THE NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

A Report to the Congress
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EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
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The National Security
Organization
A report to the Congress by the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, February 1949
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The Commission on Organization of The
Executive Branch of the Government
HERBERT HOOVER, Chairman
DEAN ACHESON, Vice Chairman
ARTHUR S. FLEMMING JOHN H. MCCLELLAN
JAMES FORRESTAL JAMES K. POLLOCK
GEORGE H. MEAD CLARENCE J. BROWN
GEORGE D. AIKEN CARTER MANASCO
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY JAMES H. RowE, JR.
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Letter of Transmittal
WASHINGTON, D. C.
15 February 1949.
DEAR SIRS: In accordance with Public Law 162, Eightieth
Congress, approved July 7, 1947, the Commission on Or-
ganization of the Executive Branch of the Government
submits herewith its report on the National Security
Organization, and, separately, as appendix G, a part of the
report of the task force assigned to examine this segment
of the executive branch.
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, a member of this
Commission, took no part in the preparation or consideration
of this report.
The Commission wishes to express its appreciation for the
work of its task force and for the cooperation of the members
of the National Security Organization and other departments
and agencies concerned with this report.
Respectfully,
The Honorable
The President of the Senate.
The Honorable
The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
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Contents
Page
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . I
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION . . . 5
Over-all Departmental Management . . . . . . . . 6
Civilian Control and Accountability . . . . . . . . 7
Budget and Expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . II
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE ORGANIZATION . . . . 15
Civilian Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Teamwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Medical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Civilian and Industrial Mobilization . . . . . . . . 20
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
RELATED TASK FORCE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
SEPARATE STATEMENT BY VICE-CHAIRMAN ACHESON, COMMIS-
SIONERS MEAD, POLLOCK, AND ROWE . . . . . . . . . 25
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The National Security Organization
World conditions demand that the United States maintain
a strong National Security Organization.
This need results directly from the total disruption of the
old balance of power among nations, and from new forms
of communications and warfare which have impaired
America's ocean-moated isolation. Ours is a need for defense
and our military strength must be predicated upon the
degree of menace which we face. At present outlook, the
United States' need for a strong Military Establishment is
obvious.
In the past, the United States has maintained merely a
nominal Army and Air Force, and its Navy has been sharply
limited. The assumption was that war, and international
crises which could result in war, would be rare and that there
would always be ample time to build a strong military force
around this permanent cadre. Now the United States, in
the forefront of world affairs, must continuously deal with
political and economic pressures.
The maintenance of a huge military force and of enormous
military budgets in peacetime poses a severe problem. It
introduces a new element into our social and political life;
this spending, both as a drain on the taxpayers and as pur-
chasing power, can vitally affect our economy. The degree
NOTE. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal took no part in the preparation
or consideration of this report.
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of our success in achieving efficiency of military operations
and planning, economy in execution, and proper relationship
of this new force to our political and economic fabric can
make the difference between democracy and totalitarianism,
both for our Nation, and for the whole world.
Military strength and efficiency is important, but it is only
one element of national security. National strength depends
upon economic, political, and human values. We must,
therefore, assure ourselves that the military arm of Govern-
ment, in its new strength, will not grow up as a thing apart.
In particular, it must be unequivocally under the direction of
the executive branch and fully accountable to the President,
the Congress, and the people.
Throughout its history, the United States has been fearful
of military cliques and has thrown up safeguards against this
threat to democratic government. Under the Constitution,
we have subordinated the military to civilian control by mak-
ing the President Commander in Chief of the armed forces,
and by installing civilian secretaries to direct the, departments.
The pressure of events has resulted in a budget of approxi-
mately $15,ooo,ooo,ooo in the current fiscal year, more than a
third of all Federal appropriations, and large military budg-
ets must be the expectation for the immediate future. Un-
der these circumstances, the Nation must make very sure that
means of exercising civilian control are strong and effective.
We repeat, that under these circumstances, we must hold the
military rigidly accountable to the President, the Congress,
and the people. We must do this not only to safeguard our
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democratic traditions against militarism, but to insure that
military policy shall be in close accord with national needs
and national welfare; and also to insure that the huge military
budget shall be used with efficiency, and that costs shall be
commensurate with actual needs without damaging or de-
stroying our national economy.
At present, we can be sure of none of these things.
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What is Wrong with the Present
Organization
The National Security Organization, as legislated in 1947
to establish unification of the armed services and unified
national policy on security, has achieved gains. Further
improvement may be expected since the organization is still
young, but there is evidence that the utmost that can be
accomplished under the present statute will fall far short
of national needs.
The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
has had the benefit of an investigation into the National
Security Organization by a distinguished committee. The
committee found continued disharmony and lack of unified
planning. Extravagance in military budgets and waste in
military expenditure show a serious lack of understanding
of the effect of military costs and spending upon the total
economy. True national security depends more upon eco-
nomic stability and political strength than upon military
power.
Interservice rivalries indicate a lack of understanding
of the fact that military security depends upon cooperation
and balance among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and
upon the creation of a genuinely unified military arm.
There is 'a lack of close working relationships among such
important elements as the Research and Development Board
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and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Some part of these weaknesses undoubtedly can be traced
to the newness of the operation, but the Commission believes
that they show serious organizational defects. The lack of
central authority in the direction of the National Military
Establishment, the rigid statutory structure established under
the act, and divided responsibility, have resulted in a failure
to assert clear civilian control over the armed forces.
Over-All Department Management
In our first report we have urged that the foundation of
good departmental administration requires that the Secre-
tary have authority from the Congress to organize and con-
trol his organization, and that separate authorities to com-
ponent subordinates be eliminated.
In our Report on the Budget we propose a new form of
"performance" budget for all departments. We also pro-
pose that each department or agency keep its own administra-
tive accounts in the manner prescribed by an Accountant
General in the Treasury and subject to the approval and audit
of the Comptroller General! The Commission also recom-
mends that personnel recruitment be performed by the De-
partment (except possibly in the lower grades), subject to
standards and methods of merit selection to be proposed by
the Department, but with the approval and enforcement of
the Civil Service Commission? The Commission likewise
x Report on Budgeting and Accounting.
Report on Personnel Management.
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recommends elsewhere that the procurement of supplies
peculiar to the Department be decentralized into the Depart-
ment, under standards and methods established in the Office
of General Services! The items of common use would of
course be handled by the latter office. Further, we propose
that the Department should strengthen its management
research unit, working in cooperation with a comparable
staff unit under the Office of the Budget:
Civilian Control and Accountability
In its study of the executive branch the Commission has
established certain principles that must underlie systems of
organization in order to assure the three essentials of good
Government management: efficiency, economy, and clear
accountability to the Congress and the people.
These principles call for centralization of authority and
control in the President and the department heads, for clear
lines of command and accountability, and for provision of
adequate staff for policy formulation and for supervision of
operation. Without these, the President and the department
heads cannot exercise positive control and hence cannot be
held responsible by the Congress and the people for failures
or deficiencies of performance.
In the establishment of the present organization for national
security, these principles have been repeatedly violated.
' Report on the Office of General Services.
'Report on General Management of the Executive Branch.
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a. The President's authority has been curtailed by
statutory stipulation of the membership and duties of
both the National Security Council and the National
Security Resources Board-the Cabinet committees
concerned with vital defense policies.
b. The authority of the Secretary of Defense, and
hence the control of the President, is weak and heavily
qualified by the provisions of the act of 1947 which
set up a rigid structure of federation rather than
unification.
c. In direct proportion to the limitations and con-
fusions of authority among their civilian superiors, the
military are left free of civilian control.
The Commission's report on departmental management'
has pointed out the weaknesses and fallacies of a department
in which statutory authority is delegated to subordinate units,
and the department head is left with only the most general
supervisory powers over policies, operations, and budgets.
In such cases, the department head cannot enforce consistent
policies and obtain the necessary efficiency and economy.
Nor can he be held strictly accountable since he lacks authority
to carry out the mandates of determined policy. The Na-
tional Military Establishment as set up under the act of 1947,
is perilously close to the weakest type of department.
The Secretary of Defense, at present, has only "general"
authority over the service departments-the Army, Navy, and
Air Force. He cannot hire and fire subordinates except on
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his immediate staff. Almost all appointive power not in the
President's hands is in that of the subordinate service secre-
taries. The powers of the Secretary of Defense over the
budget for the National Military Establishment, and over
expenditures, are inadequate. He is inadequately provided
with staff and has no authority to reorganize the Establish-
ment, most of whose machinery is rigidly prescribed by
statute.
The principle of federation, rather than firm unification,
is implicit in the statutory provision that "all powers and
duties relating to such departments (the Army, Navy, and
Air Force) and not specifically conferred upon the Secretary
of Defense" are reserved to the departments. The pattern
does not cease at that point. Within the service departments,
subordinate units-such as the Corps of Engineers in the
Army insofar as its civilian functions are concerned-have
direct authority from the Congress exclusive of control even
by their own secretaries.
Moreover, the service secretaries are given specific authority
to resist the supervision of the Secretary of Defense in budget-
ary matters by appealing over his. head to the President or to
the Director of the Budget. The service secretaries set with
the Secretary of Defense on the National Security Council
and can "out vote" him in that body's deliberations. They
have more staff for planning and execution and, in fact,
operate as almost fully autonomous units.
Under these circumstances centralized civilian control
scarcely exists. Each military branch follows its own pur-
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poses and, due both to the weakness of the Defense Secre-
tary's powers and to the confusion of authority over them, has
very much a free hand. In effect, divided responsibility
means no responsibility. Civilian control thus depends
directly upon the Congress whose chief mechanism is the
tightening or loosening of the purse strings. In the present
unsatisfactory state of military budget practices and pro-
cedure, the effectiveness of this mechanism in the hands of
the Congress is highly attenuated.
In the period ahead when national security will demand
a large military budget, this time-honored device for sub-
ordinating the military to civilian control will be ineffective.
The remedy must be sought through organization of the
executive branch to establish firm lines of authority and
accountability. Otherwise, civilian control will continue to
be a label instead of a reality.
What is true of the National Military Establishment is
equally true of the operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Three of the four members are spokesmen for separate service
arms. The Secretary of Defense, and his viewpoint for the
unified Establishment as a whole, is not represented in their
deliberations. Thus, though the Secretary of Defense is,
under the act, the principal assistant to the President, in
military matters, he cannot, as a practical matter, maintain
effective civilian control over this most powerful of military
units. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a unit, report to two
officials-the Secretary of Defense and the President. As
individuals, they report to the President, the Secretary of
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Defense, and the service secretaries. Each will tend to
answer much more to the service secretary who is his direct
superior than to the single policies of a unified Establishment.
Here, too, it is clear that divided responsibility and alle-
giance are tantamount to an almost complete absence of
control. Under this system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
virtually a law unto themselves, as evidenced in the fact
that their activities are not well-coordinated with intra-
Military Establishment operations, nor with the policy work
of the Cabinet councils. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, like the
rest of the National Military Establishment, are not firmly
under civilian control.
Budget and Expenditure
The present budget of the armed forces represents about
$zoo per capita for the Nation, as contrasted with some $2.25
before the First World War. Our task force reports that
the current preliminary budget estimates of the three mili-
tary departments for the fiscal year i95o were for more than
$30,000,000,000.
Such a budget would be justifiable only if the Nation were
actually involved in warfare. It would require a sharp reduc-
tion in production for civilian consumption, precipitate the
need for controls over the economy and enormously increase
inflationary pressures. It reflects a lack of realistic under-
standing by the three military departments of the economic
and social factors of national security.
Moreover, military budgets are not drawn with careful
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consciousness of cost factors. For example, an examination
of the 1950 budget revealed estimates requesting moderniza-
tion of io2 more tanks of a certain type than the Army actually
possessed. In another case, a misplaced figure added some
$3o,000,ooo to budget estimates.
The committee which examined into these matters for
the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
was unable to compare with any degree of accuracy the
cost of similar functions in the three services because of
varied organizational structures and differing budgetary and
accounting classifications and procedures.
Firm control over the budget and over military expendi-
tures, as authorized by the Congress, is of the utmost impor-
tance to the national economy. Full control in the hands
of the Secretary of Defense, under the authority of the Presi-
dent, would accomplish three main purposes: (a) It would
assure budgeting and spending from the standpoint of
national welfare, rather than from the standpoint of service
rivalries; (b) it would assure clear and direct accountability
to the President, the Office of the Budget, and the Congress
through a single official, and by these means would assure
a budget that conformed to national policy; (c) it would
provide the Secretary of Defense with a most effective
mechanism for asserting civilian control over the military.
Recommendation No.1
The Commission, therefore, recommends:
a. That full power over preparation of the budget and
over expenditures as authorized by the Congress be
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vested in the Secretary of Defense, under the authority
of the President.
b. That the Secretary of Defense direct and supervise
a major overhaul of the entire budget system; that the
budget be of a performance type with emphasis on the
objectives and purposes to be accomplished rather than
upon personnel, supplies, and similar classifications; 6
that uniform terminology, classifications, budgetary,
and accounting practices be established throughout all
the services along administrative lines of responsibility,
so that fiscal and management responsibility go together.
Under the performance budget system, each major organi-
zational unit with management responsibility would have
to prepare, and defend before the Secretary of Defense, com-
plete estimates for its activities on the basis of functions and
performance, and therefore could be held responsible for
any money it might spend. Accountability would extend
to accounting for operating results and to the measurement of
performance against standards set through budgetary plan-
ning and cost estimates.
Such a system would accomplish a great deal, not only for
efficiency, but to establish the authority of the Secretary of
Defense and hence to assure civilian control.
c. That the armed services be required, at least in
peacetime, to keep complete, accurate, and current
inventories.
This system of budgeting is discussed in detail in the Commission's report on
Budgeting and Accounting.
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What Should Be Done To Improve
Organization
The Commission calls attention to the findings of its task
force report submitted separately to the Congress. The Com-
mission is in general agreement with the conclusions and
recommendations of the task force. However, the Commis-
sion feels that certain of the measures suggested by the task
force for carrying out the policies need strengthening from
the broader standpoint of reorganization of the entire execu-
tive branch-particularly to insure firm civilian control.
The Commission, in its first report, has recommended that
all statutory restrictions on the National Security Council
and the National Security Resources Board which limit the
authority of the President should be removed and that the
President have entire discretion over their membership,
assignments, and direction.
The Commission recommends that the post of Chief of
Staff to the President be abolished.
Civilian Control
Singleness of control is the essence of efficiency. The
present scattering of authority is expensive, promotes rather
than curtails service rivalries, and destroys the very principle
of unification. Accountability is most strongly enforced
when the President and the Congress, in the people's name,
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can call a single official to book for his conduct of a Govern-
ment operation.
Recommendation No. 2
Therefore the Commission makes the following recom-
mendations:
a. That the principle of unified civilian control and
accountability be the guiding rule for all legislation
concerned with the National Military Establishment
and that full authority and accountability be centered
in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to the Presi-
dent and the Congress.
b. That all statutory authority now vested in the
service departments, or their subordinate units, be
granted directly to the Secretary of Defense, subject to
the authority of the President, with further authority to
delegate them as he sees fit and wise.
c. That the Secretary of Defense shall have full au-
thority, subject only to the President and the Congress,
to establish policies and programs.
d. That the service secretaries be deprived of their
privilege of appeal over the head of the Secretary of
Defense; that they be directly and exclusively respon-
sible to him; that the Secretary of Defense be the sole
agent reporting to the President; that the service sec-
retaries, to clarify their positions, be designated the
Under Secretaries for Army, Navy, and Air Force.'
' Commissioners Hoover, Flemming, Manasco, and Mead dissent from the
recommendation to change the designation of the service secretaries to Under
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e. That specific provisions be made that the three mil-
itary services shall be administered by the several under
secretaries subject to the full direction and authority
of the Secretary of Defense.
f. That there shall be joint Chiefs of Staff represent-
ing the three services, appointed by the President and
subject to confirmation by the Senate and that the Sec-
retary of Defense, with the President's approval, shall
appoint a chairman to preside over the joint Chiefs of
Staff and to represent, and report to, the Secretary of
Defense?
g. That all administrative authority be centered in the
Secretary of Defense, subject only to the authority of
the President, including full and final authority over
preparation of the military budget and over the expendi-
ture of funds appropriated by the Congress.
h. That the Secretary be provided with an Under Secre-
tary of Defense, who shall be his full deputy and act for
him in his absence, and three assistant secretaries; and
that the Secretary of Defense be empowered to set up
such personal assistants to himself as he shall require to
relieve him of day-to-day detail, to advise and assist him
in planning and carrying out programs, and to organize
this staff as he sees fit.
i. That full authority for the procurement and man-
agement of supplies and materiel be vested in the
Secretaries as they believe that the importance of these positions, the magnitude
of the departments, and the danger of diluting civilian control over the military
at the departmental level by a change of tides, outweigh considerations favoring
a change.
' Separate views of certain Commissioners are stated later.
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Secretary of Defense. The Secretary can delegate this
authority to the Munitions Board (or to other officers or
agencies as he may determine) with directions to expedite
by all possible means the elimination of costly duplica-
tion in procurement and waste in utilization among the
three services. Our further recommendations regard-
ing the coordination of military with civilian supply
management are contained in the Commission's report
on the Offices of General Services.
Recommendation No. 3
The following recommendations are made regarding
personnel:
a. That, in line with our recommendation below for
an integrated system of military personnel administra-
tion, military education, training, recruitment, promo-
tion, and transfers among the services be put under the
central direction and control of the Secretary of Defense.
b. That the recruitment of civilian employees should
be decentralized into the National Military Establish-
ment under standards and procedures to be approved and
enforced by the Civil Service Commission.'
c. That full authority be vested in the Secretary of
Defense, subject only to policies established by the Con-
gress and the President, to prescribe uniform personnel
policies for civilian and military personnel throughout
the several services.
8 See the Commission's report on Personnel Management.
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Teamwork
Recommendation No. 4
Teamwork and coordination throughout the National
Military Establishment should be improved. For these
purposes, the Commission recommends:
a. That more adequate and effective relations be de-
veloped at the working level among the appropriate
committees of the joint Chiefs of Staff on the one hand
and the National Security Council, Central Intelligence
Agency, Research and Development Board, Munitions
Board, and the National Security Resources Board on the
other hand.
b. That the jurisdiction and activities of the National
Security Resources Board be further defined and clarified
by the President.
c. That vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central
Intelligence Agency and its work.
The present system of military administration does not
allow for interchange of military and civilian personnel in
administrative positions. Economy and efficiency would be
fostered by a flexible system permitting the use of military
or civilian skills in the higher posts of military administration
and the Secretary should have authority to make such shifts
as circumstances dictate.
Supervision over military personnel is now vested in the
service department heads and in the President, not in the
Secretary of Defense. There are, in addition, many statu-
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tory prescriptions of certain administrative services such as
promotion boards, retirement boards, and others composed
of military personnel, all of which serve to restrict the
authority of the Secretary and his top civilian administrators.
Moreover, statutory specifications of the numbers and grades
of military personnel to be assigned to specific organizational
units limit the most economical utilization of available
military manpower when conditions require transfers and
changes among organizational units.
The Secretary should have full authority to organize
personnel management throughout the Military Establish-
ment for greater efficiency and economy, and present
hampering restrictions should be removed.
Medical Services
Recommendation No. 5
That steps be instituted to implement the recommenda-
tions which the Commission will file later concerning
the medical departments of the three services, and their
coordination with other medical programs of the Fed-
eral Government, as detailed in the Commission's sepa-
rate report on medical services.
Civilian and Industrial Mobilization
For the security of the Nation, the formulation of plans for
civilian and industrial mobilization should be completed at
the earliest possible date.
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Recommendation No. 6
The Commission therefore makes the following recom-
mendations:
a. That emergency plans for civilian and industrial
mobilization be completed promptly and continuously
revised.
b. That use of civilian advisory boards should be
continued.
c. That full responsibility and authority for formulat-
ing stock-pile policy and for its execution be clearly
determined and centralized.
d. That further steps be taken immediately under the
President's direction to prepare plans for civilian defense.
Such an effort will require the participation of many
agencies of Government. Similar action should be
taken under the President's direction with respect to
internal security. No clear allocation of responsibilities
has been worked out among the agencies involved. The
Commission believes that the problem in this area is one
of determining what needs to be done and designating
administrative responsibilities.
e. That defenses against unconventional methods of
warfare be developed promptly and more vigorous and
active attention be given to psychological warfare.
J. That the economic warfare section of the National
Security Resources Board develop a comprehensive
economic warfare program aimed at supporting national
security both in peace and war.
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Conclusions
These provisions should insure the full control and account-
ability of the National Military Establishment and the full
subordination of the military to civilian control by establish-
ing the Secretary of Defense as the principal assistant to the
President in military matters, responsible to him and to the
Congress for the conduct, efficiency, and economy of the
National Military Establishment. Lines of command would
be clear; interservice rivalries reduced by the fresh emphasis
on the singleness of purpose of the total military effort;
efficiency promoted and economy achieved through consistent
policy and program, and through centralized control.
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Related Task Force Reports
The Commission has had printed volume I of the task
force report and it is submitted to the Congress separately
as Appendix G, National Security Organization. Other
volumes of the task force report are submitted to the Congress
separately in typescript.
Acknowledgment
We wish to acknowledge the able service of the task force
on National Security Organization comprising:
Chairman
FERDINAND EBERSTADT, president, F. Eberstadt & Co., New York City;
chairman, Army and Navy Munitions Board, 1942 and former
vice chairman, War Production Board 1942-43.
Committee
RAYMOND B. ALLEN, president of the University of Washington.
THOMAS ARCHER, vice president, General Motors Corp.
HANSON W. BALDWIN, of the New York Times.
CHESTER I. BARNARD, president, Rockefeller Foundation.
DR. CHARLES W. COLE, president of Amherst College.
JOHN COWLES, president, Minneapolis Star and Tribune.
JAMES KNOWLSON, president of Stewart-Warner Corp.
JOHN J. MCCLOY, president, International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development.
DR. FREDERICK A. MIDDLEBUSH, president of the University of Missouri.
ROBERT P. PATTERSON, of Patterson, Belknap & Webb.
LEWIS L. STRAUSS, Commission member, Atomic Energy Commission.
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J. CARLTON WARD, JR., chairman of the board, Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp.
GEN. ROBERT E. WooD, chairman of the board, Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Military Advisory Committee
ADMIRAL R. S. EDWARDS. MAY. GEN. GILBERT R. COOK.
ADMIRAL BEN MOREELL. MAJ. GEN. EDWARD P. CURTIS.
LT. GEN. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE. MAJ. GEN. ROBERT W. HASBROUCK.
LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER. COL. TRUMAN SMITH.
VICE ADM. JOHN H. TOWERS.
Consultants
GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.
FLEET ADM. ERNEST J. KING.
FLEET ADM. CHESTER W. NIMITZ.
GEN. CARL SPAATZ.
LT. GEN. STANLEY D. EMBICK.
MAJ. GEN. FREDERICK L. ANDERSON.
JOHN M. HANCOCK, of Lehman Bros., New York City.
MRS. OVETA CULP HOBBY, executive vice president, the Houston Post.
CHARLES E. WILSON, president, General Electric Co.
Staff Members
WILLIAM ARNSTEIN
JOHN A. BROSS
DR. ROBERT H. CONNERY
ELMER T. CUMMINS
DR. CHARLES FAIRMAN
ELLIS J.fGROFF
JAMES E. HOLLINGSWORTH
ROY THOMAS HURLEY
ALMET JENKS
DR. RICHARD L. MEILING
CARROLL F. MILES
MATTHEW RADOM
MISS JESSIE PEARL RICE
DR. HOWARD RUSK
DR. E. DWIGHT SALMON
COL. LEWIS SANDERS
FRANZ SCHNEIDER
RICHARD W. SEABURY
MASON SEARS
WILLIAM H. STRONG
ARTHUR SUTHERLAND
DR. EDWARD F. WILLETT
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Separate Statement by Vice Chairman
Acheson, Commissioners Mead,
Pollock, and Rowe
We cannot agree with the recommendation of the other
members as to the joint Chiefs of Staff. We feel this Com-
mission should go one step further and recommend to the
Congress the creation of a single Chief of Staff over the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The full Commission is, we think, in complete agreement
as to the problem inherent in the present system of the joint
Chiefs. Our differences lie in the way it should be solved.
Stated simply, there are several major flaws today which
are for the most part caused by deficiencies in organization.
The existing structure operates to prevent our disinterested
and able-indeed often brilliant-high-ranking military men
from performing the best service of which they are capable
for their country. We think these faults can be remedied by
the improvement in organization and structure which we
suggest.
As presently organized the Joint Chiefs are, for one thing,
"too remote," to use the words of our task force report. They
are remote from the control of their civilian heads, the con-
stitutional Commander in Chief and his chief adviser and
assistant in the field of national security, the Secretary of De-
fense. Our task force tells us also that they are remote from
the civilian scientists who must try to arm them wisely for
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the future-the Research and Development Board. They
are remote from the Munitions Board which must arm them
now and in the immediate years ahead.
For another thing, they appear to be too deeply immersed
in the point of view of their particular services.. Since they
occupy dual roles-they are heads of separate services as well
as members of the Joint Chiefs-they must, perforce, be advo-
cates. The task force report has said:
.. the individual Chiefs of Staff have allowed themselves to be
influenced far too much by considerations of service particularism and
aggrandizement and have failed sufficiently to recognize and accept
their responsibilities as an integrating agency of national military
policy, .... individually they have been too heavily burdened with
departmental obligations to give their important duties as members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time and thought that those duties demand.
We feel that only by the creation of the post of a single
Chief of Staff can these faults be remedied. Essentially, they
are the same-a lack of civilian control and damaging serv-
ice rivalries-which by its findings the full Commission has
recognized do exist throughout the military establishment.
We think we should take this one step more. For if we are
really to achieve economy and efficiency in the military the
place to begin is here. As the annual report of the Secretary
of Defense has put it, "the nerve center of unification lies in
the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
just as the Commission has recommended centralizing
authority in the Secretary of Defense (as in all other depart-
mental heads), and has suggested adequate civilian staff
assistance so that such control will be exercised effectively,
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we likewise believe his control and authority should be bol-
stered in the military sphere by giving him the technical staff
assistance he needs, in the form of a single Chief of Staff as
his adviser.
If the President and the Secretary of Defense are to decide
intelligently the civilian head must have staff advice respon-
sive to him and not to one of three services. If the Congress is
to legislate wisely, to appropriate judiciously, it must be ad-
vised from an over-all strategic point of view, not on the basis
of a compromise of desires of three separate services.
A single Chief of Staff, with adequate staff, will, we believe,
escape from the particularistic view of one service; a tradition
aimed toward the over-all defense needs of the Nation will
begin, and today's habit of advocacy will diminish and
gradually disappear.
Civilian control can be either strong or weak. It is strong
if the information on which civilians-the President, the
Secretary, the Congress-must rely to make their decisions is
objective and complete; and it is weak if these decisions must
be made without such information. It is strong if there is
a clear line of responsibility for carrying out these decisions,
once made; and it is weak if responsibility is dispersed and
accountability is proportionately diffused, as is the situation
in the military establishment today. It is strong if the
military program is unified to a degree so that the whole is
stronger than the sum of its parts; and it is weak if the whole
must be determined by civilians through attempts to judge
the merits of separate service programs which do not mesh.
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A President, a Secretary cannot judge wisely without pro-
fessional aid directed at the problem as a whole and not at
its parts.
We believe that a single Chief of Staff will strengthen, not
weaken, the tradition of civilian control of the military, a
tradition which is held most closely by our people and one
which we think needs reaffirmation by action.
Accordingly we recommend the post of Chief of Staff
for the Armed Services.
He would have staff functions only, not command func-
tions. He would be a staff adviser to the Secretary who
should make the decisions, and to the President whenever the
latter so requires.
He would preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the
power to initiate and terminate discussions. He would bring
to the Secretary for decision the recommendations of the
Joint Chiefs, including disagreements. He would give his
own recommendation to the Secretary on such agreements
and disagreements. In the absence of the Secretary at meet-
ings he would give the Joint Chiefs the Secretary's views, if
formulated.
The Joint Staff would be subordinate to him. He would
have such personal staff assistance as the Secretary would
decide.
He would be called the Chief of Staff and not "chairman,"
"responsible head," "principal adviser," or some other tempo-
rizing title.
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We would emphasize his importance by his rank. His
post should carry the most senior active rank in the services.
Like all other officers, he would of course be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. His would be the
post to which every young professional soldier, naval officer,
and airman would aspire, instead of, as now, to be the head of
a separate service.
He would advise the civilian policy makers on the over-all
strategic problems they must take into account. In turn, he
will be familiar with our national policy, particularly with
national economic considerations and, at the direction of the
Secretary, will transmit them down through the three serv-
ices so they will become more economy-minded than they
now are.
His awareness of considerations other than military, his
over-all defense point of view, and his technical military skill
would enable him to advise the Secretary on the military
budget; he could distinguish the necessary from the merely
desirable.
The solution we recommend is not new to the United
States. In a previous period of our history it was tried and
not found wanting. Elihu Root, when Secretary of War,
found the cavalry, infantry, and artillery immersed in danger-
ous service rivalries and found himself making hard deci-
sions without benefit of over-all technical advice. He recom-
mended that the post of Chief of Staff be created in the Army.
Through the years since it has often been filled by our most
brilliant officers.
29
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Today's problem while larger and more complex is, we
believe, the same one. We feel its solution is so urgent, so
vital to our national security, that we should not temporize
any longer.
DEAN ACHESON.
GEORGE H. MEAD.
JAMES K. POLLOCK.
JAMES H. RowE, JR.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, A. S. Goveramsnt Printing Most
Washington 25. D. C - Price 15 seats
30
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Copy provided to OLC for Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence user
6 August 1976
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