6 MARCH DRAFT OF NIE 50-73

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800040002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 8, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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8 March 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Huizenga
Director, National Estimates
SUBJECT : 6 March Draft of NIE 50-73
1. I have just read the 6 March draft of NIE 50-73, "Southeast Asia
and the Powers -- Issues for the Seventies. " Since I will probably not be
able to attend the representatives' meeting scheduled for 1400 on 8 March,
I am sending this note to register my office's very strong objections to
certain portions of the current estimate draft.
2. Overall the estimate strikes me as very long and rather diffuse.
Given this length, the references it makes to Indochina, especially Vietnam,
are extremely cursory. I realize this was actually the result of a deliberate,
eminently defensible, choice -- since Indochina is to be the subject of a
separate, somewhat later paper. Nothing in the current draft tells a reader
this, however, hence an uninstructed reader would have every reason to
wonder why a major area of Southeast Asian concern -- an area whose
developments are certain to have impact on the whole region -- is given
such cursory treatment.
3. Some of the key substantive judgments that are made about
Indochina in this paper are -- in my opinion -- open to factual challenge
or so elliptically phrased that they suggest conclusions which are highly
debatable or (in some instances) dead wrong.
4. Conclusion C in the "Summary and Conclusions" section, for
example, states that "the Soviets lack a foundation for acquiring a
significant voice in the affairs of Laos and Cambodia." This is a rather
curious statement given Souvanna's relations with the Soviets and the
fact that the latter have an embassy, and presence, in Phnom Penh as well
as Vientiane.
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5. Conclusion J says the mainland states of Southeast Asia "see
Laos and Cambodia as the litmus test of Chinese intentions." No mention
is made of Vietnam, which surely is -- and will be regarded -- as at least
an equally important sign of Chinese intent. The next paragraph (K) says,
"There is a good chance that the Chinese will want to cooperate in stabilizing
the Indochina situation. " But what does this mean? The greatest contri-
bution China (and the USSR) could make to such stabilization would be to
tell the North Vietnamese, pointedly, that they should concentrate for the
medium term future on political -- not military -- struggle, reinforcing
this suggestion with a constriction of military aid. There is no evidence
whatsoever that the Chinese (or the Soviets) have yet taken any such action.
6. In paragraph 1 of the actual estimate, the text leads off with the
phrase, "Cease-fires have been achieved in Vietnam and Laos and there may
soon be a truce in Cambodia . ." A policy-level recipient of this prose could
legitimately wonder whether its drafters live in the real world. Things may
be reasonably (though not totally) quiet in Laos, and an agreement for
Vietnam has been signed, but anyone saying "cease-fires have been achieved"
in both countries does not read his mail.
7. Paragraph 5 of the estimate says that if Hanoi wants to resume
significant military action "it must plan for greater self-sufficiency in war
materiel -- or ensure the continued flow of large scale Chinese and Soviet
military aid." The latter, certainly; but the former is nonsense. There is
no way Hanoi can "plan for self-sufficiency" without building an industrial
plant capable of manufacturing weapons, ammunition, artillery, tanks, etc.
DRV has no such industrial base and developing one would take years.
8. Paragraph 11, particularly its footnote (3), raises a point that has
long irritated me. That footnote's second paragraph leads off with the
sentence:
"There is also a case to be made for the proposition that
Chinese roadbuilding in Northwestern Laos since the
late 1960's has been a response to concern in Peking
over the possibility of military operations in this sector
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In my opinion, there is no plausible case whatsoever that can be made for
this proposition. For one thing, there were no such units operating anywhere
near the area in question prior to 1970. For another, it defies logic and
common sense to argue that the Chinese built the north Laos road complex,
with eight engineer regiments protected by an infantry regiment and three
a. I have long felt that our whole institutional analytic
approach to the Chinese road is rooted in doctrinnaire theology:
The Chinese are peaceful folk with no irridentist ambitions,
therefore anything they do along their southern borders which
might look bellicose, menacing or imperialist to an ignorant
layman must -- by definition -- be the result of some prior
U. S. provocation.
b . It seems to me dangerous for an intelligence agency to
wed itself to a theological position into which evidence is sub-
sequently shoe horned. I would have thought it much better in
.this instance (and all others) to start with the observed facts
of behavior, in this case Chinese behavior, and try to develop
plausible hypotheses to account for that behavior. In the case
of the Chinese road, plausible hypotheses are not hard to
develop at all. Surely the pattern of Chinese behavior in Laos,
and Burma, indicates -- among other things -- a nervousness
about China's southern boundaries and a desire to protect them
in the classic great power fashion of establishing buffer spheres
of influence along them, a policy motivated by the hard-headed,
real-politik view that any fighting that might have to be done
to protect one's borders is better done on someone else's territory.
Furthermore, I quite fail to see why we stubbornly resist
acknowledging that one purpose to which the north Laos road
complex certainly could be put would be that of supporting
trans-Mekong insurgent activity in Thailand.
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9. On the specific, and major, question of Vietnam, the current
draft makes -- or implies -- three important substantive judgments which
I think are, at a minimum, highly debatable.
a. In paragraph 78 and 79, the paper'implies that
Thieu and the GVN will lose any political struggle with the
Communists even if the latter do not make further resort to
military action. This implication is conveyed by the unadorned
statement that "few regional leaders are optimistic on this
matter." There is no companion statement indicating what
the U.S. intelligence community thinks and the possibility
that Thieu and the GVN might win a political struggle is not
even mentioned as a possibility, let alone discussed. Iam
not suggesting that the paper should argue that the GVN
necessarily will win any such struggle, but I do feel legitimate
issue can be taken with what any cold reader could easily
construe as the clearly implied conclusion that a Communist
political victory is somehow foreordained.
b. In the same paragraphs (78 and 79), the current
draft also implies that a Communist success "some months
hence" in toppling Thieu and replacing him with a coalition
under strong Communist influence, would have minimal
regional impact since such a chain of events would "not
come as a shock" to other regional leaders. The argument
is then advanced that if -- and the language suggests this
should be construed in the sense of "only if" -- U.S. conduct
somehow appeared to contribute to Thieu's fall would other
regional leaders be disturbed. This argument strikes me as
emanating from cloud cuckoo land. "Some months hence"
presumably translates as "less than a year." If the Communists
should effect a political takeover in South Vietnam in less
than a year, I think the impact throughout the rest of Southeast
Asia would be major. Furthermore, under any such time-
scaled scenario, U.S. conduct would inevitably be read as
having contributed in a major way to Thieu's and the GVN's
defeat.
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c. In paragraph 94, the paper contends that "A Communist
takeover in Saigon . . . would have less impact regionally than
the fall of Vientiane or Phnom Penh." With all due respect to the
estimate's drafters, this is arrant nonsense.' The fall of Saigon
and emergence of a unified, Communist controlled Vietnam would
have a profound impact throughout the whole region, and far
beyond. Furthermore, if Vietnam were to be unified under
Vietnamese Communist control, the Lao Dong Party would soon
establish de facto suzerainty over Laos and Cambodia, whose
governments would soon be reduced to the' status of satellites
in the orbit of their irresistibly powerful Vietnamese neighbors.
Thus a "fall" of Saigon would almost inevitably portend some
form of "fall" for Phnom Penh and Vientiane, though the converse
is not necessarily true.
10. I realize it is late in the game, but I feel very strongly that the
DCI should not be asked to sign off on this estimate without some attention
first being paid to the points outlined above.
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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Copies to
Mr. Proctor
Mr. Walsh
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VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DATE: 8 March 1973
To: The Director
FROM: GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT: Southeast Asia Estimate Draft
REMARKS:
Attached is a copy of a note I have sent
to ONE that should be self-explanatory. At
this stage, I would counsel against any direct
interventi
on on your part. If the paragraphs
flagged are not modified in the version
eventually submitted for your con
id
s
eration,
however, I think you should not sign off on the
document as your estimate.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
cc: General Walters
Mr. Colby
1 - GAC Chrono
1 - VAS Chrono
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