PROBLEMS IN INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES TO 1949 PAPER NO. 6

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00121A000100010007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1948
• Content Type: PAPER

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KS IN I -kagNCY COORDINATION
OF ARTS AX D ESTIMATES
To 1949
Paper Na. 6
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CC RDINATION OF REPORTS AND ESTATE
TO 1949
NDERLYINO PROBL iS
Intell.iger related to the national security produced and dissemi-
nated by the ft-tor of Central intelligence was to be "officially
concurred in b n.e Intelligence Agencies or carry a statement of sub-
stantial r diffLng opinion."' It was left to the Director and the
Agency chiefs t.nterpret the terms of this statement and discover
the means of putng them into effect. MewrAlile, there were important
questions regarog the coordination of estimates still to be answered.
In the absence canswers it would be difficult to develop satisfactory
techniques for 1$ actual coordination of papers.
Did "concusnce" mean that the party concurring stood equally
responsible wit:tthe originator for every word in the agreed estimate?
Or was concurrera a mere nihil obstat to the paper as a whole? This
question alone, ' long as it remained unanswered' posed formidable
problems of coorination,
A clearcut oncurrence or dissent is not always possible with
respect to an opaion based on incomplete evidence and intended for use
in the lbrmationof national policy, Yet the Directives spoke only
of "concurrence" or "dissent," What if one of the intelligence Agencies
could not agree entirely yet did not entirely disagree?
At what stage was a given item to be submitted for concurrence or
dissent? Should the Director make up his mind to the validity of a
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1, Paragraphs 1, !e 6
S ectt "Coordination of Central Intelligence Estimates
with the Intelligence Divisions of the States War,, and
gfwv7 Departments," This is Paragraph 4 of an enclosure
entitled ".Suggested 'Xemxrandi from the Director of
0tx'ai Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory ward. r"
See Historical Files, Safe #8405
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given estimate and then present it to his colleagues for a peremptory
opinion? Or was he to submit a tentative draft and then evolve his own
a others& opinions through successive revisions? Could he insist on
an immediate opinion, or rest he wait until the Agencies were ready to
render one?
What discretion had the Director with regard to concurrence or
dissent? Could he permit an Agency not to comment at all if it chose?
What were his prerogatives if an Agency wished to submit an opinion not
germane to the subject at issue,, or whose effect mould be to confuse
the issue? Must the Director accept whatever the Agencies offered,, or
could he insist on an opinion that he considered acceptable under the
terms of the Directives?
Finally,, was coordination considered a process that mould take
place naturally by general consent and mutual desire,, or was there to
be a means through which the coordinator could ensure an orderly com-
pletion of the process? if coordination by general consent failed to
bring the desired results, what was Central Intelligence expected to do?
This problem, which in a sense comprehends the rest' arose early in the
history of coordination.
A memorandum of July 16, 1914?, from the Assistant Director for
Reports and Estimates to the Director of Central Intelligence illustrates
the point:1
*One of the functions of Central Intelligence,, if not the
most important functions is that of coordinating the intelligence
efforts of governmental intelligence agencies* in o this instance., it
is a matter of thoroughly coordinating production of intelligence reports between the Intelligence Divisions of the State,,
War,, and Navy Departments and Central Intelligence. The rigid and
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cumbersome techniques established to effect this coordination in fait
place in the hands of any one of the intelligence divisions of the
participating departments the power of determining when and to what
d at the
i
se
is &baa1uL? and can be exerc
of any one agency irrespective of the desires or views of all of th~
others. Manifestly the situation is an absurdity in that the cocgrdnator
(Central Intelligence) cannot discharge its responsibilities exc#pV-9n
coordinate. It is believed that this situation is fundantallyi wring,
impairing the production and presentation of national intelligence. n
view of the fact that Central Intelligence is required to coordinate the
production of national intelligence,, it is believed that concomitant
responsibility for this coordination must be vested in Central Intelli-
gence."
This paragraph, written at a time when no more than twenty papers
had been subjected to the coordination process tinder discussion, could
en repeated without essential chart a at any time during the en-
suing three years. In the concrete terse of actual coordination of
papers as between their authors and reviewers, it resulted in a difficult
situation.. Because the recommendation implicit in the memorandum was
not acted upon, there was no essential change in the situation described.
From 1946 on, Central Intelligence wrote its own first drafts
of reports and estimates rather than editing drafts produced by the
Agencies. Drafts so written had to be "coordinated," but in practice
inationn meant seeking Agency approval, Legally, perhaps, Central
ence did not have to seek approval-, it had only to note any
substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency, But in the
absence of any "concomitant responsibility on the part of Central
Intelligence and in the face of what proved to be the realities of
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coordination,, K id application of such presumed legal prerogatives
would have been an invitation to nonconcurrence. Papers encumbered
with dissents night be "coordinated" papers In a technical senses but
they would not be taken as such by those who read them.
Actually, therefore, Central. Intelligence was in the position of
seeking approval. Its position in fact was that of bargainer on nre
or less equal terms. As a result, Central Intelligence was likely to
have to choose between an unsatisfactory estimate and an undesirable
dissent,
II. EARLY E 'OPMEN TS I
COORDINATION
Natully, there was a difference between the plans for producing
"nastior.al intelligence" as they were developed in theory, and what
proved to be the facts of "coordination." The official directives
in 1946 and 1947 were necessarily stated in theoretical terms.
Thus esti~nates were said to be produced by they Director of Central
Intelligence, submitted by him to the gibers of the Intelligence
Advisory C,anrmittee, and published by him with their concurrence or
dissent.
This was an over simplification, as was of course realized by
the authors of the Directives.
In point of fact, neither the Director nor his immediate assistants
act"
mates. Actual produ
Lion was by intelligence analysts
with specialized knowledge of subjects and areas. These analysts might
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and aught not write actual drafts,# but even if they did not, their
approval was necessarily sought by those who did the writing. Not
only were these experts capable of holding differing opinions on
the same subject, but they were in the employ of five different
intelligence organizations and generally shared their several points
of view. Thus innediate agreement in draft estimates was unlikely;
even the first stage in production of an estite usually presented
difficulties.
When the experts were in general agreement, a draft estimate
had to be cleared with some form of reviewing authority within the
producing agency. Here,, conclict between author and editor usually
became a complicating factor. Indeed, this conflict, in one or
another, fonn, usually continued all the way through the interagency
coordination process,1
Agreement between author and edttar having been obtained, this
reviewing authority must seek the approval of similar authorities
dent in the several agencies. Whereas the analysts had been
primarily concerned with facts and interpretations of facts,, those
handling the estimate at this stage must concentrate on broad con-
clusions to be drawn from the whole mass of evidence as applied to a
particular situation in a particular world context. At the sane time,
there entered the problem of how a paper's conclusions affected or
a'ff'ected by departmental "views." Thus the total problem become
how to draw valid conclusions adequately supported by evidence so stated
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Cf,r the Branch-Staff conflict within CIA (ORZ) in the
sn .er of 191i7, No. 1, p? Note also some of the
ntrcverstes described in pp.
$ee initiation order in ORE 14/1 folder, Historical
;stem
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that they did not conflict with departmental preferences. It is evident
that considerable possibility of disagreement existed at this stage.
The first two stages having been successftill.y passed, the estimate
was ready for the approval of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Con-
sidering the preparation that had gone befd'e, it might have been expected
that the Coitteed s approval would become almost a formality. This was
not invariably the case.
In order that a given estimate could be shepherded through the three
utiined above, there obviously had to be some sort
system.
It would have been possible to construct such a system by preliminary
inter-agency agreement, but this was not done. Instead, individuals
proceeded according to whatever methods seemed appropriate. There were
as yet no official rulings to guide them.
The first estimates produced (i.e. those published during 19146) were
d by informal
d ad hoc methods. "4i l," for instance, ("Soviet
'oreign military Policy," 23 July 19 6) was "cowdinated" by an ad hoc
committee which was not officially appointed but was assembled hurriedly
by its author.
etroleum Resources Within the USSR," June 16, 1947) was handled without
On the other hand another estimate begun four months later, "ORE i
the appointment of any inter-agency group. It was directed, when this
paper was initiated, that it should be prepared by certain analysts within
the Office of Reports and Estimates "in consultation with the appropriate
ital specialists."" Who these were to be or - what extent they
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ed was at the discretion of the Central Intelligence
analysts. This method was presumably followed and a draft was produced
in the course of five months. Final concurrences with comment, were
1
then returned by the Agencies in separate memoranda.
It was the written rather than the oral method of coordination that
revailed. after 19.6 and until a regular system of inter-agency con-
ferences was adopted in 1959. The reason probably lay in the fact that
efs of Agency intelligence would not accept the plan proposed by
ral Reports Staff under which Agency representatives would be
had to the Central intelligence Group for purposes of coordination.
The fact that these representatives remained in their home 'offices may
have suggested written communtcati?sn with the agencies through these
entatives.2
underlyi
this method postulated that if the specialists
Intelligence who were charged with the preparation of an
constantly sought the aid and consent of Agency specialists;
and if on completion of a first draft, specialists in all agencies were
in agreement, then official approval of such drafts when circulated in
should not be difficult to attain, The hope, in other words,
was that Agency reviewing authorities, prompted by advisers who had
already been brought into agreement, would concur without serious hesi-
tation.
The hope was sometimes fulfilled. At other times the results
were such as to make the whole effort of preliminary coordination seem
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published neither' M-1 nor O is/i contains any
,cation of the position taken by the participating
sting specific Agency positions as a part of
_
estnate has not yet been borne in upon the
ants in , coordination. It was not until Wovem-
in fact, that published estimates began
7
-.
,
rte, ' y contain a specific statement of concur-
e or fl.ssent. Before that tine, it was apparentiy
sonumod that in the absence of a statement to the
eo rsr7. readers wot ld assure that an es'tt*ate mus
have been published with complete Agency agreer,nt.
he change to a more specific statement in the form
t footnote which stated exactly the position of
_
Owft ages r apparently came about as a eons uence
of the controversy between Central Intelligence and
Intelligence .over C -62 ("govist Objectives in
November l$, 1917). See discussion below.
ntral Intelligence Agency as 'an Instrument of
Taumsnt 1940-1950, Chapter III, pp. 27-31 and
N o P P
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to have been wasted. In as:y case a flat concurrence requiring no
further action by Central Intelligence was seldom to be expected.
the Agencies returned concurrences with comment.
The resultant problem was often a formidable one. The come
returned by the respective agencies were compiled independently.
Central Intelligence was expected, within limits, to adopt then all.
Adoption of even a single suggestion might have a damaging effect upon
the carefully constructed Central Intelligence draft. The adoption of
numerous independent suggestions was almost sure to have such an effect.
Furthermore, suggestions independently made auuld sometimes conflict as
between themselves, thus making it impossible for Central Intelligence
to adopt more than one of them.
Under such circumstances there was little the Office of Reports
and Estimates could do but construct a new draft of the estimate under
discussion based upon all comments received, and return it to the several
agencies for farther comment. This new draft usually elicited new
comments calling for another draft. The method was obviously cumber-
some and tim-conswsin.g. That it would eventually be replaced, at
least in part, by some form of officially sanctioned oral negotiation
was almost inevitable*
Meanwhile, however9 the method became generally accepted and was
described in a memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Board prepared
for the Director of Central Intelligence by the Office of Reports and
Estimates on July 16, 1917, as follows:
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"a. Initially, the Central Intelligence Officers assigned to
prepare a report call, on the appropriate officers of the Intelligence
Divisions of the State, War, and Navy Departrients, At these meetings,
the departmental representatives are informed of the project and are
consulted in detail regarding its scope and coverage.
b, During the preparation of the report, day to day consultation
maintained to the extent necessary to keep informed of departmental
co Upon completion of a preliminary draft of the report. it is
referred to the appropriate officers of the Intelligence Divisions
State, War, and Navy Departments for comment,, criticism, sage
, and possible amendment, The views of these experts are thoroughly
considered,, and at a series of conferences, revisions are worked out and
usually agreement is reached on a revised draft acceptable to all con-
cerned,
d. The draft report incorporating any revisions arrived at as
a result of the procedures outlined in c above is then referred through
official channels to the Intelligence Divisions of the State, War,
and Navy Departments for formal concurrence through representatives of
those departments specifically designated for this purpose by each of
the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
Formal cor.eats on this revised draft report are received
from the departmental intelligence divisions and are made the basis
for further revising the revised report to produce a final draft of the
report. Whenever there is a dissent or a divergence of point of view
on the part of any one of the departmental intelligence divisions, the
matter is discussed in detail between representatives of Central Intel-
ligence and the dissenting departmental intelligence division. if
these representatives are unable to resolve their differences, the
statement of the dissenting departmental intelligence division., letting
forth its views, is published as a part of the finished report,"
III. TIM FORMAL A dMNIS OF 19It8
- prii' ur..~... rrrrrrr.. rrr.rrrrrr
eadily apparent by mid-191L8 that a formal agreement was
needed to cover assorted problems of interdepartmental production and
coordination of reports and estimates that had arisen in the course
of to years. There were several outstanding controversies as between
the participants in the coordination process, There was still a demand
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. See file marked "Coordination with IAC Agencies in
1,etoriaal Files, Safe 3405. See also CIG Administra-
tive Order #32 implementing MIA Directive 31, Paragraph
6.
h'ZIbO
For copies of these Directives, see Historical. Files
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10.
that current intelligence (particularly the Daily and Weekly Summary
and the Monthly Review) be accorded full interdepartmental coordination.
There was a complaint that Central Intelligence, in the preparation of
reports and estimates, was proceeding too independently and not pro-
viding for sufficient agency participation. Disputes had developed over
agency failure to return comn3ents and other material to Central Intelli.
gence on time, but there was no agreement on the amount of time allowable
for such procedures. Finally, there was a clear need for an official
delineation of allowable dissent.
Agreements on these and other problems were reached in "Director
of Central Intelligence Directive 3/1" dated 8 July l9h8 and "Director
of Central Intelligence Directive 3/2" dated 13 September 1948. The
proposals on which the first of these is based came chiefly from the
State Department; the second from Central Intelligence. The final
drafts were produced by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff, 1
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 311, entitled "Standard
Operating Procedures for Departmental Participation in the Production
and Coordination of National. Intelligence," provides first that in
case of "current/ intelligence, "departmental concurrence or dissent i
not required." This represented a concession on the part of the agencies
in recognition of the fact that coordination of current intelligence
under prevailing conditions siri ly was not feasible. It was provided,
that copies of all current material published by Central Intel-
ligence would be sent to the Agencies as quickly as possible," and
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ce would always be given that this material had not been coordinated.
Passing quickly over the subject of National Intelligence Surveys
(on which agreement had already been reached by a special coimdttee)
the Directive then took up "National Intelligence Reports and Estimates"
at some length. Section "a" provided that whenever Central Intelli-
gence proposed to produce a report or estimate it must :notify each
departmental intelligence organisation of the problem under consideration,
the nature and scope of the -pro ject, the scheduled date of a first draft,
what would. be expected of each Agency, and the date upon which Agency
action should be completer. it required Central Intelligence, in
tion to providing this information in writing, to discuss it with appro-
priate members of the departmental intelligence organisations.
The directive then proceeded to outline three different types of
cedures for the production of estiz ates: "normal," "urgent" and
"exceptional.
t does not define these terms to the extent of speci-
who should declare a given paper "urgent" or "exceptional," or
under what circumstances.
The first specification under "normal procedures" is that "The
al. Tntelligence Agency will prepare an initial draft of the report
or estimste.....`t This provision represents no more than a recognition
of the status quo. Because, in practice, the matter of who produces
first drafts may be of considerable consequences, however, this state-
ment is of some importance.I
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paragraph
C {1) of NDCI 3/1"
1. Paragraph 3 C (3)
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12.
the same sentence it is provided that Central Intelligence in
producing reports and estimates, shall utilize "available departmental
contributions," a practice which,, of course, had always been recognized,
It is not directed, however, that the Agencies must always furnish
written contributions. Under the actual circumstances of 1948 to 1950,
written contributions were the exception rather than the rule.
Under "normal procedures," Central Intelligence was required to
furnish each agency with initial drafts of each report and to request
Agency comments; to arrange for an interdepartmental meeting in case
serious disagreements developed out of these comments; to prepares
(after the comments had been dealt with) a final draft for concurrence
or dissent; and finally, to publish the estimate with accompanying
statements of concurrence or substantial dissent.
ormal procedures" also provided the length of time allowed
for Agency action. This was to vary according to circumstances but
the normal time allowed would be "five full working days." Although
this may not seem to involve an excessive delay for a non-urgent paper,
it should be recognized that five working days meant at least seven
calendar days and that the five-day allowance was a minim .requirement
in practice, it was seldom met.
One other provision under "Normal procedures"1 may be of passing
interest. It enjoined the Central Intelligence Agency to make Ono
changes other than those of a strictly editorial nature while the paper
is under agency review without informing the agencies of such changes."
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Reasonable as such a provision may seem, it would be manifestly diffi-
cult in all cases to know exactly what changes could be considered
"strictly editorial." It is probable., furthermore, that no necessity
for making such a statement in writing would have been felt had there
not been a latent suspicion among the Agencies even by 1948 that Central
Intelligence would be capable of deliberately modifying agency views
under the guise of the coordinating and editing process.
The principal difference between "normal" and "urgent" procedures
as outlined in "CI 3/1" lay in the fact that Central Intelligent
after notifying the departments and writing the initial drafts was
directed to call er interagency meeting to consider the paper; then
prepare it for final concurrence or dissent, then go ahead with pub-
lication as soon as Agency positions were known. The description of
"urgent" procedures does not! however, provide for what would happen if
epresentatives failed to agree at the meetings or if their superiors
declined to sign an official statement of concurrbnce or dissent. The
possibility thus remained that "urgent" procedures c uld be considerably
delayed.
"exceptional" circumstances it was provided that Central
Intelligence could "prepare and disseminate most urgent reports and
estimates immediately upon completion and without formal coordination
the departmental intelligence organization." in other words,,
"exceptional." circumstances called for the rules applying to current
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intelligence, It was provided,, however,, that reports published under
"exceptional" procedures must (a) carry, a statement to the effect that
they had not been coordinated and (b) be subjected to coordination as
soon as possible after publication.
In cases where individual agencies failed to meet deadlines for
concurrence or dissent "DCI 3/1" allowed Central Intelligence to
publish a paper "with a note explaining that the department concerned
has neither concurred ;
rated within the time allowed for such
purposes." The purpose of this provision was to prevent a single
arty to a national estimate from unilaterally delaying its publication
(See p. 3 above).
Director of Central. Intelligence Directive 3/2 entitled "Polities
Governing Departmental Concurrence in National Intelligence Reports
and Estimates" was produced in final agreed form by the Interdepart-
mental Coordinating and Planning Staff. Its purpose was to establish
procedures under which there could be "clarity and uniformity in the
preparation of concurrences in or dissents from national intelligence
reports and estimates."
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/i does not really
deal with concurrence or dissent as such,, but with the means through
which the participating agencies might arrive at concurrence or dissent,
to state the case in another way, "`iDCI 3/2" does not deal with
concurrence and dissent at the level of the chiefs of intelligence but
at the level of their subordinates.
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The document states that on receipt of a report or estimate
"depart aentaal agencies should take action as promptly as possible
in one of the following ways: (a) concur, (b) concur with comment,
dissent', (d) return the paper with the statement that the agency
has no corment." In other words, an Agency could agree fully; could
agree but limit the extent of its agreement and thus the extent of
its liability; or could agree while at the same time suggesting change
that would make its agreement more compatible.
This last provision, of course, tended to sustain an existing
ambiguity, even though the Directive goes on to state that "a comment
not qualify or limit the concurrence in any respect but is a
suggestion designed to strengthen the substance of a national intelli-
gence report or estimate." Despite the, fact that this statement seemed
to have made official the stand of Central Intelligence that it might
but was not obliged to include Agency comments in, its final reports,
the Agencies did not accept this interpretation, and the point of
whether or not Central Intelligence must accept or might decline to
adopt comments remained in dispute over the ensuing two years.
In describing "concurrence with coment" the Directive also speci-
fied that the departmental agencies were at liberty, if they chose:,
to casement on subjects outside their special fields of interest. This
may account for later papers in which the service agencies dissented for
olitical reasons or the State Department on the basis of military can-
as also specified under this heading that "it is not
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necessary to comet on a national intelligence report or estimate
merely from an editorial point of view on ratters of punctuation, phraseolo
or grammatical construction which do not materially change the meaning
of the estimate." The point hpd been inserted for obvious reasons of
efficiency, but whatever value the sentence mi,ht have had from that point
of view was destroyed by its final phrase. Superfluous inter-agency
arguments continued to develop over points that were primarily- editorial.
As to the problem of dissent itself, Central Intelligence in 1948
was anxious for real clarification. Certain "dissents" had already been
published (See below, pp. 28-31) which did not seem to fit the commonly
held concept of a clearly opposed opinion on a point clearly of major
importance, and of such a nature that it merited the attention of a reader
desiring a bftanced view of the problem at issue.
stated in "DCI 3/2", however, the nature of allowable dissent
was not clarified. Instead, two general points were offered; that
the purpose of a dissent was to assist readers in understanding the
question; and that the existence of the dissent called upon the reader
to make a. choice between divergent views. No dissent should be offered,
therefore, unless it presented a clear and important choice. This may
have been clarification to a point, but beyond this point the directive
simply says: "a disagreement should not become a dissent unless the
dissenting intelligence organization believes that the reader will other-
wise reach conclusions which are false or dangerously misleading." Such
a statement as this, of course, did not narrow but if anything, tended
to -widen the latitude already enjoyed by the agencies in "dissenting" on
Central Intelligence papers.
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In sumraar, ? it might be stated that not very snatch was acoompliehed
through the two directives just discussed. Central Intel.l.i:,ence was
enjoined but not compelled to further
articipation in the ;.,rep-
aration of estii tes. The A eencies were likewise instructed but
forced to refrain from tsusing the processes of concurrence and dissent.
Central Intelli:;erase complied with the requirements about announcing
the nature and scope of projects as soon as they were undertake
its analysts continued to consult informally with Agency analysts in the
course of preparing estimates. But Central Intelligence wrote it
drafts L r ly on th bests of its own research.
did not always
quest fency contributions on which its estimates might be directly
based even though this method was implicit in the ireotives.1
their part, the agencies, of course, continued to be 1
in meeting deadlines, and to dissent on grounds considered dubious
Central Intelligence.
IV. L-ATP-R f gLOF OF THTT SYSTEM
a result of the two procedural directives just discussed,
but more through force of circumstances,, what amounted to realieti
standard operating procedures took form gradually du.rin 1948 and 1949
and were continued without much change through 1950. Because this
exactly the one officially established and because
depended
custom and tacit agreement, it never became thoro
standardized. -robably no two estimates
way, and in some cases the procedures were radically different.2 The
ensuin : description of the procedures as developed in 1949 should be talon
therefore, as approximate.
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Till?
This statement should be qualified to the extent that
procedures differed within the intelligence organizations
affected, it would probably be accurate to say fcr
eple that the Far East Branch of the Office of 3eporte
and Estimates did everything within its power to make
agency participation in Far Eastern estimates a reality.
This was not necessarily true, however, of the Office
whole,
See, for example, the case of ORE 22-4B in No.
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In general, however, an estimate would be handled in the followin.
steps;
1. Proposals for a new project were received from within or
outside of Central intelligence.
2. Except in rare instances where Central Intelligence declined
to accept a proposal, the project became official forthwith.
3. The agencies were sent information concerning the new project
including the proposed scope; sometimes complete terms of reference,
and occasionally a request for contributions.
L. These proposals were sometimes discussed in an official meeting
with. agency- representatives before Central Intelligence went further with
the project, but this was more the exception than the rule.
Ordinarily, as soon as information concerning the existence
the project had been sent out, Central Intelligences would proceed
to the preparation of its own estimate, discussing it informally with
agency representatives as it progressed.
6. When a Central intelligence draft had been completed, it was
cleared with all interested elements within the Office of deports and
Estimates including the Assistant Director in case he should wish to
study
and was then sent out in duplicate to the participating
`j. The fate of this draft would depend upon circumstances
normally it was negotiated through a combination of interagency Meeting's
and exchange of memoranda until those negotiating it would express them-
selves as in agreement (or official disagree sent). Luring the period
l94-1951 interagency meetings took on increasing importance as the
prim-'s-:ry method of coordination,
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'he agreed draft was not submitted to the Inte
Advisory
committee because the .Inteili;~ ence Advisory uo ittee at this time did
not meet for such purposes. Instead, a copy was furnished to the Director
f Central Intelli? enoo and to each agency chief. The Director seldom
if ever made any for- l comment on these drafts. By 1949 it had become,
generally the custom, however, for most of the agency. intelligence chiefs
to affix their own signatures to memoranda of formal concurrence or
dissssent. These memoranda. were furnished to Central Intelligence severally
and inde?endentls; and probably, in most oases, apart from consultation
between members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This fact may
p in explaining why it was possible for two or more agencies to
dissent on the saw estimate for unrelated reasons.
9. The process of coordination was not necessarily et an end when
all formal replies from a :eney chiefs had been received by Central
Intelligence. If all concurred without objection or commd,-nt, the paper
would, of course, be published at once; but in cases where further coie ent
niched or where there was a proposed dissent which Central Intell.i-
nce considered still avoidable, coordination was likely to be further
protracted until either a definite agreement coAd be reached, or the
force of ciraumstl nces made immediate publication mandatory,
Certain weaknesses in this s etem are evident. The failure of the
Office of Reports and Estimates to encourage the fullest agency partici-
pation probably diminished agency cooperation in otter respects, Likewise,
the failure to involve the Intelligence Advisor`, Go ittee, as a group,
in the business of coordination doubtless made for less efficiency and less
cooperation than might have been obta.7..ned. It should be recO$!ized,
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however,, that during this period the Intelligence advisory Committee,
as a group, preferred not to deal directly with coordination of individual
estimates.
The attempt to arrive at not only agreed conclusions but at agreed
rarer form in intelligence estimates through exchange of c+
by memoranda was,, of course, essentially impractical. Comments had to be
compared and assimilated. For intelligent handling of such problems,
more than one representative had to be on the ground, preferably one
speak for each Agency. This had been better recognized in 1946 than in
1946, and the first formal call for an inter-agency meeting to discuss an
estimate was drafted for the Central Intelligence Agency by Mr. James
S. Lay in November, 1947. Thereafter the idea seems to have lapsed until.
Theodore Babbitt, as Assistant Director for Reports and estimates, pro-
posed in February, 191; that such meetings be regularly adopted as a
means toward better coordina.tion.1 A system was then developed under
which Central Intelligence furnished an impartial chairman to preside
over the deliberations of expert Central Intelligence and Agency repre-
sentatives. By 1950 it had also become customary to make phonographic
recordings of these meetin;~s.
Interagency meetings, however, did not solve as many problems
as had been hoped. For one thing, oral negotiation allowed more latitude
for discussion than is possible when comments must be stated in writing.
Meetings were often protracted and sometimes inconclusive. The bringing
together of individuals rather than documents did nothing toward increasing
the spirit of cooperation which had progressively deteriorated Curing
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'2120
See fjlee relating to ORE-7 and ORE 3-49 in Historical
tiles, Safe 12165
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1947 and 1948. Finally there was an objection that had held. from the
beginning and probably had had much to do with the hesitance of Central
Irntellience to adopt oral procedures before it did: namely that a
meeting in which the members could not speak officially for their depart-
meats could never accomplish anything final. The importance of this
fallacy was borne out in the experience of 19?49 and 1900.
V. ThhF RE LILTS OF COORDINATION
Theoretically, under the established axles,, dissents on national
estimates ought to have been rare. An estimate was to be primarily
a statement of conclusions on a matter of consequence to national security.
These conclusions were to be based on evidence equally available to all
five parties to each e
. Theoretically under these assumptions,
a dissent could occur only in case (a) one or more parties arrived at a
legitimate interpretation of the evidence which differed from that of
the others; or (b) when, by equally valid logical processes, one or more
parties derived conclusions from the evidence that differed substantially
m those drawn by the rest.
The spirit, if not the letter of the regulations, however, allowed
for a different ""orm of dissent. It was generally understood that the
provisions regarding concurrence and dissent were established to allow
individual agencies to bring their "views" before those charged with
forming policy. Whether or not it was so intended, this provision made
possible the entering of dissent for reasons which did not derive purely
from interpretation of evidence or logical inference. To state the case
in another way it was possible for an agency to be in general agreement
with conclusions, but to believe that such conclusions at stated should not
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be brought to the attention of the National Security Council at a
given time.
The way was also open under existing regulations for minor disa-
greements to develop into major ones. It was not difficult for
disagreements which were basically semantic or even rhetorical to be
confused with actual positions contrary to the validity of 4n estimate.
It was also admissible under the terms of "DCI 3/2" for an Agency
to dissent when it believed that statements made in estimates night be
'h nisleading," a provision which seemed to take for granted that intelli-
gence employees would know what would ,_ ivi would not mislead a policy-
making officer. The effect of the provision was virtually to allow
for dissent on any grounds selected by any agency.
With all this as a background, certain results developed that
could easily have been foreseen. Dissents based on differing evalua-
tion of evidence or contrary inferences were rare. Lupending on one's
interpretation, there probably was not one dissent of this nature
during the period under consideration. Dissents apparently traceable to
departmental "views" were not uncom?rion. The same may be said of
official disagreements whose origins may be found in the inability of
analysts to agree on what were essentially minor points unrelated to
immediate or long-range requirements of national security.
t. Summary of the First Five Dissents
Aside from "p-l" on which Agency concurrence may be considered
more passive than active,I there were five "dissents" on the fi/te-en
papers published between duly, 1916 and July,, 1947. -All things considered,
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VIf22
The paper was done in a great hurry. It had the consent
it not the concurrence of an intera envy committee, It
did not have the sued "concurrence" of the agency
chiefs, It is doubtful that the publication of "ORE 1"
wouuld have been as smooth as it was if the full "coordina-
tion" process had been invoked,
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rate of protest seems high.
subjects covered were not particularly controversial. The
fact that there was controversy and that there were formal "dissents"
on any of then would seem to point to a flaw somewhere in the Central
Intelligence system as so far developed.
Very briefly, the "dissents" could be summarized as follows:
1. ORE 6 "The Greek Situation" 7 February 195?
The Army dissent is called a "Comment". It says that:
paper, despite isolated statements in the contrary sense, attributes to
the Leftists, and particularly the leftist bands, a strength and national
character which they lack. Concurrently, the paper places in question
the representative character and competence of the Ric h+,ist partias or
leaders to an extent which does not correspond to known facts, particularly
the results of the recent elections." This dissent does not directly
dispute the main conclusion of the paper which was that Greece was in
grave danger of succumbing to Communist domination.
2. O -E 13/1 "The Situation in Austria" 20 February 1947
This paper is described as "only- partially ooordinated," dissent if
any to follow. Whether or not it became part of the official record,
State disagreed with portions of the paper at length. The greater part
of this disagreement is with items said to have been omitted and with
statements said to be misleading.
ORE lL "Future Soviet _ Partici
r T`ransp- it 11 March 19
In the case of ORE-14 Arwr took issue with the statement that....
"the USSR, without relaying the safeguards to its polil"l and military
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security, will eventually modify its present international air transpo
policy to the extent of granting rights to lcnrr at points on the perimeter
of Soviet territory." Army maintained that the USSR "...will continue to
regard the factor of internal security as more important than the intro-
duction of International Civil Aviation to the USSR on a reciprocal basis."
The disagreement is not clearcut unless it is taken to mean (as is not
stated) that one party believes the USSR will eventually grant landing
rights on its territory while the other party does not.
4. OU 11. "Review ofthe Soviet, British and French
rogra W11,11 h :pact to Geri any~' Agri 9 7
State took issue with two sentences. The first said: "The ultimate
over-all objective of the USSR is the extension of Soviet hegemony over
the whole of Germany," The other maintained that the Constitution pub-
lished by the Fast Jarman Communist party would allow for control of
the country by a well-entrenched minority. State found the first state-
ment too sweeping and pointed to alternative policies that the USSR
might adopt: weakening through division; or sacrifice of political
advantages to tangible economic benefits. As to the second, it was
State's view that the constitution granted "almost unlimited power to
the parliamentary majority."
5. ORE 17 'The International Economic Position of the
United ;;; om. 31 May
The disagreement between State and the Group over this paper
is too complicated for brief summary. It would appear from a reading
of the paper, the "dissent," and the Oroup's cownent on the dissent,
that actual disagreement over the main points with which the paper was
concerned was less than the length of the coranentaries would indicate.
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ed accusation by Central Intelligence that State's dissent was
dictated by Department policies may explain the confusing; nature of the
dissent as recorded.1
B, SEL CTED CASES IN LATE t COO RLINATION
the record of July, 1946-July, 1947 were to be substantially
repeated thereafter, the result would be an alarming proportion of
disagreement on papers not necessarily worthy of controversy on a national
level. Whether or not this was actually the case during 1947-1949 would
be a matter of opinion. The proportion of formal dissent was lowered
from 31% to 19 Some of the dissents were on papers of less than the
highest importance. The problem of gaining assent tended to become more
rather than less difficult. 'deverthelessj it should not be forgotten
that cases of complete concurrence were far more frequent than cases of
dissent or near dissent and that there were occasions when the coordina-
tion system, with all its faults, worked very well.
To illustrate, ORE 38-?38
rossible Developments from the Palestine
July 27, 1918, was requested by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense at ten o'clock on the morning of July 20, 194. and was delivered
to that office, complete even to the point of an accompanying zap, at
4:45 that same afternoon. It was not in printed form, and it had not
received formal concurrence over the signatures of the chiefs of Agency
intelli ;ence, but it had the full approval of agency representatives
whose suggestions had been incorporated. A printed edition, virtually
unchaanged, and with the formal concurrence of all Agencies, was distributed
one week later. TInch the same can be said of O! 748 "Possible
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VI/25
See memorandum for Assistant }director R &E from ORE of ,
Intelligence Staff dated 5 Aug et 1917,
Historical Filee, Safe #2465
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Developments in Palestine", 28 February 1948, which had a similar history
and was printed with full concurrence in less than a week. There were
other examples of the same type, such as the papers in the 1947-19
estimates series on China (See !b. l2,, pp. 2940) which, though highly
controversial, gained full agency agreement without suffering in the
process. For an example, ORE 27-.l8 "Possible Developments in China",
19 November 1918 was completed, from request to dissemination in sixteen
days.
The elements that made for ease in coordinating an estimate on the
Palestine papers, however, did not usually exist with respect to other
problems. There was seldom such urgency in the minds of all concerned
toward completion of a Central Intelligence estimate. The motivation
toward getting the paper completed was often overborne by a desire to
delay publication, if necessary, in order to make sure that a given.
point of view became part of it.
Ordinarily, any estimate was the product of friction between the
analysts in Central Intelligence who wrote the papers and their counter-
parts in the other agencies who reviewed the drafts. There was some
supervision of the papers they wrote, and there was subsequent clearance
of papers with persons on a "higher level" than that of the analysts.
Occasionally the Chiefs of intelligence themselves entered into the final
phases of the argument. But when they did so it was always in the
negative role of upsetting prior agree!aent. The records show no case
where the Chiefs stepped in to settle arguments and brim; about harmony
among their subordinates.
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It may have been questionable if intelligence analysts should
have been allowed as free a rein as they were. If those in higher
office had intervened more often for the purpose of concentrating; attention
on the essential conclusions of estimates, there might not only have
been fewer dissents but there might have been less friction among the
analysts. Furthermore, if those in command had taken more direct charge
of the coordination process, there might have been less tendency for
this friction to interfere with the orderly process of produc in., coordinated
national estimates.
Of the some fifty;-three items in the "OH" Series bearing, publication
dates from April 10, 1947 to March 17, 1949 ten carry Agency dissents.
In the same g=roup of papers, there are nine instances of "no comment, "
almost all of them by Air Force; five where military a ;encies concurred
"in the military aspects only"; and one where State publicly disclaimed
all responsibility. None of this, of course, takes account of the dissents
and near dissents which do not appear in the published papers. Some of
these, though unpublished, were of some importance in the development
of coordination and are therefore noted here.
The following examples, chosen from the files of the Office of
Reports and Estimates illustrate the progress of disagree-lent over
individual papers, and the possible effect on the coordination system
as it was developing after duly, 1947. They are arbitrarily arranged in
chronological order.
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1. 4RF 9-48 "Cuban Political Trends", March
The paper argued that as a result of the va aries of Cuban
as the party in power may not be as favorably inclined toward
the United States as it seems. It linked this problem with the concept
of the security of the United. States with reference to maneuvers open
to the Cuban GYovernnent embarrassing to the United States policy.
The State Department dissented on the ;eneral grounds that any
elections anywhere are likely to modify international relationships? but
that those in Cuba could hardly have an "adverse effect" on the security
of the United States. It can be inferred from the nature of the dissent
and the negotiations over it that the real disagreement was not so much
anything; in the paper as with two different interpretations of the
word "security."
2. Or% - 16 "Soviet Objectives in Latin America"
April 10t IF47
The principal argument of this paper (which was begun in 1946) is
that for various reasons Soviet aims in the area were essentially
negative--to foment bad hemisphere relations rather than to communize
individual countries.1 State's comments on the first draft run to five
full pages. The principal objections were:
1. An allegation that the estimate gave an impression of "greater
Soviet danger in Latin America than the material presented warranted."
2. A statement that "Strictures upon U.S. policy toward. Arentina
and toward negotiation of a hemisphere defense pact seem gratuitous."
3. An assertion that the paper had not proved that Soviet foreign
policy was based on the inevitability of war.
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4I/26
For a sunmary of the papers here discussed, see No.
For correspondence relating to the papers, see O
collection in historical Files.
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The first point was a matter of interpretation; the second
criticized alleged motives of the authors; the third asked for something
beyond the scope of the paper which the Central Intelli;;ence f:'ency con-
sidered to have been settled in "ORF'-l.". The records snake it clear that
those In Central Irtellisence who dealt with these comments were fended
b; the tone in which they were written.I
state finally entered a
dissent on grounds that "in certain respects, the estimate is misleading."
it c n be inferred that the effect of the controversy on releti.ons between
State end Central Intelligence analysts was not good.
2. ORE-62 "Soviet Objectives in Korea's, November 18, 1947
ent is recorded with this paper as published. In the files,
however, there is a memorandum from the Army Intel i; ence Division dated
December , 1947 .(sixteen days
formal publication which probably
why the memorandum did not become attached to the estima.t,
saving that the Intelligence Division "does not concur with subject
paper as writton."
The Intelli;3ence Division took exception to the paper's main these--
that the USSR would eventually withdraw its troops from Korea and that
the United States followed suit, a "north Korean invasion would follow.
y took the position that the Soviets would neither withdraw nor
h an invasion. Its principal reasons were:
1. The North Koreans were a "volatile" people who could not
be trusted to remain loyal to the USSR once Soviet troops had been
withdrawn.
2. There was so much dissatisfaction in the North with the
yong7ang government that the Ossians would not dare leave for fear
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the Communist regime would be overthrown in their absence.
The USSR feared the United States. The Soviets would not gam-
ble on withdrawing, their trool'a when they could not be sure that the
United States would do the same. The USSR," said army in this connec-
tion, "is as --much in the dark re arding future steps of =the U.S. in
Korea as is the U.S. regarding Soviet plans and policy."
4, Even if the { ussians had pl?ns for a t Srth Korean Invasion
of South Korea and could trust the North Koreans, they would not rely
on them to carry out the plan in the absence of Soviet troops. The
reason ;given for this was that Koreans fight well when they =ere attacked,
but not when they are the aggressors. This was b;~sed on historical
analogies furnished by the Arnty.
y, Finally, the Army contended that the USSR was bound by
sty aa~. ree nts with. respect to Korea, could not find a le listic
means of evading these treaties (as Central Intelligence had maintained)
and so would not dare take overt steps in Korea for fear of adverse
reaction in the United Actions.
3. ORE-61 "The Cu.rrezit Situation in France" 31 December 1947
This paper was requested by the National Security Council as a
matter of priority. It was written under pressure, therefore, and a
draft was sent to the Agencies (on December 16, 191.7) with a request
for formal concurrence or dissent by the 23rd.
and Army
concurred on December 22, 23, and 29 respectively. The first word from
State was received on the 24th, but it was neither concurrence nor dissent;
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VI/29
See folder on ORE-16 in Historical Files
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it was rather an unofficial memorandum, signed by a State analyst,
which purported to give advance notice of what State's position would
be.
This memorandum begins: "I sincerely hope that the O analysts
concerned will be given an adequate chance to study these criticisms
and. that we may have a conference to discuss points on which we remain
in disagreement."
Following this formal opening, there are numerous individual
comments on the paper, the following being examp
"Our conclusion is that this is a distressingly poor paper."
"This curious juxtaposition of French political psychology
and certain surface aspects of current party strengths does justice to
neither subject."
"It seems odd, to say the least, thz,t no space is ,riven to
France's interest in peace in gene
"This is a good example of ORE putting France's worse foot for-
"A childish generalization partially contradicted on page 9.
".Meaningless as written."
These comments elicited the followin;~ proposed reply (which
probably never sent to the State Department but indicates a state of
mind unfavorable to successful negotiation of the paper).
"Reference (a) is hereby returned because its tone, substance
and uncertain representation of departmental authority render it entirely
unacceptable.
No useful purpose is discernible in the conference proposed by
Reference (a) and the suggestion is therefore rejected because the captious
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-
attitude which has become ch
ful negotiations.
istic of OIR offers no basis for fruit
Enclosed, are two (2) copies of WE s &' final draft of ORE-64o
which represents the coordinated views of CIA, Army, Navy and Air, the
last three of which are enthusiastic about CIA s s estimate.
In view of the foregoing, it is strongly recommended that a
copy of ORF.614 be forwarded to the Department of State, for such action
as it may deem advisable, with a request that the anticipated dissent
be in OREts hands not later than 7 January 1948 since publication will
then have been delayed by the Department of State for thirteen (13)
days over and above the time allotted to all supporting agencies."
The controvorey culminated in a formal dissent by State. The
"dissent" took issue with no major conclusion. Rather it consists of
seriatim comments on individual points in the paper.
OR1-.65 "The Venezuelan Elections of its Decesr,
January
The pr
cipal point made in this paper was that the Accion Democrstice,
a political party returned to power by the December elections, was not
Communist and would be friendly to the United States. The Departments
of State, Navy, and Air Force concurred in this view, The Army dissented
because it did not believe "th&t Accion Democrrtica is at present an
active non-communist party" and "their present temperate pro-United
States policy represents expediency."
Records show that the Navy was on the point of dissenting also,
for much the same reasons as the Army. The Army's analysis of the Accion
Demooratica seems to have been built chiefly on the opinion of the
military attache in Caracas, who considered, contrary to many experts on
Venezuelan politics, that the party was a dangerously left-wing group.
This was, of course, a case (see p. above) where a reader of the paper
might have been confused at finding a dissent on purely political affairs
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The Western European section of the Office of Reports
and Estimates
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made by
A ency a against the findings of both non-political
netea.
oRE-69 "Cons uences of. Communist Accession to Power
in eece in the Absence o - aun raction",
e.ruary 9,
The National Security Council asked for`10.-!-6 "as a guide in the
formation of policy for Greece at a time when the success of the new
United States aid program seemed to be in grave doubt. It was not
unnatural that Council members should have wanted to know what would
happen if, on the one hand, the United States abandoned eece to the
Communists or, on the other, backed the "Truman Doctrine" in Greece
with msilitary? force. % RE-69" outlined the probable consequences of the
first extreme; "OR 10-48" (see below) of the secon
In order to present the issues involved in "ORE-69" clearly, the
Central Intelli ;ence Agency adopted a ' 3y thetical assumption (suggested
as it happens by the National Security Council Secret?riat) that a
Communist regime (the "Markos" government) had already seized power
in Greece and that the United States had chosen to do nothing about
It was this assumption, basically, that made the coordination of
"ORE-69" troublesome.
The actual "coordination footnote" on "ORE 69" reads as follows:
"rho information in this report is as of 28 January 1948 at
which time the report was submitted to the memb r agencies of the Inter-
departmental Advisory Council for coordi-ation.
"The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, and the Air
Intelligence Division, Department of the Air Force, have concurred in the
military aspects of this paper but have not concurred in the
aspects. The statement of the intelligence Or~;arization of the Depart: e tt
of State disassociating itself from the paper is sat forth in Enclosure
#A+. The dissent of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department,
set forth in Enclosure sB:. a
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This title was not a misprint. The publishing office
of Central Intelligence was not yet aware of the correct
meaning of "SAC"
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his means is that "O E 69" received no concurrence at all.
The "military aspects" of the paper--whatever that term might :jean--
were not important. State's "disassociation", if not a dissent, was cer-
tainly not a concurrence. The total effect was to make it apeear that
no Agency had any real quarrel with the paper as such, but rather with
the fact that such a paper had been atteaapted.
The trouble, of course, lay in the second part of the assus,,Uo
set forth. This was, indeed, as assumption contrary to any conceivable
sort of fact, but it should have been evident to the Agencies that no
how the paper had been written, some such device would have been
required by the mere mechanics of preee;itatioJ. Nevertheless, althous.
^. ntral lntelli;;ence representatives made earnest aid patient efforts
considerable period of time, they could never overcome
qualms to the effect that it is impossible to arrive at correct conclusions
when the startinr point is an assumption known to be invalid. The fact
that the reasoning in question was wholly hypothetical se ms not to
have carried weight with the Agencies,
e gave as its reason for "disassociation" that a sound analysis
of the proble:i could not be based on the assumption as adopted. The
'djssent" mekcs the same point but is more elaborate in adding
that: (1) no valid conclusion with respect to Oteece could : o such
beyond genare:l formula (outlined by the Navy in its dissent) which
ended with the words: "recce is the ke; stcnc.... in the whole Communist
rte"t (2) it was doubtful that the loss of Greece "would br
international panic" (the paper had not said
ulc"; it had said
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"could" ); (3) loss of Greece would not necessarily mean the loss of
Iran (again the paper had said "could")); (Ii) it was unlikely that
Turkey would capitulate (the paper had mentioned this only as con-
ceivable); and finally (5) the paper left the impression that the
hypothetical events enumerated were "inevitable."
6. 6.46 "Copse uences of Communist Accession to Power
in Italy by Legal eane March
One month after the publication of "ORE-69," the Central Intelligence
Agency vas called upon to write substantially the same estimate with
respect to the situation in Italy. The assumption used in this case
was that the Italian Communists had won the elections of April 18, 1948;
the problem to construct a hypothesis as to what the consequences of
d. development would be. In this case, State concurred;
Army and Air Force resorted to the "military aspects only" formul
and Navy, still opposed to reasoning from hypothesis, dissented on
grounds that it was "not prepared to underwrite the detailed speculative
predictions derived from, the estimates
RE 10-48 "consequences of Certain Courses of Action
with Respect to Greece," April 5s ly45
N. rlrrr rYrr r
The only published dissent on this paper was by Army which main-
ineed that the estimate was too "pessimistic" with respect to Creek
srqr capabilities against the guerrillas. Much more important was an
Air Force dissent that was never published.
Air Force representatives concurred in the final draft, a
Director of Air Force Intelligence entered a formal concurrence there-
With three formal concurrences and the Army dissent, the paper
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y published after a delay of some twenty d a'781 occasioned by what
the author called the "vagaries of coordination." The paper outlined
various courses of action that the United States mi? gh.t take in Greece
and concluded that none of them-including the use of actual American
troops against the Ireek errillas--would be taken as a casus b l i
by the USSR, unless the i;saiana concluded, for other reasons,
United States maneuv rs in Greece meant an imminent attack by th
United States on the USSR*
on 9 April, four days after publication, the
of Reports
ived a memorandum si ned by Colonel James S. Olive for
the Director of Intelli, ence, United States Air Force. The Director of
Intelligence, according to Olive, had noted an inconsistency between
the conclusions of "OR 10-48" and those of MORE 2248," Possibility of
Direct Soviet Military Action Airing 1948 (see No. ). ORE 10-46 said
that "The Kremlin would resort to war only if convinced that a U.S.
k was in prospect s.nd inevitable;" while 22-4E stated that "the
ght resort to direct military action in 1948, particularly if
in should interpret some U.S. wove,, or series of moves
indicatin;, an intention to attack the USSR and its satellites." Con-
sequently, said Olive, "the Director of Intelligence, USAF, wishes to
go on record as amending the estimate (Conclusion (7)) contained in
ORE 1048 as follows s Delete the sentence f The Kremlin would resort
war only if convinced that a U.S. attack of the USSR was inevitab1
andum dated April 13 the author of the Central Intelligence
draft, in a proposed memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence,
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attacked the Air Force position. He attributed the memorandum to
and thoughtless reading; out of context" and to "poor staff work
the United States Air Force." He recoi:
Intelligence should snake formal representations to the Air Force
to this effect. This was not done.
Instead, the Assitaat Director for Beport? and Estimates prepared
a reply via the Director stating that, "since the Director of gence, USAF wishes to, go on record as amending conclusion 7 of OR 10-48,
The ori; i.nal of your reference memorandum has been filed in the Reference
Center, CIA, with: the record copy of ORE 1Q48 and a copy o,'-' this reply."
There is no record of further transactions. Presurnabl;, the
Force decided to let the matter pass.
The Air Force later contained so many implications regarding
the future of coordination, however, that it engaged the serious
tion of ever,- parse concerned, including the Director of Central
Intelli,. enee. In the first place, aithouzh the Director of Intelligence,
tea Air Force had not said so, he apparently wanted to enter
what amounted to a dissent on a paper already, published and disseminated.
Or if this was not his aim,, he must have wished to have the offending
words deleted from the published copies. The precedent that would be
established if either of these courses of action were allowed, might
well have been detrin ent= l to the whole process of producing coordinated
estimates. In the second place, if it beet. rye possible for a single
agency to revise estimates without regard for the rest, there would seem
to be little future for the idea of unified intelligence in any form.
There was also involved the principle that statements made in one
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estimate could be used out of context to damn those made in another:
though the second might be unrelated to the first.
The Central Intelligence Agency did not have the authority--or
did not believe it had the authority--simply to reject as inadmissible any
comment, objection,,, or dissent offered on any of its estimates. As to
the legality of reversing a concurrence once it had been signed and
published, there was no ruling and no precedent. Hence this particular
problem ended in the Central Files. It was by no means solved? however,,
and was to arise again.
22-LB "?ossibilit~r of Direct Soviet Military Action
The Air Force again dissented after the paper had been c
seminted and this time succeeded in having its dissent published
paper No. for a fun account of the important controversy regardin.
this paper
9. C 23-28 The Current Situation in the Free Territo
o- es , ? ' ^.. ,.
This paper was produced in an atmosphere of urgencyy apparently
occasioned by the national elections to be held in Italy on April 18,
1948. The atoll of what happened in the course of coordination can be
vaned from a memorandum (undated but must have been sent after April
17) from the Assistant Director: Reports and Estimates., to the Director
,f Army Intelligence,
According to this memorandum, Army representatives had professed
fun agreement with the various drafts of #p 23-ti' UP until the moment
concurrence. The Central Intelligence Agency was then informed
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versal of Army's stand,., not in official communication to the
etor of Central Inteliig< nce, but in the for of a telephone call
from the Army
e that handled immediate coordination detail to its
counterpart in Central Inteili-rence. By this time, MORRE 23-48" had
already gone to press with an urgent deadline as noted above. Since
it would have been, insecure to discuss AM-18 objections over the
telephone, the Central Intellience representative requested an immdiate
meeting to detc
ompromise solution could be reached. To
this suggestion the Army representative replied that it would be useless
to call such a meeting because the Army
sent was "too fundamental"
to allow compromise. All other Agencies having iven formal con-
0 -
currence by this time, and the Italian elections being only three
days off, Central I ztelli:~ ence went ahead with publication, stating
in the "coordination footnote," in accordance with "DCI 3/i
Army had not yet reported its position, which would be published when
eived. It wa
received on the sixteenth, bearing the date of 14 .April
1
but apparently was never published.
According to its memorandum, Army disagreed with a statement to
the effect that Italo-Yugoslav desires to control Trieste were based on
national pride and tradition more than strategic consideration, since
Trieste no longer had any great strategic significance from the point
of view of c.=itherx Army took the contrary view, that Trieste was still
of considerable strategic importance to both countries. This would
presumably have been a legitimate matter of dispute, but the point
is still unexplained why the .Army should not have been concerned about
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1. This was probably the first case in which CIA. made
use of the relevant provisions in DCI 3/1
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the strategic importance of Trieste until "ORE 23-18" was about to
press, or may, thereafter, it should have considered the resultant
difference of opinion too "fundamental" to allow even of discussion.
10. ORE 46-Its * Com munier mrengTn in o
ptezuber 26, 1940
A footnote states that all Agencies had concurred in this estimate,
Documents in the ORE file on ORE Ii6-48, however,, show that Navy was not
accord. The Office of Naval Intelligence was asked to partici-
pate in production of the paper but failed to do so. Up to the last
stage of coordination, Navy acted as a sort of passive onlooker. It then.
sent a mei randui of provisional concurrence. After having done so.,
, the Office of Naval Intelligence forwarded a memorandum which
however
,
not in the file,, but whose tone can be deduced from the reply to it
by the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates which reads in part
as follows
*3. To characterise a paper as $ another example of what we
consider to be unprofessional works and to say that 'the paper loses
value due to its verbosity and the unsyatemitiaed (sic) development of
its informations does not of itself enable CIA to improve its production.
even assuming these comments to be valid.*
U. o 4l448-"Prospects for Survival of the R
Navy entered a dissent on this paper, first on
new south 'Korean government would not gain United Nations recognition
(which it did within a few days) and second that Central Intelligence
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based its discussion of South Korea ss future on an assumption of
continued United States aid. This assumption, the Navy thought, ?i-ht
er too opti iistic conclusions on the part of persons reading
the paper. s.ther, said office of Naval Irtelli :fence, the protle
should have been discussed on the assumption that aid would not be
ed, and then have been followed by supplementary remarks on what
would happen if it were. However cos endable the Navyfl's suggestion
may have been, the grounds for dissent mi. ht seem, difficult to follow.
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