RISING TIDE OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: July 1, 1978
• Content Type: LIST

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CENTRAL IN`~ELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
7 December 1978
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Rising Tide.o:~ Indochinese Refugees
Key Points
The fZozo of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and
Kampuchea has not abated with the passage of time
since the Communist victories in Indochina; in fact,
over the past year the numbers have increased markedly.
The political and economic developments that have
stimulated this exodus are unlikely to change in the
near term; a continued large outflow is probable,
although much will depend on the effort individual
Indochina states earn or ~uiZZ exert to stop the refugees.
The Indochina states do not appear embarrassed by the
large refugee outfZmo. Moreover, Vietnam is actively
encouraging the departure of those it considers
potential security risks, particularly the overseas
Chinese.
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-- Most of the refugees arrive in Thailand or MaZaz~sia,
causing concern in these governments about potential
domestic political and securitr~ problems.
-- The increasingZ~ unmanageable refugee situation
is a potential irritant in US bilateral relations
with some non-Communist Southeast Asian states, as
theZZ as among the states themselves, and betraeen
them and the Communist governments of Tndoehina.
-- TnternationaZ consultations on the growing Tndochinese
refugee problem zJiZZ take place December 11 and 12 in
Geneva under the ausroices o the UN H' Commissioner
for Refugees.
US government estim~ites in August 1977 predicted that
60,000 would flee Indochina between July 1977 and December 1980.
Between August 1977 and mid-November 1978, however, the
number of arrivals in non--Communist Southeast Asia already
totaled over 116,000, of wTzom almost 60,000 were Vietnamese
arriving by boat. Unforeseen circumstances, such as Vietnam's
escalating conflicts with Kampuchea and China and worsening
economic conditions in Laos ar ly explain the dramatic
increase.
The sharp escalation in the refugee exodus, particularly
from Vietnam, will impart, a sense of urgency to the 2ndo-
chinese refugee consultations scheduled for Geneva on
December 11 and 12 under the auspices of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees.. All interested nations have
been invited, including Vietnam, but the 'Vietnamese are
nat expected to attend. The non-Communist Southeast Asian
states, which have born the brunt of the refugee exodus,
will seek assurances that the US and others will organize
swift departure to third countries for all seeking asylum.
Other likely topics of discuss-ion include the possibility of
prevailing upon the Indachinese states to help establish a
more orderly refugee outflow, ways to spread the resettlement
responsibility among a wider number of nations, as well as
long-term institutional, :Financial, and procedural issues
involving the Indochinese refugee problem. 25X1
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Contributing Factors
Initially most refugees were members of the military
or civil service of the former non-Communist governments of
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Subsequent refugees
were more often people fleeing deteriorating economic
conditions, ethnic animosity, and intensified efforts by the
Communist governments t? create socialist economies and
tighten political controls.' In addition, specific problems
in each of the three countries have caused refugees to leave.
Chinese residents of Vietnam account for much of the
increase from that country in 1.978 and perhaps as many as
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three-quarters of the ref~~gees now arriving by boat in Southeast
Asia. Hanoi's decision in March 1978 to nationalize commerce,
which had been largely controlled by overseas Chinese, occurred
at a time when the ChinesE~ community was already under increased
pressure from Vietnamese authorities as a result of Peking's
support of Kampuchea in ii:s bloody border war with Vietnam.
These events and the rumors they inspired created an air of
panic among the Chinese community. Over 160,000 Chinese,
mostly from northern Vietnam, fled to China. Those in
southern Vietnam had litt~_e interest in going to China and
instead began seeking a way to escape to the West. The border
war between Vietnam and Kampuchea has also added to the general
uneasiness inside Vietnam. Many Vietnamese sa ther fled
because they feared military conscription. 25X1
Vietnamese efforts to resettle urban dwellers in so-
called New Economic Zones also raised fears among the popula-
tion and caused people to leave. These "zones" are new
agricultural settlements Located on large tracts of previously
uncultivated or abandoned rural land, often near the Kampuchean
border; the sites are often poorly prepared; and. living condi-
tions are extremely harsh. Some Vietnamese characterize the
settlements as little better than concentration cam s, and
few willingly relocate to them. 25X1
Political and military actions of the Laotian government
designed to increase its control in the countryside are largely
responsible for the increased number of Laotian refugees
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entering Thailand in 1978. Tn late 1977, the Laotian
government supported by Vietnamese troops moved against
rebellious Hmong (Meo) tribesmen i.n the highlands of Central
Laos. Large numbers of Hmong fled across the border into
Thailand. Although Hmong continue to leave at a steady
rate, more recently large numbers of Lowland Lao from the
area around Vientiane and along the .Mekong River in southern
Laos have begun crossing into Thailand. Worsening economic
conditions, including severe food shortages, and government
attempts to reorganize agriculture along socialist lines
have caused thousands of these people, who are mostly rice
farmers, to leave.
Life in Kampuchea today is much harsher than in either
Vietnam or Laos, but the ;number of refugees remains relatively
limited despite worsening conditions. Kampuchean security
along the border is so tight that most escapees are shot
before reaching Thailand and effective security and population
controls prevent escape by boat. By contrast, the border
with Vietnam is more open, and over 100,000 Kampucheans have
fled into southern Vietnam.
Refugees Policies
More than 160,000 refugees are still in temporary camps
outside Indochina, most of them in Thailand and Malaysia.
Thailand has over 1?4,000 refugees in 15 camps. About 100,000
of these are from Laos. Tn November 1977, the Thai government
announced an exclusionary policy intended to discourage
refugees by threatening to repatriate those who were not
legitimate political refugees. The Thai are concerned about
the increasing number of poor farmers fleeing Laos; Bangkok
considers them illegal aliens rather than refugees. Efforts
to keep them out, however, have been largely unsuccessful
because the border is not: well-patrolled, and the Thai have
forced relatively few to return in part from concern about
how the Laotian authorities would treat them.
The Thai are concerned about the domestic political
consequences of the growing refugee camps. Many are located
in extremely poor areas, often with active Communist insurgent
groups. Not all of the ~?efugees who flee to Thailand come
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to tY.e attention pf-Thai officials; some observers estimate
that as many as 10 to 15 percent resettle themselves in the
area. The Lowland Lao, for example, are culturally similar
to the Thai, and many have famil or other contacts on the
Thai side of the Mekong River. 25X1.
The number of Vietnamese seeking asylum has increased
substantially during the past year, from an average of 1,700
per month in the first quarter of 1978 to over 12,000 in
October alone. For geographic reasons,~most of them arrive
in Malaysia. Malaysia has seven major refugee camps con-
taining a total of over 40,000 Vietnamese refugees. The
rapid increase is causing grumbling among local Malaysian
officials about the burden being placed on them. The camps
are in a very poor part o:E? Malaysia, and some Malaysian
press accounts charge that a serious inflation problem
exists in the nearby villages.
The large percentage of ethnic Chinese among the recent
arrivals exacerbates the problem for Malaysia, which already
has a serious communal problem caused by friction between
Muslim Malays and local Chinese. The severe overcrowding of
the camps has aroused fear among Malaysian police that the
refugees could become "restless" and create a potentially
serious security problem. The Malaysian government until
recently had not publicized the refugee influx because it
feared that this might complicate the problem, but in recent
weeks it has reversed its policy and begun to politicize the
issue in the local media. The sensational reporting that
has resulted, however, may cause the government severe
roblems by inflaming local opinion against the refugees.
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The Malaysian navy has increased its patrols off the
coast in an effort to intercept and turn back arriving
refugee boats, but many refugees still manage to beach and
destroy the. boats before the navy can tow them back, Tn
some instances, irate Malaysian villa ers try to prevent the
refugee boats from landing. 25X1
Problems for the non-Communist Southeast Asians
The refugee situation threatens to become a contentious
issue within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
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a political and economic association of the five non-
communist states in the region -- Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, and the Jhilippines. Malaysia, in
particular, has been pres:~ing for the group to agree on
a common position about how to handle the refugee problem,
but despite its efforts to arrange for consultations, each
of the ASEAN nations tend: to deal with the refugees on its
own without r~gard to the region as a whole. Malaysia has
privately complained that the refugee burden is not being
shared equally among the ASEAN states; the vast majority of
the camps are in Malaysia and Thailand, while Indonesia,
Singapore, and the Philippines keep out all but a token
number of refugees. Singapore has taken an extremely strong
line and has imposed an overall limit of 1,000 on the number
of refugees permitted asylum in Singapore at any one time.
Even this number is accepted only if another country has
already agreed to resettle them within 90 days. Indonesia,
for its part, tries to prevent refugee boats from-landing.
It will permit boats to replenish and repair with the under-
standing that they will continue to Australia.
Some of the ASEAN states would like to make the refugees
an issue in ASEAN-Vietnam relations. In 1975, the ASEAN
states were concerned that accepting Vietnamese refugees
might damage future bilateral relations with the Communist
government, but lately the concern is that Vietnam is using the
ASEAN states as a "dumping ground" for people it does not
want. The Malaysians would like ASEAN to make representations
to Vietnam and suggest that Hanoi should prove its recently
professed interest in improving relations with its neighbors
by taking stron er action to prevent refugees from leaving
Vietnam.
The refugees are ale~o becoming an issue in US relations
with Malaysia in particular,-but potentially with ASEAN as
a whole. Comments by so~ie Southeast Asian o.#,f_icials and
editorials in the local press allege that the TJS and its
[nTestern allies are large]_y to blame for the refugee problem
and that they are not exerting enough effort to resettle the
refugees. Southeast Asian governments are especially nettled
by comments from US and iJN officials criticizing them for
trying to turn the refugees away and charging that exclusionary
practices violate international conventions on human rights.
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Representatives of -the ASEAN states will probably try
to formulate a common position on the refugees in the forth-
coming Indochinese refugE~e consultations i:n Geneva, although
thus far there have been no high'level consultations. The
UN High Commission on Re:E=ugees hopes to convene a meeting
of the ASEAN ambassadors in Geneva prior to the general
Resettlement Prospects
About 250,000 refugees have been resettled since
April 1975, most of them in the United States, France,
Australia and Canada. Almost none have been resettled in
Southeast Asia itself, although Malaysia accepted a group
of Muslims from Kampuchea in 1976. None of the ASEAN states
is likely to accept any Vietnamese or overseas Chinese
refugees. Thailand may eventually agree to resettle some of
the Laotian and Kampuchean refugees now in Thai camps if
someone else pays for it. The Thai, however, would not agree
to a resettlement program if they thought it might encourage
even more Laotians to come. The Thai are concerned that
a large resettlement program could create domestic problems
because Thai citizens would resent benefits going to foreigners
that were not available to themselves. All of the ASEAN
states are concerned about the potential security risks
posed by the refugees. Z'hey worry both about the possibility
that Communist agents have been infiltrated into refugee
groups and about the prospects that the refugees' presence
may arouse discontent among their own citizens.
If the refugees are not resettled in third countries,
both Thailand and Malaysia are likely to redouble their
efforts to keep new arrivals out and to pursue attempts to
repatriate them to Indochina. Thailand, however, would
probably be willing to tolerate the large numbers of Laotians
in camps in northern Thailand for same time; Malaysia, on
the other hand, feels the refugee problem in its territory
has already reached crisis proportions. Thailand already
has a large community of Vietnamese refugees who fled there
after 1954 and who have never been satisfactorily assimilated.
Bangkok recently resumed pressing I-lanoi to repatriate this
group as agreed to in the Rangoon Agreement of 1959.
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Prospects for More Refuges
Although it is impassible to predict the number of
additional refugees that can be expected over the coming
months, there is no reasran to assume that the rate will
decline. Increased effo:rts by the Communist governments of
Indochina to extend soci~~lization and population control
measures, combined with their inability to solve serious
economic problems, will undoubtedly cause more people to
attempt escape. Efforts to force urban residents to move to
the New Economic Zones will also continue.
Vietnam's confrontai:ion with China is unlikely to be
resolved anytime soon, giving Hanoi little reason to relax
its pressure on the overseas Chinese community in Vietnam.
Even if government-to-government relations improved, long-
standing ethnic hostility between the Vietnamese and the
overseas Chinese would continue to make Vietnam an unfriendly
,~, i ~ ,. ~ ~,-.,,. nt...., .. ,... -- - - - ~ - -- ~ -
The growing border war between Vietnam and Kampuchea will
add to the general atmos~,here of uncertainty in southern
Vietnam, especially as manpower and economic resources are
mobilized to support the struggle.
Perhaps most important, however, there is evidence that
Vietnamese officials are actively encouraging people they
regard as potential security problems, particularly the
Chinese, to leave. Refugees have always been able to bribe
Communist officials in southern Vietnam to overlook escape
attempts, but recently there have been reports that it is
official Vietnamese policy to expedite the departure of
thousands of Chinese refugees to Southeast Asia. In any
event, the confrontations with Kampuchea and China will
continue to divert manpower from internal security tasks to
combat units, thereby reducing 'Vietnam's abilit to prevent
refugees from leaving.
Some Chinese and Sino-Vietnamese businessmen outside
Vietnam are apparently helping to organize large-scale
escapes, such as the recent one involving the merchant ship
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Hai Hong. Although some may be motivated by desires to
rescue relatives and friends most a ear attracted by the
profits to be made.
Refugees will probably also continue to arrive in
Thailand from Laos. The Laotian economy shows little sign
of improvement, and the government program to socialize
agriculture, particularly in the southern area, will continue
to cause Lao to seek escape. The Laotian border with
Thailand is difficult to patrol. Moreover, there is a long
history of movement back and forth across it by the peoples
of northern Thailand and Laos. Many will probably keep on
entering Thailand without comin to the attention of the Thai
authorities.
Although economic conditions inside Kampuchea are
poor, and politically inspired purges apparently persist
in same areas, security along the border with Thailand is 25X1
so tight that few will escape. Continuing political uncer-
tainty, however, could lead Communist cadre and even security
forces, who fear for their own lives as the Kampuchean
revolution devours its own, to seek refuge abroad.'
The available evidence indicates that the most important
factors behind the decision to flee arise from internal
conditions in Indochina itself rather than a "pull effect"
from outside, although the refugees, particularly from Vietnam,
are often well aware of resettlement programs offered by the
US and other nations. 'The Indochina states show little sign
of embarrassment about the large numbers of people who choose
to leave, and in the case of Vietnam they encourage them.
Despite the fact that many who leave Vietnam are people whose
skills are badly needed by the new regime, most officials
apparently prefer to rid themselves of potential malcontents
rather than hope to convert them. 25X1
The ASEAN states may eventually try to apply concerted
diplomatic pressure on Vietnam to get Hanoi to take measures
to prevent the refugees from leaving, but they have little
if any leverage to exert. The only nation that might con-
ceivably have that kind of influence is the USSR, and it
would have no reason to use it, particularly when the refugee
in question are largely Chinese. Increased pressure by
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Communist governments to reorganize society and the
economy, combined in the case of Laos and Vietnam with
the relative ease of arrancfing a.n escape, will contribute to
a continued large influx of refugees to non-Communist
Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future.
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