PREVIEW OF REPORT OF THE JOINT STUDY GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000200060025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: December 2, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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2 December 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
as0111.0?000.10.-..."
: Preview of Report of the Joint Study Group
1. Inasmuch as the draft of our report as of today is still
in fairly rough form, I think it would best serve your purpose if I
briefly summarize some of the items that have been under considera-
tion and on which the Group would very much like to have an expression
of your views on Monday afternoon. I would note that you are the
last of the heads of the intelligence agencies to be heard, and that
following our meeting with you we have only to meet with Mr. Gordon
Gray, Mr. Stans, Secretary Gates and Secretary Herter. Thus,
during our last two weeks of work we will have met with the principals
and also we will have met with the heads of all of the intelligence
agencies. Finally, before summarizing some of the views of the
Study Group, I would mention that there are only a few major areas
in which there is still strong disagreement within the Study Group
itself. I will point these out in the course of my notes.
2. Perhaps more time has been spent by the Study Group
on its own discussions and more questions asked of the people who
have appeared before us on the subject of coordination of intelligence
activities and how this should be achieved. I believe that the final
report will comment on this somewhat along the following lines.
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F irst, that coordination on the national level be under the Director
of Central Intelligence, and that to achieve this he should separate
his present coordination staff from the rest of CIA and add to the
staff senior personnel detailed from other agencies. This staff
would actively particpate in coordination both in Washington and in
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would be relieved of coordination responsibilities. Further, that
the DCI should also effect coordination in the various embassies
through the greater use of ambassadors and that he should send
instructions to ambassadors through the Secretary of State. Second,
that the coordination in the embassies should be achieved under the
direct supervision of the ambassadors and perhaps through the use
of coordinators. I
/I would note here that the Group
feels that where the ambassador uses the CIA chief to coordinate
overt as well as clandestine activities, he places CIA in a difficult
position, particularly vis-a-vis the military services. Third, that
in areas of unified commands, e.g., CINCPAC in the Pacific and
EUCOM in Europe, coordination should be under the direction of
the tinified commander, which should include communications from
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G roup will recommend that the Army be encouraged to develop its
clandestine collection of Order of Battle and other tactical intelligence.
We were told quiteetrongly by CIA representatives in the field that
this was a form of low-level collection in which they did not wish to
engage. We feel that the Army military intelligence units, who in
combat will be concerned with the same type of tactical collection,
should have the benefit of peacetime experience to assist their work.
We do not believe that any theater G-2 would ever surrender his
responsibility for protecting the command to another agency unless
or until he received such complete information from that agency
that he no longer felt any necessity for further collection. In
encouraging the Army to engage in clandestine Order of Battle
collection we believe that the CIA should give them every assistance
We further feel that ultimately, after there has
been a reasonable period for the development of good will between
the agencies, the proper way to handle this would be by complete
integration of all clandestine collectors operating under the guidance
of CIA.
4. Possibly this would be the appropriate time to report
that there is very strong feeling not only on the part of the Army but
also on the part of other military services--the Air Force least of
all--that CIA wants to take over all clandestine operations and that
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the new DCIDs are so designed as to force all other agencies out of
business. I should note that this feeling is also present in the intelli-
gence production field where the depth of feeling in the Department
of State concerning CIA as competitors was far deeper than even I
had previously imagined.
5. The Joint Study Group has spent a considerable amount
of time on the exceedingly complicated problem of requirements for
intelligence collection. In this area I should point out that the
Department of State does not feel that there is a serious a problem
as the rest of the Study Group does. In simplest terms, a tremendous
amount of effort is devoted in the intelligence community to preparing
basic handbooks as guides to collectors, to preparing series of
guides for collection on current subjects of interest, and to issuing
spot requests for collection. One of the particular problems in this
area is that whereas the subcommittees of the USIB do a very
creditable job on handling requirements either by subject area,
e. g., economic or scientific, or by method of collection, e. g.
CO1VIINT or clandestine, there is nowhere in the intelligence community
where all requirements are known and all resources are known. For
example, clandestine collection could be used for obtaining something
that might be obtainable overtly or, conceivably, could already be
available in current files in Washington. The Joint Staff has just
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completed, by direction from General Erskinets office, a monumental
study of requirements in the military area. The Joint Study Group
will probably recommend that there be some central system established
where all requirements could be correlated with all resources--
duplication eliminated and all files searched--before action is sent
to the field. We will also suggest a much greater pooling of
requirements in the various embassies and commands for the same
reason as quoted above.
6. In the collection field, we believe that certain added
emphasis should be given to those sources of collection currently
available which are productive. For example, we will undoubtedly
urge greater overhead reconnaisance at the earliest possible time,
while priority be given for equipment for ELINT and COMINT and
peripheral photography. In this connection, the Study Group will
probably propose that the CIA be the national center for photographic
interpretation, but will also probably propose that some system of
monitoring the extent of this work be established. It is rather
disturbing to note that a great deal of our planning and that of the
Air Force has gone on separately, with little coordination, and we
feel that this particular type of "arms race" should be slowed
down or stopped.
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7. The Study Group has discussed at some length the
structure and organization of the United States Intelligence Board.
We are particularly interested in whether this board would be more
effective or efficient if it consisted only of the Director of Central
Intelligence, a representative of the Secretary of Defense, a repre-
sentative of the Joint Staff, and a representative of the Department
of State. Under this arrangement, the Defense representative, or
the Joint Staff representative, would be supported by the chiefs of
the three military intelligence services. The Director of NSA
would also be included on the Board because of its importance to
the Intelligence Community. We have discovered some feeling in
the Intelligence Community that it would be very useful if the
Defense Department reconciled some of its differences prior to
USIB meetings. This would not preclude individual services from
presenting dissenting viewpoints, but would save the time of other
intelligence services by having the matters thrashed out in advance.
We have also heard some views to the effect that the USIB should
devote more time and attention to the work of its subcommittees.
Recognizing that the members of the USIB are extremely busy
individuals, we have thought about the creation of an executive
committee for the USIB which would review in advance, where
possible, material coming to the USIB, particularly material of
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a management nature. This executive committee would not
review the National Estimates inasmuch as everybody is unani-
mous in expressing the view that the estimate procedure and system
today is emminently satisfactory.
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9. A tremendous portion of the effort of the Intelligence
Community is going into air targeting work. We examined this
subject quite closely in Washington, with SAC, with ATIC, and with
U.S. Air Forces, Europe. I believe it is the consensus that the
creation of the new Strategic Targeting Unit at Omaha will help to
correct the situation but we found to a certain degree a lack of
correlation between SAC targeting, USAFE targeting, and Navy
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targeting. A slight approximation of the size of this problem
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targets of which we understand some
constitute strategic targets.
10. In the cost field, we have not tried to duplicate the
work of the USIB Committee on cost and our report will probably
be along the lines that this effort be continued and refined over the
years, urging the military services particularly to try to identify
more precisely what is actually attributable to intelligence. It is
my view, at least, that under the present system it is extremely
difficult to estimate to any degree what our intelligence effort
costs the US Government. You are aware, of course, that the
USIB report suggests that the cost is in the neighborhood of
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persons. On the
other hand, General Erskine has in his office a summary which
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dollars for the intelligence effort.
tremendous part of the problem is deciding what to charge to
intelligence.
11. There has been considerable discussion of whether
there should be one focal point in the Department of Defense on
intelligence matters, and there seems to be a fairly strong opinion
in support of this. Part of the argument behind this falls back on
I would simply note here that a
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the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the evolution that
they may have started in favor of a stronger Joint Staff as is
distinct from distributing responsibilities between individual
services. General Erskine seems to feel quite strongly that his
office should at least be a monitoring organization for the relations
of other agencies with Defense.
12. Related to the subject above, of course, is the re-
quirement of the Joint Study Group to thoroughly review the military
intelligence set-up, which we have done at great length. The
Group is divided on this subject but I believe that the majority is
strongly in favor of no dimunition of the strength and effectiveness
of the respective military intelligence services. On the other hand,
I believe that the Group feels that any increase in Joint Staff responsi-
bilities be made only if certain decreases are made in the individual
military intelligence service responsibilities. For example, perhaps
the Joint Staff could produce certain intelligence periodicals by having
assigned to them representatives of the individual services; but this
would be useful only if some publications were given up by the individual
services. I believe the Group strongly feels that the production of
publications exclusively of interest to one service, e.g. , ground
Order of Battle for the Army, should remain the exclusive responsi-
bility of that service. The Group will possibly make some recommendations
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in this regard for the consideration of the Secretary of Defense,
particularly along the line of insuring that if the Joint Staffs and
unified commands are developed it not be done with a loss of
expertise on the part of the individual services. The Group appears
to be strongly opposed, with possibly one exception, to a single
military intelligence service.
13. Related to the above and also to many of the problems
which we have observed in the Intelligence Community, is the defini-
tion of what constitutes departmental intelligence. As you know the
law states that the creation of CIA in no way interferes with. the right
of each department to collect and produce departmental intelligence.
This is further emphasized in the directives. The result is that each
department can decide that any intelligence is of departmental interest
and thus we find such duplication as attaches reporting on political
events, etc. The Group will possibly make a recommendation that
there be a more precise delineation of what each department can
collect and produce, including of course, safeguards to insure that
if the only political intelligence they can get is from State by their
attaches, they would be enabled to present a differing interpretation
if they so desired.
14. The Study Group has also discussed the feasibility of
a country intelligence plan as an adjunct or supplement to the OCB
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country plans. This document would simply further define what
each agency did and be a tool and guidance document for each
ambassador. The general thinking is that it would be prepared on
the desk level in Washington, reviewed prior to final approval in
the field, with the USIB as the final authority.
15. There is some thinking in the Group as to whether
there shouldn't be a general over-all review of who performs what
services of common concern. This is still a matter of some dis-
cussion and there does not seem to be any precise view at the mom-
ent. It is related, however, to our general concern over the imple-
mentation of intelligence directives and also that there are some
activities under which there are no intelligence directives, e.g.,
photographic intelligence,
It is my personal feeling,
which I believe is shared to some degree by the Group, that perhaps
intelligence directives are not so much in need as specific written
understandings by the various departments and agencies. In conclusion
I would note that there is rather a striking lack of information on what
is coordinated and how it is coordinated and that it is fairly obvious
we should expand our mutual indoctrination of each other in the
Intelligence Commumity.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General
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TOP SECRET
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Signatures of the Joint Study Group. (Copies distributed had reproduced
signatures.)
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V Lyman B. Kirkpatrick (Chairman)
Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency
Representing the Director of Central Intelligence
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Special Assistant to the Director of Intelligence & Research,
Department of State
Representing the Secretary of State
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Genefal*Uraves B. Erskine, et.)
Assistant to the Secretary of fense
for Special Operations
Representing the Secretary of Defense
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Robert M. Mac,
Chief of the International Division, Bureau of the Budget
Representing the Director, Bureau of the Budget
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James a. i.ay, Jr
Exe e Secretary, National Sec ri Council
Representing the Special Assistant to tie President
for National Security Affairs
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ZS September PAO
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Interim Report of Joint Study Group
I. The President, on 21 September, indicated to Mr. Gordon
Gray, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. an interest
tn the progress of the work of the Joint Study Group. The following
is a status report of our work. Each member of the Study Graup
has shown this report to his principal and it has been approved for
use in briefing the President.
I. The Joint Study Group has held meetings every day since
July 11 when the Terms of Reference were approved, with the ex-
ception of two days in September when the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities was meeting. These
meetings of the Group have lasted a minimum of two hours and during
the week when the Group visited the Air Force Security Service at
Sea Antonio, the Strategic Air Command at Omaha, and the Air
Technical Intelligence Center at Dayton, lasted all day.
. Approximately the first month of our work was devoted to
detailed briefings by each of the intelligence agencies on their organi-
sation, mission and operations. The second phase of our work was
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devoted to round-table discussions with knowledgeable individuals
in the field of those subjects which we wer, directed by our Terms
of Reference to examine in depth; namely: intelligence requirements
intelligence collection and processing intelligence costs, and intelli-
gence research and development. This phase of our work also occu-
pied approximately a month.
4. We are currently in a third phase of study which can most
accurately be described as a follow-up in those areas where we felt
additional study necessary: for example, Automatic Data Processing
where we are interested in determining whether the various systems
being planned by the different intelligence agencies are compatible;
intelligence procedures in air targeting; priorities for collection;
mechanical translation; the work of the National Indications Center;
COMINT-ELINT collection and processing; photo interpretation; and
the intelligence potential of reconnaissance satellites.
S. The first week in October we will start the fourth phase
of our work which will be an on-the-spot examination of the activities
of the various intelligence agencies in selected posts abroad. The
Study Group believes that this trip ii essential in order to fully appreciate
the scope of overseas activities of the various intelligence services
and to obtain a field reaction to some of our tentative conclusions. A
copy of the trip itinerary is attached. Upon our return the second
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week in November we will devote our fall attention to the final pre-
paration of the report and by that time we hope to have in at least a
preliminary draft.
6. We are certain that there will be many follow-up discussions
required in the latter part of November, particularly to discuss our
findings with the various head. of the intelligence agencies. We will
have the report completed for submission to you by our deadline of
December 15.
7. We feel that it would be inadvisable at this time to comment
on any specific problems other than to say that in each of the areas
which we have been directed to study we believe we can make some
helpful recommendations for improvement, including greater integration
of the intelligence activities and the elimination of unnecessary dupli-
cation in the Government. We are aware of the problems created by
the sin* and complexity of the intelligence community. We are
particularly concerned about the outlook for the future when it is con-
ceivable there may be a flood of information from reconnaissance
satellites. We are already of a mind that the future demands for more
manpower, more money, better communications etc., must be balanced
by tighter integration.
8. We wish to advise you that the cooperation which we have re-
ceived from all of the intelligence agencies has been of the highest order
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and that the senior officers have given to us freely of their time in
order to further our work. I would also mention that the members of
the Study Group have been extremely faithful in attending all of the
meetings with absences occasioned only by unavoidable conflicts
with other responsibilities and the necessity for some leave.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
C hair man
Joint Study Group
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STAT
you
Please add these to the file I gave/on the
Joint Study Group report. I think there was one tab
on the left marked "miscellanaous" and these can be
added under klittot that tab.
If the 26 Sept memo is already on file there,
pis destroy this copy
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