MEMO OF CONVERSATION WITH MARK CLARK FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130034-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: December 8, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R004400130034-9
8 December 1954
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL CLARK
General Clark called to see me this morning and we had a
half hour's conversation covering the progress of his committee.
In reply to my inquiry, he indicated that his people were entirely
satisfied with the cooperation they were receiving here. I told him
that I was in constant touch with General Christiansen, as well as
with various members of his working group. I had impressed upon
General Christiansen that I wished to be informed directly if his
people ran into any roadblocks. General Clark indicated that he had
heard of nothing of that nature. He indicated that he had been in touch
with Colonel Lane on the covert side and was to be kept currently
informed by Colonel Lane of what the latter was doing.
General Clark said that he expected to send representatives
to both the European and Far Eastern theaters to have a look at the
overseas intelligence setup. Admiral Conolly, he said, would be
in charge of one of these groups. Consequently he said it was
important to arrange that Conolly might have such access to the
covert side as was necessary for him to do his work effectively on
the overt side, and also to make this trip abroad. He said that he
supposed this would require the approval of the President. I told
the General I thought this request was reasonable; that I had the
greatest confidence in Admiral Conolly, and that if he preferred
I would be glad to take it up myself with Sherman Adams.
General Clark remarked that he felt that our National Estimates,
as being the end product of all or intelligence work here, were of
great importance and that key members of the Task Force should see
certain of these Estimates of recent date. I told him there was no
objection to this and that I would lay before him all of the Estimates
which the intelligence community (IAC) had produced during 19,54
and he could select from this list those that he would like to see.
Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130034-9
 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000400130034-9
I assumed that the number of persons seeing the Estimates would
be carefully limited. I pointed out that in addition to the Estimates
there was a great deal of intelligence work done which was reflected
in the Estimates but which was also of great value to the policy
makers and to our other intelligence agencies. I felt that he should
also have a look at specimens of this type of intelligence as well as
the Estimates.
General Clark asked whether we had a general charter for
work in the cold war field, and inquired whether the direction we
received from the National Security Council was adequate. I told
him we had such a charter, namely NSC 5412, which I would give
him to read on an eyes only basis as I did not feel that anyone,
rpt. anyone, else on his committee should see this. I said it was
one of the most carefully guarded papers in the entire government.
I told him that we received from the National Security Council
general policy guidance but that specific operations of a major
character in the cold war field were cleared through the OCB, and
I explained the general workings of the OCB. I said I thought that
in general there was adequate machinery to give us both the policy
guidance and the operation approvals needed.
General Clark said that he expected to talk with a number
of people who wished to see him and mentioned specifically General
F I told him that I welcomed this as I realized he would
see a certain number of disgruntled people whom we had dismissed
as well as some crackpots. He said he realized this and thought he
could handle this situation. I asked him whether the report 25X1A
had come to his attention and he said he thought it ha not, I said
that I would wish this report to be seen by someone on his committee
as it had been circulated by in high quarters of the government 25X1A
and I thought it was quite likely that it was in McCarthy's hands.
I asked General Clark whether McCarthy had turned over
any of his papers to him. He indicated he had not and said that he
had not yet seen McCarthy. He had planned to see him on this trip
to Washington but for reasons that were quite understood, he had
cancelled out these plans and expected to see him quite a bit later.
Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130034-9
 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R00O-100130034-9
I said that he would find a certain number of critics who
objected to the idea of having the analysis and production of intel-
ligence in the same organization as the collection of covert intel-
ligence, and others who would object to having operations associated
in any way with an intelligence organization. I told him that I had
given a good deal of thought to this problem and would like an oppor-
tunity to discuss it with him thoroughly before he submitted his report.
The General replied that he was aware of this problem and that his
thinking as of the moment was that there was no serious objection
to the combination of these different functions as he was opposed to
having too many separate organizations working in this delicate field.
He indicated he would give me a full opportunity to go into this with
him at a later date. I did, however, refer to my Swiss experience
and the value, as I saw it, of having an overt intelligence umbrella
to cover covert intelligence and covert operations.
General Clark adverted to the fact that he could not under-
stand why the United States gave out so much information about what
we were doing and pointed to.the front page of the Washington Post
(December 8) giving a first photo of our Washington Nike protection.
I told him that this was a hobby of mine and I had done everything I
could to stir up this issue publicly and in the intelligence community.
I thought we were making it far too easy for the Russians and seriously
harming ourselves. I suggested that the answer to this might lie in the
field of public opinion. If the public got stirred up about it they would
bring pressure on the press to stop printing things which affected
American security. I showed him a copy of my article in US News
and World Report on "We Tell Russia Too Much," and in passing
adverted to the fact that the publicity problem as regards CIA was
a difficult one and that I regretted the nature of publicity received
through the recent Saturday Evening Post articles.
General Clark then withdrew and spent about twenty minutes
reading over NSC 5412 and the conclusions of the Doolittle report.
He indicated a desire at a later date to read the full report. I said
I would make it available to him at any time and added that the
President had indicated that he was willing that the report be read
by ex-President Hoover if the latter wished to see it. General Clark
agreed to pass this message on to Mr. Hoover.
Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130034-9
 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000j00130034-9
In conclusion General Clark said he had three requests. He
would like at some time to get together his Task Force together with
General Christiansen and let the Task Force put to me any questions
they might have. If the questions got into highly classified matters,
he would quite understand if they were handled without disclosing
information that the full Task Force should not have.
Second, he wanted to be in as good a position as possible to
answer any charges as to Communist infiltration into the CIA and
asked for suggestions as to how we could satisfy him on that point.
I told him that his people would have a chance for a thorough look
over our security organization and to study the protections we set
up against Communist infiltration. I told him that obviously with
an organization as large as ours and working in such a sensitive
field, it was inevitable that the Communists would try to infiltrate
it and we believed that we had caught up with at least two such
efforts. We had to be continually on our guard. After checking with
Mr. Kirkpatrick, I told him that both Lane and Miller were going
through the security office early in January. If after they had com-
pleted this survey, he or they had any questions, I should be glad to
try to answer them.
Third, he said he had run across from time to time persons
who claimed some affiliation with us and who, after the announce-
ment of the functions of his Task Force, had come up to him and
told him of their CIA affiliations. He said he thought this was
unfortunate to which I fully agreed and said it was unauthorized
but possibly human.
I told him about our general system of outside consultants
incident to the responsibilities we had in running certain cover
organizations and in dealing with the scientific and technical field.
I said we would be glad to go over with him our whole procedure,
including security measures in the consultant field, and he indicated
that he would like to do this personally.
Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130034-9
 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 CIA-RDP86B00269R009-100130034-9
The conversation was cordial and friendly. General Clark
indicated a desire to be constructive. I handed him a copy of my
letter dated 8 December 1954, containing suggestions in the field
of legislation which I thought his Task Force might wish to consider.
I said that there would be further memoranda of this nature that we
would give him from time to time, and I had a brief discussion with
him on the Watch-dog Committee" proposals.
I also mentioned the urgent need for legislation to give
further fringe benefits to our overseas personnel, and the need
for a new building.
ector
Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130034-9