NIGERIA: POLITICAL TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 30, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
MEMORANDUM
NIGERIA: POLITICAL TRENDS
Key Judgments
Disquieting political trends are becoming
more evident as Nigeria approaches its planned
return to civilian rule in October 1979. The
turnover may yet go smoothly, but for the
present these trends make for a more guarded
view of prospects for a peaceful transition
and successful new regime.
? Political parties, given only three
months to organize openly on a national
basis before applications for recognition
are due in mid-December, are developing
along much the same regional Lines that
undermined the first repub.Zic.
? Regional divisions seem so sharp that
no presidential candidate now in sight
is Likely to receive the nationwide support
required in the first stage of the elections.
? These divisions could Lead to communal
violence.
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? Signs of Arab involvement and intra-
Muslim divisions in northern Nigeria
bear watching.
? The situation may soon test the unity
and resolve of Nigeria's current military
rulers to proceed with the transfer of
power.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Overview
Nigeria's civilian politicians are rushing to complete
the formation of political parties, selection of presidential
candidates, and cementing of alliances necessary to meet an
18 December registration deadline for applying for the
status of recognized national parties. The requirement for
nationally oriented, broadly based parties is viewed by the
military as a key feature of Nigeria's new constitution, one
that is intended to enhance unity and a more national outlook
in future political activity in this highly variegated
country.
The political scene remains in considerable flux, and
in the time left for maneuvering some major realignments
that may result in an awkward succession of musical chair
alliances are still possible. The most disturbing development
has been the breakup along regional lines of the most
nationally appearing of the three emergent parties--the
north-south amalgam known as the Nigerian People's Party.
The political contest now seems to be shaping up as a regional
confrontation between one major northern Muslim-oriented
party and two opposing parties splitting the south's vote
between its two large and traditionally antagonistic ethnic
groups.
Since the formal ban on politics was removed on 21
September, Nigerian politicians will--by 18 December--
have been allowed only 13 weeks to put together national
parties and leadership slates. After a hiatus of 12 years
of military rule, the regime may well be trying to compress
too much political development into too short a time to
realistically expect that a viable political structure will
be in place when civilians are scheduled to assume power in
October 1979.
The ruling military council may have instructed the
federal electoral commission to set the short deadline for
party registration in an effort to force order on the
chaotic party scene in prepartion for a series of elections
scheduled to begin next spring. The effect is to limit
dramatically the time for political sorting out and to
crystalize prematurely the organization of political parties.
Some of the major parties that emerge under such circumstances
are likely to be plagued by internal squabbling, shaky
organization, and defections. All of this does not make for
an auspicious beginning for a return to party-based civilian
government.
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More serious for the future is that Nigerian parties
appear to be emerging along many of the same regional and
ethnic lines that fueled bitter competition and undermined
stability during the first republic. The splits between the
main groups now on the scene are reminiscent of the three-
way regional-ethnic division that existed in the early 1960s
between the Hausa-Fulani in the Muslim north, the Christian
and Muslim Yoruba in the southwest, and the predominantly
Christian Ibo in the southeast. Moreover, these parties
also have many of the same old cast of characters in leadership
positions. What is remarkable is that so few aspects of
Nigeria's political makeup may have been transformed for the
better under the facade of military rule.
The way political parties are evolving must be a source
of some concern, if not a real dilemma, for Nigeria's military
rulers unless they are dead set on returning the country to
civilian rule and claiming credit for the move. The question
of whether or not to register basically regional parties
that claim to be national and to proceed with the transition
to civilian rule could thus pose a real test of the resolve
and unity of the military leadership.
Over the short term, continued political competition
between essentially regional parties is likely to enhance
prospects for bitter political confrontation and the outbreak
of serious communal violence. Unrestrained regional com-
petition would make it all the more difficult for the parties
involved to accept the prospect of electoral defeat, which
could again raise the specter of threatened secession in
Nigeria. If this danger materialized, the regime would be
compelled to extend military rule in order to preserve
national unity--providing, of course, that it was still in
control of the situation. Looking further down the road,
renewed regionally based political competition could threaten
the survival of any new civilian government and future
stability.
We have no indications at this time that the regime may
be having second thoughts about the wisdom of proceeding
with civilian rule. In assessing the dangers to unity
ahead, however, the military leadership could decide at some
point to postpone the transfer of power. The regime would
have to make a very convincing public case--particularly in
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CONFIDENTIAL
the absence of communal disorders--that an extension of
military rule would be in the country's best interest.
Despite some misgivings about what may lie ahead, the civilian
elite is eagerly anticipating the passage to civilian rule.
The military has always been more tolerated than popular,
and many Nigerians blame it for the country's economic
failings and their poor living conditions. A delay in the
transfer of power would risk anti-government demonstrations
and broad social unrest.
Although we have no knowledge of how the officer corps
view Nigeria's current political evolution, a coup attempt
by disgruntled middle-grade officers--fearful that the
country is heading for chaos and that civilian politicians
on the scene are incapable of running a future government--
is an ever present possibility.
Nigerian People's Party
The breakup of the Nigerian People's Party underscores
the difficulties in Nigeria of regional cooperation and
building a multi-ethnic party, particularly in the aftermath
of the bitter north-south controversy earlier this year over
the constitutional proposal for a federal Islamic court of
appeals. Both sides in the constituent assembly approached
the court issue, which the north lost, not as a religious
question, but as a symbolic measure of the political power
each region hoped to wield under a civilian rule. The
People's Party, heavily southern in makeup from the outset
but lacking a nationally known southern vote-getter, was
built in large part around a coalition of the forces that
defeated the proposed Islamic court.
The party is now split into northern and southern
wings, each claiming the party label. The split was precipitated
by the political re-emergence of Nnamdi Azikiwe, 74, a well-
known southern Ibo politician who had been the ceremonial
president of the first republic. Azikiwe in the early 1960s
had founded a predominantly Ibo political party that dominated
the politics of the former eastern region.
Before Azikiwe's appearance, southern party members had
reluctantly supported Waziri. Ibrahim, a northern dissident
politician who had been neutral on the court issue, as the
People's Party candidate for the presidency and the party's
best hope to project a national image. They felt, however,
that Ibrahim's candidacy would be tantamount--symbolically
at least--to a thinly veiled acceptance of northern domination,
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and when Azikiwe declared his availability, the southern
members bolted from Ibrahim's ranks. Without them, Ibrahim
appears to have no chance of winning the presidency; he has
little following in the north.
Azikiwe is projecting himself as an elder statesman
concerned with national unity and the regional cast of
Nigeria's other parties. Ironically, he has destroyed the
one major party that best transcended ethnic and regional
lines. The diffident Azikiwe apparently hopes to build a
"national" party out of the southern wing of the People's
party. This faction, however, seems destined to be little
more than another southern-based regional group dependent on
building wide support among the now factionalized major Ibo
tribe.
Azikiwe cannot expect, as an Ibo, to attract significant
votes among Yorubas and Muslim northerners. No Ibo can make
a credible presidential candidate because the Ibos are still
too tainted by their attempted secession as Biafra in 1967.
Azikiwe does have the backing of many minority peoples in
southeastern Nigeria; a few of the Yoruba opposed to the
presidential candidacy of the major Yoruba politician, Chief
Awolowo, and those minority tribesmen from Nigeria's middle
belt who are anti-northern. The middle belt is a politically
divided, ethnically and religiously mixed buffer zone between
the Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south.
Middle belters and non-Ibo easterners, who traditionally
have resented Ibo encroachment, are susceptible to wooing by
the Muslim north.
The National Party of Nigeria
The National Party represents a major effort by the
Muslim north to close ranks in a regional front after the
debacle of the Islamic court defeat. It is aimed at re-
asserting the control the northern region exercised in the
first republic over any future civilian government. The
party has experienced serious organizational problems and
factional infighting, however, which made for prolonged
difficulties in agreeing on a leadership slate. Many of its
problems reflect the fact that the solid north of the early
1960s has passed with the creation of 10 states in place of
the former single northern administrative region. This
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has broken the hold the large Hausa-Fulani group once had
over smaller Muslim ethnic groups and middle-belt tribesmen
and has allowed the ethnic and political diversity that had
always existed in the north to manifest itself. The impact
of modernization and social change, though far less pervasive
than in the south, has created sharper generational differences
of outlook between the traditional Muslim political establishment
and the region's younger "new breed" politicians.
To add to its troubles, the north does not have a
nationally recognized presidential candidate to support.
Younger and inexperienced northern politicians who represented
the region in the constituent assembly battle over the
Islamic court issue turned to the establishment for leadership
during the subsequent formation of the National Party.
Recent reports suggest, however, that serious splits may
have developed between the two groups. As a result, the
party may end up choosing either a relatively noncontroversial
old guard politician as a compromise presidential candidate
or a dark horse "new breed" candidate at its convention on
7-10 December. The degree to which younger, more aggressive
northerners are in control of the party could have much to
do with how confrontational and unyielding an approach the
party takes in future politicking. The northern establishment
figures, by and large, are tempermentally inclined to favor
a more moderate approach.
In the first republic, the Muslim north initially had a
modus vivendi with a considerable proportion of the Ibos. If
it cannot now reestablish such support, it would appear to
southerners as an even more overtly regional vehicle of the
north. The party's electoral strategy is based on the fact
that the Muslim north with 38 percent of the total electorate
has the largest potential bloc of voters. It can also count
on a majority of anti-Awolowo Yorubas, many of whom are
Muslims, and presumably many voters in the middle belt,
which was part of the former northern administrative region.
Without Ibo votes, however, the National Party would
face a difficult struggle to win a direct popular victory
under the election rules* that exist. It would probably
have to pin its hopes for victory on a subsequent runoff
,*The winning president must obtain a plurality nationwide
and one-quarter of two votes in 13 of 19 states.
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election where federal and state legislators act as an
electoral college to choose a president. A northerner could
win if northern unity is operative, since the 10 states of
the former northern region collectively have more legislative
votes than the less populous south.
The Unity Party of Nigeria
Chief Awolowo's Unity party-though the best organized--
has the most narrow ethnic cast of the three major parties.
It is a reincarnation of the southern Yoruba-based party he
led in the early 1960s. Awolowo seems to have very little
support among other ethnic groups, and the party's wings in
non-Yoruba areas--which give it claim to national status--
are largely made up of the sizable Yoruba population in
principal urban centers throughout the country. Because of
traditional Yoruba political disunity, however, Awolowo
probably cannot attract more than a slim majority of the
Yoruba vote and would seem to have little chance of becoming
Nigeria's next president. This does not mean that he is not
a source of worry to the Muslim north and Ibo east.
Awolowo is a nationally known figure who strives to be
an elder statesman, but he is widely regarded by other
Nigerians as a Yoruba-firster and has a reputation for being
inflexible. He is a symbol. of that group's presumed quest
for national preeminence. The state-oriented distribution
of political power has reduced previous Hausa-Fulani domination
of politics, and the civil war ended a period of Ibo ascendency
in the civil service and commerce. Yorubas have made inroads
in these areas, including the state civil services in the
undereducated north. These gains, when accompanied by the
aggressiveness of the Yoruba personality, have led in the
northern states to an anti-Yoruba feeling which in many
areas is stronger than previous anti-Ibo sentiment. Awolowo
thus is anathema to the north, and he bitterly divides the
south.
Awolowo's less well-organized opponents are nevertheless
worried about the possible mass appeal of the avowedly
populist welfare campaign he is conducting. He espouses
mildly socialist goals and apparently aspires to become the
leader and articulator of currently unorganized and incoherent
discontent evident among many Nigerian intellectuals, students,
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workers, and farmers. Awolowo is politicking aggressively--
where local campaign regulations permit--with a splashy
street-oriented campaign, but with little apparent ground-
swell of support. He is the first declared presidential
candidate to embark on a national tour; so far, he has
visited 72 urban areas and traveled more than 8,000 kilometers.
The Regime--Becoming Politically Involved?
As the political process unfolds, members of the ruling
military council are becoming all the more vulnerable to the
divisive pulls of ethnic and regional loyalties. Until now,
this body has done a remarkable job of maintaining an outward
image of unanimity and neutrality toward various political
groups. Should real fissures in the facade of unity appear,
a return to civilian government could become much more
difficult.
There is evidence that some key northern council members
have been quietly trying to help the National Party overcome
its lack of leadership and unity, doubtless in hopes of
ensuring northern domination of the future government. Head
of State General Obasanjo, a southerner, perhaps feeling he
is not in a political position to interfere, continues to
project the image of a statesman above partisan politics.
There have been allegations--so far unconfirmed--that Obasanjo
and some other southern Yoruba council members are privately
sympathetic to the presidential aspirations of fellow tribesman
Chief Awolowo. They supposedly view Awolowo as Nigeria's
most experienced politician and the one most capable of
administering the country and managing its precarious finances.
Islamic Divisions and Foreign Involvement in the North
The greatest unknown as the country marches along
toward civilian rule is what impact intra-Muslim religious
divisions and purported Libyan involvement may be having on
political development and attitudes in the north. These
forces would have implications for the entire country should
they cause northerners to take an even more confrontational
approach to politics and make religion a more openly political
issue than before. They would seriously jeopardize a
harmonious transition to civilian rule by forcing to the
surface the dangerous ethnic, regional, and religious anti-
pathies that lurk just below the surface of Nigerian society.
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I I Kano City in the
Muslim nor is one of the areas in Nigeria where serious
violence is most likely to erupt. Kano City is a centuries-
old commercial and religious center and the capital of Kano
state. Rapid population growth--along with chronic social,
ethnic, and religious tensions that are compounded by the
presence of numerous resident Libyans, other Arabs, and non-
Muslim southerners--all make for a potentially volatile mix.
Symptomatic of tensions are so far unconfirmed rumors of
foreign arms shipments to the city.
Kano City is the seat of the Tijaniyya Islamic sect,
now the largest in northern Nigeria with adherents drawn
primarily from younger Muslims. The Tijaniyya reportedly
are more puritantical in outlook than are the Qadiriyya, the
next largest sect, to which all the north's conservative
traditional leaders outside Kano belong. In recent years,
religious feelings in Kano have occasionally led to intra-
Muslim violence and to near violence between Muslims and
Christians.
Religious rivalries in Kano City may partly underlie
the competition there between the major National Party and
its splinter group, People's Redemption Party. Establishment
members have lined up behind the former, while the latter
draws its support from younger, more radical northern elements,
and possibly the more religiously extreme Tijaniyya. The
Redemption Party also has the support of some northern
leftists and socialists.
The Redemption Party probably cannot now qualify for
registration as a national party, but it could assume far
greater importance were it to attract frustrated "new breed"
politicians from the major National Party. The party is led
by 57-year-old Aminu Kano, of Kano City. His party may be
nothing more than a reincarnation of the minor radical party
he founded in the early 1960s, then as now in protest against
the conservative, right-wing cast of the major northern
party. The liberal ideas of Aminu Kano and those of others
in the group would seem to be at variance with any political
impulse toward Islamic traditionalism. The party also
includes some southern Ibo progressives, who almost certainly
would not remain were that group religiously virulent.
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There are a number of indications that Libya is playing
an active role in northern politics--though the specifics
are murky--with the aim of helping to ensure that a Muslim-
oriented civilian government emerges in 1979. It seems
clear that Libyan money is going to certain Muslim politicians
in both the major National Party and its offshoot, the
People's Redemption Party. We do not know if one party is
being favored over the other or to what degree communal
tensions in Kano state and elsewhere in the north can be
ascribed to possible Libyan machinations. The Redemption
Party could be an enticing target of opportunity for the
Libyans, particularly if the National Party cannot pull
itself together or if the Redemption party does prove to be
a religiously extreme grouping.
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The Enduring Problem of Political Violence
There have been several minor incidents of violence
since the resumption of legal political activity last September.
Political violence has a long history in Nigerian politics,
but has not yet become the center-stage problem that it was
during the country's post-independence experiment with
civilian rule. How successfully Nigeria can control violence
in the future will be an important measure of the chances
for a peaceful and successful transition to civilian rule.
In October, each major party experienced some violence.
A National Party meeting in Niger state was interrupted by a
rival faction of the party and a riot ensued. A rally in
Borno state organized by People's Party figure Waziri Ibrahim
was disrupted by National Party thugs, and a campaign stop
in Anambra state by Unity Party leader chief Awolowo was
disrupted by thugs. No deaths were reported in any of these
incidents.
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Kano state in the north took the lead in trying to
forestall political violence and inflammatory politicking by
placing strict restraints on campaigning in that state.
Other states in various parts of the country have followed
suit. According to an official of the federal electoral
commission, state authorities and police have the primary
responsibility for maintaining public order during Nigeria's
transition to civilian rule. Widespread violence, however,
almost certainly would compel the federal government and
army to step in.
Political violence precipitated by party thugs resulted
in the death of at least 2,000 people and the breakdown of
public order in the former Western region in 1964-65, which
in turn contributed to the military's takeover in 1966.
Politicians, both old and new, display a remarkable capacity
to forget such lessons from the past, in spite of frequent
rhetorical exhortations to each other to recall them. More
often than not, they continue to display a penchant for an
unrestrained style of confrontational politics in which
tolerance and compromise is defined as the other side giving
in to their wishes.
Money and Nigerian Politics
In Nigerian politics money has considerable symbolic
connotations. To the mass of Nigeria's impoverished and
largely illiterate voters, the expenditure of substantial
amounts of money by a politician is symbolic proof that he
is an important man. Lavish political spending is already
evident. Though it is difficult to document, the money comes
from a variety of sources--including foreign governments and
companies, wealthy Nigerian entrepreneurs, and the personal
fortunes of Nigerian politicians. It is used notably for
publicity purposes, but also to cement alliances, buy votes,
and hire political thugs. Politicians even attempt to buy
a presence in unfriendly ethnic areas, if only to try to
meet requirements that to be registered, a political party
must demonstrate some strength and organization in all the
country's 19 states.
Rumors are circulating about foreign money and influence
in support of the various major parties on the scene. As
the pace of campaigning quickens, advantage-seeking politicians
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are sure to publicize these rumors and use them against one
another. Despite a strong warning last September by Head of
State General Obasanjo against foreign interference in
Nigerian politics, there is little doubt that--as in the
past--foreign money is entering Nigeria and Nigerian politicians
are opportunistically taking it.
Officials of the federal electoral commission have
taken a position that foreign money is a problem for Nigeria's
security service to investigate. Determined action can come
only from the ruling military council, but its own delicate
ethnic and regional balance forces cause it to tread very
carefully. As a southerner, for example, Head of State
General Obasanjo must proceed diplomatically in pressing his
concern over signs of Libyan involvement in northern politics.
There is the possibility that some influential northern
colleagues in the government might be sympathetic to such
Libyan involvement. Also, the security organization is
headed by a northerner who might be reluctant to investigate
vigorously fellow northerners.
In addition to Arab funds entering Nigeria, it can be
assumed that the Soviets are providing some money to favorite
Nigerian socialist politicians. Nigerian socialists are
trying to work out a merger of the three socialist parties
now existing. The ideological splits and personal rivalries
involved, however, militate against such a merger. The
groups will have to align themselves with major parties or
become pressure groups.
Some major party presidential candidates are wealthy
enough in their own right to fund a good part of their
political activities. Chief Awolowo of the Unity Party, a
well-to-do lawyer, has considerable funds which enemies
claim he stole from the Nigerian central bank when he served
as finance minister during the Nigerian civil war. Waziri
Ibrahim of the Nigerian People's Party has substantial
financial resources and a multitude of business interests
that he began to acquire in the 1960s, first as minister of
economic development in the original civilian regime, and
later as Nigeria's chief arms merchant in Europe during the
civil war.
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Nigeria: Federal States, Tribal Groups, and Islam
Benin:
PORTO- --LAGOS
NOVO
Plateau
;^r
Gros9
Rivers
Gulf of Guinea
Equatorial
Guinea
Camero-on
The "Holy North" -75-100% Muslim
Former northern region boundary
-?- State boundary
PRINCIPAL TRIBES
Hausa and Fulani Yoruba
(intermingled)
Kanuri
Middle Belt
0
:Gabon (Conga
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