RESPONSES TO DCI COMMENTS ON I&W WORKING GROUP REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000200060009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 7, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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7 August 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support
National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT : Responses to DCI Comments on I&W Working Group Report
REFERENCE : Memorandum from I I same subject, dated
4 August 1978
1. I have read 0 suggested approach to the DCI's request for
"alternatives" and am submitting herewith both. my comments and those of
who, as you know, is an unofficial member of the Working
Group largely because of his vast experience in this field.
2. Our comments are submitted in the form of separate attachments.
are included as Attachment "A" and mine as Attachment "B".
In connection with 0 submission I give it my complete support, particularly
as it concerns the discussion of recommendations from Paragraph 8 forward.
I think the dispersal of the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) and the use of
these positions as a network of warning officers throughout the community
is a worthy one and would serve to convince the HPSCI that the DCI is
indeed serious about approaching this problem on a total community basis.
My comments in Attachment "B" are not nearly as detailed and very largely
are keyed to proposed answer to the DCI.
25X
25X
Director
CIA Operations Center
25X
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Background
1. Each warning and crisis situation is different with respect to
location, time stress, kinds of substantive analytic talent (across the
community) required, types of collection needed, and the element of risk
involved.
2. An outline of the steps in the warning process, together with
the functional responsibilities C ), can be put in the following sequence:
a. detection of the problem (community)
b. determination of the unknowns (analytic)
c. defining the requirement (analytic)
d. selection of collectors (collection)
e. assessment of risks (both to collector and policy)
(analytic, collection, policy)
f. activation, processing and dissemination (collection)
g. reassessing the problem and unknowns [analytic)
3. Obviously the above steps require a close coordination of many
elements in the intelligence community. In the transition from normal
times to times of potential warning this coordination must often take
place rapidly. Fortunately, there now exists within a number of operations
centers a new remote conferencing communication system called the National
Operations and Intelligence Analysts Net (NOIAN) which allows secure
voice (speaker phone) conferencing as well as a. means to create and edit
documents when necessary (CONTEXTConferenced Text Editing) at the same
time. An ability to add display conferencing (DISCON) for map problems
is also being developed. These NOIAN/CONTEXT rooms are established at
CIA, DIA, NSA, State andi
4. The most difficult step in the warning process is the ability
of the community to detect the problem (Paragraph 2 a. above). This
step first occurs in the transition from the normal to the potential
warning phase. Detection ususally begins when someone in the community
notices a significant change. Others in other parts of the community
also notice related changes. These "pockets of concern" often do not
get connected unless they are reported to some point of convergence or
focal point within the intelligence community. In order to facilitate
this convergence the following steps are recommended.
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Recommendation:
5. Abolish the SWS and disperse the positions back to their re-
presentative agencies with the understanding that each agency and service
would use these positions to establish a Warning Officer (WO).
6. Create directly under the DCI (or DDCI) a Special Assistant for
Warning (SAW) who would be the focal point of all agency and service
warning officers. Under the SAW's direction they would meet periodically
(perhaps daily) by remote conferencing means (NOIAN) to bring attention
to any incidents which might grow into a warning situation.
7. If a warning situation appears probable,. the SAW would notify
the appropriate NIO as well as the appropriate DIOs and NITOs or other
substantive elements within the intelligence community, seeking their
advice and recommendations for issuing alerting memoranda and/or the
formation of an appropriate working group or task force either by individual
agency or by the intelligence community, or to withhold any action.
8. If agency working groups or task forces were to be formed the
SAW would provide means of assembling the results of their efforts.
If a community working group or task. force were formed the SAW would see
that they were supported by remote conferencing techniques and procedures
as appropriate, particularly when situation reports are required.
Discussion of Recommendations:
9. The role of the SAW (as well as agency or service warning officers)
would remain catalytic rather than analytic in nature. The SAW's main
function would be to detect and connect "pockets of concern" within
the intelligence community. He would also have expertise in the procedures
to allow information to be exchanged on a community basis using NOIAN
conferencing and other means. In this function he could depend on the
network of 24-hour watch centers across the community.
10. The dispersal of the SWS and the creation of Warning Officers
in each agency would overcome the problem of unwillingness of personnel
to be assigned away from their parent agency which has always been considered
a detriment to one's career.
11. By including the services as well as the agencies a broader
base of convergence could be achieved.
12. The endless argument over "strategic" vs. "tactical" as well as
"big W" vs. "small w" would be non existent.
13. This proposal would have a better chance to relieve the support of
the intelligence community than other proposals presented so far because
it serves the needs of military as well as-non-military intelligence.
The military needs warning primarily for purposes of readiness, but
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they have less interest in crisis avoidance (within the constraints of
national policy) which is the primary concern of the civil side of
intelligence. The SAW and the WOs across the intelligence community
could bridge those interests.
14. The proposal, while eliminating the SWS, does not interfere
with the functions or command relationships of other elements of the
intelligence community, but, rather, enhances their functions in the
I$W area.
15. A sub-option would be to have a committee on warning and
crisis (COWAC), as suggested in previous proposals, to represent the
interests of the NFIB. It should be understood, however, that the
COWAC would not be a permanent standing committee but one which would
be convened only as necessary. The SAW would serve as its permanent
executive secretary. COWAC meetings could also use the NOIAN to conduct
conferences without having to leave their own agency.
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7 August 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support
National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT : DCI's Comments on our IFW Report
memorandum of 4 August seeking our
comments on his paper in this regard
1. Most of what Dincluded in his proposed answer to the DCI's
18 July memo flows logically from our earlier deliberations and has my
support. There are several things that could concern me, however, and
the main thrust of this response is to seek clarification on these points.
a. Page 2, Paragraph 4: The last sentence of this paragraph
seems unnecessarily restrictive. While we certainly do not intend
to "duplicate" the Community's I&W apparatus we do indeed intend to
add something to it that it currently lacks,cohesion a focal
point status and executive attention and support. II sentence 25X
seems to be designed to assure that the regular analytical echelons
do not feel threatened. All well and good. But we should not
lead people to believe--as this does--that nothing new will be
added.
"The technical problems of converging I$W information
are manageable." Agreed, but this lacks a "for instance" in
order for the DCI to know whether (and how) this concerns I&W information
among Washington players only or in a broader context. I urge a few
sentences of explanation or dropping the sentence altogether.
NOlAN/CONTEXT pitch could fit in here if we are just talking
about the Washington community.
c. Page 10, Paragraph 13 f.: Here again we could mislead
the DCI. If we are advocating a Senior Assistant for Warning
plus a committee you will need a few staffers to support the
structure. I advocate that the first sentence of this sub-paragraph
be changed. To my recollection I remember no consensus against
staffs, per se, just against large and redundant staffs.
b. Page 3, Paragraph 5: In the middle of this paragraph
d. Pages 13 & 14, Paragraphs 15 and 16: In two places
advocates an individual from DOD being named to the
Senior Assistant job. While this was touched on I. recall no serious
discussion of it, no less a consensus in its favor. Personally,
I have doubts you will get anything but second raters from DOD.
25X
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Further, the person must be comfortable with the overall DCI
environment and that of Langley where he should be located.
I doubt if a DOD officer could fill this bill even if he
were first class. On this point I do not see DOD joining the
effort fully as long as the subordination is to the DCI. Thus,
they will always have their warning group. We should give the
DCI a man who is totally the DCI's man (With frankly a little
CIA bias).
2. Finally I wish to go on record most strongly against splitting
this responsibility between NITC and NFAC. Aside from not working it
probably would not be acceptable to the HPSCI and its view of the warning
problem.
Director
CIA Operations Center
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