum furnish tacti-
cal advice and technical and logistic support.
3. Although Chinese Nationalist forces are
sufficient in number and materiel to defend
Formosa, lack of staying power, poor com-
mand structure, lack of inter-service coordi-
nation, questionable morale and shortages of
some types of ammunition make their defense
capabilities questionable.
4. Without direct Soviet participation and
given strong naval and air assistance by the
US armed forces, the Chinese Nationalist
defense forces are capable of holding Formosa
against a determined Chinese Communist
.invasion.
III. Factors Bearing on Intent.
5. Indications of Intentions. Frequent of-
ficial statements of the Chinese Communists
have clearly indicated their intention to seize
control of Formosa. However, available in-
telligence does not indicate their intention
to do so in the immediate future. An un-
known factor bearing upon the intent to
invade is the degree of control the USSR is
capable of exercising over the Chinese Com-
munists, and the Soviet intent with respect
to Formosa.
6. Factors Favoring Invasion o f Formosa.
a. The occupation of Formosa would re-
move the symbol of Nationalist resistance;
eliminate a potential source of coordinated
opposition to the Chinese Communist regime;
and would seriously diminish continued anti-
communist resistance in China and through-
out Southeast Asia.
b. Abandonment or continued postpone-
ment of an attack on Formosa would result in
a loss of "face" to the Chinese Communists.
c. Formosa would provide the Chinese Com-
munists with a small but significant source
of foreign exchange, and a potential source
of rice, thereby contributing somewhat to
Chinese Communist capabilities for economic
reconstruction.
7. Factors Opposing an Invasion of Formosa.
a. Success would be improbable.
b. An attack involves the risk of war with
the US as long as US forces are interposed
between Formosa and the mainland. The
Chinese Communist leadership would be re-
luctant to jeopardize its popular support,
domestic achievements, and internal program
by an attack on Formosa that could lead to
retaliatory air attacks on Chinese cities, to a
strict blockade of the Chinese coast, to strong
economic sanctions, and to protracted warfare
that could sap Chinese economic strength.
c. The Chinese Communists face serious
domestic problems, including banditry, wide-
spread unrest, guerrilla opposition, economic
stagnation, agrarian maladjustments, and the
problems involved in consolidating the Com-
munist Party's political control. For these
reasons the danger exists that, if attacks
should fail or prove unduly costly, the present
apparent solidarity of the Communist regime
would be subjected to a severe strain.
d. In view of current UN interest in For-
mosa, the Chinese Communists have some rea-
son to hope for a favorable political solution.
IV. Probability of Chinese Communist Invasion.
8. It is believed that, barring a Soviet deci-
sion to precipitate global war, an invasion of
Formosa by the Chinese Communists will not
be attempted during the remainder of 1950.
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D. Threat of A Chinese Communist Invasion of Indochina
I. Statement of the Problem.
1. To estimate the threat of a Chinese Com-
munist invasion of Indochina in 1950.
II. Capabilities.
2. From forces presently deployed near the
Indochina border, the Chinese Communists
could commit 100,000 troops for an invasion
of Indochina without appreciable forewarn-
ing. Approximately 150,000 additional Chi-
nese Communist troops could arrive at the
border in support of an invasion within ten
days. Reinforcements and supplies might be
moved by sea to rebel-held sections of the
Indochina coast. It is also within Chinese
Communist capabilities to furnish air support
for an invasion.
3. These capabilities could be exercised
without jeopardy to other possible Chinese
Communist military operations in the Far
East, except to the already inadequate air
support far a simultaneous North Korean or
Formosan intervention.
4. If the Chinese Communists should in-
vade Indochina, it is almost certain that the
defending forces under the French would soon
lose all of Vietnam, except Cochin China.
III. Factors Bearing on Intent.
5. Indications o f Intentions.
a. The construction and improvement of
roads, railroads, and air facilities; the provi-
sion of technical and training assistance and
advisory personnel; present logistic support
from the border provinces of Kwangtung,
Kwangsi, and Yunnan -all these might be
construed as positive indicators of an impend-
ing invasion. These activities, however, might
also be indicators of an increase in the flow
of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh
Communists, rather than of Chinese invasion.
b. Although Chinese Communists have
given propaganda support to -the Viet Minh,
there has been no public Chinese Communist
statement which could reasonably be con-
strued as a commitment to invade or as justi-
fication for invasion.
6. Factors Favoring Intervention.
a. A Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-
china would be the most rapid means of estab-
lishing aCommunist Indochina.
b. The fall of Vietnam to the Communists
would facilitate establishment of Communist
control over Burma and Thailand.
c. An early Communist victory in Indo-
china would in part offset the loss of Inter-
national Communist prestige occasioned by
Communist reverses in Korea.
d. The Chinese Communists, operating on
behalf of International Communism, might
invade Indochina with the hope that, even if
UN intervention should deprive them of com-
plete victory, Western bloc forces would be
involved in inconclusive warfare in the Far
East.
7. Factors Opposing Intervention.
a. A Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-
china would greatly increase the risk of Chi-
nese Communist involvement in war against
the Western Powers or the UN, as well as the
risk of global war.
b. Recent Viet Minh military successes have
increased the probability that Communist
control of Indochina can be ultimately secured
without resort to Chinese Communist inva-
sion, providing there is no major increase of
presently planned external assistance to the
French and their supporters.
c. Viet Minh capabilities can be substan-
tially increased without resort to open inter-
vention.
d. Invasion of Indochina by Chinese Com-
munist troops would arouse local anti-Chinese
sentiment and could be a serious source of
command conflict between Peiping and Viet
Minh leadership.
e. A Chinese Communist invasion would
tend to antagonize the presently neutral states
of Asia, particularly India.
f. Communist China's prospects for mem-
bership in the UN and UN-sponsored organiza-
tions would be jeopardized and the opportu-
nity for the establishment of diplomatic rela-
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tions with powers outside the Soviet orbit
would be curtailed.
g. Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-
china might provide the US with an impelling
reason for retaining in the vicinity of For-
mosa-a major objective of the Chinese
Communist government-the US Seventh
Fleet.
IV. Probabilities of Chinese Communist Invasion.
It is estimated that an open Chinese Com-
munist invasion-while possible and capable
of being launched with little or no preliminary
warning-is improbable in 1950. It is highly
probable, however, that the Chinese Commu-
nists will increase the substantial military
assistance already being given to the Viet
Minh forces.
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E. Communist Capabilities and Threat in the Philippines
I. Statement of the Problem.
1. To estimate the Communist capabilities
and threat in the Philippines.
II. Capabilities.
2. The Huks. The Huks (Hukbong Mapag-
palaya Ng Bayan) are today the army of
Philippine Communism, led by avowed Com-
munists who follow the policies and seek to
further the objectives of World Communism.
Their armed strength is estimated at no more
than about 10,000. The Huks are essentially
a guerrilla organization, utilizing "hit and
run" tactics; making maximum use of the ele-
ments of surprise, choice of terrain, and mo-
bility; and avoiding frontal engagement with
government forces. The Huks, who are lim-
ited almost exclusively to infantry weapons,
have the capability of mounting several com-
paratively large-scale (300-500 men) coordi-
nated attacks simultaneously against widely
separated targets. During 1949-50, they have
expanded their areas of operation throughout
Luzon and to other islands of the Philippines.
In recent months they have carried out better
coordinated and more widespread attacks.
The Huks have terrorized local communities
and interfered with travel. They can extend
and intensify their operations, particularly in
weakly defended provincial areas, and may
well stage another series of coordinated at-
tacks before the end of 1950.
3. Supporting Elements.
a. Support of the Huk movement, apart
from that derived from unorganized lawless
elements, is found among large numbers of
peasants, who willingly or by force and intimi-
dation contribute to the Huk movement. An-
other source of support is found in the Philip-
pine labor movement, where low real wages
and poor conditions of work permit exploita-
tion of the union movements by Communist
organizers.
b. Since the Communists have achieved
power in China, it is believed that a number
of the approximately half a million Philippine
Chinese have already aligned themselves with
the Peiping regime. Such Chinese are prob-
ably facilitating Communist communications,
providing financial support, and otherwise
rendering aid to the Huks.
c. Available intelligence does not indicate
that the Huks have received, or are likely to
receive, sufficient assistance from external
Communist sources to alter their military ca-
pabilities significantly during 1950.
4. Government Countermeasures. Govern-
ment efforts to deal with the Huk problem
have been ineffective thus far. Government
forces have been and are able to maintain
over-all internal security but are unable to
control local areas where dissident groups are
strongest. Recently reorganized armed forces
may be able to deal more effectively with Huk
activities, but little improvement is antici-
pated during 1950. Disillusionment with the
government's ineffectiveness has caused many
persons who are not active Huk supporters to
become indifferent and uncooperative toward
government efforts to stamp out the dissident
forces. The government, moreover, has shown
little disposition. to adopt and implement basic
agrarian and social reforms which might re-
duce considerably the number of peasants who
support the Huks. Such a reduction would
lessen measurably Huk capabilities and the in-
tensity of their operations, but would not elim-
inate the hard core of the Huk movement
which would continue to pose a burdensome
security problem.
IV. Conclusions.
5. While the Huks are capable of conduct-
ing widespread, coordinated raids particularly
in central Luzon, and creating some disturb-
ances in the Manila area, it is estimated that
they cannot overthrow the Philippine Govern-
ment in 1950.
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F. General Soviet and Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabilities in the Far East
I. Statement of the Problem.
1. To estimate general Soviet and Chinese
Communist intentions and capabilities in the
Far East in 1950.
II. Objectives.
2. The Soviet Union and Communist China
share the common objective of establishing
Communist control throughout the Far East.
Logically, both would prefer to secure this ob-
jective without resort to general war. The
Soviet Union includes in its objective Kremlin
control of a communized Asia, including
China. While the Chinese Communists may
well object to such Kremlin control, they have
given no overt indication that they do not ac-
cept the primacy of Moscow in International
Communism..
III. Capabilities.
3. Short of Direct Employment of Armed
Forces. The Soviet Union and Communist
China have the capacity, through a continua-
tion of measures short of war, further to de-
velop the strength of Communism in all areas
in the Far East except those occupied by US
or UN forces. It is estimated, however, that
in no area of the Far East, except Tibet and
possibly Indochina. unless presently planned
external assistance is increased, do they have
the capability of establishing complete Com-
munist control during 1950 through such
measures.
4. With Full-Scale Employment of Armed
Forces. In the event of war beginning in
1950:
a. The Soviet Union acting alone has the ca-
pability of rapidly occupying Korea, Hokkaido,
and Okinawa; of launching a substantial am-
phibious-airborne invasion of Honshu; and of
conducting harassing attacks on the Aleu-
tians, Kyushu, Formosa, the Philippines, and
other islands in the adjacent waters, and lines
of communication.
b. Communist China acting alone possesses
the capability to overrun Tibet and substantial
portions of the mainland of Southeast Asia,
and to make a strong attack on Korea.
c. In combination, the Soviet Union and
Communist China have the capability of over-
running practically all the Asiatic mainland
and possibly of occupying all Japan and
Formosa.
IV. Intentions.
5. Both the Soviet Union and Communist
China have clearly indicated that they intend
to pursue without pause their goal of extend-
ing Communist control over every vulnerable
area in the Far East by every means open to
them short of direct use of their armed forces.
Neither has given concrete indication. of an in-
tention to employ during 1950 its own armed
forces outside its own boundaries.
6. It is estimated in particular that, barring
a Soviet decision to precipitate a global war,
the Soviet Union will not during 1950 inter-
vene directly with its armed forces in Ko-
rean hostilities, and the Chinese Communists
probably will not in 1950 attempt to invade
Korea, Formosa, or Indochina.
7. With respect to a possible Soviet deci-
sion to precipitate global war, the latest agreed
conclusions are set forth in Enclosure G.
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G. Conclusions Regarding A Possible Soviet Decision To Precipitate Global War
1. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously mo-
tivated by Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine
and by considerations affecting the position
of the Soviet Union as a world power. They
have made clear that their long-term object
is to establish World .Communism under the
domination of the Kremlin. Their immediate
concerns, however, are
a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin
over the peoples of the Soviet Union.
b. To strengthen the economic and military
position and defend the territory of the So-
viet Union.
c. To consolidate control over the European
and Asian Satellites (including Communist
China) .
d. To make secure the strategic approaches
to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the estab-
lishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces capa-
ble of threatening the Soviet position.
e. To eliminate Anglo-American influence
in Europe and Asia.
f. To establish Soviet domination over Eu-
rope and Asia.
y. To weaken and disintegrate the non-
Soviet world generally.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these
objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict
between one and another of these objectives,
however, it may be expected that the Soviet
rulers will attach greater importance to the
first four listed, and in that order.
2. On the basis that the long-term object
of the Soviet rulers is immutable and dynamic,
and that the Western Powers are not pre-
pared to succumb to Soviet domination with-
out afight, there is, and will continue to be,
grave danger of war between the Soviet Union
and its satellites on the one hand, and the
Western Powers and their allies on the other.
3. The Soviet Union will continue relent-
lessly its aggressive pressures on the power
position of the Western nations.
4. The Soviet rulers could achieve, and are
in a fair way toward achieving, the first three
parts of their object (see a, b, c above) without
risk of involvement in direct armed conflict
with the Western Powers.
5. Parts d, e, f, and g of their object are
improbable of achievement without the em-
ployment of armed force, though there are
still factors in the existing situation which
might well lead Soviet rulers to consider that,
in certain circumstances, and in the absence
of effective armed opposition by the Western
Powers, they might ultimately attain these
parts of their object without the overt in-
volvement of Soviet armed forces.
6. In pressing to achieve parts d, e, f, and g
of their object, the Soviet rulers will, at cer-
tain stages, inevitably impinge upon the vital
interests of the Western Powers and so incur
the risk of involvement in a general war pre-
cipitated through the necessary reactions of
the Western Powers.
7. In the belief that their object cannot be
fully attained without involvement in a gen-
eral war against the Western Powers, the
Soviet rulers may decide deliberately to pro-
voke such a war at a moment when, in their
opinion, the strength of the Soviet Union
vis-~,-vis the Western Powers is at its maxi-
mum. It is estimated that such a period
exists now and will extend from the present
through 1954 (Note 1) with its peak at about
halfway, i.e., 1952 (Note 2).
8. From the point of view of military forces
and economic potential, the Soviet Union is
in a position to conduct a general war of lim-
ited duration now if Soviet rulers thought it
desirable or expedient.
9. While intelligence is lacking to permit
a valid prediction as to whether or when the
Soviet Union may actually exercise its initia-
tive and capability to launch a general war, in
view of the foregoing it must be recognized
that the risk of a general war exists now and
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hereafter at any time when the Soviet rulers
may elect to take action which threatens,
wholly or in part, the vital interests of the
Western Powers.
Note 1: 1954 being the date by which it is assumed
that North Atlantic Treaty Organization
forces in Europe will be built up to such
a strength that they can withstand the
initial shock of surprise attack; and when
the gap between the relative strength of
the Western Union forces and those of the
Soviet Union will have begun to contract.
Note 2: i.e., when the Soviet Union has made good
some essential deficiencies in atomic bomb
stockpile, and in certain types of aircraft;
and before the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization economy is fully geared to the
war effort,
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