EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00988R000100090068-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 68
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY._
The Agency's enabling legislation and General Services
Administration's (GSA) statutory mission overlap in the areas of
supply, procurement, real estate, and facilities. Precedence
has been established over the years wherein the Agency now relies
on GSA to satisfy most domestic requirements; but there is increasing
criticism of, and dissatisfaction with, the performance of GSA.
However, given GSA's statutory authorities and presence, the
Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) General Counsel has been
reluctant to use the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI)
authorities domestically except in limited circumstances. A
more liberal utilization of the DCI's authorities provided by
Sections 8A and 8B of the CIA Act of 1949 would allow the equilibrium
between CIA and GSA to shift to CIA being more self-sufficient.
Self-sufficiency would reduce GSA's workload, in turn relieving,
somewhat, their chronic problems of being both understaffed and
underfunded. Decentralization would increase the responsiveness
of service to the ultimate customer and, as developed later in
this paper, should increase overall governmental efficiency.
This paper will identify each service furnished by GSA and will
provide a background and problem statement that discusses the issues
and provides a recommendation for improvement. The recurrent theme
and recommendation is that overall governmental efficiency and
responsiveness can be greatly improved through the judicious and
controlled delegation of specific authorities by GSA to the Agency.
Requested delegations are summarized in the following matrix:
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Category
Acquisition
of leased
space
Reimbursable
work. (Im-
provement,
alteration,
and new con-
s truction)
Existing Arrangement Proposed Arrangement
GSA has delegated authority No square feet restriction,
to acquire up to 5000 sq.ft. only communications with
GSA and adherence to the
F.P.M. R.
GSA responsibility, with Agency responsibility;
delegations to the Agency work accomplished through
on a case-by-case basis. GSA if responsive, other-
wise through direct Agency
contract.
SLUG (opera- GSA responsibility, with
tions, main- Agency often providing
tenance, and supplemental funds.
housekeeping)
Cafeteria
and Vending
Machines
Supply and
Procurement
STATINTL
Protective
Services
GSA publish standards for
SLUG funded services; where
services are not commen-
surate with standards,
Agency will contract
directly, adjusting the
SLUG payment accordingly.
Services provided through No change.
the GSA, by GSI for cafe-
teria and Va. Comm. for
blind for vending machines.
Interfaces, responsi- No major changes. System
bilities, and authorities tuning recommended.
clear. ADPE procurement is
delegated to the Agency.
Under GSA control. Under Agency control.
The limited FPS Services Conduct a systems analysis
provided by SLUG are aug- to determine the best mix of
mented on a reimbursable options to meet requirements.
basis.
The delegation of Automated Data Processing Equipment (ADPE)
procurement authority demonstrates that mission support does improve
and that laws and regulations are honored. GSA has audited this
delegation on three occasions since granted in 1973 and complimented
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the Agency's exercise of the authority each time. This ADPE dele-
gation represents the direction proposed for the first three
categories of the above matrix and is the direction the Agency
believes the National Academy of Public Administration study
should recommend. If the shift of responsibilities proposed in
the matrix is not possible and it came to a choice of either
the Agency or GSA to perform the services, we would recommend
the delegations of the entire set of operating authorities and
the transfer of appropriate resources to the CIA. We cannot
continue the current pattern of unresponsiveness.
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Background
In the early days, the Agency's enabling legislation was
focused on the overseas mission, with domestic needs modest and
adequately served by GSA. As the Agency grew, consolidation
STATINTL through construction at Langley was approved and funded by the
I thus allowing the potential for
STATINTL subsequent services to be provided internally, via contract, via the
I r through GSA. GSA was selected, and through an exchange
of correspondence in 1959 between the T)CI and the Administrator of
GSA, it was agreed that GSA would perform services incident to the
operation, maintenance, protection, and repair of the CIA Head-
quarters Building.
This arrangement went unaltered until 1972 when passage of
Public Law 92-313, an amendment to the Property Act of 1949,
provided GSA authority to bill Federal agencies for furnished
space and services. This billing was identified as a Standard
Level User Charge (SLUC), designed to provide GSA with reimburse-
ment for the provision of a standard level of service plus an
amount for a Federal Building Fund to provide for acquisition of
new Federal buildings. In anticipation of the adverse effects
that PL 92-313 might have on the CIA, the DCI, in November 1973,
STATINTL
forwarded an appeal to GSA for exemption of the Headquarters complex
STATINT
I This appeal was denied by
GSA. Consequently, all Agency properties subject to the provisions
of PL 92-313, including Headquarters and
were STATINTL
identified to GSA, thus establishing the basis for our current
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14aw "0.
The remainder of the paper concerns shifts of responsibilities
present in the GSA/CIA arrangements. There is one area, support
STATINTL to our
where the disparity between GSA's capabilities
(and track record) and our support requirements is so great that
we recommend that total responsibility for the facility be trans-
ferred to the CIA. The justifications and rationale for this
recommendation are the subjects of a separate study. However, as
the recommendation represents the most sweeping solution to the
problems of GSA support that permeate this report, a synopsis of
the situation is included in the next paragraph.
GSA's organization has been, and is, -primarily structured to
support the routine requirements of a standard office building.
This has impacted on the Agency most in the area of building
STATINTL management, has always been unique and has a special
purpose, primarily housing technical equipment which requires special
support - support above and beyond GSA's standard services. The
Headquarters complex has each year evolved from a standard office
building to more of a light industrial park, housing ever-increasing
amounts of technical equipment; and, similar to
I
requires special, responsive, and efficient support services.
Although GSA has historically not been able to provide the necessary
support to our operational requirements in either building in
the area of facilities management, we have been able to cope in
the less critical area of support to the Headquarters complex.
Coping in Headquarters is also facilitated by the physical location
of GSA shops in the Headquarters building, a condition that NPIC does
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STATINTL
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.60, W
not enjoy. The need for reliable, time-critical, responsive
STATINTL
? There are few standards or feedback mechanisms to
evaluate responsiveness, effectiveness, and effi-
ciency; therefore, there is no signal when GSA is
performing poorly.
? There are few incentives for good management and
few disincentives for poor management.
and controlled facilities support at
is non-nego-
STATINTL
tiable in order to meet the mission - a dynamic mission dependent
on the availability of precise complex and sensitive electro/
mechanical/optical equipment. GSA does not have the capability
or apparent inclination to meet Agency requirements at Building
0
and it is, thereby, recommended that
entirety, be transferred from GSA control to CIA control.
Discussion
The GSA organization is of gargantuan proportions, is
bureaucratic, and provides most services on a monopolistic
basis. Size, bureaucracy, and monopoly combine to aggravate
managerial and administrative considerations that are common
to all organizations, i.e.:
0 There is a general lack of a sense of urgency or
importance, to the extent that even telephone
communication is often time-consuming or impos-
sible.
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STATINTL
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By their perceptions, in which we are in agreement,
they are often understaffed, are often underfunded,
and the personnel are often underpaid and/or under-
motivated.
There is a lack of authority and willingness to make
decisions, particularly in the wake of the recent
disclosures of dishonesty and fraudulent behavior.
? There can be lengthy delays due to the plethora of
confusing and restrictive central regulations and
congressional directives, oversight committees, etc.
The efficiency of centralized service, with the potential
attendant savings to the taxpayer, is often realized at a cost
in responsiveness to the customer. In our case, the centralized
GSA service has become both relatively costly and unresponsive.
This Agency's involvement with GSA is multidimensional,
involving the operations, maintenance and alteration of facilities,
engineering, housekeeping, procurement, supply, and transportation.
Relations have been good, with interpersonal relationships at the
individual level excellent. Most GSA representatives are eager
to be responsive. Nonetheless, although there are many examples
of organizational success, it is also common for the GSA system
to preclude responsiveness. This Agency does observe a strong
correlation between unresponsiveness and monopoly; those areas
where this Agency must go to GSA for services are usually the
areas in which GSA is least responsive. Poor response has forced
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this Agency to use its staff to help GSA help us - professional
personnel that could be more effectively utilized in directly
accomplishing tasks through existing Agency authorities.
The world situation is fluid and mission requirements often
cannot be anticipated; specific support requirements, therefore,
cannot be incorporated into long-range plans. Mission duration
is often less than the time GSA requires to respond to our requests
for services. To meet our mission, either GSA must become more re-
sponsive or delegations from GSA are necessary, delegations with
the appropriate constraints and procedures for audit.
The recurrent theme that permeates the following examples
is that both overall governmental efficiency and responsiveness of
service can be greatly improved through the judicious and controlled
delegation of specific authorities by GSA to this Agency. The
delegations are in the best interest of the government not only
for the improvement of efficiency and responsiveness but also
because stronger checks and balances to the process of -providing
services are possible, thereby reducing the potential for abuses.
The relative smallness of the Agency allows complete internal
auditing procedures. Aggressive auditing and a manageable scope
of operations inherently provide reasonable checks and balances.
Repeated Congressional investigations could not find abuses in
the Agency's support or financial operations. Investigations of
GSA disclosed sweeping abuses and dishonesty. The above facts and
observations lead us to suggest that the Agency can inherently
offer better safeguards against abuse in the provision of goods
and services.
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The remainder of this paper will identify in more detail the
categories of services received from GSA. The organization of the
paper will be to identify the category of service, provide an
introductory narrative (background), and then identify the issues,
followed by a recommendation for improvement. Typical of most
customers who receive services from others, the bulk of the
narrative is concerned with GSA services that lack some combination
of effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness, or adequacy. Service
that is responsive is often taken for granted and not documented
and studied. There are many examples where GSA has performed above
and beyond the call of normal duty to be responsive to our needs,
particularly at the individual and working levels.
Category: Acquisition of Lease Space
Background: Although the Agency has, under the provisions of its
enabling legislation, authority to lease real property, utiliza-
tion has been restricted to acquisition of "operational" real
estate. Thus the Agency must rely on GSA to satisfy its needs for
"administrative" property. Unfortunately, most of the Agency's
requirements are for relatively small offices which, although
falling within the "administrative" definition, have operational
and security characteristics which dictate location, type of space,
and time frame. GSA has proven to be uniformly unable to respond
in a timely manner to these requirements.
Problem: GSA appears to be both overworked and understaffed.
This problem is exacerbated by an internal bureaucracy which
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requires many levels of both vertical and lateral approval before
a lease may be signed. In addition, GSA has become the executive
agency responsible for a myriad of social and economic programs
designed to revitalize urban areas, employ minorities, aid the
handicapped, conserve energy, improve the environment, balance
the budget, reduce the size of the Federal work force, etc.
While worthwhile, the total impact of these programs is to
grind the leasing process to a virtual halt. Real impact may be
achieved through these programs when applied to large-scale Federal
space programs. Unfortunately, these conditions are applied
STATINTL
across the board and affect this Agency's attempts to obtain an
as construction of a major Federal center.
Examples:
1.
STATINTL
was moved to temporary space as a result of a bomb explosion
which made its previous office unacceptable. The tempo-
rary space, although nearly thrice as large as required,
was inadequate from a safety and security viewpoint.
Over the ensuing two and one-half years, GSA was unable
to locate replacement space. Direct appeals were made by
the DCI, Deputy Director for Administration, and Director
of Logistics, to no avail. As a last resort, in November
1979, an Agency officer spent one week, full time, in
STATINTL
surveyed available space, and located an office
acceptable to GSA and the Agency. It then took GSA until
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ftol "W
February 1980 to negotiate and sign a lease, and
it would not have been done then had not the Agency
intervened at critical times.
2. In 1975, the Agency formally requested that GSA
obtain 85,750 square feet of office and special-purpose
space to meet expanded Agency requirements. Problems
involving GSA funding restraints, leasing priorities,
and moratoriums delayed formal solicitation for offers
until May 1979. Negotiations continued until November
1979, at which time GSA's General Counsel, overruling its
local National Capital Region, determined that GSA could
not enter into a lease. Leasing authority was subse-
quently delegated to the Agency.
STATINTL
GSA ultimately advised that owing to the tight leasing
market, space of this small size was not available. In
both instances the Agency subsequently located suitable
space.
Pros: GSA provides a certain flexibility I I antTATINTL
ensures that leasing reflects current rules and regulations governing
space acquisition. They also assume the administrative burden of
lease payments and ongoing relations with the landlord. Because
of the large volume, they are presumably very familiar with their
local leasing market.
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Cons: The nonresponsiveness results in an inordinate amount of
time consumed simply attempting to get GSA to react. This largely
nonproductive effort far exceeds the time involved in direct
leasing. GSA is, at best, only vaguely aware of security and
cover conditions which affect many of our offices and totally
unaware of the operational priorities which affect our space
planning efforts.
Recommendation: The 5,000 square foot restriction on the recent
delegation for leasing should be removed and future leasing should
only require coordination with GSA and adherence to the Federal
Property Management Regulations. The 5,000 souare foot delegation
has proven to be quite workable. By virtue of its overseas and
other operational responsibilities, this Agency has a professional
cadre of engineers and realty officers. These personnel are
competent to design and lease office space. Use of the delegation
has cut leasing delays from literally years to weeks.
Category: Reimbursable Work - Improvements, Alterations, New
Construction
Background: The Agency requests reimbursable services outside of
those provided under SLUC by means of GSA Work Authorization Form
2957. Supposedly, GSA provides the Agency "detailed estimates;"
but, in fact, only overall figures for labor, material, and total
are reflected and those figures in absolutely no detail. Wide
variations in material quantities, oversights, duplication between
shops, and other discrepancies are possible and likely, with no
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verification possible. Costs significantly higher than Agency
estimates, little control over GSA work schedules, and quality
of work often cause reimbursable services to be unresponsive.
Problem: Where construction is involved, GSA is not responsive.
Most construction is preceded by a feasibility study, construction
drawings and specifications (design), and finally, after award,
construction. This assumes that the Architect and Engineer
selection process (which takes usually eight months), Con-
gressional prospectus process (if the -project is of significant
size), which may take from two to five years, and the budget
process are all satisfied. Given the GSA staffing and compe-
tition for those limited resources from other agencies, only the
highest priority projects get attention, and important projects
continually slide further behind. Limited resources available
to the Agency are consumed in trying to prod GSA into action.
Since the Agency is a captive customer and must deal with
GSA without the benefit of competition, it ultimately faces a
"take it or leave it" bargaining situation. It is necessary
that the Agency be able to judge the adequacy of transactions.
Estimates in sufficient detail to show materiel lists and manhours
per job element must be prepared and used at negotiation sessions.
Alternatives must he given the Agency if agreement cannot be
reached in cost or response.
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Pros: There are certain projects which can be forecast far enough
in advance to get GSA moving in an acceptable time frame. Useful
life of capital improvements can be predicted and replacements set
in motion. In some instances, GSA can, and occasionally does,
program the necessary funding. It is advantageous when this Agency
can provide guidance and prodding, with GSA administrating the
projects. Where fiscal year funds are involved, arrangements can
occasionally be made in sufficient detail to obligate Agency funds,
with GSA performing the majority of the actual project administration.
Cons: When an operational exigency exists, GSA more often than not
cannot respond. Only utilization of maximum Agency influence at
the highest level can achieve improved response and then only in
extremely rare cases. Installation of major equipment, even when
it is provided by the Agency, takes years to accomplish and then
with only minimum efficiency and coordination evident, as seen in
the installation of emergency generators at the power plant. It
is clear that GSA is deficient in areas vital to this Agency's
operational integrity.
Recommendation: It must be clearly established that this Agency
has the responsibility and authority to accomplish necessary repairs,
improvements, alterations, and new construction through its own
resources, and that work may be accomplished through direct Agency
contract or through GSA; the decision to be made solely at this
Agency's discretion.
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Category: SLUC - Building Operation, Maintenance (SLUG - Custodial
Covered in next Category)
Background: GSA supposedly provides a habitable environment for a
normal 40-hour work week under the provisions of the Public Buildings
SLUC process. Funds over and above the actual amount required for
normal operation are collected for the purpose of providing increased
maintenance, repair, or manning. Much of the funding collected by
GSA from client agencies flows outside the system. It is usually
necessary for an agency to provide additional funds for any service
falling outside of the narrowly defined standard services. Our
Agency has responsibilities that require 24 hours per day, 365
days per year support. Utilities must be continuously available
to computers and communication equipment. Backup equipment must
be provided, maintained, and operated to preclude either scheduled
or unforeseen events from interrupting critical functions.
Problems: GSA is either unwilling or unable to provide the 24-hour
level of reliable service required. Even though reimbursed to
provide the necessary resources, GSA allows emergency equipment to
become and remain inoperative, preferring to trust that the primary
equipment stays on line. Important equipment may remain inop-
erative for years, such as the #3 1500-ton chiller in the power plant,
the Dunham Bush 500-ton chiller in the Headquarters Building, and
the central control air compressors in the Headquarters Building.
After years of "recruiting" the diesel technicians and electricians
to operate the multimillion dollar emergency power system, the
system is still not staffed to have the necessary personnel avail-
able for 24-hour coverage at the minimum acceptable level.
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Pros: The bad state of affairs just described has few advantages
beyond the fact that there are usually a few GSA mechanics around
when an emergency occurs. GSA seems emergency breakdown oriented
and responds reasonably well when the last operable piece of
equipment fails. When things are going well, they do handle their
own personnel and administrative headaches without burdening Agency
resources.
Cons: Communications, data processing, and other activities
directly contribute to national security and must have reliable
and responsive support. GSA support to critical activities is the
weak link of an otherwise strong chain. Continuity of service is
jeopardized for the entire building under the SLUC system. Poor
support reliability, especially in utility systems, is not
compatible with Agency requirements.
Recommendation: In those instances where the Agency determines
the level of services received are not commensurate with the
amount for which reimbursement has been provided, the Agency must
be able to contract directly for an acceptable level of service
using whatever source of funding is appropriate, including
adjustment to the ongoing SLUC funding. Although it is acknowledged
that no alternative appears demonstratively superior to a competent
GSA, it is clear that GSA is deficient in areas vital to this
Agency's operational integrity. This Agency must be able to obtain
those vital services for which Agency funds are budgeted and/or
which appear in the SLUC account.
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Category: SLUC Housekeeping/Custodial
Background: Through an exchange of correspondence in 1959 between
the DCI and the Administrator of the GSA, it was agreed that GSA
would perform services incident to the operation, maintenance,
protection, and housekeeping of the CIA Headquarters Building.
Although GSA was invited to provide housekeeping and related
services, time has institutionalized the arrangement and GSA now
considers the Headquarters Building as a public building, and
therefore under GSA control.
Problem: Support provided by GSA to this Agency under the SLUC
arrangement has never measured up to Agency expectations, partic-
ularly in the custodial area, although this has, no doubt, been
due in part to the thankless nature of the services provided.
However, over the past several years, the quality of these
services has deteriorated primarily due to the lowering of
custodial standards by GSA.
Pros: Although responsiveness suffers and difficulties arise due
to the inherent crossing of GSA/CIA organizational lines and
perceived prerogatives, GSA is convenient and is saddled with the
complexities of hiring, motivating and controlling a blue collar
work force.
Cons: GSA is not reponsive. However, the task is onerous and we
do not think anyone could provide better service under the same
constraints.
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Recommendation: In those instances where the Agency determines
the level of services received are not commensurate with the amount
for which reimbursement has been provided, it must be able to
contract directly
source of funding
SLUC funding.
similar to the
(operation and
those services
for an acceptable level of service using whatever
is appropriate, including adjustment to the ongoing
Responsibility and
control remain with GSA. However,
recommendation for the other areas covered by SLUC
maintenance), this
Agency must be able to obtain
for which Agency funds are budgeted and/or
appear in the SLUC account.
Category: Supply and Procurement
Background: The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, cart 101,
subchapter E, prescribes regulations, policies, procedures, and
delegations of authority pertaining to property management and
the supply and procurement of goods and services. The Agency
STATINTL
interfaces with GSA for the provisioning o
services. Services include:
(b)
acquisition and
STATINTL
disposal of property, (c) transportation, and (d) motor vehicle
acquisitions. Fervices have historically been responsive,
and we attribute this fact to the special one-on-one relation-
ships that have evolved over the years. Overt services have been
less responsive with our problems similar to those experienced by
other Government agencies.
It should be noted that the overlapping of Agency and GSA
authorities have never impacted on the Agency's abilities to
meet mission requirements. GSA has historically accepted the
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 STATINTL
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STATINTL
legitimacy of the Agency's procurement authorities,
0
and has recognized that GSA is but one of several alternatives
to obtain goods and services. Further, unlike construction, opera-
tions, and maintenance, activities which involve a physical GSA
presence, supply and procurement are of low profile and generally
conducted without GSA presence or awareness. However, should GSA
become aggressive and insist on participating in our procurement
and supply endeavors, the Agency's ability to provide responsive
service would deteriorate and a problem would exist.
In the area of ADPE acquisition, GSA has delegated its
exclusive procurement authority for ADPE and related services
to the Agency to accommodate its requirements and those of any
activity under Agency operational and technical control. The
delegation was formally granted to the DCI on 7 December 1973 by
the Commissioner, Automated Data and Telecommunication Service,
GSA. It was amended in September 1978 to update the regulatory
citations which limit this authority of the Agency, and to
include ADP management and procurement on a Government-wide basis
(i.e., all Federal agencies). They can be found generally in
FPR 1-4.11 and FPMR 101-35 and 36. In addition, the delegation
provides for an annual GSA review of ADPE procurement actions
as a means of assessing compliance with regulatory procedures.
The delegation from GSA for ADPE has proven to be advantageous
to the Agency for obvious reasons, not the least of which has been
the effect of reducing the time required to conduct procurements by
eliminating the GSA review and approval process that would be
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required in advance of mailing an award. GSA apparently has found
this arrangement satisfactory, since they not only extended the
delegation in 1978, but also expanded it to include ADP services.
This type of delegation enables services to be more responsive,
increases Government efficiency, and -provides checks and balances
to minimize the potential for abuse.
Problems: With the delegation. for ADPE, the GSA/CIA supply and
procurement entities have generally been responsive to mission
requirements. It is noted that the system for property disposal
is awkward from our point of view, requiring storage of the material
for extended periods of time, but as in other areas where we have
similar perceptions, like vehicle acquisitions, we would only
recommend GSA review its system to cut current time standards
in half.
Pros: GSA provides effective
and STATINTL
is a reasonably effective source of
goods and services. STATINTL
Cons: Efficiencies could be improved by fine tuning the system.
Recommendations: Specific improvements to'the existing GSA/CIA
interface follow:
1. Minimum Order Limitations (~4OL)
We suggest that GSA permit procuring agencies to waive
the MOL by unilateral determinations when critical
operational requirements or exigencies prevail. This
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would eliminate the sometimes rather lengthy approval
process when critical operational requirements exceed the
MOL.
2. Mandatory Nature of Federal Supply Schedules (FSS)
We suggest that GSA allow procuring agencies to negotiate
better pricing based on "similar or identical items" rather
than solely for "identical items." This would enable
agencies to take full advantage of the on-the-spot con-
ditions affecting price in the marketplace.
3. GSA-Improved---Management Controls
GSA recently imposed management controls on specific com-
modity groups, e.g., furniture, paper, etc. We suggest that
GSA permit agencies to continue to procure these items to
meet their specific minimum requirements rather than
attempt to "force fit" Government-wide standards on all
agencies.
Category: Protective Services
Background: Protective services for Agency buildings in the
Washington area, including the Headquarters compound, are pro-
vided by the Federal Protective Service (FPS) of GSA. Federal
Protective Officers (FPO's) are assigned to Agency buildings from
five separate FPS zones, one of which is totally dedicated to
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the protection of the Headquarters compound, two Westgate
buildings, and the Northrop Page site in Vienna. The working
relationship between FPS and the Agency has been generally
cooperative over the years. With the formation of FPS in
1971, FPO's have not only provided physical protection but
have served as onsite police authority at our installations.
A small portion of FPS coverage of the Headquarters
compound and certain other Agency buildings is provided by GSA
under the SLUG umbrella. This minimum amount is determined by
GSA in the context that Agency buildings require only basic
protection services similar to nonsensitive Government facilities,
e.g., the Department of Agriculture.
The sensitive nature of Agency facilities and operations
dictates that this basic SLUG coverage be dramatically augmented
to meet our security requirements. This augmentation is accom-
plished with GSA cooperation but within the limits of available
FPS manpower on a reimbursable basis - sometimes at an overtime
rate. Reimbursement charges for FPS services in recent years
have been escalating; at the present time GSA's regular hourly
rate of reimbursement is $12.82 and the overtime rate is $19.23.
Problem: As in other areas, GSA/FPS appears to be overworked
and understaffed in providing protective services. In addition,
the FPS seems philosophically moving in the direction of becoming
a police support organization, while the vast majority of Agency
protective requirements continue to be of the guard service variety.
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Further, as noted in other GSA support activities, FPS has
been in a monopolistic position in serving our needs. This
monopoly has encumbered the responsiveness of FPS to serve
our requirements. At least on one occasion FPS has
unilaterally decided to reduce protective coverage of Agency
installations without even advance notification. It has also
inhibited our ability to respond in an immediate fashion to
emergency coverage requirements. In the past several months, FPS
requested that the Agency immediately implement a severe reduction
in its protective coverage, simply because FPS was unable to recruit
a full complement against its own established billet ceiling.
Our General Counsel has acknowledged the responsibility of
FPS to provide protective coverage to GSA buildings. He has also
advised that this FPS responsibility does not inhibit nor encroach
upon the Agency's own responsibility and authority to establish
access controls for Agency installations and to use alternative
resources to FPS to implement these controls. Use of such
alternatives would not include their exercise of police powers.
Recommendation: Our review of this function does not result
in a recommendation for any change of the FPS. Rather, we believe
CIA needs to conduct a thorough, updated analysis of the protective
service requirements of its Washington area installations to
seek a more cost-effective and responsive method for satisfying
our needs. Depending upon the results of this analysis, we may
exercise the option of providing protective services using methods
and resources in addition to, or other than, the FPS.
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Conclusion
The delegations of the authorities identified in the matrix located
in the Executive Summary of this report will improve overall govern-
mental efficiency, greatly improve the responsiveness of support
to the Agency's mission, and decrease the potential for abuse
in the provision of goods and services.
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