LETTER TO MISS ADRIENNE C. THOMAS FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300030002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 16, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
25X1
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Miss Adrienne C. Thomas
Staff Assistant, ICRC
The White House
Washington, D. C.
16 August 1973
We have completed the review of the additional pages
of the background papers for the Gaither Report which were
forwarded to 110 April 1973 by heir.
Tufaro. These are pages 34 through 49 of Section III, Volume
3, with Figure 1 attached.
We have no objections to the declassification of these
pages.
Sincerely,
25X1
Records Management Officer
GFD:bec
Distribution:
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1 - General Counsel
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1 - D/OSR
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EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY DEFENSE
The beginning of the period of critical danger this country
faces, from an aggressively-posed and rapidly-developing enemy,
is at most two years away. To mobilize the technological
skills and the economic resources required to maximize and
protect our offensive power and to build defenses against
present and future enemy weapons will require a succession of
prompt, informed decisions and efficient continuing direction
of the whole gamut of defense activities. The organization
that exists in the Department of Defense is inadequate for
these critical needs.
NATURE OF INADEQUACIES
A succession of studies have reiterated the nature of
inadequacies that limit the organizational effectiveness of
the Department of Defense.l/ The basic inadequacy of the
present organization is its inability to conduct warfare
without special provisions being made to achieve unity and
or o t e Committee on Department of Defense Organiza-
tion (Rockefeller Committee) April, 1953; Business Organi-
zation of the Department of Defense, (Second Hoover Com-
mission) June, 1955; Riehlman Report, Organization and
Administration of the Military Research and Development
Programs; (House Committee on Government Operations)
August, 1954; Report of the Advisory Committee on Army
Organization, Dec. 1953; Report of the Committee on Organi-
zation of the Department of the Navy, April, 1954. See
also United States Defense Policies Since World War II,
House Document No. 100, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957.
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d irec t comA'iaricere `'a
a The existence of tripartite committees and other
complex organizational arrangements that delay decisions by
the Secretary of Defense while the interests of three Services
are compromised; and a complexity of channels through which
the Secretary must carry out operations and development
programs.
b The inability of the existing organization to develop
a unified military plan, and the lack of machinery to integrate
separate Army, Navy, and Air Force plans into a single plan
for the military operations that will protect this country.
c The duplication in each of the Service departments of
military and support activities that are simultaneously main-
tained by other services.
d The splintering of responsibility for basic military
functions; e.g., the air defense of the continent - and for
the development of vital new weapons systems among the three
Services.
PRIMARY OBSTACLE TO MEETING INADEQUACIES
Technological advance -- by our enemies as well as our-
selves -- is making existing military weapons, doctrine and
plans obsolete. Consequently, this country's defense organi-
zation must be continually adjusted to new needs. Present
legislation prevents essential adjustments and denies the
Secretary of Defense the flexibility he needs in using available
resources.
Section III
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The 88SQW r le ~9 f 8/12 : 6~ O 3Q~~~. 1
Security Act from:
a. Transferring, reassigning, abolishing or consolidating
the combatant functions of the military services.
b. Indirectly accomplishing what is directly forbidden
by detailing or assigning personnel or directing the expen-
diture of funds.
c. Establishing a military staff.
Lacking a military staff, the Secretary must rely on many
inter-Service committees for much of his staff work. In time
of war, the Secretary would be handicapped in resolving con-
flicting demands for such limited resources as manpower,
transportation, communications, and industrial and other
facilities.
In addition, the organic acts establishing each of the
three military departments and the Marine Corps contain pro-
visions fixing functions in these Services and thus preventing
the reassignment of tasks as missions change. These provisions
establish a rigid structure that handicaps the Secretary in
deploying his forces as current missions and conditions dic-
tate. Furthermore, present Acts appropriate funds directly
to each of the three military Services and thus limit the
Secretary's control. This limitation is aggravated by the
See Appendix A to the Report of the Committee on Department
of Defense organization, April 11, 1953.
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Statutory authority vested in the comptrollers of.the Department
and each of the Services.
OVERCOMING MAJOR OBSTACLES
Some improvements might be made within existing legis-
lation. For example, the JCS might be freed of detailed
operational matters and all existing joint operational com-
mands could probably report to the Secretary of Defense.
These and similar actions that can be taken withinlexisting
legislation should be implemented immediately. Others that
will take more time are proposed below.
Revising Laws
An essential step in meeting the urgent need for
improving the organization for military defense is to ask
the Congress to repeal those provisions of the National
Security Act and the organic acts establishing the three
Services that limit the Secretary's authority to transfer,
reassign, abolish or consolidate units and staff as may be
required to improve the department's organization. Flexi-
bility in establishing and realigning commands to meet
changing defense needs is imperative. In any future conflict,
time may not be available for such a large-scale defense
reorganization as was necessary in the War Department after
Pearl Harbor.
Establishing Operational Commands
To give defense the flexibility and readiness it needs
operational commands should be created. These commands should
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have complete control over the personnel (e.g., authority to
promote and discipline) and resources assigned to them and
they should report directly to the Secretary of Defense for
all major military missions that now cross Service lines. He
should be authorized, with the approval of the President, to
change, eliminate, or add commands as circumstances require.
This necessitates the removal of the three military~depart-
ments from the chain of command over military operations,
and the provision of staff to the Secretary-for strategic
1
planning, intelligence, and military operations.
The need for these commands was borne out by the President
in his Oklahoma City speech on November 13. He said that the
design and power of our military defenses "must keep pace
with the increasing capabilities that science gives to both
an aggressor and a defender. They must continue to perform
four main tasks:
"I. As a primary deterrent to war, maintain a nuclear
retaliatory power of such capacity as to convince the Soviets
that any attack on us and our Allies would result, regardless
of damage to us, in their own nation's destruction.
"2. In cooperation with our Allies, provide a force
structure so flexible that it can cope quickly with any form
of aggression against the free world.
"3
Keep our home defenses in a high state of efficiency.
"/+. Have the reserve strength to meet unforeseen emergency
demands."
In time of war, no single military department can carry
any one of these missions. In World War II, theater commands
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were established to un~`y rmy,avy,
elements. Today separate forces needed for conducting cer-
tain missions are brought together in unified commands (Alaskan
Unified Command) and joint or specified commands (North American
Continental Air Defense Command).
Present unified and joint commands do not have completely
efficient, integrated organizations to conduct operations.
Their commanders do not have complete authority over the per-
sonnel and other resources assigned to them, and the chain of
command from the President is not as direct and clear as it
might be.
Elements from two or more military services are assigned
to unified commands for "operational control" by the com-
mander. This control is limited, however, because service
elements of a unified command are administered and supplied
separately by their respective arm. Thus, a unified commander
is at the mercy of Services other than his own for the resources
he needs to carry out his mission.
A unified commander's position is confused further by
the lack of clarity in his relationships with higher authority.
A unified or joint command may be organized under the JCS
(such as NORAD) and one of the military departments is desig-
nated as the "executive agency" of the Secretary of Defense.
Under certain circumstances, the military chief of the executive
agency is authorized to direct commands for the executive
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agency department. He does so in the name of the Secretary of
Defense. He must also keep the Secretary of his department
and the JCS informed of his actions.
Consequently, a unified commander, such as the head of
NORAD, may receive directions for the same functions from
several officials. These officials may be the Secretary of
Defense, the JCS, the civilian secretary of a military depart-
ment designated as executive agent, the Chief of Staff of an
executive agency department in his position as military chief
of that department, or in his position as agent member of the
JCS. Who is authorized to exercise command over a unified
or joint command? It is not clear.
This confusion can be eliminated by the creation of
operational commands directly under the Secretary of Defense.
Thus, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary
of Defense will have the flexibility to organize forces as
and when required and the ability to exercise more direct
control of military operations. Furthermore, the establish-
ment of such commands will multiply the opportunities for top-
level responsibilities for military men with outstanding
capabilities.
Clarifying the Role of Military Departments
Another essential step is to define a revised role
for each military department. The role of the military.
departments would be changed, not diminished. They would
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continue to be responsible to the Secretary of Defense for
assisting with military planning. But, primarily, they would
have the responsibility for the major and indispensible jobs
of personnel and logistics. These major jobs underlie readi-
ness for and the success of military operations. Relieved of
direct responsibility for global military operations, the
military departments will be better able to assist the
Secretary of Defense with the management of these important
activities.
Personnel activities comprehend the development of trained
and equipped units ready for operations. This will involve
recruitment of military and civilian personnel into the three
Services and include the operation of service academies and
the administration of basic, technical, and other training
programs. Readiness for war and its successful prosecution
depends in large part upon effective training of men and
units. After assignment to operational commands, each mili-
tary department will continue to have cognizance over the
career development of its personnel.
The significance of logistical activities and their
separation from operations is borne out by their concen-
tration in a separate command during World War II. Commanders
of military operations must concentrate their efforts and
resources on winning battles. Their success depends largely
upon the efficient development, production, and distribution
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of weapons systems and other materiel. The military ceparcments
will continue to be responsible for providing this essential
support. This responsibility includes procurement, production
planning, distribution, transportation, stockpiling, ware-
housing, maintaining industrial facilities, and construction.
The magnitude of these activities is illustrated by the fact
that procurement and production consume about one-half of
the defense budget.
Creating a Research and Development Authority
To maintain superiority for conducting military opera-
tions, there is a vital need for creating organizational
machinery that will expedite the translation of technological
concepts into weapons systems that can be produced prior to
conflicts. Our future military strength rests upon the
efficiency with which we can select from a number of weapon
concepts those that must be developed, and then ensure that
they are brought expeditiously to the production stage and
are made available for use by operational commands.
To achieve these objectives, the military defense organi-
zation must be provided with a Defense Research and Development
Authority. The present Assistant Secretary for Research and
Development should direct this authority. He should be a
civilian, skilled in science, engineering and the adminis-
tvation of research, and report directly to the Secretary.
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This Authority should be responsible for -
a. Reviewing and approving for the Secretary the research
and development programs and budgets for each of the three
military departments. All appropriations for research and
development should be made to the Secretary of Defense and
allocated among the military departments or the Research and
Development Authority upon the advice of the Assistant
Secretary-Director.
b. Conducting or managing research and development on
such projects and weapons as are of interest to more than
one military department.
c. Establishing such policies as will ensure the develop-
ment and proper utilization of scientific and engineering
personnel for the conduct of research and development in the
Department of Defense and the three military departments. To
achieve this objective, the Authority should review on a
continuing basis the conduct of all research and development
activities within the military establishment
Improving the Secretary's Staff
Action then needs to be undertaken to develop a
staff immediately responsible to the Secretary of Defense to
See, for example, the Report on Improving Government
Laboratories to the Science Advisory Committee of the
Office of Defense Mobilization by James B. Fisk,
Bruce S. Old, and Immanuel Priore (OD-6649).
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aid him in obtaining and weighing the relevant views of the
operational commanders and supporting services so as to
facilitate hard, prompt decisions. To enable the Secretary
of Defense effectively to serve as the civilian deputy to
the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief, two kinds
of staffs are required: one, a staff of-Assistant Secretaries
to facilitate his management of all supporting activities -
research and development, manpower, international security,
comptroller, public relations, legislative, and other
affairs; another, a command post-type staff, to aid him on
military planning and operations.
a. The Staff of Assistant Secretaries: To aid the
Secretary of Defense to manage and control-the large and impor-
tant logistical, manpower, and administrarive problems of
the military establishment, a staff of Assistant Secretaries
somewhat similar to the present Assistant Secretary positions
should be retained.4 Their role, however, needs to be re-
considered.
Their primary task should be to assist the Secretary
in carrying out his department-wide responsibilities for
providing the operational commands with the resources and
weapons systems they need to accomplish'their missions. In
We have not studied the necessity for each of the present
Assistant Secretaries and are not prepared to offer recom-
mendations as to the necessity for each. We recommend that
consideration be given to the possibility of consolidating
activities now assigned to several of these positions, and
reviewing the possible need for additional positions.
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addition, the Assistant becre arses s ou en a systems
exist to provide the Secretary with complete, timely, accurate
and understandable information upon which to base decisions
on non-operational matters. Furthermore, the Assistant
Secretaries should help the Secretary carry out a continuous
examination and audit of the conduct of all supporting activities.
This should include actual visits to posts, camps, and indus-
trial facilities so that first-hand factual data on the
status and conduct of supporting programs can be developed
for the Secretary. Visits should also be made to operational
commands to ensure that supporting activities are responsive
to operational requirements.
b. The Command Post-Type Staff: To aid the Secretary
of Defense on long-term planning and operational matters, the
command post-type staff we visualize to facilitate his
decisions will:
(1) Provide a unified -- not a joint -- point
of view, and
(2) Consist of both military and civilian
personnel (military members should be selected, promoted and
relieved and on the basis of their capabilities for serving by
the Secretary, rather than the Service"or corps whose insignia
they wear).
This staff should function only for and in behalf of
the Secretary. It should not be empowered to exercise
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authority independent.Ly of the ecretary.
the Secretary in essentially the same manner that OPD served
General Marshall in World War II. This "command post" per-
formed for and in behalf of the Chief of Staff the unique
functions of:
"l. The translation of approved strategy and policy
into Army directives.
"2. The organization of theater commands adequate
to perform the operations called for., and
"3. The deployment of trained, equipped forces to
the theaters.
"Thus the Chief of Staff, through his Washington
command post, was able to project strategic and operational
requirements across the whole field of Army activities and
needs. This emphasis on operations gave the whole War Depart-
ment a single standard for organizing its efforts and-a
single staff for solving difficult day-to-day problems in
the interests of the ultimate objective: success in battle."5/
Success in averting and countering an attack today
requires the type of command staff described above. Unlike
OPD, however, this staff should assist the Secretary of
Defense with personnel, logistics, and intelligence and
other problems related to operations. Furthermore, it would
assist him in conducting the long-term planning his responsi-
bilities require. However, to ensure that long-term plans
for military operations and those for their logistical support
are appropriately coordinated and integrated with one another,
the Secretary of Defense should have an independent planning
ton Command Post; The Operations
See Ray S. Cline, Washing
Division; Departmen ' of the Army, 1951.
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group. Such a group might be organized under a Deputy or
Assistant Secretary.
This command post staff will not be entirely adequate,
however, to provide the broad-gauged advice top civilian
officials need. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
freed of command and operating responsibilities, should con-
tinue as the senior military advisors to the President, the
National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
The original military planning and advisory role of the JCS,
envisaged in the National Security Act, should be re-established
and their staff should be drastically reduced to a small but
strong planning gr;.,up. To enable the JCS to fulfill their
major responsibilities - the preparation of over-all strategic
plans, the development of long-range logistic plans, and the
review of war plans in the light of new weapons systems and
techniques - each Chief of Staff should continue to be
selected from among outstanding leaders of military operations,
and the Chiefs of Staff should be empowered to.delegate opera-
ting responsibilities to their Vice Chiefs and other subor-
dinate officers./
SUMMARY
The above steps for organizational improvement are as
essential ingredients for the defense of this nation as are
In addition o improving the Secretary of Defense's staff
and taking the other steps outlined above, the Secretary
of Defense should have complete control over funds, man-
power, and other resources. These and other problems are
not comprehended in this paper because it is intended only
to illustrate the over-all concept of an improved organization.
Section III
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the missiles, submarines Sewarning sysAtems86 Bc o86 F o 8( 9g?s3
that will deter attack and save lives. They are required to
ensure that decisions are made expeditiously and that resources
are expended effectively. They are required to keep pace with
an enemy that exhibits an ability to change directions, shift
resources, and alter plans as rapidly as an evolving
technology or new circumstances dictate.
Section III
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ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN FOR
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SEC. OF DEF.
COMMAND
STAFF
JCS
DEPARTMENT
OF THE
ARMY
GENEAALI
COUNSEL
ASST. SEC.
COMP.
ASST. SEC.
M.P.R.
DEPARTMENT
OF THE
NAVY
ASST. SEC.
R. AE.
ASST. SEC.
S. & L.
DEPARTMENT
OF THE
AIR FORCE
ASST. SEA ASSi.SEC.
I.S.A. P. A.,
ASST. SEC.
P.I.
ASST. SEC.
H. & M.
RAD
AUTHORITY
STRATEGIC
COMMAND
LIMITED WAR
COMMAND -
DEP. SEC. DEP. SEC.
CONT. DEF.
COMMAND
RESERVE FORCE
COMMAND
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