TURKEY UNDER MARTIAL LAW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010042-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: December 27, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
MEMORANDUM
TURKEY UNDER MARTIAL LAW
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The government's resort to martial Law on Monday
to quell Turkey's spiralling poZiticaZ violence was
a painful poZiticaZ and ideological step for socialist-
minded Prime Minister Ecevit. The move holds dangers
for his government and opportunities for his political
rivals if the tough action proves unsuccessful. Whether
martial Zaw will restore domestic tranquility will
depend as much on the determination of extremists to
persist as in the capabilities of Turkey's no-nonsense
military.
The imposition of martial law for the third time since World War II,
and the second in this decade, became official December 26 when the'Grand
National Assembly concurred. Ecevit had tried a series of more moderate
measures during his first year in office aimed at curbing violence while
preserving constitutional liberties, but they failed on both counts. They
included a streamlining of the judicial system, improvements in law enforce-
ment methods and personnel including the purging of those associated with
RP M 78-10506
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extremist groups, and the selective use of military troops to augment
the police in outlying provinces. Most recently, Ecevit banned the
youth wing of Alpaslan Turkes' neo-facist National Action Party, which
has spearheaded the violence from the right. That over 600 people
were killed during Ecevit's first year in office--more than double
the rate of deaths in the last ve his predecessor's reign--attests
to this failure.
Ecevit Wary of Martial Law
Ecevit's resistance to declaring martial law until the weekend
disturbances in Maras left nearly 100 dead is rooted in politics and
ideology. The Prime Minister had strongly criticized earlier martial
law periods for their excesses, particularly against members of the
left wing of his party who suffered most. In addition, Ecevit has
exhibited a strong personal commitment to democracy and against military
or other forms of authoritarian rule. Indications are that Ecevit
consented to martial law only after a majority of his cabinet, and
possibly the military as well, came out strongly in its favor.
Causes of Violence
Political violence in Turkey has numerous causes. These include
the sharp cleavage between leftist "modernizers" and Islamic tradition-
alists and nationalists leading to the emergence of rival extremist
groups. Their ranks have been ugmented with youths radicalized by an
outmoded educational system and poor job prospects. In addition to
left-right differences and student discontent, the violence has been
fueled by sectarian disputes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims and by
Kurdish separatist aspirations in the impoverished eastern provinces
where economic discontent obviously also plays a role. Whereas the
violence in the large urban areas has been directed by one extremist
faction against another and has taken the form of "gang warfare," that
in the east has involved large numbers of people, in part because law
enforcement is less efficient and the people are more malleable.
Extreme Right Defiant?
The more conservative opposition parties have charged Ecevit
with coddling leftist extremists and there is little doubt that his
government has been more vigorous in quelling rightist-inspired violence,
particularly in the cities. The most recent pattern in the eastern
provinces, however, has been one in which extreme rightists--possibly
associated with Turkes--have incited the politically more conservative
Sunni Muslims to attacl: members of the poorer Shiite minority who tend
to support Ecevit's party or other leftist groups.
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Ecevit has implied that the rioting in Maras was organized by Turkes'
followers and there are indications he may be right. Ecevit's charges
have fueled talk about a Turkes conspiracy to create disorder leading
to the fall of the government and military intervention and has raised
the possibility of additional government measures against Turkes' party.
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Outlook
The immediate outlook for the Ecevit government, and in the longer
term, for Turkish democracy, will depend on how effective martial law
is in curbing domestic strife. Should the Turkish military secure peace,
if only a temporary one, Ecevit will have bought time--time to attend
to the underlying causes of violence and to related problems such as
Turkey's failing economy, which is experiencing inflation and unemployment
rates of over 50 percent and 20 percent respectively as well as severe
foreign exchange shortages. The military authorities will be aided by
the fact that extremist leaders, including Turkes, have been reluctant
openly to incite their followers to storm the barricades. Indead, Turkes
has even denied any link with extreme rightist gangs. Nonetheless, the
need to share power with military authorities in the 13 affected provinces
could create strains in the overnment's razor thin parliamentary majority
of two seats.
Should extremist factions persistently challenge the martial law
regime, Ecevit's prospects may quickly deteriorate. He will be subjected
to conflicting pressures from within his government, his party, and
the military, and may ultimately face the dilemma either of backtracking
or adopting even more repressive measures. In such circumstances, his
government would be in jeopardy, and it is difficult to know what might
follow it. There are serious obstacles to most of the alternatives that
have been suggested, such as a grand coalition, a government of "tech-
nicians", or a more active role for the President. And should none of
these materialize, the military might rapidly lose its reluctance to try
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