ANGOLA: UNITA VS. THE BENGUELA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 30, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
Key Points
--The Angolan Government will find it
difficult to make the Benguela Railroad
operational not only because of the
numerous economic and Logistic prob-
lems it confronts, but--more impor-
tantly--because of UNITA's insurgent
activities.
--UNITA apparently plans to step up its
attacks against the vulnerable rail-
Zine--much of which passes through
territory occupied by the insurgents--
and we believe UNITA will be able
to attack trains or commit sabotage
at will along Large sections
of the rail Line.
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-The insurgents already have
substantial stockpiles of
military supplies inside
Angola.
-UNITA probably believes that its
international credibility would
be damaged if it failed to prevent
the railroad from operating
normally.
-Insurgent leader Savimbi, already
concerned over the Angolan Govern-
ment's continuing diplomatic and
political gains, may opt to in-
flict heavier damage on the rail-
road if he believes his position
is deteriorating.
--Persistent UNITA attacks against the line
could lead Neto to renew charges that
either Mobutu or Kaunda is aiding the
insurgents.
--We strongly doubt that the Benguela Rail-
road can be restored to full use until
Luanda reaches a modus vivendi with UNITA
or is able to defeat UNITA militarily,
neither of which appears likely in the
short term.
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Introduction
The total reopening of the Benguela Railroad--announced
earlier this month--is jeopardized by myriad political,
economic, technical, organizational, and logistic problems,
any one of which could prevent an early return to efficient
operations. In addition to these problems, an even more
important question will be the extent to which the insur-
gents of the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) maintain or increase their attacks on the
vulnerable rail line.
The Benguela reportedly is in generally good condition
and an attempt to begin operations along the entire 1,347
kilometer route is expected soon--barring increased rebel
activity. In recent weeks, however, representatives of the
UNITA insurgents--a force numbering approximately 18,000--
have stated repeatedly that they will escalate their attacks.
We have no reason to doubt either their intentions or their
capability. Even as the repairs on the major bridge at
Dilolo were being completed last month, UNITA continued to
sabotage other sections of the line, demonstrating that it
is able to attack portions of the railroad almost at will.
UNITA Capability
UNITA insurgents have
cont Iluuu -co attacK trains and to sabotage portions of the
line in central Angola and that they have begun to increase
the tempo of their assaults. UNITA probably believes that
its credibility both with Luanda and with its outside sup-
porters rests largely on its ability to prevent the railroad
from operating. The insurgents are concerned that the
Angolan Government's continuing diplomatic gestures toward
the West are aimed in part at putting pressure on UNITA.
They may have decided to respond by stepping up their attacks
on the rail line so as to demonstrate that they remain a
force to be reckoned with.
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The insurgents' attacks over the last two years have
been numerous, but most have been relatively minor hit-and-
run raids aimed primarily at causing derailments, destroying
track, and blowing up small bridges. With a few exceptions,
most of the damage inflicted by these raids could be repaired
within 48 hours. Late last month, however, UNITA reportedly
destroyed two bridges that may close the railroad for several
weeks. The guerrillas also may attempt to inflict greater
damage on the Benguela if they see a substantial increase in
traffic on the line or if they believe they are becoming
isolated from their traditional sources of external diplomatic
or material support.
UNITA will maintain the capability to harass the railroad--
especially in those areas where they have tribal and popular
support. We believe that at present UNITA has the men and
materiel to survive as an effective guerrilla force against
the railroad even without substantial external. assistance.
Contrary to what Angolan President Neto has publicly alleged,
the insurgents are not dependent on outside assistance or
sanctuary from Angola's neighbors to maintain their attacks
against the line, and they apparently have substantial
stockpiles of military supplies inside Angola.
UNITA does not have to destroy the railroad completely
to keep it from operating effectively. Frequent minor
damage, the threat of sabotage that causes the Angolans to
run trains at less than normal. speed, and the need for the
Angolans to check the line in advance and to scout the
surrounding terrain will greatly impede the Benguela's
usefulness.
Security Measures
As part of the agreement to reopen the Benguela Rail-
road, the Angolan Government has promised to provide as much
military protection as necessary to ensure its security.
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In addition to posting guards and building fortifications at
major bridges, an armored ore car manned by Angolan troops
is run in front of each train. Helicopters and spotter
aircraft also are flown along the route. There may be as
many as a few thousand Angolan troops guarding the line,
with work gangs stationed at. various points to make repairs
caused by UNITA activity. The Angolan Government intends to
reinforce its defenses along the rail line, but these measures
are unlikely to reduce UNITA's capacity to conduct sabotage.
Luanda had attempted to extract a commitment from
Kinshasa to assist with security along the Angolan section
of the line, presumably by using Zairian military personnel.
Zaire reportedly refused, but each country then agreed to
"guarantee circulation and security" within its respective
territory. Although Kinshasa has been less than enthusiastic
in preparing for the reopening of the railway, the Zairian
portion of the line should be secure--at least as long as
the Inter-African Force remains in Shaba.
Impact on Zaire and Zambia
Although Kinshasa and Lusaka have reacted positively to
Luanda's decision last August to reopen the railroad, neither
President Mobutu nor President Kaunda believes that the
Angolan Government can ensure the security of the route.
Both believe that UNITA will not allow the Benguela to
operate until Angolan President Neto agrees to negotiate
with the insurgents. Despite the recent Angola-Zaire
rapprochement, Mobutu and Kaunda remain sympathetic to
UNITA. Neither has indicated that he intends to press UNITA
leader Jonas Savimbi to cease his attacks on the railroad.
The two presidents have nothing to lose, however, by appearing
to support Luanda's attempts to get the Benguela operating
again.
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In the short to medium term, the railroad probably will
have little increased economic significance for Angola,
Zambia, or Zaire. Nor will Zambia and Zaire attempt to
,adjust their transport routes until Angola is able to
demonstrate that the railroad is secure.* For the present,
Zaire and now Zambia's most important route to the outside
is the rail line to the south, through Zambia, Rhodesia, and
Botswana to South African ports. Loss of this access route,
however, would put heavy pressure on Zaire and Zambia to
look again to the Benguela.
Increased UNITA attacks on the line could lead Neto to
blame the Zairians--or the Zambians--for aiding the rebels
and to insist that they put pressure on Savimbi to curtail
the attacks. UNITA activities against the Benguela Railroad
therefore have the potential of jeopardizing the recent
progress made in easing tensions between Angola and Zaire.
There is little doubt that UNITA could put the railroad
out of action if it chose to do so. Angolan officials un-
doubtedly are concerned over the vulnerability of bridges in
the Cubal Variant area which, if destroyed, would take many
months to rebuild. Even though some of the spans may be
guarded by Angolan troops, UNITA has the capability to mount
effective operations in this area.
lit would also not be difficult for
UNITA to put the line out of operation by destroying the
railroad's locomotives. We do not believe that Angolan
troops will be able to protect the line--much of which runs
through UNITA-occupied territory. Savimbi has threatened to
intensify his attacks against: the railroad if Cuban troops
are used for security.
*UntiZ Z975, Zaire and Zand-locked Zambia used the
Benguela Railroad to transport more than half of their vital
copper exports to Angola's Atlantic port of Lobito. Zaire's
copper industry in Shaba Region also depended heavily on the
line for imports of equipment that were necessary to keep
the mines working efficiently.
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In sum, it is unlikely that Benguela Railroad operations
can be restored to the pre-civil war level until the Angolan
Government either reaches a modus vivendi with UNITA or is
able to defeat UNITA militarily, neither of which appears
likely over the short term.
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UNITA Guerrilla Insurgency
BOTSWANA
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